Text
~s REoy o4
+o 0
Cy
/A Op o~
+**<<+
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-220 NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO.
1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 55 License No. DPR-63 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has,found that:
The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated August 5, 1980 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical'to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's,regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Spec-ifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility License No. DPR-63 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 55, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
June 1, 1981 Thomas.A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch P2 Division of Licensing
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 55
'FACILITY
- OPERATING LICENSE NO. "DPR-'63 DOCKET NO. 50-220 Remove 6
13 52 53a
59 159 213 Insert 6
13
'2 53a 59 159 213
0
Snl I.IY LIIIII LIIIITIIIGShl!ETY SYSTEN SLTTlIIG Tliu iiuiil.rr>>i flux shall riol exceed ILs scraai sutli>>g for. Iiiiigur lliari 1.5 seconds as inillcated liy lliu I>>ocuss comlr<<tur.
IIIivii Lliv process cunqr<<tur is iiuL uf svrvicu, a safely liiait vliilal.luiislial1 Iiu assumvd I f Llic neutron flux rrxcuuds llic sera>>i suiting and control rod scram iluvs rur L occur.
Tu i.rrsr>> u lliat lliu Safety Limit estalil lslied in Sliucificaliuiis 2.l.la and 2.1.lb is not uxcuu<iuil. cauli r'eilulrcd'cram shall be initiated by ils vxlivcl.v.d scram signal.
Tliv Safety Liuiit sliall liu assumuil to be uxceedvd wliun scram is accrlmlrl lsllull Ily a llluarls oilier'llall lilu cxl)cele(l scr'cllll s lgtlal d,
Tlie reactor water low level serai>> trip setting shall be iio lower lhaii -12 inches (53 Inclies indlcalor scalv) relative to tlie minlniuin riormal water level (302'g").
e.
Tlie reactor water low-low level setting for core spray initiation sliall be no less than -5 feet (5 iiiclies iridicator, scale) rvlativc to the minimuai normal water level (Elevat.ion 302'9").
f.
Tlie flow biased APIIII rod block trip settiirgs sliall be less tlran or equal to that sliown in Figure 2.1.1.
ii.
IIIlulluvur lliv rcactoi. Is Iir tlic sliuLiliiwii crririliliuiiwilli irradialud fuel Iii lire reactor vvssul, lliv watvr luvul sliall iiol be uiore tllarl j'<
>irliuse of Irerforuiing major maintenance (lllll lu i.'xccvtl I 2 weeks ill rllli'at loll) olr tile r'uac lllr'essel; lliv reactor wa tur 1 evv1 may be Iiwui'ud O'iv.luw lhe minimmn riornial water Iuvul (I li!valii>>i 302'9").
llhurruvur llie reactor walur level Is lo bv. lowercil l>ulow lliu.
low-1ow-liiw luvul sul Iioint rudunilanL Irrstrrr>>i<<rrtatiorr will be proviiluil Io mo>>ilor lliv. iuaclur waL<<r luvcl.
Amendment No.
55
IIASES I'OII 2. l. I FOCI. CLAI)l)IIIG-Shl'FTY l.llllT I)u)'l>>(J lie)'Iuds wIieii Llie ieactoi is sliut dow>>, c>>>>sideratio>>
)mist also be giv<<n to water level re(luireme>>ts, due Lll Lllla QI fl.'ct llf decay IiedL.
I f reactor i)ate) level slioiild di op below Llie top of llie active fuel duriiig this Limii, IIie al)iliLy Lo i:()ol Llie core is rediiced.
Tliis ieductlori in core coolirig capability could lead Lo e I <<vs) Led cladd I>>g Leiiilieia Lui <>d cl a(I per fora t ioii.
Tlie core wi 1 1 be cooled suffIci e>> tly to prevent clad i>>eltiiig sliiiiild Lliu wate) level be )educed Lo Lwo-Llilr(ls of tli<<core lielglit.
lli<<. I(iw(.st I>>iliiLaL wliicli Llie watei'<<vel ca>> normally be mo>>itored is aliproxii>>ately 0 feet 0 inclies above tlie top oi the active f>>at.
This is lha i>>w-iow-iow water ievei trip point, which tsy feet lllnches (-30 inches i>>>iicator seal>:)
i>eiow
~>ini>>aae norswi water ievei (Eiovatio>> 3o2'>J").
Tho safety ii~it has been estahiished he)'e L>> I)vovld(.'
