ML16161A330

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Amends 302,302 & 302 to Licenses DPR-38,DPR-47 & DPR-55, Respectively,Revising Heatup,Cooldown & IST Limitations for Reactor Coolant Sys of Each Unit to Max of 26 Effective full-power Years
ML16161A330
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/30/1999
From: Berkow H
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML16161A331 List:
References
NUDOCS 9904090180
Download: ML16161A330 (30)


Text

VkREG&j UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-269 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 302 License No. DPR-38

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility)

Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated October 15, 1998, as supplemented December 17, 1998, and January 11 and 21, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9904090180 990330 PDR ADOCK 05000269 P

PDR

-2

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 302, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION H rbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance:

March 30, 1999

pf REc~j UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-270 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.302 License No. DPR-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility)

Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated October 15, 1998, as supplemented December 17, 1998, and January 11 and 21, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

-2

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 302, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Herbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance:

March 30, 1999

REG09 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-287 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 302 License No. DPR-55

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 (the facility)

Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated October 15, 1998, as supplemented December 17, 1998, and January 11 and 21, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specificati6ns as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:

-2 B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.

302, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION He ert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: March 30, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 302 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38 DOCKET NO. 50-269 TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 302 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47 DOCKET NO. 50-270 AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 302 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55 DOCKET NO. 50-287 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 3.4.3-5 3.4.3-5 3.4.3-6 3.4.3-6 3.4.3-7 3.4.3-7 3.4.3-8 3.4.3-8 3.4.3-9 3.4.3-9 3.4.3-10 3.4.3-10 3.4.3-11 3.4.3-11 3.4.3-12 3.4.3-12 3.4.3-13 3.4.3-13 3.4.12-1 3.4.12-1 3.4.12-5 3.4.12-5 B 3.4.12-1 B 3.4.12-1 B 3.4.12-2 B 3.4.12-2 B 3.4.12-3 B 3.4.12-3 B 3.4.12-4 B 3.4.12-4 B 3.4.12-5 B 3.4.12-5 B 3.4.12-6 B 3.4.12-6 B 3.4.12-7 B 3.4.12-7 B 3.4.12-8 B 3.4.12-8 B 3.4.12-9 B 3.4.12-9 B 3.4.12-10 B 3.4.12-10 B 3.4.12-11 B 3.4.12-11 B 3.4.12-12 B 3.4.12-12

RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3

  • P THE REGIONS OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND TO THE RIGHT OF THE UMrr CUVES. MARdINS ARE INCLUDED FOR NE PRESSUkE DIFFERETIAL 2000 - -

BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSUREIEAAUREMENTAND THE PRESSURE ON -

THE REACTOR VESSEL REGION CONTROLLNG.THE LIMIT CURVE. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLUDED, rOiNT uEW.

PRESUE A*

60O 357 06 115.

357.

C C

150 376 8

1500----

175---- 8---------

E 200.

458.

F N533 NT 1 HEATUP E

G 238 584 HD 11 250,

584 I

275.

739 J

280 777 K

300 833L L

.x L

325 966 gcnl 00--

M o

0 c0 35s 1s2e Criticality a

0o 40 2045 Ui t5 -S Umit Pa 408 25 (DQ 393 0

Ta T

440 2045 S

500 --

4 2,

NOTE:

HEATUP AND COOLDOWN RATE RESTRICTIONS AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP COMBINATION'RESTRICTIONS DURING HEATUP AND C6OLDOWN A E REQUIREDS AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT 00 O

50 100 150 200 250 -

300 350 400 450 Indicated Reactor Coolant Intet Temperature, F Figure 3.4.3-1 (page 1 of 1)

RCS Normal Operational Heatup Limitations Applicable for the First 26 EFPY - Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1 OCONEE UNITS 1,

2,

& 3 3.4.3-5 Amendment Nos. 302,

302, 302

RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3 N

THE RE61ONS OF ACCtPTABLE OPEFkATION ARE B1LOW AND TO tHE 2000 -

- RIGT oFTHeurMIT C RVES.- MARGNS ARE INCLUPED FOR THE, PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSURE MEASUREMENT AND THE PRESSURE-ON THE REACTOR VESSEL*

REGION CONTROU.ING THE LIMIT CURVE. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLODED.

