ML16097A219
| ML16097A219 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/2016 |
| From: | Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16097A220 | List: |
| References | |
| 16-055 | |
| Download: ML16097A219 (985) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:Serial No. 16-055 Docket No. 72-16 Attachment 4 TN-32 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Revision 2 provides the TN-32 FSAR, Revision 2. The TN-32 FSAR, Revision 2 was provided to the NRC in AREVA-TN letter, E-19479 on April 19, 2002. North Anna Power Station ISFSI Virginia Electric and Power Company
A TRANSNUCLEAR April 19, 2002 E-19479 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject:
TN-32 FSAR update per 10CFR72.248 Docket 72-1021
Dear Ms. Ross-Lee:
**As required by 10 CFR 72.248, Transnuclear hereby submits the following pages for r~ision 2 of the TN-32 FSAR:
*~ ;*.
~'
Drawing 1049-70-2, rev 8 Drawing 1049-70-3, rev 6 Drawing 1049-70-4, rev 3 Drawing 1049-70-8, rev 1 Page 7.1-5 / 7.1-6 Transnuclear has made no changes under the provisions* of to CFR 72.48 that were not previously submitted to the Commission. FSAR rev 1 changes associated with Certificate of Compliance 1021 amendment 1
- were previously submitted May 22, 2000 under cover E-18172 with J_une 7, 2000 errata.
. ________ _l c~[tjfy ~flat this information accurately represents changes made since that previous
- submittal. -- - ---_------ -------;-- --------- - - - - - ------- ------- ----- ----- -----~ __ _
Sincerely, Ian Hunter Vice President of Engineering cc: 1066, 1084, and 1087 Files Mary Jane Ross-Lee, NRC Keith Waldrop, Duke Energy Eric Mails, WEPCO FOUR SKYLINE DRIVE, HAWTHORNE, NEW- YORK 10532 Phone: 914-347~2345
- Fax: 914-347M2346
TN-32 DRY STORAGE CASK FINAL SAFETY ANALYSJS REPORT RECORD OF REVIEW, REV 2 Thermal Analyst All revisions Structural Analyst All revisions Nuclear Analyst All revisions
-project Engineer All revisions
- . *~ *I . O"'t.
i( Chi~f Engineer All revisions Revisions: Drawing 1049-70-2 Drawing 1049-70-3 Drawing 1049-70-4 Drawing 1049-70-8 Page 7.1-5
TN-32 FINAL SAFETY ANALYS~S REPORT Transnuclear, Inc. 4 Skyline Drive Hawthorne, NY 10532
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYS~S REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 1~1 Introduction 1.1-1 1.2 General Description of the TN-32 1.2-1 1.2.1 Cask Characteristics 1.2-1 1.2.2 Operational Features 1.2-4 1.2.2.1 General Features 1.2-4 1.2.2.2 Sequence of Operations L2-4 1.2.2.3 Identification of Subjects for Safety and Reliability Analysis 1.2-5 1.2.3 Cask Contents 1.2-6 1.3 Identification of Agents' and Contractors 1.3-1 1.4 Generic Cask Arrays 1. 4-1 1.5 Supplemental Data 1.5-1 1.6 References 1. 6-1 2 PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA 2.1 Spent Fuel To Be Stored 2.1-1 2.2 Design Criteria for Environmental Conditions and Natural Phenomena 2.2-1 2.2.1 Tornado and Wind Loadings 2.2.1 2.2.1.1 Applicable Design Parameters 2.2-1 2.2.1.2 Determination of Forces on Structures 2.2-2 2.2.1.3 Tornado Missiles 2.2-10 2.2.2 Water Level (Flood) Design 2.2-14 2.2.2.1 Flood Elevations 2.2-14 2.2.2.2 Phenomena Considered in Design Load Calculations 2.2-14 2.2.2.3 Flood Force Application 2.2-14 2.2.2.4 Flood Protection 2.2-16 2.2.3 Seismic Design 2.2-16 2.2.3.1 Input Criteria 2.2-16 2.2.3.2 Seismic-System Analysis 2.2-17 2.2.4 Snow and Ice Loadings 2.2-19 2.2.5 Combined Load Criteria 2.2-20 2.2.5.1 Introduction 2.2-20 2.2.5.2 TN-32 Cask Loadings 2.2-20 i Rev. O 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 2.2.5.3 Bounding Loads for Design and Service Conditions 2.2-24 2.2.5.4 Design Loads 2.2-26 2.3 Safety Protection Systems 2.3-1 2.3.1 General 2.3-1 2.3.2 Protection By Multiple*Confinement Barriers and Systems 2.3-2 2.3.2.1 Confinement Barriers and Systems 2*. 3-2 2.3.2.2 Cask Cooling 2.3-4 2.3.3 Protection by Equipment and Instrument Selection 2.3-5 2.3.3.1 Equipment 2.3-5 2.3.3.2 Instrumentation 2.3-5 2.3.4 Nuclear Criticality Safety 2.3-5 2.3.4.1 Control Methods for Prevention of Criticality 2.3-5 2.3.4.2 Error Contingency Criteria 2.3-7 2.3.4.3 Verification Analysis-Benchmarking 2.3-7 2.3.5 Radiological Protection 2.3-7 2.3.5.1 Access Control 2.3-7 2.3.5.2 Shielding 2.3-7 2.3.5.3 Radiological Alarm System 2.3-8 2.3.6 Fire and Explosion Protection 2.3-8 2.4 Deconunissioning Considerations 2.4-1 2.5 Summary of Storage Cas~_p~~ign Criteria 2.5-1 2.6 References *- ----* * --- - - - - ---------- --~-2-~ -6~1-3 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION 3.1 Structural Design 3:1-1 3.1.1 Discussion 3.1-1 3.1.2 Design Criteria 3.1-3 3.1.2.1 Confinement Boundary 3.1-3 3.1.2.2 Non-Confinement Structure 3.1-4 3.1.2.3 Basket 3.1-4 3.1.2.4 Trunnions 3.1-6 3.2 Weights and Centers of Gravity 3.2-1 3.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials 3.3-1 3.3.1 Cask Material Properties 3.3-1 3.3.2 Basket Material Properties 3.3-1 ii Rev. o 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYS~S REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 3.3.3 Material Properties Summary 3.3-1 3.3.4 Materials Durability 3.3-1 3.4 General Standards for Casks 3.4-1 3.4.1 Chemical and Galvanic Reactions 3.4-1 3.4.1.1 Cask Interior 3.4-2 3.4.1.2 Cask Exterior 3.4-7 3.4.1.3 Lubricants and Cleaning Agents 3.4-8 3.4.1.4 Hydrogen Generation 3*. 4-8 3.4.1.5 Effect of Galvanic Reactions on the Performance of the Cask 3.4-9 3.4.2 Positive Closure 3.4-10 3.4.3 Lifting Devices 3.4-10 3.4.3.1 Trunnion Analysis 3.4-10 3.4.3.2 Local Stresses in Cask Body 3.4-11 3.4.4 Heat 3.4-13 3.4.4.1 Summary of Pressures and Temperatures 3.4-13 3.4.4.2 Differential Thermal Expansion 3.4-13 3.4.4.3 Stress Calculations 3.4-13 3.4.4.4 Comparison with Allowable Stresses 3.4-16 3.4.5 Cold 3.4-16 3.4.6 Fire Accident 3.4-17 3.5 Fuel Rods 3.5-1 3.5.l Fuel Rod Temperature Limits 3.5-1 3.5.2 Thermal Stress of Fuel Cladding due To Unloading Operations 3.5-2 3.6 References 3.6-1 Appendix 3A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE TN-32 STORAGE CASK BODY 3A.1 Introduction 3A. l-1 3A.2 Cask Body Structural Analysis 3A.2-1 3A.2.l Description 3A.2-1 3A.2.2 ANSYS Cask Model 3A.2-l 3A.2.3 Individual Load Cases 3A.2-2 3A.2.3.1 Normal Conditions 3A.2-2 3A.2.3.2 Accident Conditions 3A.2-6 3A.2.3.3 Summary of Individual Load Cases 3A.2-9 3A.2.4 Additional Cask Body Analyses 3A.2-10 3A.2.4.1 Trunnion Local Stresses 3A.2-10 3A.2.4.2 Tornado Missile Impact 3A.2-11 3A.2.4.3 Impact on a Trunnion 3A.2-ll iii Rev. o 1/00
'l'N-32 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 3A.2.5 Evaluation (Load Combinations Vs. Allowables) 3A. 2-15 3A. 3 Lid Bolt Analyses 3A. 3-1 3A.3.1 Normal Conditions 3A.3-1 3A.3.l.1 Bolt Preload 3A. 3-1 3A.3.l.2 Differential Thermal Expansion 3A. 3-2
, 3A.3.l.3 Bolt Torsion 3A. 3-2 3A.3.1.4 Bolt Bending 3A.3-3 3A.3.1.5 Combined Stresses 3A.3-6 3A.3.2 Accident Conditions 3A. 3-6 3A.3.2.1 Bottom End Drop 3A.3""'7 3A.3.2.2 Tipover 3A. 3-8 3A.3.3 Conclusion 3A.3-ll 3A.4 Outer Shell 3A. 4-1 3A.4.1 Description 3A.4-1 3A.4.2 Materials Input Data 3A.4-1 3A.4.3 Applied Loads 3~. 4-1 3A.4.4 Method of Analysis 3A. 4-2 3A.4.5 Results 3A. 4-3 3A.5 Top Neutron Shield Bolt Analysis 3A. 5-1 3A.5.1 Discussion 3A.5-1 3A.5.2 Bolt Stress ,calculation 3A.5-l 3A.5.3 Results 3A. 5-2 3A.6 References 3A.6-l Appendix 3B STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE T~-32 BASKET
--- - --* -~--------
3B.l Introduction 3B.1-1 3B .1.1 Geometry 3B.l-2 3B.1. 2 Weight 3B.1-2 3B.1. 3 Temperature 3B.1-3 3B.2 Basket Finite Element Model Development For Side Impact Analysis 3B.2-1 3B.3 Basket Under Normal Condition Loads 3B.3-l 3B.3.1 Description 3B.3-l 3B.3.2 Basket Analysis Under lG Side Load 3B.3-l 3B.3.3 Basket Analysis Under Vertical Load 3B.3-1 3B.3.4 Thermal Stress 3B.3-2 3B.3.5 Design Criteria 3B.3-4 3B.3.6 Evaluation 3B.3-5 3B.4 Basket Under Accident Condition Loads 3B.4-l 3B.4.1 Basket Analysis Under SOG Bottom End Drop 3B.4-l iv Rev. O 1/00
TN-32 SAFE'l'Y.ANALYSXS
;. * * * * * * ' ;a.. ......:: *:1-** : . *.. . *.
REPORT TABLE . OF. CONTENTS .. SECT I:ON ~AGE . 3B.4.2 .Basket Analysis Under 50G Side Impact 3B.4-2 3B.4.3 Design Criteria Fo~ Impact Accident 3B.4-2.
. 3B. 4. 4 Evaluation 3B.4-9 3B.4.5 Basket Rails Under 50 g Side . Impact 3B. 4-10*
3B.5 References 3B.5-l Appendix 3C INELASTIC ANALYSIS OF THE TN-32 BASKET 3C.l Introduction 3C.l-1 3C.2 Stress Analysis of the Basket Structure 3C.2-l 3C.3 Plastic Analysis of the Basket arid Supper~. Rail Structure
- 3C.3~1
. 3C. 4 References 3C.4-1 Appendix 3D Tipover Analysis of the TN-32 Dry Storage Cask 30.l TN-32 Cask Tipover Model 30.1-1 30.2 Analysis Description 3D.2-l 30.3 Equivalent Side Loading on the Cask and Basket for Stress Analysis 30.3-1 30 *. 4 Benchmarking .30. 4-1 30.5 References 30. 5-1. APPENDIX 3E FRACTURE TOUGHNESS EVALUATION OF THE TN-32 CASK 3E.l Introduction 3E.1.1 Fracture Toughness Evaluation of Confinement Boundary 3E-1 3E.1.2* Fracture-Toughness- Evaluation of Gamma Shield 3E-10 3E.1. 3 References 3E-21 4 THERMAL EVALUATION 4.1 Discussion 4.1-1 4.2 Summary of Thermal P*roperties of Materials 4.2-1 4.3 Specifications for Components 4.3-1 4.4 Thermal Evaluation for Normal Conditions of Storage 4.4-1 4.4.1 Thermal Model 4.4-1 4.4.1.1 Analytical Model 4.4-1
- 4. 4. 1. 2 Test Model . 4.4-8 4.4.2 Maximum Temperatures 4.4-8 4*. 4. 3 Minimum Temperatu.res 4.4-8 v Rev. 1. 5/00
* ~
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECT.ION PAGE 4.4.4 Maximum Internal Pressure 4.4-8
-*4. 4. 5* Maximum Thermal* Stresses 4.4-8 4.4.6 Evaluation of Cask Performance for Normal Conditions of Storage 4.4-9 4.5 Thermal Evaluation for Accident Conditions* 4.5-1 4.5.1 Fire Accident Evaluation 4.5-1 4.5.2 Buried Cask Thermal Evaluation 4. 5:....4 4.6 Thermal Evaluation for Loading/Unloading Conditions ' ..
4,6-1 . 4.6.1 Pressure During Unloading of Cask . 4. 6-1
.4.6.2 Cask Heatup Analysis
- 4.6-2 4.6.3 Pressure *During Loading-of .Cask 4.6-3 4.7 Supplementa1 Information 4. 1*-1 .
4.7.1 Supplemental Information from References 12 & 13 4.7-1 4.8 References 4. 1 APPENDIX 4A EFFECTIVE THERMAL PROPERTIES OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 4A.1 Discussion 4A.1-1 4A.2 Worst case Payload 4A. 2-1 4A.3 Summary of Thermal Properties of Materials 4A.3-1 4A.4 Fuel Assembly Geometry 4A~4-1 4A.5 Longitudinal Effective Conductivity Calculation 4A.5-l 4A.6 Transverse Effective Conductivity Calculation 4A. 6-1 4A.7 Effective Specific Heat and Density Calculations 4A. 7-1 4A.8 Conclusions 4A. 8-1 4A.9 References 4A. 9-1 5 SHIELDING EVALUATION 5.1 Discussion and Results 5.1-1 5.2 Source Specification 5.2-1 5.2.1 Gamma Source 5.2-2 5.2.2 Neutron Source 5.2-5 5.2.3 Airborne Radioactive Material Sources 5.2-5 5.2.4 Evaluation of Burnup Enrichments and Cool Time for ... the Fuel *s. 2-5
- 5. 2-5 Comparison. of Mark BW and Westin*g~ouse 17xl7 Fuels 5 .2-7 5.3 Model Specification . 5.3-1 5.3.1 Description of the Radial and Axial Shielding Configuration * *. ** *s .*3-1 5.3.2 Shield Regional Densities 5.3-4 '--*
vi Rev. 1 5/00
'l'N-32 SAFETY ANALYSI:S REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 5.4 Shielding Evaluation 5.4-1 5.5 Supplemental Data 5.5-1 5.5.1 SAS2H/ORIGEN-S Input File* 5.5-1 5.5.2 SAS4 Models 5.5-6 5.5.3 Sample MCNP Input File 5.5-23 5.6 References 5.6-1 APPENDIX SA EVALUATION OF MEASURED DOSE RATES SA.1 Measured Dose Rates 5A-1.
SA.2 Fuel Data 5A-1 SA.3 Source Terms 5A-1 5A.4 Shielding Analysis 5A-2 SA.5 Comparison of Measured and Calculated 5A-2 SA.6 Dose Above and Below Neutron Shield SA-3 6 CRITICALITY EVALUATION 6.1 Discussion and Results 6.1-1 6.2 Fuel Specification 6.2-1 6.3 Model Specification 6.3-1 6.3.1 Description of Calculation Model 6.3-1 6.3.2 Cask Regional Densities 6.3-1 6.4 Criticality Calculation 6. 4-1 6.4.1 Calculational or Experimental Method 6.4-1 6.4.2 Fuel Loading or Other Contents Loading Optimiza'tion --- -- - ---- - - - -- -* -- - __ 6_. :4_".'" 1, 6.5 Critical Benchmark Experiments 6.5-1 6.5.1 Benchmark Experiments and Applicability 6.5-1 6.5.2 Results of the Benchmark Calculations 6.5-1 6.6 Supplemental Data 6.6-1 6.6.1 Sample Input File for Determination of Most Reactive Configuration 6.6-1 6.6.2 Sample Input File, TN-32 Criticality Evaluation 6.6-9 6.6.3 Computer Platforms and Codes 6.6-18 6.* 7 References 6.7-1 APPENDIX 6A EVALUATION OF FUEL UNDER ACCIDENT ACCELERATIONS 6A.1 Material Properties 6A-1 vii Rev. 0 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 6A.2 Tipover 6A-2 6A.3 Bottom End Drop 6A-2 6A.4 Brittle Fracture Evaluation 6A-6 6A.5 References 6A-9 7 CONFINEMENT 7.1 Confinement Boundary 7.1-1 7.1.1 Confinement Vessel 7.1-1 7.1.2 Confinement Penetrations 7.1-3 7.1.3 Seals and Welds 7.1-4 7.1.4 Closure 7.1-6 7.1.5 Monitoring of System Confinement 7.1-6 7.2 Requirements for Normal Conditions of Storage 7.2.1 Release of Radioactive Materials 7.2-1 7.2.2 Pressurization of Confinement Vessel 7.2-1 7.2.2.1 Pressure Under 100°F Ambient Air Temperature, Maximum Insolation 7.2-1 7.2.2.2 Pressure Under 100°F Ambient Air Temperature, Maximum Insolation, 10% Fuel Failure 7.2-1 7.3 Confinement Requirements for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 7.3-1 7.3.1 Fission Gas Products 7.3-i 7.3.2 Release of Contents 7.3-2
-7:-3:2~1 -- Dose- Calcu1-ati.ons------ - --- ---- ---- - ---- ,-3,.,.4 -
7.3.2.2 Pressurization of Confinement Vessel 7.3-5 7.3.3 Latent Seal Failures 7.3-6 7.4 References 7.4-1 8 OPERATING PROCEDURES "' 8.1 Loading the Cask 8.1-1 8.1.1 General Description 8.1-1 8.1.2 Flow Sheets 8.1-2 8 .1. 3 Vacuum Drying System 8.1-2 8 .1. 4 Leak Detection 8.1-3 8 .1. 5 Major Tools and Equipment 8.1-3 8.2 Unloading the Cask 8.2-1 8.3 Surveillance and Maintenance 8.3-1 viii Rev. O 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYS~S REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTJ:ON PAGE 8.4 Contingency Actions 8.4-1 8.5 Preparation of the Cask 8.5-1 8.6 References 8.6-1 9 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 9.1 Acceptance Criteria 9.1-1 9.1.1 Visual Inspection 9.1-1 9.1.2 Structural 9.1-1 9.1.3 Leak Tests 9.1-2 9.1.4 Components 9.1-3 9.1.4.1 Valves 9.1-3 9.1.4.2 Gaskets 9.1-3 9.1.5 Shielding Integrity 9.1-3 9.1.6 Thermal Acceptance 9.1-5 9.1.7 Neutron Absorber Tests 9.1-6 9.2 Maintenance Program 9.2-1 9.3 References 9.3-1 APPENDIX 9A TRANSNUCLEAR TN-32 NEUTRON SHIELDING MATERIAL 9A-1 10 RADIATION PROTECTION 10.1 Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposure Are As Low As is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) 10.1-1 10.1.1 Policy Considerations 10.1-1 10.1. 2 Design Considerations 10 .1-1
-10 .1. 3 - -Operati-ona-l- -t:ons-ide-I'ations- ---- -------- -------------- _l_Q _.1=_2- _
10.2 Radiation Protection Design Features 10.2-1 10.2.1 Cask Design Features 10.2-1 10.2.2 Radiation Dose Rates 10.2-1 10.3 Estimated Onsite Collective Dose Assessment 10.3-1 10.4 References 10.4-1 11 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 11.1 Off-Normal Operations 11.1-1 11.1.1 Loss of Electric Power 11.1-1 11.1.1.1 Postulated Cause of the Event 11.1-1 11.1.1.2 Detection of Events 11.1-1 11.1.1.3 Analysis of Effects and Consequences 11.1-1 ix Rev. O l/00
'l'N-32 SAFETY ANALY&IS REPORT TABLE OP CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 11.1.1.4 Corrective Actions 11.1-2 11.1.1.5 Radiological Impact from Off-Normal Operations 11.1-2 11.1. 2 Cask Seal Leakage or Leakage of the Overpressure Monitoring System 11.1-2 11.1.2.1 Postulated Cause of the Event 11.1-2 11.1.2.2 Detection of Event 11.1-2 11.1.2.3 Analysis of Effects and Consequences 11.1-3 11.1.2.4 Corrective Actions 11.1-4 11.1. 2. 5 Radiological Impact 11.1-.-5
- 11. 2 Accidents 11.2-1
- 11. 2 .1 Earthquake 11.2-1 11.2.1.1 Cause of Accident 11. 2-1 11.2.1.2 Accident Analysis 11.2-1 11.2.1.3 Accident Dose Calculations 11.2-1 11.2.1.4 Corrective Actions 11.2-1
- 11. 2. 2 Extreme Wind and Tornado Missiles 11. 2-2 11.2.2.1 Cause of Accident 11.2-2 11.2.2.2 Accident Analysis 11.2-2 11.2.2.3 Accident Dose Calculations 11. 2-2 11.2.2.4 Corrective Actions 11. 2-2
- 11. 2. 3 Flood 11.2-3 11.2.3.1 Cause of Accident 11.2-3 11.2.3.2 Accident Analysis 11.2-3 11.2.3.3 Accident Dose Calculations 11.2-3
___ 11. 2. 3 ._4 _Correctiye__ 1\G_t;i,.Q!}s__________________ 11. 2-3
- 11. 2. 4 Explosion --11. 2.: --- ---- - ----
- 11. 2. 4 .1 Cause of Accident 11.2-3 11.2.4.2 Accident Analysis 11.2-3 11.2.4.3 Accident Dose Calculations 11.2-4 11.2.4.4 Corrective Actions 11.2-4
- 11. 2. 5 Fire 11.2-4 11.2.5.1 cause of Accident 11. 2-4 11.2.5.2 Accident Analysis 11.2-4 11.2.5.3 Accident Dose Calculations 11.2-5 11.2.5.4 Corrective Actions 11. 2-5
- 11. 2. 6 Inadvertent Loading of a Newly Discharged Fuel Assembly 11.2-6 11.2.6.1 cause of Accident 11.2-6 11.2.6.2 Accident Analysis 11. 2-6 11.2.6.3 Accident Dose Calculations 11. 2-7 x Rev. O 1/00
'l'N-32 SAFETY ANALYS~S REPORT TABiaE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 11.2.6.4 Corrective Actions 11. 2-7 11.2. 7 Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly with a higher initial enrichment than the ~esign Basis Fuel 11.2-7 11.2.7.1 Cause of Accident 11.2-7 11.2.7.2 Accident Analysis 11.2-7 11.2.7.3 Accident Dose Calculations 11.2-8 11.2.7.4 Corrective Action 11.2-8
- 11. 2. 8 Hypothetical Cask Drop and Tipping Accidents 11. 2-8 11.2.8.1 Cause of Accident 11. 2...,9 11.2.8.2 Accident Analyses 11.2-8 11.2.8.3 Accident Dose Calculations 11.2-10 11.2.8.4 Corrective Actions 11.2-10 11.2.9 Loss of Confinement Barrier 11. 2-10 11.2.9.1 Cause of Accident 11.2-10 11.2.9.2 Accident Analysis 11.2-10 11.2.9.3 Accident Dose Calculations 11.2-11 11.2.9.4 Corrective Actions 11.2-11 11.2.10 Buried Cask 11.2-11 11.2.10.1 Cause of Accident 11. 2-11 11.2.10.2 Accident Analysis 11. 2-11 11.2.10.3 Accident Dose Calculations 11. 2-11 11.2.10.4 Corrective Actions 11. 2-12
- 11. 3 References 11. 3-1 12 OPERATING CONTROLS AND LIMITS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 13 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 13-1 14 DECOMMISSIONING 14.1 Decommissioning Considerations 14.1-1 14.2 Supplemental Information 14.2-1 14.2.1 SASl Input File 14.2-1 14.2.2 ORIGEN2 Input File 14.2-1 14.3 References 14.3-1 xi Rev. O 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYSIS 'REPORT LIST OF TABLES 1.2-1 Dimensions and Weight of the TN-32 Cask 2.1-1 Fuel Assembly Parameters 2.1-2 Thermal, Ganuna and Neutron Source for the Design Basis 17x17 Westinghouse Fuel Assembly 2.1-3 Cooling Time As A Function Of Maximum Bu~nup and Minimum Initial Enrichment 2.1-4 Thermal and Ganuna Sources for Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies and Thimble Plug Assemblies 2.2-1 Sununary of Internal and External Pressures Acting on the TN-32 Cask 2.2-2 Summary of Lifting Loads Used in Trunnion ANSI N14.6 Analysis of TN-32 Cask 2.2-3 Summary of Loads Acting on TN-32 Cask Due to Environmental and Natural Phenomena 2.2-4 TN-32 Cask Loading Conditions 2.2-5 TN-32 Cask Design Loads
