ML17083C121
| ML17083C121 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1988 |
| From: | Fish R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Shiffer J PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8807270042 | |
| Download: ML17083C121 (60) | |
Text
Docket Nos. 50-275, 50-323 Pacific Gas
& Electric Company 77 Beale St.,
Room 1451 San Francisco, CA.
94106 JUL x,". eaS Attention:
Mr. J.
D. Shiffer, Vice President Nuclear Power Generator, Licensing By memorandum dated February 22, 1988, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) informed the NRC of the results of their observations of the offsite activities during the September 23 and October 28, 1987, plume pathway and ingestion pathway exercises respectively of the REP plans for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
The memorandum states that "Based upon the result of these exercises, there continues to be a reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be implemented by the offsite jurisdictions... to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency."
A copy of the FEMA memorandum and the two reports are enclosed for your information.
Sincerely, Enclosures as stated Ray F. Fish, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section cc:
w/enclosures S.
M. Skidmore, PG&E J.
D. Townsend, Plant Manager, PG&E Co., Diablo Canyon, P. 0.
Box 117 Avila Beach, CA.
93424 Richard F..Locke, PG&E Co.,
Law Department, P. 0.
Box 7442, San Francisco, CA. 94120 D. Taggart, Supervisor, Quality Assurance, PG&E Co., Diablo Canyon, P. 0.
Box 117, Avila Beach, CA.
93424 R. Heinberg, News Services, PG&E Co., Diablo Canyon, P. 0.
Box 117, Avila Beach, CA.
93424 T. L. Grebel, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, PG&E Co., Diablo Canyon, P. 0.
Box 117, Avila Beach, CA.
93424 State of California (Gordon K. Van Vleck)
E. Maage, PG&E Co.,
77 Beale St.,
San Francisco, CA. 94106 w/o enclosure:
J.
Dominguez, FEMA, Region IX bcc: w/o enclosure V,. Travers,
/NO YES
/NO YES
/NO YES
/NO REQUEST COPY ]
YES
/NO
]
ING TO PDR YES
/NO RV/gmd RFish gP 7/f~/88 3307270042 330712 PDR ADIJCK 05000275 F
aV
STATE OF CALIFORNIA (DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT)
NGESTION ATHWAY ONE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT FEDERAL EMERGENCy MANAGE NT AGENCY REGION IX SUILDINO
$ 0d.PRESIDIO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 04 0 29
..8807270042 i1~
EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE EXERCISE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT)
EXERCISE PARTICIPATION IDENTIFICATION Facility Licensee Location Diablo Canyon Power Plant Pacific Gas and Electric Company San Luis Obispo County State of California Date of Exercise Report Date of Exercise Participants December 28, 1987 October 28, 1987 State of California San Luis Obispo County Santa Barbara County Pacific Gas and Electric Company Non-Participants None
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EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE EXERCISE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
~Pa e
Exercise Participation Identification Table of Contents Exercise Summary Exercise Detail:
Dispatch Center Field Emergency Operations Center Ingestion Pathway-Recovery Advisory Committee Public Information Radiological Field Monitoring Teams Controller-Simulator and Other Activities 4
6 7
9 10 12 Exercise Findings Matrix 15 ATTACHMENTS:
h.
Be C.
De State
Response
Exercise Qb3ectives Scenario Summary Evaluator Roster 20 21 22 25
EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE EXERCISE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT)
EXERCISE
SUMMARY
The State of California conducted an Ingestion Exposur P th E
Zone exercise at San Luis Obispo, California on 0 t b
28 1987 xposure at way Emergency Plannin c o er, The exercise g
vas conducted to demonstrate the State s ability to mp ement plans and i
1 preparedness activities undertaken for the protecti f
h h
including animal feeds and vater, vhich may be cont i
d b
ec on o
t e
human food
- chain, e
contam nated by a radioactive release from a
commercial nuclear pover
- plant, Th I
i e
ngestion Exposure Pathway mergency P arming Zone selected for the exercise surrounded the Di bl Pover Plant.
e surroun e
t e
Diablo Canyon In California, the primary responsibility for ingestio planning zone response activities is born by the C lif i D
es on exposure pathway emergenc e
a orn a Department of Health y
- Services, Environmental Health Division Radiologi H
1 h B
h c
ea t ranch.
State level plume exposure pathvay emergency planning zone respons ponse operat ons are led by the i
dat e
California Office of Emergency
- Services, supported by th S
y ot er tate Departments.
The ata used to develop the scenario for the ingestion ex o on exposure pathvay exercise vas September 23, 1987
'n conjunction vith the plume exposure pathway exer i e d
d'rc se con ucted at this site on The Federal Emergency Management'gency and Regional Assi t C
i ss stance
- ommittee, Region evaluated both exercises.
The report of findings r 1 t d t h
1 thwa e
s re a
e to t e plume exposure s report eta s
the ingestion way exercise is dated November 23, 198?
~
This report d t il h
a es areas requiring corrective exposure pathway evaluation findings and incorporates r
i i exercise.
actions by the State as a result of participation in the 1
n e
p ume exposure pathway The categories for exercise findings of
- 1) defi i i
2) e c enc es, areas requiring corrective action, and 3) areas recommended for improvement are. fully explained in the Exercise Detail portion of this report.
n an eva uat on n this exercise All of the objectives established for demonstration and ev 1 ti i
h vere met.
No deficiency findings vere reported hr a i i ress requ r ng corrective action vere noted and are reported herein.
Areas recommended for im rov m
described in this report.
men e
or mprovement are also
- Overall, evaluation findings supported the determin ti h
erm na on t at the exercise did demonstrate a
sound and effective planning conc t f i
i cep or ngest on exposure pathwa b
response operations.
Areas requiring correctiv ti 1
d e
ac on re ate to 1'arger and etter equipped facilities for response operati opera ons; providing dedicated communications between response operations f ciliti a
es, expansion of certain ncrease tra ning activities.
The procedures for more detailed instruction, and increased trai i areas recommended for improvement. are not considered to i t
o mpact on public health and safety and, in general, center around administrative processes'mplementation of the areas requiring correctiv ti e
ac on; ws veil as serious consideration to the areas recommended for improvement ill
- men, v
. assist the State to ither refine the ingestion exposure pathvay response plan d
mum protection of public health and safety.
