ML17277B019
| ML17277B019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1983 |
| From: | Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0892, RTR-NUREG-892 GO2-83-1023, NUDOCS 8311160060 | |
| Download: ML17277B019 (21) | |
Text
REGULATORY ORMATION DISTRIBUTION SV M (RIDSi AGLESSItjN NOR: 8311160060 DOC ~ DATE: 83/11/04 NOTARIZED; NO DOCKET P'SCIL:50-397 NPPSS Nuclear Projects Unit'2i Washington Public Powe 0500()397 AUTH BYNAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SORENSEN~G~C
~
Washington.Public Power Supply System REC I'P ~ NAME RECIPIENT AF F ILIATION SCHHENCERiA ~
Licensing Branch 2
SUBJECT:
For wards summaries of equipement that need not be seiqmically qualified by fuel load per SER (NUREG 0892)o Justification explaining why facility can be operated safety until qualification completed
- included, DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A048S
.COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
/
TITLE: OR/Licensing Submittal:
Equipment Qualification NOTES:
RECIPIENT It) CODE/NAME NRA LB2 BC 12 INTERNAL: ELD/HDS2 12 IE FILE 09 NRR/DE/EQB 07 NAA B
06 E
FILE 04 COPIES L.TTR ENCL 1
0 1
1 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME AIJLUCK,AD 01 GC 13 NRR CALVOgJ NRR/DL DIR 14 NRR/DSI/AEB RGN5 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 ii EXTERNAL: ACRS 15 NRt'DR 02 NTIS 31 1
1i LPDR NSIC 03 05 1
1>>i TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 25 ENCL 24
Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000 November 4, 1983 G02-83-1023 Docket No. 50-397 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No.
2 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Dear Mr. Schwencert
Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT 2
EQUIPMENT SEISMIC QUALIfICATION
References:
1)
Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2, Docket No. 50-397, NUREG-0892, Supplement No. 3, dated May 1983 2)
G02-83-590, G.
D. Bouchey to A. Schwencer, Docket No. 50-397, "Justification for Interim Operation",
dated June 30, 1983 Safety-related equipment required to operate WNP-2 safely will be seismically qualified by fuel load.
We have identified certain equipment that need not be,.quali.fied by fuel load.
The equipment identified at this time is described in attachments, along with justifications as to why WNP-2 can be operated safely until qualification is completed.
As we have previously emphasized, reference 2), we expect a continuing flow of plant changes which will require development of qualification documents.
We will act on these changes and develop final qualification documentation in a timely manner, which we believe is responsive to the Staff's require-ments in this area.
Very truly yours, G.
C.
- orensen, Acting Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Programs KRW/sms PDR ADOCK pspppS97 83iii60060 8311p4 Attachment PDR cc:
R Auluck -
NRC WS Chin
- BPA A
Toth NRC Site J.
Singh EG8G o<<
J
)
TABLE Justification No.
- -2
-7 E ui ment T
e WMA Filters HPCS Diesel Generator MSIV SDV Modifications CRD Air operators Heat Trace Control Panel
- Spray, Pond Monitors Fatigue Wetwell Level Monitors
EPN:
WMA-FL-53A, 53B
==
Description:==
WMA-FL-53A and 53B are roughing.filters for the critical switchgear air handling units WMA-AH-53A and
- 53B, respectively.
They are continuously rolling type filters.
Safety Function:
WMA-FL-53A and 53B filter the air that heats or cools the critical switchgear room, battery and battery charging rooms, electrical equipment
- rooms, and the RPS rooms, which contain 'he M-6 sets and motor control centers.
The filter itself is passive and need not operate during or after a seismic event.
Justification:
If the rolling filter fails due to a seismic event, heating or cooling is not immediately prevented.
The probable failure mode would be local yielding in filter media support grid.
Structural failure of the filter media support grid could cause a breach of the filter media.
This would have no near term operational effect on the cooling or heating performance of the air handling units.
An alternate fai lure mode is stalling of the filter media.
Long-term effect of this failure mode would be the eventual clogging of the filter medi a.
If it does, there is a differential pressure switch to detect it and actuate a control room annunciation.
Even with a clogged filter, the reduced air flow could keep the rooms within their design temperature range.
