ML17059C022
| ML17059C022 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/1995 |
| From: | STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17059C023 | List: |
| References | |
| 95C2873-C001, 95C2873-C001-R00, 95C2873-C1, 95C2873-C1-R, NUDOCS 9806010303 | |
| Download: ML17059C022 (46) | |
Text
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O Client:
Title:
Block Wall Screening Spreadsheet Calculation No.
95C2873%001 Prospect:
Elastic Analysis and LimitingDriftAnalysis Acceptance Criteria:
EPRI NP~I Remarks:
No.
Description InitialIssue REVlSIONS By App.
Date CALCULATION COVER SHEET CONTRACTNO.
95C2783 FIGURE 1.3 98060i0303 9805%8 PDR ADQCK 05000220 P'DR 1-20
STEVENSON
&ASSOCIATES a structurehmechanical consulting engineering fum JOB NO. 95C2873-C001 SUBJECT NMP1 IPEEE Block Wall Screening Spreadsheet REVlSW C
OQ SHEET ¹2 OF 9 Rewston By TMT7/26/95 Chk, MSL 8/23/95
Background
This calcuhmtion documents the seismic screening spreadsheet for the block walls in the Nme MilePoint 1
stationas part ofthe IPEEE evaluation.
Page 1 ofthe spreadsheet provides the basis for preliminary screening. If the block walls do not pass the prelimimuy screening, page 2 can be used which allows the wall to driftduring an earthquake.
The block walls in NMP1 are typically made of8" and 12" hollow blocks reinforced by 04 bars 32"
[4]. The reinforced cell is filledwith concrete. Wall bottom is reinforced with existing dowels 16" spacing.
The walls are reinforced horizontally by Dur~Wall, or 3/16" deformed side rods at 16" spacing [4]. The sides ofthe walls are tied in to precast concrete withtwo 1/4" threaded rods into inserts.
The walls are considered well anchored at the ends. In the pro-screening, only the outmf-plane bending moment at the center ofthe wall is checked.
The in-plane loading is neglected. 'Ihe slight beneficial effect due to the gravity is also ignored.
Solution Methodology The solution is mainly based on EPRI NP~1 [1] Appendix R without taking advantage ofthe permissible drift. In addition to the methodology of[1], two-way plate action is considered in both the &equency estimation and the maximum moment estimation.
Instead using the formula in [1], the two-way rectangular plate frequency formular &om P], p. 258 willbe used.
The wall is assumed to be simply-supported on all four sides, E I,g f=
2'"
q(1 v')
where z'3r'V Width ofthe wall H= Height ofthe wall q = Weight per unit wall area v
Poisson's ratio E
elastic modulus ofmasonry = 750 f(psi)
I, Effective moment ofinertia 3
= I+
~
(I -I~)SI M~
Ir Gross moment ofinertia Ir~ Cracked section transformed moment ofinertia
JOB NO. 95C2873-COOED SUBJECT NMP1 IPEEE REvlS(OH PAGE NO SHEET ¹3 OF 9 STEVENSON
&ASSOCIATES a structuraMechanical consulting engineering firm Block Wall Screening Spreadsheet Revision By TMT 7/26/95'hk.
MSL 8/23/95 McR ~ Cracking moment frSs fr Crenkinti tension io flexnre ~ 25+f(psi)
Sc = Gross section modulus ~ 2I!/D Since the walls are hollow, it is grouted only at the reinforcement, the moment ofinertia willcalculated using the concrete block cover only.
I,
=br(D-r)2/2'here b
unt width ofthe wall, and t thickness ofcover. For the cracked section, the location ofthe neutral axis &om the compression face can be estimated by solving x - nA (d-x) = 0 x
2 E,
n=
E, = elastic modulus for rebars assuming x does not exceed r, the cracked section moment ofinertia I=
+nA (d -x) bx' r
3 s
Mv = 09Mu = 0.9Asf>> d where A,= steel area per unit width f>> ~ yield strength ofrebar d= depth from the compressive face to the center ofsteel ~ D/2 D ~ Depth ofwall A,f 0.85f fspecified compressive strength ofmasonry (psi) e
S8A STEVENSON
&ASSOQATES a structuraWechantcaf consulting engineering firm JOB NO. 95C2873-C001 REVISLON PAGE HO SUBJECT NMP1 IPEEE Block Wall Screening Spreadsheet SHEET ¹4 OF 9 Revision By TMT7/26/95 Ctlk. MSL 8/23/95 Thc vertical moment capacity is defined as the larger ofthe Myor the cracking moment M~ defined in the previous section.
Since the Dur~Wall horizontal reinforcement has only 0.028 in every 16", in addition the splice is only 6",
which willnot be able to sustain the yield strength ofthe bars, the bending m the horizontal direction willbe governed by the cracking moment ofthe blocks.
According to [TJ, Table 63.1.1, the allowable fiexural tension parallel to bed joint is at least 133% ofthe tensile strength when stressed normal to bed joints.
