ML16342A207
| ML16342A207 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1993 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342A205 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-93-16, 50-323-93-16, NUDOCS 9308160142 | |
| Download: ML16342A207 (30) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1993016
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License
Nos:
Licensee:
facility Name:
Inspection at:
50-275/93-16
and 50-323/93-16
50-275
and 50-323
DPR-80 and
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
Nuclear
Power Generation,
B14A
77 Beale Street,
Room 1451
P. 0.
Box 770000
San francisco, California 94177
Diablo Canyon Units
1 and
2
Diablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection
Conducted:
Hay 25 through July 6,
1993
Inspectors:
N. Hiller, Senior Resident
Inspector
F.
Gee,
Resident
Inspector
Appr oved by:
~Summar:
o nson,
se
Reac
Projects
Section
1
>(~- v~
ate
igne
Ins ection from Ma
25 Throu
h Jul
6
1993
Re ort Nos.
50-275 93-16
and
~3!
I
e
Areas Ins ected:
Routine,
announced,
resident
inspection of plant operations;
maintenance
and surveillance activities; review of plant events;
followup of
onsite events;
open items;
and selected
independent
inspection activities.
Inspection
Procedures
40500,
41500,
61726,
62703,
71707,
82701,
92701,
and
93702,
were used
as guidance during this inspection.
Safet
Issues
Mana ement
S stem
SINS
Items:
None
Results:
General
Conclusions
on Stren ths
and Weaknesses
Strengths:
Licensed operator training conducted
in the simulator
was
challenging
and specifically trained operators
in individual diagnostic
skills, as well as communications
and crew cooperation,
to more effectively
and rapidly diagnose plant conditions
and events
(Paragraph
8).
9308160142
930730
ADQCK 05000275
9
Weaknesses
were identified in:
Failure to prevent
two separate
occurrences
of
boron dilution in the reactor coolant system
(RCS),
and failure to evaluate
action requests
within the required
30 days to determine if they represent
a
quality problem
(Paragraph
5).
Si nificant Safet
Hatters:
None
Summar
of Violations:
The inspectors identified two violations, involving:
(1) two instances
of
failure to provide or follow appropriate
procedures
for operation
and boration
of demineralizers
in the chemical
and volume control system
(Paragraph
5.c and
5.d),
and
(2) the licensee's
failure to perform timely quality evaluations
(Paragraph
5.e).
0
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Pacific
Gas
and El ectr ic
Com an
- G. H. Rueger,
Senior Vice President
and General
Manager,
Nuclear
Power Generation
Business
Unit
- J. D. Townsend,
Vice President
and Plant Manager,
Diablo
Canyon Operations
W. H. Fujimoto, Vice President,
Nuclear Technical
Services
- J. A. Sexton,
Manager,
Nuclear Regulatory Services
D. B. Hiklush,
Manager,
Operations
Services
- B. W. Giffin, Manager,
Maintenance
Services
, *R. Anderson,
Former Manager,
Nuclear Engineering/Construction
Services
- W. G. Crockett,
Manager,
Technical
and Support Services
- R. Russell, Director, Nuclear Regulatory Services
J.
E. Holden, Director, Instrumentation
and Controls
- R. P.
Powers,
Manager,
Nuclear guality Services
- T. L. Grebel, Supervisor,
Regulatory
Compliance
J.
S.
Bard, Director, Mechanical
Maintenance
S.
R. Ortore, Director, Electrical Maintenance
- S. R. Fridley, Director, Operations
- H. R. Tresler,
Manager,
Nuclear Engineering Services
- D. Tateosian,
Assistant to Vice President
- K. A. Hubbard,
Senior Engineer,
Regulatory Compliance
- S. Chesnut,
Senior Reactor Engineer
- J. Bonner, Site equality Control Specialist
J. J. Griffin, Group Leader,
Onsite Engineering
- C. R. Groff, Director, Plant Engineering
J.
E. Fields,
Lead Engineer, guality Control
W. T. Rapp,
Chairman,
Onsite Safety Review Group
T. King, Shift Foreman,
Operations
D. J..
Dye, Shift Supervisor,
Operations
P. Sarafian,
Senior
Engineer,
Nuclear guality Services
- E. Carlsen,
Regulatory Compliance
Engineer
S.
R. Vosburg, Director, Work Planning
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
The inspectors
interviewed other licensee
employees
including shift
supervisors,
shift foremen, reactor
and auxiliary operators,
maintenance
personnel,
plant technicians
and engineers,
and quality assurance
personnel.
0 erational
Status of Diablo Can
on Units I and
2
On June
2, the system dispatcher
requested
that Diablo Canyon reduce
plant output by 500
HW to follow the electrical distribution system
load,
the first request of this type in the plant's history.
Plant
management initiated
a 250
HW reduction in load
on each unit, which
corresponded
to each of the units operating at about
78 percent
power.
3 ~
During the power reduction,
as Unit
1 reached
95 percent
power, the low
pressure
steam stop valve on main feedwater
pump l-l closed unex-
pectedly,
reducing feedwater
flow to about
10 percent of the pump's
capacity.
Operators
promptly reduced reactor
power to 50 percent
and
stopped
the pump.
Since this power reduction
on Unit
1 was about
550
NW, Unit 2, which had been
reduced to about
95 percent
power at that
time,
was then returned to 100 percent
power.
Unit
1 remained at 50 percent
power for about 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />,
increased
power
to 85 percent,
and then reduced to 25 percent
power
on June
5 and
6 for
a scheduled
condenser
and circulating water tunnel cleaning over the
weekend.
Additional troubleshooting of the feedwater
pump was also
performed during the curtailment.
This event is discussed
in detail in
the following paragraph.
Otherwise,
Units
1 and
2 operated at 100~ power during this inspection
period.
Followu
of Onsi te Events
93702
4 ~
Unit
1
S urious Closure of Nain Feedwater
Pum
Low Pressure
Steam
Sto
Valve:
In response
to system dispatcher's
request
on June
2, both units
commenced
power reduction to 78 percent
power.
At about
95% power
Unit
1 experienced
a spurious closure of the low pressure
steam stop
valve on main feedwater
pump 1-1, which reduced the pump's output to
about
10 percent of capacity.
Operations staff personnel
quickly
reduced
the unit to 50 percent -power and
commenced
troubleshooting to
identify the cause of failure.
After about
30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />,
the licensee
had
not determined
the cause of the failure, and rai sed
power to 85 percent.
Power was limited to this level since plant management
was concerned
that the failure could recur,
and concluded that the plant's
response
to
would be more favorable beginning at 85 percent
than at
100 percent
power.
Power was maintained at 85 percent until the evening
= of June
4,
when power was reduced to 50 percent for scheduled
condenser
and tunnel cleaning during the weekend.
Troubleshooting of the feedwater
pump valve continued,
and power was
later reduced to 25 percent to permit the performance of preventive
maintenenance
work on a feedwater regulating valve.
Since
no cause
was
identified for the stop valve failure, and since the licensee
had
addressed
several
potential
causes of the failure during the power
reduction
(such
as cleaning of the main feedwater
pump hydraulic control
oil and associated
system orifices), the licensee
returned the plant to
100 percent
power at the conclusion of the tunnel cleaning
on June 6.
No similar failures have occurred.
No violations or deviations
were identified,
0 erational
Safet
Verification
71707
a.
General
During the inspection period, the inspectors
observed
and examined
activities to verify the operational
safety of the licensee's
0
faci 1 ity.
The observati ons
and examinati ons
of those acti vities
were conducted
on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
On
a daily basis,
the inspectors
observed
control
room activities
to verify compliance with selected
Limiting Conditions for
Operation
(LCOs)
as prescribed in the facility Technical
Specifications
(TS).
Logs, instrumentation,
recorder traces,
and
other operational
records
were examined to obtain information on
plant conditions
and to evaluate trends.
This operational
information was then evaluated to determine whether regulatory
requirements
were satisfied.
Shift turnovers
were observed
on a
sampling basis to verify that all pertinent information on plant
status
was relayed to the oncoming crew.
During each
week, the
inspectors
toured accessible
areas of the facility to observe
the
following:
(I)
General
plant and equipment conditions
(2)
Fire hazards
and fire fighting equipment
(3)
Conduct of selected activities for compliance with the
licensee's
administrative controls
and approved
procedures
(4)
Interiors of electrical
and control panels
(5)
Plant housekeeping
and cleanliness
(6)
Engineered
safety features
equipment alignment
and
conditions
(7)
Storage of pressurized
gas bottles
The inspectors
talked with control
room operators
and other plant
personnel.
The discussions
centered
on pertinent topics of
general
plant conditions,
procedures,
security, training,
and
, other aspects
of the work activities.
Radiolo ical Protection
The inspectors periodically observed radiological protection
practices
to determine whether the licensee's
program was being
implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedures
and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors
verified that health physics supervisors
and professionals
conducted
frequent plant tours to observe activities in progress
and were aware of significant plant activities, particularly those
related to radiological conditions and/or challenges.
considerations
were found to be an integral part of each
(Radiation
Work Permit).
Ph sical Securit
Security activities were observed for conformance with regulatory
requirements,
the site security plan,
and administrative
procedures,
including vehicle
and personnel
access
screening,
personnel
badging, site security force manning,
compensatory
measures,
and protected
and vital area integrity.
Exterior
lighting was checked during backshift inspections.
No violati ons or devi ati ons were identi fied.
Inadvertent Dilution of Reactor Coolant
S stem
Unresolved
Item 50-
323 93-12-01
Closed
92701
Inspection
Report 93-12 discussed
two reactor coolant system dilution
events
which occurred April 5,
and
May 12,
1993.
This inspection
included additional
examination of the circumstances
sur rounding the two
events,
with findings as follows:
~Bk
d
Each Unit's chemical
and volume control system
(CVCS)
has five
demineralizers,
consisting of three types:
two mixed bed,
one
cation bed,
and two deborating
bed demineralizers.
Mixed Bed:
The mixed bed demineralizers
contain lithiated anion
resins
and are used to place lithium into the reactor coolant
system
(RCS) for pH control.
A new lithiated resin
bed can last
for approximately
2 years of routine operation.
A mixed bed
demineralizer
with a new lithiated anion resin
bed has
some
capacity for removing boron from the
RCS.
However, after the
mixed bed demineralizer
has
been saturated
concentration of coolant passing
through it will not change.
Cation
Bed:
The cation
bed demineralizer is used to remove
lithium from the
RCS; the cation resin
bed has
no affinity for
b.
Deboratin
Bed:
The deborating
bed demineralizers
contain anion
resins
and are
used for removing boron from the
RCS.
Chronolo
On August 12,
1992, following a procedure
review, the licensee
concluded that the steps in Operating Procedure
OP G-5:III, "Spent
Resin Transfer System Demineralizer
Resin
Load and Rinse,"
Revision 4, were adequate
to preclude
an unexpected reactivity
change after placing newly replenished
ion exchange
beds in
service.
On December
8,
1992, during the
NRC shutdown risk team inspection,
the team identified to the licensee
the specific need for controls
to preclude inadvertent dilution of boron in the spent fuel pool
and the refueling cavity.
The licensee
issued
a new procedure
and
installed metering devices to monitor water inventory additions.
On April 5,
1993, during a Unit 2 refueling outage,
Operations
personnel
returned
mixed bed demineralizer
2-2 to service without
consulting chemistry staff personnel,
and induced
a 24 ppm boron
dilution in the refueling cavity.
Chemistry personnel
determined
that the boron concentration
in the refueling cavity had been
diluted from 2421
ppm to 2397
ppm, The boron concentration
in the
refueling cavity remained
above the administrative refueling limit
of 2100 ppm;
Hay 12,
1993, shortly after startup
and return to 100~ power
operation of. Unit 2,
a
CVCS cation bed demineralizer,
which had
last
been in service
on January
29,, 1993, prior to the refueling
outage,
was placed in service.
The relatively diluted coolant
(approximately
100
ppm boron) in the associated
vessel
and piping
caused
a dilution of the
RCS.
The added reactivity was noticed by
a control operator
as reactor
power and the primary average
temperature
began to rise.
The control operator inserted control
rods
and added approximately
20 gallons of boric acid to the
RCS,
limiting the resulting
power increase
to 0.7~.
On Hay 12,
1993, after the second
unplanned
boron dilution
event,
the action request
(AR)
(No. A0301928) written for the
dilution event
on April 5,
1993,
was reviewed (approximately
40
days after the event)
and determined to require
a quality
evaluation.
Reactivit
Addition Caused
b
Returnin
Nixed Bed Demineralizer to
Service
On April 5,
1993, during the Unit 2 outage,
Operations
personnel
returned
mixed bed demineralizer
2-2 to service,
inducing
a
decrease
of 24 ppm boron concentration
in the refueling cavity.
Prior to this event,
the resin for this demineralizer
had been
replaced,
and the bed
had been rinsed;
however, it had not been
saturated
with boron.
