ML17174A130

Forwards NRC Position Re Safe Shutdown Capability.Requests Addl Info within 90 Days to Complete Review of Fire Protection Safety Evaluation

ML17174A130
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	10/22/1979
From:	Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Peoples D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML112690177	List: ML17174A130
References
NUDOCS 7911150163
Download: ML17174A130 (18)

Text

I DI STR IBUTI ON:

Docket GL~inas.

, / OCTOBER 2 2 1919.

NRCPDR, "1 Tlppolito' Local PDR

'. DCrutchfield

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Docket Nos. 50-2374\\. /.-*..

a.nd 50-249.,",,/ * '*

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.Mr. o. Louis Peoples

• Director-of Nuclear Licensing Commonwealth Edi son Company.

P. O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690,

Dear Mt. Peoples:

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. NRR Rdg Xtr~ C6pies WGammill RVol.lmer BGrimes JMiller

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• SSheppard RBevan OELD OI&E.(3)

JRBuchanan TERA*.

'ACRS (16)

ARoisman In the Safe.ty Evaluation Report: (SER) for.ffre iWaiegef~on supporting Ame.ndrnents Nos. 36 and 33 to Fac~ljty Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 for the Dresden *Nuclear Power Statio~ Urii~s Nos~ 2 and 3, Alternate Safe Shutdown Capab_ility was.identified, as *an.incomplete item of. rev_iew in Section 3.2.4 *.

To -exped.ite the completion of our review of this -item,. we are* enclosing our position entitled, 11Safe Shutdown Capability". Section 8. of this document

• specifies the *1nfdrmation we require to complete-our -review.

Please* provide this infonriation w.ithin 90 days of the date of this letter._* Where some of the

"*info.rmation is already avai_lable*in your.. letter of June 5, 1978, you need.only reference that material.

Since you are integratin.g the safe shutdown requirements for fire protection.

with any *other requirements which result from the review of other topics in the Systematic Eval u_ation. Program, ther~ maY be additional criteria and. inforrnation requirements resulting from those topics *. When you submit your safe shutdown anal yi;;i s and any proposed modificatio,ns resulting th~refrolT,!, you shou1 d use the enclosed document for guidance in meeting our fire protection criteri.a.

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Enclosure:

S~aff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability do~rP

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MlC ".ORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240 J. A. lpPolito.

Thomas Ai Ippolito, Chief Operating Rejctors Brahch #3 Division of *operating Reactors*

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-~~r. D. Louis Peoples Corrmonwealth Edisqn Company

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Mr. John W. Rowe Isham, Lincoln & Beale Counselors at Law

. On~ First National Plaza, 42nd Floor Chicago, llli_nofs 60603 Mr. B. B. Stephenson Plant Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station

. Rural Route #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Anthony Z. Reisman Natural Resources Defense Council 917 15th Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C.. 20005 Morris Public Library 604 Liberty Street

. Morris, Illinois 60451 Jinuny L. Barker

• . U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• P. 0-. Box 706 Morris, Illinois 60450 Susan. N. Sekuler Assi'stant Attorney General Environmental Control. Division 188 W. Randolph Street Suite.2315

.Chicago, Illinois 60601

aTAFF POSITION SAF!llHUTOOWN CAPABILITY Staff Concern *

[)Jring the staff's evaluation of fire protection programs at operating plants, one or more speci*ffc plant are~s may be i denti f1ed in which the staff does not have adequate assurance that a postulated fire wi 11 *not damage both* redundant divisions of shutdown systems.

This 1 ack of assurance in safe shutdown capability has resulted from one or both of the following: situations:

• .Case A:

The 1icense.e has not adequately identified the systems and components required for safe shutdown and theif l~cation. in specifi~ fire areas *.

• .,:case *s: The licensee has not demonstrated that the fire

_*protection for specific plant areas wil 1 -prevent

• damage to both redundant divisions of safe shutdC>Wn components identified in these areas.

For Case A, the staff has required that an adequate safe shutdown analysis be performed.

This evaluation includes the identification o:f the systems required for safe shutdown and the. location of the system components in the plant. Where it is determined by this evaluation that safe shutdown components of both redundant divisions are located in the same fire area, the licensee js required to demonstrate that a postulated fire will not damage both divisions or provide alternate shutdown capability as in Case B.