M=133Mca
'Re maximum moment in the wall willbe determined by the close form solutions presented in [2], Section 30, pp. 113-119.assuming all edges ofthe wall are simply-supported.
The maximum moment occurs at thc center of the wall (M,)~ =
qB"n'ms[2vB -(1-v)~jsin-
~L34 iF (M)
=v
-qB"ns gms[2B. +(1-v)~jsin-a ~
a (M.)
=(M,)~
=
q8"n'ms[2vB -(1-v)g jnn
~id'f 2vB-(I-v)AjsinqJP'
~vs 2
= PqW' F'M~)
=(M)
=v
-qiVsns gms[2B +(1-v}@jsin-a Ud
= -n'm'[2B +(1-v}A jsinqWs a 1*5 2
"4
JOB NO. 95C2S73-C001 SUBJECT NMP1 IPEEE REVISION PAGE NO SHEET 05 OF 9 STEVENSON
&ASSOClATES a structuraMechanical consulting engineering firm Block Wall Screening Spreadsheet Revision By TMT7/26/95 Chk. MSL 8/23/95 2(aumbra. +2) m'm'osha 2
B=n'm'osha The spectral acceleration willbe extracted &em the corresponding Floor Response Spectrum at the bottom and the top ofthe block wall. The average ofthe top and bottom acceleration willbe used in the spreadsheet.
ZKXZE
'Re HCLPF willbe estimated by the minimum of PCLPFy (PGA)
MI, HCLPFH ~
'PGA)
(M,)
H Pre-Screening Implementation The above procedure is implemented in an Excel spreadsheet, BWSCREEN3CLS, sheet BLOCK.
f.
Based on test results in Ref. [5] and [6], the average compressive strength is 2,920 psi with a standard deviation of400 psi. Followmg the guideline of[1], the SMA strength capacity fornonMuctile materials should be set the
'99'lo level, therefore, it is recommended that f~2,920 - 23 i 400 ~ 2,000 psi Raght Lacking detailed information, the followingweight may be used [8] for hollow walls Wall thickness 6N 8tl l2N Unit Weight 43 Ib/k'2 55 80
0
SaA JOB NO. 95C287~001 SUBJECT NMP1 IPEEE
~ZgaPP o
REVISiON u
OF 9 STEVENSON
&ASSOCIATES a structuraMechanical consulting engineering fir Block Wall Screening Spreadsheet Revision By TMT7/26/95 CHIc. MSL 8/23/95 Any attached weight on the wall, including electrical boxes, conduits, etc. should be added to the total weight.
When retrieving spectral values, 7/o damping similar to reinforced concrete structures may be used for the preliminary screening.
HCLPF Based on NP041, Appendix R Alternative to the above elastic solution, thc followingcalculation allowing the block wall to driftbased on Appendix R of[I]is presented in a spretulsheet.
Based on the above parameters, thc CDFM permissible driftlimitis determined by F, =
s1.0 H/d 30 Based on Ref. [I],for a simply supported uniformlyloaded non-load bearing masonry wall, the seismic spectral acceleration capacity is In determining the seismic demand using the equivalent linear elastic procedure, an effectiv &equcncy is required. According to Rcf. [1], the secant frequency corresponding to an ultimate nonlinear displacement 6, is 1
ISS~
2n The effective nonlinear seismic demand can be approximated by treating the walls as pseudo-elastic with an effective frequency equals f,and effective damping t3, at about 6% [1]. Therefore s=sg, 6r.)
SaA JOB NO. 95C287~001 SUBJECT NMP1 IPEEE REYISIOH o
OF 9 STEVENSON
&ASSOCIATES a structuraMechanical consulting engineering firm Block Wall Screening Spreadsheet Revision By TMT7/26/95 Chk. MSL 8/23/95 The scale factor to be applied to a reference input spectrum is S~
FSl gAgg The HCLPF can then be obtained by HCLPF ~ Fs, (PGA)
The computation has been implemented in the spreadsheet fileBWSCIKEN3KB,sheet DRIFT.
Note that the elastic frequency is lower than that ofthe pre-screening spmdsheet, because Appendix R ofNP-6041 assumes the wall to span one way verticallyv4ile in the pro-screening, two-way action is used. The final HCLPF is the maximum within the driftlimits in the sheet. In some cases with large drift, the seismic capacity may turn negative.
These limitingcases should be ignored.
References I. EPRI NP-604 l, "AMethodology for Assessment ofNuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin," Revision 1, Final Report, August 1991.
- 2. Tomoshenko and Woinowsky-Krieger, "Theory ofPlate and Shells," 2nd Edition, McGraw-Hill, 1959.
- 3. Blevins, "Formulas forNatural Frequency and Mode Shape," Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1979.
- 4. NMP1 Drawing C-18801-C, Rev. 6, Turbine Building Battery Board Room at El. 261'-1", Plane Sections and Details.
