ML16293A761
| ML16293A761 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1994 |
| From: | Plisco L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16138A773 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9402020364 | |
| Download: ML16293A761 (21) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DUKE POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-269 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 204 License No. DPR-38
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 filed by the Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated July 14, 1993, as supplemented August 24 and September 22, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is-hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 is
-hereby amended to read as follows:
9402020364 940125 PDR ADOCK 05000269 P
__PDRL
-2 Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 204, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION oren R. Plisco, Acting Director Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects -
I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance:
January 25, 1994
pkREC;,
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DUKE POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-270 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 204 License No. DPR-47
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 filed by the Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated July 14, 1993, as supplemented August 24 and September 22, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as.indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:
-2 Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 204, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION oren R. Plisco, Acting Director Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects -
I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance:
January 25, 1994
- ,kRE~tZ UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DUKE POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-287 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 201 License No. DPR-55
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 filed by the Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated July 14, 1993, as supplemented August 24 and September 22, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as.indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.8 of Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:
-2 Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.201, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Loren R. Plisco, Acting Director Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects -
I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance:
January 25, 1994
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 204 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38 DOCKET NO. 50-269 AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.204 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47 DOCKET NO. 50-270 AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 201 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55 DOCKET NO. 50-287 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Pages Insert Pages 3.1-3a 3.1-3a 3.1-3b 3.1-3b 3.1-4 3.1-4 3.1-4a 3.1-4a 3.1-4b 3.1-4b 3.1-6 3.1-6 3.1-6a 3.1-6a 3.1-6b 3.1-6b 3.1-7 3.1-7 3.1-7a 3.1-7a 3.1-7b 3.1-7b 3.1-7c 3.1-7c 3.1-7d 3.1-7d 3.1-7e 3.1-7e
3.1.2.7 Not used 3.1.2.8 Not used 3.1.2.9
- 1.
The requirements of 2 below shall be met when both of the following conditions apply:
a)
The temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is 325'F, and b)
An RCS vent path capable of mitigating the most limiting LTOP event is not open.
- 2.
a)
Two trains of the low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) system shall be operable, b)
HPI train A and B shall be deactivated, and c)
Both core flood tanks shall be deactivated.
- 3.
One LTOP train is comprised of the PORV with a lift setting of s 480 psig.
a)
The PORV is not required to be operable when no HPI pumps are running and RCS pressure is < 100 psig.
- 4.
The second LTOP train is comprised of the controls which assure that 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event. The following controls comprise the second LTOP train:
a)
RCS pressure is limited to a 345 psig for an RCS temperature
< 220*F.
b)
Pressurizer level shall be controlled such that 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event.
c)
Makeup flow shall be restricted such that 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event.
d)
Alarms shall be provided such that 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event.
e)
The high pressure nitrogen system shall be controlled such that 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate anLTOP event.
Oconee 1, 2, and 3 3.1-3a Amendment No. 204 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 204 (Unit 2)
Amendment No. 201 (Unit 3)
- 5.
- a.
If one or more HPI trains or CFTs are not deactivated, the HPI trains and CFTs shall be deactivated immediately.
- b.
If the PORV is inoperable, the PORV shall be returned to operable status or the RCS shall be heated above 325*F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> the RCS shall be depressurized to < 100 psig and HPI shall be removed from service.
- c.
If the second LTOP train is inoperable, the second train shall be restored to operable status or compensatory measures shall be provided to monitor for initiation of an LTOP event within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> the RCS shall be depressurized and a vent path capable of mitigating the most limiting LTOP event shall be opened.
Bases -
Units 1, 2 and 3 All components in the Reactor Coolant System are designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes. These cyclic loads are introduced by normal load transients, reactor trips, startup and shutdown operations, and inservice leak and hydrostatic tests. The various categories of load cycles used for design purposes are provided in Table 5.2-1 of the FSAR.
The major components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary have been analyzed in accordance with Appendix G to 10 CFR 50. Results of this analysis, including the actual pressure-temperature limitations of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, are given in BAW-1699 and BAW-1697.
The Figures specified in 3.1.2-1, 3.1.2-2 and 3.1.2-3 present the pressure temperature limit curves for normal heatup, normal cooldown and hydrostatic tests respectively. The limit curves are applicable up to the indicated effective full power years of operation. These curves will be adjusted to include possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments. The pressure limit is also adjusted for the pressure differential between the point of system pressure measurement and the limiting component for all operating re4ctor coolant pump combinations.