Iillillt,wllicll call be Illol)I Loved ali(I i) iso ca>> pvovide ade(lua te mav(JI>>
IIowevel fol'el forliiili(J maj>>) maliiteiiaiice ds sliecl fled I>> Speci ffcatlon 2. l. I.e, reduiidaiit i>>strui)ientation will be provided for i))o>>i toring
)'eall. Lol'ate)
Iev<<l huluw tli<< low-low-low water level set point.
(For example, by i>>stall ing teniporary instrume>>t 1 iiius <<iid )'eful'(!lice Iluts Lo vQdlilldtillt lt!Vel tl'illlslllitt<<rs, so Lliat llie reactor water level may be mo>>itored over Ilii: ie(liiiied itiiige.)
l>> aildltloii wrlLLe>> piocedures, wlilch ideiitify all Llie va1ves wliich have tlie poteiitial of I()wt.) iiitJ Llie waLQ)'(.vul iiiadvurteiitly, aie estalilislied to preve>>t tlieir operation during the n)ajo)'nai>>te>>a>>ce.
wlil(.I) i.<<ipilr<<s Lli(i watei. level Lo be b<<luw tlie low-low 1eve1 set pol>>t.
lliu Lhu)(t)al I>>iw<<r Ll'ellisl<<lit vesul tiiig wli<<ii a scr.am is accon)l)lislied otlier tlian by tlie expected scram sigiia1 (I.'. (J.
~ scl'(Illl I t'i)Ill lie(Itl'(ill flux fo1 1 ow I >>g closure o f Llie ma Ii)
I urb i>>e s top va 1 ves ) does>>o t neces sari ly cause fiiel <<Iillllil(JQ.
II()weve)', foi'liis speci ficati>>>> a safety li>>iit violaLion will be assumed wlie>> a scram is o>>ly accllilil)lislied by (>>ed>>s of t) backuli feature of tlie I)la)it d<<sign.
Tlie co>>cept of iiot approachliig a safety liuilt liri)vlded scram slgiials aie ulierable is sulilioi Led liy llie exLensive plant safely a>>alysis.
Amendment Ho.
55 13
LIHITI<<C Co<<DITIO<< FOR OPERW.ION SURYEILLN(CE REqUIREI'IEHT Co d0 If a redundant component in each of the core spray systems becomes inoperable, both systems shall be considered opevable provided that the component is returned to an operable condition wi)hin 7 days and the additional surveillance required is performed.
If a copy spray system becomes inoperable and all the components are operable in the other system, the reactor may remain in operation fov a period not to exceed 7 days.
check calibrate test Once/day Once/3 months Once/3 months.
d.
Core spray header AP'instrumentation If Specifications
- a. b, c and d are not met, a normal orderly shutdown shall be initiated within one hour and the veactor shall be in the cold shutdown. condition within ten hours.
If both core spray systems become inoperable the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within ten houvs and no work (except as specified in "f" and "h" below) shall be performed on the reac tor or i ts connec ted systems which coul d result in lowering the reactor water level to more than seven feet eleven inches below minimum normal water level (-30 inches indicator scale).
e.
Surveillance with Ino erable Com onents 1lhen a component or system becomes inoperable its vedundant component or system shall be demonstvated to be operable immediately and daily ther'-
after.
Si~vveillance during control rod drive maintenance which is simultaneous with the suppression chamber unwatered "hall include at least hourly checks Chat the conditions listed in 3.1.4f are met.
Amendment No.
55
0
LIHITltlG CO!'lOITIOti FOR OPERRTIOH SURVEILLRllCE RE UIREI1EHTS h.
For the purpose of performing !!major maintenance
.(not to exceed 12 weel:s in duration) on the reacto!
- vessel, thc reactor water level may be lowered to 9'relow the !!rini!num nor>>!al water level (elevation 302'9").
Hlrcncvcr the reactor crater level is to hc lowered below Lhc lo;r-low-low level set point
'redundant i>>strumentation trill be provided to u!o>>itor Lh'eactor water level a>>d vrritLe>> 'pro-cedures Irili bc developed and followed whenever Lhe reactor water level is lowered below the low-low level set point.
Ttre procedures
>>ill define Ll!c valises that will h<<. used to lo:;c! th<<vessel waicr level.
Rll other valves that have Lhe pote>>tial of luvrcring Lhe vessel
>>atcr level w!11 be identified by valve number
. irr the lrroccdur.cs and these valves will bc rcd Lagged Lo lrr cclude Lheir operation du! ing thc rrajor n!air!Lcr!a>>cc>>ith Lhe water level bclo!r the low-lo>> level set poir>t.