The,Fed 1
E e
p ans an preparedness for t
gency and Regional Assistance Committee Region IX ill id e,
e era mergency Management echnical assistance to the State, as requested, toward accom lishme common goals and objectives.
owar accomp ishment of these
EXERCISE'EVALUATION REPORT IHGESTIOH EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE EXERCISE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (DIABLO CANYOH POWER PLANT)
EXERCISE DEThIL The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) rule establishing policy and procedures for review and approval of State and local emergency plans and preparedness for coping with the offsite effects'of radiological emergencies which may occur at commercial nuclear power facilities is 44 Code of Federa1 Regulations, part
- 350, Review and h royal of State aad Local Radiolo ical Emer enc Plans and t
set forth at 350.7, (b) of this rule vhich states:
"Generally, the plume exposure pathvay EPZ for nuclear power facilities shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 Km) in radius and the ingestion exposure path~ay EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 Km) in radius.
The.exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear
'power facility shall be determined by State and local governments in consultation"with FEMA and NRC taking into account such local conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes and local urisdiction boundaries."
The plume exposure pathway refers to vhole body external exposure to gamma radiation from the plume and from deposited materials and inhalation exposure from the passing radioactive plume.
The ingestion exposure pathway refers to exposure primarily from ingestion of vater or foods such as milk and fresh vegetables that have been contaminated with radiation.
The 44 CRF 350.9, (c),
(4),
rule requires "States vithin the 50>>mile emergency planning zone of a site shall exercise thei.r plans and preparedness related to ingestion exposure pathway measures at least once every five years in con)unction with a plume exposure pathway exercise for that site."
Through the issuance of Guidance Memorandum PR-l, Polic on NUREG-0654/PEMA REP-1 AND 44 CPR 350 Periodic In California, there are three licensed nuclear pover plants:
Rancho Seco in Sacramento
- County, San Onofre in San Diego County, and Diablo Canyon in San Luis Obispo County.
The date of the first )oint exercise within the State of California vas May 13, 1981(at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station)
~
- Thus, 1987 completes a six-year cycle of exercising offsite )urisdiction planning and preparedness activities vithin the State of California.
To meet the requirement of 44 CFR 350.9, (c), (2)
"Each State vith multiple sites vithin its boundaries shall fully participate in a )oint exercise at some site on a rota tione 1 basis at leas t every 2
yea rs..."
the State of California fully participated in the offsite 5urisdiction rad'iological emergency plans and preparedness plume exposure pathway exercise at the Diablo 'Cahyon Pciwer Plant on eptember 23, 1987.
I
Exercise Detail continued)
In California, by State law, local )urisdictions have the primary responsibility for emergency response to any disaster within their incorporated boundaries.
There is a
statewide Master Mutual Aid Agreement.
The State supports local government
- efforts, when requested, and coordinates all assistance from the Federal Government.
The State has primary responsibility for the Ingestion, Exposure Path~ay EPZ response activities at all nuclear power plant sites within the State.
Effecting State level plume exposure pathway emergency response operations is the primary responsibility of the California Governor s Office of Emergency
- Services, supported by other State Departments'he lead responsibility for Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ response activities is born by the California Department of Health Services, Environmental Health Division, Radiologic Health Branch.
The 1987 Ingestion Exposure Pathway
- EPZ, conducted by the State of California on October 28,
- 1987, was a
continuation of the September 23, 1987 plume exposure path~ay EPZ exercise conducted at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
The exercise evaluation report of findings related to the September exercise is dated November 23,
- 1987, The State Operations Center (SOC) and State Dose Assessment Center (SDAC).were fully activated and evaluated during that exercise.
The areas requiring corrective action identified in the November 23, 1987 exercise evaluation report have been made a part of the Exercise Matrix portion of this report.
The Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ exercise scenario was developed by staff of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) in cooperation with the State of aliiornia.
Both the exercise ob)ectives and the scenario were submitted well ithin the required milestones established.
They were reviewed and approved by FEMA RIX.
The exercise ob)ectives and scenario summary are Attachment A and B
respectively.
A list of exercise evaluator assignments is Attachment C.
The time factor between the conduct of the plume exposure pathway EPZ exercise and the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ exercise required both exercise participants and evaluators to simulate the plume exposure pathway emergency response operations that would be ongoing during the ingestion exposure pathway response (e.g.,
road
'locks, reception and care activities, etc.).
All of the emergency response operations facilities:
- SOC, SDAC, San Luis Obispo County Emergency Operations Center (SLO CO EOC), Unified Dose assessment Center (UDAC), Santa Barbara County Emergency Operations Center (SB CO EOC),
and County Radiological Pield Monitoring Team (FMT), either provided limited activation for co'mmuni'cations to support the
- exercise, or were handled by staff assigned to a simulation cell.
Pertinent background materials, exercise ob)ectives and scenario data was provided to all assigned evaluators prior to the exercise.
A meeting of. exercise controllers and evaluators was conducted on October 27, 1987 to familiarize them with the exercise parameters.
and facilities where the exercise would be conducted.
The exercise was evaluated on the basis of a revised State of California Nuclear Power Plant Emergency
Response
Plan (which incorporates the. Environmental Health Division Radiologic Emergency
Response
Plan for Nuclear Power'PXant Emergencies)
J
Exercise Detail continued and in accord vith:
1) 44 Code of Federal Re latione Part 350 Review and h
royal of State and Local Radiolo ical Emer enc Plans and Pre aredness Final Rule Se t embe r 28 1983; 2)
NUREG-0654 FEHA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Criteria for Pre aration and Evaluation of Radiolo ical Emer enc Res onse Plans and Pre aredness in Su ort of Nuclear Power Plants November 1980; 3)
The FEMA NRC Memorandum of Understandin A ril 1985; 4)
Draft FEMA Guidance Memorandum IN-1 The In cation Ex osure Pathwa and
- 5) other established FEMA program criteria.
The FEMA/NRC Hemorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishes that the offsite exercise evaluation reports vill identify one of the following conditions:
(1)
There is reasonable assurance that the plans are adequate and can be implemented as demonstrated in the exercise; (2) there are deficiencies that may adversely impact public health and safety that must be corrected by the affected State and local governments in order to provide reasonable assurance that the plan can be implemented;
.or (3)
FEMA is undecided and will provide a
schedule of actions leading to a decision.
Within 30 days of the exercise, a draft exercise report vill be sent to the State and local governments with a copy to the RAC requesting comments and a schedule of corrective
- actions,
.as appropriate,'from the State and
" local governments in 30 days.
The FEMA. region will then finalize the report and process to its headquarters.
Mithin 90 days of the exercise, the FEMA report will be forwarded to the NRC.