- 2.2-6 Level A Service Loads 2.2-7 Level D Service Loads 2.2-8 Normal Condition Load Combinations 2.2-9 Accident Condition Load Combinations 2.3-1 Classification of Components 2.5-1 Design Criteria for TN-32 Casks 3.1-1 Individual Load Cases Analyzed 3.1-2 Confinement Vessel Stress Limits 3.1-3 Confinement Bolt Stress.Limits 3.1-4 Non Confinement Structure Stress Limits 3.1-5 Basket Stress Limits
. -- -~--* 2.=1 Cask Weight and Center of Gravity 3.3-1 . Mechanica.r* Propertl.es of *Body* Mater-i"als 3.3-2 Temperature Dependent Material Properties 3.3-3 Reference Temperatures for Stress Analysis Acceptance Criteria 3.3-4 Mechanical Properties of Basket Materials 3.3-5 Temperature Dependent Material Properties. 3.3-6 tn-32 Cask Components and Materials 3.4-lA Trunnion Section Properties and Loads (TN-32 and TN-32A) 3.4-lB Trunnion Section Properties and Loads (TN-32B) 3.4-2A Trunnion Stresses (TN-32 & TN-32A) 3.4-2B Trunnion Stresses (TN-32B) 3.4-3A Trunnion Loadings Used in Cask Body Evaluation (TN-32 & TN-32A) 3.4-3B Trunnion Loadings Used In Cask Body Evaluation (TN-32B)
.3.4-4 Bijlaard Computation Sheet xii Rev. 0 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT LIST or TABLES 3.4-5 Comparison of Actual with Allowable Stress Intensity Confinement Vessel 3.4-6 Comparison of Actual with Allqwable Stress Intensity - Gamma Shielding 3.4-7 Summary of Maximum Stress Intensity and Allowable Stress Limits for Lid Bolts 3.4-8 Comparison of Actual with Allowable Stress Intensity in Basket 3.4-9 Comparison of Maximum Stress Intensity with Allowables in Outer Shell 3A.2.3-1 Bolt Preload (Shell Elements) 3A.2.3-2 Bolt Preload {Solid Elements) 3A.2.3-3 One (1) G Down (Shell Elements) 3A.2.3-4 One (1) G Down (Solid Elements) 3A.2.3-5 Internal Pressure - 100 PSI (Shell Elements) 3A.2.3-6 Internal Pressure - 100 PSI (Solid Elements) 3A.2.3-7 External Pressure - 25 PSI (Shell Elements) _3A. 2. 3-8 External Pressure - 25 PSI (Solid Elements) 3A.2.3-9 Thermal Stress {Shell Elements) 3A.2.3-10 Thermal Stress (Solid Elements) 3A.2.3-11 Three (3) G on Trunnion {Shell Elements) 3A.2.3-12 Three (3) G on Trunnion (Solid Elements) 3A.2.3-13 One (1) G Lateral (Shell Elements) 3A.2.3-14 One (1) G Lateral (Solid Elements) 3A.2.3-15 One (1) G Side Drop - Contact Side (Shell Elements) 3A.2.3-16 One (1) G Side Drop - Contact Side (Solid Elements) 3A.2.3-17 One {1} G Side Drop - Side Opposite Contact (Shell Elements} 3A.2.3-18 One (1) G Side Drop - Side Opposite Contact
- - ------- - -- csolid-Elementsr* ------------------*----- -* * - - --- - - --------------- --- -----------
3A.2.3-19 Seismic Load - 2G Down + lG Lateral (Shell Elements) 3A.2.3-20 Seismic Load - 2G Down + lG Lateral (Solid Elements} 3A.2.5-1 Normal Condition Load Combinations 3A.2.5-2 Bolt Preload + 100 PSI Internal Pressure + lG Down
+ Thermal(Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-3 Bolt Preload + 100 PSI Internal Pressure + lG Down
+ Thermal(Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-4 Bolt Preload + 100 PSI Internal Pressure + Thermal
+ 3G Up + Trunnion Local Stress (Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-5 Bolt Preload + 100 PSI Internal Pressure + Thermal
+ 3G Up + Trunnion Local Stress (Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-6 Bolt Preload + lG Down + 25 PSI External Pressure (Shell Elements}
xiii Rev. O 1/00
'l'N-32 SAFETY ANALYSlS REPORT LIST OF TABLES 3A.2.5-7 Bolt Preload + lG Down + 25 PSI External Pressure (Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-8 Bolt Preload + lG Down + 25 PSI External Pressure
+ Thermal (Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-9 Bolt Preload + lG Down + 25 P&I External Pressure
+ Thermal (Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-10 Bolt Preload + 25 PSI External Pressure + Thermal
+ 3G Up + Trunnion Local Stress (Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-11 Bolt Preload + 25 PSI External Pressure + Thermal
+ 3G Up + Trunnion Local Stress (Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-12 Accident Condition Load Combinations 3A.2.5-13 Bolt Preload + SOG Down End Drop + 100 PSI Internal Pressure (Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-14 Bolt Preload + 50G Down End Drop + 100 PSI Internal Pressure {Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-15 Bolt Preload + 50G Down End Drop + 25 PSI External Pressure(Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-16 Bolt Preload + SOG Down End Drop + 25 PSI External Pressure (Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-17 Bolt Preload + Tipover(50G) + 100 PSI Internal Pressure
- Opposite Contact Side(Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-18 Bolt Preload + Tipover(SOG) + 100 PSI Internal Pressure
- Opposite Contact Side(Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-19 Bolt Preload + Tipover(SOG) + 100 PSI Internal Pressure
- Contact Side(Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-20 Bolt Preload + Tipover(50G) + 100 PSI Internal Pressure
- Contact Side(Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-21 Bolt Preload + Tipover(SOG) + 25 PSI External Pressure
- Opposite Contact Side(Shell Elements)
-- *--3~.-2 _-5;.;;22--Bo-1t--Preloact--+--Tipover (-S-oc;-)--+---2s-ps1--Externa-l--Pres*sure
- Opposite Contact Side(Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-23 Bolt Preload + Tipover(SOG)* + 25 PSI External Pressure
- Contact Side(Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-24 Bolt Preload + Tipover{50G) + 25 PSI External Pressure
- Contact Side(Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-25 Bolt Preload + 100 PSI Internal Pressure + Seismic (Tornado, Flood) (Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-26 Bolt Preload + 100 PSI Internal Pressure + Seismic
{Tornado, Flood) (Solid Elements) 3A.2.5-27 Bolt Preload + 25 PSI External Pressure + Seismic (Tornado, Flood) (Shell Elements) 3A.2.5-28 Bolt Preload + 25 PSI External Pressure + Seismic (Tornado, Flood) {Solid Elements) 3A.4-1 Stress In Outer Shell and Closure Plates xiv Rev. O 1/00
'l'N-32 SAFBTY ANALYSIS REPORT LIST OF 'l'ABLES 3B.3-1 Basket Panel Corner Region Stresses Under lG Lateral
- 90° Load Orientation 3B.3-2 Basket Panel Center Region Stresses Under lG Lateral
- 90° Load Orientation 3B.3-3 Basket Panel 304 S.S. Stresses.at Plug Weld Region
- 90° Load Orientation 3B.3-4 Basket Panel Stresses - Thermal 3B.3-5 Basket Panel Stresses - Thermal Stress + lG Lateral 3B.4-1 TN-32 Basket Structural Design Criteria for Level D Impact Accident Conditions 3B.4-2 TN-32 Basket Structural Design Criteria for Level D.
Impact Accident Conditions 3B. 4-3 Buckling Limits - 304 S.S. Panel - One 0.5" Aluminum and Two 0.1{)5" S.S. 3B.4-4 Buckling Limits - Aluminum Panel - One 0.5" Aluminum and Two 0.105" S.S. 3B.4-5 Buckling Limits - 304 S.S. Panel - Two 0 .. 5" Aluminum and Two 0.105" S.S. 38.4-6 Buckling Limits - Aluminum Panel - Two 0.5" Aluminum and Two 0.105" S.S. 3B. 4-7 Basket Panel Loads - Compression and Bending Under 50G Side Drop (90° Drop Orientation) 38.4-8 Basket Panel Loads - Compression and Bending Under SOG Side Drop (45° Drop Orientation) 3B.4-9 Basket Panel Loads - Compression and Bending Under 50G Side Drop (0° Drop Orientation) 3B. 4-10 Basket Panel Corner Region Stresses Under SOG Side Drop
*(90° Drop Orientation) 3B.4-11 Basket Panel Corner Region Stresses Under SOG Side Drop
--- -------r4-5°-*orop-orTent-at:1onr------------ ------- --- - - --- - - -
3B. 4-12 Basket Panel Corner Region Stresses Under 50G Side Drop (0° Drop Orientation) 38.4-13 Basket Panel Center Region Stresses Under 50G Side Drop (90° Drop Orientation) 3B.4-14 Basket Panel Center Region Stresses Under SOG Side Drop {45° Drop Orientation) 3B.4-15 Basket Panel Center Region Stresses Under SOG Side Drop (0° Drop Orientation) , 3B. 4-16 Mechanical Properties of Aluminum Alloy ASTM B221 6061-T6 3B.4-17 Summary of Aluminum Rail Stresses 3B.4-18 Aluminum Rail Design Criteria for Level D Accident Conditions 3B.4-19 Mechanical Properties of SA-240 Type 304 SST (400°F) xv Rev. O 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT L:tST OP TABLES 3C.l-1 Maximum Dynamic Load Factors 3C.2-1 Load Steps for Inelastic Analysis 3C.2-2 Mechanical Properties of SA-240 Type 304 SST (400°F) 3C.2-3 TN-32 Basket Structural Design Criteria for Level D Conditions (Elastic Analysis)
- 3C.2-4 TN-32 Basket Structural Design Criteria for Level D Conditions (Plastic Analysis) 3C.2-5 Basket Panel Loads - Compression and Bending (88G 90° Drop Orientation) 3C.2-6 Basket Panel Corner Region Stresses Under 88 G Side *Drop (90° Drop Orientation) 3C.2-7 Basket Panel Center Region Stresses Under 88 G Side Drop (90° Drop Orientation) 3C.2-8 Basket Panel Shear Stresses at Plug Weld Region Under 88 G Side Drop (90° Drop Orientation) 4.1-1 Component Temperatures in the TN-32 Cask.
4.4-1 Normal Storage Cask Temperatures as a Function of Storage time 4.4-2 Cask Temperatures as a Function of Storage Time (-20 °F Ambient Temperature) 4.5-1 Maximum Transient Temperatures - Fire Accident 5.1-1 TN-32 Cask Shield Materials 5.1-2 Summary of Dose Rates (mrem/hr) 5.1-3 Direct Dose Rates at Postulated Site Boundary from One Cask 5.2-1 Material Distribution in Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies 5.2-2 Material Compositions for Fuel Assembly Hardware
---- *----MaEeiiars- *-*-------* ---*--*- ---- --* ----*-*---- ** -*--*- -*---*-- -------
5 .2-3 PWR Spent Fuel Assembly Source 5.2-4 Gamma and Neutron Radiation Sources 5.2-5 Gamma Radiation Sources, Thimble Plug Assembly and Burnable Poison Rod Assembly 5.2-6 Fission Product Activities 5.2-7 Activation Activities 5.2-8 Primary Gamma Source Spectrum 5.2-~ Primary Gamma Source Spectrum, SCALE 18 Group Structure, Thimble Plug Assembly 5.2-10 Primary Gamma Source Spectrum, SCALE 18 Group Structure, Burnable Poison Rod Assembly 5.2-11 Axial Burnup Profile 5.2-12 Neutron Source Distribution xvi Rev. 0 1/00 .
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYS!CS REPORT LIST OF TABLES 5.3-1 Material Input for SAS4 Model, TN-32 Cask - Fuel Assemblies Only 5.3-2 Material Input for SAS4 Model, TN-32 Cask - Fuel Assemblies with Thimble Plug Assemblies 5.3-3 Material Input for SAS4 Model*TN-32 Cask~ Fuel Assemblies with Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies 5.4-1 Parameters for the SCALE 27N-18G Library SA-1 Fuel Data for*TN-32-07 5A-2 Primary Gamma Source Spectrum SA-3 Gamma and Neutron Spectra for Active Fuel Region 6.2-1 Fuel Parameters for Westinghouse PWR Fuel 6.3-1 Comparison of Design Dimensions with Criticality Model 6.3-2 Model Mass Densities 6.4-1 Results, Most Reactive Fuel Evaluation 6.4-2 TN-32 Criticality Calculation Results w~th Most Reactive
- Fuel Configuration 6.4-3 Criticality Results, Accident, Reduced Pin Pitch Due to Fuel Grid Damage 6-5-1 Dissolved Boron Critical Experiments and Results with CSAS25 and 27 Group Library 6.5-2 Critical Experiment Results with CSAS25 and 27 Group Library 6.5-3 Critical Experiments, Boron Plate Areal Density 6.5-4 Trend Analysis of Benchmark Results 6A-l Tipover/Side Drop Impact Stress Calculations 6A-2 Tube Buckling Loads Due to End Drop Impact
-eA=3 ---- ---- -Rod--Bucking -L--oads-Due--to-*-End--D??op--I-mpactTN-32._Wl.1xLLOFA ________ _
Fuel Rod, Beam - Column Analysis 7.3-1 TN-32 Releasable Source Term for Off-Normal Conditions 7.3-2 TN-32 Releasable Source Term for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 7.3-3 Off-Site Airborne Doses from Off-Normal Conditions at 100 m From the TN-32 Cask 7.3-4 Off-Site Airborne Doses from Hypothetical Accident Conditions at 100 m from the TN-32 Cask 8.1-1 Sequence of Operations 8.2-1 Sequence of Operations - Unloading 9A-1 Analysis of Gases Released from Neutron Shield Test Resin xvii Rev. O 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYSXS REPORT LIST OF TABLES 10.2-1 Sky Shine Dose Rates at Postulated Site Boundary From One Cask 10.3-1 Design Basis Occupational Exposures for Cask Loading, Transport, and.Emplacement (One Time Exposure) 10.3-2 Design Basis ISFSI Maintenance. Operations Annual Exposures 13.1 Quality Assurance Criteria Matrix 14.1-1 Data for TN-32 Activation Analysis 14.1-2 Results of ORIGEN2 Activation Analysis 14.1-3 Comparison of TN-32 Activity with Class A Waste Limits xviii Rev. O 1/00
'l'N-32 SAFETY ANALYSJ:S REPORT LIST OF FIGURES 1.2-1 TN-32 Confinement Boundary Components 1.4-l Typical ISFSI Vertical Storage 2.1-1 Decay Heat Westinghouse 17x17 Standard Fuel Assembly 2.1-2 Gamma Source Westinghouse 17x17 Standard Fuel Assembly 2.1-3 Neutron Source Westinghouse 17xl7 Standard Fuel Assembly 2.1-4 BPRA's Permissible for Storage in the TN-32 Cask 2.1-5 TPA's Permissible for Storage in the TN-32 Cask 2.1-6 Burnable Poison Rod Assembly, Upper Head Injection Reactor 2.2 ... 1 Earthquake, Wind and Water Loads 2.2-2 Tornado Missile Impact Loads 2.2-3 Lifting Loads 2.3-1 TN-32 Cask Seal Pressure Monitoring System 2.3-2 Long Term Leak Test Results on Metallic Seals 2.3-3 Long Term Leak Test Results on Metallic Seals 2.3-4 Long Term Leak Test Results on Metallic Seals 3.4-lA Upper Trunnion Geometry TN-32 & TN-32A Casks 3.4-lB Upper Trunnion Geometry TN-32B Cask 3.4-lC Lower Trunnion Geometry TN-32, TN-32A & TN-3?B Casks 3.4-2 Cask Body Key Dimensions 3.4-3 Standard Reporting Locations for Cask Body 3.4-4 Weld Stress Locations 3.4-5 Potential Versus pH Diagram for Aluminum-Water System 3.5-1 Finite Element Model 3.5-2 Nodal Temperature Used for Thermal Analysis
- 3. 5-3 Temperature Di.stribution Resulting from Thermal Analysis
__ _3_.~-_4 _______ Nod*al__ S.tress._.IntensitY-- -- -- --- - ------- - --- - ------- -------- - -- 3A.1-1 Cask Body Key Dimensions 3A.2-1 Cask Body - ANSYS Model 3A.2-2 Cask Body - Bottom Corner 3A.2-3 Cask Body - Top Corner 3A. 2-4 Cask Lid to Shield Plate Connection 3A.2-5 Fourier Coefficients for the 1 g Lateral 3A.2-6 Bolt Preload and Seal Reaction 3A.2-7 Design Internal Pressure (100 PSIG) 3A.2-8 External Pressure Loading (25 PSIG) 3A.2-9 lg Down Loading 3A.2-10 Lifting: 3g and 6g Vertical Up 3A.2-11 lg Lateral 3A.2-12 Standard Reporting Locations for cask Body 3A.2-13 Weld Stress Locations xix Rev. O 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT LIST OF FIGURES 3A.2-14 Fourier Series Approximation of the Footprint Pressure for Side Drop 3A. 2-15A Upper Trunnion Geometry TN-32 and TN-32A Casks 3A.2-15B Upper Trunnion Geometry TN-32B Cask 3A. 2-16 Idealized Model of Impact on Trunnion onto Gamma Shield Cylinder 3A.3-1 Summarizing the Bolt End Motions due to 100 PSIG Pressure in the Cask Cavity 3A. 3-2 Lid Bolt Bending Due to Lid Edge Rotation Under Internal Pressure 3A. 3-3 Bearing Area Between Lid and Cask Body Flange 3A.3-4 Tipover onto Concrete Storage Pad 3A. 3-5 System of Inertia Loads Applied on Cask 3A. 3-6 Inertia Loads Applied on Lid 3A. 3-7 Lid Bolts Reacting Inertia Loads 3A. 4-1 Cask Outer Shell and Connection with Cask Body 3A. 4-2 Finite Element Model Outer Shell 3A. 4-3 Finite Element Model Top Corner 3A.4-4 Finite Element Model Bottom Corner 3A. 4-5 Internal Pressure (25 PSIG} 3A. 4-6 3G Down 3B.l-l Representative Basket Wall Panel 3B.2-1 Representative Basket Model Simulation 3B.2-2 Representative Basket Model Simulation 3B.2-3 Basket ANSYS Model 3B.2-4 ' Basket System Model Computer Plot 3B.__3-_l _LQad_D~5-~~ibution and Boundary Conditions lG Lateral (90° orientation)__________________ -- --- ---- ----- -- --- - -- -- --- --- - 3B.3-2 Basket Panel Corner Region Stress Report Locations 3B.3-3 Basket Panel Center Region Stress Report Locations 3B.3-4 Basket Panel Plug Weld Region Stress Report Locations 3B.3-5 Basket Stress Due to 3G Vertical Load 3B.3-6 Detailed Panel Model Thermal Run and Thermal Stress Reporting Locations 3B.3-7 Basket Lifting Slots and Chamfers 3B.4-l Load Distribution and Boundary Conditions - 90° Drop 3B. 4-2 Load Distribution and Boundary Conditions - 45° Drop 3B.4-3 Load Distribution and Boundary Conditions - 0° Drop 3B.4-4 Displacement Plot - 90° Drop 3B.4-5 Displacement Plot - 45° Drop 3B.4-6 Displacement Plot - o0 Drop 3B.4-7 Basket Buckling Modes xx Rev. O 1/00
TN-32 SAPBTY ANALYSiS REPORT LIST OF FIGURES 3B.4-8 Panel Stability Under Compressive Load - Single Aluminum Plate 3B.4~9 Panel Stability Under Compressive Load - Double Aluminum Plates 38.4-10 Panel Stability Evaluation - aending Moment Limit With Applied Load on Compressive Surface Plate ~ Single Aluminum Plate 3B.4-11 Panel Stability Evaluation - Bending Moment Limit With Compression Surface Plate Free to Separate - Single Aluminum Plate
- 3B.4-12 Panel Stability Evaluation - Bending Moment Limit With Applied Load on Compressive Surface Plate - Double Aluminum Plates 3B.4-13 Panel Stability Evaluation - Bending Moment Limit With Compression Surf ace Plate Free to Separate Double Aluminum Plates 3B.4-14 Basket Panel Center Region Stress Report Locations 3B.4-15 Basket Panel Corner Region Stress Report Locations 3B.4-16 Finite Element Model Simulation for Bottom Rail 3B.4-17 Finite Element Model Simulation for Side Rail 3B.4-18 Panel Stability Under Compressive Load 3B.4-19 Finite Element Model Simulation for Basket Panel 3C.1-l Dynamic Load Factors vs. Frequency ~atio - Reproduced from NUREG/CR-3966 3C.2-1 Finite Element Model of the Basket Structure 3C.2~2 Boundary and Loading Conditions for Stress Analysis of the Basket
--*---3C ... 2-3-- - Basket -.Panel _Corner.__ Reg ion__::_S_tr..es_s__ RepQ..rt_L_ocat ions _______ .__________ _
3C.2-4 Basket Panel Center Region - Stress Report Locations 3C.2-5 Basket Panel Plug Weld Region - Stress Report Locations 3C.2-6 Displacement Plot - 88G (90° Drop Orientation) 3C.3-1 Finite Element Model of the Basket and Rail Structures 3C.3-2 Boundary and Loading Conditions for Stress Analysis of the Basket 3C.3-3 Displacement Plot - Basket and Support Rails (88G-400°F) 3C.3-4 Displacement Plot - Bottom Support Rails (BBG-350 °F) 3C.3-5 Membrane Stress Intensities - 304 Stainless Steel Plate (BBG-400 °F) 3C.3-6 Membrane Plus Bending Stress Intensities -304 Stainless Steel (88G-400 °F) 3C.3-7 Membrane Stress Intensities - Aluminum Plate (88G-400 °F) xxi Rev. O 1/00
'l'N-32 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT LIST OF FIGURES 3C.3-8 Membrane Plus Bending Stress Intensities - Aluminum Plate (88G-400 °F) 3C.3-9 Collapse Load of Bottom Support Rail 3C.3-10 Membrane Stress Intensities -304 Stainless Steel Plate cs2G:..s31 °F) 3C.3-11 Membrane Plus Bending Stress Intensities - 304 Stainless Steel Plate (52G-531 °F) 3C.3-12 Membrane Stress Intensities - Aluminum Plate (52G-531 °F) 3C.3-13 Membrane Plus Bending Stress Intensities - Aluminum Plate (52G-531 °F) .