For Case B, the staff may have required that an alternate shutdown capability be provided with is independent of the area of concern or the licensee may have proposed such a capability in lieu of certain additional fire protection irodifications in the area. The specific modifications associated with the area of concern along with other systems and equipment already independent of the area fonn the alternate shutdown capability.

For each plant, the modifications needed and the combinations of systems which provide the shutdown functions may be unique for each critical area; however, the shutdown functions provided should maintain plant parameters within the bounds of the limiting*

safety consequences deemed acceptable for the design basis event.

Staff Position Safe shutdown capability should be demonstrated (Case A) or alternate shutdown capability provided (Case B) in accordance with the guidelines provided below:

l. Desion Basis Event The design basis ev~nt for considering the need for alternate shutdown is a postulated fire in a specific fire area containing redundant safe ~hutdown cables/eq~ipment in close proximity wh~re it has been de.termir.ed that fire protection means cannot assure that safe $hU tdown capability wil i be preserved.

Two cases should be considered:

(1) offsite power is availab,1e; and (2) offsite power js not available.

2 -

2.* Limi tine.safety Conseouences and Regui red Shutdown Functions

• . 2.1 No fiss.ion product boundary irftegrity shall be affected:

a.

No fuel clad damage; b.* No rupture of any primary coolant boundary;

e.

No rupture of the containment boundary.

2.2 The re?ctor coolant system process variables shall be within those predicted. for a loss of nonna 1 ac power.

2.3 The alternate shutdown capability shall be able to achieve and maintain subcritica1 conditions in the reactor, maintain

• reactor coolant inventory, achieve and maintain hot stan.dby* conditions (hot shutdown* for a BWR) for an extended period of time, achieve cold shutdown* conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter.

• As defined in the Standard Technical Specifications.

3.: Perfonnance Goals 3.1 The* reactivity control function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions.

3.2 The reactor coolant makeup function shall be capable of maintaining the reactor coplant level above the top of the core for BWR 1 s and in the pressurizer for PWR's.

3.3 The reactor heat removal function shall be capable cf achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.

3.4 The process monitoring function shall be capable of provi-di cg di re ct readings of the precess va ri ab 1 es neces~ary to perform and control the above functions.

3.5 The supporting function shall be capable of providing ttie process cooling, lubrication, etc. necessary to permit the opera ti on of the equipment used for safe shutdown by the systems identified in 3.1 - 3.4.

3.6 The equipment and systems used to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions (hot shutdown for a BWR) should be (1) free of fire damage; (2) capable cf maintaining such co.nditions for an extended time period longer than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if the equipment required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown is not available due to fire damage; and (3) capable of being powered by an onsite emergency power system.

3. 7 The equipment and systems used to achieve and main'tain cold shutdown conditions should be either free of fire damaoe or the fire damage to such systems should be limited suc~-

that repairs can be.made and cold shutdown conditicr.s achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the fire should be capable of being powered by an onsite emergency power system; those used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by 79~1150 \\bf

- 3 offsi te power.

3.. 8 These systems need not be.des*igned to (l) seismic category I criteria; (2) single failure criteria; or (3) cope with other plant accid'ents such as pipe breaks or stud( valves

{Appendix A BTP 9.5-1), except th.ose portions of these systems which. interface w.ith er impact existing safe:tY systems.

4. PWR Eouipment Gener~lly Necessary For Hot Standby

. (1)

Reactivity Control

{2)

{ 3)

• Reactor trip capability (scram). Boration capability e.g.,

cha.rging pump, makeup pump or high pressure injection pump takfog suction from concentrated borated water supplies, and letdown system if required.

Reactor Coolant Makeup Reactor coolant makeup capability, e.g., charging pumps or the high pressure injection pumps.

Power operated relief valves may be required to reduce pressure to a11ow use of the high pressure injection pumps.

Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control Reactor pressure control capability, e.g., charging pumps or pressurizer heaters and use of the letdown syste~s if required.

{4)

Decay Heat Removal Decay heat removal capability, e.g., power operated relief valves.(steam generator) or safety relief valves for heat removal with a water supply and emergency or auxiliary feedwater pumps fer makeup to the steam generator.