Mithin'5 days of receipt of the FEMA report, NRC will notify FEMA in writing of action taken with the licensee relative to FEMA nitiatives with State and local governments, if any.
(It should be noted that the report itself vill not contain a statement of the conditions noted above.
They are contained in the FEHA Associate Director transmittal letter to the NRC and, upon concurrence, conveyed to the licensee by the
- NRC, FEMA transmits the information to the State and Local governments.)
For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEHA uses an evaluation method to apply the criteria of NUREG-0654/FEHA-REP-1.
FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective actions.
Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety 'of the public living in the vicinity
'of a nuclear power facility in the event of a radiological emergency.
Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial
- exercise, drills or other actions
~
Areas requiring corrective actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial
- exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
In addition to these inadequacies, FEMA identifies areas recommended for improvement, vhich are problem areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety.
Mhile not required, FEMA believes correction vill enhance the organization s level of preparedness.
For this
- exercise, there vere no deficiency findings' Evaluator findings ategorized as areas requiring corrective action and areas recommended for
I'
Exercise Detail continued) improvement are described below.
The corrective action items are capsulized in the Exercise Findings Matrix of this report.
Corrective actions are to be accomplished during the non-exercise interval and re-examined at the next regularly scheduled exercise
~
Areas recommended for improvement do not require corrective action or response.
Also included in the narrative portion of the report that follows are commendations for those activities recognised as being exceptionally wel) performed.
This narrative is presented in alphabetical order of the particular emergency response operations facility or the specific emergency response organizat ion.
Dis atch Center.
Dispatcher:
Stuart Rosenberg San Luis Obispo County Agriculture Liaison:
John Schmitz The Dispatcher did an outstanding
)ob.
He was very knowledgeable, knew exactly what needed to be done and how to direct the task for accomplishment.
The procedures for this activity. (the.Environmental Health Division, Radiologic Emergency
Response
Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies, Procedure E-4, ispatch Procedures) were well applied and understood.
map board, located in the Dispatch Center, did not cover all of the sample points (e.g.,
there was no map of the Cal Poly area).
No one was assigned to 'update the map board to track the positions of the field teams.
The lack of detailed maps created a problem in field team dispatch.
- However, the Dispatch Center did make effective use of available resources, such as the County staff present.
brea Recommended for Im rovement There is a definite need for better area maps and the assignment of staff to keep the maps currently posted, identifying all field team locations.
The map should be detailed and perhaps supplemented by an actual directory for locating "XYZ Dairy" or "Bar Seven Ranch."
There should also be other information available, including such things as feeding practices for dairies, how to access known locked gates at certain locations, etc.
Extensive briefings were provided to the field teams.
They were very thorough.
- However, the teams were briefed individually which took a lot of time.
Some of the information, such as meteorological and radiological data, was the same for each of the teams.
The specifics provided included locations and crops to be sampled.
brea Recommended for Im rovement Ic would be more advantageous if an overall briefing was provided to all the field team members and then followed with team-specific 'instruction as 'the teams are being dispatched.
Exercise Detail continued The sample return area was constructed after the teams were dispatched and signs vere made to identify various areas.
The exit door for the safaple return area was simulated.
As a result, the field teams did not appear to know what was expected of them when they returned to the Dispatch Center.
Similarly, although believed to be related to the facility limitations, the use of clean versus contaminated sample control areas needs to be strengthened.
Neither the field teams nor the personnel receiving the samples vere certain as to what to do to prepare the samples for shipment.
Direction given by the Dispatcher, overcame these problems.
- However, had he not been available or had a large number of teams been involved, the Dispatch Center would not have been able to process the samples in a
timely manner.
This vould affect the efficient use nf the field sampling teams.
brea Re uirin Corrective Action Either the Procedures E-4 need to be expanded and/or increased training for staff provided to include:
1) comprehensive, descriptive instructions for the field teams and personnel receiving samples at the Dispatch Center and/or a
Sample Control Officer assigned to be responsible for receipt of the samples from the field teams; ')
a clear, precise system for contamination control and transfer of samples to the packaging area; and 3}
a standard listing of locations should be maintained, otherwise the
-7 Dairy (Bar 7 Dairy or Bar Seven Dairy) vill all appear in different places in the computer printout.
Some of the laboratory analysis (such as a
gamma scan for milk) could be done automatically on all milk samples, but others need to be ordered for the specific situation.
Th Dispatcher and support staff covered their duties effectively with thorough attention to administrative details'ovever, the evaluators in the Dispatch Center did not feel that there was a "supervisory presence" at all times.
Area Recommended for Ia rovement An alternate dispatcher position should be assigned to the Dispatch Center.
The Dispatcher assigned
- vas, as is reported
- above, very effective and conscientious, but could not always be available to fulfillthe multiple needs of field teams and support staff.
Radio communications betveen the field teams and the Dispatch Center were a
,problem.
Two of the three teams could not communicate vith the Dispatch Center by radio The controller radios vere observed to vork veil, due to an in place repeater system of the utility.
For purposes of this exercise, a roving repeater vas to be used.
It vas not effected.
Therefore, the communications shortfall was made obvious.
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Exercise Detail continued korea Re uirin Corrective Action The State needs more powerful radtos and/or an adequate repeater system to improve radio communications between the field teams and the Dispatch Center.
Field Emer enc 0 erations Center (FEOC)
Acting RHB Emergency
Response
Director Field Emergency Coordinator Ingestion Pathway Coordinator Assistant Ingestion Pathway Coordinator Recovery Coordinator Dispatch Center Coordinator OES Liaison DFA Liaison San Luis Obispo Co OES Liaison San Luis Obispo Co Agricultural Representative Santa Barbara Co OES Liaison Santa Barbara CO Agricultural Representative CHP Liaisons Situation Analyst Recorders Jack McGurk (CA-RHB)
Don Honey.(CA-RHB)
Larry Carter (CA-EHD)
Jeff Wong (CA-RHB)
Gary Butner (CA-RHB)
Frank Bold (San Diego Co.)
Ben Tong (CA-OES)
Warner James Jeff Hamm Bob Lilley Lois McCoy Curtis Sayer Sgt.
Paul Warnke Lt. Richard Sabath Bill Watson (CA-EHD)
Janey Belli (CA-DHS)
Kim Ladama (CA-DHS)
Space in the FEOC (located in a facility at the California Specialized Training Institute) was such that it was almost impossible to update posted information while other activities were taking place.