FOINT.

e.
PRESU A

60 408 1500.- - :--

i-.-

0 C

so 446

a.

D HAI 446 E

175 491 (D

F 195 537 200:

537 Cl -..

H 218 640 CO I

230 703 A

1000 ---

240..--757--------

o K

255:

84:

8 00X CC 280 1088 H

320 1650 to 25 (D

UNIT 1 COOLDOWN NOT4:

HEATUP AtD COOLDOWN RATE RESTRICTIONS AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP COMBINATION RESTRICTIONS DURING HEATJP AND COOLDOWN ARE REOUIRED, AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT 0 ilfil lI 0

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, F Figure 3.4.3-2 (page 1 of 1)

RCS Normal Operational Cooldown Limitations Applicable for the First 26 EFPY - Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.4.3-6 Amendment Nos.

302, 302, 302

RCS P/T Limits 1.4.3 2500 THE REGIONS OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND TOTHE RIGHT OF ThE LIMIT CJRVES. MARdiNS ARE INCLQDED FOR THE:PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL BWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSURE MEASUREMENT AND THE PRESSURE ON THE REACTOR VESSEL REGION CONTROLLING THE LIMIT CURVE.. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT. ERROR ARE NOT INCLUDED.*

2000-PaNrT TDEP.

PRESSIE A

60.489.

6 115 489 0_-..

C 2

492 E5 D

S 514

(

175 557 0> 1 500

-. -s2 G

205 5w2 UNIT1 ISLH CO H

210 658 0I 2

722 J

240 801 K

250 808 0L 275 1014 1 0 -

-06 (D

10001-

-, II300 1137 a

325 1313 P

350 1609

.90 375 2053 A

500 --- -

NOTE:

HEATUP AND COOLDOWN RATE RESTRICTIONS AND

-REA TOR COOLANT PUMP COMBWNATION RESTRICTIONS DURING HEATUP AND COOLDOWN AAE REQUIRED, AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT 0

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, F Figure 3.4.3-3 (page 1 of 1)

RCS Leak and Hydrostatic Test Heatup and Cooldown Limitations Applicable for the First 26 EFPY - Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.4.3-7 Amendment Nos.

302, 302, 302

RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3 0

T THE REGIONS OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION -ARE BELOW AND TO THE RIGHT OF THE LIMIT CORVES. MAf"GINS ARE INCLUDED FOR THE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM P9ESSURE MEASUREMENT AND THE PfIESSURE O4 2000 THE REACTOR VESSEL-REGIONCONITROLULNG THEUMIT OURVE.-MARGINSFOR-INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLUDED.

POINT TEMP.

  • PRESSUR A

60' 33 B

10 353.

1500_..

C...-..1s:.....3711...----------------------

0 175 403' 1 :

200 451:

UNIT 2 HEATUP:

eF 234.

558..

G 250 558 '

E H

275 6451 I

280 667 J

300 737 K

325' 872 01000 _

L-..

350-10W O

H 375 1348.

H o

400 1746 Criticahty a

423 2250 Limii 0

P

407, 0

'U 0Q 407.

1248...

R 415' 1348 S

440 176 TU 463.

2250.

500-----------

NOTE' HEATUP AND COOLDOWN RATE RSTRICTION9 AND REACTPR COOLANT PUMP COMBINATION FESTRICTIO S DURING HEATUP AND COOLDOWN ARE REQUIRED, AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT P.

0 0

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, F Figure, 3.4.3-4 (page 1 of 1)

RCS Normal Operational Heatup Limitations Applicable for the First 26 EFPY - Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 2 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.4.3-8 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3 M

THE REGIONS OF AOCEPTABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND TO THE RIGHT OF THE UMIT CURVES. MARGINS ARE INCLUDED FOR THE 2000

.PRESSA)RE DIFFEREnALBETWtEN POINT Ot SYSTEM PRESSURE..............