Service water or other pumps may be required to provide water for auxiliary

• feed pump suction if the condensate storage tank capacity is not*adequate for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

{5)

Process Monitoring Instrumentation Process monitoring capability e.g., pressurizer pressure and J!!vel, steam generator level.*

(6)

Suooort.

The equiprrent required to support operation of the above described shutdown equipment e.g., cornpcnent cooiing water service water, etc. and onsite power sources (AC, DC) with their associated electrical distribution syste~.

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5. PWR Eguioment Genera11y Necessary For Cold Shutdown*

{1) Reactor Coolant System Pressure Reduction to Residua1 ;Heat Remova 1 System ( RHR) Capaoi 1i ty..

Reactor coolant system pressure r~duction by cooldown using steam.generator power operated relief valves or atmospheric dump valves.

{2)* Decay Heat Removal Decay heat re~o~al capability e.g., residual he~t removal system, component cooling water system and service water

.system to removal heat and maintain cold shutdown.

(3) Supo6rt Support capability e.g., onsite power sources (AC & DC) or offsite after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and the associated electrical distribution system to supply the above equipnent.

'*:*:Equipment necessary i:i 3ddition to t~at alreany provided to maintain hot standby.

6. BWR Eouioment Generally Necessary For Hot Shutdown (1)

Reactivity Control Reactor trip capability (scram).*

(2)

Reactor Coolant Makeuo (3)

Reactor coolant inventory makeup capability e.g., reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) or the high pressure coo1ant injection system (HPCI).

Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal oe'press'urizat1on system valves or safety relief valves for dump to the suppression poc1.

The residual heat removal system in steam condensing node, and service water system may also be used for heat remova1 to the u1tirnat.e heat sink.

( 4)

Succress ion Pool Coo 1 i ng Residual heat removal system (in suppression poo1 cooling mode) service water system to maintain hot shutdown.

(5)

Process Monitorino Pr*ocess.monitoring capability e.g., reactor vessel level and pressure and suppression poo1 temperature.

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( 6)

Support*

Support" capab11ity'e.g., onsite power source {AC & DC) and their associated distribution systems to provide for the shutdown.equipment.

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• BWR Eouip~ent Genera l1y Necessary For Cold Shutdown*

• • .. At.*this point the equipment necessary for hot shutd0wn has reduced

. the primary system pressure and temperature to where the RHR

• system may be placed in service in RHR cooling mode. *

. ( 1 )

Decay Heat.Remova 1

• Res.idua1 heat removal system in the RHR cooling rrode, service--:_ ___.. - _

water system.

• (2)

Supoort Onsite sources (AC & DC) or offsite after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and their associated distribution systems to provide for shutdown.equipment.

• 11-'

Equipment provided in addition to that for achieving hot shutdown.

8. Information Required For.Staff Review (a)

Description of the systems" or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capability and modifi-cations required

_to achieve the alternate shutdown capability if required.

(b)

System design by drawings which show nonna1 and alternate shutdown control and power circuits, location of components, and that wiring which is in the area and the wiring which is out of the area that reQui red the a 1 tern ate system.

(c)

Demonstrate that changes to safety systems will not 9egrade safety systems.

(e.g., new isolation switches and control switches should meet design criteria and standards 1n FSAR for electrical equipment in the system that the switch is to be installed; cabinets that the switches are to be mounted in should also meet* the same criteria (FSAR) as other safety related cabinets and panels; to avoid inadvertent isolation from the control room, the i"solation switches should be keylocked, or alar:red in the control room if in the "local" or "isolated" position; periodic checks should be made to verify switch is in*the proper position for normal operation; and a single transfer switch or other new device should not be a source for a single failure to cause loss of redundant safety systems).

(d)

Demonstrate that wiring, including power sources for the control circuit and equipment operation fer the alternate shutdown method, is independent of equipment wiring in the area to be avoi.ded.

6 -.

(e)

Demonstrate that alternate shutdown power sources, including.

all breakers, have isolation devices on control circuits th!t are. routed through the area to be avoided, even if the breaker is to be operated mam,1ally.