The cooldown limit curves are not applicable to conditions of off-normal operation (e.g., small LOCA and extended loss of feedwater) where cooling is achieved for extended periods of time by circulating water from the HPI through the core. If core cooling is restricted to meet the cooldown limits under other than normal operation, core integrity could be jeopardized.
The pressure-temperature limit lines shown on the figures specified in 3.1.2-1 for reactor criticality and on the figures referred to in 3.1.2-3 for hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50 for reactor criticality and for inservice hydrostatic testing.
Oconee 1, 2, and 3 Amendment No. 204 (Unit 1) 3.-3b Amendment No. 204 (Unit 2)
Amendment No. 201 (Unit 3)
The limitations on steam generator pressure and temperature provide protection against-nonductile failure of the secondary side of the steam generator. At metal temperatures lower than the RTNDT of +60*F, the protection against nonductile failure is achieved by limiting the secondary coolant pressure to 20 percent of the preoperational system hydrostatic test pressure.
The limitations of 110*F and 237 psig are based on the highest estimated RTNT of
+40*F and the preoperational system hydrostatic test pressure of 1312 psig. The average metal temperature is assumed to be equal to or greater than the coolant temperature. The limitations include margins of 25 psi and 10*F for possible instrument error.
The requirements to perform leakage tests of systems outside of containment which could potentially contain radioactivity were established by the NRC following TMI.
Oconee performs the leak test of LPI by establishing RCS pressure at about 300 psig and with LPI at this same pressure, checking for leakage. Such a test is within the scope of testing upon which the curves referenced in Specification 3.1.2.2 are based--that is, they are not routine evolutions, such as heatup and cooldown, but rather infrequent leak tests conducted on a refueling outage basis. As such, the hydrostatic/leak test pressure-temperature limitations are applicable for the RCS when performing leak tests of the LPI system.
The spray temperature difference is imposed to maintain the thermal stresses at the pressurized spray line nozzle below the design limit.
The reactor vessel is protected against damage due to excessive pressures at low temperatures by the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System. LTOP vulnerability is assumed when RCS cold leg temperature is s 325'F and a RCS vent path is not capable of mitigating the most limiting LTOP event.
The LTOP enable temperature of 325*F is based on RT T + 900, with additional margin.
The LTOP System consists of two trains. One train is the pressurizer PORV calibrated to a low setpoint of less than or equal to 480 psig. The PORV block valve must be open, both trains of HPI must be deactivated, and both CFTs must be deactivated for the PORV to be operable. The capacity of the pressurizer PORV is sufficient to maintain the RCS pressure below the appropriate brittle fracture pressure limits during LTOP events in which boiling does not occur in the core.
PORV operability is not required when RCS pressure is < 100 psig and HPI pumps are not operating since credible LTOP events progress relatively slowly, thus giving the operator ample time to respond. In addition, the PORV cannot be tested until there is sufficient RCS pressure. The remaining train is operator action and is based on an operating philosophy that precludes the plant from being in a water solid condition (except for system hydrotests).
The fact that the Oconee units are operated with a steam or gas space in the pressurizer allows sufficient time for operator action to terminate an LTOP event prior to exceeding the appropriate brittle fracture pressure limits. Assuming an LTOP event was to occur at Oconee, and a single failure disables either train, the remaining train must be capable of maintaining RCS pressure below the appropriate brittle fracture pressure limits.
The Oconee LTOP System provides protection from pressure transients at low temperatures, by limiting the pressure of such a transient to below the limits set by 10CFR 50 Appendix G utilizing a conservative safety factor of 1.5.
In addition, the following conditions are imposed by the NRC for the evaluation of the Oconee 1, 2, and 3 3.1-4 Amendment No. 204 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 204 (Unit 2)
Amendment No. 201 (Unit 3)
acceptability of LTOF Systems:
- a.
The most limiting initial conditions must be used.
- b.
The most limiting single failure, distinct from the initiating event, must be used.
- c.
No credit can be taken for mitigative operator action until 10 minutes after the operators become aware that a pressure transient is in progress.