~ea Re uired for Corrective Action The FEOC needs to be a larger facility, preferably closer to the IPRAC.
The information flow within the FEOC was very good.
The technical staff prepared calcu1ations from the data provided and supplied the proper information to the Field Emergency Coordinator.
The information was also displayed very effectively on a Iarge wall map.
The map as used during this exercise was very effective, but might not be as effective with a differing scenario, especially if a large number of field teams (50+) were involved.
The method used for making overlays from the display maps to provide information to the IPRAC was very cumbersome and time-consuming.
Standard wall maps identifying the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway around each of the nuclear power plants in California could be prepared for use in the Fr.OC operations.
0
Exercise Detail continued)
Area Recommended for Im rovement Advance materials for use by FEOC staff in briefing the IPRAC need to be developed.
The information provided in IPRAC briefings should be followed up with hard copy for use by the IPRAC.
There was an initial effort made to establish a priority plan in the
- FEOC, but it was not completed or updated.
An ingestion exposure pathway priority plan needs to be created as a first order of business in the FEOC.
Priorities for sample types and locations could be developed, discussed with the IPRAC, modified if necessa.y and implemented.
It would provide'n opportunity for the IPRAC involvement in the priority setting process.
The plan might also prevent consideration to some actions that need not be addressed.
For instance, an abalone farm reportedly exists at Morro Bay.
Morro Bay was outside the plume path.
The FEOC should have been able to explain this and there should not have been a hold on selling or shipping the product from this location by the IPRAC.
brea Re uired for Corrective Action h draft priority plan must be established early and updated as information becomes available.
This should be a part of the FEOC procedures, The current plan does address the development of a plan, but does not address priority-setting and is not in sufficient detail for practical use.
This also impacts the need for the FEOC to establish priorities for laboratory sample analyses.
The County Agriculture representatives, both from San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara Counties interfaced with the State effectively.
They were knowledgeable and decisive.
The State use of these resources to determine what crops were affected and the location of dairies and water supplies, was very good.
Similar to the staffing needs of the Dispatch
- Center, there were times within the FEOC that both the Field Emergency Coordinator and Field Recovery Coordinator were involved with activities away from the FEOC at a time when strong leadership was required.
According to the plan and the exercise staf fing pattern provided, the
-RHB Emergency
Response
Director was to be present in the FEOC.
During the
- exercise, the individual was actually located in the IPRAC the entire 'time.
Evaluators concluded that his presence in the IPRAC provided direct support necessary.
Therefore, the plan should be modified accordingly.
- However, this leaves a void in the FEOC that evaluators feel might more effectively be supplied by a full time FEOC Facility Manager.
In cation Pathwa -Recove Adviso Committee (IPRAC) ~
Director/Designee (DHS)
RHB Emergency
Response
Director RHB Technical Liaison OES Representative DFA Representative Alex Kelter, M.D.
Jack McGurk Edwin Njoku Eileen Baumgardn'er'ob Fox
1
Exercise Detail continued P'~SB Representatives FDB Representative San Luis Obispo Co. Agricultural Commissioner San Luis Obispo Co. Health Officer Santa Barbara Co. Agricultural Commissioner Santa Barbara Co. Health Officer Recorders Nadine Feletto Perri Garfinkle Frank Nava Richard Greek George Rolland, M.O.
Ronald M. Gilman Elliot Schulman, M.D.
Dee Nichols Gloria Nest The IPRAC is made up of decision-makers from various State agencies and th:
affected local offsite )urisdictions.
The IPRAC Director is from the Department of Health Services.
The IPRAC was observed to function well as a decision-making and policy setting organization for protecting the food supply from the effects of the exercise scenario incident at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
The individual assigned as the IpRAC Director during the exercise provided
. strong leadership in.the IFRAC act ivit ies.
otect ive action decisions, based on dose assessment calculat tons provided, were thoroughly discussed by all members of the IPRAC before being implemented.
The IPRAC adequately demonstrated its ability to make recommendations on the interdiction of food, crops, milk and water.
The facility used to house the IPRAC (within a facility at the California Specialized Training Institute) was totally inadequate
~
The space was very
- cramped, communications limited, and displays inadequate.
hxea Re uirin Corrective Action The IPRAC needs a larger space from which to operate.
More telephones and better map displays for increased efficiency of their operations.
A dedicated communications link between the
- IPRAC, the
- FEOC, and Public Information Officers needs to be established.
During the
- exercise, some concerns surfaced that involved fish and game.
- Also, there were requests for Federal assistance.
The IPRAC was limited in addressing certain issues due to the lack of representation on the IPRAC from these agencies
~
hosea Re uirin Corrective Action The IPRAC plans and procedures should include representation from the California Department of Fish and
- Game, as well as fro'm the Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States Department of Agriculture, and Food and Drug Administration (and possible inclusion, as appropriate, from the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Energy).
1 I
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Exercise Detail continued Areas recommended for improvement are offered for consideration by the State, as follows:
hreas Recommended for Im rovement l.
The Director, Department of Health
- Services, should not be responsible for preparing handwritten press releases.
A Public Information Officer should be assigned and available at al1 times to the IPRAC to prepare press releases and to keep the IPRAC informed of all press releases and Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages that have been released by other jurisdictions.
2.
The technical representative to the IPRAC needs to take a more aggressive lead in explaining technical recommendations made by the FEOC.
Additional training may be required.
3 ~
Roles and responsibi1ities of the IPRAC need to be more clearly defined in relation to those of the FEOC.
Members of the IPRAC should not get involved in "operational" activities but confine their responsibilities.to the "Big Picture" involved with policy setting arid d'ecision-making.
Increased training is recommended.
Each of the IPRAC representatives should actively particlpatc in a structured, periodic briefing to provide information and updates on their other response activities.
All members of the IPRAC need to be informed and up-to-date on the entire emergency response ef fort.
Public Information Pete Weisser, (CA-DHS)
Nancy Hardaker, (CA-OES)
This activity was understaffed and exemplified the lack of information flow between the operational facilities (i.e, PEOC/IPRAC/PIO/etc.).
Public Information activities are very dependent upon input from the emergency response operations facilities.
During the exercise, there was a release of information relative to the reduction in the area being addressed (from 90 to 40 miles) when a decision by the IPRAC held the area to the 90 miles.
Another incident involved the release of information to the public regarding the radiation particles not penetrating clothing or skin that was simply not true.
Axea Re uirin for Corrective Action The public information officers, addressing ingestion exposure pathway
- issues, require the assignment of a technical representative.
