ML17083B740
| ML17083B740 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1986 |
| From: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Shiffer J PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B741 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8605130570 | |
| Download: ML17083B740 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1986002
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
1450 MARIALANE,SUITE 210
WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA94596
APR 28 1986
Docket Noa. 50-275
aed 50-323/ II(
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street,
Room 1451
San Francisco,
95106
Attention:
Mr. J.
D. Shiffer, Vice President
Nuclear Power Generation
Gentlemen:
Subject:
NRC Team Inspection of Diablo Canyon Units
1 and
2
This refers to the special
team inspection,
conducted
by Mr. P. Narbut and
other members of our staff on February 24,
1986 through March 7, '1986.
This
inspection
examined your activities
as authorized
by NRC License
Nos.
and DPR-82.
Discussions
of our findings were held with Mr. R.
C. Thornberry,
and other members of your staff, at the conclusion of the inspection.
Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclosed
inspection
report.
Within these
areas,
the inspection consisted of selective
examinations of procedures
and representative
records,
interviews with
personnel,
and observations
by the inspectors.
Based
on the results of this inspection, it appears
that certain of your
activities were not conducted in full compliance with NRC requirements,
as set
forth in the Notice of Violation, enclosed
herewith as Appendix A.
Your
response
to this notice is to be submitted in accordance
with the provisions
of 10 CFR 2.201
as stated in Appendix A, Notice of Violation.
This inspection
was based
on generic probabilistic risk assessments
and,
therefore,
focused
on highly important safe
shutdown systems.
Specifically,
the team examined the Residual
Heat Removal
(RHR) and Component Cooling Water
(CCW) systems
and their respective electrical power and control systems.
The
inspectors
performed in-depth physical examinations of these
systems in Unit 2
and also examined
documented
evidence of maintenance,
modifications
and
testing for a large number of the involved components.
The results of these
detailed physical
and records
examinations
were then coupled with a systematic
review of your management
control system implementing procedures
to identify
strengths
and weaknesses
in both the design of the management
systems
and the
working-level implementation of the systems.
Additionally, the team
interviewed working-level operations,
craft and quality control personnel
to
ascertain their perceptions of your quality programs,
program implementation
effectiveness,
and management
attitudes
toward safety
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In general the team concluded that your current management
programs
were
generally functioning in a manner which provided for quality; however, certain
findings warrant your attention
and action.
Mana ement Control
S stem Weaknesses
Certain weaknesses
in the design of your current management
control systems
were identified.
For example,
the low priority level assigned
to preventative
maintenance
work on safety related
pumps allows that any decision to defer
such work may be made at the maintenance
foreman level rather than at an
engineering or management
level.
Additionally, the amount
and degree of
quality control inspection applied to maintenance
work is determined
by QC
personnel
each time the work task is accomplished,
even though much of the
work is repetitive
and appropriate for permanent
inspection plans.
Although
these
weaknesses
did not, become
a factor in the violations identified during
this inspection,
they clearly have the potential to lead to future problems
and w'arrant your attention.
An exception to the proper functioning of your current management
control
systems is an apparent violation dealing with an improper procedure
change
made by a maintenance
mechanic without the further review and approval
as
required by your administrative procedures.
The particular improperly
accomplished
change did not affect hardware operability; however,
improperly
accomplished
changes
have the potential to affect operability and are
a
serious
concern.
It appears
that a policy of strict procedure
adherence
needs
to be emphasized.
Additionally, some of your preoperational
management
control programs
had not
functioned properly.
Specifically, four apparent violations were identified
dealing with improper wiring of motor operated valves,
improper gasket
material in a valve, improper setting of motor-operated
valve torque
and limit
switches,
and the omission of local valve position indication devices
required
by drawing.
Although none of the identified problems
caused
component
inoperability or loss of function, the problems identified do raise questions
regarding the as-built, as-tested
condition of plant hardware which deserve
your full attention.
This is especially true for the wiring errors which,
when coupled to recent problems with feedwater
and main steam isolation valve
wiring, indicate there
may be other undetected
errors,
some of which may be
significant.
We trust you will give careful consideration
to your actions in
response
to these violations.
Inade uate Review of Records
The administratively improper procedure
change
discussed
above
was identified
through our review of your records.
The
same records
had already undergone
several tiers of review by your supervisory
and quality assurance
personnel.
The inspectors
also identified several minor errors, in the form of missing
data
and signatures,
in other records
such as surveillance test
and
calibration records
which should have been identified by supervisory
and
quality assurance
reviews. It appears
that additional management
attention to
the adequate
review of records is needed.
J
I
Material Condition Discre ancies
Regarding the general material condition of the plant machinery spaces,
the
team was favorably impressed with the attention to cleanliness,
radiological
contamination control,
and painting and labeling conditions in the areas
inspected.
It was apparent to the team that management
programs
were geared
to providing a machinery environment which may contribute to a high level
personnel pride and performanc'e.
Several obvious minor discrepancies
were
identified, such
as leftover deficiency tags (for items which had been
corrected)
and
some extraneous
gear,
which should have been identified and
corrected
by your staff.
This would indicate that
some additional motivation
is appropriate.
Overall Conclusions
The team concluded that, overall, your management
programs
were functioning in
a generally satisfactory
manner, with identified exceptions.
The wiring
errors identified in motor 'operated
valv'es,
and the questions
they raise
regarding conformance,to 'design
documents,
are
a major concern
and deserve
your full management
attention.
In accordance
with 10 CFR 2.790(a),
a copy of this letter and the enclosures
will be placed in the
NRC Public Document
Room.
C
The responses
directed by this letter are not subject to the clearance
procedures
of the Office of Management
and Budget as required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980,
PL 96-511.
Should you have any questions
concerning this inspection,
we will be glad to,
'iscuss
them with you.
Sincerely,
/
D. P.
irsch, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
and Projects
Enclosures:
l.
Appendix A, Notice of Violation
2.'nspection
Report. Nos. 50-275/86-02
and 50-323/86-02
cc w/enclosure:
S.
D. Skidmore,
PGSE
P. A. Crane, Sr.,
R.
C. Thornberry,
PGSE (Diablo Canyon)
D. A. Taggert,
PGSZ (Diablo Canyon)
R.
S. Weinberg,
PGSE (Diablo Canyon)
J. Partlow,
NRC
C. Heltemes,
NRC
W. Russell,
NRC
State of California
Sandra Silver (Enclosure
2 only)
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RSB/Document Control Desk (RIDS); Resident Inspector;
Project Inspector;
G. Cook; B. Faulkenberry;
J. Martin
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