ML16342A339
| ML16342A339 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1993 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342A340 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-93-29, 50-323-93-29, NUDOCS 9312160010 | |
| Download: ML16342A339 (28) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1993029
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR .REGULATORY COHHISSION
REGION
V
I
a
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License
Nos:
Licensee:
Facility Name:,
Inspection at:
Inspection
Conducted:
Inspectors:
50-275/93-29
and 50-323/93-29
50-275
and 50-323
DPR-80 and
Pacific
Gas
and Electric Company
Nuclear
Power Generation,
B14A
77 Scale Street,
Room 1451
P. 0.
Box 770000
San Francisco,
California 94177
Diabl o Canyon
Uni ts
1 and
2
Diablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
September
29 through
November 3,
1993
H. Hiller, Senior Resident
Inspector
H. Tschi ltz, Resident
inspector
D. Corporandy,
Project Inspector
(October 4-8,
1993)
D. Kirsch, Technical Advisor, Division of Reactor
Safety
and Projects,
Region
V
(September
29 October
1,
1993)
F. Huey,
Enforcement Officer, Region
V
(October 21-22,
1993)
Approved by:
P.
H. Johnson,
C ref
Reactor Projects
Section
1
h-~%-~S
Date Signed
~Summar:
I
Ins ection
on
Se tember
29 throu
h November
3
1993
Re ort Nos.
50-275 93-29
~d
Areas
Ins ected:
Routine,
announced
resident inspection of plant operations;
maintenance
and surveillance activities; follow-up of onsite events,
open
items,
and licensee
event reports
(LERs);
and selected
independent
inspection
activities.
Inspection
Procedures
40500,
61726,
62703,
71707,
90712,
92701,
and
93702 were used
as guidance
during this inspection.
Safet
Issues
Hang ement
S stem
SIHS
Items:
None
9312260010
932124
ADOCK 05000275
8
Results:
General
Conclusions
on Stren ths
and Weaknesses:
The licensee
cnntinued operation with no events,
no significant equipment
failures,
and
no significant personnel
errors
(Paragraph
2) .
Si nificant Safet
Matters:
None
Summar
of Violations:
A non-cited violation was identified for several
cases
of minor'procedural
non-compliance
(Paragraph
4).
ll
I
!
DETAILS
I
Persons
Contacted
Pacific
Gas
and Electric
Com an
G. H. Rueger,
Senior Vice President
and General
Manager,
Nuclear
Power Generation
Business. Unit
J.
D. Townsend,
Vice President
and Plant Manager,
Diablo
Canyon Operations
W. H. Fujimoto, Vice President,
Nuclear Technical
Services
~
- M. J. Angus,
Manager,
Nuclear Engineering Services
- R. P.
Powers,
Manager,
Nuclear guality Services
- J. A. Sexton,
Manager,
Nuclear Regulatory Services
- J. S, Bard, Director, Mechanical
Haintenance
D. H. Behnke,
Senior Engineer,
Regulatory
Compliance
G. H. Burgess,
Director,
Systems
Engineering
- M. G. Crockett,
Manager,
Technical
and Support Services
S.
R. Fridley, Director, Operations
- R. D. Glynn, Senior guality Assurance
Supervisor
- T. L. Grebel,
Supervisor,
Regulatory
Compliance
B.
W. Giffin, Manager,
Haintenance
Services
C.
R. Groff, Director, Plant'Engineering
- J. R. Hinds, Director, Nuclear Safety Engineering
- K. A. Hubbard,
Engineer,
Regulatory
Compliance
T. H. HcKnight, Senior Engineer, guality Control
- J. E. Holden, Acting Direztor, Operations
Services
- S. R. Ortore, Director, 'Electrical Maintenance
J.
H. Rappa,
General
Foreman, Electrical Haintenance
P.
G. Sarafian,
Senior Engineer,
Nuclear guality Services
R. A. Savard,
Director, Technical
Services
- J. A. Shoulders,
Director, Onsite Nuclear Engineering Services
D. A. Taggart, Director, Onsite guality Assurance
R.
C. Washington,
Acting Director, Instrumentation
and
Controls
- Denotes those attending the exit interview;
The inspectors
interviewed other licensee
employees
including shift
supervisors,
shift foremen, reactor
and auxiliary operators,
maintenance
personnel,
plant technicians
and engineers,
and quality assurance
personnel.