At the very least, there needs to be a requirement that any news release
Exercise Detail continued containing technical information will not be released until approved by the FEOC.
In addLtfon, improved communications between the
- FEOC, the
- IPRAC, and the Public Information Officers needs to be effected.
Much of the information released, through EBS messages and/or news
- releases, was highly technical and/or used terminology that was presented in a manner the public may not understand.
An assumption that visual aids presented over television clearly identify the location of various activities is inadequate.
Area Recommended for Ia roveaent EBS messages and news release should be clear and timely.
Development of prescripted messages could alleviate the burden of preparing materials based on vague data.
The use of localized landmarks (e.g.,
- lakes, mountains,
- bridges, roadway systems, etc.)
when referring to agricultural hold areas is advisable.
This could be done ahead of time in con)unction with the development of the 50-mile ingestion pathway zone maps for all nuclear power plants within the State of California.
The Public Information activity was located ip e portion oi the
- FEOC, adversely impacting FEOC activities.
Since it is 'understood that this activity would ordinarily be implemented from the Media Center, no facility recommendation is made elative to the adverse impact of this activity on the FEOC.
The staff assigned responsibility for this activity during the exercise
.are highly commended.
Every attempt was made to achieve a high level of public information as well as provide internal coordination, under very understaffed and restrictive space conditions.
Radiolo ical Field Monitorin Teams Cathy Eckberg (CA-RHB)
Paul Graveline (CA-RHB)
Kristen Dahl (CA-DFA)
Jim Conley (CA-DFA)
Ralph Shields (CA-DFA)
Howard Eastham (CA-DFA)
Fred Toyama (CA-EHD)
Ed Cloor (CA-RHB)
Steve McLean (CA-DFA)
James Moreno (CA-DFA)
Joanne Makishima (CA-DFA)
Richard McKinley (CA-RHB)
Beverly Sigafoos (CA-DHS)
There vere three radiological field monitoring teams sent from the Dispatch Center to collect samples in the field.
A fourth field team was retained at the Dispatch Center to establish a receiving and processing area for returned samples.
- Overall, the field team members performed professionally, according to procedures, and exhibited strong evidence of excellent training.
The field teams received a
very complete and informative briefing at the Dispatch Center.
All the required equipment was present (in accord with the procedures).
The procedures were peccably followed by the team members in obtaining samples.
Exe reise Detail cont inued The problem areas encountered by the field teams were attributable to either a
failing of the Dispatch Center or circumstances beyond their control.
For example, the problems with communicating to the Dispatch Center (cited as an area requiring corrective action in the Dispatch Center portion of this report) was created by an exercise artificiality.
The State is aware of the communications problem in this area and had arranged for a
roving repeater to allow the communications to be accomplished.
The roving repeater was not dispatched and the lack of comrr~nications capability surfaced.
Another problem cited in the Dispatch Center portion of this report is the need for improved mapping.
The Dispatch Center itself needs improved maps to identify specifi.c locations of sampling areas and track field team activities.
The field teams maps should have specific directions and instructions for finding the sampling locations.
If available, the field teams should also be provided with other information, such as the feeding practices for
- dairies, harvesting
- data, locked areas, etc.
The maps used by the field teams were totally inadequate.
Other areas for planning and preparedness enhancement include:
hreas Recommended for Im rovement l.
Sampling in fields under adverse weather conditions will be greatly hampered by use of the types of vehicles available to the field teams during this exercise.'our-wheel-drive vehicles should be provided to the field teams.
2.
The field teams were observed to be wearing pocket dosimeters affixed outside of shirt pockets.
The dosimeters could easily be dislodged
- when, team members are performing sampling activities.
It is suggested the field teams be instructed to affix the pocket dosimeters inside a
packet" or more stable area.
(If a person is suited out in full protective clothing with all closures, cuffs, etc.
- taped, the dosimeters would be affixed to the outside of clothing.
- However, these conditions did not exist for this exercise.)
3.
When the information is available, field teams should label milk samples with information on the type of feed the cows had been on (e.g.,
- stored, sheltered food or open pasture) at the time of the incidents Equipment provided to the field teams might include check sources for the
- meters, extra batteries for backup
- purposes, and bolt cutters to access areas that are locked or chained.
5.
A one gallon water sample from a large lake will not provide meaningful data.
Therefore, water intake points should be sampled.
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Exercise Detail continued 6.
Since State field teams may not be familiar with the
- area, consideration should be given to assigning a local government worker that can provide guidance as far as
- roads, owners,
- crops, locations of water
- supplies, etc.
This individual should have an inventory of all watering
- points, farms,
- ranches, seasons for local
- crops, feed lots, packing
- sheds, point-of-contact data, etc.
7.
There appears to be a
need to review the intent and possibly expand on certain procedures.
For instance initially if 2
/hr is detected, a monitoring team should not have tn spend 1
any more time in that area since people are not going to be moved back in immediately.
However, after additional resource>>
are obtained, 2 mR/hr should not be inferred to be a turnback exposure.
Similarly, 1000 cpm would be about 22,000 pCi.
The first field team does not have to take time to collect a sample since it is not going to be harvested that day.
But a sample is needed for further analysis and 22,000 pCi is not going to pose a radiation hazard to a sampling team or to the Dispatch Center.
Controller-Simulator and Other Activities Ed Waage (PG&E)
Jim Petroni (CA-OES)
Barry Lacey (CA-DFA}
Dave Wheeler (CA-RHB)
Jane Doyle (CA-EHD)
Jim Alexander (CA-OES}
Terry Owyang (PG&E)
JoAnne Schmitz (PG&E)
Learh Wright (PG&E)
Steve Joiner (PG&E)
Dennis Smith (CA"OES)
Bob Krueger (Ch-OES)
Irv Johnson (CA-OES)
Dave guinton (CA-DHS)
Rich Powers (CA-OES)
Tim Mazzacano (San Luis Obispo Co)
Wayne Hall (San Luis Obispo Co)
Teri Mack (PG&E)
Keith Harrison (CA-OES)
Robert Lorenz.(PG&E)
Bill 0 Hara (PG&E)
Bill Keyworth (PG&E)
George Buzzelli (SCE)
Joseph Ward (CA-OES)
Barbara Fox (CA-DFA)
Don Root (CA-OES}
The exercise controllers were extremely knowledgeable and professional.
Tn addition to providing exercise message traffic to the exercise participants, they were also evaluating response performance.
