ML17037C224

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning High Energy Line Breaks Outside the Containment of Unit 1
ML17037C224
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/28/1974
From: Raymond P
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp
To: Ziemann D
US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
References
Download: ML17037C224 (16)


Text

AEC DIST UTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATE (TEMPORARY 'FORA) CONTROL NO: 1690 FILE PRON: DATE OF DOC DATE REC'D LTR MEMO OTHER NiagaraMohawk Power Corp.

Syracuse, N. Y.

l TO: ORIG CC OTHER SENT AEC PDR XXX SENT LOCAL PDR XXX D. L. Ziemann 1 signed 39 CLASS UNCLASS PROP INFO INPUT NO C S REC'D DOCKET NO:

40 50-220 DESCRIPTION: ENCLOSURES:

Ltr re our ltr 1-29-74 trans the following.. Info re postulated pipe failure outside containment structure for Nine Mile Point Unit j/1 BONOT R.EMOVE

,)ACKNOWLEDGED PLANT NAME: NINE MILE POINT UNIT 81 .-'-~ ~x U A'I FQGE33 FOR ACTION/INFORMATION BUTLER(L) SCHWENCER(L) ZIEMANN(L) REGAN (E)

W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ 4 Copies W/ Copies CLARK(L) STOLZ(L) DICKER(E)

W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies GOLLER(L) VASSALLO(L) '/

KNIGHTON(E) "

W/ Copies Copies Copie's 'W/

W/ 'Copies KNIEL(L) SCHEMEL(L) YOUNGBLOOD (E)

W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION REG PILE TECH REVIEW DEN TON A/T IND AE HENDRIE GRIMES XC ASST BRAI'I'M OGC, ROON P-506A SCHROEDER GAMMILL DIGGS (L) SALTZMAN MUNTZING/STAFF MACCARY KASTNER GEARIN (L) B. HURT CASE KNIGHT BALLARD GOULBOURNE (L) PLANS GXAMBUSSO PAWLICKI 'PANGLER LEE (L)

MCDONALD BOYD SHAO MAIGRET (L) DUBF w/Input MOORE (L) (BWR) STELLO ENVYRO SERVICE (L) g DEYOUNG(L) (PWR) HOUSTON MULLER SHEPPARD (E) INFO H SKOVHOLT (L) NOVAK DICKER SMITH (L) C, MILES P; COLLINS ROSS KNIGHTON TEETS (L) B. KING DENISE IPPOLITO YOUNGBLOOD WADE (E) ~VARGA REG OPR JTEDESCO REGAN WILLIAMS (E) KEECKER FILE & REGION(3) JLONG PROJECT .LDR WILSON (L) 2CARTER MORRXS LAINAS S. REED (L) JEISENHUT Ltr STEELE BENAROYA HARLESS VOLLNER EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION 1 - LOCAL PDR OSWEGO NY 4 1 " DTIE(ABERNATHY) ) (1) (2)(10)-NATIONAL LAB' .1"PDR-SAN/LA/NY 1 - HSIC(BUCHANAN) 1-ASLBP(E/W Bldg,Rm 529) 1-GERALD LELLOUCHE 1 - ASLB(YORE/SAYRE/ 1-W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT BROOKHAVEN'AT. LAB.

WOODARD/ "H" ST. 1-CONSULTANT'S 1"AGMED(Ruth Gussman)

J 16 - CYS ACRS HSOXL%k Sent to Lic Asst Diggs 3-4-74 NEtRQRK/BLUME/AGBABIAN 1-GERALD ULRIKSON...ORNL BN<<B-127, GT.

1-RD..MULLER.', F-309 GT 1N I

0 ~ ~

4 I

K 1$ ~ ~

\ ~

)

I k

egu1atoI y. :f0e. Cy,.

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION II1 I~,

NIAGARA ~( MOHAWK 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202 February 28, 1974 Mr. D. L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch /I2 Directorate of Licensing 4yl@ Q United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Ziemann:

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Docket No. 50-220 Your letter of January 29, 1974 requested additional information concerning high energy line breaks outside the con-tainment for Nine Mile Point Unit 1. The additional information is attached in the form of responses to the specific questions included in your letter.

As requested in your letter, we are providing one signed original and thirty-nine copies.

Very truly yours, P. D. ymond Vice President Engineering 4

uvAKIEII 1" 1974 MAR ~890 IIE".I'a~C>>

II>II. C<<~ID'+

IIIICKET CLEM Q7 Attachment p ~i, f'>>

t1 ol 6

1. 'uestion Define the minimum design pressure of the main steam tunnel and/or its component walls or slabs.

~Res onse The main steam tunnel is comprised of reinforced concre'te walls and slabs.

These are two (2) feet thick and rectangular in configuration. The hori-zontal portion of the tunnel is eight (8) feet in height and eighteen (18) feet in width. The vertical portion is 18 feet x 37 feet. A computer an-

'lysis of. the tunnel's integrity was made for the previous report on high energy line breaks., This was submitted on June 29,'973. The loadings consist of internal pressure transients which have rapid ris'e times and exhibit, pressure oscillations which were charted. A number of locations

'were subjected to a guillotine double ended pipe break. The tunnel sus-tained the most severe pressure rise of 33 psia for 0.0075 seconds without any significant damage.

Pressure oscillation occurred beyond that point in time at an average of approximately 21 psia for the balance of the first second, decreasing from there on.