2.
0 erational
Status of Diablo Can
on Units
1 and
2
During this inspection period, Unit
1 operated at
100 percent
power
except for a reduction to 50 percent
power on October
15,
1993, for
approximately twenty-nine hours,
to perform cleaning of the circulating
water
pump 1-2 forebay.
Unit 2 operated at
100% power for the entire report period.
I
N
3.
0 erational
Safet
Verification
71707
a.
General
During the inspection period,
the inspectors
o6served
and examined
activities to verify the operational
safety of the licensee's
facility.
The observations
and examinations of those activities
were conducted
on
a daily, weekly, or monthly basis.
On a daily basis,
the inspectors
observed control
room activities to
verify compliance with selected
Limiting Conditions for Operation
(LCOs)
as prescribed in the facility Technical Specifications
(TS).
Logs, instrumentation,
recorder traces,
and other operational
records
were examined, to, obtain information on plant conditions
and
to evaluate
trends.
This operational
information was then evaluated
to-determine
whether regulatory requirements
were satisfied.
Shift
turnovers
were observed
on a sampling basis to verify that all
pertinent information on plant status
was relayed to the oncoming
crew.
During each
week, the inspectors
toured accessible
areas of
the facility to observe
the following:
(I)
General plant and equipment conditions
(2)
Fire hazards
and fire fighting equipment
(3)
Conduct of selected activities for compliance with the
licensee's
administrative controls
and approved
procedures
(4)
Interiors of electrical
and control panels
(5)
Plant housekeeping
and cleanliness
(6)
Engineered safety features
equipment alignment
and conditions
(7)
Storage of pressurized
gas bottles
The inspectors
talked with control
room operators
and other plant
personnel.
The discussions
centered
on pertizent topics of general
plant conditions,
procedures,
security, training, and-other
aspects
of the work activities.
b.
Radiolo ical Protection
The inspectors periodically observed radiological protection
practices
to determine whether the licensee's
program was being
implemented in conformance with facility policies
and procedures
and
in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors verified
that health physics supervisors
and professionals
conducted
frequent
plant tours to observe activities in progress
and were aware of
significant plant activities, particularly those related to radio-
logical conditions and/or challeriges.
ALARA considerations
were
found to be
an integral part of each
RWP (Radiation
Work Permit).
~
~
c ~
No
Ph sical Securit
Security activities were ob'served for conformance with regulatory
requirements;
the site security plan,
and administrative
procedures,
including vehicle
and personnel
access
screening,
personnel
badging,
site security force manning,
compensatory
measures,
and protected
and vital area integrity.
Exterior lighting was checked during
backshift inspections.
violations or deviations
were identified.
4. 'inor Failures to
Com
1
With Procedures
93702
During-. this inspection report period,
several
minor examples
occurred
which involved the licensee's
failure to comply with their procedures.
Although each of these
cases
was of low safety significance,
the number
of examples
indicated-a
lack. of attention-to-detail
in procedure
implementation.
These
cases
are described briefly below.
'I
a.
Im ro er Performance of Diesel
Generator. Surveillance
Testin
On November
1,
1993, during the performance of routine surveillance
test
STP M-9A, Revision 25, "Diesel Engine Generator
Routine
Surveillance," for emergency
diesel
generator
(EDG) l-l, a licensed
operator mistakenly went to the wrong 4-KV switchgear
room and
actuated
a relay which inadvertently started
EDG 1-3.
The purpose
of surveillance test
was to verify that
a start-up
bus under-voltage
relay output sent
an auto-start
signal to the
EDG 1-1 supplying
Bus "H".
When
STP H-9A directed the operator to actuate
the start-
up transformer relay toggle switch for EDG 1-1, the licensed
operator incorrectly went to bus "F" associated
with
EDG 1-3.
Control
room operators
immediately recognized that the incorrect
had
been started.
EDG 1-3 was run for 5 minutes
and secured without
loading in accordance
with licensee
procedures.
The licensee
reported the occurrence
in a four-hour, non-emergency
report to the
NRC, after classifying it as
a condition that 'resulted in the
actuation of an engineered
safety feature
(ESF).