{f)

Demonstrate*. that licensee procedure(s) have been developed whiCh *describe the tasks to be parforned to effect the shutdown method.

A sunrnary of these procedures shou1 d be reviewed by the staff *

. (;g)

Demonstrate that spare fuses are avail able* for control circuits where these fuses.may be required in supplying power to control circuits used for the shutdown method and may be bl°own by the effects of a cable spreading room. fire.

The spare fuses should be *1 ocated convenient to th~ existing fuses.

The shutdown procedure should.

infonn the operator to check these fuses.

{h)

( i).

{j)

Demonstrate that the manpower required to perform the shutdown functions using the procedure's of (f} as well as to provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fire brigade technical specifications.

Demonstrate that adequate acceptance tests are performed.

These should verify that: equipment operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch

. is placed in the "local" ROSition and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room; and that equip- -

ment operates from the control room but cannot be operated at the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is in the "remote" position.

Technical Specifications of the surveillance requirements and limiting conditions for operation for that equipment not ah*eady covered *by existing Tech. Specs. For example; if new i sol at ion and control switches. are added to a service water system, the existing Tech. Spec. surveillance require-f!M!nts on the service water system should add a statement si'milar to the following:.

"Every third pump test should also verify that the pump starts from the alternate shutdown station after moving a11 service water system isolation switches to the local control position."

(k) Demonstrate that the systems avail able are adequate to perform the necessary shutdown functions.

The functions requi*red should be based on previous ana1yses, if possible (e.g.,

in the FSAR), such as a loss of normal e.c. power or shutdown on a Group I isolation (BWR)~ The equip~ent required for the alternate capability shou1d be ~ie same or equivalent to that reiied on in the above analysis.

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(1)

Demonstrate that n!pair procedures for cold shutdown'systems.

an! developed and material for repairs is maintained on site

• OCTOBER, 2 2 1979

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-Docket Jfos.1. * ?0-237. /

and '50-2.49 v Mr. D. Louis Peoples Director of Nuclear licensing

• Commonweal th Edison Company P *. 0. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 I,;

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DISTRIBUTION:

• • .Docket NRC PDR Local PDR

. ORB#3 Rdg.

NRR Rdg *.

WGammill RVolliner BGrimes JMi 11 ~r*

LShao SShpppard RBevan OELD Ol&°E (3)

JRBuch'anan.

TERA GLainas,

Tlppolito DRrutchrield File -

xtra Copies

Dear Mr. Peoples:

ACR~ (16)

AR01sman,

In the_S.afety.Evaluatio-ry Repor:t (SER) for f!,f. e p~

supporting Amendl'irents

• N9S* 36 and 33 to Fae il 1ty Opera~1n_g.Liceu~.$. Nos. OPR-19 and OPR-25 _for the..

Dresden Nuclear Po\\'1er Station.Un1ts,Nos *. 2~ ilfjc;t 3, Alternate Safe Shutdown Capabil i~y 't1as identified as an. incor.i~le~e i&tn of review-in Section.. 3.2.4.

To exped lte the completion of our review of th1~ item, we are enclosing our position entitl.ed, 11Safe Shutdown 'capability". S.cc*tion 8 of this document specifies the information ~'le.require to cornp1ete our review.

Please provide'*

this i nfomiat fo.n within 90 days of the date of~ thi s'-1 etter ~-

Where some of the information fs already,a_vailable i-n your letter,_of June 5, 1978, yoi.i need only reference. that rnateri al.

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,Sine~ you are irrtegrat1ng the $afe shutdown reaiui~einents~{or fire protection with any oth~r requirements which result from the rE)Vi_ew o'f other topics in the Systematic J:val uat ion Program, there may be add1 tionaJ.crite(i a and f nfonnation requirements resulting from thOse topics~

When you subrllit ycr_ur safe shutdown

• analysis and any proposed modifications resulting therefro!Jl, you should use the encl oscd document for guidanc~ in meeti-ng our fire protecti{)n criteria.