In addition, there are also temperature monitors in each room which actuate a control room annunci ation.
These temperature monitors are of the same manufac-turer and model as Seismically gualified Safety-related monitors.
Safe shutdown is not prevented and there are alarms to indicate failure.
JIO-S-2 Name:
EPN:
HPCS Diesel Generator,
- engine, various control panels and components.
DG-ENG-1C+
Safety Function:
To provide emergency power, in the event of loss of off-site power sources, to the HPCS which supplies high pressure emergency cooling water to the reactor pressure
- vessel, in order to maintain reactor core temperatures within specification limits.
Failure Effect:
A.
Effect on Primary Use Justification:
Failures concurrent with loss of off-site power and LOCA with additional loss of redundant ECCS System (ADS) could cause flow rate of emergency cooling water to be less than required to maintain reactor core temperatures within specification limits under high pressure accident conditions.
The diesel generator on the Supply System Nuclear Pro-ject No.
2 High Pressure Core Spray System has been undergoing an extensive seismic qualification upgrade program.
Original qualification was to IEEE-344, 1971.
This program, using a combination of test and
- analysis, has shown that the majority of essential components mounted on the diesel generator are quali-fied to the SgRT criteria.
- However, a few essential components require additional tests or analyses to complete their qualification upgrade to current SORT requirements.
Diesel generator systems are designed for high vibra-tion applications (i.e., locomotives, shipboard, etc.)
and by their nature (internal combustion engine) pro-duce vibrations often higher than seismic during normal running conditions.
Me have confidence that the com-ponents with incomplete documentation wi 11 not fail during a seismic event due to basic diesel design requirements and partial qualification information.
Operation of Supply System Nuclear Project No.
2 prior to completion of this qualification poses no safety hazard because a redundant, single failure proof equip-ment path exists which provides safe shutdown without HPCS for those accidents for which HPCS is designed to operate.
This alternate safe shutdown path to provide core cooling would be accomplished by vessel depres-suri zation through ADS coupled with the low pressure LPCI mode of RHR operation and/or LPCS.
EPN'escription:
MS-V-22A,B,C,D; MS-A0-22A,B,C,D; MS-SPV-22A,B,C,D series MS-V-28A,B,C,D; MS-A0-28A,B,C,D; MS-SPV-28A,B,C,D series The equipment is the main steam isolation valves and operators.
They are large 26" isolation valves with air operators that fail shut in the event of loss of air.
The operators are equipped with large springs that return the valve to its closed (safe) position.
Safety Function:
These valves serve to provide main steam line isolation in the event of LOCA, MSLB, or breach of fuel accidents.
The safe position of these valves is closed for all design basis events.
Justification:
Dynamic qualification of these valves and operators to seismic and hydrodynamic loads has been achieved to IEEE-344, 1971.
A program to upgrade the valve and operator qualification to meet the criteria of IEEE-344, 1975, is in progress; however, final upgrade, including operability demonstration documentation, may not be available prior to fuel load.
System testing has confirmed the operability of these valves to normal conditions which, in themselves, produce large vibratory forces.
Stress factors associated with the seismic and hydrodynamic loads have already been considered and found acceptable.
In addition, in-plant static deflec-tion testing at maximum seismic and hydrodynamic loads has successfully been completed demonstrating operability.
Based on this, we believe that these valves will accom-plish their safety function (i.e., closed on demand) when required as these valves spring return to close upon loss of air pressure.
Operation of WNP-2 is justified based on the initial qualification to IEEE-344, 1971, the fail-safe design of the valves, and demonstrated normal and faulted service operability testing as part of the Startup System Testing Program.
JIO-S Continued Justification:
(Continued)
Sections 6.3.2.2.2, 6.3.2.2.3 and 6.3.2.2.4 of the FSAR describe operation of this alternate shutdown path.
In addition, Sections 7.3.1.1.1-2, 7.3.1.1.1.3 and 7.3.1.1.1.4 of the FSAR discuss the controls and instrumentation in detail.
Completion of the qualification documentation defined in the attached list will achieve seismic qualifica-tion of this alternate shutdown path.
These components will be completed prior to fuel load.