30.1-1 Weight and Dimensions of TN-32 Cask 30.1-2 TN-32 Cask - Finite Element Model (1) 30.1-3 TN-32 Cask - Finite *Element Model (2) 30.1-4 TN-32 Cask - Finite Element Model (3) 3D.2-1 Damping Ratio Data Reproduced from References 13 and 14 30.2-2 TN-32 Cask - Symmetry Boundary Condition~ 3D.2-3 TN-32 Cask - Modal Analysis 30.2-4 TN-32 Cask Tipover Analysis - Displacement Time History 30.2-5 TN-32 Tipover Analysis - Von Mises Stress Time History 30.2-6 TN-32 Cask Tipover Analysis - Stress Plot 3D.2-7 TN-32 Cask Tipover Analysis - Acceleration Time History 3D.2-8 Generic Tipover Analysis Results, Unfiltered and Filtered at 350 Hz Filtered at 350 Hz 30.2-9 Dynamic Load Factors vs. Frequency Ratio - Reproduced From NUREG/CR-3966 30.4-1 Finite Element Grid for BNFL Cask Drop on Concrete Slab 3D.4-2 Finite Element Model of BNFL Full Scale Drop Test #4 30.4-3 BNFL Full Scale Drop Test #4 - Cask Modal Analysis -- --*-- -----:fo~-4 .:.1 -- - --BNFL -cas-k-Enff Drop---=-oispfi1.cemenc-Trme ffisto-ry--rro%--------------- Damping) 30.4-5 BNFL Cask End Drop - Displacement Plot (10% Damping) 30.4-6 BNFL Cask End Drop - Displacement Time History (4% Damping) 30.4-7 BNFL Cask End Drop - Displacement Plot (4% Damping) 3E-1 Locations of Fracture Toughness Evaluations (TN-32 Confinement Boundary) 3E-2 Locations of Fracture Toughness Evaluations {TN-32 Gamma Shield) 3E-3 Charpy V-Notch Test Results for SA-266 Gr 2 4.4-1 Thermal Model, Radial Cross Section 4.4-2 Thermal Model, Axial Cross Section 4.4-3 Finite Element Thermal Model xxii Rev. O 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYSXS REPORT LIST OF FIGURES 4.4-4 Thermal Model Cross Section 4.4-5 Storage Configuration 4.4-6 Cask Temperature Distribution, Normal Storage Conditions
- 4.4-7 Cask Temperature Distribution,. Hottest Cro~s Section 4.4-8 . Basket Temperature Distribution, Hottest Cross Section 4.4-9 Basket Temperature Distribution, Top 4 Inches 4.4-10 Cask Body Temperature Distribution 4.5-1 Finite Element Cross Section Thermal Model (Fire Analysis) 4.5-2 Lid Seal Thermal Model 4.5-3 Finite Element Lid Seal Thermal Model 4A. 6-1 Finite Element Model W 17x17 Spent Nuclear Fuel
{1/4 Symmetry) 4A. 6-2 Typical Temperature Distribution of W 17x17 Assembly 5.1-1 Cask Shielding Configuration 5.1-2 TN-32 Normal Conditions Dose Point Locations 5.2-1 Axial Burnup Profile for Design Basis Fuel 5.2-2 Neutron Source Distribution Profile for Design Basis Fuel 5.3-1 SAS4 T~p Model, Normal Conditions, View 90° from Trunnions 5.3-2 SAS4 Top Model, Normal Conditions, View Through Trunnions 5.3-3 SAS4 Top Model, Normal Conditions, Plane View Through Top Trunnions 5.3-4 SAS4 Top Model, Normal Conditions, Plane View through Center 5.3-5 SAS4 Bottom Model, Normal Conditions, View 90° from Trunnions
- 5. 3-6--- - s;.A-$4-Bottom Moaer;- Normal -conartJ.ons,--vi-evrthrough-----------
Trunnions 5.3-7 SAS4 Bottom Model, Normal Conditions, Plane View through Bottom Trunnions 5.3-8 Shielding at Top Perimeter with Type "A" Lid 5.3-9 SAS4 Top Model Accident Conditions 5.3-10 SAS4 Top Model., Type "'Pt' Lid, Accident Conditions 5.3-11 SAS4 Bottom Model, Accident Conditions 5.3-12 SAS2H Radial Model 5.4-1 Normal Conditions - Radial Direction - Midplane - Average 5.4-2 Normal Conditions - Axial Direction - Average Top 5.4-3 Normal and Accident Conditions - Axial Direction - Average Bottom 5.4-4 Accident Conditions - Radial Direction -Midplane -Average xxiii Rev. o 1/00
TN-32 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT LIST OP FIGURES 5.4-5 Accident Conditions - Axial Direction ~ Average Standard Lid I 5.4-6 Accident Conditions - Axial Direction, Type A Lid-Average 5A-1 Cask TN-32-05 Dose Measurements 0° from Trunnions SA-2 Cask TN-32-05 Dose Measurements 90° from Trunnions SA-3 Cask TN-32-07 Dose Measurements 0° from Trunnions SA-4 Cask TN-32-07 Dose Measurements 90° from Trunnions 6.3-1 KENO Va Fuel Assembly Model 6.3-2 KENO Va Cask Model 6.3-3 KENO Va Axial Model 6.3-4 Model for Evaluation.of Plugs and Holes in Neutron Absorber Plates 6.4-1 Combined Worst Case Model with Single 5% Assembly 6A-1 Tube and Fuel Pellets Finite Element Model Simulation 6A-2 Lateral Displacement of Center Rod Limited by Rod-to-~od Contact and Assembly/Basket Gap 7.1-1 Overpressure Monitoring System Pressure Drop with Time (Assuming Acceptance Test Leak Rate of 1x10- 5 std cc/sec) 7.1-2 Overpressure Monitoring System Pressure Drop with Time (Assuming Latent Seal Leak Rate of 5 x io- 5 std cc/sec) 7.1-3 Lid, Vent Port & Drain Port Metal Seals 8.2-1 Typical Setup for Filling Cask with Water 9A-l Weight Loss Due to Thermal Aging of Neutron Shield Test Resin 10.2-1 Annual Dose from One Cask 10.2-2 Off-Site Skyshine Dose at Postulated Site Boundary From a Typical ISFSI xxiv Rev. O 1/00
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION This Safety Analysis Report addresses the safety related aspects of storing spent fuel in the TN-32 dry storage cask. The . format follows the guidance provided in NRC Regulatory Guide
- 3. 61 <1 > * (Thro.ughout this report, superscripted numbers in parentheses refer to reference numbers for the Section.) The report: is intended for review by the NRC under 10CFR72<2 >.
The TN-32 dry storage.cask provides confinement, shielding, criticality control and passive heat removal independent of any other facility structures or components. The cask also maintains structural integrity of the fuel during storage. It can be used either singly or as the basic storage module in an ISFSI. This Safety Analysis Rep~rt analyzes the safety related aspects of one cask and also the interactions among casks at an ISFSI. It is intended that a Certificate of Compliance under the requirements of 10CFR72 Subpart L be issued such that the casks can be used for the storage of spent fuel in an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) at power reactor sites under the conditions of a general license in accorqance with 10CFR72 Subpart K. 1.1 Introduction The TN-32 cask accommodates 32 intact PWR fuel assemblies with or without burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs) or thimble plug assemblies (TPAs) and consists of the following components: ____ _ __ _ A basket assembly which locates and supports the fuel
- ---a.ssemblies1trans£er-S-heat__t_o__the -~ask body wall, and provides neutron absorption to satisfy nuc!ear-------
criticality requirements. A confinement vessel including a closure lid which provides radioactive material confinement and a cavity with an inert gas atmosphere. Gamma Shielding surrounding the confinement vessel. Radial neutron shielding surrounding the gamma shield, enclosed in an outer steel shell,.which provides additional radiation shielding. A protective cover which provides weather protection for the closure lid and seal components, the top ne9t~on shield and the overpressure system. 1.1-1 Rev.o 1/09
An overpressure monitoring system which is used to monitor the pressure in the interspace between the inner (confinement boundary) and outer seals on the lid, vent and drain port cover.* The overpressure monitoring system consists of a tank filled with helium at a pressure greater than that of the cask cavity and pressure transducers or switches to monitor *the pressure of the overpressure system. In the event of a confinement seal leak, helium would leak into the cask cavity, rather than allowing leakage of radioactive gases from the cask cavity. If the overpressure system pressure falls below a set pressure, an alarm will indicate that a cask seal may be leaking. Sets of upper and lower trunnions which provide support, lifting and rotation capability for the cask. Due to the various designs of nuclear power plants, there are three versions of the TN-32 cask. The standard TN-32 cask has non-single failure proof trunnions and a standard lid. This is the original cask design that was approved by the NRC as a Topical Report in 1996 for reference in site specific applications. TN and its customers have successfully manufactured and placed into service 8 casks under site specific licenses. An alternative configuration, designated the TN-32A has a shorter lid assembly and longer cavity. The inner shield plate on the lid is reduced from 6 inches to 4.89 inches thickness. To compensate for the reduced lid thickness, the bottom and top plates on the top neutron shield are made correspondingly thicker, so that the top of the cask has the same total shielding as the standard TN-32 design. In all other respects, the cask, lid and basket are the same as in the standard TN-32 _________ c.onfig_ura_tion. __ The_ redu_ce_d ._l_id___tb_i_cknas_s_o_f _t_he___ TN-32A results in a nominal cold cavity length of 164.37 inches. This additional cavity length allows accommodation of the additional length of the hardware for a Westinghouse Upper Head Injection (UHI) reactor. For this reactor design, the hardware includes an "Upper Head Injection Cup" which increases the overall length of the fuel and hardware to 162.95 inches (cold, unirradiated). Therefore there is an additional 1.4 inches for irradiation and thermal growth. A second alternative configuration, designated the TN-32B, is identical to the standard TN-32 except that the top lifting trunnions are designed as single failure proof. In all other respects, the cask, lid and basket are the same as in the standard TN-32 configuration. The type of fuel to be stored in the TN-32 cask (including the standard TN-32, TN-32A and TN-32B configurations) is Light Water Reactor~LWR) fuel of the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) 1.1-2 Rev.a 1/0.0
~:vpe. A PWR fuel assembly typically consists of zircaloy fuel rods containing uranium dioxide (U02 ) fuel pellets. The fuel rods are assembled into a square array, spaced and supported laterally by grid structures with top and bottom fittings for vertical support and handling. The maximum allowable initial enrichment is 4.05% U-235 and the maximum allowable burnup is 45,000 MWD/MTU. The cask is designed for a maximum heat load of 32.7 kW or 1.02 *kW/assembly (includes decay heat from* spent fuel and BPRA or TPA) . The fuel must be cooled at leas*t 7 years prior to storage. Known or suspected failed fuel assemblies '(rods) with cladding defects greater than pin holes or hairline cracks are not to be *stored in the TN-32 cask. The fuel which may be stored within the TN-32 cask is presented in Table 2.1-1 and Table 2.1-3. Along with the spent fuel assemblies, Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs) and Thimble.Plug Assemblies (TPAs} may be stored within the TN-32. These assemblies fit into the square array of the fuel assembly. The BPRA 1 s which may be stored in the TN-32 casks are shown in Figure 2.1-4. The TPA's which may be stored in the TN-32 casks are shown in Figure 2.1-s. The acceptance criteria depends on the cooling time since storage and the cumulative exposure. These parameters are used to determine the source term for shielding and thermal analyses presented in later chapters. The casks are intended for storage on a reinforced concrete pad at a nuclear power plant. 1.1-3 Rev.a 1/00
1.2* General Description of the TN-32 1.2.1 Cask Characteristics Each storage cask consists of a fuel basket, a cask body (shell, bottom and l~d), a protective cover, an over pressure system, four trunnions, penetra~ions _with bolted and sealed covers for leak detection and venting, and closure bolts. *. A set of reference drawings is presented in Section 1.5. The casks are self-supporting cylindrical vessels. Dimensions and the estimated weight of the cask are shown in Table 1.2-1 for each configuration. The materials used to fabricate the cask are shown in the Parts List on Drawing 1049-70-2. Where more than one material has been specified for a component, the most limiting properties are used in the analyses in the subsequent chapters of this SAR. The confinement vessel for the TN-32 cask consists of: an inner shell which is a welded, carbon steel cylinder with an integrally-welded, carbon steel bottom closure (Item l}; a welded flange forging (Item 3); a flanged and bolted carbon steel lid. (outer plate) with bolts and inner metallic seal (Item 2); and vent and drain covers with bolts and inner metallic seals (Items 4 and 5) . The confinement boundary components are shown in Figure 1.2-1. The overall confinement vessel length is 175.25. in. with a wall thickness of 1.5 in. The cylindrical cask cavity has a diameter of 68.75 in. and a length of 163.25 in for the standard TN-32 and TN-*32B, while the TN-32A configuration has a cavity length of 164.38 in due to the shorter lid. (All dimensions are nominal). There are two penetrations through the confinement vessel, both in the lid: one is for draining and the other is for ______ ve~-~~!_lg_._ -~--ds>~!>l~_-s~aJ. _m_eqh_an.i,cal clq_e_u:r:~ __is provided__ for _each ________________ _ penetration. The confinement lid is 4.50 in. thick and is fastened to the body by 48 bolts. Double metallic o-ring seals with interspace leakage monitoring are provided for the lid closure. To preclude air in-leakage, the cask cavity is pressurized above atmospheric pressure with helium. The interspace between the metallic seals is connected to an overpressure tank and a pressure monitoring system. The overpressure tank and the interspace is pressurized with helium
.to a higher level than the cavity so that any seal leakage would be into rather than out of the cavity. A decrease in the pressure of the overpressure system would be signaled by a pressure transducer/switch wired to a monitoring/alarm panel.
For additional protection a torispherical weather cover with a Viton o-ring is provided above the lid. A gamma s9ield is provided around the walls and bottom of the confinement vessel by an independent shell and bottom plate 1.2-1 Rev. o 1/00
- of carbon steel which is welded to the closure flange. The gamma shield completely encloses the confinement vessel inner shell and bottom closure. Gamma shielding is also welded to the inside of the confinement lid.
- Neutron shielding is provided by a borated polyester resin compound surrounding the body. The resin compound is cast into long, slender aluminum containers. The array of resin-filled containers is enclosed within a smooth outer steel shell constructed of two half cylinders. In addition to serving as resin containers, the aluminum provides a conduction path for heat transfer from the cask body.to the outer shell. A pressure relief valve is mounted on the top of the resin enclosure for ..
venting pressure due to heating of the resin and entrapped air after fuel loading. A 4-inch thick disc of polypropylene encased in a 0.25-inch steel shell is attached to the cask lid to provide neutron shielding during storage. The basket structure consists of an assembly of stainless steel cells joined by a proprietary fusion welding process and separated by aluminum and poison plates which form a sandwich panel. The panel consists of a 0.50-inch thick aluminum plate and a 0.040-inch thick poison plate. The aluminum provides the heat conduction paths from the fuel assemblies to the cask cavity wall. The poison material provides the necessary criticality control. This method of construction forms a very strong honeycomb-like structure of cell liners which provide compartments for 32 fuel assemblies. The open dimension of each cell is 8.70 in. x 8.70 in. which provides a minimum of 1/8 in. clearance around the fuel assemblies. The overall basket length (160 in.) is less than the cask cavity length to allow for thermal expansion and fuel- assembly handling.
- The_pask cavity surfaces have a sprayed metallic coating of aluminum for -corrosro:n-protection.--T-he-external surf aces of the cask are metal sprayed or painted or both for ease of decontamination and corrosion protection.
A stainless steel overlay is applied to the o-ring seating surfaces on the body for corrosion protection. Four trunnions are attached to the cask body for lifting and rotation of the cask. Two of the trunnions are located near the top of the body and two near the bottom. The lower trunnions may be used for rotating the unloaded. cask between vertical and horizontal positions. Threaded holes are provided in the lid for attachment of component lifting devices. These are used for attachment points for sling systems or other lifting tools. Impact limiters are not used during storage. l.2-2 Rev. o 1/00
......... ~--::-. - ... -. -
During dry storage of the spent fuel, no active systems are required for the removal and dissipation of the decay heat from the fuel. The TN-32 cask is designed to transfer the decay heat from the fuel to the basket,. from the basket to the cask body and ultimately to the surrounding air by radiation and natural convection. The cask is capable of removing 32.7 kW of .decay heat without external fins, thus providing a smooth"outer surface for ease of decontamination. Each cask is labeled with a durable nameplate welded to the outer shell in a visible location. The nameplate includes a unique identification number, the designer and fabricator name, the year built and the empty and loaded weight. 1.2-3 Rev. O l/O~-
Each standard TN-32 cask is identified by a Mark Number, TN-32-XX, where XX is a sequential number corresponding to a specific cask. The TN-32A casks are identified by a Mark Number TN-32A-XX and the TN-32B casks are identified by a Mark Number TN-32B-XX. Each cask is also marked with the empty weigh_t. 1.2.2 Operational Features 1.2.2.1 General Features The TN-32 cask is designed to safely store 32 intact design basis PWR fuel assemblies and associated BPRA's and TPA's. Each fuel assembly is assumed to have a maximum initial enrichment not to exceed 4.05% w/o U-235. Further assumptions limit the fuel to a maximum of 45,000 MWD/MTU burnup, a minimum decay time of 7 years after reactor discharge and a maximum decay heat load of 1.02 kw per assembly for a total of 32.7 kW for a TN-32 cask. Fuel assemblies may or may not.include burnable poison rod assemblies or thimble plugs. The heat rejection capability of the TN-32 cask maintains the maximum fuel rod clad temperature below the 322 °C limit (calculated in Section 3.5.l in accordance with Ref. 4) based on normal operating conditions with a 32.7 kW decay heat load, l00°F ambient air, and solar insolation. The fuel assemblies are stored in an inert helium gas atmosphere. The shielding features of the TN-32 cask are designed to maintain the average combined gamma and neutron dose rate at accessible surfaces to less than 310 mrem/hr under normal operating conditions .. The criticalit*y control features of the TN-32 cask are designed to maintain the neutron multiplication factor k-ef fecti ve {including uncertainties and calculational bias) at -- --- ress-than- Q-, 95 -mi-nus- under_all CQI1.Q;t.t:ions. A dry run will be performed prior to loading of the first cask by each utility to demonstrate the adequacy of training and operational procedures. This dry run will be used to demonstrate that the loading and unloading processes are sound and the operations personnel are adequately trained. The loading and unloading operations which have an impact on safety will be verified and recorded. These operations include loading and identifying each fuel assembly, ensuring that the fuel assembly meets the fuel acceptance criteria, torquing of the lid and cover bolts, drying, leak testing, backfilling and pressurizing the cask and pressure monitoring system, gas sampling and flooding the cask. 1.2.2.2 Sequence of Operatjons A typiea~ sequence of operations to be performed in loading fuel into the TN-32 storage cask is presented in Chapte.! B. 1.2-4 Rev. O 1/09
~.- ........ .
These operations are summarized below. The cask is designed to be loaded in the spent fuel pool or cask pit. Upon arrival, the empty cask is inspected, and the protective cover, overpressure tank, top neutron shield and lid are removed. The cask is then lowered into the cask pit/spent fuel pool .. Fuel. assemblies may be placed in each of the*32 basket compartments.
- The lid is installed and the cavity is vented and drained.
While performing initial radiological surveys, the cask is lifted above the water and some of the lid bolts are installed hand tight. Venting/draining may occur while lifting the cask out .of the pool or may be postponed until after lid bolt torquing has been completed. The*cask is moved from the cask pit/spent fuel pool to the decontamination area. The remaining lid bolts are installed. The cask cavity is then evacuated and dried by means of a vacuum system and then b~ck-filled with helium .. The lid seals and penetration cover seals are leak tested. The top neutron shield is installed on the lid. The external surface radiation levels are checked to assure that they are within acceptable limits. The overpressure system is installed and the overpressure system and seal interspace is pressurized with hel~um. The protective cover may be installed either in the decontamination area or at the ISFSI. The cask is transferred to the ISFSI by a transport vehicle. The cask is set in its storage position, and connected to the site storage cask monitoring system. A functional check of the monitoring system is performed. To unload the cask, these steps are performed in reverse . . *-- _ ___ ____The._cas.k__i s _b.r.o_ught_ b_a.c.k_t_o_the__:r.e_a_c_t.ox.._hui_l_di_ng_.__The_ p.r_o.t_e_c_t_iv.:e~-- cover, pressure monitoring system, overpressure tank and top neutron shield are removed. Prior to opening the cask, the cavity gas is sampled through the vent and drain port. The cavity is depressurized and the cask is lowered into the spent fuel pool. The cask is slowly filled with pool water through the vent or drain port. The cask is vented during this process. The water/steam mixture from the vent line may contain some radioactive gas. Protective measures, as necessary, shall be imposed in accordance with ALARA such as routing the gas through the plant gaseous radwaste system. The exit pressure and temperature are monitored during this operation. When the cask is full of water, the lid is remoyed and the fuel is accessible for unloading. 1.2.2.3 Identjfjcatjpn of Sphjects for Safety and Reljabjlity AnaJysjs 1.2.2.3.1 Criticality Prevention 1.2-5 Rev. O 1/00:
Criticality is controlled by utilizing neutron absorption materials in the pool water and basket assembly".** These .features " ** are only necessary during the loading .and.unloading operations that occur in the cask loading pool {underwater*)~: .. *During storage, with the cavity dry and sealed from the environment, criticality control measures within the *installation are not necessary because no water can enter the.cask* du~ing storage. 1.2.2.3.2 Chemical Safety There are no chemical safety hazards associated with operations of the TN-32 dry storage cask. 1.2.2.3.3 Operation Shutdown Modes The TN-32 dry storage cask is a totally passive system so that consideration of .operati'on shutdown modes is unnecessary. 1.2.2.3.4 Instrumentation The only instrumentation pertinent to storage are the pressure transducers/switches which monitor the cask seals for leakage. The transducers/switches monitor the pressure in an interspace between the inner and outer seals* to provide an indication of seal failure before any release is possible. An initial functional check of the transducers/switches is performed at the manufacturer's plant and another function check of the switches is performed in preparation for storage. Two identical transducers/switches are used to assure a functional system through redundancy. 1.2.2.3.5 Maintenance Techniques
**-secaus*e-o-f**thei--rpass+/-ve--nature-,-t*he-sto-rage-eas-k-s-w-i-1-l require little, if any, maintenance over their lifetime. Typical maintenance tasks would involve occasional replacement and recalibration of monitoring instrumentation, repressurizing the overpressure system and repainting of some casks with corrosion-inhibiting coatings. No special maintenance techniques are necessary.
1.2.3 Cask Contents The TN-32 cask is designed to store up to 32 intact PWR fuel assemblies with or without BPRA's or TPA's. A description of the fuel assemblies is provided in Section 2.1. The maximum allowable initial enrichment of the fuel to be stored is 4.05% u-235 and the maximum burnup is 45,000 MWD/MTU. The fuel must be cooled at least 7 years prior to storage. The cask is designed for a maximum heat load of 32.7 kW or 1.02 kW per assembly. Westinghouse 14 x 14, 15 x 15 or 11*x 17 and B&W Mark BW 17x17 I. fuel assemblies may be stored in the TN-32 cask prov~ded that 1.2-6' Rev. 1 5/00
they meet the burnup, *,enrichment and coolipg times required. The. BPRA-'s and-TPA's which may*be. stored in the TN-32 are shown in* Figures 2.1~4 and 2.1-5 .respectively. A description of the*fuel assemblies is provided in Section 2.1. The quantity and type of *radionuclides in the spent fuel assemblies are described .arid tabulated, in Chapter 5. *.
- Chapt~r 6 .
covers the criticality safety of the TN-32 cask and.its contents, listing material densities, moderator ratios, and geometric configurations. .*
*-'--------------~---------**-- ---=- - ---- ~-------*
- - ; .=. .. ~-* -~\ :* :* .* -; ... *:' ..: . . ....
. . . ..... :, ***. t: *.*
.;~ *:j:.:.~. ~-.:** ~ .. :* :. ,,.
****** :..* * : * ' "1 ... *; .. :-
~ . . . .:* ' ~ \ *. :.*
1.2-7 Rev. 1 5/00
1.3 Tdentifjcatjon of Agents and Contractors Transnuclear, Inc., (TN), provides the design, analysis, licensing support and quality assurance for the TN-32 cask. Fabrication of the cask is done by one or more qualified fabricators under TN's quality assurance program. Personnel are trained and qualified in accordance with industry standards such as SNT-TC-1A for non-destructive testing and the ASME code, Section IX for welding. TN's quality assurance program is described in Chapter 13. This program is written to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 72, Subpart G and covers control of design, procurement, fabrication, inspection, testing, operations and corrective action. .The TN QA program satisfies the 18
- criteria of 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart G, Quality Assurance. Cask operations, site construction and decommissioning activities are performed by the utility under their QA program. Experienced TN operations personnel provide training to utility personnel prior to first use of the cask and prepare generic operating procedures.