For the Oconee units, the most limiting single failure is failure of the single pressurizer PORV to open at its low pressure setpoint. Operator awareness is assumed to be achieved by actuation of control room alarms. The following scenarios have the potential to result in an LTOP event:
- 1)
Makeup control Valve (HP-120) fails full open.
- 2)
Erroneous opening of a core flood tank (CFT) discharge valve.
- 3)
Erroneous actuation of the HPI system.
- 4)
All pressurizer heaters erroneously energized.
- 5)
Temporary loss of decay heat removal.
- 6)
Thermal expansion of the RCS after starting an RCP due to stored energy in the steam generator.
- 7)
Erroneous addition of high pressure nitrogen.
Specification 3.1.2.9.2 requires that both CFTs and both HPI trains be isolated from the RCS, thus preventing these scenarios. PORV capacity may not be sufficient to mitigate the erroneous opening of a CFT discharge valve or HPI actuation. Physical restriction of makeup flow, control of pressurizer level, and alarms ensure that at least 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate the remaining events.
Unit specific values required to meet the 10 minute operator action criterion and the description of RCS vent paths capable of mitigating the most limiting LTOP event are provided within the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual.
In order to assure 10 minutes are available for operator action, the operational restrictions of Specification 3.1.2.9.4 must be implemented:
Deactivating train A of HPI is accomplished by one of the following methods:
- 1)
Shutting and deactivating valve HP-26 by tagging open the valve breaker and tagging the valve handwheel in the closed position, shutting valve HP-410 and tagging the valve switch in the closed position.
- 2)
Deactivating all HPI pumps aligned to A HPI train and tagging the pump breakers open.
Deactivating train B of HPI is accomplished by one of the following methods:
- 1)
Shutting and deactivating valve HP-27 by tagging open the valve breaker and tagging the valve handwheel in the closed position, shutting valve HP-409 and tagging the valve switch in the closed position.
- 2)
Deactivating all HPI pumps aligned to B HPI train and tagging the pump breakers open.
Oconee 1, 2, and 3 3.1-4a Amendment No. 204 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 204 (Unit 2)
Amendment No. 201 (Unit 3)
Deactivating both core flood tanks is accomplished by shutting valves CF-1 and CF-2, tagging open the valve breaker, and tagging the valves in the closed position. Alternately, core flood tanks may be deactivated by maintaining core flood tank pressure below the maximum allowable RCS pressure for the existing RCS temperature (per Figures 3.1.2-1 and 3.1.2-2).
Makeup flow must be restricted such that 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate the event.
Audible alarms must be provided such that 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate the event.
The high pressure nitrogen system shall be controlled such that 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event.
The intent of the action statements provided in Specification 3.1.2.9.5 is to place the reactor vessel in a condition in which it is not vulnerable to an LTOP event via the safest and most prompt course of action. In some cases, it may be more prudent to heat up above 325*F (cold leg temperature) rather than depressurize and open an RCS vent.
The allowable outage times (AOTs) provided in Specification 3.1.2.9.5 have been established based on the following considerations:
- a.
In the event one or more HPI trains or CFTs are not deactivated, the HPI trains and CFTs must be deactivated immediately since PORV capacity may not be sufficient, nor are 10 minutes available for operator action, to mitigate these LTOP events.
- b.
When the PORV is inoperable, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is an acceptable period of time to restore the PORV to operable status based on the low likelihood of an LTOP event requiring actuation of the PORV and the time available for operator action to mitigate the event.
- c.
In the event of "1 2nd train" inoperabilities, a time period of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is sufficient to return the train to operable status or to implement the compensatory measures. For example, establishing a dedicated operator to monitor for initiation of an LTOP event, is sufficient to compensate for inoperability of the makeup flow restriction, inoperability of required alarms, or deviation from Specification 3.1.2.9.4 pressure, temperature, or level limits., Establishing a dedicated operator is not sufficient to compensate for not deactivating HPI or CFTs.
REFERENCES (1)
Analysis of Capsule OCII-E from Duke Power Company Oconee Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Materials Surveillance Program, BAW-2051, October, 1988.
(2) Analysis of Capsule OCIII-D from Duke Power Company Oconee Unit 3 Reactor Vessel Materials Surveillance Program, BAW-2128, Rev. 1, May 1992.