The integrity of the tunnel's maintained under all loading conditions: As stated in our letter of June 29, 1973, the main steam tunnel and isola'tion

'valve enclosure will not collapse, al.though spalling and cracking may occur..

u.Aiss uSAEC MAR 1 rgb RE'AMR'I HAIL SECTIOII DOCKEl CLERII q)

Ila

~ ~ ~

'0 I ~ ~ O.

~

~

2. guestion Describe the anchors at the main steam line isolation valves and/or the seismic restraints designed as pipe whipping restraints.

~Res onse The main steam isolation valves are supported as shown in. Figures 2-1 and 2-2. Points A, B and D are designed to resist a guillotine break in the main steam line on ei ther side of the valve. The design force for this pipe break is 240 kips. Point C is an anchor point for ther-mal and seismic forces.

~ I r,

r'

~

20'-0 POINT -A

$1 PAItt STEAN ISOLATION VALVE POlttT -B ~Q 8 rr.rra ei 4 NORIZOt!TAL FLAt!GEO RESTPrrlt!T

' 26I'-0 ELEV.

~ jp

'4 I ~

n

~ 4 ~

NICNOR ~ POINT C OF VALVE 24'IA. Kiltt STDLrt PIPING

~

! E':V. 250'-0 I

~ ~

5'-6 POINT .

Q OF PIPE, ELEV. 243'-6-I/2 r/' "

~  !

FLOOR ELEV. 241'-0 g t.!

CROSS SECT IONassmmcm~rv~~~~~

THRU iVIAIN STEAM VA LVE

~

ANCHOR POI NTS 8 RESTRAI NTS

~ ~ ~ 0 ~I I

LINE OF I I YALYE FLANGE (NORTH) OAR S'TOPS TO BEAR (ALL PLANS)

/ (POINT A)

~

\

g OF YAI.VE yl /

STRUCTURAL STEEL I YALYE SUPPORT I

Jl PLAN SECTION ~ A -A ..

VALVE BODY NOR I ZOtITAL FLANGEO RESTRAIIIT FIELD PLACED SHIHS TO BEAR (POINT 8)

PLAN SECT I ON B.. 8 I

~

lT C: ~'0 0 C:! 0 C>, ~> 0 O.'"0, 9

('- <~: i. 4

~ ~

ANCHOR PLATE 5 STOPS (POINT C) 24" DIA. I'AIN I

STEAH PIP INC I

L 4

SECT ON C C 2-2 Fl GUR F

~ ~ s ~ ~ '

~ 0 C

i s ~

guestion Describe the reactor cleanup system pipeline run as related in proximity to the torus. Provide necessary plan and el,evation drawings showing its routing. Indicate whether a rupture of this pipeline could cause damage'o the torus.

~Res onse As described in our June 29, 1973 submittal on pages 17.and 18 and Figure 3, no portion of the reactor cleanup system piping which is classified as h>gh energy goes below elevat)on 261 feet.

Figure 3-1 of this submittal shows a plan of the station. The area in which the cleanup system is located is denoted by "C" on the figure (ele-vation 261 feet, columns H - g). As can be seen, there are two separate concrete floors between any of the high energy reactor cleanup system piping and the suppression chamber. However, there is a relief valve discharge line to the chamber. This line is not high eneroy since it is designed for 150 PSIG and 120 F. It has been concluded that no damage to the chamber could be effected by a rupture in the cleanup system. y

~ ~ ~ 'I 0 SECTION BET)}IEEN COLUL5 ROSS 7 AND 8 Watt LlOL I States 4 eclat ICLOC I I I"

PCCACICR CCIO'2'KI'SLO CO'a CO'4'CS'Ctt CORI tal SSS'A b ILC CL %54 CL IAIVL r ~dr laoto fRCAC OCI SCO C.

a'I I

Kaa Oc Co a>>t RNL ca saod L IOO OC RICCI. CL SNO'

>> '1 K

TIICOwt IOP OC 'STCtl, ta.. SSS;Ol

~'

} . OAKCRAIOR COIIIA>>t>>t>>I tenta

. CL v},,IS IICSSCL >>a I VN CL.

>>2>> I }tt>> SOS'>>'

la l>>ao I,

I>>a A I a>> CL I}TLCL tl I-O' III+

AOI L

atC I r I

~

Ca CL Iva O.

~~}la TA OO atv' Ca Ca 'TSOq WSIR K faO' IA1 It AAA >>SAIC N'I

~ Nwv NIC

.~~.;. ~

I TCt>>C>>

tKACKICO}LACCCKCARC 2 tKICI KV ~alla Nat ea 4 ooclAATWR WATTR alwtlel CAA C IAN DSCAAAOOC APC

~

I I <<~o ILINV NOKIALLKI tlaaa IAICII I I'nl IINNC TNC 4'It C IOO>>S

'lo0'o'cr 4naa 4 I 44'O C}A 22 Cf 2 Al ISOII AO 224'2'O'2'0' ~ I CAOAAIAC LAIS AIAA liat To'ov I NIO I coors K CAT NAK 144 CIIA IIC' trt le lane Kana 21 2 l (I1 lan a Kana RCRCCV ~ O IAOOOC OCACTOR LOINC, TLIROINC OCNCRATCkl OIARTSIAIR 2 lr(illa'.llICAITI ICS artie lani rant 2C eral lane Kana CO OllA COACI

1

'i 4 ~

~ ~