- 5. NMP 1 Calculation S6-IE8011-MWRl, Masonry Wall Ref. 1. 1987.
- 6. NMPI Calculation S6-IE801I-MW, Masonry Walls, 1987.
- 7. ACI 530-92/ASCE 5-92flMS 402-92, Building Code Requirements forMasonry Structures, 1992.
- 8. AISC, Steel Construction Manual, 8th Edition.
SaA JOB NO. 95C287~001 SUBJECT NMP1 IPEEE
~
QW
~ GurCC.~
e REVISIOh o o SHEET ¹8 OF 9 STEVENSON
&ASSOCIATES a structurahmechanical consulting engineering firm Block Wall Screening Spreadsheet Revision By TMT7/26/95.
Chk. MSL 8/23/95 Block Wall Preliminaiy Screnning Based on S&ACalculation 95C287~1:
Wall Name:
Diesel Generator Area Block Wall<<29 (Example)
User Input Height (H)
Span (W)
Weight (q)
Nominal Depth Sa Top Constant Fields:
Cover Thickness Poisson's Ratio Steel Area (As)
Es 36.8 40 79 12 0.41 0.36 0.385 1.25 0.15
- 0.00625 0.13 29000000 19.33 ft Total unsupported height of block wall ft Unsupported horizontal span Ib/ft"2 Weight per unit area g
Top spectral acceleratke g
Average spectral acaHeration p% damping) psi Mortar compressive strength psi Steel yiekt strength ln"2/in
<<4 bar 32" g
Peak Ground Acderation for FRS psl 750 'm psi Calculated Fields:
Actual Depth (D)
Ig Mcr le Frequency (f)
Mh Beta1 My Beta 11.625 5.8125 67.28 11.57 111.80 1.29 1.07 3.13 6728 4.01 0.147 1.29 1.72 0.0416 2.02 0.0361 1.76 in 3/8" less than nominal in in"4/in Section moment of inertia in"3fin Section modulus psi Flexural strength Nn/in Cracking coment
~
in in"4/in in"4fin Hz Fundamental frequency kAn/in kAn/in Moment coefficient kAnfin Maximum horizontal moment Moment coefficient kAnfin Maximum vertical moment HCLPF 0.083
I 0
l
SaA STEVENSON
&ASSOCIATES a structuraMechanical coasultmg eagmcermg firm JOB NO. 96C287~001 SUBJECT NMP1 IPEEE Block Wall Screening Spreadsheet REvisias SHEET ¹9 OF 9 Revision By TMT7/26/95 Chk. MSL 8/23/95 DriftCalculation Based on EPRI NP~1, Appendix R Cotinuatke on Wall: Diesel Generator Area BlockWall <<29 (Example)
Fc Ch/L 0.00625 5.81 0.00108 0.147 0.173 0.030 441.6 0.040 in"2 in NP~1 Eq. R-14 NP~1 Eq. R-15 W
17.68 0.549 2.14 129 fn COFM Pemissible Orfft Lfmft Ib/M2 DriftRatio Orfft Frequency Reference Demand Capacity Scale Factor HCPLF hu/L hu (in) f(Hz) sum (9)
Shc.(9)
Fsi 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.00 2.21 4.42 13.25 17.66 2.158 0.713 0.166
<<NUMI
<<NUMI 0.281 0.092 0.057 0.025 0.097 0.077 0.057 0.017
<.023
%.063 0.34 0.84 0.99 0.68
<<OIV/OI
<<OIV/Ol 0.045 0.109 0.129 0.088 HCLPF 0.129
i ~ sagP'4Lil CALC NO REVlSION PAGE NO 0.
E.
Sacer /o /7 C]ient:
Nia ara Mohawk Power Corporation Ca]cuhtion No.
G404 Tide:
F 'nal sis of Selected Block Walls in Nine Mile Point Unit I prospect:
Nine Mile Point I IPEEE Method:
Acceptance Criteria; EPRI NP4041, Appendix R Remarks:
No.
Descri tion REWSIONS 0
Ori 'ssue CALCULATION COVER SHEET CONTRACTNO.
95C2873 Stevenson dc hssoc]ates; FIGURE 13
PROJECT NO. 95C2873 CAL. NO. C404
SUBJECT:
NMPI IPEEE REVISION PAGE NO O cy SHEET ¹f offC )7 Revision 0 Stevenson I Associates Fragility Analysis of Selected Block Walls in Nine Mile Point Unit I By MSL 8/25/95 Chk. TMT8/25/95 This caicuiatke documents the HCLPF evaluation for selected block walls in Nine Mile Point Unit I (NMPI).
The list is based the walls that are not screened in NMPC's report, Nine Mile Point 1 - IPEEE, Seismic Analysis - Masonry Wall Screening 8 Evaluation," Rev. 0, August 1995, spreadsheet on page 3, except for walls 32, 33, 35, and 104, which were screened on page 8 ofthe NMPC report, and wall 48 which has a MCLPF value greater than 0.3g in the preliminary screening.