\\

Enclosure:

Staff Posit ion - Safe Shutdo~n Capabil.ity rr.. r1~ _, ""' *-~*

Origi~al, Signed b~

I. A. lppoU~o,/ *

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Thonia? A~ Ippol Ho, Chief

-Operating Reactors Branch #3

. Division of.Operating Reactors see w)

OP'P'ICll

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• Mr. D. Louis Peoples Contnonwealth Edisqn Company

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Mr. John W. Rowe Isham, Lincoln & Beale Counselors at Law On~ First National *Plaza, 42nd Floor

- Chicag*o, °Illinois 60603 Mr. B. B. Stephenson Plant Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station

. Ru~al RoLlte #1

~o~ris, Illinois 60450 Anthony Z. Reisman Natural Resources Defense Council 917 15th Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C.. 20005 Morris Public Library 604 Liberty Street Morris, Illinois 60451 Jirrany L. Barker U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O*. Box 706 Morris, Illinois 60450 Susan. N. Sekuler Assistant Attorney General Environmental Control. Division 188 W. Randolph Street Suite 2315

.Chicago, Il 1 inois 60601 2 -

.STAFF POSITiON SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY

§taff Concern

• Curing the staff's evaluation of fire protection pro;rams at operating plants, one or more specific plant are~s rnav* be identified in which the staff does not have adequate assurance that a postulated fire will *not damage both redundant divisions of shutdown systems.

This lack of assurance in safe shutdown capabi 1ity has resu1 ted from one or both of the following situations:

• .Case A:

The 1icense.e has not adequately identified the systems and CO!T1ponents required for safe shutdO'loln and thei~ l~ca~ion in specifi~ fire areas.*

• :case*s: The licensee has not demonstrated that the fire

_protection for specific plant areas wi11 -prevent

• damage to both redundant divisions of safe shutdown components identified. in these areas.

For Case A, the staff has required that an adequate safe shutdown analysis be performed.

This evaluation includes the identification o:f the systems required for safe shutdown and the location of the.

system components in the plant.

Where it is determined by this evaluation that safe shutdown componeits of both redundant divisions are located in the same fire area, the licensee js required to demonstrate that a postulated fire will not damage both divisions or provide alternate shutdown capability as in Case B.

For Case B, the staff may have required that an alternate shutdown capability be provided with is independent of the area of concern or the licensee rr.ay have proposed such a capability in lieu of certain additional fire protection modifications in the area.

Tne specific modifications associated with the area of coricem along with other systems aiid equipment a 1 ready independent of the area fonn the alternate shutdown capability.

For each plant, the modifications needed and the combinations of systems which provide the shutdown functions may be unique for each critical area; however, the shutdown functions provided should maintain plant parameters within the bounds of the limiting

.. safety ci:insequences deemed acceptable for the design basis event.

Staff Position*

Safe shutdown capability should be demonstrated {Case A) or alternate shutdown capability provided.{Case S) in. accordance with the guidelines provided below:

1. Desicn Basis Event The design basis event for considering the need for-aiternate shutdown is a postulated fire in a specific fire ar-:a containing redundant safe shutdown cables/eq:iipment-in ciose proximity where it has been de.ter.nir.ed that fire ;:rotecticn mear.s c3nr.ot assure that safe shutdown. capabi1 i ty wil 1 be preserved.

'Two cases should be considered:

(1) offsite power is avaiiab1e; and (2) offsite power is not availabie.

2 -

2. Limitina -Safety Conseouences and Reouired Shutdown Functions 2.1 No fiss.ion product boundary in.tegrity sha11 be affected:

a.

No fuel c1ad damage;

b.

Ne rupture of any primary coolant boundary;

c.

No rupture of the containment boundary.

2.2 The re.actor coolant system process variables shaH be within those predicted. for a loss of nonna 1 ac power.

2.3 The alternate shut~own capability shall be able to achieve and maintain subcritical conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor cool ant inventory, achieve and maintain hot stand-by'* conditions (hot shutdown* for a BWR) for an extended period of time, achieve cold shutdown'* conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter.

• As defined in the Standard* Techn ;*ca 1 Speci fi cations.

3. Perfonnance Goals 3.1 ihe* reactivity control function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity.conditions.

3.2 The reactor coolant makeup function sha11 be capable of maintaining the reactor cop1ant level above the top of the core for BWR's an'd in the pressurizer for PWR's.