The construction of the ISFSI (other than the casks) is performed by others under the direction of the general licensee. Cask operations and maintenance are performed or directed by the general licensee. Decommissioning activities will be performed by the general licensee in accordance with site procedures.
\ .
Managerial and administrative controls which are used to ensure safe operation of the casks are provided by the host utility. Modifications to the TN-32 cask design, when required, may not be performed without concurrence of Transnuclear. The host utility may make changes to the cask as specified in 10 CFR 72.48, as described in the Safety Analysis Report or changes in - -flie *procedures *-aescribed--in-the .Safety _AnalyE?~_s Report or conduct tests or experiments not described in the Safety Analy~ds- Report*, - without prior NRC approval. If the proposed change, test or experiment involves a change in the license conditions incorporated in the license, an unreviewed safety question, a significant increase in occupational exposure or a significant unreviewed environmental impact, it may not be performed without prior NRC approval. Transnuclear, Inc. provides specialized services for the nuclear fuel cycle that support transportation, storage and handling of spent nuclear fuel, ~adioactive waste and other radioactive materials. Transnuclear, Inc. was incorporated in the State of New York in 1965. Transnuclear, Inc. has been involved in the design, analysis, fabrication, testing, certification and operation of packagings for ..spent fuel, radioactive waste, and other radioactive materials for over three decades. Transnuclear, Inc. l.3-1 Rev. o 1/00
**~*-*-"'-* -
developed the TN-24 cask which has been licensed for storage in the United States. Transnuclear, Inc. also developed the TN-40 dry storage cask for use at Northern States Power Prairie Island Nuclear Plant. Transnuclear, Inc. has also obtained previous approval of the TN-32 as a Topical Report which can be used for reference in a site specific applicati~n. Transnuclear, Inc. also maintains an NRC Quality Assurance Program Approval for Radioactive Material Transportation Packages. 1.3-2 Rev. O lfOO
1.4 Generjc Cask Arrays The installation for storing spent fuel may be designed to include one or more TN-32 casks. The casks will be stored on a concrete slab in a free standing, vertical orientat~on. Typically, two or three concrete pads are. utilized at an ISFSI. with *each pad containing a 2 by xx array'of casks .. One possible configuration for a dry storage installation is shown in Figure 1.4-1. Nominal sixteen foot center-to-center s*pacing is assumed between casks for the thermal analysis.
------- ------ - - - - -----~-- - - - - - - --
1.4-1 Rev. O 1/00
- l. 5 Supplemental Data The following Transnuclear Drawings are enclosed:
- 1. TN-32 Dry Storage.Cask, General Arrangement, Drawing No.
1049-70-1 ..
- 2. TN-32 Dry Storage Cask, General Arrangement Cross Section &
Details, Drawing No. 1049-70-2.
- 3. TN-32 Dry Storage Cask, Lid Assembly & Details, Drawing No.
1049-70-3.
- 4. TN-32 Dry Storage Cask, Protective Cover, Drawing No.
l.049-70-4.
- s. TN-32 Dry Storage Cask, Basket, General Arrangement, Drawing No. 1049-70-5.
- 6. TN-32 Dry Storage Cask, Basket, Typical Cross Section, Drawing No. 1049-70-6.
- 7. TN-32 Dry Storage cas~, Pressure Monitoring System, Drawing No. 1049-70-7.
- 8. TN-32 Dry Storage Cask, Top Neutron Shield, Drawing No.1049-70-8.
1.5-1 Rev. o l/00
Supplemental drawing prepared to support l OCFR72.48 evaluations perfonned by WEPCO & VEPCO
1.6 References
- 1. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 3.61, Standard Format and Content for a Topical Safety Analysis Report for a Spent Fuel Dry Storage* cask, February, 1989.
- 2. 10CFR12, Rules and Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations - Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, o.c., "Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste".
- 3. 10CFR71, Rules and Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material *.". *
- 4. Levy, et. al., "Recommended Temperature Limits for Dry Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Zircaloy - Clad Fuel Rods in Inert Gas, " Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-6189.
1.6-1 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 1.2-1 DIMENSIONS AND WEIGHT OF THE TN-32 CASK* Overall length (with protective cover, in) 202.25 Outside diameter (in) 97.75 Cavity diameter (in) 68.75 Cavity length {in) TN-32 Standard and TN-32B 163.25 TN-32A 164.38 Body wall thickness (in) 9.50 Lid thickness (in) 10.50 Bottom thickness (in) 10.25 Resin compound thickness {in) 4.50 outer.shell thickness (in} o.so Cask weight: Loaded on storage pad (tons)
. TN-32 115.5 TN-32A 115.6 TN-32B 115.6 Loaded on pool crane hook without water (tons)
TN-32 114.l TN-32A 113.5 TN-32B 114 .2 Loaded on pool crane hook with water (tons) TN-32 120.2 TN-32A 119.6 m-32B ____ ------ ----. ---- --- - . -120;3**------- --- ----. --- - Rev. O 1/00
NO'l'BS:l. FIG'D'RE NOT TO SCALE. FEA'l'tJRES EXAGGERATED FOR CLARI:'l'Y.
- 2. PHANTOM LINB ( - - - - - - - ) INDICA'l'BS CON!'INEHBN'l' BOUNDARY.
- 3. CONFINEMENT BO'ONDARY COMPONENTS ARB LIS'l'ED BELOW.
- -* I I
LEGEND
- 1. INNER SHELL
- 2. LID ASSEMBLY OU'l'ER PLATE, CLOS~RB BOLTS & INNER METALLIC SEALS
- 3. WELDED FLANGE FORGING FIGURE 1.2-1
- 4. VENT POR'l' COVER PL., BOLTS & INNER SEALS TN-32 CONFINEMENT
- 5. DRA'IN PORT COVER PL., BOL'l'S & INNER SEALS BOUNDARY COMPONENTS
'REV. 0 1/00
CHAPTER 2 PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA
. This chapter provides the principal design criteria for the TN-32 casks. Section 2.1 presents a general description of the spent fuel to be stored*. Section 2. 2 provides the design criteria for environmental conditions and natural phenomena.
This section presents the analysis which shows that the casks will not tip over or slide significant distances under the desigri ...
- basis seismic, tornado, wind and missile loadings, or extreme*.
- floods. This section also contains an assessment of the local damage due to the _design basis environmental conditions and *.
natural phenomena and the general loadings and design parameters used for analysis in subsequent chapters. Section 2.3 provides a description of the systems which have been.designated as important to safety. Section 2.4 provides a general discussion' regarding decommissioning corisideratioris. This is further elaborated on in Chapter 14. Section 2.5 summarizes the cask design criteria. 2.1 Spent Fuel To Be Stored The TN-32 cask is designed to store 32 PWR Westinghouse 14x14 (standard or OFA), 15xl5 or 17x17(standard or OFA) and B&W Mark BW 17x17 spent fuel assemblies with or without burnable. *
*I poison rod assemblies or thimble plug inserts. The physical characteristics of these PWR fuel assemblies are given in Table 2.1-1. The fuel to be stored in the TN-32 is limited to fuel with a maximum initial enrichment of 4.05% U235, maximum burnup of 45,000 MWD/MTU and minimum 7 years cooling time. Table 2.1-3 provides the minimum cooling time required for various combinations of minimum initial enrichment and maximum burnup .
The thermal and radiological characteristics for the PWR spent Rev. i 5/00 2.1-1
fuel were generated using the SAS2H/ORIGEN-S computer code< 1 >. These.characteristics for the Westinghouse*17x17 assembly are shown in Table 2 . 1- 2 *.
- For the thermal and radiological characteristics, the 17x17 assembly with an initial minimum enrichment of 3.5 w/o U-235 was assumed combined with a burnup of .
45,000 MWd/MTU and~ seven year cooling time.
- Fuel* with various combinations of burnup, specific power, enrichment and cooling time can be stored in the TN-3.2 cask . as long as values for decay.heat and gamma and neutron sources, including spectra, fall within the design limits specified in Table 2.1-2. For combinations of maximum burnup and minimum enrichment, the minimum cooling time of fuel acceptable for .**
- storage in the TN-32 cask is presented in Table 2.1-3. The-evaluation performed to determine these cooling times is . .
presented in Chapter 5. Figures 2.1-1, 2.1-2 and 2.1-3 show.the ....
- total thermal, gamma and neutron sources for the W 17x17 standard ..
fuel assembly, respectively, as a function of cooling time. * -
- Table 2.1-4 presents the thermal and radiological* source term for the burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRA'~) and the thimble plug assemblies (TPA's). These values are consistent with the cumulative exposures and cooling times shown in Figures 2.1-4 and 2.1-5. The gamma spectrum for the burnable poison rod assetnblies and thimble plug assemblies is-presented in chapter 5.
Generally any fuel assembly type, with or without associated hardware can be loaded in any of the TN-32 -configurations.:. The l one exception is BPRA's used in Upper Head Injection reactors. These BPRA's are longer than the standard BPRA designs, since they have an Upper Head Injection Cup above the Hold-Down. Assembly. This type of BPRA is shown in Figure 2.1-6.
- Specific gamma and neutron source spectra and fission product gas inventory are given in Chapter 5.
The standard~ 14x14 assembly without BPRA'S or TPA 1 S is used for stability calculations (wind, tornado, missiles,* flood and seismic) due to the lighter weight of the contents and the slightly higher cent~r of gravity. The fuel is stored in the TN-32 in an inert environment since the cavity is vacuum dried and filled with helium after loading. Fuel assemblies. shall be intact. Partial fuel assemblies, that is, fuel assemblies from which fuel pins are.missing shall not be loaded unless missing full pins are replaced. Fuel. assemblies known or suspected to have cladding defects greater.*** than hairline cracks or pin holes are not permitted in the TN-32 cask. Although analyses in this Safety Analysis Report are Rev. 1 5/00 2.1-2
performed only for the design basis fuel, any other intact PWR ~uel which falls within the geometric, thermal and nuclear limits established for the design basis fuel could be stored in the TN-32 cask. Rev. O l/00 2.1-3
- 2. 2 Design Cri terj a for Envj ronmentaJ Conditj ans and Natural phenomena The storage cask design ensures that fuel criticality is prevented, cask integrity is maintained, and fuel is not damaged so as to preclude its ultimate removal from the cask. The conditions under which these objectives are met are described below.
The casks are self-contained, independent, passive systems, which do not rely on any other systems or components for their operation. The criteria used in the design of the casks ensure that their exposure to credible site hazards do not impair their safety functions. The design criteria satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72 121
- They include the effects of normal operation, natural phenomena and postulated man-made accidents. The criteria are defined in terms of loading conditions imposed on the storage cask. The loading conditions are evaluated to determine the type and magnitude of loads induced on the storage cask. The combinations of these loads are then established based on the number of conditions that can be superimposed. The load combinations are then classified as Service Conditions consistent with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 13 ' .
The stresses resulting from the application of these loads are then evaluated based on the rules for a Class 1 nuclear component in Subsection NB of the Code. *
- 2. 2 .1 Tornado and Wj nd r.oadj ngs The TN-32 storage cask is designed to resist tornado loadings result i]lg f_ro111_ J;.1:1.q~-~ in -~h~__trlQE::i; _ torna_do p_rqne _r_egions __ _
of -the United States as defined in NRC Regulatory Guide 1. 76 14 ' An analysis of impact on the cask by tornado missiles in accordance with NUREG-0800, csi Section 3. 5 .1. 4, is presented in this Safety Analysis Report. Non-tornado wind loading is not significant in comparison to that due to tornadoes; therefore, the wind loading is conservatively tak~n to be the same as the tornado wind loading.
- 2. 2 .1.1 Appl i ca,hl e Design Parameters The design basis tornado wind velocity and external pressure drop based on NRC Regulatory Guide* 1.76 are 360 mph and 3 psi respectively. The external pressure drop of 3 psi associated with passing of the tornado is small and, when combined with the other internal pressure loads is far exceeded by the design Rev. O 1/00 2.2-1
internal pressure (100 psi) for the cask. 2.2.1.2 neterxninatjon of Forces on Structures The 360 mph tornado wind loading is converted to a dynamic pressure (psf) acting on the cask by multiplying the square of the wind v~locity (in mph} by a coefficient (0.002558 at ambient sea level condition} dependent on the air density, based on data presented in a paper by T. w. Singell. ' 61
- The result is a pressure of 332 psf. The net force acting on the cask is obtained by multiplying this pressure by the product of the area of the cask projected onto a plane normal to the direction of wind times a drag coefficient. A drag coefficient of l is used based on the geometric proportions of the cask (i.e. length to diameter ratio of approximately 2) and the conservative assumption that the cask surface is rough.* Smooth surfaces would result in less drag forces on. the cask.
This results in a distributed load, w lb/in, acting on the cask in a vertical orientation over the length of 201.88 in. as shown in Figure. 2.2-la. The load is calculated as follows: 332 w= x outer shell diameter 144 332 w= x 97 .75 = 225.4/b I inch
- 144
An--addi-t.iona1--type_of_lo_a.d_o.n___the structure is that created by the impact of tornado missiles on the cask. These impacts are analyzed for 3 types of missiles:
- Missile A: high energy deformable type missile (1800 kg or 4,000 lbs. automobile) impacting the cask horizontally at normal incidence at 35% of the design basis tornado horizontal wind speed.
Missile B: rigid missile (125 kg. *or 276 lb. 8 11 diameter armor piercing artillery shell) impacting the cask: a) horizontally at normal incidence at 35% of the design basis tornado horizontal wind speed. Rev. o 1/00 2.2-2
b) vertically at normal incidence at 70% of the horizontal component (i.e. 24.5% of the design basis tornado horizontal wind speed} . Missile C: small rigid steel sphere l" in diameter impinging upon the barrier openings in the most damaging directions at 35% of the design basis tornado horizontal wind speed. 2.2.1.2.l Stability of the Cask in the Vertical Position Under Wj nd T,oadj ng Cask stability evaluations are performed using a conservatively low cask weight of 218,000 lbs. This is lower than the weight of the cask filled with the 14 x 14 assemblies which have the lowest weight. The cask rests in an upright position on a concrete pad. To determine an appropriate coefficient of friction between steel
- and concrete, the following references are cited:
Coefficient of Static References Friction Metal on stone: Beer and Johnston, Vector 0.30 - 0.70 Mechanics for Engineers: Static and Dynamic ' 221 Metal on Concrete: Walmer, M.E., Manual of 0.30 - 0.40 Structural Design and Engineering Solutions'23 >
*Concret*e-to-stee-J.-:-----*- - - --pc:r-oe-st:wi-H"andbook-,2-nd--
0.40 . Edition 12 > The coefficient of static friction is used to calculate the maximum amount of frictional force available to prevent s.liding. Once sliding begins, there is lower frictional force available, and the coefficient of kinetic friction should be used. According to the textbook t22 >, Vector Mechanics for Engineers : Static and Dynamic by F.P. Beer and -E.R. Johnston, the coefficient of kinetic friction is approximately 25% smaller than the coefficient of static friction. In the concrete construction specifications by specify a. broom finish for the top surface of the concrete pad, this will result in a more coarse texture than a smooth, troweled finish. It is therefore concluded that a coefficient -of static friction value of 0.35 is appropriate for the determination of the factor Rev. O 1/00 2.2-3
*of safety against cask sliding. Based on- the above, kinetic coefficients of friction between the steel cask and the concrete pad ar~ conservatively taken as 0.2625.
Cask SJjding The wind loading on the cask body is, q = o. 002ss0 v 2 = o. 002ss0 (360 > 2
= 331. 6 lb/£t 2 The projected area A is approximated for a 97.75 inch diameter x 201.88 inch high cylinder, A= (201.88 x 97.75)/144 = 137.04 ft 2 Therefore, the total wind force is, Fwind = 331. 6 X 137. 04 = 45, 442 lbs.
The friction force under the cask is, Ffriction = WcAsk Xµ = 218,000 X 0.35 = 76,300 lbs. A conservatively low weight of 218,000 lbs. is used for the stability analysis. Ffriction/Fwind = 76, 300/ 45, 442 = 1. 68, the factor of safety is larger than l.l as recommended by ANSI/ANS-57.9 1u 1 , Section 6.17.4.l. Since Ffriction > (l.l)Fwind' the wind load will not be able to slide the cask on the concrete pad. Cask Tjp.pjng The cask has an outer diameter of 87.75 inches at its base {Exclude resin and outer shell)
- The ability of wind at a constant velocity of 360 mph to tip the cask is calculated by equating the tipping moment' due to wind force and the restoring moment due to cask weight.
Rev. O l/00 2.2-4
The tipping moment due to the 360 mph wind about the bottom edge of the cask is: Mtipping = Fwind X B = 45, 442 X 92. 3 = 4 .19 X 10 6 in-lb. Where: Fwind = 45,442 lbs, Total wind force B = 92.3", C.G. of the Cask The restoring moment due to the cask weight is: Mrestoring = Wcask x r = 219,000 x 43.875 = 9.56 x 10 6 in-lb. Where: wcask = 218 I 0 0 0 lbs I Weight of Cask r = 43.875", Radius of the Cask 6 Mrestoring I 6 Mtipping = 9.56 x 10 /4.19 x 10 = 2.28, the factor of safety is larger than 1.1 as recommended by ANSI/ANS-57. 9 1191 ,
- Section 6.17.4.1.
Since Mrestoring > (1.1) Mtipping , the wind load will not be able to tip the cask. Therefore, the design basis tornado wind velocity of 360 mph will neither slide nor tip the cask. Rev. O 1/00 2.2-5
~.2.1.2.2 Stability of the Cask in the Vertical Posjtjoo Under Mjssjle Impact The cask stability is. evaluated for three types of tornado missile impacts of 126 mph velocity. The missile impacts typically occur on the standing cask at normal incidence as shown in Figure 2.2-2. Missiles A(4,000 lb. automobile) is assumed to crush while Missile B (276 lb. 8 inch diameter armor piercing artillery shell) and Missile c (1 inch diameter steel sphere) are assumed to partially penetrate the cask wall. The cask will tend to slide if a missile strikes it below the C.G. (unless it is blocked in position) or tilt if the missile strikes it above the CG. Conservation of momentum is assumed for both sliding and tipping with P coefficient of restitution of zero. The energy transferred to the cask is dissipated by friction in the sliding case or transformed into potential energy as the cask CG lifts in the tipping case. When a missile strikes the side of the cask at an elevation near the C.G., the translational velocity of cask after impact, is given by: V= mvo M+m Where: v = cask translational velocity after impact, (in/sec)
=missile initial velocity, 126 x 17.6 (in/sec)
= mass *of-Missile,- -lbf/386_._4__ __.
2
- cask mass, 218 1 000/386.4 (lb-sec /in}
When the appropriate substitutions are performed for Missile impact, the cask velocity after impact in the sliding case, V, is summarized as follqws: Rev. O 1/00 2.2-6
Mass Missile Cask Missile (lbs.) Initial Translational Velocity Velocity After Vo (mph) Impact v (mph) A Automobile 4,000 126 2.270 8 11 Diameter Armor Piercing Artillery B Shell 276 126 0.159 1 11 Diameter Steel c Sphere 0.152 126 0 Missile A, therefore, has the greatest effect on the stability of the cask. It has the larges~ mass and produces the highest cask velocity of 2.270 mph or 40.0 in/sec after impact. Cask SJjding The cask may tend to slide if the missile A strikes it below the CG. Assuming no rotation and ignoring friction, the cask velocity could reach 2.270 mph or 40.0 in/sec-after the impact. Therefore, the final kinetic energy of cask after an impact is: KE= l/2(Wcask x V2 )/g 1/2 (218,000 x 40.0 2 )/386.4
= 5 4.51 X 10 in-lb.
This cask kin~ti_c em~rgy _after j,,_rt_1p_a~~-:lf1 a1;>~9_r_b_e_d _b_y_________ friction, as the cask slides on the concrete pad. A dynamic coefficient of* friction of 0.2625 is used for this analysis. Thus, the friction work is equated to the kinetic energy for computing the sliding distance. Ffriction = µ Wcask = 0
- 2625 X 218, 000 =- 0. 572 X 10 5 lbs.
Where: Ftriction = friction force
µ = dynamic coefficient of friction, 0.2625 Friction Work = Ffriction x sliding distance Therefore, Sliding Distance, 5
L =KE/ Fectction = 4.51 X 10 /0.572 X 10 = 7.88 in. 5 Rev. O 1/00 2.2-7
The cask may tend to slide 7.88 inches if the missile A strikes it belQw the C.G. of the cask. Cask Tjpping If missile A strikes the cask above the C.G. and the entire momentum of missile A is applied to the cask to res~lt in cask tipping: Impulse Momentum of missile is (Ref. 20}: Impulse Momentum = (Wmissile/g) X (v0 )
~ (4000/386.4) X (126x528~Xl2/3600)
= 2.296 x 10 4 lb.-sec If the entire impulse is conservatively applied near the top and the cask pivots about the bottom corner (no sliding),
Cask angular momentum after impact = Impulse Momentum of missile The rotational kinetic energy about corner P is (see Figure 2.2-
- 2) :
2 KErot&tion = 0 *5 (Icask about AX (1) ) Ic.G. = (Wcask/g) {r 2
+ A2 /3) /4 '
= (218,000/386.4) (43.875 2 + (184.0) 2 /3)/4
= 1.86 x 10 6 lb-in-sec 2
Therefore, 2 !cask abouc p = 1. 86 X 10 6 + (218, 000/386. 4) (102. 2)
= ?
- 75 x 10 6 lb-in-sec 2 And, {Ic:ask about p} (co) "" Impulse X Height
= 2.296' x 10 4 x 201.88
= 4.64 x 10 6 in-lb.-sec ro = 4. 64 x 10' I Icask &bout p
= 4. 64 x 10 6 /7. 75 x 10 6
= . 599 sec* 1 The rotationaYkinetic energy of cask is, Rev. O 1/00 2.2-8
2 KErotation = l/2 ( ICHk about p x co )
= l/2 (7. 75 x 10 6 x 0. 599 2 )
= l.390 x 10 6 in-lb.
The cask tilts through a small angle before it stops. When the cask tips or pivots about point P after impact, the kinetic energy is transformed into potential energy as the cask C.G. rises (Figure 2.2-2): Ecipping = Increase in Potential Energy = Kinetic Energy
= 1.390 x 10 6 in-lb.
Ei:ipping = Wcask x (x) (sin a - sin 9) Therefore, a = sin" 1 [{Etipping I (Wcask x x) } + sin 9] 9 = sin. 1 {B/x) = sin" 1 (92.3/102~2) = 64.6° a= sin" 1 [{l.390 x 10 6 /(218,000 x 102.2)} + sin 64.61 = 74.89° So the cask tilts an angle equal to (a - 9) = 74.9° - 64.6°
= 10. 3° The cask is still stable since it will keep righting itself until the C.G. lifts over the corner i.e., a reaches 90°.
-*- -- -*- - - **--~ ----- -- Ci--;;~f(}O-a - e= 90° - 64.6° =*25.4° Therefore, the cask will not tipover due to missile A striking above the center of gravity of cask. The impact forces applied to the cask as it is struck by the missiles are determined as follows: Missile A - (automobile) is assumed to crush 3 feet under a constant force during the impact. The loss .of kinetic energy' is assumed to be dissipated by crushing of the missile. The frontal area of the automobile is assumed to be 20 sq. ft. Rev. 0 1/00 2.2-9
Fa* x 3 ft. = 0.5 [mv02 - (M + m)V 2
]
where: v = cask translational velocity after impact, 2.27x 17.6 (in/sec) Vo = missile initial velocity, 126 x 17.6 (in/sec) m = mass of Missile, 4,000/386.4 (lb-sec2 /in) M = cask mass, 218,000/386.4 (lb-sec2 /in) Fa = Impact force on cask by Missile A y Pa = Impact pressure on cask by Mi"ssile A The impact force, F8 , is determined to be 694,324 lb, and the crush pressure on the frontal area of the automobile, Pa' is 241 psi. Missile B - (rigid missile) does not deform under impact. The loss in kinetic energy is assumed to be dissipated as the missile partially penetrates .the cask wall. '!'he penetration force is assumed to be equal to the yield strength of the cask body material multiplied by the frontal area of the 8 in. diameter missile. The imp~~t---i~rce, - i~,---i.8--aet.ermTii-ea-t:o- be---:i:. 6-03 _x _Io'--i:ns~ --- assuming a cask body yield stress, Sy, of 31,900 psi. This force is higher than that developed by Missile A, but the impact time duration is much smaller so that a smaller impulse is applied to the cask producing less cask movement than Missile A. Missile C (1 in. diameter sphere) impact has no effect on cask stability. The above forces, Fa and Fb, are used in the stress analysis of the cask body. 2.2.1.3 Torpado Missiles The TN-32 cask has been evaluated for potential damage due to the three tornado missiles identified in 2.2.1.2. The effect of the missile~ on the cask is described below. Missile A does Rev. O 1/00 2.2-10
-not result in damage to the cask body. However there could be localized damage to the neutron shielding, the protective cover or the over pressure monitoring system. Missiles B and C may partially penetrate the cask wall if the energy is not first dissipated by the outer shell and neutron shielding. It can also dent the protective cover. The overpressure system which has not been designed to withstand accident loads could be rendered inoperable .
- 2.2.1.3.1 Mjssjle A Missile A {automobile) deforms and is crushed during the impact. The local pressure on the cask structure is less than 1%
of the body yield strength. Therefore, no local penetration occurs. The shear stress in the cask wall is conservatively calculated below. Certain assumptions have been made in order to perform this analysis as stated below. The impact force is concentrated on a small curved section of the cask wall having dimensions w x L. Smaller areas will result in larger forces per unit area. Two edges are tending to shear (above and below the curved section) . Actually the sides would also need to shear, resulting in a larger total shear area. Only 3 foot sections are shearing this result in a smaller shear area. Then Shear Area = 2 x 36 x the thickness of the gamma shielding
= 2 x 36 x 8.0 = 576 in2 The shear stress, t = Force/area = 694,324/576 = 1,205 psi, which is well below accident allowable shear stress of 0.42 x Su= 0.42 x 70.000 = 29,400 psi.
*-- *- - -- - *-2.2.1.3.2
- --- - ----- -- Missile B . -- *---- ----- - H ---------- *- - -- *- *- - - - - u - -- - -- -------- * - * - - - - - - - - - - -
Missile B (rigid) partially penetrates the cask wall. The loss in kinetic energy is dissipated as strain energy in the cask wall. The force developed as the 8 in. diameter missile penetrates the cask body is: Fb =Sy(" )(8/=1.603 x J0 6 lbs. 4 From conservation of energy: Rev. O 1/00 2.2-11
or for constant puncture force: Where x =the penetration distance, (in.) v0 =missile initial velocity, 126 x 17.6 (in/sec) 2 m11 .. mass of Missile, 276/386 .4 (lb-sec /in) The penetration distance is found to be 1.09 in. The penetration distance is much less than the. thickness of the gamma shield shell (8 in.). As an order of magnitude check, the minimum thickness of a steel plate capable of being perforated by the postulated DBT missile as recommended by NUREG-1536 125 >" Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage System" and NOREG-0800 <sl is provided by Ballistic Research Laboratory formula described in Reference 22: Where T = Perforation Thickness (in.) missile initial velocity, 184.8 (ft/sec)
= mass of missile, 276/32.2 (lb-sec 2 /ft)
= missile diameter, 8 in.
-Substituting-- the-values giv.en __ above, ___________________ _ T = 0.54 in. The 8 inch thick gamma shield exceeds the minimum required perforation thickness of O._54 inch by a wide margin. When the impact angle is not 90 degrees, the missile will rotate during impact (conservatively neglected), limiting the energy available for penetration since part of the energy will be transformed 1nto rotary kinetic energy. When hitting the weather protective cover, Missile B deforms the dished head before penetration begins (see Figure 2.2-2c). This will decrease the penetration distance from the above values. In the worst,.- case (cask vertical with Missile B impacting Rev. 0 1/00 2.2-12
.vertically at 24.5% of tornado wind), the following results are obtained for impact in the center of the protective cover:
- 94% of the kinetic energy is absorbed by the weather protective cover deformation (see Fig. 2.2-2c)
- 6% of the* energy is absorbed in denting the protective cover.
- Depth of indentation into the protective cover: 0.034 in.
The protective cover absorbs all the impact energy, leaving the lid intact. The overpressure monitoring system could be damaged due to a tornado missile. 2.2.1.3.3 MjssjJe c (steel sphere 1" diameter) The impact of the steel sphere can result in a local dent by penetrating into the cask surface at the yield strength, Sy, for a penetration depth, d. The contact area on the cask surface is: A= 7r(2Rd-d 1) Where: R is the radius of the sphere d is the penetration depth The kinetic energy of the steel sphere is dissipated by displacing the cask surface material: Where me: = sphere mass KE =0.5(4/3) (7t} (0.5) 3 (0.28) {l/32.2) {126 x 5280/3600) 2.= 933 in-lbs Sy 0 f1 (x) (2Rd-d2 ) dd = Sy {x) (Rd2 - d 1 /3) = KE = 933 in-lbs Hence: d = 0.14 in. The area, A, is therefore 0.38 sq. inches. A maximum impact force of 12,122 lb. (Ax Sy) will be developed. Therefore only local denting of the cask will result. Rev. O 1/00 2.2-13
If the impact point is at the center of the protective cover (dished head), the deformation will be largely elastic with no possi~~lity of penetrating the cover.
- 2. 2. l . 3. 4 Abj] j ty of Structures to Perfom Despite Fa j lure of Structures not Designed for Tornado Loads The TN-32 cask itself can withstand the tornado loading. It is also evaluated for burial in Chapter 11. Generally, the casks will be stored outside on a flat concrete slab. Therefore, there will be no structures that could collapse above the storage cask.
If such structures were present at an ISFSI, further analysis would be required.
- 2. 2. 2 Water r.eyeJ !Flood) Design The cask has been evaluated for a water level of 57 ft and a water drag force of 57,160 lbs. due to floods, hurricanes, tsunami and seiches. It is demonstrated that the cask is acceptable for these conditions. If a specific site has conditions exceeding these values, further analysis is required.
2.2.2.1 Flood Elevations It is anticipated that the storage casks will be located on flood-dry sites. However, the storage cask is designed for an external pressure of 25 psi which would be equivalent to a static head of water of approximately 57 ft. This is greater than would be anticipated due to floods, tsunami and seiches regardless of the site. ' 2.2.2.2 Phenomena Considered in Design r.oad Calculations
--------The- casks a*re -designea-- t.o-withst-and-loads-from-forces---- -- - ----- ------ -- --
developed by the probable maximum flood including hydrostatic effects and dynamic phenomena such as momentum and drag~ 2.2.2.3 FJood Force Application Using a friction coefficient of 0.35, a drag force greater than 57,160 lb. is required to move the cask when the cask is in an upright position (after taking into account the bouyant force on the cask). The drag force is calculated as follows: The approximate volume of the cask =~ (97.75) 2 (201.88)/4
= l._515 x 10 6 in3
- Water density = 0.0361 lbs/in3 Rev. o 1/00 2.2-14
The buoyant force is therefore, Fb = 1.515 x 10' (0.0361)
= 54,692 lbs.
The weight of the cask in water = 218,000 - 54,692 = 163-,308 lbs. Using a friction coefficient of 0.35, a drag force greater than 0.35 x 163,308 ~ 57,160 lbs is required to move the cask when the cask is in the upright position. This force is equivalent to a stream of water flowing past the cask at 25 ft/sec. The water velocity was calculated using the following formula (Reference 18, Pg. 4-27) v2 F=coAP-2g where F = Drag force, 57,160 lbs. Co =Drag coefficient~ 0.7 2 A = Projected area, 137.04 ft 3 p = 62.4 lb/ft v = water velocity, ft/sec g = 32.2 ft/sec 2 The ref ore
--- --- - - -R!---- --
V= 2Fg Co AP V ~ 25 ft/sec For a lower friction coefficient, the drag force is less and the water velocity to move the cask is less. Rev. O 1/00 2.2-15
2.2.2.4 Flood Protectjon The storage cask is designed for an internal pressure of 100 psi. The normal cavity operating pressure is 35 psi. It is demonstrated in Chapter 7 that the leakage rate past the seals will not result in dose levels exceeding regulatory requirements. The seals also prevent water in-leakage. The interspace between the containment seals and the containment vessel cavity are pressurized to approximately 6 atm and 2 atm, respectively, to preclude any possibility of water in-leakage. Seismic design criteria are dependent on the specific site location. These criteria are* established based on the general requirements stated in 10CFR Part 72.102. The design earthquake for use in the design of the casks must be equivalent to the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) for a collocated nuclear power plant, the site of which has been evaluated under the criteria of 10CFRlOO, Appendix A<a>. 2.2.3.1 Inp11t Crjteria The TN-32 cask is a very stiff structure. For the purpose of calculating seismic load, the cask is treated as a rigid body attached to the ground and equivalent static analysis methods are used to calculate loads and overturning moments. This assumption is valid as long as the cask does not slide due to the seismic loads. The fundamental natural frequency of vibration for the cask is determined as shown below (Formulas for Stress and Strain 121 >, 4 t:h Edition, - :Pase-- 369, -case #3) ~ __ .. ___ - - - ------- ---- ----- -- - --- -----*- f = 3. 89/ (WL3 /BE!) 112 Where: w =Weight of Cask c21a,ooo lbs) L = Height of Cask = 184 in. E = Mo4ulus of Elasticity= 28.3 x *10 6 psi I = <n/64) (D 0 4 - Di4 ) = Cn/64) (87. 75 4 - 68. 75 4
) = 1. 8 x 10 6 in4 Substituting the values given above, f = 66 Hz,*
Rev. o 1/00 2.2-16
The vertical structural frequency of cask will be still higher since the cask has higher axial stiffness than the lateral stiffness. Thus the cask standing vertically on its pad has dominant lateral and vertical frequencies higher than 33 Hz * (corresponding to the maximum ground acceleration, reference to NOR.EG 1.60 1261 ) . Therefore, the cask can be treated as a rigid body and the maximum seismic load on the cask is the peak ground acceleration times the mass of the cask. The cask is, therefore, evaluated using an equivalent static seismic loading method, and there is no need to specify a design response spectrum or its associated time history. The factor of 1.5 (reference to NUREG* oaoo< 5 >, Para. 3. 7. 2) to account for multimode behavior need not be included in the seismic accelerations for this analysis, as the potential for sliding/uplift is due to rigid body motion, and no frequency content effects are associated with this action. 2.2.3.2 Sejsmjc-System Analysis Cask Slidjng If the cask is to slide due to seismic loading, the horizontal component of the seismic load must overcome the friction force between the cask base and concrete pad. The friction force is equal to the normal force due to gravity acting at the cask/ground interface multiplied by the coefficient of friction. The vertical seismic force is applied upward so as to decrease the normal force and hence the sliding resistance force. The equivalent static horizontal acceleration load required to initiate sliding is calculated as follows: where: gh = Fraction of horizontal acceleration value necessary to initiate sliding W = Weight of cask on pad
µ = Coefficient of friction For a coefficient of friction of 0.35, the equivalent static horizontal load required to initiate sliding is 0.284g.
Using a safety factor of 1.1 as recommended by ANSI/ANS-57.9,* Section 6.17.4.1, the cask will not slide for a horizontal g loading of 0.284/l.1 = 0.26g. The maximum vertica} g loading is 2/3 (0.26) or 0.17g. Rev. O 1/00 2.2-17
The two horizontal components of seismic load are combined as indicaeed in Section 3.7.2 of NUREG-0800. At 45° to either horizontal component, the response due to a N-S earthquake is sin45° x N-S response and likewise for an E-W earthquake is sin45° x E-W response. If both components are equal, the combined response is: (sin2 45° + sin245°} 112 x response = r~sponse in either axis. Therefore, we only need to consider a single horizontal axis for the maximum seismic response. Cask Tipping The cask will not tipover due to a seismic event if the stabilizing moment due to cask weight is higher than the seismic tipping moment. The vertical acceleration is assumed to be 2/3 the horizontal acceleration in accordance with NUREG-0800. For a circular cask, the horizontal g value necessary to tip the cask is calculated below: Where: Mtip = Moment necessary to tip the cask, in-lbs gh = Acceleration value necessary to tip the cask W = Weight of cask on pad L,, =Vertical distance to 'c.G. = 92.3 in. Lr =Radial distance to C.G. = 43.875 in. Where: Mscab = Stabilizing moment of the cask, in-lbs. W = Weight of cask on pad Lr =Radial distance to C.G = 43.875 in Therefore, the g value necessary to tip.the cask is found by equating Mtip to Mstab: gh = 43.875/(92.3 + 0.66 x 43.875) = 0.36 Rev. O l/00 2.2-18
Using a safety factor of 1.1 as recommended by ANSI/ANS-57.9, Section 6.17.4.1, the cask will not tipover for a horizontal g loading of 0.36/1.l = 0.33g. The maximum vertical g loading is 2/3 (0.33) or 0.22g. Conclnsjon As demonstrated by the above calculations, an applied horizontal acceleration of 0.26g (and vertical acceleration of 0.17g) or less will neither slide nor tip the cask. The load distribution is shown in Figure 2.2-lb. For evaluation of the stresses of the cask body, a lg lateral and 2g down were used for seismic loads on the cask. These loads are applied while the cask is standing in a vertical position on the concrete pad and bound the specified seismic load limits. 2.2.4 Spaw and Ice I-0~djngs The temperature of the protective cover attached to the top of the cask above the lid will generally stay above freezing due to the heat load of the contents. However, if the heat load is neglected under certain conditions could.fall below 32°F and a layer of snow or ice might build up. A 50 psf (0.35 psi) snow or ice load corresponds to approximately 6 ft of snow or 1 ft of ice. However, this load is insignificant on the TN-32 since the cover is a 0.38 in. thick torispherical steel head which can withstand an external pressure over 20 psi. Therefore, the cover will maintain its intended protective function under snow or ice loading conditions. Rev. 0 1/00 2.2-19
2.2.5 Combjned I.oad Criteria 2.2.5.1 Introduction Sections 2.2.l through 2.2.4, describe the most severe natural phenomena considered in the design of the TN-32. it has been shown that the cask is stable When subjected to natural phenomena. It will not tip over under any condition or slide on its pad more than 10 inches. In addition, the forces and pressures applied to the cask due to these phenomena have been determined. It should be noted that all of the above phenomena are upper bound, low probability events. In most cases, however, there is a more regular and frequent similar phenomena of lower magnitude. For instance, some small wind load occurs often, but a tornado is unlikely. The forces and pressures determined for the severe phenomena can therefore be used as upper bound values for all of the similar events. These bounding forces and pressures, with a single exception, can occur at any time and their effects are combined with.those due to normal operation. The sole exception is the loading{s) due to the tornado missiles as described in Section 2.2.1.3. The missile case is evaluated in combinat~on with others as a low probability event which is postulated only because the consequences of cask penetration might result in severe impact on the immediate environs. 2.2.5.2 TN-32 Cask r.oadin~s A brief explanation follows of the cask loads due to events that will occur or can be expected to occur in the course of _normal operation_.___ T_he _Ca.$~ loads due to the severe natural phenomena and accidents are "compared wfth- -those --for similar -but-- - -- *- less severe normal events. Then loads equal to or higher than the upper bound values selected for design and analysis of the TN-32, defined as Service Loads, are described. Finally, the Service Loads are separated into two levels and superposition of simultaneous loadings (combined loads) is discussed. 2.2.5.2.1 Normal Operatjon During-normal storage on the ISFSI pad, the cask is subjected to loading due to its own dead weight and that of its contents {fuel and basket), assembly stresses due to the bolt preload required to seat the double metallic seals and react to the internal pressure, and internal pressure due to initial Rev. O 1/00 2.2-20
-pressurization and any postulated fuel clad failure resulting in fission gas release.
Additional normal loads include wind loading which produces a distributed lateral load on one side of the cask and can also result in slight external pressure drop on other portions of the cask.
- Lifting loads are applied to the cask through the trunnions and the cask dead weight is reacted through the trunnions during lifting operations.
I! it becomes necessary to unload a recently loaded hot cask, cold water would be pumped into the cask to reduce the temperature before returning the cask to the pool. If proper controls are not maintained, an internal pressure corresponding to saturated steam pressure at the cavity wall temperature could occur which would be higher than the normal internal pressure. Finally, an increased external pressure is applied to all surf aces of the cask during fuel loading when the cask is at the bottom of the spent fuel pool. Snow and ice loads apply local external pressure loading to the top of the cask. The cask will, of course, be subjected to the full range of thermal conditions produced by ambient variations (including insolation} and decay heat. Fabrication stresses, due to the shrink fit or welding are not combined with the design stresses in accordance with ASME Section III.
- 2. 2. 5. 2. 2 I.oadj ngs Due to Seyere Natural Phenomena and Accidents
The-cask-is- subjected--to-dead-we-ight--loading and--assembly-.- - - - -------
stresses due to bolt preload and seal compression under all conditions. Other loads act on the cask during various conditions. The tornado wind loading described in Section 2.2.1 could produce higher lateral loading than any normal wind loading or flood water drag force. The external pressure drop due to the tornado wind is also more severe than due to any normal condition. Tornado missile impact described in Section 2.2.1.3 could apply a high local loading to the cask unlike any normal condition. External pressure loading of the cask could occur due to flooding (see Section 2.2.2), or nearby explosion. Th~ full range of thermal conditions due.to ambient variations, decay heat and minor fires in the vicinity of the cask apply. Rev. O 1/00 2.2-21
2.2.5.2.3 Thermal Condjtjons The TN-32 component temperatures and thermal gradients are affected by the following thermal conditions:
- Fuel loading
- Decay heat
- Insolation
- Beginning of life unloading
- Ambient variations
- Lightning
- Minor fire The thermal conditions which are of concern structurally are the temperature distributions in the cask and the differential thermal expansions of interfacing cask components.
- 2. 2. 5. 2. 4 Fuel I..oadi ng The cask is loaded in a spent fuel pool under water. The cask is cooled by pool water; therefore, the thermal. gradients established during fuel loading will be negligible.
2.2.5.2.5 Decay Heat/Solar Iqad After the cask is loaded and removed from the pool, the body temperature will gradually'reach steady state conditions. Since the mass of the cask is large, the time to reach equilibrium will be approximately l to 2 days. The temperature gradients in the ________cask __ body:_haY-e_an__insignifi_c_ant effect on the structural ___ _ integrity of the body. Several thermal analysis calculations were made for different ambient and decay heat load conditions. The methods used to obtain these results are discussed in Ch. 4. The cask temperature distribution for the normal storage condition {See Chapter 4) was used for the structural analysis. 2.2.5.2.6 Begippjng of Storage Unloadiqg This condition would occur if it were necessary to place the cask back in the pool at the beginning of storage after it had been loaded and reached thermal equilibrium. Prior to unloading fuel, the cask and fuel would be cooled by circulating water Rev. o l/00 2.2-22
- through the cask. Therefore, cool water would contact the hotter cask inside surfaces. The thermal gradients in the cask body due
- to this condition are small and would have an insignificant effect on the cask body. The fuel cladding stresses during beginning of life unloading is evaluated in Section 3.5.
2.2.5.2.7 Ambient VarjatioDs Because the cask thermal inertia is large, the cask temperature response to changes in atmospheric conditions will be relatively slow. Ambient temperature variations due to changes in atmospheric conditions i.e., sun, ice, snow, rain and wind will not affect the performance of the cask. The cyclical variation of insolation during a day will also create insignificant thermal gradients. The thermal effects due to ambient variations and conditions are discussed in further detail in Ch. 4.
- 2. 2. 5. 2. 8 Id ghtn i ng Lightning will not cause a significant thermal effect. If struck by lightning on the lid, the electrical charge will be conducted by paths provided by the lid bolts to the body.
The lid metallic o-ring seals can withstand temperatures of up to 536°F without loss of sealing capability. It is not anticipated that lightning could result in the seals reaching temperatures above these values because they are protected by the heavy wall flange. The viton 0-ring of the protective cover could be effected by-a-direct--l-ighting-str+/-ke-on-the--cask-.--*-However-,-t*he--viton-sea1.--------- - - - does not serve a function.important to safety, but is used only as a weather seal. 2.2.5.2.9 Eil:e. The only source of fuel which could cause a fire in the
- vicinity of the cask is the fuel tank of the tow vehicle which transports the cask to the storage pad. An evaluation was made to determine the thermal response of the cask assuming this minor fire is an engulfing fire. The details of this analysis are given in Ch. 4. It is concluded that the cask will maintain its confinement integrity during and after this bounding hypothetical fire accident.
Rev. 0 1/00 2.2-23
.2.2.5.3 Bmmdjng I,oads for Design and Service Conditions 2.2.5.3.1 Dead (Weight) l©ads The only dead loads (hereafter referred to.as weight loads) on the cask are the cask weight including the contents. The calculated weights of the individual components of the cask and the total weights are given in Table 3.2-1. The weight of the cask assembly is reacted as a contact force between cask and storage pad except when the cask is supported (lifted) by the pair of trunnions at the top of the cask during handling prior to fuel loading. 2.2.5.3.2 Lifting Loads The cask is provided with two trunnions at the top spaced 180 degrees apart for lifting. The two trunnions at the bottom of the cask are for rotation of the cask. Upper Tr1mpj ans for TN-32 and TN-32A Casks The upper trunnions are considered to be lifting devices and are evaluated for lifting for g levels equivalent to 3 times and 5 times the upper bound_weight of the cask. These ~alues are based on ANSI N14. 6 1101 , which requires that single failure proof lifting devices be capable of lifting 3 times and 5 times the cask weight without exceeding the yield and ultimate strengths of the material, .respectively. The trunnion loads for the ANSI N14.6 analysis are shown in Figure 2.2-3 and listed in Table 2.2-
- 2. The local region of the cask body is conservatively evaluated for a vertical load of 3 g {i.e., 3 times the weight of the cask) which is reacted at the trunnions involved in the handling operation.
Upper Tnmnj ops fqr TN-32B Casks The upper trunnions are considered to be single failure proof lifting devices and are evaluated for lifting for g levels equivalent to 6 times and 10 times the upper bound weight of the cask. These values are based on ANSI Nl4. 6 1101 , which requires that lifting devices be capable of lifting 6 times and 10 times the cask weight without exceeding the yield and ultimate strengths of the material, respectiv~ly. The trunnion loads for the ANSI N14.6 analysis are shown in Figure 2.2-3 and listed in Table 2.2-2: To account for an additional dynamic load factor of 10%, the weight of the cask used for these analyses is a conservatively assumed maximum loaded weight of 267,300 lbs. The local region of the cask body is conservatively evaluated for a vertical load of 6 g (i.e., 6 times the weight of Rev. O l/00 2.2-24
*the cask) which is reacted at the trunnions involved in the handling operation. The factor of 6 provides ample allowance for
- sudden load application during lifting.
r.ower Trunni ans far TN-32. TN-32A. and TN-32B Casks The two lower trunnions are cylindrical SA-105 forgings that are welded to the cask body gamma shielding. The lower trunnions provide capability to rotate the cask prior to loading of spent fuel and are evaluated for lifting for g levels equivalent to 3 times and 5 times the upper bound weight of the cask. The geometries of lower trunnions are identical for all TN-32, TN-32A, and TN-32B casks. 2.2.5.3.3 Internal press11re The pressure inside the cavity of the storage cask results from several sources. Initially, the cavity is pressurized with helium such that the cavity pressure is about 2.2 atm. The purpose of pressurizing the cavity above atmospheric pressure is to prevent in-leakage of air. The initial pressure is determined on the basis that a 1 atm pressure must exist in the cavity on the coldest day at the end of life. Pressure variations due to daily and seasonal changes in ambient temperature conditions will be small due to the large thermal capacity of the cask. Postulated fuel clad failure results in the release of fission gas which increases cavity pressure. Fission gas release under normal storage conditions is evaluated in Section 7.2. The evaluation gives an increase in cavity pressure of 3.0 psi. Another condition when internal pressure could increase is the cool down prior to unloading. Unloading could occur at any time ___________wh_il_~ __t_he__ ca.§X__i_ei_inservice, but it is worst at the beginning of the storage period:-The- caskcavity-waITteinperature at-the-- beginning of life is 314°F- (bottom plate) . Before unloading fuel, water would be pumped into the cavity to reduce the temperature. When the water contacts the cavity surface, steam will be produced and the resulting pressure inside the cavity could reach the saturated steam pressure of 82.5 psia (5.61 atm) corresponding to the cavity wall temperature of 314°F. Rev. o 1/00 2.2-25
Table 2.2-1 presents a summary of internal pressures for the* conditions identified. A pressure of 100 psig was chosen as the design internal pressure, since this value exceeds that of all conditions producing an internal pressure. 2.2.5.3.4 External Pressure There are several conditions which can result in external pressure on the cask. The external pressure due to flood level is assumed to be equal to or less than 25 psi which is equivalent to a 56 ft. head of water as discussed in Section 2.2.2. This is the limiting condition for external pressure. The various external pressures are summarized in Table 2.2-1. 2.2.S.3.S Cask Body Igads Global distributed loads may be applied to the cask by wind (tornado is upper bound case), flood water and seismic excitation. These loads are explained in detail and calculated in Sections 2.2.l through 2.2.3. Table 2.2-3 lists the numerical values of these forces as calculated in the various sections. Note that bounding loads equal to the weight of the cask (lg load) in each direction (lateral and vertical} applied as inertial loads for stress analysis purposes envelope' all of these distributed loads with a large margin. The local loads due to the tornado missile impact loading are unique. The calculated values from Section 2.2.1 are directly used in the cask analysis since there are no other cases to bound. 2.2.5.4 Design Loads The various cask loading condi-tions are listed in Table
- 2. 2-4. These foading-conditions- incluaetliose descril5ed-irlTo*cFR Part 72 <2 l, which are categorized as normal, man-made and natural phenomena. The applied loads acting on the different cask components due to these loading conditions have been determined and are discussed in the preceding sections and are listed *in Tables 2.2-1 through 2.2-3. This section describes the bases which are used to combine the loads for each cask component. The specific stress criteria against which each load combination will be compared are described in Section 3.4 .
The bounding pressures and loads described above are used in the load combinations. Certain combinations therefore are conservative evaluations of several events (e.g. one load combination conservatively represents stresses due to tornado wind, hurricane wind, normal wind, flood water, etc.). Several Rev. a 1/00 2.2-26
-loads are always present and are included in all evaluations.
These are the assembly stresses due to bolt preload and metallic seal compression. Lifting loads are always reacted by the cask weight (supported on trunnions - not the storage pad) . Lifting loads are not combined with those due to extreme natural phenomena since cask operations would be halted during a flood, hurricane, etc. Dead weight loads are -reacted at the bottom of the cask by the storage pad for all cases except the.lifting cases. 2.2.5.4.1 Cask Body The loading conditions for the cask body including the confinement vessel are categorized based on the rules of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Subsection NB, for a Class 1 nuclear component. The ASME code categorizes component loadings into five service loading conditions. They include Design Conditions (same as the Primary Service) and Levels A, B, C and D Service Loadings. The code also provides different stress limits for each of these service loadings. For each of these service loading conditions there are several applied loads which are acting on the cask. The Design Loads are listed in Table 2.2-5. They include internal and external pressure; lid bolt preload including the effect of the gasket reactions; distributed loads due to weight, wind, and handling, and attachment loads applied by the trunnion to the cask body. The inertia g loads are quasistatically applied loads which are multiples of the weight of the cask and/or contents. The magnitude of the Design Loads envelop the maximum Level A Service Loads. Thermal effects are excluded, except for their influence on the preload of the lid bolts (if any) because the ASME Code doeS--not-.consider--these-aS--Des-ign--<-L-e..-Primacy )-- Loads~----------*----*- -- --- The Level A Service loads are listed in Table 2.2-6 and are basically the same as the Design Loadings except that the thermal effects on the containment vessel are included. "The thermal effects consist of secondary (thermal) stresses caused by differential thermal expansion due to temperature differences caused by decay heat, solar insolation, ambient temperature variations and ambient conditions, e.g. ice, snow, wind, sun. There are no Level B or C Service Loading Conditions. All loads are categorized as Level A (which meet design allowables) or Level D, loads. The loads due to Level D Service Loading Conditions, which .are extremely unlikely conditions, are listed in Table 2.2-7. Rev. O 1/00 2.2-27
Loading combinations for Normal Conditions {D~sign Conditions and Levels A) are given in Table 2. 2-8 :'* Loading combinations for Accident Condition (Level D) Loadings which are evaluated are given in Table 2.2-9. The loads are listed across the top of the table and the Load Combinations are designated in the first column of the table. There are seven normal (Design and Level A) load combinations listed, and six accident condition (Level D) combinations. The loads which are acting simultaneously for each of these combinations are denoted by an 11 X11 under the load column heading. For example, for Normal Condition Load Combination Nl, internal pressure due to cavity pressurization, fission gas release, distributed weight, heat due to maximum normal temperatures and lid bolt preload are acting simultaneously. 2.2.5.4.2 Basket Cask body internal and external pressures have no effect on the basket. External loads applied to the TN-32 cask do not result in basket loads unless the cask actually moves. Therefore, tornado wind and flood water produce no basket loads. Seismic loading, however, is an inertial loading since the cask and ISFSI pad experience both horizontal and vertical accelerations during an earthquake as discussed in *section 2.2.3. The seismic acceleration loading (much less than lg acceleration) does combine with dead weight loading since these two effects occur simultaneously. Temperature effects due to snow, minor fire and even day/night cycles that can cause thermal transients on the outside of the cask body will not cause similar transients in the basket. The high heat capacity of the body slows the temperature response and effectively eliminates transients at the wall of the* cask cavity. The steady state temperature and temperature differences throughout the basket are, however, affected by decay heat, solar
insolat-ion-~rn.d--ari\l51enr-t-emperature---var+/-ati-ons-.
The basket is important for control of criticality of the fuel assemblies stored in the cask. The bounding lateral and vertical inertial loadings on the basket are equal to lg (in each direction) have been shown to envelope the basket loadings. For the basket evaluation, an even more conservative 3g loading in the vertical direction is analyzed. The stresses in the 304 stainless steel portions of the basket due to the primary loading, lg in any lateral direction combined with 3g vertical (including dead weight), are determined by conservatively neglecting the tensile and bending strength of the aluminum thermal conductor plates between fuel compartment boxes. However, the through thickness strength of the aluminum plates which separate the boxes is considered. Thus the aluminum Rev. O 1/00 2.2-28
-is conservatively neglected in the primary load analysis where it can react some of the load. These primary stresses in the steel are evaluated at the maximum metal temperature occurring under extreme ambient conditions.
The secondary (thermal) stresses in the stainless steel are calculated assuming elastic'behavior of the steel but considering the actual strength of the aluminum. The local bearing stresses in the aluminum plates adjacent to the plugs are significantly higher than the yield value when calculated elastically. The aluminum would therefore yield and creep resulting in lower thermal stresses in the stainless steel. The primary steel stresses calculated ignoring the aluminum (when it actually can react some of the load) are superimposed on the secondary stresses calculated assuming the full strength of the aluminum is available to induce thermal stresses in the stainless steel. Therefore the primary plus secondary stresses determined for the 304 stainless steel fuel compartment boxes and their attachments in the basket are conservative. The basket design criteria described in Section 3.4 is based on Section III of the ASME Code for stress limits and buckling. The basket evaltiation is also summarized in that section. 2.2.5.4.3 Upper Trnnnjons The upper trunnions are considered to be lifting devices and are evaluated to the ANSI Nl4.6 requirements for lifting operations. During lifting, the trunnions are evaluated for vertical lifting reactions applied at the centers of the lifting shoulders required to support three times (six times for single failure proof trunnions, TN-32B Cask) or five times (ten times for single failure proof trunnions, TN-32B'Cask)the maximum weight of a fully loaded cask. When the load is equal to three
times--(six--times-for-single- £ailure_pro_o.f____tr_unnions_)___t.he___w_eight_,_
the maximum tensile stresses shall not exceed the minimum yield strength of the trunnion material. For the load equal to five times (ten times for single failure proof trunnions) the weight, the maximum tensile stresses shall not exceed the minimum ultimate tensile strength of the trunnion material. In addition to the trunnions themselves, the welds that attach the trunnions to the-cask body gamma shielding and the local region of. the gamma shielding are analyzed under the same 3W (3 times weight of cask) (6W for single failure proof trunnion) and SW (lOW for single failure proof trunnion) reactions. The stresses in the welds and shielding shall not exceed the minimum yield strength of these components under the 3W (6W for single failure proof trunnion) loading nor the mi~imum ultimate strength under the SW (lOW for single failure proof
.trunnion) loading.
Rev. 0 1/00 2.2-29
The* loads acting on the, trunnions are given in Table 2.2-2. The structural analysis of the trunnions is presented in Section
- 3.4.3.+.
2
- 2
- 5 . 4 *4 Out er She 11 The outer *shell is evaluated for the combined effects of inertia g loads due to lifting and internal pressure.
Outgassing from the resin between the cask body and outer shell may cause a slight pressure on the inside of the outer shell. A pressure relief valve is provided in the outer shell to assure any pressure buildup is small. The outer shell is completely supported by the resin when subjected to an external pressure. An internal pressure of 3 psi will occur due to the reduced external pressure during a tornado. However, since the cask body is designed for an external pressure of 25 psi, an internal pressure of 25 psi is conservatively used to evaluate the outer shell. The structural analysis of the outer shell is presented in Appendix 3A.~. A summary of results and comparison with design criteria are given in Section 3.4.4. The combined stress due to the inertia g loads and pressure is less than the minimum yield strength of the outer shell material. Rev. o 1/00 2.2-30
2.3 Aafety protection Systems 2.3.1 General The TN-32 dry storage cask is designed to provide storage of spent fuel for at least 40 years. The cask materials are selected such that degradation would not be expected during the storage period. The cask cavity pressure is always above ambient during the storage period as a precaution against the in-leakage of air which might be harmful to the fuel. Since the confinement vessel consists of a steel cylinder with an integrally-welded bottom closure, the cavity gas-can escape only through the lid closure system. In order to ensure cask leak tightness, two systems are employed. A double barrier system for all potential lid leakage paths consisting of covers with multiple seals is utilized. Additionally, pressurization of monitored seal interspaces provides a continuous positive inward and outward pressure gradient which guards against a release of the cavity gas to the environment and the admission ~f air to the cavity. The components of the cask are classified as "Important to Safety" and "Not Important to Safety." A tabulation of the components and their classification is shown in Table 2.3-1. The classification of structures, components, and systems which are part of the ISFSI, but not part of the cask, is included in the Safety Analysis Report submitted by the applicant for a license under 10CFR72. The following items are considered not important to safety: I
- Drain tube with all associated hardware including drain tube clamp, drain tube adapter, attachment screws, and o-ring
- -seals~- *--The- dra-i-n-- tube is---fo:r.---operationaL convenience-onl:y--and----*-- ---- __
does not perform any safety function. The drain tube can be removed and replaced with a lance that can perform the same function.
- Quick disconnect couplings and associated a-ring seals. The couplings are for operational purposes only. These couplings do not form part of the confinement boundary.
- Pressure Monitoring equipment including pressure switches or transducers and electrical cables. If the monitoring system were not to function, no safety function of the cask would be impaired. There would be no leakage in or out of the cask.
The overpressure system and monitoring instrumentation is . designated as not important to safety since the failure of the system will not result in a release of radioactive material. The monitoring system has not been designed to prevent failure during accidQnt loadings. If an accident were to occur, Rev. O 1/00 2.3-1
measures would be taken to replace or repair the system soon after the accident. Leakage of the overpressure system is treated as an off-normal event and addressed in Section 11.1*.2. The overpressure system is leak tested at the manufacturer's facility and again after installation to ensure that the total leak rate limits imposed on the cask are not exceeded. The monitoring system is designed so that its failure can readily be identified. The switches are set to alarm if power is lost or if the switch is no longer functioning. Two separate switches are_provided for redundancy.
- The top neutron shield and its attachments. The top neutron shield is used for supplemental shielding, but the accident condition dose ~imits are met assuming the top neutron shield is gone.
- A suitable primer and white topcoat paint for exterior of cask. This coating is used to prevent the cask from rusting.
As part of the surveillance activities, the paint coverage is surveyed periodically. The paint is also inspected prior to shipment at the Fabricator to ensure proper thickness, color and adhesion. 2.3.2 Protection By Multiple Confjpement Barriers and Systems 2.3.2.l Confjnement Barriers and Systems A combined cover-seal pressure monitoring system (Figure 2.3-1) always meets or exceeds the requirement of a double barrier closure which guarantees tight, permanent confinement. There are two lid penetrations, one for draining and one for venting and pressurization. When the cask is placed in storage, a pressure greater than that of the cavity is set up in the gaps --- ---Tint::erspa-ces)--:oeeween -t:he-aoul:>l:e--met:a-llic-sea-i.-s--of-t:he-I-id-and---- the lid penetrations. A decrease in the pressure of the monitoring system would be signaled by a pressure transducer/switch wired to a monitoring/alarm panel (Figure 2.3-l} . Connections to the overpressure tank are welded fittings. A quick connect coupling with a diaphragm valve is used to fill the tank. The metallic face seals of the lid and lid penetrations possess long-term stability and have high corrosion resistance over the entire storage period. These high performance seals are comprised of two metal linings formed around a helically-wound spring. The sealing principle is based on plastically deforming the seal's outer lining. Permanent contact of the lining against Rev. o 1/00 2.3-2
the sealing surf ace is ensured by the outward force exerted by the helically-wound spring. The metallic seals consist of an inner spring, a lining, and a jacket. The spring is Nimonic 90 or an equivalent material. The lining and jacket are st.ainless steel or nickel alloy and aluminum respectively. The review of corrosion and galvanic reactions in Section 3.4.1 demonstrates the corrosion resistance of aluminum and stainless 304. The exposure to the borated pool environment is short term. The long term environment of the.seals is helium, except for the outside of the outer seal. That is exposed to the air under the protective cover, but it is not exposed to rain or snow. If crevice corrosion at the outer seal were to cause a leak, it would be detected by the overpressure monitoring system. The maximum seal temperature is 256 °F (Chapter 4). The neutron flux is 2.37x10 5 n/cm2 s (Chapter 14) equivalent to less than 1. Sxl0 14 n/cm2 after 20 years. The temperature and neutron fluence are low enough that for these materials, the environment is no more challenging than a non-radiation, ambient air environment. Cef ilac has conducted twice yearly leak testing of Helicoflex seals that were installed in 1973 .. The test fixture has been indoors, and has never been disassembled. The spring, lining, and jacket on the test seals are music wire, soft steel, and aluminum, respectively. The seal dimensions are 13 mm minor diameter x 3620 mm major diameter and 9.6 mm x 1935 mm. From 1973 to 1984, the seals were cycled 700 times between 20 and lSOoC. From 1984 to present, the seals have been maintained at ___2_0~C_._ __T_he_l.e_ak__r_a_t~s have remained below 10* 7 Pa m3 /m s for the entire test duration. Plots showing test data are attached as Figures 2. 3-2 through 2. 3-"4. Additionally, all metallic seal seating areas are stainless steel overlay for improved surface control. The overlay technique has been used for Transnuclear's transport casks and storage casks including the TN-24, TN-40 and TN-32 designs. For protection against the environment, a torispherical protective cover equipped with an elastomer seal is provided above the lid. The lid and cover seals described above are contained in grooves. A high level of sealing over the storage period is assured by utilizing seals in a deformation-controlled design. The deformation of the seals is constant since bolt
- loads assure that the mating surfaces remain in contact. The seal deformation is set by its original diameter and the depth of the groove.
Rev. O 1/00 2.3-3
Metal gasket face seal fittings, diaphragm valves and metallic seals are all capable of limiting leak rates to less than J. *x io-7 atm-cc/sec of helium. The initial operating pressure of the monitoring system 1 s overpressure tank is set at s.s atm minimum. Over the storage period, the pressure is postulated to decrease as a.result of leakage from the system and as a result of temperature reduction of the gas in the system. Since the level of permeation through the confinement vessel is negligible and leakage past the higher pressure of the monitoring system is physically impossible, a decrease in cavity pressure during the storage period occurs only as a result of a reduction in the cavity gas temperature with time. As long as the cavity pressure is greater than ambient pressure and the pressure in the monitoring system is greater
~ban that of the cavity, no in-leakage of air nor out-leakage of cavity gas is possible.
The calculations provided in Chapter 7 define the monitoring system leakage test rate which ensures that no cavity gas can be released to the environment nor air admitted to the casks for the 20 year storage period. All seals are considered collectively in the analysis as the monitoring system pressure boundary. This analysis is performed in accordance with ANSI Nl4. 5 111 >. As shown in Chapter 7, the monitoring system pressure is always greater than the cask cavity or atmospheric pressure. Thus, no leakage can occur from the cask cavity during the storage period. The pressure monitoring system alarm will be set to 3.2 atm +/- 5%. This is less than the minimum expected monitoring system pressure *and greater than the maximum cavity pressur~.
2-.-3 -. 2-.-2 Cask CooJ J_ng To establish the heat removal capability of the TN-32 cask, several thermal design criteria are established for the normal conditions. These are:
Confinement of radioactive material and gases is a major design requirement. Seal temperatures must be maintained within specified limits to satisfy the leak tight confinement funct~on during normal and accident conditions. A maximum temperature limit of 536oF (280oC} is set for the seals (double metallic o-rings) in the confinement vessel closure lid and vent and drain covers. Maintaining fuel cladding integrity during storage is Rev. O 1/00 2.3-4
another major design consideration. To minimize creep deformation that can occur over the storage duration, the maximum initial storage fuel cladding temperature is determined as a function of the initial fuel age using the guidelines provided bii the Commercial Spent Fuel Management Program (CSFM)c 1 >. These temperature limits are :reported in Section 3.5. To maintain the stability of the neutron shield resin during normal storage conditions, a maximum temperature limit of 30QoF (149oC) is set for the neutron shield. Maximum temperatures qf the confinement structural components must not adversely affect the confinement function. The thermal evaluations for normal conditions and hypothetical accident conditions are presented in Chapter 4.0. 2.3.3 Protection hy Eq.11ipment and Instrumentation Selection 2.3.3.1 EqJJjpment Design criteria for the casks are described in Section 2.2 and summarized in Table 2.5-1. 2.3.3.2 Instrumentation Due to the totally passive and inherently safe nature of the storage, safety-related instrumentation is not necessary. __ J_n_§_t;_~_~m~!!_t_ation __ t_q_r11._on:i,t_q_;: __c~_~k_pres~ure is furnished. _____ _ Appropriate capabilities to check and recalibrate these monitors are also provided. The pressure monitoring system is further described in Section 2.3.2.1. 2.3.4 Nuclear CrjtjcaJjty Safety 2.3.4.1 Control Methods f6r Prevention of Crjtjcaljty The design criterion for criticality is that the effective neutron multiplication factor, keu' including statistical uncertainties and bias, shall be less than 0.95 for all postulated arrangements of fuel with~n the cask. The fuel . assemblies are assumed to stay within their basket compartment. Rev. 0 1/00 2.3-5
The control methods used to prevent c~iticality are: (1) Incorporation of neutron absorbing material (boron) -in* .the basket material. (2) Loading of *the irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel pool water containing at least 2300 ppm boron. (3) Prevention of fresh water entering the loaded cask .. The basket has been designed to assure an.ample margin of safety against criticality under the conditions of fresh fuel* in .. a cask flooded with borated water. The methods of criticality control are in* keeping with the requirements of* 10CFR72.124. Criticality analysis* is performed using the KENO-V.a Monte Carlo code< 1 > along with data prepared using the NITAWL code<11 and the SCALE 27-group cross section library. These codes and cross-section library are part of the SCALE system prepa_red by Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the U.S. Nuclear Re~latory ..: . , . : Commission Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research< 1
- They are widely used for critiGality analysis of shipping casks, fue~
storage pools and storage casks. Benchmark.problems are run to verify the codes, methodology and cross section library. Examples of computer input used for criticality evaluation ar~ included in Section 6.6. In the criticality calculation, the fuel assemblies, basket, and cask geometries are modeled explicitly. Within each assembly, each fuel pin and each guide tube is represented. Reactivity analyses were performed for Westinghouse 14 x 14 .
~-standard.,-11Lx~4-0FA~5xl.5_,-11xl? s_t__andardJ___~nd 1. 7xl. 7 OFA a~_f _____
the B&W Mark BW 17x17 assemblies at 4.05% enrichment, with and -----i without burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRA) . Thimble plugs were not analyzed since they displace less borated water than the BPRA assemblies. The analyses assume fresh fuel composition with 2300. ppm borated water in the cavity, and the cask surrounded by a*fresh water reflector. The results of the analyses (assuming accidental loadi°ng . of one fuel assembly with an initial enrichment .of 5 wtt U-235) with - 2300 ppm borated water show the standard 17xl7 with BPRA.to be* * - most reactive with a keff=0.9315+/-0.0009. Including the bias determined from benchmark calculations and 2 sigma yields . keff=O. 9333. The *critiqal:ity analyses are described in Section 6.0. Rev. 1 5/00 2.3-6
2.3.4.2 Error Cont~ngency Criteria Provision for error contingency*is built into-the criterion u*sed in Section 2. 3. 4 .1 above. The criterion, used in* conjunction with.the KENO-V.a and NITAWL codes, is common practice for licensing submittals. Because conservative assumptions are made in modeling, it is not necessary to introduce additional co~tingency for error. 2.3.4.3 Verjfjcatjon AnalySis-Benchmarkjng critical ben~hmarking experiments-are taken*from-~EG/CR~ 6361 and described in Section 6.5. An upper subcritical limit (USL) is determined using method 1, " confidence band with administrative margin to be 0.9341 including mod~ling.bias. 2.3.5 RadjologjcaJ protection Provisions.for radiological *protection by confinement barriers and systems are described in Section 2.3:2.1. 2.3.5.1 Access Control
- The storage casks will be located in a restricted area on a .
site to which access is controlled. In keeping with the terminology of 10CFR72, the terms restricted and unrestricted area refer only to areas within the controlled area. The controlled area and the site are taken to be the same.* The term restricted area is defined in 10CFR20. 3 <17>. The specific procedures for controlling access to the site and to the restricted area within the site are to be addressed by the license applicant's Safety.Analysis Report. The cask will not ---~re-qutre-the-c-ot1tinuous presence ~opef'at:ors or maint_e_n_a_n_c_e---~------ personnel. 2.3.5.2 Shielding Shielding has the objective of assuring that radiation dose rates at key locations are at acceptable levels for those * ** locations. Three *locations are of particular interest:. (1) Immediate Vicinity of the Cask (2) Restricted Area Boundary * .. (3) Controlled Area (Site) Boundary Dose rates in t.he immediate vicinity of the. cask are '*:: :.: : !._:::**.;--:.-' *
- important in consideration of occupational exposure. **.The de.sigri .,_,
- criterion for shielding is 310 mrem/hr maximum at the accessible cask surfaces during storage. Because of the passive nature of Rev. 1 5/00 2.3-7
storage with this cask, occupational tasks related to the cask are infrequent and_ short. Personnel exposures due to operational and maintenance activities are discussed in Section 10.3. Dose rates at the restricted area boundary should be such that people outside the restricted area need not have their radiation exposures monitored. Dose rates at the site boundary should be in accordance with applicable regulatory guides. The estimated occupational doses for personnel comply with the requirements of 10CFR20.1301. 2.3.5.3 RadjoJogjcaJ Alarm System There are no credible events which could result in releases of radioactive products or unacceptable ipcreases in direct radiation. In addition, the releases postulated as the result of the hypothetical accidents described in Chapter 11 are of a very small magnitude. Therefore, radiological alarm systems are not necessary. However, as described in Section 2.3.3.1, nonsafety-grade pressure monitors are provided. Procedures to be followed when these alarms are activated will be specified in the ISFSI operating procedures. 2.3.6 Fjre apd Explosion protectjqn There are no combustible or explosive materials associated with the TN-32.dry storage cask. In general, no such materials would be stored within an ISFSI controlled area. The quantity of fuel carried in a tow vehicle will be limited to 200 gallons, so that only a fire of short duration would be possible. An evaluation of the cask engulfed in a fuel fire is discussed in Section 11.2.5. Due to the large thermal mass of the casks, any minor fires in the vicinity of the ISFSI would raise the cask
~emper~ture by only a few degrees and will not affect cask
- -i-nt-egt--J..t;.y .