The calculation is based on the following materfal properties uied, f = 2,000 psi fr = 40,000 psl Some of the earlier NMPI block wall calculations use f~ = 700 psi but most recent calculations use higher f'alue than the value used in this calculation.
Wall¹ Location RX261 16 Solid
¹4 bar 16'F SH256 12" Hollow unreinforced Size 18.5' x20'W 16'Hx33'W HCLPF 0,53 g 0.31 g Comments T~ay slab Tw~y slab
.:.'TB281 F.:
..zV.
B'iHotio'w"i<>~'¹4'4iir,I 'f6',,~'=.",=',: 'j,+14~8:'/20'-Vf.g":..
ISee VhlN24'and'nee'd,te>
'".23'-2 "
-".'f2;~Holkiw." :4m:bar.,"'e;1'6.,"-'N,': '"'14'(8:x'20'f ":
"Sie,VRdf'C?4';arid:need.te,,-'4 27 53 47-1 47-2 52 TB261 8'Hollow
¹4bar48'B261 12 Hollow
¹4 bar 32'B277 12 Hollow
¹4 bar 32'B277 8'ollow
¹4 bar 32'B277 12 Hollow
¹4 bar 32'B277 8'ollow
¹5 bar 24'B277 12 Hollow
¹4 bar 32 14' x20'W 13.5' x80'W
..; 4C....
20' x49.5'W 12' x40'W 21.4' x 30' 21' x 25' 20.25' x 40' 0.39 g 0.41 g 0.39 g 0.47 g 0.34 g 0.33 g 0.37 g Tray slab On~ay slab with drift O~y slab with drift On~y slab with drift On~y slab with drift Tw~y slab On~y slab with drift
NMP1 IPEEE Project 95C2873 Calc. No. C404 ATTACHMENT C
4'it By: MSLi 8/25/95 Chk.: TMT 8/25/95 Block Wall Preliminary Screnning Based on SSA Calculation 95C287~001:
Wall Name:
Stairwell Enclosure Area Block Wall 024 with horizontal span of 20'ser Input Height (H)
Span (W)
Weight (q)
Nominal Depth Sa Top Sa Bottom Sa 14 20 55 0.385 0.245 0.315 Remark ft NMPI Gale. No. S6-TB2614ON24, Rev. 0, page 4 ft NMPI Cele. No. S6-TB2614NV24, Rev. 1, page 9 1~2 NMPI Gale. No. S6-TB261%9N24, Rev. 0, page 4 in NMPI Gale. No. S6-TB2614NV24, Rev. 0, page 4 g
Average of 0.4g (5%) and 0.37g (7%) at TB 27T BD11 NS g
Average of 025g (5%) and 0.24g (7%) at TB 261'E10 NS g
Average spectral acceleration (6% damping)
Constant Fields:
Cover Thickness Poisson's Ratio Steel Area (As)
PGA 1.25 0.15 0.0042 0.13 1500000 29000000 ln psi Mortar compressive strength psi Steel yiekI strength in"2fin W bar 48" (NPMI Drwg. W<503$C) g Peak Ground Accieration for FRS psi 750 f'm psl Calculated Fields Actual Depth (D)
Ig Sg le Frequency (f)
Mv Mh My Beta Mx 7.625 3.8125 25.40 111.80 0.74 0.71 0.89 25.40 16 46 0.098 0.56 0.99 0.0357 0.25 0.0195 0.14 in 3/8" less than nominal in"4/in Section moment of inertia in"3/in Section modulus psi Flexural strength k~n/in Cracking coment ln i~in in"4/in Hz Fundamental frequency in k~n/in k~in Moment coefficient kin/in Maximum horizontal moment Moment coefficient k~in Maximum vertical moment HCLPF
.0.392
~
V
~t 0
NMP1 IPEEE Project 95C2873 Caic. No. CA$4
+l'I CAiC NO REVISION PAGE KO 7
4 uktp By: MSLi 8/25/95 Chk.: TMT 8/25/95 Block Wail Preliminary Screnning Based on S8A Calculation 95G287~001:
Wall Name:
AuxiliaryControl Room Block Wall 027 with horizontal span of 60'lock Wall along Column Line BB or A is checked since the spectra acceleration is always higher in the North/South direction.