MEASUeEMENT AND.THE PRESSVRE ON THE SEACTOR VESSEL. REGIO" CONTROLLING THE LIMIT CURVE.. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INGLUDED UNIT 2 COOLDOWN a6 1500 ----------------------

POlINT TEw.;

PRESSURt A.

60.

387,

8 O

  • 387*

0.

C 175' 404 '

i-*

D 195

406, a

E.

200.

406.

F*

218 430 G

230 481' 1000 240-.-

0 I

S 255*

584.

OJ 0 280 653' cc K

320 1060 S

A L.

370.

1797.

C N'

404 2

  • 5 02 50.------:-

S500 A

NOTE:

NEATUP AND COOLDOWN iRATE RESTRICTIONS AND' REACTOF COOLANT PoMP COMBINTION RESTRICTIONS DURING HEATUP AND COOLDOWN ARE REQUIRED, AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT 0

1 0

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, F Figure 3.4.3-5 (page 1 of 1)

RCS Normal Operational Cooldown Limitations Applicable for the First 26 EFPY - Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 2 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.4.3-9 Amendment Nos.

302, 302, 302

RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3 2500 R.

THE ftEGIONS OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION,(ARE BELOWAND TO THE.RIGHT OF THE UMIT CURVES. MARGINS ARE INCLUDED FOR THE PRESSURE DLFFERENTIAL BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSURE MEASUREMENT AND THE PRESSURE ON THE REACTOR VESSEL REGION CONTROLLING THE UMIT'CURVE. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLUDED,.

2000 -----. -----

POINT TEMP.

PRESURE..***

A62

485, B

120 '

485 C

125, 487 0

150 509*

42 1soo - - - -

0-F 175*

547, E.

G.

200.

556.

E 218 5

UNIT2ISLH (n a I

240 714' 255 792 K

280.

901.

0

-T" L

M 8

939 C) 0 N11 300.

1014......

0 0

325

  • 1193 **

o5 P

350 '

1452 co e0 Q

375.

1821:

CR 4

25*0

-9 500 --

NOTE-' HEATUP AND COOLDOWN RATE RESTRICTIONS AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP COM8INATION RESTRICTIONS DURING HEATUF AND COOLOWN ARE REQUIRED, AS:iDENTIFED IN TEXT 0

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, F Figure 3.4.3-6 (page 1 of 1)

RCS Leak and Hydrostatic Test Heatup and Cooldown Limitations Applicable for the First 26 EFPY - Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 2 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.4.3-10 Amendment Nos.

302, 302, 302

RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3 THE REGIONS OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION ARE-BELOW AND TO THE RIGHT OF THE V

LIMIT CURVES. MARGINS ARE INCLUDED FOR THE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEtt POINT OF'SYSTEM PROESSURE MEAMREMENT AkD THE PRESSURE ON THE REACTOR 2000 -- -vtssW ZGicONcotro uNoaTL rr CAVt AAsaN km 1NSmo ERTYA'oA ARE NOT INCLUDED POIT TEM.

PitESSSE A

60 7m 8

115 375 C

120 378 Sa H

Ae 407 1500---------- 17S -.-

-454-.

F 200 523 G

n225 62

  • UNITJ HEATUP If 235 6W7 (1.

I 237 687 E

250 687 2

K 275 831 C))

WL

  • 2W0 866M oI 325 12 0

0 350 1520 Q 0*P 375 1974 r

c Q

387 22o0 Criticality tg a

a oLmit ac T

9 no u20 y

(1 415 1974 e

500 NOTE-HEATOP AND COOLbDOWN RATE IqESTRICTIOVIS AND REACTOR COL PUMP OBINATIOf RESTRICT S DURING HEATUP AND COOLDOWN ARE REQUIRED, AS 10ENTIRIED IN TEXT,..

aR:

0 0

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, F Figure 3.4.3-7 (page 1 of 1)

RCS Normal Operational Heatup Limitations Applicable for the First 26 EFPY - Oconee Nuclear Station Unit.3 OCONEE UNITS 1,

2,

& 3 3.4.3-11 Amendment Nos.