The inspectors
will review the licensee corrective actions associated
with the
event after issuance
of the licensee
event report.
b.
Exhaust
Fan
104
Auxiliar Salt Water
Pum
Vault Ventilation Fan
Im ro er Lifted Lead Record
On October
21,
1993,
an
NRC inspector
observed portions of the
replacement
of auxiliary salt water
(ASW) pump 2-1 room ventilation
exhaust
fan E-104 due to motor bearing degradation.
Fan E-104's
safety function is to provide ventilation. cooling for the
ASW pump.
During the review of the work package
and the observation of the
restoration
and associated
retest of the fan motor, the inspector
noted that the E-104 fan motor did not start
as expected
when
ASW
pump 2-1 was started.
The inspector
noted that the fan motor controller fuse
had been
e
removed
and the load side-of the circuit grounded in accordance
with
the licensee's
standard electrical safety work practices
by the
electrician
who initially prepared for the fan replacement.
However,
the removal of the fan controller fuse
was not recorded
on
the lifted circuit and tag control status
sheet
and the cauti.on -tag
identifying that the fuse was. removed
was
hung
on the interior of
the electrical
panel.
Therefore,
the caution tag was not visible to.
the personnel
performing the restoration without opening the panel.
Additionally; the annotation for the caution tag
on the lifted
circuit and tag control status
sheet did not clearly indicate that
the fuse
was removed.
Consequently,
during the electrical
restoration for post-maintenance
testing the controller fuse
was not
re-installed.
The failure to log the fuse removal
on the lifted
circuit and tag control status
sheet
was
a violation of the
requirements
of licensee
procedure
AP C-4S3 Revision 4, "Control of
Lifted Circuitry, Process
Tubing and Jumpers
During Maintenance
and Circuits"..
Surveillance
Test Ste
's Performed
Out of Se uence
On September
30,
1993,
the
NRC inspectors
observed
the performance
of surveillance
test
STP I-16A28, Revision 8, "Actuation Logic Test
of Protection
System Logic", and portions of STP I-16Al, Revision
11,
"Removal
from Service of the
SSPS for Actuating Logic Testing
During Modes
1, 2, 3, or 4," for Unit 2.
-The inspectors
noted that
the instrumentation
and controls
(I&C) personnel
were familiar with
both the procedure
and the equipment.
During the surveillance
the
18C personnel
understood
and anticipated
the results of their-
actions
and kept the control
room operator
informed .of the
performance of steps
which initiated annunciator
alarms.
However,
the
NRC inspectors identified two minor concerns listed below.
~
STP I-16A1 requires
the reactor trip bypass circuit breakers
to
be racked into the test position and closed.
Contrary to
operations
procedure
OP A-3: IV Revision
10, "Control
Rod System
Manual Operation of Reactor Trip and
Bypass
Breakers,"
the
licensed
operator
attempted
to close the train
bypass breaker'ithout first re-installing the associated
control'power fuses.
After the initial unsuccessful
attempt to
close the trip breaker the operator re-installed the
DC control
power fuses
and closed the trip bypass
breaker.
Although the
operator
had reviewed the procedure prior to performing the
required actions,
he did not accomplish the procedure
steps in
the specified
sequence.
~
At two points in STP I-16A2B, the
NRC inspector noted that the
IKC technician operating
the equipment
was performing the test
steps faster than the
I&C technician reading the procedure
could read
and record the results
and i'nitial for the
completion of the step.
In one instance,
this resulted in the
testing of a function wi.th the function test switch in the
incorrect position.
In the second instance,
this resulted in
the
ISC mechanic performing a step prior to the procedure
reader
being able to ascertain if the actions
taken were in the
4
procedure.
In each of these
instances,
the improper operation
of equipment
and the potential for the improper operation of
equipment
was introduced
by not reading
and understanding .the
procedural
step prior to operating plant equipment.
The
inspectors
discussed
these
concerns
with Haintenance,
Operations,
and guality Assurance
management.
Licensee
management
has di scussed
these attention-to-detai
1 concerns
with supervision
and technician staff,
and
has
scheduled
further discussions
with supervisors
and technicians
in this
area.
d.
