ML16340A820
| ML16340A820 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1979 |
| From: | Dodds R, Haist D, Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340A818 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-79-22, 50-323-79-12, NUDOCS 8003040693 | |
| Download: ML16340A820 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1979022
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COYiHISSIOi's
OFFICE
OF
INSPECTION
AND ENFORCE ~ENT
50-275/79-22
ort No.
50-323/79-12
50-275,
50-323
Docket No.
Licens~e
No
Safeguards
Grouo
Licensee:
Pacific Gas
and Electric
Com an
77 Beale Street
San Francisco,
Cali fornia
94106
Facility Name:
Diablo Canvon Units
1 and
2
Inspection at:
Diablo Canvon Site,
San Luis Obis
o Count
Inspection
Conducted:
October 23-26,
1979
Inspectors:
.
..dA<-'
,
eac or
nspector
D. P.
aist,
Reactor Inspector
/7,rj
m j7jY
G.
He nandez,
Reactor
Inspector
/I-J'n-
Date Signed
//Id yg
D te Signed
fill79
D te Signed
Approved by:
Summary:
R. T. Dodds', Chief, Fngineering Section,
Reactor
Construction
and Engineering
Support
Branch,
Ce
ate Signed
Ins ection durin
eriod of October 23-26,
1979
Re ort Nos.
50-275/79-22
an
-323/79-1
old:
R ti,
di
p
t.i
by r
1b
di
p
of construction/modification activities including:
licensee
actions
on
previous inspection findings and 50.55(e)
items; Unit 2 pipe supports
and
restraints
work observation;
Unit 2 seismic trip system installation including
OA procedure
review, work observation
and quality record review;
and observation
and quality record review of Units
1 and
2 4KY switchgear undervoltage protection
relay installation work.
The inspection
involved 75 inspector hours
by three
NRC inspectors.
Results:
Of the five areas
inspected
no items of noncompliance or deviations
weve
~ Kentii'ied in four areas.
One apparent. deviation from committment rIas
identified in the area of repair of weld and fitup deficiencies
on the volume
control tanks
(excessive
weld reinforcement
on the interior welds of Units
1
and
2 volume control tanks - see
paragraph 4.c).
908040
RV Form 219 (2)
'L
DETAILS
l.
Individuals Contacted
a.
Pacific Gas
and Electric
Com anv
PGAE)
- R. D. Etzler, Project Superintendent
- D. A. Rockwell, Resident Electrical
Engineer
- C. Braff, Mechanical
Supervisor
- J. Arnold, Coordinating
QC Engineer
- C. M. Seward,
QA Engineer
M. E. Leppke, Resident
Mechanical
Engineer
S. J. Foat,
OC Engineer
J.
R. Bratton,
QC Engineer
J.
Hanna,
Mechanical
Inspector
D. Adamson,
Level II Examiner,
DER
J.
S.
Diamonon,
QC Supervisor,
Operations
M. N. Norem, Startup Engineer
J.
Nystrom, Electrical
Inspector
R. Cook, Field Engineer
b.
Pullman-Kello
Kello
D. Geske,
QA Manager
c.
H. P. Foie
Com an
Foie
Y. Tenneyson,
QA Manager
J. C.,Perry,
Engineering Assistant
d.
Other Personnel
- T. Young,
NRC Resident
Inspector
- Denotes Exit Interview attendees
2.
Site Tour
Upon arrival the inspectors
conducted
a tour of the facility to observe
the activities of construction,
housekeeping
and general
compliance
with the
FSAR and applicable
codes
and standards.
During the tour the inspectors
observed that the Unit
1 pr essurizer
relief tank mounting assembly
had two anchor bolts without full thread
engagement,
one anchor bolt which was not torqued
and
had
some slotted
holes in the tank foundation which were not covered
by the washer for
the anchor bolt attachment.
The tank is classified
as design class II
and
PGRE class
E in the
FSAR.
As such,
the tank is not a nuclear safety
related
component
and not subject to the quality assurance
criteria of
The licensee
stated that the observed
mounting
conditions would be evaluated
and resolved.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.-
3.
Licensee Action on Previousl
Identified Enforcement
Items
'a
~
(Closed
275/79-17-01
Infraction:
Arc strikes
on pi
ewa
rupture
.
restraint structura
stee
.
b.
The licensee
response
to the item of noncompliance
was delineated
by letter of October 26, 1979.
The inspector verified that the form
for documentation of final walkdown inspection
was modified'o
specifically include inspection for arc strikes.
The contractor
(Kellogg) utilizes
a three tiered walkdown system.
The crafts personnel
perform the first walkdown and note deficient
conditions
on field sketches.
These
marked
up field sketches
are then given to the Kellogg engineering
department for walkdown
and verification.
These results
are then given to Kellogg gA who
performs the inspections
required
by procedure
ESD-243
(Pipe
Rupture Restraints).
Deficient conditions
noted are listed on a
repair process
sheet for work performance.