Operations
personnel
had affixed two
administrative
clearance
tags to an isolation valve for the
demineralizer
to prevent its use.
These tags
were temporarily
~ removed to permit filling and venting of the
CVCS.
The tags
were
inadvertently not returned to the valve,
and the demineralizer
was
left in service.
The chemistry staff noticed that the
demineralizer
had been returned to 'service,
and sampled the boron
concentration in the refueling cavity.
The concentration
had been
diluted from 2421
ppm to 2397
ppm.
The boron concentration in the
refueling cavity remained
above the licensee's
administrative
refueling limit of 2100
ppm and the Technical Specification limit
of 2000 ppm.
The licensee
had decided to not borate the
new bed placed in mixed
bed demineralizer
2-2, to reserve
the deboration
capacity of the
new bed for use at the end of core life.
Using the deboration
capacity of the
new bed in this manner
would have reduced the
generation of radioactive waste.
To implement this policy,
Operations
issued
a shift order,
dated February
23,
1993,
and
relied on administrative clearance
tags to prevent unintended
use
of the unborated
mixed bed demineralizers.
The inspector
noted the following weaknesses
which contributed to
the April 5,
1993, dilution event:
(1)
The use of a shift order to provide long-term instructions
for the use
and control of mixed bed demineralizers
was not
allowed by the licensee's
administrative procedures.
Administrative Procedure
(AP) C-151, "Administrative
Procedure
Dissemination of Operations
Department
Information,", Revision 3, governing the use of shift orders,
prescribed that shift orders
address
only short-term
instructions or communications
which are daily in nature.
The administrative
procedure further stated that operating
procedures
are to be used to control plant operation.
(2)
The licensee
did not follow an applicable operating
procedure.
Operating procedure
OP G-5: III, "Spent Resin
Transfer
System Demineralizer
Resin
Load and Rinse,"
Revision 4, Section 5.2, required the mixed Bed
demineralizer to be thoroughly saturated
with boron.
(3)
The licensee
did not maintain adequate
control of the
administrative
clearance
tags which had
been placed
on the
mixed bed demineralizer.
Operations
issued
two
administrative
clearance
tags,
Clearance
Numbers
00036563
and 00039966,
and affixed them to the isolation valve for
mixed bed demineralizer
2-2 to reserve
the
new unborated
resin
bed for deboration
use at end of core life.
Operations
personnel
removed the two clearance
tags to
permit filling and venting, of the
CVCS system
and system
realignment,
but did not replace
them after this evolution
was complete,
leaving the demineralizer in service.
One tag
was not returned
due to a lack of clarity of the clearance
instructions.,
The other was not returned
due to oversight
by licensed operators
during a busy period near the end of
the outage.
'he inspector
reviewed the safety significance of the event.
The
risk from boron dilution is higher during refueling since
manual
control of boron concentration
in the refueling cavity is relied
upon to maintain shutdown margin
.
Although the boron
concentration
was reduced
by 24 ppm,
a margin of 290
ppm remained
above the licensee's
administrative limits for refueling.
The failure to follow OP G-5: III was
an instance of violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, which requires that
activities affecting quality be accomplished
in accordance
with
established
procedures
(50-323/93-16-01).
Reactivit
Addition Caused
b
Returnin
Cation Demineralizer to
Service
On May 12,
1993, shortly after Unit 2 had
been returned to 100~
power operation following the refueling outage,
operators
placed
a
CVCS cation
bed demineralizer
in service.
The cation
bed
demineralizer
had last been in service
on January
29,
1993, prior
to the refueling outage,
and contained relatively diluted reactor
coolant (approximately
100
ppm boron),
compared to the
concentration after refueling.-
Mhen the
bed was placed into
service,
the less concentrated
coolant in .the demineralizer
vessel
and associated
piping was flushed into the
RCS, causing
a boron
dilution and adding reactivity to the core.
The added reactivity
was noticed
by a control operator
as reactor
power and primary
average
temperature
began to rise.
The control operator inserted
2Q steps
and added approximately
20 gallons of boric
acid to the
RCS to limit the power transient to 0.78.
The inspector noted the following weaknesses
which contributed to
the
Hay
12 dilution event:
(1)
The operators
were not aware of the low boron concentration
in the piping of the cation
bed demineralizer
system or the
potential for reactivity addition associated
with this lower
concentration..
(2)
Operating procedure
OP B-lA:XIII, "CVCS Place Cation
Bed
in Service / Prepare
Deborating Demineralizer for Service,"
Revision 2, did not require
a verification of boron
concentration
in the cation
bed demineralizer
and piping, to
guard against
an inadvertent dilution event.
(3)
As discussed
in the next section,
the licensee
had not
initiated
a review or taken corrective actions for the April
5 dilution event.
The inspector reviewed the safety significance of this event.
The
reactor
power ramp rate briefly exceeded
the licensee's
restriction
imposed for new fuel conditioning,
and there
was the
potential that a turbine runback could have
been initiated.
The
licensee
determined that exceeding
the fuel conditioning
'estriction did not have adverse
consequences,
since the magnitude
of the power increase
was minimal and the basis of the restriction
was to limit local power and temperature
increases
in the fuel
pellets.
The licensee
estimated that, without operator
action,
the power excursion would have
been approximately
3~ and might
have resulted in a turbine runback.
Although this control
system
is non-safety related,
a runback would have
imposed
an unnecessary
on the Unit.
Based
upon review of this issue,
the inspector
concluded that the
procedure for placing the cation demineralizer in service
was not
adequate
to prevent potential
unplanned
boron dilution.
The
procedure did not verify proper boron concentration
in the
demineralizer
(and associated
piping) before placing .it in
service.
This was
an instance of violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, which requires that procedures
be
appropriate
to the circumstances
(50-323/93-16-02).
Untimel
ual it
Evaluati ons
During followup of the April 5,
1993, dilution event,
the
inspector
found that the licensee
had not taken corrective actions
in accordance
with approved procedures.
Licensee chemistry
personnel initiated an action request
(AR A0301928), the lowest
level of problem report,
on April 6,
1993.
However,
a quality
evaluation
(QE), which would have prompted
a root cause
evaluation
and corrective actions to prevent recurrence,
was not initiated
until after the
May 12,
1993 dilution event.
Inter-Departmental
Administrative
Procedure
(IDAP) OM7.ID1,
"Problem Identification and Resolution
Action Requests,"
Revision 0, required that each
AR be reviewed to determine whether
a
QE should
be initiated.
The procedure established
that the
Section Director of Operations
and the Director of Quality Control
(QC) were responsible
for assuring that this review was completed.
IDAP OM7. ID2, "Quality Evaluations," required that all corrective
maintenance
and administrative task ARs, to which the Quality
Assurance
Program is applicable,
be reviewed
by Quality
Assurance/Quality
Control within 30 days to determine whether
a
quality problem exists.
In several
instances,
the
QC organization
requested
that
Operations
determine
the need for a
QE for this
AR (A0301928) .
Operations
did not respond to these
requests
until after the
second inadvertent reactivi ty addition event occurred
on May 12,
1993.
At that time, Operations
management
concluded that the
change in boron concentration
was insignificant.
In addition,
operations
perceived that the demanding
schedule of the refueling
outage allowed
some latitude in not following the established
procedure
requirements
to promptly issue
a QE.
Therefore,
Operations
did not perform a critical review of the configuration
control process
or other contributors to the problem.
During additional review and questioning of licensee
personnel,
the inspector
found that the licensee
had failed to perform timely
reviews of ARs in several
instances.
On June
9,
1993, the
inspector
noted the following:
Operations
had
a backlog of five ARs which required review
to determine
the need for QEs.
The age of these
ARs ranged
from approximately
40 days to 90 days.
Three other ARs with
outstanding
QE determinations
were closed
soon after the
May 26,
1993, exit meeting for NRC Inspection Period 93-12,
at which the inspectors identified the untimely
QE review
related to the April 5,.- 1993, dilution event.
Approximately 100 other
ARs more than
30 days old, from
various departments, still required
a
QE determination.
Of
these,
about
80 were the responsibility of the Mechanical
Maintenance
department.
On June
16,
1993, the licensee
documented
(on QE-Q0010742) that
130 ARs from various
departments
were older than thirty days
and had not yet
received
a gE determination.
Ninety-one of these
ARs had
statements
indicating more time was required for the
gE
determination.
Some of these
statements
were documented
more than 30 days after initiation of the AR.
Thirty-nine
of these
130 ARs did not have
a statement
regarding the
status of the pending
gE determination.
A review of the outstanding action requests
identified indicated
that the untimeliness of quality evaluations
was widespread.