Surveillance
Procedure
Ste
s Performed
Out of Se
uence to Neet
Intent of Procedure
On October
13,
1993,
the
NRC inspector
observed. surveillance
procedure
STP V-3H8, Revision 8, "Exercising FCV-430 and
FCV-431
System
Heat Exchanger Isolation Outlet Valves," which tested
the
stroke times of valves
FCV-430 and FCV-431.
The operators
noted
that, for the heat exchanger
valve line-up in service in Unit 2, if
the procedure
steps
were followed as written, the valves would be
stroked
once prior to obtaining the stroke times;
This would
precondition the valves, contrary to the prohibiti on of
preconditioning stated in the procedure.
When'he
NRC inspector
questioned
the implementation of steps
out of order,
the licensee
issued
AR A0431906 to review the circumstances
of the event.
The
licensee
determined that the operators
understood
the intent of the
procedure
and that all the steps
were performed.
However, if the
steps
had
been performed in the order written, the intent of the
procedure
would not have
been
met for the Unit 2 initial test
conditions.
A more appropriate
approach
would have
been to change
the procedure
before implementation to address all the possible
initial test conditions.
In response
to these
and other examples of incorrect implementation of
procedures
which were identified by the licensee,
operations
management
issued
a memorandum,
and briefed all operations
crew members
on the need
for attention-to-detail
and procedural
compliance.
The memorandum
and
discussions
with shift members
reviewed lessons
learned
from improper
procedure
implementation.
The maintenance
organization
has identified
the need for consistency
in expectations
regarding procedure
compliance,
and is continuing emphasis
in this area.
Human performance
expertise
has
been applied in both the maintenance
and operations
organizations.
Each of these
occurrences
of failure to follow procedures
was of very low
safety significance.
However, the programmatic aspects
of lack of
compliance with procedures
indicate
a potential
problem.
These
examples
of a failure to follow plant procedure
requirements
are
a violation of
TS 6.8. 1.
Since the violations,
even in aggregate,
are of low safety
significance,
and since the criteria of Section VII.B.2 of the
enforcement policy were satisfied,
this violation is not cited (50-
275/93-29-01,
closed).
One non-cited violation was identified.
Maintenance
62703
During the inspection period,
the inspectors
observed portions of, and
reviewed records
on selected
maintenance activities to assure
compliance
with approved
procedures,
Technical Specifications,
And appropriate
industry codes
and standards.
Furthermore,
the inspectors verified that
maintenance activities were performed
by qualified personnel,
in
accordance
with fire protection
and housekeeping
controls,
and that
replacement
parts
were appropriately certified.
The inspectors
observed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Dates
Performed
Replacement
and retest of ASW pump 2-1
ventilation exhaust
fan E-104
(Wprk order:C0119279)
Replacement
and retest of
Diesel Generator
2-1
125
VDC
relay
(Work order: C0119171)
Main annunciator
spare wire
identi ficati on
(Unit 1)
(Work order: C0118304)
Scaffolding installation in
125
VDC switchgear
room 1-3 to
support pre-outage
inverter replacement
(Work Order:C0117487)
October
21
1993
October
18,
1993
September
29,
1993
October 4,
1993
October
12,
1993 and
October
19,
1993
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Block Wall Modifications in 4 KV
Switchgear areas,
Units
1 and
2
On September. 29,
1993,
an inspector
observed
ongoing work in the Unit
1
cable spreading
room on the annunciator panels.
The annunciator
panel
doors
on both sides .of the cabinets
were removed for modification and
spare
cables
were hanging out of the cabinets
and secured
to overhead
supports.
The inspector
expressed
concerns
to licensee
management
over
work on an operating
system in preparation for the next outage.
The
ongoing work involved spare wiring identification, relocation
and
removal.
The circuits were energized,
since the main annunciator
could
not be removed
from service while the work was being performed.
The
licensee
did not restrict access
into areas
adjacent to the open
energized
panels until after the inspector raised
concerns
over the
access
into the area.
In response
to these
concerns,
the licensee
placed
boundary tape at the entrance
points for the work areas
associated
with
open panels.
The inspectors will continue to closely monitor the control
of the work area
and the extent of the work being performed
as part of
routine inspection activities.
tl
~ ~
6.
