ML17054B932
| ML17054B932 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1985 |
| From: | Butler W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Hooten B NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8510160349 | |
| Download: ML17054B932 (16) | |
Text
Docket No. 50-410
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Mr. B. G. Hooten Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard Nest
- Syracuse, NY 13202
Dear Mr. Hooten:
SUBJECT:
SAFE AND ALTERNATE SHUTDONN OF NINE MILE POINT 2 Enclosed is a draft copy of the safety evaluation for safe and alternate shutdown for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP-2).
This draft safety evaluation is scheduled to be part of the next SER supplement.
It is being provided to you for your information prior to the scheduled Appendix R audit, October 21 through 25, 1985.
Any questions concerning the enclosed report should be directed to the licensing project manager, Mary Haughey (301-492-7897).
Sincerely,
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
See next page prlgtnnl Signed by 1lalter R. Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No.
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Docket No. 50-410 UNITED STATES C%EAR REGULATORY COMMISSI WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 OCT. )O 1985 Mr. B. G. Hooten Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West
- Syracuse, NY 13202
Dear Mr. Hooten:
SUBJECT:
SAFE AND ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN OF NIIIE IIILE POINT 2 Enclosed is a draft copy of the safety evaluation for safe and alternate shutdown for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP-2).
This draft safety evaluation is scheduled to be part of the next SER supplement.
It is being provided to you for your information prior to the scheduled Appendix R audit, October 21 through 25, 1985.
Any questions concerning the enclosed report should be directed to the licensing project manager, Mary Haughey (301-492-7897).
Sincerely,
Enclosure:
As stated r
Q4PA~j1C'
. r~~~~/r W Walter R. Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No.
2 Division of Licensing cc:
See next page
1
,Mr. B.
G. Hooten Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 CC:
Hr. Troy B. Conner, Jr.,
Esq.
Conner e Wetterhahn Suite 1050 1747 Pennsylvania
- Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20006-Richard Goldsmith Syracuse University College of Law E. I. White Hall Campus Syracuse,'New York 12223 Ezra I. Bialik Assistant Attorney General-Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade Center New York, New York 10047 Resident Inspector Nine tiile Point Nuclear Power Station P. 0.
Box 99
- Lycoming, New York 13093 Mr. John W. Keib, Esq.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boul'evard West
- Syracuse, New York 13202 Mr. James Linville U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Norman Rademacher, Licensing Niagara Mohawk Power Corpora.ion 300 Erie Boulevard West
- Syracuse, New York 13202 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Mr. Paul D.
Eddy New York State Public Service Commission Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station-Unit II Post Office Box 63
- Lycoming, New York 13093
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SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT INPUT NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH 9.5.1.5.b Safe Shutdown Ca abilit The applicant has addressed the post-fire safe shutdown capability in Appendix 9B and Section 7.4 of the FSAR in accordance with the guidelines of Appendix R,Section III.G as contained in SRP Section 9.5. l.
The applicant's safe shutdown analysis states that systems needed for hot and cold shutdown are redundant and that one train of systems needed for safe shutdown would be free of fire damage because of separation, fire barriers and/or alternative shutdown capability.
The safe shutdown analysis included components, cabling and support equipment needed to achieve hot and cold shutdown.
For hot shutdown, at least one train of the following systems would be available following a fire in any plant area:
high pressure core spray system (HPCS), reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC), main steam safety/
relief valves (MS/SRVs),
and the residual heat removal system (RHR) in the suppression pool cooling mode.
The RHR system would be used for long ter'm decay heat removal and provides the capability to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after a fire.
The support systems for post-fire safe shutdown include the diesel generators, service water system, and the necessary HVAC systems.
The applicant performed an essential cabling study as a part of the shutdown analysis in order to ensure that at least one train of the above equipment and essential instrumentation is available in the event of a fire in areas which might affect these components.
The applicant utilized a computer to verify cable separation.
Safe shutdown equipment and cabling were identified and traced through each fire area from the components to the power source.
Additional equipment and cabling considered as associated either because of a shared common power source or common enclosure, or whose fire induced spurious operation could affect shutdown, were also identified.
For the identified
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associated circuits, the applicant has provided power lockout, circuit isolation and/or procedures to ensure that circuit failures would not prevent safe shutdown.
For'example, in order to prevent fire induced spurious signals from causing LOCA's from sources such as the RHR suction line, the applicant has stated that power will be locked out to one of the two RHR suction line valves during power operation.
Similarly, the operator will trip the power supply breakers for other valves whose controls are not provided at the remote shutdown
- panel, thereby preventing their fire induced spurious actuation.