302, 302, 302

RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3 THE REGIONS OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND TO THE RIGHT N

OF THE LIMIT CURVES. MARGINS ARE INCLUDED FOR THE PRESSURE 2000 -

OIFFERE TIAL BETWEEI POINT OF SYTEM PRESSUkEstEASURE4ENTAND -

THE PRESSURE ON THE.REACTOR VESSEL REGION CONTROULNG THE LIMIT CURVE. MARGINS FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLUDED.

PG T

TE -

RES LE UNIT3 COOLDOWN:

A 60 407 1soo -

-4 0'.

o 7so 430 0

u32 E

275 470 F

195 503 E.

G 200 503 e)

H 218 587 1

230 648 On 361 225 L

-i 500---

'-A 5

0liti 0

50 31020 15 20 253030 40 o

ts ca NOTEd HiATUP AND COolaOWN RA RESTRICTI eS AND REACTORCOOOLANT PUMP COMBIATION RESTRICTIONS DURING HEATUP AND COOLDOWN AFIE REQUIRED. AS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT 0

so 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, F Figure 3.4.3-8 (page 1 of 1)

RCS Normal Operational Cooldown Limitations Applicable for the First 26 EFPY - Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.4.3-12 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

RCS P/T Limits 1.4.3 2500 THE REGIONS OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION ARE BELOW AND TO THE RIGHT OF*

THE LIMIT CURVES. MARGINS ARE INCLUDED FOR THE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN POINT OF SYSTEM PRESSURE MEASUREMENT AND THE PRE'SSURE ON THL REACTOR VfSSEL REGION CONTROLLINd THE LIMIT CURVE. MARGNS FOI INSTRUMENT ERROR ARE NOT INCLUDED.

2000 0

POINT TEP.

PRESSt*

Ao

5s4 8

110 514 C

0-1500 s-...s SD E

165 591 E

205 591

a. zv.

os.sx

.UNIT 3ISLH E as 210 747 0

a3 240:

945 I

250 949 J

275 1138 K

2

  • 1184 0 1000

--- - - -L-:--

0

-u-- -------

3.

H..----------

)0 325

.1628 N

350 2046 0

CO 371 2500 cc******

-A soo - -- --

NOTE.'

H".TUP AND COOLDOWN RATe RESTRICTIONS AND

~REACTOR.COOLANT PUM(P COMBINATIQ RESTRICTIQNS DURING, HEATUP AND COOLDOWhiARE REQUIRED, AS IDENTIFJED IN TEXT.

0 so 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 Indicated Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature, F Figure 3.4.3-9 (page 1 of 1)

RCS Leak and Hydrostatic Test Heatup and Cooldown Limitations Applicable for the First 26 EFPY - Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.4.3-13 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

LTOP System 3.4.12 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System LCO 3.4.12 An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with high pressure injection (HPI) deactivated, and the core flood tanks (CFTs) isolated and:

a. An OPERABLE power operated relief valve (PORV) with a lift setpoint of 460 psig; and
b. Administrative controls implemented that assure 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 3 when any RCS cold leg temperature is g 3250F, MODES 4, 5, and 6 when an RCS vent path capable of mitigating the most limiting LTOP event is not open.


NOTES----------------------

1.

CFT isolation is only required when CFT pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS temperature allowed by the pressure and temperature limit curves provided in Specification 3.4.3.

2. The PORV is not required to be OPERABLE when no HPI pumps are running and RCS pressure < 100 psig.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.4.12-1 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

LTOP System 3.4.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.12.6 Verify Administrative Controls, other than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> limits for pressurizer level, that assure 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event are implemented for the following:

a. RCS pressure when RCS temperature is

< 3250F;

b. Makeup flow rate;
c. Alarms;
d. High pressure Nitrogen System; and
e. Verify pressurizer heater bank 3 or 4 is deactiviated.

SR 3.4.12.7 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for PORV.

18 months OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.4.12-5 Amendment Nos. 302,.302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System BASES BACKGROUND The LTOP System limits RCS pressure at low temperatures so the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) is not compromised by violating the pressure and temperature (P/T) requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G (Ref. 1).

The reactor vessel is the limiting RCPB component for providing such protection. LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits," provides the allowable combinations for operational pressure and temperature during cooldown, shutdown, and heatup to keep from violating the Reference 1 limits.