Survei 1 1 ance
61726
The inspectors
reviewed
a sampling of Technical Specifications
(TS)
surveillance tests
and verified that:
(1)'a technically adequate
pro'cedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests;
(2)
the
surveillance tests
had
been performed at the frequency specified in the
TS and in accordance
with the
TS surveillance
requirements;
and
(3) test
results satisfied
acceptance
criteria or were properly disposi tioned.
The inspectors
observed portions of the following surveillance tests
on
the dates
shown:
d
Dates
Performed
STP I-16A2B
STP I-16A1
STP V-3P5
Actuation Logic Test of Protection
System Logic, including Protection
,Master Relays
and Reactor Trip-
Breakers
Removal
From Service of the
SSPS for
Actuation Logic Testing
Exercising
and Timing of Valves
-LCV-106,107,108
and
109 Auxiliary
Pump Discharge
September
30,
1993
September
30,
1993
October 7,
1993
STP M-9A
STP-3H8
Diesel
Generator
Routine Surveillance
October
18,
1993
Exercising
FCV-430 and FCV-431,
October
13,
1993
CCM Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation
Valves
7.
One non-cited violation was identified, which is discussed
in Paragraph
4
above.
Review of ualit
Hotline
HL
Pro
ram
40500
As of. October
22,
1993, .the following statistics
were noted with regard
to the Quality Hotline files initiated by the. licensee
during the last
four years:.
Number of NSC concerns
submitted:
Number of anonymous
concerns:
Number using
QHL Hotline Recording Machine:
Average length of time to close file (weeks
Longest period file was
open
weeks
. Number of concerns
substantiated:
Number of fi.les remaining open:
'990
1991
1992
1993
4
4
7
5
2
2
5
5
1
2
5
3
66
34
37+
18+
145
100
56+
, 36+
2
1
3
2
0
0
3
1
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
procedures
and training covering
the
QHL program
and each of the
QHL files noted above, identifying the
following observations:
~ ~
iP
Licensee
procedure
OM3. ID3,
equal ity Hotl ine,
impl ements
the
licensee's
guality Hotline program.
The licensee's
program is
significantly different from others in Region V,. in that,
the
program is structured
to place high emphasis
on users of the program
remaicing completely anonymous.
Although this 'approach
appears
to
have merit in that potential
users of the program
may feel
more
comfortable,
the inspector noted several
concerns
that may warrant
additional
consideration:
~
Specific details of the employee's
concerns
may not be clearly
understood
and 'documented.
The employee is not provided with a clearly documented
resolution of his concerns.
Failure to provide
a formal
closure letter may detract
from employee confidence in the
formality and thoroughness
of the
gHL program.
A formal
closure letter appears
to be especially important for concerns
that are determined
to be unsubstantiated.
Failure to do so
may result in a chilling effect of the employee
and/or result
in his pursuing his concerns
elsewhere.
The licensee
may miss valuable opportunities for employee
feedback
on the
gHL process.
Licensee
procedure
OH3.ID3 provides
no requirements
for security of
gHL files or how employee confidentiality is to be maintained in
instances
where the employee's
name is known. 'he inspector noted
that the
gHL log and
some of the
gHL files (August 21,
1991 log
entry,
and files 91-02 and 90-03) contain the employee's identity,
yet these
documents
are not secure.
The inspector also noted that
the licensee's
gHL phone recording machine
was not secure.
The
gHL log identified a July 5,
1991,
concern
about unqualified
members of the fire brigade for which no gHL file was initiated.
Licensee
procedure
OH3.ID3 does not provide specific requirements
for how files are to be closed or who is authorized to close out
gHL'iles.
Few of the files included clear documentation
as to how each
of the employee's
concerns
had
been resolved.
The time required to close
some files seems
excessive
(e.g.,
145
weeks) .
Although the inspector did not evaluate
the reasons
for
files remaining
open for extended periods,
the lack of specific
requirements
for periodic review and management
oversight of file
status
may result in unwarranted
delays in resolving significant
employee
concerns.
Safety concern training provided to licensee
and contractor
supervisory personnel
does not specifically emphasize
the
supervisor's
personal
culpability for NRC enforcement
action under
Consi,dering
some of the significant problems other
licensees
have experienced
involving allegations of discrimination
associated
with raising safety concerns
(especially involving
contractor personnel),
additional
emphasis
may be warranted.