The Department of Health assigned various individuals'o evaluate performance of exercise participants to gain insight for further plan refinement and development of future exercise scenario data.
1 J
Fxercise Detail continued As stated earlier in the exercise detail, a simulation cell was established in lieu of activating various plume exposure pathway EPZ emergency response facilities (e
g SOC SDAC J SLO CO EOC y SB CO EOC UDAC, etc. ) that were previous ly evaluated.
The individuals assigned as simulators served a dual role:
that of dispatching exercise scenario message inquiries to exercise participants and responding as exercise participants representing the various emergency response facilities.
FEMA evaluators were assigned to the simulation cell to observe the level of interface and coordination that the ingestion pathway exercise participants would provide to the emergency response operations in progress
~
The simulation cell was not evaluated for demonstrating offsite Emergency Operations Center (EOC) response operations.
The following observations are included in the report for information in the event future exercise development employs a similar activity.
1.
The exercise simulators appeared to lack an understanding of past events and were unf amiliar with the
- area, creating confusion in handling questions being posed by exercise participants.
2 ~
More than two hours into the
- exercise, the simulators were still not clear as to who was playing various roles in the exercise.
A clearly defined posting of players and organizational positions may have alleviated this problem.
3.
There was a general lack of information flow relative to exercise play status, except for County input to their counterparts in the simulation cell.
Other simulators gathered information over the controllers radio net or listening to IPRAC briefings.
Exercise participants did not acknowledge the requirement for coordination with the other emergency response facilities that were simulated at this location.
4.
There were no periodic briefings provided to simulators to, explain some of the actions taken or recommended by the FEOC or IPRAC+
5.
The simulators, early in 'he
- exercise, were bypassing the message
- center, going direct to the representatives within the other facilities.
This created a problem of backtracking for the message center staff and double duty for the exercise participants.
6.
Exercise message I-18 to the FEQC evoked a response that there was no one available.to check vehicles loaded with produce and that they should contact the California Department of Transportation (CalTrans).
This is considered to be a function of the FEOC.
1
Exercise Detail continued 7 ~
Many of the simulators had a difficult time in obtaining responses to messages provided exercise participants.
It often required a succession of calls to obtain partial information.
8.
The time shift from Day-1 to Day-2 confused the simulators.
FEOC was receiving information for Day-2 whereas the simulators were not sure if the IPRAC should receive Day-1 or Day"2 inputs.
A regular briefing system may have corrected this problem.
In s'unary, all of the evaluators felt they observed a very good effort.
It was obvious that a lot of time was devoted to planning and training.
Some demonstrations were limited to scenario statements such as the demonstration of an ability to control emergency worker exposure (other than monitoring teams);
- however, most of the objectives were thoroughly demon'strated, Certain land
- use, dairy information, and directions are still necessary and should be collected, reported and updated.
There was also evidence that continued plan refinement training and exercising is vital to provide increased familiarity with ingestion exposure pathway response operations for those
.who are assigned responsibility for these activities.
t would be remiss if a most significant observation was not included as a part of is report.
The exercise controller/participant self-critique, conducted ediately following the close of the exercise was considered to be one of the most thorough observed to date.
A primary goal of any exercise is to determine areas that can be further improved through the information gained during the exercise.
Exercise controllers/participants at each of the locations evaluated were noted to be candid in identifying shortfalls of exercise player performance.
Each of the exercise findings reported herein were identified during the self-critique and each of the evaluators commented that it was a constructive exchange.
hs mentioned in the exercise summary portion of this report, the staff of FEMA and the RAG, Region IX, will provide assistance upon request.
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2
INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE EXERCISE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT)
EXERCISE FINDINGS WLTRIX The categories for exercise evaluation findings and processing of the exercise evaluation report are described in the Exercise Detail portion of this report.
The Exercise Findings Matrix on page 16 refers to specific parts of the report that describe "areas requiring corrective action" and includes information furnished by exercise participants as to the actions to be taken and projected dates of completion.
It also serves as a reference for tracking activities that will be evaluated during the next regularly scheduled biennial exercise. ~
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EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE EXERCISE STATE OF CAl IFORNIA (DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT)
EXERCISE FINDINGS MATRIX r~indfo Proposed Corrective Action Date for Com letioa 1.
Improved facilities and communications.
See Pages 6 and 8.
As you know, the exercise was conducted at the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI).
During the exercise, the institute was used for training.
The class in session took up cons ide rable space that would be available for use in an emergency.
The Aames Hall main floor has 5000 square foot open area that would be used.
Also in Aames Hall are two classrooms, each seats about 75 people, that could be used in an emergency.
- Further, an additional room under construction during the exercise is now complete.
This room could also be used during an emergency.
- Overall, about three times the space used during the'xercise would be available in an emergency.
Because the space exists and was observed by the evaluation
- team, we strongly recommend this finding be" reclassified as an area recommended for improvement.
We acknowledge'ommunication between facilities was a
problem and plan to correct this finding prior to December 1989.
Region IX accepts the State s
rationale.
The finding is downgraded to an area recommended for improvement.
The facility housing the IPRAC is, in
- act, large enough to incorporate the OC-Full use of the available acilities at CSTI will correct the problems observed.
The radio system used in the exercise for the field teams is a
new system that.the state is installing state-wide.
Its shortfalls indicate that additional equipment is necessary.
Due to lead times required for the budget
- process, we anticipate a working system by December 31, 1991.
2.
Improved maps materials.
See Page 8.
and display The telephone issue vas addressed in finding ).
The need for improved displays vere obvious'lans are currently undervay to upgrade the display capability.
Expected completion date is December 1988.
3.
Expansion of procedures for field teams.
See Page 5.
Nev procedures vill be developed for the receipt and packaging of samples.
Implementation of this procedure will be included in field team training.
A system for contamination control and transfer of samples will be included in the procedure for receipt and packaging of samples.
Detailed maps utilizing a common grid system exist.
These maps vill be obtained and training provided on their use;
. Grid coordinates will be used for ide.ntifying sample locations.
Completion date for the above is December 1988.
FEOC procedure for priority plan development.
See Page 7.
FEOC procedures vill be amended to include the development and periodic updating of a priority plan.
Responsibility for seeing that periodic updates are made vill be assigned.to one of the FEOC staff.
Completion date for the updated procedure is December
- 1988, 5.
Expansion of IPRAC to include Fish and Game and Federal representation.
See Page 8.
IPRAC is composed of policy level decision makers from state and county organizations
~
It serves in an advisory capacity to the Director of DHS.