User Input Height (H)
Span (W)
Weight (q) 13.5 60 101.3 Ib/It"2 Remark NMPI Calo. No. S6-TB2614MI27, Rev. 0, page 8 NMPI Gale. No. S6-TB2614NV27, Rev. 0, page 4 NMPI Calo. No. S6-TB2614NV27, Rev. 0, page 5 Nominal Depth Sa Top Sa Bottom 12 0.5 0.302 0.401 in NMPI Calo. No. S6-TB2614M27, Rev. 0, page 4 g
Average of 0.536 (5%) and OA63g (7%) at TB 27T BD11 NS Average of 0.316g (5%) and 0.288g (7%) at TB 261'E10 NS Average spectral acceleration (6% damping)
Constant Fields:
Cover Thickness Poisson's Ratio Steel Area (As)
PGA Em Es 1.25 0.15 0.00625 in~2fIn 0.13 1500000 29000000 psi 19.33 Mortar compressive strength Steel yield strength f/4 bar 32 (NMPI DWG OFM03&C 8 Calo. No. S6-TB261-MW27, Rev. 0, page 4)
Peak Ground Accieration for FRS 750 fm Calculated Fields Actual Depth (D)
Ig Sg le Frequency (f)
Mv My Beta Mx 11.625 5.8125 67.28 11.57 111.80 1.29 1.07 3.13 67.28 14.97 0.147 1.29 0.0063 0.0010 0.14 in in"4lin in"3fin kAn/in In in"4/in in'4/in in kin/in k~nfin kdn/in k~nfin 3/8" less than nominal Section moment of inertia Section modulus Flexural strength Cracking coment Fundamental frequency Moment coefficient Maximum horizontal moment Moment coefficient Maximum vertical moment HGLPF 0.183
NMP1 IPEEE Project 95C2873 Gale. No. C-004, Rev.
1 Sheet ¹ 17 of 18 By: MSLi 4/30/98 ChI<.: TMT 4/30/98 Block Wall Preliminary Screnning Based on SBA Calculation 95C2873-C001:
Wall Name:
Diesel Generator Area Block Wall¹53 with horizontal span of 49.5'ser Input Height (H)
Span (W)
Weight (q)
Nominal Depth 20 49.5 66 12 Ib/ft"2 in Remark NMPI Gale. No. S6-TB277-MW53, Rev. 0, page 5 NMPI Gale. No. S6-TB277-MW53, Rev. 0, page 5 NMPI Gale. No. S6-TB277-MW53, Rev. 0, page 5 NMPI Gale. No. S6-TB277-MW53, Rev. 0, page 4 Sa Top Sa Bottom Sa Constant Fields:
Cover Thickness Poisson's Ratio 0.864 0.5085 0.68625 1.25 0.15 2000 40000 In PSI PSI Average of 0.950g (5%) and 0.778g (7%) at TB 300'C10A EW Average of 0.553g (5%) and 0.464g (7%) at TB 277'D11 EW Average spectral acceleration (6% damping)
Mortar compressive strength Steel yield strength Steel Area (As)
PGA 0.00625 in"2/in 0.13
¹4 bar O 32" (NMPI DWG ¹FP5030-C)
Peak Ground Accleration for FRS Em 1500000 PSI 750 *f'm Es n
Calculated Fields 29000000 psi 19.33 Actual Depth (D)
Ig Sg Mcr le Frequency (f)
Beta1 My Beta 11.625 5.8125 67.28 11.57 111.80 1.29 1.07 3.13 67.28 9.35 0.147 1.29 1.72 0.0181 2.01 0.0044 0.48 in In in"4/in in"3/in PSI k-in/in in in"4/in in"4/in Hz in k-in/in k-in/in k-in/in k-in/in 3/8" less than nominal Section moment of inertia Section modulus Flexural strength Cracking coment Fundamental frequency Moment coefficient Maximum horizontal moment Moment coefficient Maximum vertical moment HCLPF 0.084
.4
N IPEEE Project 95C2873 Gale. No. C-004, Rev.1 0
't Sheet 18 of 18 By: MSLi 4/30/98 Chk.: TMT 4/30/98 DriftCalculation Based on EPRI NP4041, Appendix R Wall Name:
Diesel Generator Area Block Wall ¹53 with horizontal span of 49.5's Fc hu/L W
Mph MCDFM 0.00625 5.81 0.00108 0.147 0.173 0.030 240.0 0.040 9.60 0.458 0.53 1.29 nn2 in in in in in Ib/in"2 k-in/in k-in/in Remark NP4041 Eq. R-14 NP-6041 Eq. R-15 CDFM Permissible DriftLimit DriftRatio Drift Frequency SaBot(5%)
SaBot(7%)
SaTop (5%)
SaTop (7%)
Reference Demand Capacity Scale Factor HCPLF hu/L hu (in) f(Hz)
SADR (9)
SAC (g)
Fsi Elastic 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.00 1.20 2.40 4.80 7.20 9.60 7.993 2.131 1.466 0.976 0.744 0.595 0.506 0.280 0.190 0.130 0.097 0.083 0.439 0.255 0.160 0.115 0.084 0.073 0.752 0.285 0.200 0.135 0.097 0.083 0.620 0.255 0.160 0.115 0.085 0.073 0.579 0.269 0.178 0.124 0.091 0.078 0.391 0.371 0.351 0.311 0.271 0.231 0.68 1.38 1.98 2.52 2.99 2.97 0.09 0.18 0.26 0.33 0.39 0.39 DriftHCLPF 0.39
Cy
~
TABLE 1
< ~
~ 0
TABLE 1 Action ID IPEEE Section Improvement Table Status of NMPI IPEEE Im rovement Initiatives Benefit Significance Status 2
Seismic Control room panels F through N require top cross-tles Seismic Power boards 16A/B and 17A/B require base plug welding Seismic Power boards 102/103 require rear base plug welding Control room panels have weak lateral support and could bvist and separate in an earthquake.