The
above failures to promptly identify and initiate corrective
actions to preclude recurrence
were in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, which requires that conditions
adverse
to quality be promptly identified and corrected
(50-
323/93-16-03).
f.
Licensee Corrective Actions
The inspector discussed
the findings concerning
the untimely
quality evaluation review processes
and the unplanned
di lutions with the licensee
during an exit meeting (for Inspection
Report 93-12)
on Nay 26,
1993.
The licensee
subsequently
initiated the following actions:
(1)
A review of the related
procedures
and an evaluation of the
root causes,
(2)
A review of past industry information to determine if other
situations
had occurred wherein the licensee
had responded
inadequately
to industry lessons
learned
and corrective
actions,
and
(3)
A review of the use of a new mixed bed demineralizer for
deboration.
The licensee
reported
these
events
to industry representatives
on
, July 15,
1993.
In addition, the licensee
completed
an incident
summary,
issued
on June
15,
1993, which reviewed the lessons
learned
from the dilution events,
and informed the Operations
staff of corrective actions
which had
been
implemented.
The
summary stressed:
(1)
The importance of maintaining
a questioning attitude,
especially during periods of high activity during outages,
(2)
The importance of consulting all involved groups in an
issue,
since the chemistry department
had not been contacted
regarding the mixed bed demineralizer,
and
(3)
The importance of documenting
intended actions,
such
as the
clearance
tag which was intended to be re-hung but was over-
looked during the period of high activity in the control
room.
The inspector will review the licensee's
actions
described
above
-10-
'
in conjunction with the licensee's
response
to the Notice of
Violation provided with this report.
6.
Haintenance
62703
During the inspection period, the inspectors
observed
portions of, and
reviewed records
on, selected
maintenance activities to assure
compliance with approved procedures,
Technical Specifications,
and
appropriate
industry codes
and standards.
Furthermore,
the inspectors
verified that maintenance activities were performed
by 'qualified
personnel,
in accordance
with fire protection
and housekeeping
controls',
and that replacement
part's were appropriately certified.
The inspectors
observed portions of the following maintenance
activities:
Descri tion
Work Order C0115401,
Unit 2 ESF
Room Temperature
Scanner
Work Order C0115375,
Unit 2 Seal
Table Thimble Tube Nock-up
Simulated
Run,
HP N-54.3
Work Order
R0100615,
ASW pump l-l
Sample
Bearing Oil
Work Order C0115591,
ASW pump 1-1,
Replace
Bearing Oil
Work Order C0114762,
HS-l-PCV.-21,
Repair Seat
Leak-By
Work Order C0115439,
ASW unit
" cross-tie,
SW-O-FCV-601,
Verify and Set Limits as Required
No violati ons or devi ati ons were identi fied.
7.
Surveillance
61726
Dates
Performed
June
18,
1993
June
15 18,
1993
June
29,
1993
June
29,
1993
July 6,
1993
July 6,
1993
I
The inspectors
reviewed
a sampling of Technical Specifications
(TS)
surveillance tests
and verified that:
(1)
a technically adequate
procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests;
(2) the
surveillance
tests
had been
performed at the frequency speci fied in the
TS and in accordance
with the
TS surveillance
requirements;
and
(3) test
results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
11
The inspectors
observed portions of the following surveillance tests
on
the dates
shown:
Procedure
STP I-1A
Descri tion
Shift Checklist
Units
1 and
2
Dates
Performed
July
1 and 6,
1993
STP P-78
STP M-26
STP V-2A2
STP V-3F3
Auxiliary Sal twater
Pumps
ASW System
Flow
Monitoring
Auxiliary Saltwater
Crosstie
FCV-601
Verify Remote Position
Indicati on
Exercising Valve
FCV-601, Stroke Time
Test
June
29,
1993
June
29,
1993
July 6,
1993
July 6,
1993
'o
violations or deviations
were identified.
Observation of Licensed
0 erator Trainin
41500
On June
15,
1993, the inspectors
observed
licensed operator training in
the simulator
(Lesson
LR931Sl).
The training addressed
shift crew
performance
as
a team during design basis events. Skills exercised
and
discussed
included understanding
of plant equipment configurations
and
accident
responses,
individual operators'lant
knowledge
and
diagnostics skills, team .communications,
and team diagnostic skills.
The lesson
consisted of a scenario
which included
a condenser
leak,
a
loss of vital
DC,
a reactor trip and safety injection,
and
implementation of the emergency plan.