The licensee
has
developed
a procedure titled "Pipe Rupture
Re-
straint Repair Instructions"
(no. NFI-2-16) which addresses
inspec-
tions required to be performed
by the licensee's
mechanical
group
on the repair of pipe rupture restraint welds.
The inspector
examined
documentary
evidence that the required inspections
were
heing performed.
The inspector
examined about
150 weldment repairs in the areas
of the Unit 1 turbine building and pipeway.
The pipeway appeared
to be free of arc strikes
and repairs of arc strikes
were being
conducted in the Turbine Building in accordance
with procedures.
The inspector
had
no further questions.
Closed
275/78-12-01
Infraction:
Failure to se arate mutuall
re un ant circui ts in contro
room
ane
s in a manner re uire
The licensee
had completed separation
work and inspections
in the
Unit 1 control
room panels.
Control
room panel circuit separation
work and inspections
were in progress
on Unit 2.
The main control board layout drawings
had
been color coded
by
Engineering to show circuits requiring separation.
The licensee
inspections
were performed using these
drawings
as
a basis
and
documented
on sign off sheets.
The inspector
examined
the inspec-
tion documentation
and
had
no questions.
1
-3-
The inspector visually examined all Unit 1 main control boards
(Nos.
1VB1, 2,
3 and 4). It appeared
that redundant circuits
had been isolated
as required
by Engineering
Department directions.
The licensee
had satisfactorily corrected
the noncompliance for
Unit 1 identified as 275/78-12-01.
The correction of the non-
compliance in Unit 2, identified as 323/78-12-01, will be examined
during
a future inspection.
4.
Licensee Action on Previousl
Identified Followu
Items.
a ~
b.
,C.
(Closed
275/79-23-01
Followu
Item:
Non-Safet
related cir-
cults associated
with Unit 2, 480 volt vital bus 2F.
The inspector verified, by use of circuit schedules
and cable
routing information that the non-safety related circuits in
question did not cross vitalities.
Ho items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
(0 en
50-275/79-12-.04
Followu
Item:
Indications of crazinq
on Unic
1 and
2 cold le
rin
dams.
The licensee
had identified scattered
cracking (crazing) in the
cladding at the edge of the weld material
on the outside diameter
of the ring dams.
The licensee
has not yet determined
the depth
of the indications or the disposition.
The Unit 2 Steam Generators
were examined with liquid penetrant.
Crazing
was identified on
6 out of 8 ring dams extending
up to
9 inches out from the ring dam.
The depth of the indications
has not yet been determined.
This item will be examined further
during
a future inspection:
(50-323/79-12-01.)
(0 en
50-275/79-17-02)
Followun Item:
Re air of weld and
stu
efscsencses
on t e
C emica
an
Vo ume Contro
Tanks
.
The licensee
submitted
a repair program for the Units
1 and
2
Volume Control
Tanks to the
NRC Regional Office on July 16,
1979.
The repair program was submitted in accordance
with ASf1E Code
Section
XI requirements
to correct construction deficiencies.
The
deficiencies
include surface defects,
excess
defects,
and excessive
misalignment in the
head to shell welds.
The inspector
reviewed the results of the original
and continuing
nondestructive
examinations
and the licensee's
progress
in correcting
the deficiencies.
Repair efforts appeared
to be in accordance
with the
ASME Code and the licensee's
repair program.
The inspector
visually examined
the interior of each
VCT and identified small
areas
of excess
reinforcement
on the interior longitudinal
and
top head to shell welds.
On the interior longitudinal
seam,
excess
reinforcement of between
3/32 inch and 1/8 inch was observed
to be
a total of approximately
18 inches
in length
on a
6 foot
long seam.
On the top head to shell interior weld the
same
excess
reinforcement
was observed to be
a total of approximately
3 inches in length
on
a 20 foot long seam.
Both Unit 1 and
Unit 2 tanks exhibited these conditions.
The Unit No.
1 and
2
VCT were constructed
to the
ASME Code
Section III as
Class
C. tanks.
Fabrication
Drawing
No. 110F213
S.H.
1 specifies
radiography in accordance
with
paragraph
U~~J-51 of ASME Code Section VIII.
(1968), paragraph
Ull-51 specifies that the finished weld crown
of joints to be radiographed
may not exceed 1/16-inch for the
reinforcement thickness of the VCT's.
Full radiography is required
on
VCT tank seams.
The inspector
examined llestinghouse
Ouality Control Releases
gCR
No.
5464 (Unit 1) and
gCR No.
5688 (Unit 2) which indicate
acceptability of RT film, records
and visual inspections.
The excess
reinforcement identified on the Units
1 and
2 Volume
Control tanks
appears
to be
a deviation from committment.
(50-275/79-22-01
and 50-361/79-12-02).
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.5.
Licensee Action on 50.55(e
Items
(0 en)
(275/79-13-01
and
IE Ins ection Report 50-275/79-07
Cracks in
ru ture restraint
we dments.