3. 3

• The reactor heat remova 1 *function sha 11 be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.

3.4 The process monitoring function shall be capable of provi~icg direct readings of the process variables necedary to perform and control the above functions.

3.5 The supporting function sha1i be capable of pM,viding ttie process cooling, lubrication, etc. necessary to permit the opera ti on of the equipment used for safe shutdown by the systems identified in 3.1 ~*3~4.

3. 6 The equipment and systems used to achieve and maintain hot standby condi ti ens (hot *shutdown for a BWR) should be (1) free of fire damage; (2) capable of maintaining such conditions for an extended tine period longer than i2 hours if the equipment required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown is not available due to fire damage; and (3) capable

• of being powered by an onsite emergency power system.

• 3. 7 The equipment and systems used to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions should be either free of fire da~age or the fir~* damaoe to such s~stems should be limited such that re~airs can be"made and cold shutdown condi:i:~s achieved within. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Equipment and systems used orio!" to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the fire should be capable of being powered by an onsite emergency power system; those used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by

- 3 ~

offs i te power.

3.. 8 Tnese systems need not be.designed to (l) seismic category I criteria~ (2) single failure criteria~ or (3) cope with other plant accidents such as pipe breaks or stuc~ valves (Appendix A BT? 9. 5-1 ), except th.ose portions of these systems which interface w.ith or impact existing safe:ty systems.

4. ?WR Ecuioment Gener~lly Necessary For Hot Standby

. (1). Reactivity Control

• Reactor trip capability (scram).

Soration capability e.~.,

charging pump, makeup pump or high pressure injection pump

. taking suction from concentrated borated water supplies, and 1 etdown system if required.

(2)

Reactor Coolant Makeup Reactor coolant makeup capability, e.g., charging pumps or the high pressure injection pumps.

Power operated relief valves may be required to reduce pressu~ to al 10'w' use of the high pressure injection pumps.

(3)

Reactor Coolant Svstem Pressure Control Reactor pressure control capability, e.g., charging pumps or pressurizer heaters and use of the letdown systems if required.

(4)

Decay Heat Removal Decay heat removal capability, e.g., power operated relief valves.. (steam generator) or safety relief valves for heat removal with a water supply and emergency or auxiliary feedwater pumps for makeup to the steam generator.

Service water or other pumps may be required to provide water for auxiliary

• feed pump suction if the condensate storage tank capacity is not adequate for n hours __ *

(S)

Process Monitorinq Instrumentation P~ocess monitoring capability e.g., pressurizer pressure and.

J eve 1, steam genera tor 1 eve l.

( 6)

Suooort.

The equipment required to support opera ti en of *t!'ie above described shutdown equipment e.g., cornpcnent cooiing water service water, etc. and onsite power sources (AC, DC) with their associated e1ect;ical distribution sys~e~.

5. PWR Eauioment Genera11y Necessary For Co1d Shutdown*

{1-)

Reactor Coolant System Pressure Reduction to Residual Heat Removal System (RHR} caoaoility.. **

Reactor coolant system pressure reduction by coo1down using steam.generator power operated re1ief valves or atmospheric dump valves *

. * {2)

• Decay Heat Remova 1 Decay heat renio~al capability e.g., residual heat removal system, component coo1ing water system a"d service water

.system to removal heat and maintain cold shutdown.

(3)

Supoort Support capability e.g., onsite power sources (AC & DC) or offsite after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and the associated electrical distributi'on system to supply the above equipnent *

... : Equipment necessary i~ addition to t!iat alrearty provided to maintain hot standby.

6. BWR Eouioment Generally Necessary For Hot Shutdown (1)

Reactivity Control Reactor trip capability (scram).

(2)

Reactor Coolant Makeuo

{3)

Reactor coolant inventory makeup capability e.g., reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) or the high pressure coolant injection system (HPCI).

Reactor Pressure Contro1 and Decay Heat Removal oepressurization system valves or safety relief valves for dump to the suppression pool.

The residual heat removal system in steam condensing ncde, arid service water system.

may a 1 so be used for heat removal to the ultimate heat sink.

(4)

Suooression Pool Cooling Residual heat l"'emoval system (in suppression pool cooling mode) service water system to maintain hot shutdown.