Since this was
a team skills
exercise
as well, the trainers
stopped
the simulation at appropriate
times during the exercise to probe the individual and shift crew
understanding
of changing plant information, as well as individual
knowledge of the plant systems
affected
by the simulated events.
The
trainers
encouraged
teamwork and pointed out instances
when
conscientious
involvement as
a team would ensure that plant conditions
are quickly and effectively assessed.
Trainers
appeared
to have
presented
an appropriate
level of challenges
to operator
teamwork and
diagnostic skills by this method.
Operator actions
appeared
appropriate
and procedures
were followed.
The inspector also observed
the
licensee's
critique of the simulator exercise,
which appeared
appropriately probing and critical.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
-12-
Emer enc
Drill
82701
On June
16,
1993, the licensee
conducted
an emergency drill.
This drill
included simulation of a medical
emergency with contamination,
a
chemical spill, loss of annunciators,
implementation of the site
emergency plan, loss of offsite power,
two seismic events,
release
of
radioactive noble gases,
evacuation of the Operations
Support Center
(OSC),
and
a natural circulation cooldown by control
room operators.
The licensee
reviewed the weaknesses
identified during the past
two
drills with the plant emergency
response staff,
and addressed
these
weaknesses
in the drill scenario
where possible,
so plant staff response
could be monitored to determine if the weakness
had
been corrected.
During the drill, control
room operators
(in the simulator)
appeared
to
conduct appropriate notifications and implementation of the emergency
plan.
Onsite personnel
were notified of the plant status
in timely
announcements.
Control
room operators
conducted
a natural circulation
cooldown of the plant.
The scenario
was run live on the simulator,
a
change
from taped scenarios
used in the past,
which the
NRC noted
had
limited the control
room staff s participation in the exercise.
This
past
weakness
appeared
to have
been corrected.
The inspector
observed
emergency
response
activities in the
OSC,
relocation of OSC staff to an alternate location,
and emergency
response
in the Technical
Support Center
(TSC).
The
OSC appeared
to
appropriately brief and track work teams.
Congestion
and noise were
minimized.
The relocation,
brought
on by loss of phone communications,
was quick and without complication.
Appropriate verification of
habitability at the alternate
location was performed before relocation.
Procedures
EP EF-2, "Activation and Operation of the Operational
Support
Center",
and
EP EF-9, "Activation of Back-up Emergency
Response
Facilities," were available
and were followed.
The
TSC appeared
to function well, providing appropriate
technical
support to the control
room and offsite monitoring.
Analysis of plant
conditions
and trends
appeared
timely and appropriate.
Emergency
response
organization
management
personnel
in the
TSC were appropriately
involved in assessing
plant conditions
and in provided good direction of
the
TSC resources
to support the control
room and offsite monitoring.
For the areas
observed
by the inspector,
the licensee
appeared
to have
planned
and performed the drill exercise,
giving appropriate
challenges
to the plant staff,
and demonstrating
the emergency
response
organiza-
tion's capability.
The relocation of the
OSC demonstrated
the
licensee's ability to relocate
an emergency
response facility.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
NSOC Meetin
40500
The inspector attended
a meeting of the Nuclear Safety Oversight
Committee
(NSOC)
on July 2,
1993.
NSOC is the highest-level
independent
quality group comprised of plant management.
Some of the issues
-13-
discussed
by the members of NSOC concerned
the objectives of the
new
Nuclear guality Assurance
group, monitoring of the performance
and
quality of plant organizations
as reorganization
and cost reductions
are
implemented,
non-conformance
reports, significant industry events,
specific plant issues
which had occurred since the meeting about
two
months previous,
personnel
safety,
the diversity of the ATLAS mitigation
system
and the Eagle
21 reactor protection
system replacement,
and the
recent
boron dilution events.
The subjects of discussion
appeared
appropriate.
Members of the
NSOC
who were not part of the licensee's
organization activity participated
in questioning
and discussion of issues.
Recommendations
by the group
members
were adopted or resolved during the meeting.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
11 .
~Ei
An exit meeting
was conducted
on July 1,
1993, with the licensee
representatives
identified in Paragraph
1.
The inspectors
summarized
the scope
and findings of the inspection
as described
in this report.
The only information that the licensee identified as proprietary was
a
technical
and financial
summary provided to the inspector to support
their review of the diversity issue associated
with the Eagle
21
replacement
for the reactor protection
system discussed
in Paragragh
10.
This information will be returned after review.
l
~
'I