(3) Analysis of Capsule OCI-C from Duke Power Company Oconee Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Materials Surveillance Program, BAW-2050, October, 1988.
Oconee 1, 2, and 3 3.1-4b Amendment No. 204 (Unit 1)
Amendment' No. 204 (Unit 2)
Amendment No. 201 (Unit 3)
0 O
Figure 3.1.2-1A Reactor Coolant System Normal Operational Heatup Limitations Applicable for First 21.0 EFPY - Unit I Oconee Nuclear Station y
P U
THE REGIONS OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND TO THE RIGHT OF THE UMIT CURVES.
MARGINS ARE INCLUDED FOR THE PRESSURE CL DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSURE IEASIREMENT AND w
2,00 THE PRESSURE ON THE REACTOR VESSEL REGION CONTROLLING THE LIMIT CURVE. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLUDED.
POINT TEMP. PRESSURE 4
A 70 401 B
115 401 (i
C 150 433 D
175 487 E
200 568 e 150 F
206 59 a
G 230 592 4j tyl H
233 684 1
240 705 (A
J 250 705 K
275 852 L
300 1007 14 t
n M
- 325, 1234L 0
1,000 N
350 1562
~~ O~
0 375 2030CRTALY U
P 385 2250 C+ C+ r+
4 Q
370 0
0 R
370 1291 U
S 390 1562 to T
415 2030 c0 U
425 2250 C+
-+
t+ o w r%)NOTE:
flEATIJP AND COOLDOwN RATE RESTRICTIONS
-DO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP COMBINATION RESTICTIONS DURING IIEATSP AND COOLDOWN ARE REQUIRED, AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT.
0 100 200 300 400 50 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, OF
Zi 0
I.z4.j C
0zo 0
44 ac
- d a
4
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- 16.
§ 1
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v Amenmen No. 20Unt3
CD CD Figure 3.1.2-ic Reactor Coolant System Normal Operation Heatup Limitations ADDlicable for First 21.0 EFPY - Unit 3 Oconee Nuclear Station TH1E REGIO#NSOFACCErFABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND O II III OF P
THE LIMIT CURVES.
MARGINS ARE INCLUDED FOR IIIF PRESSt RE w
DIFFERENWAL BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSURE i lSI HI NII-1 %ND
-00*
THE PRESSUR ON THE REACTOR VESSEL REGION CONTROLlI.; I IIF LIMIT Io 2A CURVE. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INC(
I IM POINT TEMP. PRESSURE e
A 70 397 B
115 397 U
C 125 400 to In D
ISO 428 E
175 481
- 1,500 F
200 561 91 G
208 591 p tr H
230 591 to 1
234 726 J
240 751 aj ~K 250 751 L
275 922 M
300 1100 CRITICALITY a
1 000 N
325 1362 LIMIT 00 A 0
350 1740 L
P 375 2250 M gQ 360 0
P p
R 360 1302 C-+ C+ r+
s 390 1740 0oo
)
T 415 2250 o o
,d 500 CD 0
A CCC 4
- 91 b
41 A '
NOTE:
IIEATUP AND COOLDOWN RATE RESTRICTIONS 4ND C+
REACTOR COOLANT PI'IlP COMBINATION RESTRICTIONS DURING IIEATUP AND COOLDOWN,4RE REQUIRED. AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT.
0 100 200 300 400 500 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, OF
0 (D
Figure 3.1.2-2A Reactor Coolant System Normal Operational Cooldown Limitations Applicable for First 21.0 EFPY - Unit I Oconee Nuclear Station THE REGIONS OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND T0 TH FRIGHT OF THE LIMIT CURVES.
MARGINS ARE INCLUDED FOR TIHF PRESSURE
.14 DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSURE MEASUREMENT AND 0
2,000" THE PRESSURE ON THE REACTOR VESSEL REGION CONTROLLING TFHE LIMIT CURVE. MARGINS FOR INSTiRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLUDED.
POINT TEMP.
PRESSURE A
70 374 B
150 374 0
C 175 429 D
200 490 E
225 600 F
250 766 G
280 1027 1.0wJ 10 320 1549 0
8 C4 I
366 2250 41 man U
E.
'aa 0
A NOTE:
HEATUP AND COOL.DOWN RATE RESTRICTIONS %ND e
'REACTOR COOLANT PUMP COMBINAT ION RESTRICTIONS DURING IlEATUP AND COOLDOWN ARE REQUIRED, AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT.