As indicated in Section 11.2.4, overpressures of a few psi can be conservatively postulated to occur at the ISFSI as a result of accidents involving explosive materials which are stored or transported near the site. This impact is less than that postulated to result from the tornado wind loading and missile impact analysis, as described in Section 2.2.1, and is well within the design basis of the cask . Rev. o 1/00 2.3-8
2.4 Decommjssioning Considerations The dry cask design concept to be utilized at the ISFSI features inherent ease and simplicity of decommissioning. At the end of its service lifetime, cask decommissioning could be accomplished by one of several options described below.
- The casks, including the spent fuel stored inside, could be shipped to a suitable fuel repository for permanent storage.
Depending on licensing requirements existing at the time of shipment off site, placement of the entire cask inside a supplemental shipping container or overpack would be considered. The spent fuel could be removed from the ISFSI cask and shipped in a licensed shipping container to a suitable fuel repository. If desirable, cask decontamination could be accomplished through the use of conventional high pressure water sprays to further reduce contamination on the cask interior. The sources of contamination on the interior of the cask would be crud from the outside of the fuel pins and the crud left by the spent fuel pool water. The expected low levels of contamination from these sources could be easily removed with a high pressure water spray. After decontamination, the ISFSI cask could either be cut-up for scrap or partially scrapped and any remaining contaminated portions shipped as low level radioactive waste to a disposal facility. For surface decontamination of the ISFSI cask, chemical etching using hydrochloric acid or nitric acid can be applied to remove the contaminated surface of the cask. Alternatively, electropolishing can also be used to achieve the same result. Cask activation analyses have been performed to quantify
speci-fi-c act:ivity-1evels of cask mater-~a.i-s--aftefr-*-ye-a:rs-oe -----------~-----*-**--
storage. The following assumptions were made: The cask contains 32 design basis PWR assemblies. The neutron flux is assumed constant for 20 years. The cask activation analyses are presented in Chapter 14. The results of these calculations show that the TN-32 will be far below the speci!ic activity limits for both long and short lived nuclides for Class A waste. Consequently, it is expected that after application of the surface decontamination process as described above, the radiation level due to activation products will be negligible and the cask could be disposed of as Class A waste. A detailed evaluation will be performed at the time of decommissioning to determine the appropriate method of disposal. Due to the,leak tight design of the storage casks, no 2.4-1 Rev. O 1/00
residual contamination is expected to be left behind on the concrete base pad. The base pad, fence, and peripheral utility structures will require no decontamination or special handling after the last cask is removed. If the spent fuel pool is to remain functional until the ISFSI is decommissioned, it will allow the pool to *be utilized to transfer fuel from the storage casks to licensed shipping containers for shipment off site if this decommissioning option is chosen. Due to the design of the storage casks and exterior decontamination prior to storage, no residual contamination will be left behind on the concrete base pad. The volume of waste material produced incidental to ISFSI decommissioning will be limited to that necessary to accomplish surface decontamination of the casks once the spent fuel elements are removed. The costs of decommissioning the ISFSI are expected to represent a small and negligible fraction of the cost of the decommissioning a Nuclear Generating Plant. Rev. o 1/00 2.4-2
2.5 Summary of Cask Design Criteria The principal design criteria for the TN-32 *cask are presented in Table 2.5-1. The TN-32 dry storage cask is designed to store 32 intact PWR spent fuel assemblies with or without burnable poison rod assemblies or thimble plugs with a maximum assembly average burnup of 45,000 MWD/MTU, maximum initial enrichment of 4.05% and a minimum cooling time of 7 years. The maximum total heat generation rate of the stored fuel (including BPRA'S and TPA's) is limited to 32.7 kW in order to keep the maximum fuel cladding temperature below the limit necessary to ensure cladding integrity for 4 O years storage ' 12 >
- The fuel cladding integrity is assured by the limited fuel cladding temperature and maintenance of a nonoxidizing environment in the cask 117>.
The confinement vessel {body and lid) is designed and fabricated to the maximum practicable extent as a Class I component in accordance with the rules of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection NB, Articles NB-3200. Deviations to the code are listed in Chapter 7: The cask design, fabrication and testing are covered by a Quality Assurance Program which conforms to the criteria in Subpart G of 10CFR72. The cask is designed to maintain a subcritical configuration during loading, handling, storage and accident conditions. Poison materials in the fuel basket are employed to maintain ketf ~ 0.95 including statistical uncertainties. The TN-32 cask is designed to withstand the effects of severe environmental conditions and natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, lightning, hurricanes and floods. Chapter 11 describes the cask behavior--un.der- t:liese -environme-n.tal ccmdit:i"ons:- - ----- -- --------- -~----------- *---- -----*- 2.5-1 Rev. o 1/0_0
2.6 References
- l. "SCALE 4.3: A Modular Code System for Performing Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation for Workstations and Personal Computers," CCC-545, ORNL.
- 2. Licensing Requirements for the Storage of Spent Fuel in an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, 1~CFR Part 72, Rules and Regulations, Title 10, Chapter l, Code of Federal Regulations - Energy, U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C.
- 3. American Society of Mecbanical Engineers, ASME Boiler And Pressure Vessel Code, Section IlI, Division l - Subsection NB, 1992.
- 4. Design Basis Tornado for.Nuclear Power Plants, Regulatory Guide 1.76, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April, 1974.
- 5. Standard Review Plan, Missiles Generated by ~atural Phenomena, Section 3.5.l.4, NRC NUREG-0800, Rev. 2, July, 1981.
*6. T. W. Singell, Wind Forces on Structures: Forces on Enclosed Structures. ASCE Structural Journal, July 1958.
- 7. Baumeister and Marks, Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, Sixth Edition.
B. 10CFR100, Reactor Site Criteria
- 9. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.92,
_________ *--- ____ *-- Comb..i_l;J.Jng__~o_d~l _R~SP.91.l_~~~ and Spacial Components in Seismic Response Analysis, Revision 1, February, 1976. ----*-------
- 10. American National Standards Institute, "American National Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials. 11 , ANSI N14.6, New York.
- 11. American National Standards Institute, 11 National Standard for Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment of Radioactive Materials", ANSI N14.S-1997, Feb 1998 Rev. O 1/00
*2.6-l
- 12. Levy, et. al., "Recommended Temperature Limits for Dry Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Zircaloy - Clad Fuel Rods in Inert Gas, 11 Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-6189, 1987.
- 13. Petrie, L.M. and Landers, N. F., KENO-V.a, An Improved Monte Carlo Criticality Program with Supergrouping, NUREG/CR-0200,0ak Ridge Laboratory, December; 1984.
- 14. Green, N. M., et.al., 11 NITAWL-S: Scale System Module for Performing Resonance Shielding and.Working Library Production," NUREG/CR-0200, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, October, 1981.
- 15. 10CFR20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation.
- 16. 10CFR61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste.
- 17. Johnson, Jr., A.B., and Gilbert, E.R., "Technical Basis for Storage of Zircaloy-Clad Spent Fuel in Inert *Gases," PNL-3602, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Wash., Sept.
1983.
- 18. Engineer in Training Review Manual, Sixth Edition
- 19. ANSI/ANS-57.9 - 1992, "Design Criteria for an independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (Dry Type}".
- 20. Gwaltney, R.C., "Missile Generation and Protection in Light Water Cooled Power Reactor Plants", ORNL NSIC-22.
2-1--:-- ~oark--;-R--:J-:-,--"-Formu-1a-for--stress-and--St-ra-in"-4~E-cl.-i-t-i-e1 B-l-=,---------
- 22. Beer and Johnston, "Vector Mechanics for Engineer: Static and Dynamic, Mcgraw-Hill Book Co., 1962.
- 23. Walmer, M.E., "Manual of Structural Design and Engineering Solutions", Prentic-Hall, Inc., 1972.
- 24. PCI Design Handbook, 2nd Edition, Precast Concrete Institute, 1978.
- 25. NUREG-1536, "Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems", 1997.
Rev. 0 1/00 2.6-2
- 26. *Regulatory Guide 1.60, "Des:igri Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants"~
- 27. NUREG/CR-6361, "Criticality Benchmark Guide for Light-Water-Reactor Fuel in Transportation and Storage- Packages",* :1997.
--~--------------------
- . ~ ..
- l. * ~ ~.. '
... *:.: *Rev. 1 5/00
TABLE 2.1-1 FUEL ASSEMBLY P~TERS Parameter Wl4xl4 Wl4xl4 OFA W15xl5 W17xl7 B&W 17xl7 W17xl7. OFA Mark BW Number of Rods 179I 179 204 264 264 264 cross Section (in.) 7.761x7.761 7,761X7.761 8.426x8.426 8.426x8.426 8.425x8.425 8.426x8.426 Length {in.) 1611. 3 161.3 160 160 160 160 Fuel Rod Pitch (in.) 0.556 0.556 0.563 0.496 0.496 0.496 Fuel Rod O.D. (in.} 0.4:22 0.400 0.422 0.374 0.374 o.. 360 in. Clad Material Zircaloy Zircaloy Zircaloy
- Zircaloy Zircaloy Zircaloy Clad Thickness (in.) 0.0243 0.0243 0.0243 0.0225 0.0240 0.0225 Pellet O.D. {in.) 0.3~59 0.3444 0.366 0.322 0.3195 0.309 u*~~ Enrichment (%wt) 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 Theoretical Density (%) 95~0 95.0 95.0 95.0 96.0 95.0 Active Fuel Length {in.) 144 144 144 144 144 144 u Content, nominal {kg) 410 360 459 461 456 423 u Content, maximum {kg)'" 414!.4 361.1 467.1 467.1 463.2 428.2 Assembly Weight {lbs} 13QO 1150 1439 1467 1470 1380 Assembly Weight including 1345 1195 1525 1533 1533*** 1446 II heaviest BPRA {lbs)
Notes:
- 1. Calculated from criticality analysis presented in Chapter 6
- 2. Mark BW fuel with a B&W 24 finger BPRA weighs more than 1533 lb. Any combination of fuel and hardware which weighs more than 1533 lb is not acceptaple for storage in the TN-*32. ."
.) . .:
Rev. 1 5/00
TABLE 2.1-2 THERMAL, GAMMA AND NEUTRON SOURCES FOR THE DESIGN BASIS 17 x 17 WESTINGHOUSE FUEL ASSEMBLY U235 Enrichment (%wt) 3.5 (minimum} Burnup (MWD/MTU) 45,000 Specific Power (MW/assembly) 20 Cooling Time (year) 7 (minimum} Decay Heat (kw/assembly) 0.986 Gamma Source (photons/sec/assembly) *S.080El5 Neutron Source {neutrons/sec/assembly) 3.278E8 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 2.1-3 COOLING TIME AS A FUNCTION OF MAXIMUM BURNUP AND MINIMUM INITIAL ENRICHMENT 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.8 2. 3.0 3.1 3.3
.4 3.5
* - not evaluated
., Cooling.times entered in bold are cases actually run. Other values interpolated.
Rev. O* 1/00
TABLE 2.1-4 THERMAL AND GAMMA SOURCES FOR
- 1 **
BURNABLE POSION ROD ASSEMBLIES AND THIMBLE PLUG ASSEMBLIES BtmNABI.E POISON ROD ASSEMBLY cumulative Exposure (MWD/MTU) See Figure 2.l.-4 Cooling Time . (days) See Figure 2.1-4 Decay Heat (kw/assembly) 0.036 Gamma Source (photons/sec/assembly) 2.302E14 THIMBLE PLUG A.SSEMBLY Cumulative Exposure (MWD/MTU) See Figure 2.1-5 Cooling Time (days) See Figure 2.1-5 Decay Heat (kw/assembly) 0.00189 Gamma Source (photons/sec/assembly) 3.922E12 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 2.2-1
SUMMARY
OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES ACTING ON TN-32 CASK Individual Loading Conditions Maximum Pressure, psig Internal Pressure: (a) Initial cavity pressurization at backfill 17.6 (2. 2 atm abs) (b) With 10% fuel fa~lure 25.1 (c) In a minor fire (assuming 100% fuel failure) 58.4 {d) Beginning of life unloading 90 {e) Tornado 3* (f) Selected bounding pressure 100 External Pressure: (a) Flood 25 (b) Snow and ice loading 0.35 (c) Selected bounding pressure 25
- This is due to a reduced external pressure.
Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 2.2-2
SUMMARY
OF LIFTING LOADS USED IN TRUNNION ANSI Nl4.6 ANALYSIS OF TN-32 CASK Loading Condition Load at cask CG Load at Each (Vertical) Trunnion TN-32 and Yield 729,000 lbs 364,500 lbs TN-3 2A Casks <1 > Evaluation Ultimate 1,215,000 lbs 607,500 lbs Evaluation TN-3 2B cask '21 Yield 1,603,800 lbs 801,900 lbs Evaluation Ultimate 2,673,000 lbs 1,336,500 lbs Evaluation NOTES:
- 1. Based on a cask weight of 243,000 lbs {Calculated cask
-weights are 230,990-lbs and 231-;220- lbs)- - ------------ --* ---
- 2. Based on a conservative cask weight of 243,000 lbs and a 10%
dynamic load factor (Calculated cask weight is 231,160 lbs) Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 2.2-3
SUMMARY
OF LOADS ACTING ON TN-32 CASK DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL PHENOMENA Distributed Loads Lateral Loading: (a) Wind (external force on cask body) 45,500 lb. (b) Seismic (inertial force throughout system) 0.26W = 56, 680 lb. <21 Selected Bounding Load W x lG = 218,000 lb. 121 Vertical Loading 111 : (a) *Seismic (inertial force throughout system) 0.17W = 37 I 060 lb, {2 ) Selected Bounding Load W x lG = 218,000 lb. 12 Local Loads Tornado Missile Loading (external force on local area of body) : (a) Lateral Load 1.603 x 10 6 lb. (b) Vertical Load <1. 603 x 10 6 lb. NOTE:
- 1. Does not include dead weight or lifting loads
- 2. A conservatively low weight is used for stability analysis.
The actual weight of the cask is used for* stress analysis. Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 2.2-4 TN-32 CASK LOADING CONDITIONS Normal Assembly Loads (bolt preload and seal compression) Pressure (internal and external) Weight Lifting Loads Handling Wind Thermal variations (e.g. insolation, decay heat, rain, snow, ice, ambient) Man-Made Fuel cladding failure Minor Fire Explosion Natura] Phenomena Earthquakes Tornados Hurricane Flood Tsunami Seiches Lightning
*Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 2.2-5 TN-32 CASK DESIGN LOADS {Normal Conditions) Appl i ed I,oad Loadjpg Condition Internal Pressure {l) and (2) External Pressure (3) Distributed Loads Weight Cask Body Contents Snow Ice wind (Tornado) Lifting Attachment Loads Lifting Bolt Loads Preload for 100 psi and metallic seal compression (l) Cask designed for 100 psi internal_ pressure_ which envelopes__ __ __ _ _____ . all internal pressure effects. (2) For normal conditions, the fission gas release should be less than 10%. However, for analysis purposes, 100% release is assumed. (3) Cask designed for 25 psi external pressure which envelopes all external pressure effects. Rev. O l/00
TABLE 2.2-6 LEVEL A SERVICE LOADS {Normal Conditions) Applied Load Ipading Condition Internal Pressure (1) and (2) External Pressure (3) Distributed Loads Weight Cask Body Contents Snow Ice Wind (Tornado) Lifting Attachment Loads Lifting Bolt Loads Preload for 100 psi and metallic seal compression Thermal Effects Decay Heat Solar Insolation Cold Rain on Hot Cask (l) Cask designed for 100 psi internal pressure which envelopes all internal pressure effects. (2) For normal conditions, the fission gas release should be less than 10%. However, for analysis purposes, 100% release is assumed. (3) Cask de*signed for 25 psi external pressure which envelopes all external pressure effects. Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 2.2-1* LEVEL D SERVICE LOADS
.cause Internal Pressure (1) and (2)
External Pressure (3) Distributed Loads Weight cask body Contents Tornado Wind Flood'Water Seismic Local Loads Tornado Wind Driven Missiles Bolt Loads Preload for 100 psi and metallic seal compression SOG Bottom Impact 18" and 60 11 Vertical Drop (Handling Accident} ______ S_OG Side Impact Tipover _. (l) Cask design for 100 psi internal pressure which envelopes all internal pressure effects .. (2) The fission gas release should be less than 10%. However, for analysis purposes, 100% release is assumed. (3) Cask designed for 25 psi external pressure which envelopes all external pressure effects including flood water level, cask burial and explosion. Explosions close to the cask are unexpected. Explosions at a significant distance from the cask would have a negligible effect. Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 2.2-8 NORMAL CONDITION LOAD COMBINATIONS INDIVIDUAL LOAD BOLT lG INTERNAL EXTERNAL 3G or 6G TRUNNION COMBINED LOAD PRELOAD DOWN PRESSURE PRESSURE THERMAL ON LOCAL STRESS
' 100 PSI 25 PSI TRUNNION 3G or 6G Nl x x x x N2 x x x x111 x<11 I
N3 x i x x I i N4 x x x x I I x x x xm x111 NS I x x x x<2> x[21 NG x ' x x x<21 x<21 N7 i; I . Notes: i
- 1. Load combination based oh 3G lifting weight (TN-32 & TN-32A Casks)
- 2. Load combination based oh 6G lifting weight (TN-32B Cask)
I I I Rev. o 1/00 I
TABLE 2.2-9 ACCIDENT CONDITION LOAD COMBINATIONS SEISMIC, INTERNAL EXTERNAL 18" TIP OVER TORNADO, INDIVIDUAL LOAD BOLT PRESSURE PRESSURE BOTTOM SIDE DROP OR FLOOD COMBINED LOAD PRE LOAD 100 PSI 25 PSI END DROP SOG lG-LATERAL + SOG 2G-DOWN Al x x x A2 x x x A3 x x x A4 x x x x x AS Ix A6 x x x I Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 2.3-1 . CLASSIFICATION: OF COMP.ONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY NOT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY Containment Vessel Overpressure System Cask Body Shell Drain Tube Cask Body Bottom Hansen Couplings Lid. Paint
- Lid Bolts Top Neutron Shield Lid Gaskets Lid Vent and Drain Covers, Bolts, Protective Cover Seal Gaskets Basket Assembly
- Trunnions Radial Neutron Shield
- Protective Cover
- -~ ---- -------- - - - - - - - - - ---------- - - - - - - - - - ----
Rev. l. 5/00
TABLE .2.5-1 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR 1N-32 CASKS Maximum gross .weight on crane (with lift .beams, without water) .120 tons .
. . .. ..~
- Maximum cask height with lid removed 179.5.in.
Minimum design life 40 years Maximum keftr including <0.95 No:rmal bias and uncertainties <0.95 Accident Payload Capacity, Fuel assemblies 32 intact W PWR 14x14, l4xl4 O". F .A*. 15xl5, 17xl7,17x17 O.F.A. or B&W l7x17 Mark BW 1. with or without BPRA' s or TPA' s 1533 lb maximum Spent* 'Fu.d Characteristics a) Initial Enrichmen.t 4.05% b) Burnup (max) 45,000 MWD/MTU c) Cooling time (min) 7 years dJ Decay Heat 32.7 kw (total including BPRA'S or TPA' S) \ Max Clad Temperature 32Soc Cask Cavity Atmosphere Helium gas Maximum Internal Pressure 100 psig Ambient Temperature -30 to 115°F Daily Averaged Ambient Temperature -20 to 100°F Over 24 hr. period (min-max) Maximum Solar Heat Load 2950 BTU/ft2 (Flat Surfaces) 1474 BTU/ft 2 (Curved Surfaces) Tornado Wind 290 mph rotational 70 mph translational Tornado Missiles 1800 kg auto 125 kg s* in. armor piercing shell 1 in. solid steel sphere Cask Drop 18" Drop and 5' Drop Cask Tip Tip onto ISFSI pad Seismic Design*Earthquake 0.26 q horizontal 0.17 q vertical Snow and Ice 50 psf load
' : ' I ,~ \' Rev. 1 5/00
FIGURE 2.1-1 Decay Heat Westinghouse 17x17 Standard Fuel Assembly 3.5 wt% U-235 Minimum Initial Enrichment 45,000 MWD/MTU 1000 950 900 850
>. 800
- E E
u
"'"' 750 i
~ 700 650 600 550 500 5 10 15 20 25 30 Decay Time (years since Discharge) Rev. 0 1/00
FIGURE 2.1-2 Garnna Source Westinghouse 17.xl7 Standard Fuel Assembly 3.5 wt% U-235 Minimum Initial Enrichment 45 I 000 MWD/MIU S.SJ?+-IS S.OE+lS 4.SE+IS ~ 4.0E+J.S Eu ~ 1l 3.SE+IS ~ E
~ 3.0E+IS 0
2.SE+IS 2.0E+IS l.SE+IS 5 10 15 20 25 30 Rev. o 1/00
FIGURE 2.1-3 Neutron Source Westinghouse 17X17 Standard Fuel Assembly 3.5 wt.% U-235 Minimum Initial Enrichrrent 45,000 ).\ff)/MIU 3.SB-08 , . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . ~ 25E-+-08 + - - - - - - -
~
~Cl) ~ c 0 ~ 20B-08 + - - - - - - * --------------"'~-----------! Cl)
- z 1.SB t - - - -
1.0E-+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_ _ _ _ _ ___.. 5 10 15 20 25 30 Ikcay Ture ~since Discharge) Rev. o 1/00
FIGURE 2.1-4 BPRAs PERMISSIBLE FOR STORAGE IN THE TN-32 CASK 2200 2100 2000
- 1900
* / ' 1800 ' /
";" 1700 / r 1600
/
*/
-~ 1500 ACCEPTABLE "C e~ 1400 /
- 1300 - - /
~"' ...., 1200
/
Col 1100 / E ~ 1000 *-- - - - - ~ Cl) .E 900 - * / 0 / u0 800 --
/ UNACCEPTABLE --
E 700
= - "/
E 600 = - ~ 500 / - 400 -- / 300 / 200 --/--~ 100 0 v 30000 35000 40000 45000 50000 55000 60000 Burnup (MWd/MTU) - Rev. 0 1/00
FIGURE 2.1-5 TPAs PERMISSIBLE FOR STORAGE IN THE TN-32 CASK
~
.= 6500
!>\
Q 8 6000 +-----------,.,__--------------1
- mr:::
_f"' ._.. s5oO+-------~-----------------i e i= 5000 ----~-------'---------------1 .r UNACCEPTABLE ~ 4500 + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 E .§ 4000 + - - * - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ! .5 3500-1---1---------------------~* 3000---~---~-----~---~-~----' 45,000 95,000 145,000 195,000 Burnup (MWd/MTU) Rev. O 1/00
. FIGURE 2.1-6 Burnable Poison Rod Assembly, . Upper Head Injection Reactor Upper Head Injection Cup HOLD-DOWN ASSEMBLY THIMBLE PLUG r*
I t L t t I I I I I I I I I I I I I
*
- t*
- I t
I I I I f
- ' t I
I
- I t
f
*' t t
I I BURNABLE [f I
*... POISON ROD I
1 * % *** . !
~ .. * .. "
- I * * .***c"~*=
~ **
.] .
*~-~ ..
- REV. 0 1/00
.I
- *WIND (a)
W = 225.4 LBS.JIN. 184* 201.aa* FORCE SEISMIC (b) t0.17W 0.26 REACTION FORCE FIGURE 2.2-1 EARTHQUAKE AND WATER LOADS REV. O 1/00
~*
MISSILE A l.A= 184* 201.88' (a} 188.2 mph
~ xissILES B & c PIVOT POINT (b) 126 :mph x I: 102.2* I I t==
o< c 74.89° MISSILES B &: C e* 64.6° (c} FIGURE 2.2-2 TORNADO MISSILE IMPACT LOADS
,,,. REV. 0 1/00
'l'lf-32. TH-32A TN-32. 'l'N-32A 1.SW(YIELD) 1.SWCYIELI>) 2.5W(ULTIMA'1'E) 2.SW(ULTlMATE) TN*32B 3W(YIELD) I I .