QID 233011 213064 297009 018008 315008 LPCS-P-1 LPCS-M-P/1 MS-RV-1A-1D MS-RV-2A-2D MS-RV-3A-3D MS-RV-4A-4D MS-RV-5B,5C MS-A0-13M,13N 13P,13Q,13S 13U,13V MS-SPV-3DA 3DB 4AA 4AB 4BA 4BB 4CA 4CB 4DA 4DB 5BA 5BB 5CA 5CB Description Low Pressure Core Spray Pump Motor for LPCS-P-1 Main Steam Relief Valves MS-RV-3D,4A,4B,4C,4D 5B 8
5C Perform the ADS Function Air Operators to ADS Main Steam Relief Valves Solenoid Pilot Valves that Actuate to Provide Control Air to Operate the Main Steam Relief Valve.
Operators that Provide the ADS Function.
EPN:
==
Description:==
Safety Function:
See Attached.
See Attached.
These components are part of a scram discharge modifi-cation package.
They contribute to ensuring proper control of control rod drive discharge water in the event of a reactor scram.
Justification:
gualification testing and analysis of these components are scheduled to be complete prior to the fuel load schedule of NNP-2.
However, the final report docu-menting all the tests and analysis that have been per-formed will not be available from the supplier unti 1 the first quarter of 1984.
This change is part of the BWR Owners Group Modification package and deferral of receipt of final documentation until after fuel load is consis-tent with requirements for other NTOLs.
QID 361501 018005 315026 050101 EPN CRD-V-180 CRD-V-181 CRD-AO-180 CRD-AO-181 CRD-SPV-9 CRD-SPV-182 CRD-LIS-601A CRD-LIS-601B CRD-LIS-601C CRD-LIS-601D Description Val ve Valve Air Operator Air Operator Solenoid Pilot Valve Solenoid Pilot Valve Level Indicating Switch Safety Function
JIO-S-5 EPN:
CRD-A0-10,11
==
Description:==
Air Operators Safety Function, Containment isolation and provide proper control of CRD water to allow reactor scram function.
Justification:
Static analysis has been completed on the yoke assembly for CRD-V-10 and -11.. However,'equired supplementary seismic qualification covering the air operators
(-AO-)
has not been completed because of insufficient. manufac-turer's documentation.
Based upon the valve yoke qualification, a successful in-situ static deflection
, operability test was performed to the actual piping loads.
We are investigating potential procurement of complete valve assembly qualification data from another Utl 1 sty
~
Interim operation of WNP-2 is justified based on the successful static deflection operability demonstration test.
EPN:
SW-CP-HTP-8A/AA SW-CB-H1,H2,H3
==
Description:==
Heat Trace Control Panel Safety Function:
The safety function of this panel is to coni;rol the electrical heat trace to the Standby Service Water System cooling lines to the emergency diesel generators.
'ystem Justification:
This panel is seismically mounted and structurally qualified.
However, internal component qualification is not complete.
Failure of this control panel-may result in failure of the heat trace for the'erv',ce water lines.
During the winter months, this may result in freezing of the cooling water lines with loss of cooling water to the emergency diesels.
Each heat trace is provided with a temperature monitor which initiates an annunciator in the main control.
room if the temperature at the trace becomes too low.
With this indication, the operator will actuate the service water pump supplying these lines.
Keeping the water moving in these lines prevents freezing until the heat trace is functional again.
Based on alarm indication and operator action in the event of failure of the power supply, WNP-2 can be operated safely.
J IO-S-7c EPN:
SW-LTD-1A, -1B, -1C, -1D
==
Description:==
Spray Pond Level Monitors Safety Function:
The safety function of these instruments is to monitor spray pond water level and control makeup water supply from the Tower'Makeup System such that a 30-day inven-tory (technical specification requirement) always exists in thc ponds.
Each pond is provided with two level monitors.
Justification:
The detectors are installed in support tubes which assure they are placed at the proper depth in the spray pond.
There is clearance between the support tube and detector assembly which could allow impact betwe'en the detectors and the support tubes during a seismic event.
The qualification testing did not duplicate the support tube/detector interface conditions and, thus, does not represent field conditions.
A design modification is being implemented to add pace fillers between the detector and the support tube to prevent impacts from occurring.
This will then allow use of previous test data.
This package is being held open pending completion of the field modif',ca.ion.
The spray ponds always have a 30-day water supply.
This supply will exist at the time a seismic event occurs.
Ir both level sensors in each pond fail't this time, a
sufficient water inventory is available in the ponds necessary to supply cooling water to those systems responding to accidents for a-sufficient,',period even':;with the automatic makeup system not functioning.
In the event that detector damage occurs, operator action will be utilized to manually control'iakeup water, to'*.the ponds.
EPN:
See Attached.
==
Description:==
See Attached.
Safety Function:
See Attached.
Justification:
The qualification. packages.forttheseccomponents~.ave complete with the exception of addressing fatigue.
The seismic and hydrodynamic maximum loads have been addressed and these components are capable of performing to these levels.
Incomplete in the existing documentation is the addressing of the number of cycles and the resulting fatigue..
The WNP-2 qualification process has identified six component types for which adequate fatigue life cannot be demonstrated for the load combinations specifically required for MNP-2.
The general fatigue evaluation conservatively requires that each component subject to seis-mic and hydrodynamic loads be capable of withstanding 13,500 cycles of SRV transient, 60 cycles of'SE transient and a reserve of 2,000 cycles for postulated LOCA transient.
The Supply System is committed to dynamically qualify components identical or similar to the affected components to demonstrate adequate fatigue life for complete 40-year operation.
In the interim, the follow-ing criteria will be used to justify two-year operation:
l.
20 cycles of SSE transient; 2.
675 cycles of SRV transient; 3.
A detailed discussion of each transient is presented below.
The number of cycles of peak response to be considered for a single seismic event is ten cycles.
The required 60 cycles represents 5
OBE transients combined with 1
The Supply System will commit to reevaluate the affected equipment should two. seismic events occur prior to completion of the indicated fatigue testing.
The total number of cycles of SRV transient to be considered for fatigue is 13,500 for the life of the plant.
This is equivalent to 675 cycles of transient in a two-year period.
This number of., cycles correlates to approximately 110 SRV transients fro the two years considered.
Should more than 100 SRV transients be required in the two-year interval, the equipment will be reevaluated.
The postulated loss-of-coolant accident transient loadings are based on low probability, large break area, high energy line breaks.
Recent materials and fracture mechanics technological developments have demon-strated that these large breaks will not occur instantaneously but will instead leak before they break.
Fracture mechanics evaluations have demonstated repeatedly that large margins exist between the development of detectable leaks and complete pipe rupture.
It is recognized that systems subjected to material erosion and intergranular stress corrosion may not exhibit these large margins;
- however, these deteriorating mechanisms require substantial time to affect the system integrity.
Based on this discussion, and the fact that WNP-2 piping has been subjected to induction heat stress improvement at locations susceptible to stress corrosion, the Supply System feels that the potential of a low probability postulated large break LOCA occurrence wi hin the first two years of
operation is negligible and, therefore, feels that not. considering the transient in the interim fatigue evaluation for the affected components will not compromise the overall safety of the plant.
~ID 248002 EPN CSP-POS-V/8/Plo 11
]
13 2
3 4
9
-V/10/Pl P2 P3 P4 P9 Plo Pll P12 P13
-V/7/PlPll P12 P13
-V/7/P2 P3 P4 P9
-V/8/Pl Descri tion Position Switch Safet Function Reg.
Guide 1.97 Cat.
1 277007 324006 RHR-V-60A, B
-75A,B RRC-V-20 Solenoid Valve CMS-RE-27E,
-27F Radiation Element.
Reg.
Guide j..97,Cat.
2 Primary and secondary containment isolation of sample lines.
361009 HY-V-20A,r.'B
-36A, B
CAS-V-453 Solenoid Valve Primary and secondary containment isolation of hydraulic system lines 382003 E-X-103A,B,C,D-..;
Electrical Penetration Provide conduction path into primary containment*and isolate primary containment 382003 E-TRB-X104A/0 B
C D
~
-X107A/0/1 B/0/1
-X105A/0/1 2
-X1058/0/1 2
-X105C/0/1 2
Terminal Blocks in primary containment electrical penetration Provide electrical conductivity
~ID 382003 (cont) 110004 EPN E-TRB-X1050/0/1 2
-X107A/0/1'.
