ML16340A843
| ML16340A843 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1980 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Crane P PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003260376 | |
| Download: ML16340A843 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V 1990 N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD SUITE 202, WALNUTCREEK PLAZA WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA94596 March 13, 1980 Docket-Nos.
50-275, 50-323 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 Attention:
Mr. Philip A. Crane, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel Gentlemen:
The enclosed Bulletin 80-06 is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this
- matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, gpgp~ +
Director
Enclosures:
1.
List of IE Bulletins Recently Issued cc w/enclosures:
E.
B. Langley, Jr.,
PGSE M. Raymond, PGSE R.
- Ramsay, PG5E, Diablo Canyon 8 003860
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT llASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 March 13, 1980 SSINS:
6820 Accession No.:
8002280639 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF)
RESET CONTROLS Description of Circumstances:
IE Bulletin No. 80-06 On November 7, 1979, Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) reported that following initiation of Safety Injection (SI) at North Anna Power Station Unit 1, the use of the SI Reset pushbuttons alone resulted in certain ventila-tion dampers changing position from their safety or emergency mode to their normal mode.
Further investigation by VEPCO and the architect-engineer resulted in discovery of circuitry which similarly affected components actuated by a Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA, activated on Hi-Hi Containment Pressure).
The circuits in question are listed below:
Component/System Outside/Inside Recirculation Spray Pump Motors Pressurized Control Room Ventilation Isolation Dampers Safeguards Area Filter Dampers Containment Recirculation Cooler Fans Service ilater Supply and Discharge Valves to Containment Service Mater Radiation Monitoring Sample Pumps Main Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust Isolation Valves to the Containment Problem Pump motors will not start after actuation if CDA Reset is depressed prior to starting timer running out (approx.
3 minutes)
Dampers will open on SI Reset Dampers reposition to bypass filters when CDA Reset is depressed Fans will restart when CDA Reset is depressed If service water is being used as the cooling medium prior to CDA actuation, valves will reopen upon depressing CDA reset Pumps will not start after actuation if CDA reset is depressed prior to motor starting timers running out After receiving a high radiation monitor alarm on the air ejector
IE Bulletin No. 80-06 March 13, 1980 Page 2 of 3 Review of circuitry for ventilation dampers,
- motors, and valves reported by VEPCO resulted in discovery of similar designs in ESF-actuated components at Surry Unit 1 and Beaver Valley; where it has been found that certain equipment would return to its normal mode following the reset of an ESF signal;
- thus, protective actions of the affected systems could be compromised once the associated actuation signal is reset.
These two plants had Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation for the architect-engineer as did the North Anna Units.
The Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation and VEPCO are preparing design changes to preclude safety-related equipment from moving out of its emergency mode upon reset of an Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS).
This corrective action has been found acceptable by the NRC, in that, upon reset of ESFAS, all affected equipment remains in its emergency mode.
The NRC has performed reviews of selected areas of ESFAS reset action on PWR facilities and, in some cases, this review was limited to examination of logic diagrams and procedures.
It has been determined that logic diagrams may not adequately reflect as-built conditions; therefore, the requested review of drawings must be done at the schematic/elementary diagram level.
There have been several communications to licensees from the NRC on ESF reset actions.
For example, some of these communications have been in the form of Generic Letters issued in November, 1978 and October, 1979 on containment venting and purging during normal operation.
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins Nos.
79-05, 05A, 05B, 06A, 06B and 08 that addressed the events at TMI-2 and NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Re ort and Short-Term Recommendatsons.
- However, eac of these communications has a dresse on y a smsted area of the ESF's.
We are requesting that the reviews undertaken for this Bulletin address all of the ESF's.
Actions To Be Taken By Licensees:
For all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses:
1.
Review the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic level to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ESF actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.
2.
Verify the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facility are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signals.
Provide a schedule for the performance of the testing in your response to this Bulletin.
3.
If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modification, design
- change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.
IE~ Bulletin No. 80-06 Harch 13, 1980 Page 3 of 3 4.
Report in writing within 90 days, the results of your review and include a list of all devices which respond as discussed in item 3 above, actions taken or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a schedule for implementation of corrective action.
This information is requested under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f).
Accordingly, you are requested to provide within the time period specified above, written statements of the above information, signed under oath or affirmation.
Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy shall be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, liashington, D. C.
20555.
For all power reactor facilities with a construction permit, this Bulletin is for information only and no written response is required.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
'h
IE Bulletin No.
March 13, 1980 80-06 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Enclosure Bul 1 etin No.
80-05 79-01B Subject Date Issued Vacuum Condition Resulting 3/10/80 In Damage To Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks Environmental gualification 2/29/80 of Class IE Equipment Issued To All PWR power reactor facilities holding OLs and to those with a
CP All power reactor facilities with an OL 80-04 80-03 80-02 80-01 Analysis of a PWR Main Steam Line Break With Continued Feedwater Addition Loss of Charcoal From Standard Type II, 2 Inch, Tray Adsorber Cells Inadequate gual ity Assurance for Nuclear Operability of ADS Valve Pneumatic Supply 2/8/80 2/6/80 1/21/80 1/11/80 All PWR reactor facilities holding OLs and to those nearing licensing All holders of Power Reactor OLs and CPs All BWR licenses with a
CP or OL All BWR power reactor facilities with and OL 79-01B 79-28 Possible Malfunction of Namco Model EA 180 Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures 12/7/79 Environmental qua 1 ificati on 1/14/80 of Class IE Equipment All power reactor facilities with an OL All power reactor facilities with an OL or a CP 79-27 79-26 Loss Of lion-Class-1-E Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus During Operation Boron Loss From BWR Control Blades 11/30/79 11/20/79 All power reactor facilities holding OLs and to those nearing licensing All BWR power reactor facilities with an OL 79-25 Failures of Westinghouse 11/2/79 BFD Relays In Safety-Related Systems All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP