ML16161A758
| ML16161A758 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1986 |
| From: | Bryant J, Peebles T, Sasser M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16161A756 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-86-20, 50-270-86-20, 50-287-86-20, NUDOCS 8608120198 | |
| Download: ML16161A758 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1986020
Text
- 10F
EU 9
UNITED STATES
o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
AUG 0 1 1986
Report Nos.:
50-269/86-20, 50-270/86-20, and 50-287/86-20
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, N.C. 28242
Facility Name:
Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287
License Nos.:
Inspection Conducted: Ju e 10 - July 7, 1986
Inspectors:
4
,8
/
/4
J. C. Bryant Senio
esid
Inspector
ate Sgned
M
ser,
esi
t Ins
re
Approved by:
T. Pebbles, Section Chief
Da e Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
announced inspection involved inspection on-site in the
areas of operations, surveillance, station modifications, followup of events, and
safeguards.
Results:
Of the 5 areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was found in one
area; Failure to follow procedure in documentation.
One deviation was found in
one area; Failure of seismic instrumentation to conform to FSAR.
~0o269c
pDR
5 PDR
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
- M.S. Tuckman, Station Manager
R.L. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent
T.S. Barr, Technical Services Superintendent
C.L. Harlin, Compliance Engineer
- D.S. Compton. Assistant Compliance Engineer
Other
licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and staff engineers.
Resident Inspectors
- J.C. Bryant
- M.K. Sasser
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview
.
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 9, 1986 with those
persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This area was not inspected during the report period.
4.
Inspector Followup Items and Unresolved Items
(Closed)
IFI
270/85-20-03:
Review of Temporary Modifications.
The
inspectors have reviewed revised station directives and their implementation
to ensure periodic reviews of temporary modifications and have found the
actions taken to be satisfactory.
(Closed)
UNR 269/86-18-03:
Discrepancies in Seismic Equipment as
Installed. The inspectors have determined this to be a deviation from the
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
See Deviation 269/86-20-01,
para
graph 9.
(Closed) UNR 269/86-18-04:
Failure to Independently Verify Valve Lineup.
The inspectors have determined this to be a violation of station procedures.
See violation 269/86-20-02, paragraph 13.
2
(Closed)
IFI 269,270,287/DRP 85-01:
Station Battery Operation, Mainten
ance,
and Inspection.
Unresolved item,
269,
270,287/85-10-01,
was
issued by the residents after inspection of the areas covered by this
inspector followup item. This IFI is considered closed.
5. Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they
are acceptable or
may
involve violations or
deviations. One unresolved item was identified during the course of this
inspection and is discussed in paragraph 11.
6.
Plant Operations
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to
verify conformance with regulatory requirements,
technical specifications
(TS),
and administrative controls.
Control room logs, shift turnover
records,
and equipment removal
and restoration records were reviewed
routinely. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance,
chemistry, health physics and performance personnel.
Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basis.
Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during week days and
on weekends.
Some inspections were made during shift change in order to
evaluate shift turnover performance.
Actions observed were conducted as
required by Operations Management Procedure 2-1. The complement of licensed
personnel
on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS.
Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of
plant conditions.
Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis.
The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building
Auxiliary Building
Units 1,2, and 3 Control Battery Rooms
Units 1,2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms
Units 1,2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms
Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area
Standby Shutdown Facility
Keowee Hydro Station
During the
plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,
equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed.
Unit 1 began the report period at 100% power.
On June 24 the unit
experienced an asymmetric rod run back to 50% power.
The run back was
caused by a blown fuse which resulted in loss of the Group 2 out limit
light. The fuse was replaced and the unit returned to 100% power the same
day. The reactor operated at 100% power during the remainder of the report
period.
4I3
Unit 2 operated at 100% power throughout the report period.
Unit 3 operated at essentially 100% power throughout the report period.
7.
Surveillance Testing
The surveillance tests listed below were reviewed and/or witnessed by the
inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy.
The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites,
instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin
work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of
deficiencies noted, and review of completed work.
The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that
approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated,
prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test
results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.
A number of surveillances were reviewed during the inspection of biofouling
of heat exchangers (see paragraph 12).
Surveillances reviewed:
PT/0/A/600/20 SSF Instrument Surveillance
Surveillances witnessed in whole or part:
PT/2/A/600/13 Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump
Performance Test
PT/O/A/0150/31 Hydrogen Analyzer Panel Post Maintenance
Leak Rate Test
PT/0/A/253/6A RB Hydrogen Sampling System Annual Check, Unit 3,
Train A
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Resident Inspector Safeguards Inspection
In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a
review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of
various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
activities which included; protected and vital areas access controls,
searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval,
escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.
In addition, the
Resident Inspectors, observed protected area lighting, protected and vital
4
areas barrier integrity and verified interfaces between the security
organization and operations or maintenance.
Specifically, the resident
inspectors:
Reviewed the
licensee's
security plan, discussing the
licensee's transition to an upgraded security system; visited the secondary
and central alarm stations; witnessed activities associated with a spent
fuel shipment; witnessed stress firing with shotguns and pistols; and
witnessed training in small unit tactics.
The licensee is voluntarily upgrading security locks on several access areas
after having found some doors unlocked.
Security officers have increased
patrols in the interim.
Followup of this action will be listed as an
inspector followup item; IFI-50-269,270,287/86-20-01, Security Access Doors.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Oconee Seismic Instrumentation
During previous report periods (see reports 86-10, 86-18) the inspectors
conducted an inspection of the seismic instrumentation installed at the
site. Results of the inspection indicated a significant discrepancy between
the instrumentation installed at the site and that described by the FSAR.
As restated from report 86-18, the discrepancy is as follows:
The FSAR states that peak recording accelerometers are installed in six
locations within the unit 1 reactor building.
Only one of these
accelerometers
is currently
the
other
five
became
deteriorated beyond use and may have been removed in 1979. Calibrations
and checks of these instruments by the I&E Department were discontinued
at that time. Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) 1110 was initiated to
complete a design review and replacement for the accelerometers;
however,
the NSM was cancelled subsequent to its original issue in
1980.
The above finding was listed as an unresolved item,
UNR 269/86-18-03,
Discrepancies in the Installation of Seismic Recording Equipment.
Based on
further review the inspectors have determined this to be a deviation from
FSAR commitments, and, as such, are closing the unresolved item and issuing
a deviation; DEV 269/86-20-02,
Discrepancies Between
and Installed
Seismic Instrumentation.
10.
Unusual Event -
Seismic Activity
An Unusual Event was declared at the Oconee Station on June 11 at 12:15 p.m.
due to a seismic event.
All three units were operating at 100% power.
While the event was felt at the station, no alarms were recorded at the
Oconee site. Seismic readings were recorded by the more sensitive Jocassee
Hydro Plant instrumentation located approximately 12 miles from the Oconee
site. The Jocassee instruments recorded two quakes.
The first quake,
at
5
12:12 p.m., registered 2.47 on the Ricter scale with a duration of 120
seconds. The second registered 1.54 on the Ricter scale with a duration of
45 seconds occurring at 12:24 p.m. Subsequent inspection of plant equip
ment, as required by plant Abnormal Operating Procedures revealed no damage
or detrimental effects. The state and county were notified. The unusual
event was terminated at 1:43 p.m.
11.
Seismic Inoperability of Keowee Batteries
On June 10, at approximately 3 p.m., NRC-Safety System Functional Inspection
(SSFI) team members touring the Keowee hydro station, noted a deficiency in
the installation of the batteries relative to current drawings.
Excess
clearance (greater than 1/4 inch) between the battery end cells and the end
cell horizontal supports (stringers) was found. This condition was noted
for 15 of 16 end cells, with as much as 3 to 4 inches of space in some
locations. The Keowee batteries are safety related, with a separate battery
for each Keowee unit, and are required for generator "field flashing" in the
event of loss of AC power. The Keowee hydro units are the class 1E onsite
emergency power source for the Oconee Nuclear Station.
During an internal NRC meeting later that day, in which SSFI team findings
were being summarized
for later presentation
to the licensee, this
particular finding was noted as a possible concern relative to operability
of the batteries.
The excessive clearance invalidates the seismic
qualification of the
racks, requiring the batteries to be declared
inoperable. When the resident inspectors became aware of the deficiency at
7:00 p.m.
on June 10,
they immediately notified the station maintenance
superintendent and the operations shift supervisor that the batteries were
technically inoperable,
which placed the plant in a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> limiting
condition for operation (LCO).
The maintenance superintendent called in
engineers and the residents kept in touch with progress.
At 10:30 p.m. on
June 10, the residents were informed by the station I&E Engineer that work
was complete and the Keowee batteries were operable. He also described the
work that had been done and the residents agreed that corrective action
taken met requirements. Subsequent inspection verified that the work had
been performed as described. An inspection into the station modification
which installed these batteries indicated that they had been installed in
August 1985.
Inspection of Operations SRO and
RO logs found no entry concerning the
inoperability of the Keowee batteries during the period following the
initial discussion with the NRC residents at 7:00 p.m., June 10. There were
no log entries concerning licensee corrective actions on the battery racks.
On June 13 the resident was informed by Compliance that the licensee was
continuing his analysis to determine if an NRC notification by red phone was
appropriate. Apparently,
since the item was found by
NRC,
operations
personnel had not considered it a required report.
The resident expressed
concern that the licensee's Operations personnel failed to appropriately
consider and address the battery operability question at the time the
problem was identified, as evidenced in part by there being no log entries
concerning the problem.
6
At 4:40 p.m. on June 13 the licensee initiated a red phone call to the NRC.
The inoperability of both Keowee hydro station batteries was reported under
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (1) Non-emergency events -
One hour
reports, section (ii)
(B),
operating in-a condition that is outside the
design basis of the plant. In addition, a licensee event report (LER) will
be submitted under the appropriate section of 50.73.
The residents, during their review of the battery installation process,
found the following:
a. The batteries were installed under NSM 52466 with battery #1 being
completed August 17,1985 and battery #2 completed on August 25,1986.
b. The installation was
performed by the
Duke Transmission Services
(Greenville, S.C.)
and the Duke CMD organizations in conjunction with
the Oconee Project Services staff.
Transmission Services normally
works on fossil and hydro projects only. Keowee station is hydro.
c. Documents reviewed by the residents were the following:
KM 320-15
Battery & Rack Instruction Manual (Gould)
KM 320-11
EQ For Class 1E Pb-Acid Keowee Batteries
KS 320-02
DPC Specification for Keowee Hydro Station
125vDC Class 1E Batteries
NSM 52466
Station Modification Package for Keowee
Hydro Station Batteries
TN/1&2/A/52466/00/AL1
Implementation Procedure for
Keowee
Battery
&
Storage
Rack
Replacement
d.
The implementing procedure was reviewed to determine the level of
detail required in complying with drawings and manuals. The procedure
was found to adequately reference the Gould manuals and included
drawings showing details for exact rack specifications.
Procedural
signoffs were also noted to have been completed by both the personnel
installing the racks and the QA inspector following the job.
Per the
procedure, there
was
involvement throughout the entire rack
fabrication and installation.
7
Based on the above, the initial conclusion was that the installing and QA
personnel did not actually install the racks per the drawing.
However, on
July 2, additional information was received indicating this not to be the
case. A more accurate assessment of the -sequence is as follows:
a. The initial vendor drawing (Gould 400304-D) did not include the note
requiring 1/4 inch or less clearance between the end cell and stringer
or that this space be filled by appropriate filler material.
b.
The licensee's installation procedures were followed and completed in
August 1985 to install the battery racks per the vendor drawing.
c.
The
licensee's Design Engineering staff questioned the
vendor
concerning clearances on the battery racks, finding that the drawing
was
in error,
and should have contained the notes relative to
clearances and the use of filler material when required.
The drawing
was subsequently revised to include these notes on September 5, 1985.
d.
The revised drawing was received at the Oconee station; however,
the
change apparently was not noted by cognizant personnel and no action
was taken to correct the battery rack installation.
10
CFR
50,
Appendix B, Criterion VI,
Document Control,
requires that
measures assure that changes to documents are distributed to and used at the
location where the prescribed activity is performed.
Since the corrected
drawing was issued on September 5, 1985,
nine months elapsed prior to the
NRC finding on June 10, 1986. It appears that ample time had elapsed to
correct the battery rack deficiency since the drawing had been distributed
to the site, but had not been used, there is an apparent noncompliance with
the
regulation.
However, pending issuance
of
Headquarters
Report
Nos. 50-269/86-16, 50-270/86-16,
and 50-287/86-16 this item will be listed
as
an unresolved item, UNR 269,270,287/86-20-03;
discrepancies
in
document/design control.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Biofouling of Heat Exchangers (TI 2515/77-02.02)
In response to Temporary Instruction 2515/77, the inspectors examined the
practices and procedures in effect at Oconee to identify fouling,
particularly biofouling, of the open cycle cooling water systems.