The reactor vessel material is less ductile at reduced temperatures than at normal operating temperature. Also, as vessel neutron irradiation accumulates, the material becomes less resistant to pressure stress at low temperatures (Ref. 2).

RCS pressure must be maintained low when temperature is low and may be increased only as temperature is increased.

Operational maneuvering during cooldown, heatup, or related anticipated transients must be controlled to not violate LCO 3.4.3. Exceeding these limits could lead to brittle fracture of the reactor vessel.

LCO 3.4.3 presents requirements for administrative control of RCS pressure and temperature to prevent exceeding.the P/T limits.

This LCO provides RCS overpressure protection in the applicable MODES by ensuring an adequate pressure relief capacity and a limit on coolant addition capability. The pressure relief capacity requires the power operated relief valve (PORV) lift setpoint to be reduced and administrative controls implemented which assure 10 minutes available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event. The administrative controls include limits on pressurizer level, limits on RCS pressure when RCS temperature is < 325 0F, limits on RCS makeup flow, the number of available pressurizer heater banks, requirements for alarms and restrictions upon use of the High Pressure Nitrogen System.

(continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-1 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES BACKGROUND The LTOP approach to protecting the vessel by limiting (continued) coolant addition capability requires administrative controls upon RCS makeup flow, the number of available pressurizer heater banks, and requires deactivating HPI, and isolating the core flood tanks (CFTs).

Should an HPI pump inject on an HPI actuation, the pressurizer level and PORV may not prevent overpressurizing the RCS.

The administrative controls upon pressurizer level provides a compressible vapor space or cushion (either steam or nitrogen) that can accommodate a coolant insurge and prevent a rapid pressure increase, allowing the operator time to stop the increase. The PORV, with reduced lift setting, is the overpressure protection device that acts as backup to the operator in terminating an increasing pressure event.

With HPI deactivated, the ability to provide RCS coolant addition is restricted. To balance the possible need for coolant addition, the LCO does not require the makeup system to be deactivated. Due to the lower pressures associated with the LTOP MODES and the expected decay heat levels, the makeup system can provide flow with the HPI pumps providing RCS makeup through the makeup control valve.

PORV Requirements As required for the LTOP, the PORV is signaled to open if the RCS pressure approaches a limit set in the LTOP actuation circuit. The LTOP actuation circuit monitors RCS pressure and determines when an overpressure condition is approached. When the monitored pressure meets or exceeds the setting, the PORV is signaled to open. Maintaining the setpoint within the limits of the LCO ensures the Reference 1 limits will be met in any event analyzed for LTOP.

When a PORV is opened in an increasing pressure transient, the release of coolant causes the pressure increase to slow and reverse. As the PORV releases steam, the RCS pressure decreases until a reset pressure is reached and the valve is (continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-2 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES BACKGROUND signaled to close. The pressure continues to decrease below (continued) the reset pressure as the valve closes.

Administrative Control Requirements Administrative controls are necessary to assure the operator has at least ten minutes available to mitigate the most limiting LTOP event. These administrative controls include the following:

1) Limits on RCS pressure based on RCS temperature;
2) Limits upon pressurizer level;
3) Limits upon makeup flow capability;
4)

OPERABLE Alarms;

5) Controls upon use of the High Pressure Nitrogen System; and
6) Restricting the number of available pressurizer heater banks.

Limiting RCS pressure based on RCS temperature provides a minimum margin to the RCS P/T limit. Restricting RCS makeup flow capability and pressurizer level and controls on the use of high pressure nitrogen limit the pressurization rate during an LTOP event. Restricting the number of available pressurizer heater banks limits the pressurization rate during an LTOP event. Alarms ensure early operator recognition of the occurrence of an LTOP event. The combination of minimum margin to the limit, limited pressurization rate and OPERABLE alarms ensure ten minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event.