~
~
~
~
As of October
22,
1993,
the licensee
has not performed
any
.independent
audits of the
gHL program.
In light of the relatively-
small
number of employee
concerns
documented
in the licensee's
gHL
program, it may be prudent
and informative to perform
a random
survey of licensee
and contractor
personnel
in drder to establish
employee
knowledge of and confidence in the
gHL program.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
8.
Licensee
Event
Re ort
LER
Followu
90712
a.
The inspector
performed
an in-office review of the following LERs
associated
with operating events.
Based
on the information provided
in the report, the inspectors
concluded that the licensee
had met
the reporting requirements,
had identified root causes,
and had
taken appropriate corrective actions.
The following LERs are
closed:
LER NUMBER
Unit 1:
DESCRIPTION
91-021,
Revision
0 'Failure of Motor Pinion Keys in Limitorque
SHB-3-80 Motor Operators
Due to Inadequate
Design of Material
92-003,
Revision
0
SG Tube Rupture Analysis Deficiency Due to
Inadequate
Communications with NSSS Supplier
92-006,
Revi si on
1
92-009,
Revision
1
92-012,
Revision
1
92-018,
Revision
1
Diesel
Fuel Oil Transfer
System Degradation
Due
to General
Corrosion
Dose Limits Potentially Exceeded
from Chemical
and Volume Control
System Valve Diaphragm
Leakage
Due to Thermally Induced Degradation
Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3
Due to
Auxiliar'y Building Ventilation System
Inoperability Resulting from a Single Failure
Manual Reactor Trip to Prevent Inadvertent
Criticality from Inadvertent
Cooldown
Due to
Abnormal Operation of Governor Valves92-020,
Revision
1
Control
Room Temperature
Limit Potentially
Exceeded
During Design Basis Accident Conditions92-021,
Revision
1
Techni cal
Speci ficati on 6.2. 2 Overtime
Restriction Violations Due to Inadequate
Overtime Control
Program
92-022,
Revision
1
Indications
on Hain Feedwater
Piping Near the
Nozzles
Due- to Thermal Fatigue
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-10-
92-025,
Revision
1
Lack of Redundant
Over-Current Protection for a
Class II Electrical Penetration
Circuit Due to.
Personnel
Error
92-027,
Revision
0
Containment Ventilation Isdlation Technical Specification 3.3.2 Not Met Due to Personnel
Error
92-029,
Revision
1
Fuel Handling Building Activities in
Noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.9, 12 Due.to Personnel
Error
92-030,
Revision
0
93-003, Revision
0
93-003, Revision
1
93-004,
Revision
0
Technical Specification 3.7.3. 1 Not Het When
Valves
Were Not Sealed
Open. or Periodically
Verified to be
Open
Due to Personnel
Error-
Low Temperature
Overpressure
Setpoint Analysis
Nonconservatism
Due to Hiscommunication
Low Temperature
Overpressure
Setpoint Analysis
Nonconservatism
Due to Miscommunication
Non-Conservative
Penalty
Used for the Heat Flux
Hot Channel
Factor Multiplier Due to Vendor
Oversight
93-007,
Revision
0
Technical Specification 6.8.4.e
Not Met Due to
Inadequate
Review of Licensing Requirements93-008, .Revision
0
Block Valves Installed
on the Inlet/Discharge
Side of Overpressure
Protection
Devices
Due to
Vendor Design Deficiency
Unit 2:
90-011, Revision
0
92-002,
Revision.
1
92-002,
Revision
2
Technical Specification 3.6.1.3
and 3.0.4 Not
Het for Unit 2 Containment Air Lock Due to
Programmatic Deficiency
Technical Specification 3.3.2 Action Requirement
Not Het When
a Steam
Flow Channel
was Calibrated
Using an Incorrect Data Sheet
Due to Personnel
Error
Technical
Speci fication 3.3.2 Action Requirement
Not Met When
a Steam
Flow Channel
was Calibrated
Using an Incorrect Data Sheet
Due to Personnel
Error
93-001, Revision
0
Turbine
and Reactor Trip During Surveillance
Testing
Due to Unknown Cause
93-001,
Revision
1
Turbine and Reactor Trip During Surveillance
Testing
Due to Unknown Cause
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-11-
93-002,
Revision
1
Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3
Due to
Auxi 1 iary .Building Ventilation System
Inoperability Caused
by Inadequate
Work
Instructions93-004,
Revision
1
Technical Specification 3.9. lg Not Net When Fuel
Handling Building Ventilation System
Was
During Fuel
Movement
Due to
Programmatic
Deficiency
93-005,
Revision
0
Valve Disc Separated
From Its Disc Nut as
a
Result of a Hanufacturing Error
93-006,
Revision
0
Anchor-Darling Check Valve Bonnet
Dowel Pins Not
in Compliance With Design Requirements
Due
to'anufacturing
Error
b.