General
The licensee
stated that they had instituted and completed
an
'xpanded
program to evaluate
every full penetration field weld
on the Unit 1 pipeway
by magnetic particle examination to
establish
the adequacy of their program for joint identification
and repair.
A sample of shop welds
had
been selected for exam-
-ination to form a data
base to establish
the adequacy of the
originally specified inspection
program applied
by the vendor
of the structural steel.
The results of the shop weld examination
program will be examined during
a future inspection.
The licensee
had begun
an evaluation of the Unit 2 heavy section,
highly restrained joints in the turbine building and pipeway.
The Unit 2 evaluation
and repair efforts will be examined during
a future inspection.
r
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(2)
Observation of llork and I:lork Activities
The inspector visually examined about
150 completed or in-process
repair welds
on the following Unit 1 restraints
in the turbine
building and pipeway:
Nos.
124,
125,
126 and 159;
Bents
2B, 3,
4,
6B and 9; and two pipe restraints
in the Unit 1 between auxiliary
and turbine buildings.
The welding appeared
to conform to
ANS D1.1
and procedural
requirements.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
(3)
Review of ualit
Records
The ihspector
examined the following quality records,
as appli-
cable,
associated
with restraint
124 (welds
10A, B, C, 17C) and
restraint
125 (welds
9A
B, C.and
10A, B.and C):
magnetic particle
examination records,
ulbasonic examination records,
freya process
sheets for qrinding and/or repair, preheat
and interpass
temperature,
base
metal repair records,
and "as-built'" documentation.
The quality
records
appeared
to conform to
AK~S D1.1 and procedural
requirements.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
6.
Pipe
Su
orts
and Restraints
- Observation of !cwork
The inspector. randomly selected
twelve Unit 2 pipe supports
and re-
straints
and visually examined their installations for conformance
.
with drawing requirements.
The selected
design
Class
I support/
restraint types
and drawing numbers
are listed below:
Su
ort/Restraint
T
e
Drawin
No.
Mechanical
Mechanical
Mechanical
051398
SH.29
051398
SH.14
051394
SH.45
Rigid multiple support
Rigid multiple support
Spring hanger
Spring hanger
051368
SH.13
051348
SH.137
051359
SH.110
051358
SH.15
Rigid hanger
051359
SH.142
Rigid hanger
051368
SH.10
Rigid support
051359
SH.7A
Rigid support
051359
SH.113
Rigid support
051357
SH.124
All supports
and restraints
examined
appeared
to be installed in con-
formance with the applicable
drawing.
No items of noncompliance
or
deviations
were identified.
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4J
7.
Seismic Tri
S stem Installation - Unit 2
Review of OA Im lementin
Procedures
The following Foley procedures
were examined for compliance with
FSAR committments
and licensee
drawing requirements.
(a)
QCP-9,
Rev 9.0; Installation of Raceway Junction
and Terminal
Boxes for Mire Pull.
(b)
QCP-10,
Rev 5.0;
QC Procedure for Power,
Control
and Signal
Wires.
(2)
(c)
QCP-11,
Rev 6.0;
QC Procedure for Cable
and Wire Terminations.
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
Observation of Work and Work Activities
The following completed work associated
with the Unit 2 seismic
trip system
was examined for compliance with the above procedures.
(a)
Seven
conduit installations
(b)
Twenty cable installations,
including terminations
c)
Seven conduit supports
d)
Cabinet mounting
and circuit installations in Seismic Trip
Cabinets for Trains
A and
B.
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
Review of
ual it
Records
The following quality related
records
associated
with the above
observations
were examined for compliance with procedural
require-
ments.
(a)
Conduit installation sheets
(b)
Raceway inspection reports
(c)
Circuit installation records
(d)
Circuit installation resistance
data
(e)
Circuit termination records
(f)
Class If support inspection reports
(g)
Support installation work sheets
(h)
Tool calibration records
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
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-7-
8.
4KV Switch ear
Second
Level Under Volta e Protection
Rela
s
The
4KV Switchgear
second level under voltage protection relays
and related
hardware for Units
1 and
2 were examined for conformance
to the install-
ation requirements
of Procedure
EII-9, Electrical
Equipment
Internal tlodification and Specification
8802 (Installing, Hiring, Small
Electrical
Equipment
and Instrumentation).
A review of associated
records
was also
conducted
which included; certification of conformances,
purchase
orders,
design
change orders,
engineering telecons,
equipment
modification logs,
and inspection
records.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
9.
Unit 1 Auxiliar
Level Control Valve Modifications
Discussions
with cognizant engineers
indicated that the present auxiliary
feedwater level control valves manufactured
by llestern Hydraulic will
be replaced
by ITT Grinnel units.
The schedule for modification com-
pl.etion is dependent
upon shipment
and completion of a testing
program of the
new valves.
10. Exit Interview
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted in paragraph
1) at the conclusion of the inspection
on October 26,
1979 and summar-
ized the inspection
scope
and findings.
The licensee
acknowledged
the apparent
deviation from FSAR commitments identified in paragraph
4.c of this report.
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