A Duke Power Company response of May 22, 1981 to IE Bulletin 81-03 included
the following statement, "....evidence of clams has not been detected in any
Oconee systems except for the Amertap system,
and no evidence of clam
fouling has been detected whatsoever. As a precaution, however, maintenance
procedures
and performance criteria are currently being reviewed
and
evaluated for inclusion in a formal monitoring program to provide early
8
detection of clam infestation of service water systems. Detection of clams
may consist of differential pressure readings across an equipment item,
examination of strainers and drainage discharge lines, and visual inspection
of inlet heat exchanger heads and piping supply lines. Supply and discharge
line flow rates to a piece of equipment may also be monitored. The criteria
for the acceptable, minimum flow rate in
a specific line are currently
being evaluated.
Flow monitoring will consist of either existing flow
meters or manually operated, sonic flow meters."
To determine how the above commitment was being carried out, the 'inspectors
held discussions with cognizant personnel, examined equipment, and reviewed
the following procedures:
PT/1/A/251/1
Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) Pump Performance
Test (quarterly and after major maintenance)
PT/O/A/230/15 High Pressure Injection Motor Cooler Flow Rate Test
(weekly)
PT/O/A/203/08 LPI System ES Test (Refueling - test also verifies
LPSW flow)
PT/O/A/160/03 R.B. Cooling System ES and Performance Test
(Refueling)
PT/O/A/250/24 Fire Protection System Three Year Flow Test
CP/O/B/4002/12 Monitoring Program for Asiatic Clams (quarterly)
LPSW flow through the various equipment is instrumented locally or in the
control room,
but instrumentation is used to control or determine adequacy
of flow rather than to determine degradation of flow.
LPSW flow through
individual systems is measured and recorded during the tests, and an
acceptable range
is given.
During the LPSW pump performance test,
acceptable, alert, and required action ranges are given, but none of the
procedures currently in use specify comparing with design parameters.
However, procedures for measuring, recording and comparison of cooling water
flows with design specifications are in preparation for decay heat removal
and reactor building cooling units. These are scheduled to be implemented
in June and August of 1986.
Operator training and procedures are geared toward response to inadequate
cooling rather than to detect degradation of flow.
On the most recent
refueling outage, a DHR heat exchanger was opened and cleaned because heat
transfer appeared to be degraded even though cooling water flow was normal.
Degradation of heat transfer was determined to be due to sludge and not to
clams.
A total of 18 drains in the LPSW, HPSW, condensate coolers, and recirculated
cooling water heat exchangers are flushed quarterly with flush water passing
through a wire mesh.
Residue is searched for clams and shell particles.
The Amertap ball collection basket is searched weekly for clam shells.
Six
fire hydrants and four fire hose stations are flushed quarterly at full flow
for one minute. The flow is screened and the screen inspected for clams.
9
Whenever any work is done involving opening of the lake water portion of
components, valves or piping,
the interior is visually inspected by
environmental personnel for clams. Also, maintenance is required to notify
environmental personnel if any clams are observed. A visual examination of
condenser water boxes for clams is performed on unit shutdowns.
The licensee appears'to be meeting the commitments made in response to
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Documentation of Independent Verification
On
May 23,
1986,
Unit 1 was being taken to cold shutdown according to
Procedure OP/1/A/1102/10, Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown. At 4:43
to 4:44 a.m.,
Enclosure 4.3,
250 F/350 PSI Conditions to Cold Shutdown,
steps 4, 5 and 6 were performed.
These steps dealt with initiating high
pressure injection flow to the pressurizer auxiliary spray line.
These
steps required independent verification of action.
At about 7:00 a.m., a Regional Inspector, who was observing shift turnover,
noted that steps 4, 5, and 6 of Enclosure 4.3 had not been signed off as
independently verified even though subsequent steps of the procedure had
been completed.
The resident inspectors subsequently reviewed the shift incident report and
talked to personnel involved. It was determined that, due to many jobs in
progress, shift personnel had decided to send only one operator to the field
for valve lineup while verification of flow was determined by control room
personnel.
Control
room personnel later stated that they had made the
verification but failed to sign off the data sheet.
The inspectors consider that the verification was made but was
not
documented. Failure to sign off the procedure is a violation, (Violation
269/86-20-04, Failure to Document Actions).