ML16138A592
| ML16138A592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16138A591 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8705060409 | |
| Download: ML16138A592 (3) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 157 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38 AMENDMENT NO. 157 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47 AMENDMENT NO. 154 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, and 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287 I. INTRODUCTION By application dated August 15, 1984 as revised on July 3, 1985, Duke Power Company (the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) of Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. These amendments would consist of changes to the Station's common TSs, TS 3.6.3, to reflect a new Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) on reactor building (RB) purge system. The RB purge system is required to be isolated whenever the reactor coolant system temperature is above 250aF and the pressure is above 350 psig. The LCO allows one isolation valve to be open on each penetration at or below hot shutdown for testing or maintenance. TS 4.4.4 is added to reflect the RB purge system surveillance requirements and the purge valve seal inspection.
II. BACKGROUND By letter dated July 7, 1981, we requested the licensee to expand the TSs to cover the reactor building purge system isolation valves and the surveillance requirements for detecting seal deterioration in these valves. By letter dated May 10, 1983, the licensee responded to the staff request and indicated that such a technical specification was being developed. The licensee also provided technical justification for isolation of the reactor building purge system based on reactor coolant system temperature/pressure limits similar to those for the Low Pressure Injection System, (i.e. 350 psig and 2500F) rather than those normally specified for containment integrity (i.e. 300 psig and 200 0F).
By letter dated August 15, 1984, the licensee proposed Technical Specification 3.6.3 which consists of a limiting condition for operation requiring that the Reactor Building Purge System be isolated when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is above 250 0 F and 300 psig. However, the proposed tech nical specification would allow one isolation valve on each penetration to be open for testing and maintenance when the reactor coolant system is above the aforementioned limits but below hot shutdown conditions. Surveillance require ments on the purge valves were also provided. By letter dated July 3, 1985, the licensee proposed to increase the allowable RCS pressure limit to 350 psig.
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-2 III. EVALUATION The licensee's proposal to incorporate slightly higher reactor coolant system pressure/temperature limits on the operation of the reactor building purge system isolation valves than normally specified for containment integrity (350 psig/250aF versus 300 psig/2000F) will permit the licensee to more expeditiously purge the Reactor Building during the period following shutdown, when purging is required to remove contaminants from the secondary side of the once-through steam generator (OTSG). This decontamination procedure requires that the OTSG be held at temperatures above 225 0F with reactor coolant circu lating for about 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> to minimize tube degradation during wet lay-up conditions. The proposed limits would save the licensee 27 to 30 critical path hours every cold shutdown. These limits are compatible with those for the Low Pressure Injection System and are not significantly different from those normally specified for containment integrity. Therefore, the licensee's proposed technical specification limits on purging present no adverse impact on safety.
The proposed surveillance requirements, TS 4.4.4, specify leakage testing after final closing of the purge valves before going above hot shutdown conditions unless such tests have been conducted within the preceeding six months. These surveillance requirements.are in accordance with staff guidelines.
IV.
SUMMARY
Based on the above evaluation, we conclude that the proposed TSs for the reactor building purge system isolation valves are in accordance with staff guidelines for assuring containment integrity. We find proposed TSs 3.6.3 and 4.4.4 to be acceptable.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. We have determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
-3 VI.
CONCLUSION The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (50 FR 47860) on November 20, 1985, and consulted with the state ofSouth Carolina. No public comments were received, and the state of South Carolina did not have any comments.
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: April 30, 1987 Principal Contributors: R. Ferguson H. Pastis