Ouring the period of major !aainte>>ance requiring lo<<ering Lire waLcr level to more than 7 feet llinches below r!rinirrurm norraal water level
{ -30 i>>cire-irulicator scale),
eil.hcr boLh Cor e Slrray Sy" tca!s must bc operable or, i f o>>c Core Sl>>'ay System is inoperablc because of th r!!air!Lcrurrrcc, all of tire rcdunrlant con'lronents of the otlrcr Core Spray Systcr!r must be operable.
Amendment No'.
55 53a
'h
BASES FOR 3.1.5 AHO 4.1.5 SOLEHOIO-RCTUA EO PRESSURE RE IEF A
ES Pressure Blowdown In the event of a small line break, substantial coolant loss could occur from the reactor vessel while it was still at relatively high pressures.
A pressure blowdown system is provided which in conjunction with the core spray system will prevent significant fuel damage for all sized line breaks (Appendix E-ll.2.0*).'peration of three solenoid-actuated pressure relief valves is sufficient to depressurize the primary system to 110 psig which, will permit full flow of the core spray system within required time limits (Appendix E-11.2*).
Requiring all six of the relief valves to be operable.
therefore, provides twice the minimum number required.
Prior to or following refueling at low reactor pressure, each valve will be manually opened to verify valve operability.
The malfunction analysis (Section II.XV, "Technical Supplement to Petition to Increase Power Level, "dated April 1970) demonstrates that no serious consequences result if one valve fails to close since the resulting blowdown is well within design limits.
In the event of a small line break, considerable time is available for the operator to permit core spray operation by manually depressurizing the vessel-using the solenoid-actuated valves.
Itowever, to ensure that the depressurization will be accomplished, automatic features are provided.
The relief valves shall be r
capable of automatic initiation from simultaneous low-low-low water level
( 7'-ll"below minimum normal water level at Elevation 302'9",
-3o inches indicator scale) and high containment pressure (3.5 psig).
The system response to small breaks requiring depressurization is discussed in Section VII-A.3.3* and the time available to take operator action is summarized in Table VII-1*. Additional information is included in the answers to guestions III-1 and III-5 of the First Supplement.
Steam from the reactor vessel is discharged to the suppression chamber during valve testing.
Conducting the tests with the reactor at low pressure such as just prior to or just after refueling minimizes the stress on the reactor coolant system.
The test interval of once per operating cycle results in a system failure probability of 7.0 x 10 7 (Fifth Supplement,
- p. 115)* and is consistent with practical consideration.
55
LIMITIHG COHOITIOH FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT c.: If a redundant component in each of the containment spray systems or their associated raw water systems become inoperable, both systems shall be considered operable provided that the component is returned to an oper-able condition within 7 days and that the additional surveillance required is performed.
- d. If a containment spray system or its associated raw water system becomes inoperable and all the components are operable in the other systems, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days.
c.
Raw tlater Cooling Pumps At least once per quarter manual startup and operability of the raw water cooling pumps shall be demon-strated.
d.
Surveillance with Inoperable Components When a component or system becomes in-operable its redundant component or system shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily there-afterr.
e.
If Specifications "a" or "b" are not met, shutdown shall begin within one hour and the reactor coolant shall be below 215F within ten hours.
If both containment spray systems become inoperable the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours and no work (except as specified in "f" below) shall be performed on the reactor which could result in lowering the reactor water level to more than seven feet eleven r
inches
(-3o inches indicator scale) below minimum normal water level (Elevation 302'9").
Amendment Ho.
55 e.
Surveillance during control rod drive maintenance which is simultaneous with the suppression chamber unwatered shall include at least hourly checks that the conditions listed in 3.3.7.f are met.
159
Table 3.6.2f ItJSIJIJIHLJI'IRTIOtt TIIAT llllTIATES AJJTO OEI'ltESSIJRI2ATIOH ti~ii~tim Condition for 0 iorstion I'arann: I.er Hlnilllollltto ~
of Trtl)ped ot Alterable Tr iii~Ss teias Hininmm) tto. of 01>eralile I os trnment Cliannel s lier Oliorable Tri
)
S stem Set-Point Iteactor Hode Swi tcl>
I'usilion in WJ>icl>
Function Hust Oe o
l/l I JI I I I A I I OJI
( I) a.
I.ow-l.ow-l.ow Iteaclor Itt>ter I.eve I 2 (a) 2 (a)
> -30 includes
( Indlca tor scale)
(b)
(b) x doll b.
IIIOJi llrywel I I risssore 2, (a) 2 (a)
J.5 I)s I(J (b)
(I))
x Amendment tto.
55 213