With regard to high impedence faults resulting from damage to two or more cables connected to power sources required for hot shutdown equipment, the applicant.has stated that the cabling for redundant divisions (I and II) are located in separate fire areas, and therefore a fire in any one area will result in loss of only one of the redundant shutdown equipment power sources.
We have reviewed the applicant's method of determining the separation provided for redundant shutdown systems'nd find it acceptable.
We have also reviewed the associated circuits.identified by the applicant and the actions necessary or modifications made to prevent spurious operation that could affect safe plant shutdown.
We conclude that the applicant has adequately addressed the effects of associated circuit interaction and that power lockout, isolation devices and procedures are adequate to ensure that such circuit interactions will not prevent safe shutdown.
Based on the above, we conclude that the post-fire safe shutdown capability, of Nine Mile Point, Unit 2 complies with the guidelines of Appendix R,Section III.G.as contained in Section 9.5. 1, Position C.S.b, and is therefore, acceptable.
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1 9'.5.1.5 Alternative Shutdown Caoabil it
~ 0 Appendix 9B.S and 9 and Section 7.4.1.4 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) describe the remote shutdown panels and.their associated transfer switch design and capability.
The design objective of the remote shutdown panels is to provide a central point to control and monitor plant shutdown indepen-dent of the control room and relay room in the event of a fire in these areas.
All other areas of the plant will meet the separation of Appendix R,Section III.G. or an approved deviation.
Refer to previous portions of this SER Section.
There are two redundant remote shutdown panels, one each for train A and B.
One panel is located in the east area, El. 261'nd one in the west
- area, El. 261'.
Either panel can be used for post-fire alternate shutdown.
The design of each remote shutdown panel provides electrical isolation from the control room and relay room for the instrumentation indications and control functions for the shutdown systems.
The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)
- system, safety relief valves, residual heat removal (RHR) system and the service water system can be controlled from the remote shutdown panels to achieve and maintain hot shutdown should a fire disable the control room or relay room.
In order to assure the availabi 1,ity of these remote shutdown panels in the event of control room or relay room fire, transfer switches are provided at each remote shutdown panel to transfer one division of the shutdown capability to the remote shutdown panel.
Redundant fuses are provided in the circuit for controls and instruments at the remote panels to assure their availability following transfer from the control room.
Support system functions are initiated either at the remote shutdown panel or at local locations.
The applicant has stated that repairs are not required to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
- Further, the applicant has stated that shutdown procedures will be completed and personnel will be trained prior to fuel load.
h'e find this acceptable.
The applicant has also stated that sufficient manpower will be available onsite to perform the required operations in a timely manner to achieve and maintain a safe hot shutdown condition with a minimum onsite shift crew and will not include fire brigade members.
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The design of the remote shutdown panels complies with the alternate shutdown performance goals of Appendix R outlined in the guidelines of SRP Section 9.5. 1, Position C.5.c.
Reactivity control will be accomplished by a manual scram before the operators leave the control room.
The RCIC system will provide reactor coolant makeup and the RHR system and safety relief valves will be used for reactor decay heat removal.
Reactor vessel water level, reactor vessel
- pressure, suppression pool water level and temperature, RCIC pump turbine speed, RHR system flow and condensate storage tank level are among the instrumentation indications available at the remote shutdown panels independent of the control room and
", clay room to provide direct reading of process variables.
The remote shutdown panels also include instrumentation and control of support functions needed for shutdown equipment.
Based on the above, we conclude that the remote shutdown panels comply with the post-fire alternate shutdown guidelines of Appendix R,Section III.G.3 and III.L as contained in SRP Section 9.5. 1, Position C.5.c and are, therefore, acceptable.
Nine Mile Point 2
I, Management Involvement and Control in Assuring Quality:, Not Applicable 2.,
Approach to Resolution of Technical Issues from a Safety Standpoint:
Category I 3.
Responsiveness to NRC Initiatives:
Category 2
4.
Enforcement History:
Not Applicable 5.
Reporting and Analysis of Reportable Events:
Not Applicable 6.
Staff (Including Management}:
Not Applicable 7.
Training and Qualification Effectiveness:
Not Applicable The following is the narrative for Items 2 and 3 above.
The applicant's FSAR and subsequent submittals for the post-fire safe and alternate shutdown capability in response to the staff's concerns demonstrated a clear and thorough understanding of the issues.
The applicant's information clearly resolved the staff's concerns.
The applicant's response to staff questions was not prompt but did not delay our review 'efforts.
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