ML17219A227
| ML17219A227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1986 |
| From: | Tourigny E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Woody C FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| GL-81-12, GL-86-10, TAC-63060, NUDOCS 8612010432 | |
| Download: ML17219A227 (6) | |
Text
November 24, 1986 Docket No.
50-335 Mr.
C.
0.
Woody Group Vice President Nuclear Energy Florida Power 8 Light Company PE 0.
Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408 Distribution j Docket File NRC/Local PDR--
PBD-8 Reading FMiraglia OGC-Bethesda JPartlow EJordan BGrimes Gray File 3.7a NThompson PKreutzer ETourigny ACRS (10)
DKubicki
Dear Mr. Woody:
SUBJECT:
ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY, ST.
LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NO.
1 By letter dated July 17, 1984, we provided to you our safety evaluation of the Unit No.
1 alternate shutdown capability.
In that evaluation, we addressed the alternate shutdown capability for a fire in the control room but we did not address a fire in the cable spreading room.
. We subsequently re-reviewed your submittals, and they address a fire in either the control room or cable spreading room.
- Thus, we believe that the staff's safety evaluation of July 17, 1984 needs to be supplemented to specifically address a fire in the cable spreading room.
In order for us to complete the supplemental safety evaluation, we have determined that we will need the additional information identified in the enclosure.
We request that you notify us within 30 days of your receipt of this letter as to what schedule you can commit to in providing the responses.
In addition, once you have had the opportunity to fully develop the responses, we believe a meeting would be valuable in discussing these issues in detail.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than 10 respondents; therefore OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Please contact me at (301) 492-8007 if you have any questions concerning this letter.
Sincerely, IA L90'-
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Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information E.
G. Tourigny, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate ¹8 Division of PWR Licensing-B PBD-8.
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Mr.
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Woody Flori da Power 8 Light Company St.
Lucie Plant CC:
Mr. Jack Shreve Office of the Public Counsel Room 4, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Resident Inspector c/o U.S.
NRC 7585 S.
Hwy AlA Jensen
- Beach, Florida 33457 State Planning
& Development Clearinghouse Office of Planning 8 Budget Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold F. Reis, Esq.
Newman 8 Holtzinger 1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 Norman A. Coll, Esq.
McCarthy, Steel, Hector and Davis 14th Floor, First National Bank Building Miami, Florida 33131 Administrator Department of Environmental Regulation Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Weldon B. Lewis, County Administrator St.
Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue, Room 104 Fort Pierce, Florida 33450 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Manager Washington - Nuclear Operations Combustion Engineering, Inc.
7910 Woodmont Avenue
- Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Mr. Allan Schubert, Manager Public Health Physicist Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Executive Director for Operations 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
RE/VEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPENDIX R ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ST.
LUCIE, UNIT 1 Indicate the current status of the evaluation of the effect of spurious signals on the ability to achieve safe shutdown (Reference April 12, 1983 letter).
Incomplete items as of that date included the evaluation of Safety Injection Actuation Signals and Containment Spray Actuation Sig-nals on safe shutdown as well as the effect of spurious actuation of equipment which could effect safe shutdown.
If this evaluation is com-plete, provide the results and a description of any hardware/procedural modifications required.
Your response should be in terms of conformance with the guidance contained in Generic Letters 81-12 and 86-10.
In some instances, you have indicated that the adverse consequences of spurious signals can be compensated for by manual actions.
Describe how the post-fire shutdown procedures are written to reflect the impact of spurious signals and the corresponding manual actions necessary to over-come them.
Previous staff guidance in Generic Letter 81-12 identifies reactor coolant hot leg temperature or exit core thermocouples as instrumentation needed for safe shutdown.
You have not provided either of these indications as part of the alternate shutdown capability.
This represents an unjustified deviation from the above referenced guidance and should be corrected.
Provide a description of the hot standby panel electrical isolation de-sign which confirms that a fire in Fire Area C does not affect the shut-down capability from the control room.
Describe how the safe shutdown procedures reflect the need to take tank level indication and diagnostic instrumentation readings in order to achieve safe shutdown.
It is not evident from a review of the present (draft) Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 1-0030142 submitted in the licensee's [[letter::05000389/LER-1983-056-03, /03L-0:on 830907,w/shutdown Cooling (SDC) Train 2B in Operation,Sdc Train 2A in Injection Mode & Loop B Reactor Coolant Pumps Inoperable,Loop a Pumps Made Inoperable.Caused by Erroneously Racking Out Pumps|October 7, 1983 letter]] that such guidance has been provided.
Provide a description of the circuit isolation devices and include veri-fication that they conform with the guidance contained in Generic Letter 81-12.
For a fire in the cable spreading room (CSR),
EOP 1-0030142 calls for isolating panel 1AB, which is located in the CSR.
Does this require an operator to enter the fire area to affect safe shutdown?
Are there any other plant areas where it is necessary for an operator to enter the fire area as part of the post-fire safe shutdown procedures?
If so, justify this practice.
8.
Has the potential for multiple high impedence faults been analyzed in terms of the adequacy of circuit isolation devices?
If yes, provide a
brief description regarding how this was done which confirms that mul-tiple high impedence faults will not affect the safe shutdown capability.
9.
In your description of the alternate shutdown capability for the control room and cable spreading room provided in the [[letter::05000389/LER-1983-056-03, /03L-0:on 830907,w/shutdown Cooling (SDC) Train 2B in Operation,Sdc Train 2A in Injection Mode & Loop B Reactor Coolant Pumps Inoperable,Loop a Pumps Made Inoperable.Caused by Erroneously Racking Out Pumps|October 7, 1983 letter]], it is stated that certain safe shutdown systems will be protected inside these areas.
Identify these systems and describe the protective en-closures used to achieve compliance with Section III.G.2. of Appendix R.
10.
Regarding the associated circuit analyses, you state that spurious sig-nals to valves are assumed to move them to their worst-case position.
Explain how this assumption conforms with the staff position on this subject contained in the response to question 5.3. 1 of Generic Letter 86-10.