(5)

Process Monitorino P~ocess monitoring capability e.g., rea~:or v~ssel level and pressure and suppressi.on pool te!!l?erature.

5 -*

(6) Sucport Support capabi1ity e.g., onsite power s.ource (AC & OC) and their associated distribution systems to provide for the shutdown equipment.

7. BWR Eouipment Generally Necessarr For Co1d Shutdown*

At.this point the equipment necessary for hot shutdown has reduced the primary system pressure and temperature to where the RHR system may be placed in service in RHR coo11ng mode.

• • _( 1)

Decay Heat Remova 1

• Residua1 heat remova1 system in the RHR coo1ing mode, service --....:_ ___.. __

water system.

• (2)

Supoort Onsite sources (AC & DC) or offsite after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and their associated distribution systems to provide for shutdown equipment.

• Equipment provided in addition to.that for achieving hot shutdown.

B. Information Regui red For Staff Review (a)

Description of the systems* or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capability and modifications required

_to-achieve the a 1ternate shutdown capability if required.

(b)

System design by drawings which show normal and alternate shutdown control and power circuits, location cf components, and that wiring which is in the area and the wiring which is out of the area that required the alternate system *

{c)" Demonstrate that ~~anges to safety systems will not

~egrade safety systems. {e.g., new isolation switches and control switches should meet design criteria and standards in FSAR for electrical equipment in the system that the switch is to be.installed; cabinets that the switches are to be mounted in shou1 d a 1so m~t the same criteria (FSAR) as other safety related cabinets and pane1s; to avoid inadvertent isolation from the control room, the isolation switches should be keylocked~ or alar:red in the control room if in the "local" or "isola:ec" position; periodic checks should be made to verify swi~~ is in the proper position for nor-:nal operation; and a single transfer switch or other new device should no~ be a sour:e for a single failure to causeless of rec!undar.t safetysysterr-s).

(d)

Demonstrate that wiring, inciudin_g power scurces fort.he control circ~it and equipment operation for ~,e alternate shutdown method, is indepe~dent of equipment wiring in the area to be avoided.

6 -.

(e). Demonstrate that alternate shutdown power sources, including.

all breakers, have isolation devices on control circuits th!t are: routed through tha area to be avoided, even if the breaker is to be operated manually.

{f)

Demonstrate that licensee procedure(s) have been developed which *describe the tasks to be parfonred to effect the shutdown method.

A sumnary of these procedures should be reviewed by the staff.

• (;9)

Demonstrate thtt *spare fuses are available* for control circuits whe~e these fuses may be required in supplying power to control circuits used for the shutdown method and may be blown by the effects of a cable spreading room. fire.

The spare fuses should be located convenient to th~ existing fuses.

The shutdown procedure should.

infonn. the operator to check these fuses *.

(h)

Demonstrate that the manpower required to perform the shutdown functions using the procedures of (f} as well as to provide f i re b ri gade nembe rs tci fight t.'te fire is available as required by the fire brigade tec.'tnical specifications.

( i). Demonstrate that adequate acceptance tests are perfonned.

These should verify that: equipment operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in the "local. ROSition and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room; and that equip-

. ment operates from the control "rOom but cannot be operated at the local contr.ol station when the transfer or isolation switch is in the "remote" position.

(j) *Technical Specifications of the surveillance requirements and l.imiting conditions for operation for that equipment net already covered *by existing Tech. Specs. *For example; if new isolation and control switches are added to a service water system, the existing Tech. Spec. surveillance require-ments on the service water system should add a. statement si"milar to the following:.

"Every third pump test should also verify that the pump starts from the alternate shutdown station after moving a11 service water system isolation switches to the local control position."

(k) Demonstrate that the systems avai1able are adequate to perform the necessary shutdown functi ens.

• The func:tfons required should be based on previous analyses, if possible (e.g.,

in the FSAR), such as a loss of normal a. c. power or shutdown on a Group I isolation (BWR)~ ihe equip~ent required for the alternate ca~ability should be ~~e same or equivalent to that. reiied on in the above analysis.

r*

7 -

(1)

Demonstrate that repair procedures for cold shutdown systems are developed and material for repairs is maint~ined on site *