This would render a significant portion ofthe control room inoperable and would likelyforce evacuation and thereby significantly
=-
affect success ath ca abilities.
These power boards are weakly anchored and could topple in an earthquake.
This would fail a significant amount ofequipment, combined with the likely coincident LOSP, would failthe success path.
These power boards are weakly anchored and could topple in an earthquake.
Tlus would fail a significant amount ofequipment, combined with the likely coincident LOSP, would failthe success path.
High, control room response followingan earthquake is critical and should be reliable.
High, failure ofthese power boards, combined with LOSP, would failthe success path.
High, failure ofthese power boards, combined with LOSP, would fail the success path.
DER 1-95-3212 complete DER 1-95-3140 in process, due RFO15 per AA6 program action lan DER 1-95-3090, 3091 in process, due RFO15 per A-46 program action lan Seismic Aux Control room cabinets 1S34, 35, 36, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75 require base filletweld 1S34 through 36 have littleimpact, but could topple over on other critical cabinets with success path components.
Cabinets 59, 60, 63, 64, 73 and 74 are also important based on containing success path components. The remaining cabinets are not important except to the event the can im act other im rtant cabinets.
High, failure ofthese cabinets can fail most if not all ofthe success path.
DER 1-95-3147, 3148, 3149, 3151, 3152, complete Seismic Aux Control room cabinets 1S37 through 39 require positive anchorage Seismic Aux Feed breakers require additional anchorage Seismic Cable tray in turbine e
building E1261 requires rod re lacement These cabinets can topple on cabinets 1S80, 82, 84, S5, 86, 87, 8S failingall emergency AC power, Panels 1S37
'nd 1S38 dominate risk considerations.
Should these circuit breakers fail to transfer on demand they could align the EDGs to offsite power and effectively fail the EDGs.
Failure ofthese cable trays could cause station blackout High, failure of emergency AC, combined with LOSP, would failthe success ath.
High, failure ofthese circuitbreakers, combined with LOSP, would fail the success ath.
High, station blackout would failthe success ath.
DER 1-95-3147, 3148, 3149, 3151, 3152, complete DER 1-95-3141 complete DER 1-95-2518 complete
le
'J
Action ID 10 IPEEE Section
- Fire, Others Fire Seismic Improvement Enhance operator training on procedure Nl-SOP-14 to include station blackout (SBO) mitigation without DC power Storage ofcombustibles in fire area T3B should be curtailed or more tightly controlled Cast iron inserts require tightness check and possible replacement Table Status of NMPI IPEEE Im rovement Initiatives Benefit Long term unrecoverable SBO was a somewhat minor contributor in the IPE. However, IPEEE scenarios where AC power cannot be recovered are more prevalent. Fire and high winds can lead to SBO scenarios where recovery is not likelyfor much longer than the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> currently considered for SBO mitigation. It is proposed to have operator training review the procedure NI-SOP-14 "Alternate Instrumentation" in the contuse ofa SBO withDC power unavailable.
This would better enable NMP1 to cope with a long term SBO and would give NMPI a ca abili uni ue within the nuclear indust Cables associated with both divisions ofemergency AC, DC, and various front-line systems (i.e., feedwater) are located in the south~ corner ofthe turbine building (el 261') near the old personnel access point. During recent IPEEE team walkdowns, a number of combustibles were noted in this immediate vicinity.
These combustibles included: five drums Qlled with oily rags, paint cans, bags oftrash, electronic equipment, and aerosol spray cans. Allofthese sources lead to a relatively high transient fire event probability in this area.
Curtailing storage would reduce a significant fire related safe issue.
Cast iron inserts are used widely to attach cable trays to ceilings. Failure could result in widespread cable tray failure and failure ofassociated cables and equipment.
Reliabilityofthese components is crucial to maintaining the capability ofthe success path.
Significance High, this action item is considered to be significant such that IPEEE results willbe adversely aQccted should it not be implemented High, a relatively minor fire could result in severe plant impacts High, widespread failure ofthese anchors could fail the success path.
Status Training Review Request (TRR) written and approved for Trallllllg Advisory Committee Ievle'w.
DER 1-96-1737 complete The limited analytical review (LAR)performed withinAA6 evaluated cable trays 'ivlthcast iron inserts. The LARdetermined the actual load is less than the insert allowable.
Item closed.
12 Seismic Lead cinch anchors require tightness check and possible re lacement Lead cinch anchors are used for anchorage ofvarious success path components.