Additional input is received through consultants who are not members of
- IPRAC, but may be invited to participate in its discussions.
To some
- degree, regional differences dictate both the membership of IPRAC and the type of consultants needed.
- Thus, Department of Fish and
- Game, or other state or local agencies might be a
member at one location and a
consultant at another.
Once this is determined, it vill be included in regional appendices to the the IPRAC portion of the plan.
Representatives of federal agencies could also be invited to the IPRAC as consultants.
Procedures for contacting federal agencies are in the state plan.
Reference to these procedures vill be included in the EHD Plan.
Estimated date for completion is December 1988.
6
~
Assignment of Technical representative to assist vith Public Information.
See Page 9.
A full-time technical representative vill be assigned to the PIOs to assist them in addressing ingestion exposure pathway issues.
PIO procedures vill be developed.
These will include FEOC approval requirement for technical in f orma t ion and IPRAC approval requirements for policy statements.
Training exercises will include PIOs in order to improve communication among the
- FEOC, IPRAC, and PIO.
Equipment for 'improving communications will be included in space planning.
Estimated completion date is December 1988.
Carried Forward from the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ Exercise (9-23-87):
1 ~
Improved communications capability betveen SOC and local of fsite jurisdiction EOC.
Refer to EPZ report for details.
We acknovledge the communications problems and have conducted preliminary discussions with the utility to correct them.
We vill improve the communications system prior to the 1989'valuated exercise.
2.
Capabi1 ity to efficiently util i re EARS in, the SDAC.
Ref er to EPZ report for details.
The EARS computer system is an optional utility ovned computer dose projection system.
The system contains a
tremendous amount of information regarding in-plant systems and its capability goes veil beyond the needs of the State Dose Assessment Center (SDAC).
The evaluator thought ve should be able to take a reading from an in-plant monitor
- and, by using a
conversion
- factor, come up with a
source term.
Calculating the source term is not the.responsibility of the SDAC, it is the 'responsibility of the Technical Support 'Center (TSC) and/or the Unified Dose'ssessment Center (UDAC) ~
"18-
Because the system is optional, and because calculating the source term is not the responsibility of the SDAC, ve s t rongly recommend removing all reference to utilizing the EARS syst m.
3
~.
Increased training for staf f assigned to SDAC.
Refer to EPZ report for details.
The method the state uses to make dose projections has been demonstrated to FEMA many times
~
Our procedure is unique to California and vas developed because there vere so many different methods to project doses.
We developed a method that vould result in dose projections that vere close to all the other methods.
In order to project'oses, we need a source term, effective age of
- release, wind
- speed, and stability classification.
Because the SDAC staff knev how to use the state method for dose calculations, I urge you.to change this corrective action as an ".area recommended for improvement",
echni cally, the St ate response to indings 2
and 3 is accurate.
The State Plan and SDAC procedures do not requ ire source te rm calculations or verification of those provided by the utility to the offsite jurisdictions.
These findings are downgraded to an area recommended for improvement.
We strongly urge the State to develop an capability to use the EARS system to verify source term data provided by the utility.
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EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE EXERCISE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT)
STATE OF CALIFORNIA RESPONSE TO FINDINGS IDENTIFIED AS AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Pa e
10 item 1
"Four-wheel-drive vehicles should be provided the field teams."
R~es ense We believe procuring four-wheel-drive vehicles for use by the field teams is not the answer.
In California, it is rare when road conditions would be impossible for regular passenger, sedans
~
Extreme difficulty arises in getting back into high seated vehicles without field team members contaminating themselves.
Vans, four-wheel-drive vehicles, and trucks pose a problem.
Regular full-sized vehicles with trunks have been used successfully and are more. easily available.
Pa e
13 item 2
"More than two hours into the e'xercise, who vas playing various roles in the layers and organizational positions may the simulators were still not clear as to exercise.
A clearly defined posting of have alleviated this problem."
R~es ense The simulators did know who was playing various roles in the exercise.
All
- players, simulators, and evaluators were given the same package showing roles )
- players, and organizational structure.
Pa e
13 item 5 The simulators, early in the exercise, were bypassing the message
- center, going
'direct to the representatives with the other facilities.
This created a problem of backtracking for the message center staff and double duty for the exercise."
Ries ense Bypassing the message center was done by design to test the system and stress the players.
The players responded as they were trained.
Pa e
13 item 6
"Exercise message 1-18 evoked a
response that there was no one available to check vehicles loaded with produce at a request of the simulation cell that they contact the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)."
R~es ones The players were instructed to contact the simulation cell if contact with an absent agency is required.
Since Caltrans did not participage.in the exercise, the players response was proper.
s
<Q s
ATTACHMENT A
STATE OF CALIFORNIA INGESTION PATHWAY.EXERCISE -
1987 A.
08 J ECTI VES 1.
Demonstrate the adequacy, operability and effective use of emergency communications procedures and equipment among appropriate facilities and groups, including field teams and the dispatch center.
2.
Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of radiologic health branch Field Emergency Operations Center (FEOC) staff the Ingestion Path~ay-Recovery Advisory Committee (IPRAC) with respect to the conduct of ingestion pathway interdiction, dose assessment acti-vities and public information activities.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to direct and coordinate the deployment of environmental sampling teams.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of the environmental sampling teams to utilize their procedures to collect samples such as soil, eater, milk, and vegetation and perform other prescribed radiological activities such as sample preparation, handling, packaging, and labeling, etc.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze environmental sampling information to define the ingestion pathway zone and controlled area boundary.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the flow of informa-tion among the
- FEOC, the IPRAC, the Public Information Officer (PIO),
the dispatch center, and field teams.
7
~
Demonstrate the ability to control emergency vorker exposures.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to utilize simulated state and federal sup ort agencies effectively.
era support 9 ~
Demonstrate the ability of the IPRAC to make recommendations on the interdiction of food crops, milk and eater, using appropriate criteria.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to develop public information to include the radiation hazard and issue emergency broadcast system messages.
ll. Demonstrate the ability to calculate total population dose,
- 12. Demonstrate the ability of sonnel and equipment.
1 3. Demonstrate the ability to areas of improvement.
the dispatch center to decontaminate per-conduct a post-exercise critique to identify ATTACHMENT B
Ol
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT
'1987 FIELD EXERCISE SCENARIO Narrative Sugar A Field Exercise for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) is conducted annually to demonstrate adequate procedures, communications, expertise and hardware exist to assure the preservation of public safety under any postulated acci-dent conditions.