APPLICABLE Safety analyses (Ref. 3) demonstrate that the reactor vessel SAFETY ANALYSES can be adequately protected against overpressurization transients during shutdown. In MODES 1, 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS temperature exceeding 325 0F, the pressurizer safety valves will prevent RCS pressure from exceeding the (continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-3 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES APPLICABLE Reference 1 limits. At nominally 325 0 F and below, SAFETY ANALYSES overpressure prevention falls to an OPERABLE PORV, a (continued) restricted coolant level in the pressurizer and other administrative controls.

The actual temperature at which the pressure in the P/T limit curve falls below the pressurizer safety valve setpoint increases as vessel material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement. Each time the P/T limit curves are revised, the LTOP System will be re-evaluated to ensure that its functional requirements can still be met with the PORV and pressurizer level/administrative controls method.

Transients that are capable of overpressurizing the RCS have been identified and evaluated. These transients relate to either mass input or heat input: actuating the HPI System, discharging the CFTs, energizing the pressurizer heaters, failing the makeup control valve open, losing decay heat removal, starting a reactor coolant pump (RCP) with a large temperature mismatch between the primary and secondary coolant systems, and adding nitrogen to the pressurizer.

HPI actuation and CFT discharge are the transients that may result in exceeding P/T limits within < 10 minutes in which time no operator action is assumed to take place. Starting an RCP and adding nitrogen to the pressurizer are self limiting events. In the rest, operator action after that time precludes overpressurization. The analyses demonstrate that the time allowed for operator action is adequate, or the events are self limiting and do not exceed P/T limits.

The following are required during the LTOP MODES to ensure that transients do not occur, which either of the LTOP overpressure protection means cannot handle:

a. Limiting RCS makeup flow capability;
b. Deactivating HPI;
c. Immobilizing CFT discharge isolation valves in their closed positions; and (continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-4 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES APPLICABLE

d. Limiting the number of available pressurizer heater

.SAFETY ANALYSES banks.

(continued)

The Reference 3 analyses demonstrate the PORV can maintain RCS pressure below limits when both makeup flow capability and the number of available pressurizer heater banks is restricted. Consequently, the administrative controls require makeup flow capability and the number of available pressurizer heater banks to be limited in the LTOP MODES.

Since the PORV cannot do this for one HPI pump, or discharging the CFTs, the LCO also requires the HPI actuation circuits deactivated and the CFTs isolated. The isolated CFTs must have their discharge valves closed and the valve power breakers fixed in their open positions.

Fracture mechanics analyses established the temperature of LTOP Applicability at 325 0F. Above this temperature, the pressurizer safety valves provide the reactor vessel pressure protection. The vessel materials were assumed to have a neutron irradiation accumulation equal to 26 effective full power years (EFPYs) of operation for Units 1, 2, and 3.

This LCO will deactivate the HPI actuation when the RCS temperature is 325 0 F.

Reference 3 contains the acceptance limits that satisfy the LTOP requirements. Any change to the RCS must be evaluated against these analyses to determine the impact of the change on the LTOP acceptance limits.

PORV Performance The fracture mechanics analyses show that the vessel is protected when the PORV is set to open at 460 psig. The setpoint is derived by modeling the performance of the LTOP system for different LTOP events. The PORV setpoint at or below the derived limit ensures the Reference 1 limits will be met.

The PORV setpoint is re-evaluated for compliance when the revised P/T limits conflict with the LTOP analysis limits.

The P/T limits are periodically modified as the reactor (continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-5 Amendment Nos.

302, 302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES APPLICABLE vessel material toughness decreases due to embrittlement SAFETY ANALYSES induced by neutron irradiation. Revised P/T limits are (continued) determined using neutron fluence projections and the results of examinations of the reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens. The Bases for LCO 3.4.3 discuss these examinations.

The PORV is considered an active component. Therefore, its failure represents the worst case LTOP single active failure.

Administrative Controls Performance Limiting RCS pressure when RCS temperature is < 325 OF provides a minimum margin to the RCS P/T limit. Restricting RCS makeup flow capability, the number of available pressurizer heater banks, pressurizer level, and controls on the use of high pressure nitrogen limit the pressurization rate during an LTOP event. Alarms ensure early operator recognition of.the occurrence of an LTOP event. The combination of minimum margin to the limit, limited pressurization rate and OPERABLE alarms ensure ten minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event.