The inspectors
reviewed the following LER by on-site review based
on
the details contained therein:
Closed
LER 50-275 92-04 Revision
0
"Low Vacuum Turbine Tri
and
Subse
uent Reactor Tri
Due to a Pro rammatic Deficienc "
. i
This
LER concerned
an Unit
1 turbine trip and subsequent
reactor
trip which occurred
on April 25,
1992,
due to low condenser
vacuum.
The low condenser
vacuum and subsequent trip were attributed .to
a
number of causes
including a faulty condenser
vacuum
pump suction
line check valve, personnel
errors encountered
when placing the
condenser
vacuum
pump in service,
and inadequate
procedural
instructions.
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's
root cause
assessment
and proposed corrective actions which included:
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Inspection of the condenser
vacuum
pump suction line check
valve for both units,
as well as repair, if necessary.
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Preparation
and distribution of an Operations
Incident Summary
of this event in order to sensitize
operations
personnel
to the
type of personnel
error which contributed to this event.
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Review of all emergency
and abnormal
operating procedures
to
identify situations
where operators
might be dispatched
to
perform equipment operations
without normal, procedure
issuance
(For such cases,
the licensee
decided to post local
instructions).
Revision of Operating
Procedure C-8:III, "Shutdown and Clearing
of a Hain Feedwater
Pump," to add precautions
and limitations
for possible
vacuum transients
when removing the
pump from
service.
The inspectors
found the licensee's
assessment
of root cause
and
proposed corrective actions to be acceptable.
The inspectors
verified that the licensee
had taken steps
to complete its proposed
12
correcti ve acti ons.
Thi s
LER i s cl osed.
No 'violati ons or devi ati ons were identi fied.
9.
Fo11owu
of 0 en
Items
9270l
a.
Closed
0 en Item 50-275 93-22-04:
Ade uac
of Flow to Cool'he
Reactor
Core in the Event
RHR Valve 8703 Fails to 0 en in the Hot
Le
Recirculation
Mode
This item was concerned
with the adequacy of flow to cool the
reactor core in the event of a single failure of resi dual heat
removal
(RHR) Valve 8703 to open during the hot leg recirculation
mode following a loss-of-coolant-accident.
The inspectors
interviewed cognizant licensee
personnel
and reviewed licensee
and
documents.
The purpose of the hot leg recirculation
mode is to prevent excessive
boron precipftation onto the fuel rods.
If Valve 8703 -failed to open,
the
RHR pump discharge
would not have
a flow path to the hot legs.
In this event,
the safety injection
(SI)
pumps would provide the only flow to the hot legs.
Licensee
calculations
demonstrated
that the flow through the hot legs with
one safety injection pump running was adequate
to satisfy
estimates
of required flow to prevent
precipitation.
The licensee
had revised its emergency operating
procedures
to realign the
RHR pump discharge
flow to inject through
the cold legs in the event that valve 8703 failed to open during the
hot leg recirculation
mode.
The inspector
concluded that the
licensee
and Westinghouse
evaluations of core flow wi th the SI
pumps
injecting into the hot legs concurrent with the
RHR pumps injecting
'into the cold legs demonstrated
reasonable
assurance
of adequate
core cooling.
This followup item is closed.
No"violations or deviations
were identified.
An exit meeting
was conducted
on. November
10,
1993, with the licensee
representatives
identified in paragraph I.
The inspectors
summarized
the
scope
and findings of the inspection
as described
in this report.
The licensee
did not,identify as proprietary any of the materials
reviewed
by or discussed
with the inspectors
during this inspection.
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