ML17059A626
| ML17059A626 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1995 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17059A625 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9501240260 | |
| Download: ML17059A626 (6) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055&4001 SA TY EVA UA 0
B TH OF CE UCLE R REACTOR REGULATION 0 AM D
60 TO FA I Y OPE ING ICENSE NO.
PF-69 C
0 ION N
ILE POI UC EAR STATION UNIT 2 C
T NO 50-10 1.0 TUTTUT 0 By letter dated October 5, 1994, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (NMP-2), Technical Specifications (TSs).
The requested changes would revise the applicability requirements of TS 3.7.3 to require operability of the Control Room Outdoor Air Special Filter Train System (CROASFTS) in Operational Conditions 1, 2, 3 and.~ rather than in all Operational Conditions and **.
-The applicability requirements for Action Statement
- b. of TS 3.7.3 and for the Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation required operable by TS Tables 3.3.7. 1-1 and 4.3.7.1-1 would be changed in a similar manner.
The proposed amendment would also add a notation to Action Statement b.l. of TS 3.7.3 stating that the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable for entry into Operational Condition ~ when one filter train is inoperable provided an operable filter train is in operation in the emergency pressurization mode of operation.
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The CROASFTS is provided to ensure that the control room will remain habitable and will be maintained within the exposure requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 following all design basis accidents.
This system consists of two independent 100X capacity, safety-related emergency filter trains with HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers.
Each filter train contains a filter booster fan which discharges air drawn through the filter train into the common duct supplying air to the two safety-
- related, 100X capacity air conditioning units, one of which is normally in operation maintaining the control room at a slight positive pressure relative to the outdoors.
The normal air supply to the air conditioning units is from either one of two outside intakes.
Redundant seismic Category I radiation detectors are provided to monitor the air intakes.
If high radiation levels or if a loss-of-coolant accident is detected, the air supply to the control room is automatically diverted to the intake of the CROASFTS and both filter booster 950i2402bO 950118 PDR ADOCK 05000410 PDR
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fans are automatically started.
This action places each filter train in the emergency pressurization mode of operation.
Operation of the booster fans pulls outside air through the HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers, thereby ensuring that the control room will remain habitable and that exposures to control room personnel will be within the requirements of GDC 19.
The applicability requirements for TS 3.7.3 currently require two trains of the CROASFTS to be operable in all Operational Conditions and in Operational Condition ~ ("Mhen irradiated fuel is being handled in the reactor building and during core alterations and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel and uncovering irradiated fuel").
The proposed amendment would revise the applicability requirements for TS 3.7.3 such that two trains of the CROASFTS would be required operable only in Operational Conditions I, 2, 3, and Operational Condition ** (i.e., the system would no longer be.required to be operable in Operational Conditions 4 and 5).
In Operational Conditions 4 and 5, the average reactor coolant temperature is
<200 'F.
This temperature limit also limits the reactor coolant system pressure such that the probability and consequences of a design basis accident are reduced sufficiently that operation of the CROASFTS is unnecessary.
Therefore, the proposed change in the applicability requirements for TS 3.7.3 is acceptable.
Since operability of the CROASFTS is not required in Operational Conditions 4 and 5, operability of the radiation detectors (TS Tables 3.3.7.1-1 and 4.3.7.1-1) which initiate automatic actuation of this system is not required either.
Therefore, the proposed change to these tables is also acceptable.
NAP-2 TS 3.0.4 prohibits entry into an operational condition unless the conditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on the provisions of the Action statement.
The proposed amendment would add a
notation to Action Statement b.l. of TS 3.7.3 stating that the provisions of TS 3.0.4 are not applicable for entry into Operational Condition ** when one filter train is inoperable provided an operable filter train is in operation in the emergency pressurization mode of operation.
This part of the proposed amendment is acceptable since placing the operable filter train in operation ensures that its safety function (filtering of air being brought into the control room) is being accomplished.
This part of the proposed amendment is also consistent with the guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter 87-09, "Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) on the Applicability of Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements."
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that this part of the proposed amendment is also acceptable.
3.0 ~CO I In accordance with the Coneission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comnents.
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4.0 ON The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding.that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 55874).
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibilitycriteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed
- above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, (2) such
.'ctivities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
Donald S.
Brinkman january 18, 1995
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