State and Local officials participate in the Field Exer-cise on a biannual basis.
These officials vill be partic-ipating in the 1987 Field Exercise.
The Exercise vill be eva1uated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The 1987 Field Exercise vill be unannounced and vill include all Emergency Classifications - beginning with an Unusual Event and escalating to a general Emergency.
The Exercise vill require the implementation of protective actions for the general public, up to and including simu-lating the sounding of the Early Warning System and evacu-ation of the public.
The 1987 Field Exercise scenario for Diablo Ganyon Power Plant involves an UNUSUAL EVENT caused by a fire in the package boiler lasting more than ten minutes, followed by an ALERT condition due to unplanned radiation levels above 1.5 R/hr in portions of the controlled area which are normally accessible and normally less than 1S mR/hr.
h second ALERT is declared due to a fire in the 4-kV vital electrical equipment area lasting more than ten minutes.
h SITE AREA EMERGENCY is caused by a pressuriser steam-space loss of coolant accident (LOCA) greater than makeup capacity.
h GENE1QL EMERGENCY is declared. when.indica-tions from containment radiation monitors show the release of 100 percent of core gap activity concurrent wIth the LOCA. The following are initial conditions for the 1987 Field Exercise:
Unit 1 is operating at steady state power.
The unit has bein operating at. greater than or equal to 90 X of full power for 1?4 consecutive days.
Containment Spray pump 1-2 is cleared for maintenance. ATTACHMENT C
1*
Narrative S~azv Spent Resin transfer operations aze in progress to trans-fer resins to a container for disposal offsite.
Inspection of all spare 4-kV electrical breakers is sche-duled to take place later in the day, due to receipt of a 10CFR21 letter detailing mechanical failures of breaker internal components caused by metal fatigue.
Results of overall leak tests of containment shov the combined leakrate for all valves and penetrations sub)ect to Type B and C testing to be 0.03 X by weight of containment aiz per day.
Unit 2 has been at power for 35 days following the latest refueling outage.
While the unit is operating at full power, a fire begins in the package boiler room.
The package boiler is a diesel oil-fired auxiliary steam source.
Propane is used to initially heat the diesel oil prior to combustion.
The location of the fire is diagnosed from indications on the fire vater annunciator panel in the main control roon.
The Fire Brigade vill be dispatched, and since the fire is inside the protected area and v'ill last longer than ten
- minutes, the Shift Foreman should declare an UhUSUAL PVNT as required by Emergency Procedure G-l.
During the Spent Resin transfer operation, a valve failure causes a spill of radioactive resins and flushing vater in the auxiliary building. The auxiliazy operator and Chem and Rad technicians report that radiation levels of 1.5 R/hr are measured outside the radiation area boundary.
The Shift Foreman should declare an ALERT, as requized by Emergency Procedure G-l, due to the unanticipated rise in radiation levels in an area vhich is normally accessible and less than 15 mR/hr.
The System Dispatcher calls to announce that a Pittsburg unit has tripped off line.
Due to high electrical demand on the PGandE system in September, Diablo Canyon is requested to maintain both units at full power and to delay any planned curtailments.
Approximately 45 minutes after the resin spill, lead shielding is erected and radiation levels are reduced to 20 mR/hr at the gate (contact),
and 2.5 mR/hr at 3 feet.
Shortly thereafter, a fire in the north end of the turbine building is detected and annunciated in the control room, h regulator valve on a tank of acetylene located in the 4kv bus fan room fails and the acetylene ignites.
Smoke is detected in several rooms containing vital electrical svitchgear equipment, and the Fire Brigade is dispatched.
Another ALERT should be declared because the fire threat-
'I
Narrative Sumnarv ens vital equipment and is not under control vithin ten minutes.
Smoke and fire destruction of lighting systems makes the fire difficult to control quickly; however, no vital equipment is actually damaged by the fize.
hftet the fire is extinguished, a LOCA occurs vhen the pressurizer safety line to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) ruptures, causing an 850 gpm steamspace leak from the pressuriter.
h SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared.
The Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Systems operate normally but only tvo of the three vital buses auto-transfer to startup pover.
The loads on bus G are not powered because a transfer breaker has tripped on overcurrent.
A mechanical failure in component cooling vater (CCW) header B prevents necessary cooling vater from reaching the chillers and motors for thtee containment fan cooler units (CFCUs), the fourth CFCU trips on overcurrent and cannot be restarted, and the fifth CFCV is inopezable due to the failure of bus G. Containment spray pumps are
-not available since one pump is out of service for maintenance vork and the other cannot be powered due to the bus G failure.
The depzessurisation, of the reactor coolant system causes a loose part vhich batters the core, causing extensive fuel damage.
Containment radiation monitors shov that lOOZ of core gap activity has been released to the containment.
A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared.
Containment pressure eventually reaches 45 psig, vith no containment cooling available.
h leak develops into the containment purge path to the plant vent, through RCVs-ll and -l2, releasing radioactive steam to the environment.
The vind continues to shift all during the event.
The problem vith the CCM header is repaired, so that cool<<
ing vater may reach the motors and chillers for thzee of the CFCUs.
Electrical maintenance czevs repair the fault on bus G,
and restore povez to its vital loads.
Tvo CFCUs start automatically, and control room operators successfully start one containment spray pump Maintenance teams dispatched to investigate the contain-ment leak successfully close off the release path.
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Exercise players, both onsite and offsite, should then discuss near-term and long-term recovery actions, end critique their performances.
'FFSITE RADIOLGOICAL PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS INGESTION PATHWAY ZONE EXERCISE DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS Mr. Nicholas, B. Nikas, Chief Natural
& Technological Hazards Division Field Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
(Radiological Health Branch-CA)
Na te Chi pman, WINCO Health Dave Duncan, RAC (EPA) RIX Susan Elkins, FEMA RIX Dispatch Center Monica Salazar, RAC (DoE) RIX Bob Teets, RAC (DoE) RIX Public Information Joe Dominguez, FEMA RIX Suzanne
- Mooney, FEMA RIX Ingestion Pathway-Recovery Advisory Committee Cheryl Malina, RAC (USDA) RIX (IPRAC)
Exercise Participant Simulation (e.g.
SLO CO
- EOC, SDAC,
- SOC, UDAC, etc.)
Ed Henry, RAC (DOT) RIX Phil Hill, RAC (DoE) RIX Field Monitoring Teams Ken Miles, RAC (FDA) RIX Bob Nicol, RAC (FDA) RIX Lyle Slagle, WINCO