The LTOP System satisfies Criterion 2 and Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref.6).

LCO The LCO requires an LTOP System OPERABLE with a limited coolant input capability and a pressure relief capability.

The LCO requires HPI to be deactivated and the CFTs to be isolated. For pressure relief, it requires the pressurizer coolant at or below a maximum level and the PORV OPERABLE with a lift setting at the LTOP limit, with other specified administrative controls.

The pressurizer is OPERABLE with a coolant level limited such that ; 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate the consequences of an LTOP event.

The PORV is OPERABLE when its block valve is open, its lift setpoint is set at < 460 psig and testing has proven its (continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-6 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES LCO ability to open at that setpoint, and power is available to (continued) the two valves and their control circuits.

APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODE 3 when any RCS cold leg temperature is 325oF, and in MODES 4, 5 and 6 when an RCS vent capable of mitigating the most limiting LTOP event is not open. The Applicability temperature of 325 0F is established by fracture mechanics analyses. The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection to meet LCO 3.4.3 P/T limits above 325 0F. With the vessel head off, overpressurization is not possible. With an RCS vent capable of mitigating the most limiting LTOP event open, an LTOP event (including HPI actuation or CFT discharge) is incapable of pressuring the RCS above the RCS P/T limits.

LCO 3.4.3 provides the operational P/T limits for all MODES.

LCO 3.4.10, "Pressurizer Safety Valves," requires the pressurizer safety valves OPERABLE to provide overpressure protection during MODES 1, 2, and 3 above 325 0 F.

The Applicability is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that CFT isolation is only required when the CFT pressure is more than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS temperature, as allowed in LCO 3.4.3. This Note permits the CFT discharge valve surveillance performed only under these pressure and temperature conditions.

Note 2 permits the PORV to be inoperable when no HPI pumps are running and RCS pressure is < 100 psig. PORV operability is not required when RCS pressure is < 100 psig and HPI pumps are not operating since credible LTOP events progress relatively slowly, thus giving the operator ample time to respond.

ACTIONS A.1 With the HPI activated, immediate actions are required to deactivate HPI.

Emphasis is on immediate deactivation (continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-7 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) because inadvertent injection with one or more HPI pump OPERABLE is the event of greatest significance, since these events cause the greatest pressure increase in the shortest time.

The immediate Completion Times reflect the urgency of quickly proceeding with the Required Actions.

B.1, C.1. and C.2 An unisolated CFT requires isolation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> only when the CFT pressure is at or more than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature allowed in LCO 3.4.3.

If isolation is needed and cannot be accomplished in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, Required Action C.1 and Required Action C.2 provide two options, either of which must be performed in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. By placing the unit in MODE 4 with the RCS temperature > 2330F, the CFT pressure of 650 psig cannot exceed the LTOP limits if both tanks are fully injected. Depressurizing the CFTs below the LTOP limit of 373 psig also prevents exceeding the LTOP limits in the same event.

The Completion Times are based on operating experience that these activities can be accomplished in these time periods and on engineering judgement indicating that a limiting LTOP event is not likely in the allowed times.

D.1, E.1, and E.2 With the PORV inoperable, overpressure relieving capability is lost, and restoration of the PORV within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is required.

If restoration cannot be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, either Required Action E.1 or Required Action E.2 must be performed. Required Action E.1 requires increasing RCS temperature within 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> to exit the Applicability of the specification. With RCS temperature > 325 0F, the CFTs are not required to be isolated. Required Action E.2 requires (continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-8 Amendment Nos.

302, 302, 302

  • 0 LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES ACTIONS D.1, E.1, and E.2 (continued) the RCS be depressurized to less than 100 psig within 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br />. With reactor pressure < 100 psig more time is available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event.

These Completion Times also consider these activities can be accomplished in these time periods. A limiting LTOP event is not likely in these times.

F.1 and G.1 With Administrative Controls that assure 10 minutes are available to mitigate the consequences of an event not implemented, the capability for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event may be lost. In this circumstance, compensatory measures must be established to monitor for initiation of an LTOP event. Establishing a dedicated operator within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to monitor for initiation of an LTOP event is sufficient to compensate for inoperability of makeup flow restrictions, having too many pressurizer heater banks available, inoperability of required alarms, or deviation from pressure, temperature or level limits.