-X107A/0/2 E-TRE-X104A/I 8/I C/I D/I
-X105A/I 8/I C/I D/I
-X107A/I 8/I CAC-EMO-FCV/1A 18
/2A
/28
/3A
/38
/4A
/48
/5A
/58 CAC-H-FCV/1A,18
/2A 28
/3A,38
/4A,48
/5A,58 Descri tion Electrical/Hydraulic valve operator Sai'et Functi on Containment atmosphere control
EPN'MS-LT-3, -4, -5 CMS-LE-3A, -3B, -4A, -4B, -5A, -5B
==
Description:==
Wetwell Le"el Monitors and Level Elements Safety Function:
Provide operator indication of suppression pool water level post-accident condition.
Justification:
See attached justification from Environmental qualification Report, which dismisses CMS-LE-3A,B, but also applies to the other EPNs listed above.
E UIPMENT JUSTIFICATION ¹7
- 1. 0 COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION EPN:
CMS-LE-3A, 3B
==
Description:==
Suppression Pool Wide Range Level Monitoring C"mponent Type:
Pressure Transducer Manufacturer/Model:
ElectroSyn/962
- 2. 0 ACCIDENT CONDITIONS*
Accident Profile:
Tem erature Relative Humidit Rev.
2 Use Code:
1 Operability Time:
4320 Hours Radiation Zone:
Zone Dose:
C500
=
bg 9.0 x 10>
Rads The following exceptions apply to CMS-LE-3A only:
Temperature:
Pressure:
Humidity:
200 F max Dependent on suppression pool level Submerged Radiation Zone:
C435 Zone Dose:
3.7 x 10'ads 3.0 COMPONENT SAFETY FUNCTION CMS-LE-3A and CMS-LE-3B provide verification of suppression pool water level and long-term surveillance in accordance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.97.
Water level indication provides verification of the availability of water f'r the ECCS and a diverse indicati'on of breach of the primary system (LOCA).
CMS-LE-3A measures pressure at the bottom of the suppression
- pool, and CMS-LE-3B measures pressure in the suppressi'on chamber air space.
The signal from each of these pressure transducers is sent to an electronics package in the control room which determines the suppression pool water level which corresponds to the indicated differential pressure.
7199 f/2
- 4. 0 VALIF ICATION STATUS 4.1 Summar of uglification Status The level monitoring system
',s being custom built for WNP-2.
The qualification plan is currently being completed, and testing to verify qualification is scheduled.
This system is scheduled for installatibri prior, to; fr~el. load,'ut it will not be demonstrated to be qualified prior to installation.
This level monitoring system has been designed to function in normal and accident environments.
Radiation and temperature resistant materials have been specified for the transducer
The flexible and rigid conduits containing the transducers and cables are water-tight.
The-junction box is. above the water level and is designed to protect the connectors from any postulated water spray.
Based on this design, the level monitoring system is expected to perform its function.
4.2 Parameters Re uirin Justification Radiation dose, temperature,
- pressure, relative humidity, and submergence.
5.0 JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION The conditions for which suppression pool water level would require wide range level instrumentation involve'the long-term passive failure of an ECCS inside the prima-,y containment c'oincident with a LOCA.
Since this assumes a passive failure in addition to the accident scenario, which is not considered in JIO, CNS-LE-3A and CHS-LE-3B are not required.
The suppression pool water level can therefore be continuously monitored with narrow range level i,nstrumentation.
gualified suppression pool narrow range instrumentation is available at this time.
CMS-LT-1 and CHS-LT-2 are qualified and provide suppression pool level indication over the range of 31' 27".
The suppression pool normal operating level is 31' 2".
k
6.0 CONCLUSION
Interim operation is justified on the basis:
Since no single active or additional long-term passive failure was assumed for the suppression pool, its water level will remain within the narrow range instrumentation.
In other words, water is not 1'ost du'e to a break in the".ECCS'... Theiqual.ified, suppression',pool; narrow range instrumentation system will provide adequate level monitoring until environmental testing can be completed on the wide range instrumentation.
Rey.
2 7199f/2