0 I
,I O 0 100 200 300 400 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, OF
44.0 CC.
544 L.6 iWv Amenmen No 0 (nt3
0 0
CD (D
Figure 3.1.2-2C Reactor Coolant System Normal Operation Cooldown Limitations Applicable for First 21.0 EFPY - Unit 3.Oconee Nuclear Station MEIM S OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND 1T) IIIE RIGHT OF 788 CURVES.
MARGINS ARE INCLUDED FOR IIE PRESSURE DIFFER3lIAL BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSURE -MEASUREMENT AND TE PRESSUR ON THE REACTOR VESSEL REGION CONTROLLING THE LIMIT ZOU CURVE. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLDED.
POINT TEMP. PRESSURE A
70 394 a
150 394
^4 C
175 459 1 0D 200 530 E
225 660 F
250 855 C.'
G 280 1127 1H 320 1725 V 0 I
364 2250 (n8 8
1,000
- 0. c.0.
OU
~0 U 50 C C+ c+ C+
41 oco g
000 50
- u*NOTE:
IfEATUP AND COOLDOWN RATE RESTRfTION AID
(..J REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (OulllIgIO' RESTICTIONS DURING IIEATUIP AND00 00O.I141 \\nE
)-4 REQUIRED, AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT.
0 E
0 100 200 300 400 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, aF
0 CD Figure 3.1.2-3A Reactor Coolant System Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Test Heatup and Cooldown Limitation Applicable for First 21.0 EFPY - Unit 1 Oconee Nuclear Station 2,500 N
THE REGIONS OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND TO THE RIGHT OF THE UNIT CURVES.
MARGINS ARE INCLUDED i1 filE PRESSI RE
-4 DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSURE MEASUREMENT AND THE PRESSURE ON THE REACTOR VESSEL REGION CONTROLLING THE LIMIT CURVE. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLUDED.
4 2,000 POINT TEMP.
PRESSURE A
70 507 B
150 507
-C 175 580 D
179 592 E
205 592 1.500-F 208 710 G
225 812 H
243 966 1
250 969 J
275 1165 0 u4 K
300 1369 M
U1,(0 L
325 1669 4
M 350 2098 N
369 2500 C+ C+ r+
man) 000
~A U
NOTE:
IIEATUP AND COOL.DOWN RITE RESTRICTIONS AND REACTOR COOLANT PIIP COMBINATION RESTRICTIONS DURING IIFATIPP AND COOlD)OWN ARE REQUIRED. AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT.
0 I
I 0
100 200 300 400 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, OF
.ll I
It 160 4,4 U,&
Ow I..
P a;
(de
-a 40H.'442 B~sd'a~SSB~
Wasxs ueloo J43VH pevop Ocone 1*
2,and3 3.-7dAmedmen No 204(Unt 1 Amnmn o
24(nt2 Amnmn No jflUit3
0 ",
M (D
(D Figure 3.1.2-3C Reactor Coolant System Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Test Heatup and Cooldown Limitations for First 21.0 EFPY - Unit 3 Oconee Nuclear Station g
2,500 THE REGIONS OF ACCEFTABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND TO IHE RIGHT OF THE LIAST CURVES.
MARGINS ARE INCLUDED FOR Til.
PRESS:RE DIFFERInAL BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSURE MEAS(itNIENT AND THE PRESSURE ON THE REACTOR VESSEL REGION CONTROLLING TIHE LIMIT CURVE. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLUDED 4
2,000 POINT TEMP. PRESSURE A
70 534 B
150 534 C
167 591 D
205 591 0 1E-4 E
210 784 S 0 1,500 F
225 893 G
235 992 H
250 1033 1
275 1258 J
300 1494 o U K
325 1840 M
0 C4 1,000 L
3se 232o 06 im06 4jM 3ss 2soo m0 0
Z 0
A 9
500 NOTE:
HEATUP AND COOLDOWN RATE RESTRI(TIONS 1D C+
C+
REACTOR CO()I.tNT PUMP CollBI\\li L,.RESTRICTIONS DURING IIEATUP AND ((001 00141 alt:
H
- REQUIRED, AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT.
0 I
I I
0 100 200 300 400 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, oF