Establishing a dedicated operator is not sufficient to compensate for not deactivating HPI or isolating CFTs. If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F is not met, the RCS must be depressurized and an RCS vent path capable of mitigating the most limiting LTOP event must be established within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. These Completion Times also consider that these activities can be accomplished in these time periods. A limiting LTOP event is not likely in these periods.

H.1 and H.2 With administrative controls which assure 10 minutes are available to mitigate the consequences of an LTOP event not implemented and the PORV inoperable; or the LTOP System inoperable for any reason other than cited in Condition A through G, the system must be restored to OPERABLE status within one hour. When this is not possible, Required (continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-9 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES ACTIONS H.1 and H.2 (continued)

Action H.2 requires the RCS depressurized and vented within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

One or more vents may be used. A vent path capable of mitigating the most limiting LTOP event is specified.

Because makeup may be required, the vent size accommodates inadvertent full makeup system operation. Such a vent keeps the pressure from full flow of the makeup pump(s) with a wide open makeup control valve within the LCO limit.

The Completion Time is based on operating experience that these activity can be accomplished in this time period and on engineering judgement indicating that a limiting LTOP transient is not likely in this time.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.1 and SR 3.4.12.2 REQUIREMENTS Verifications must be performed that HPI is deactivated, and the CFTs are isolated. These Surveillances ensure the minimum coolant input capability will not create an RCS overpressure condition to challenge the LTOP System. The Surveillances are required at 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> intervals. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> intervals are shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess conditions for potential degradation and verify operation within the safety analysis.

SR 3.4.12.3 Verification that the pressurizer level is less than the volume necessary to assure 2 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event by observing control room or other indications ensures a cushion of sufficient size is available to reduce the rate of pressure increase from potential transients.

The 30 minute Surveillance Frequency during heatup and cooldown must be performed for the LCO Applicability period when temperature changes can cause pressurizer level (continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-10 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS variations. This Frequency may be discontinued when the ends of these conditions are satisfied, as defined in plant procedures. Thereafter, the Surveillance is required at 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> intervals.

These Frequencies are shown by operating practice sufficient to regularly assess indications of potential degradation and verify operation within the safety analysis.

SR 3.4.12.4 Verification that the PORV block valve is open ensures a flow path to the PORV. This is required at 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> intervals.

The interval has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess conditions for potential degradation and verify operation is within the safety analysis.

SR 3.4.12.5 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is required within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after decreasing RCS temperature to 325 0F and every 31 days thereafter to ensure the setpoint is proper for using the PORV for LTOP. PORV actuation is not needed, as it could depressurize the RCS.

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency considers the unlikelihood of a low temperature overpressure event during the time. The 31 day Frequency is based on industry accepted practice and is acceptable by experience with equipment reliability.

SR 3.4.12.6 Verification that administrative controls, other than limits for pressurizer level, that assure 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate the consequences (continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-11 Amendment Nos.

302; 302, 302

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR '3.4.12.6 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS of an LTOP event are implemented is necessary every 7 days.

This verification consists of a combination of administrative checks for alarm availability, verification that pressurizer heater bank 3 or 4 is deactivated, appropriate restrictions on pressurizer level, controls for High Pressure Nitrogen, etc., as well as visual confirmation using available indications that associated physical parameters are within limits.

The Frequency is shown by operating practice sufficient to regularly assess indications of potential degradation and verify operation within the safety analysis.

SR 3.4.12.7 The performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION is required every 18 months. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the LTOP setpoint ensures that the PORV will be actuated at the appropriate RCS pressure by verifying the accuracy of the instrument string. The calibration can only be performed in shutdown.

The Frequency considers a typical refueling cycle and industry accepted practice.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.
2. Generic Letter 88-11.
3. UFSAR, 5.2.3.7.
4. 10 CFR 50.46.
5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
6. 10 CFR 50.36.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.4.12-12 Amendment Nos. 302, 302, 302