NUREG-0562, Advises That NUREG-0562 Fuel Failure Criteria Not Approved as Basis for Licensing.Use of Criteria Should Be Discontinued to Eliminate Licensing Delays.List of Plants Applying Criteria Requested

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Advises That NUREG-0562 Fuel Failure Criteria Not Approved as Basis for Licensing.Use of Criteria Should Be Discontinued to Eliminate Licensing Delays.List of Plants Applying Criteria Requested
ML20214C987
Person / Time
Issue date: 11/20/1985
From: Thompson H
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Rahe E
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
Shared Package
ML20213F391 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0562, RTR-NUREG-562 NUDOCS 8602210385
Download: ML20214C987 (1)


Text

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  1. November 20, 1985 \

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Mr. E. P. Rahe, Manager Nuclear Safety Department Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230

Dear Mr. Rahe:

As a result of our review of a number of recent license and or license amendment applications for plants designed by Westinghouse, it has come to our attention that Westinghouse is using criterion for fuel failure during postulated accidents that has not been approved by the NRC staff. Specifically, you are referencing a criterion presented in NUREG-0562. Although this NUREG was prepared by the NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research to document the state of knowledge

._ of post-DNB fuel behavior at that time, it has not been adopted as a basis for licensing by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

While our current review guidance uses the assumption of fuel failure following the prediction of DNB below the 95/95 confidence level, the regulations applicable to postulated accidents do not specifically prohibit the acceptance of another fuel failure criterion for these events. However, technical justification must be provided by any licensee or applicant who intends to show that post-DNB fuel failure would not occur for postulated accidents in which the DNB criterion was exceeded. This has not been done, resulting in unnecessary delays and extra review effort by both the NRR staff and the licensee or applicant.

In order to eliminate these unnecessary delays in the licensing process, I recommend that you either discontinue using the unapproved fuel failure criterion in analyses prepared for submittal to the NRC or provide the technical justifi-cation to support another failure criterion.

In addition, please provide a complete list of all domestic plants for which this fuel failure criterion has been applied, both those applying for an operating license and those which have already received an operating license.

I will be glad to meet with you to discuss this issue.

Sincerely, DR 860217 hy EPfWEST #?/

1 C H h L. Thompson, r. D' tor PDR D1 ion of Lice sin Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: H. Denton

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Westinghouse Water Reactor Electric Corporation gg5:n Pemsyivania 15230 cass Divisions i Sept.edber 10, 1985 NS'NRC-85-3062 Mr. H. L. Thompson, Jr., Director ~

Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20014

Subject:

Licensing of Fuel Failure Criteria for the Locked Rotor Event

Reference:

Letter dated August 7, 1985, Thompson (NRC) to Rahe (Westinghouse)

Dear Mr. Thompson:

We have received your letter of August 7, (reference, attached) concerning the Westinghouse use in past licensing submittals of fuel failure criteria in NUREG-0562. Specifically, fuel failure had been stated not to occur in conditions of DNB in the locked rotor event due to the short duration of DNB and the icw clad temperatures produced. For each plant for which the new criteria were applied, supporting doctanentation was submitted by Westinghouse to the utilities for inclusion in their plant docket. The staff was requested to review this information on these plants.

Based upon a number of technical meetings with members of the NRC staff during the review process of severel plants and recent Safety Evaluation Reports which indicated no issues outstandir.g, it was Westinghouse's triderstanding that this approach was accepted. However, recent discussions with the staff indiaate that the approach was not fully reviewed by the staff technical branches.

Recognizing this apparent misunderstanding, Westinghouse intends to pursue this issue via a generic topical report (WCAP) for NRC review and approval. We expect that this topical report will be submitted in the cecond quarter of 1986.

Very truly your .,

E. P. Rahe, Jr. --

Manager Nuclear Safety Department MPO:pj

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