Their reliabilityis important to earth uake miti ation.
High, widespread failure Complete ofthese anchors could fail the success ath.
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Action ID IPEEE Section Improvement Table Status of NMP1 IPEEE Im rovement Initiatives Benefit Signiflicance Status 13 Seismic Secure control room ceiling panel diffusers to T-bars in ceiling Ceiling panels could fall during a seismic event and impact operators.
Modificationwould improve operator safety and effectiveness.
Moderate, would not necessarily affect success path capability; would affect o rator reliabili DER 1-974908 complete 14
- Fire The following are potential improvements in critical areas requiring analysis:
- 1. Additional control of combustibles (Cl, T2B)
- 2. Thermography or a barrier (Cl, T3B)
- 3. Move a small transformer or use ofthermography B
These areas (cable spreading room, turbine building-southeast and turbine building north wall nert to elevator) and scenarios contribute to the fire analysis results. Thus, any ine~nsive change to the plant can have a relatively large benefit.
Moderate These areas have been added to the thermography program.
15a Seismic Relay 31D-X requires replacement or procedure change This normally deenergized relay enables EDG field flashing. Ifnormally open (NO) relay contact chatters, EDG breaker willclose and trip EDG. Ifnormally closed (NC) contact cliatters, the field flash contactor 31D willchatter while passing field current and would likelyresult in catastrophic failure ofthe contact thus reventin EDG restart.
High, failure ofthis relay, combined with LOSP, would fail the success path.
DER 1-94-1077 complete 15b Seismic Relay 67NI requires testing, replacement, or procedure change This relay can momentarily actuate causing 86DG-3 relay to trip the EDG and the associated circuitbreaker.
Moderate, results in EDG trip but failure is recoverable; EDG will restart on undervoltage after seismic motion subsides and breaker recloses automaticall Temporary procedure in place, due RFO15 per A-46 program action item 15c Seismic Relay 87DG-2 requires testing, replacement, or procedure change Tlus relay can momentarily actuate trip ofthe EDG and closure ofassociated circuit breaker.
Moderate, results in EDG trip but failure is recoverable; EDG will restart on undervoltage after seismic motion subsides and breaker recloses automaticall Temporary procedure in place, long term fixvia DER 1 1361 due RFO15
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Action ID 15c 15d 15e 15f IPEEE Section Seismic Seismic Seismic Seismic Improvement Relay 51G requires testing, replacement, or procedure change Relay 50/51 requires testing, replacement, or procedure change Relay 1H-9 requires replacement or procedure change Relay 1H-10 requires replacement or procedure change Table Status of NMP1 IPEEE Im rovement Initiatives Benefit This relay can energize a trip ofoQsite power and prevent EDG breaker closure until relay is reset.
This relay can energize a trip ofoffsite power and prevent EDG breaker closure until relay is reset.
Tlus relay in the fire actuation system could actuate in a relatively minor seismic event. Tlus would cause isolation ofthe EDG room HVACsystem and actuation ofCardox fire suppression in several areas.
Improvement ofthese relays would enhance the probability that important equipment is available to mitigate the impact ofearthquakes.
This relay in the fire actuation system could actuate in a relatively minor seismic event. This would cause isolation ofthe EDG room HVACsystem and actuation ofCardox fire suppression in several areas.
Improvement ofthese relays would enhance the probability that important equipment is available to mitigate the impact ofearthquakes.
Significance Moderate, results in EDG breaker trip but failure is recoverable; EDG will restart on undervoltage aAer seismic motion subsides and breaker recloses automaticall Moderate, results in EDG breaker trip but failure is recoverable; EDG will restart on undervoltage aAer seismic motion subsides and breaker recloses automaticall Moderate, these relays could trip EDG ventilation which could only aQect the EDG after some duration judged to be at least 30 minutes.
Cardox initiation could affect operator actions outside the control room but this is not expected to be significant, actions can still be accom lished.
Moderate, these relays could trip EDG ventilation which could only affect the EDG aAer some duration judged to be at least 30 minutes.
Cardox initiation could affect operator actions outside the control room but this is not expected to be significant, actions can still be accom lished.
Status Temporary procedure in place, due RFO15 per A46 program action item Temporary procedure in place, due RFO15 per A-46 program action item DER 1-95-2987 due RFO15 DER 1-95-2987 due RFO15
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Action ID 15g 1511 15i 15j IPEEE Section Seismic Seismic Seismic Seismic Improvement Relay 74A-9 requires replacement or procedure change Relay 74A-10 requires replacement or procedure change Relay 45X-9 requires test, replacement, or procedure change Relay 45X-10 requires test, replacement, or procedure change Table Status of NMP1 IPEEE Im rovement Initiatives Benefit Tlus relay in the fire actuation system could actuate in a relatively minor seismic event. This would cause isolation ofthe EDG room HVACsystem and actuation ofCardox fire suppression in several areas.
Improvement ofthese relays would enhance the probability that important equipment is available to mitigate the impact of earthquakes.
This relay in the fire actuation system could actuate in a relatively minor seismic event. This would cause isolation ofthe EDG room HVACsystem and actuation ofCardox fire suppression in several areas.
Improvement ofthese relays would enhance the probability that important equipment is available to mitigate the impact ofearthquakes.
This relay in the fire detection circuitry could cause actuation ofthe 1H-9 relay with impact discussed above.
This relay in the fire detection circuitry could cause actuation ofthe 1H-10 relay with impact discussed above.
Significance Moderate, these relays could trip EDG ventilation which could only affect the EDG after some duration judged to be at least 30 minutes.
Cardox initiation could aGect operator actions outside the control room but this is not e~~ed to be significant, actions can stillbe accom lished.
Moderate, these relays could trip EDG ventilation which could only aFect the EDG aAer some duration judged to be at least 30 minutes.
Cardox initiation could affect operator actions outside ofthe control room but this is not ex~ted to be significant, actions can stillbe accom lished.
Moderate, see 1H-9 Moderate, see 1H-10 Status DER 1-95-2987 due RFO15 DER 1-95-2987 due RFO15 DER 1-96-1678 combined with DER 1-95-2987 due RFO15 DER 1-96-1678 combined with DER 1-95-2987 due RFO15
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Action ID 15k 16 17 IPEEE Section Seismic Fire Seismic Improvement Series 2 timer requires replacement or procedure change Storage ofcombustibles in fire area Al should be curtailed and smoking area designation removed Electrical cabinet doors should be checked periodically Table Status of NMP1 IPEEE Im rovcment Initiatives Benefit This timer in the fire actuation system could actuate in a relatively minor seismic event. This would cause isolation ofthe EDG room HVACsystem and actuation ofCardox fire suppression in several areas.
Improvement ofthese relays would enhance the probability that important equipment is available to mitigate the impact ofearthquakes.
Cables associated with offsite power are located east of the chemistry offices on elevation 250'f the administrative building (G Building). The cables of concern are located in cable trays behind the locked gates in this area.
Storage ofrecords, computer equipment, and other combustible material was observed immediately under these cable trays. In addition, the area just outside the gate appears to be used as a break area. Itwas posted as a "Designated Smoking Area" and two ashtrays with cigarette butts were present. In addition, this area is also used for storage offiles and other materials.
Given the importance ofoffsite poiver, we recommend that, as a minimum, the material underneath the cable trays be moved and that smoking be prohibited in this area.
Measures to remove all unnecessa stora ein this area ma alsobe rudent.
Several electrical cabinet doors were found loose on a random sample basis during the walkdowns. In a seismic event they could rattle and lead to failure of sensitive equipment in the cabinet. This preventative maintenance activity would help to ensure operability of safe related ui ment Significance Moderate, this timer could trip EDG ventilation which could only affect the EDG aAer some duration judged to be at least 30 minutes.
Cardox initiation could affect ex~ntrol room operator actions but this is not +~ed to be significant, actions can stillbe accom lished.
Moderate, a relatively minor fire could result in significant plant impacts Moderate, considered an enhancement to current preventative maintenance.
Status DER 1-95-2987 due RFO15 DER 1-96-1737 complete
.Work order 98-00653-00 complete, doors gasketed.
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~J Action ID IPEEE Section Improvement Table Status of NMP1 IPEEE Im rovement Initiatives Benefit SigniTicance Status 18 Seismic Lube oil reservoir sight glasses ofpumps should be checked periodically Several lube oil reservoir sight glasses were found loose on a random sample basis during the walkdowns. In a seismic event they could leak and lead to seizing the pump. Tlus preventative maintenance activity would help to ensure operability ofsafety related equipment.
Low, considered an enhancement to current preventative maintenance.
Based on additional walkdown, only pumps on success path with these type ofreservoirs are core spray topping pumps (They were confirmed loose). With seismidSLOCA scenario, pumps are ofminimal importance since core spray pumps provide ad uate flow.
SQUG experience database reports no failures ofthis type. Based on seismic capacity engineering judgment and relatively low importance, action item closed, no additional action.
19
- Fire, Seismic Remove containment vent and torus cooling dependency on instrument air Currently instrument air is required to align containment vent and containment spray in the torus cooling mode.
Containment vent valves could be opened with handwheels.
Containment spray valves 80-15, 16, 35, 36 currently fail as is (open) on loss ofinstrument air and have no handwheels for manual operation. It is proposed to have manual handwheels added to these valves so that operators could align torus cooling without instrument air. Tlus would increase the reliabilityof torus cooling.
Low, this action item is considered to be a benefit but IPEEE results would not be adversely affected without implementation.
This action is considered cost-beneficial only if implemented along with other work that may arise in the future (i.e., perform this mod ifvalves are modified for any other reason).
On hold for future consideration.
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