'l'N-321 3W(YIE1.D)
SW(OLTIMA'l'E) I I SW(OL'l'lMA'l'E) I I I
~
I I I I I I I FIGURE 2.2-3 LIFTING LOADS REV. 0 1/00
DRAIN PORT (VENT PORT SIMILAR) OVERPRESSURE TANK
\ PROTECTIVE COVER SINGLE METALLIC SEAL DRILLED PASSAGE TO LID SEAL TUBING SINGLE ELASTOMER SBAL DOUBLE METALLIC SEAL O.P. CONTROL BOX (FILL VALVE, PRESSURE SWITCHES ENCLOSED) 0 FIGURE 2.3-1 0
0
- I TN-32 CASK SEAL PRESSURE MONITORING SYSTEM
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REV. 0 1/00
CHAPTER 3 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION 3.1 Structural Design 3.1.l
- pjscussjon This section summarizes the structural analysis- of the TN-32 storage cask. For purposes of structural analysis, the cask has been divided into four components:* the cask body (consisting of Confinement vessel and gamma shielding), the basket, the trunnions and the neutron shield outer shell. The following information is provided: a brief* description of the components, the design bases and criteria, the method of analysis, a summary*
of stresses for the highest stressed locations, and a comparison wi~h the allowable stress criteria. The cask body is described in detail in Section 1.2. Drawings 1049-70-1, 1049-70-2 and 1049-70-3 show the. cask body. The confinement shell, bottom and lid materials are SA-203, Grade D and SA-350 Grade LF3. The gamma shield cylinder is SA-266, Grade 2, the top shield plate is SA-105 or SA-516, Gr. 70 and the bottom shield plate is SA-266 Grade 2. or SA-516-70.
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In order to obtain a close fit between the confinement vessel and the gamma shielding for heat transfer, the gamma shielding is heated prior to assembly with the confinement shell. As the gamma shielding cools,. a gap forms between the confinement vessel flange and the gamma shielding. This gap is filled with shims as shown on Drawing 1049-70-3. The shims are machined to fill the gap and act as a backing plate for the a.so inch weld between the Confinement flange and the gamma shield shell. The shims are typically less than 0.25 inches and no more than 0.50 inches thick and are made from SA-516, Gr. 70, SA-414, or SA-620. The shims are sized so there is no more than 0.03 inch gap bet:ween-the--shims-and-t.he-flange..._or_tbe shims and the gamma shield shell. The TN-32 confinement vessel is designed, fabricated, examined and tested in accordance with the requirements of Subsection NB of the ASME Code 111 to the maximum practical extent. The confinement boundary, which consists of the inner shell and bottom plate, shell flange, lid outer plate, lid bolts, vent and drain cover plates and bolts, is of particular interest. The Confinement boundary welds are full penetration welds examined volumetrically by radiograph. These welds are also liquid penetrant or magnetic particle examined. The acceptance standards are in accordance with Article NB-sooo. Structural and structural attachment welds are examined by the liquid penetrant or the magnetic particle method in accordance with Section V, Article 6 of the ASME Code 111
- Acceptance stapdards are in accordance with Section III, 3.1-1 Rev. O 1/00
--.. ........... _. ___ ~
Subsection NF, Paragraphs NF-5340 and NF-5350 111
- Seal welds are examined visually or by liquid penetrant or magnetic particle methods in accordance with Section v of the ASME Code111
- Stainless steel overlay welds are examined by the liquid penetrant method in accordance with Section V of the ASME Code.
Electrodes, wire, and fluxes used for fabrication comply with the applicable requirements of the ASME Code, Section II, Part c< 1 >
- The welding procedures, welders and weld operators are qualified in accordance with Section IX of the ASME Code 111 * .
The basket structure consists of an assembly of square 304 stainless steel fuel compartment boxes or cells attached together using cylindrical plugs welded to the walls of adjacent boxes.
- Trapped between the adjacent boxes are a layer of 6061-T6/T65~
aluminum and a layer of borated aluminum. The stainless steel boxes and plugs effectively clamp and pin the aluminum thermal conductor plates and borated aluminum poison plates in place. The plugs are assembled through clearance holes in the aluminum and borated aluminum plates and are only welded to the stainless steel boxes. Drawings 1049-70-5 and 1049-70-6 show details of the basket. The basket is supported laterally by 6061-T6 aluminum rails (shown in Drawing 972-70-2) which are either bolted directly to the cask wall (Item 26 rails) or bolted to bosses which are welded to the confinement shell using full penetration welds {Item 30 rails). The trunnions are cylindrical SA-105 forgings that are welded to the cask body gamma shielding using full circumferential welds. The two upper trunnions are designed to lift the loaded TN-32. cask vertically. The lower trunnions provide capability to rotate the cask prior to loading of spent fuel. The upper trunnions are designed to meet the requirements of ANSI Nl4. 6. <21 The upper trunnions for the TN-32 and TN-32A casks are evaluated for lifting 3 times the weight of the loaded
ca.slt-J:5efore r-ea.-cb-i"ng-ure-y~eldErcrengt:n of mat:eria1-s-ana.-s-e1m~e~s~-------
the weight of the cask before reaching the ultimate strength of the materials. The upper trunnions for the TN-32B cask are designed to be single failure proof and are evaluated for lifting 6 times the weight of the loaded cask before reaching the yield strength of the materials and 10 times the weight of the loaded cask before reaching the ultimate strength (including 10% of dynamic load factor) . The trunnions are shown in Drawing 1049-70-2. The outer shell of the neutron shield consists of a cylindrical shell section with closure plates at each end. The closure plates are welded to the outer surface of the cask body gamma shielding. The outer shell provides an enclosure for the resin-filled aluminum containers and maintains the resin in the proper location with respect to the active length of the fuel assemblies in the cask cavity. The outer shell has no other structural function. The shell is metal-sprayed, and/or painted
./
3.1-2 Rev. O 1/00
9arbon steel. 1 The top neutron shield consists of a disk of commercial grade polypropylene surrounded by a steel enclosure. The top neutron shield is attached to and rests on the cask lid. It is protected from. the envi_ronment by. the protective cover. 3.1.2 nesign Criteria This section describes the TN-32 analyses performed under the various loading conditions identified in Section 2.2. These loadings include all of the normal events that are expected to . occur regularly. In addition, they include severe natural phenomena and man induced low probability events postulated because of their potential impact on the immediate environs. The loadings from the hypothetical tipover accident that are shown not to occur are also analyzed in this chapter. Section 2.2.s lists a11*of the TN-32 loadings in Table 2.2-*
- 4. These loads are described in detail in Section 2.2.5.2. The loads selected for analysis of the cask are discussed in Section 2.2.5.3. Numerical values of these loads are listed in Tables 2.2-2 and 2.2-3.
The TN-32 components have been evaluated under these loads through numerical analysis. Finite element models of the cask body and basket have been developed, and detailed computer analyses have been performed using the ANSYS computer program. <3 > Other components such as the lid bolts and trunnions have been analyzed using conventional textbook methods. Table 3.1-1 lists the specific individual load cases analyzed for each major TN-32 component. The sections where these analyses are described and the tables listing the stress results, where applicable, are also indicated. - - - 3_.l_._2_._l Confj nement Boundary.: The confinement boundary consists of the inner shell {botn-- cylinder and bottom) and closure flange out to the.seal seating surface and the lid assembly outer plate. The lid bolts and seals are also part of the confinement boundary. The Confinement boundary is designed to the maximum practical extent as an ASME Class I component in accordance with the rules of the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB. The Subsection NB rules for materials, design, fabrication and examination are applied to all of the above components to the maximum practical extent,* Exceptions to the ASME code are discussed in Chapter 7. The stresses due to each load are categorized as to the type of stress induced, e.g. membrane, bending, etc., and the classification of stress, e.g. primary, secondary, etc. Stress limits for confinement vessel components, other than bolts, for Normal (Design and Level A) and Hypothetical Accident (Level D) Loading Condi~ions are given in Table 3.1-2. The stress limits 3.1-3 Rev. o 1/00
used for Level D conditions, determined on an elastic basis, are based on the entire structure (confinement shell and gamma shielding material) resisting the accident loads. Local yielding
- is permitted at the point of contact where the load is applied.
If elastic stress limits cannot be met, the plastic system analysis approach and acceptance criteria of App~ndix F of Section I I I may be used. The limits for the confinement bolts are listed in Table 3.1-3. The allowable stress intensity value, Sm, as defined by the Code is taken at the temperature calculated for each service load condition. 3.1.2.2 Non- confinement Structure Certain components such as the gamma shielding, the neutron shield outer shell and the trunnions are not part of the cask confinement boundary but do h~ve structural functions. These components, referred to as non-confinement structures, do not have confinement functions but are required to react to the confinement or environmental loads and in some cases share loadings with the confinement structure. The stress limits for the remaining non-confinement structures are given in Table 3.1-
- 4. These limits are somewhat less restrictive than those specified in Table 3.1-2 for the confinement vessel.
3.1.2.3 Basket The basket is designed, fabricated and inspected in accordance with the ASME Code Subsection NB to the maximum practical extent. The following exceptions are taken: The poison plates are not used for structural analysis. Therefore, the materials are not required to be code materials. The quality assurance requirements of NQA-1 or 10 CFR 72 Subpart
--G---a:r;e-imposed-in-lieu.--0f-NCA"'-3-800-. - -The-basket--wilL not-be_ code stamped. Therefore the requirements of NCA are not imposed.
Fabrication and inspection surveillance is performed by the owner and design organization in lieu of an authorized nuclear inspector. The fuel basket aluminum plate and rail materials are not Class 1 materials. They were selected for their properties. Aluminum has excellent thermal conductivity and a high strength to weight ratio. The aluminum plate strength is not used for structural analyses under normal operating loads and SOg accident end drop load. The aluminum plate strength is only assumed to be effective *for the short duration dynamic loading from tipover accident and for secondary thermal stress calculations. NUREG-3854 Fabrication Criteria for Shipping Containers and 1617 Standard...Review Plan for Transportation Package for Spent 3.1-4 Rev. o 1:100
Nuclear Fuel allow materials other than ASME Code materials to be used in the cask fabrication. ASME Code does provide the material properties for the aluminum alloy up to 400°F. Properties above 400°F are taken from-the Aluminum Association Handbook and are described in details in SAR Appendix 3C.3-3. The allowable stresses used for the aluminum basket plate and rail are based on S, the allowable stress for a Class 2 or 3 component. This is conservative, since the analyses of the basket and rail are performed in accordance with the rules of Subsection NB. Subsection NB allowables are based on Sm, which is 1/3 the ultimate strength, while S is 1/4 the ultimate strength. Thus there is additional margin built into the analysis of the basket* and rail over and above the margin required by the ASME Code for Class l materials. The stress limits for the basket are summarized in Table 3.1-5. The basket structural design criteria for a hypothetical impact accident are developed *in Appendix 3B (elastic analysis) and Appendix 3C {elastic and plastic analysis). They are summarized here. The basket fuel compartment wall thickness is established to meet heat transfer, nuclear criticality, and structural requirements. The basket structure must provide sufficient rigidity to maintain a subcritical configuration under the applied loads. The primary stress analysis of the basket for Normal (Design and Level A) Service Con.di tions does not take credit for the aluminum conductor plates except for through thickness compression. The aluminum is, however, considered when determining secondary stresses in the stainless steel. The basis for the 304 stainless steel fuel compartment box stress allowables is Section III of the ASME Code. The primary membrane stress and primary membrane plus bending stress are limited to Sm (Sm is the code allowable stress intensity) and 1.5
s,;;,--respectivel-y ,--at.--an¥--location_in_t.b_e_basket for Normal (Design and Level A) load combinations. The range o:t-=p:::::r;;:-:?1-=m=a=ry~---
plus secondary stress is limited to 3 Sm for Level A combinations. This allows some local yielding of the basket strlicture. However, the thermal stresses are self-relieving and the deformation is insignificant. In addition, the thermal stress will decrease with time as the decay heat load decreases. The average primary shear stress across a section is limited to
- 0. 6 Sm.
The sustained Level D Service Conditions are actually elevated to Level A Conditions and evaluated against Design Limits since the bounding loads are greater than any Level D loads. The hypothe~ical drop and tipping impact accidents are considered separately. See Appendices 3B and 3C for complete details of tbe..criteria for these conditions. 3.1-5 Rev. O 1(00
details of the criteria for these conditions. The hypothetical impact accidents are evaluated as short duration Level D conditions. For elastic analyses, the primary membrane stress is limited to the smaller of 2.4 Sm or 0.7Su and the membrane plus bending stress limited to the smaller of 3.6 Sm or Su. The average primary shear stress across a section is
- limited to 0 .42 Su (Su is the minimum ultimate strengt~). For plastic analysis, the primary membrane $tress is limited to the 0.7Su and the membrane plus bending stress limited to the smaller of 0.9Su. The average primary shear stress across a section is limited to 0. 42 Su.
Individual fuel compartment wall panels, when subjected to compressive loadings, are also evaluated against ASME Code rules for component supports and B96 .1 <4 l to ensure that buckling will not occur. The interaction between compression and bending was evaluated using the equations of paragraph NF-3322. These equations reduce to that below for members subjected to both axial compression and bending: Applied Compressive Load + Applied Bending Moment ~ l. 0 Allowable Compressive Load Allowable Bending Moment See Appendix 3B for the development of the stability and interaction criteria. 3.1.2.4 Tp1nnions The design criteria for the trunnions are both unique and specific. They are specified in Section 2.2.5.4.3. 3.1-6 Rev. O 1/00
3.2 Weights and Centers of Grayjty The maximum total weight of the TN-32 cask and contents is 115.6 .tons .. The weights of the major individual subassemblies and center of gravity of the cask are listed iri Table 3.2-1. In most of the structural analyses, .a conservatively high weight is used. However, in certain cases, such as ,the analysis of the stability of the cask, a conservatively low weight and high center of gravity are used. 3.2-1 Rev. O 1/00
- :.~ -..........
3.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials 3.3.l Cask Material Properties This section provides _the mechanical properties of materials used in the structural evaluation of the TN-32 storage cask. Table 3.3-1 lists the materials.selected, the applicable . components, and the minimum yield, ultimate, and design stress values specified by the ASME Code. All values reported in Table *. 3.3-1 are for metal temperatures up to 100°F. For higher temperatures, the temperature dependency of the material properties is ~eported in Table 3.3-2. Table 3.3-3 is provided to summarize thermal analysis _results from Chapter 4 which support the selection of cask body component design .temperatures for structural analysis purposes. The temperatures specified in.Table 3.3-3 are used to determine the allowable stresses. They*are not a maximum use temperature for the material. 3.3.2 Basket Material Prapertjes The material properties of the 304 stainless steel plates are taken from the ASME Code 111
- The material properties of the aluminum alloy (6061-T6) are also taken from the ASME code except at elevated temperatures. *The elevated temperature properties not available in the ASME code are obtained from the Aluminum Association 151
- These properties are listed with specific references in Tables 3.3-4 and 3.3-5. The full strength of the aluminum was considered when performing dynamic impact analyses.
For long term sustained loading (under normal operation condition), the aluminum strength is generally neglected under primary loading where it can share the load with the stainless steel. 3.3.3 Material properties Summary Table 3.3-6 provides a table which susmmarized the components of the TN-32 cask, their primary function, and an overview of the general conditions (stresses, temperatures, pressures, coatings, etc., during storage. This table is intended to summarized the information provided elsewhere in the SAR. 3.3.4 Materials D11rability Materials must maintain the ability to perform their safety-related functions over at least the cask's 20 year lifetime under the cask's thermal, radiological, corrosion, and stress environment. 3.3-1 Rev. O 1/00
Metalljc components; Gamma radiation has no significant effect on metals. The
,effect of fast neutron irradiation of metals is a function of the integrated fast neutron flux, which is on the order of 10 14 n/cm2 inside the TN-32 after 20 years. Studies on fast neutron damage in aluminum, stainless steel, an.d low alloy steels rarely evaluate damage below 10 17 n/cm2 because it is not significant.
Extrapolation of the data available down to the ioi', range confirms that there will be virtually no neutron damage .to any of the TN-32 metallic components. The effect of the TN-32 temperature environment on the required structural properties is evaluated in the SAR. There,is.,_ no long term degradation of metals in the TN-32 temperature environment. The effect of creep at temperature is the basis for establishing the seal temperature limits. Additional information on the seals, including construction, corrosion evaluation and long term test data, is provided in Sections 2.3.2.1 and 7.1.3. The cask exterior carbon steel components is protected from corrosion by the paint (epoxy, acrylic urethane or equivalent) . The interior is protected by the aluminum thermal spray and by the helium environment inside the cask. The aluminum and stainless steel components are not subject to significant corrosion as discussed in Section 3.4-l. ' Ncm-meta) l i c components: The radial neutron shield resin is a proprietary reinforced polymer. Appendix 9A provides information on the composition and the radiation and temperature resistance of the resin. Polyester is inert with respect to water, and the fire retardant mineral
*fill makes it self-extinguishing. Furthermore, the resin is contained in aluminum tubes inside a steel shell, so that the material is retained in place, and isolated from both water and
- --**-* -** from*-sources of. -ignition.._
Elastomer o-rings or gaskets in the weather cover, quick disconnects, drain tube; and pressure relief valve are Not safety related; note that the quick disconnects are not part of the containment boundary. Stem tips on overpressure system valves are Kel-F or similar material, and are not safety related; at the valve locations, the radiation level and temperatures are low. The top neutron shield {polypropylene) is not safety related. Paint is subject to routine maintenance and touch-up. Radiation levels and temperature on the cask exterior are not high enough to damage the paint. This is confirmed by dry cask experience . , .,.. 3.3-2 Rev. 0 1/00
-........-=--; .... - -
- The top neutron shield (polypropylene) is not safety related. Polypropylene is slow burning to non burning according to Table 24, Section 1 of the Handbook of Plastics and Elastomers< 23 >. Polypropylene is inert with respect to water.
Furthermore, the weather protective cover isolates the top neutron shield material from sources of ignition and from water. 3.3-3 Rev. O 1/.00
3.4 r~neral Standards fgr Casks 3.4.1 Chemical and Galvanic Reactions The materials of the TN-32 cask have been reviewed to determine whether chemical, galvanic or oth~r reactions among the materials, contents and environment might occur du.ring any phase of loading, unloading, handling or storage. This review is summarized below: The TN-32 cask components are exposed to the following environments:
- During loading and unloading, the casks are submerged in borated water (boric acid solution). This affects the interio~ and exterior* surfaces of the cask body, lid and the basket. The protective cover, the top neutron shield, and the overpressure system are not' submerged in the ~pent fuel pool.
The casks are only kept in the spent fuel pool for a short period of time, typically about 6 hours to load or unload fuel, 1 - 2 hours to drain, and another 8 - 10 hours to completeiy dry, evacuate and backfill the* cask with helium.
- During handling and storage, the exterior of the cask is exposed to normal environmental conditions of temperature, rain, snow, etc. All of the exterior surfaces with the exception of stainless steel components are protected from environmental exposure by an epoxy, acrylic urethane, or equivalent enamel coating. The paint is touched up periodically if there are any areas which peel or otb~rwise deteriorate. Therefore, the cask exterior is protected from chemical, galvanic or other reactions during storage.
- During storage, the.interior of the cask is exposed to an inert helium environment. The helium environment does not support the oc-currence___of- chemica-:1.-- or-ga-l-vanic_r.eactio.n_L_______ _
because both moisture and oxygen must be present* for a -- reaction to occur. The cask is thoroughly dried before storage by a vacuum drying process. It is then sealed and backfilled with helium, thus preventing corrosion. Since the cask is vacuum dried, galvanic corrosion is also precluded since there is no water present at the point of contact between dissimilar metals.
- The radial neutron shielding materials and the aluminum resin boxes are sealed during all normal operations. The amount of oxygen in the sealed region is *very small. The resin material is inert after it has cured and does not affect the aluminum boxes or the carbon steel housing.
3.4-l Rev. o 1/00
3.4.1.1 Cask Interior The TN-32 cask materials are identified in the drawings provided in Chapter 1. The confinement vessel is made from SA-203 Grade D and SA-350 LF3. The interior surfaces of the confinement vessel are *grit blasted and then metal-sprayed with aluminum of 99.0% purity. The aluminum metal-spray coating is subject to the following service environments:
- After fabrication closed and shipped under air.
- At fuel loading, borated spent fuel pool water for a short duration.
- Vacuum-dried and helium backfilled for storage lifetime of 20 years or more.
- At fuel removal, it may again be exposed to borated spent fuel pool water for a short duration.
The coating is not subject to abrasion except .for the one-time insertion of the basket. An aluminum metal spray coating will* maintain its integrity for 20 to 40 years under rural atmosphere exposure 15 , which is a far more severe combination of exposure and time than that experienced by the TN32's internal metal spray coating. The only alteration that the coating will experience is minor corrosion during the exposure to borated pool water. At a corrosion rate of 0.5.9x10- 5 inch/year18 , the loss of aluminum during the 48 hour period would be 3x10-7 inch, which is much less than the 0.004 inch minimum coating thickness. Corrosion of metal-sprayed aluminum also has the positive effect of sealing
u~p*--t-ne pores :tn---tne coat:lng wreh--l:nsoluDle anclwell-adhered corrosion products 17 * .
Typical composition of flame sprayed aluminum as deposited includes 5 to 10% Al203 measured metallo~raphically. The balance is the same as the feed wire composition 4
- Other thermal spray methods such as arc spray result in less oxide. During initial exposure to pure water, aluminum metal spray over steel will sometimes stain brown due to the aluminum acting cathodically to the steel, probably due to the very thin aluminum oxide layer surrounding each "splat" of aluminum (aluminum oxide is less anodic than aluminum metal). After a short time, the aluminum acts normally as a sacrificial anode to protect the steel, and the staining ceases. The stains are insoluble aluminum oxides colored by iron, and they do not affect the life expectancy of the coating 17
- In the case of the TN-32, this cathodic action might occur prior to irmnersion in the spent fuel pool due to exposure to no1.mal atmospheric conditions. However, even if 3.4-2 Rev. O 1/.00
there is some cathodic action during initial immersion, it will be very short lived, and will not affect the function of the coating. Grit blasting material used to prepare the steel surface for metal spray is either aluminum oxide -0r steel grit. The grit used is clean, dry, free of oil, feldspar and other contaminants. The metal spraying procedure 15was developed following the . Guidelines of ANSI/AWS C2.18
- The final coating thickness typically is in the range of 0.004 inch to 0.015 inch. Thickness of the coating is inspected. Coating adhesion is periodically checked during fabrication.
The metallic spray coating is deposited as aluminum with an aluminum oxide coating. It is similar in composition to 1100 series aluminum and the borated aluminum in the baskets. The aluminum spray coating, 1100 series aluminum, borated aluminum . and 6061-T6 aluminum develop.a passive oxide coating and the corrosion rate decreases substantially after the oxide coating develops. Hydrogen is generated during the initial passivation. However, passivation begins in air, and only minimal amounts of hydrogen will be generated after the cask is submerged in the spent fuel pool. All sealing surf aces are stainless steel clad by weld overlay. The metallic seals have a stainless steel liner and an aluminum. jacket. Within the cask cavity, there are 12 basket rails made from 6061 T6 aluminum. The rails are shown on TN drawing 1049-70-2, provided in Chapter 1. These rails are not coated, and have a total surface area of about 53,000 in 2
- The cask basket is assembled from SA-240, Type 304 *stainless s~eel
-------::~
boxes which are joined together by a proprietary fusion we1aing-pro-ce-55-and-sepa-:r:a-t-ed-by alumin.um and poison plates which farm a sandwich panel. The aluminum plates are 0. 51nchErs-th+/-c:Jt------- 6061 T6 aluminum, with a total surface area of about 196,000 in 2
- The aluminum plates are held in place by the stainless steel plugs which are welded to the stainless steel baskets. The aluminum is not welded or bolted to the stainless steel.
The poison plates are borated aluminum, with a total surface area of approximately 196,000 in2
- The borated aluminum plates are also held in place by the stainless steel plugs that are welded to the stainless steel baskets. The borated aluminum is not welded or bolted to the stainless steel.
Potential sources of chemical or galvanic reactions are the interaction between the aluminum, borated aluminum and stainless steel within th~ basket itself, and the interaction of the aluminum spray on the cask cavity wall and the borated water. Aluminum and.stainless steel are both used extensively in the Rev. o 3.4-3 1/00
~*-*-*--*
-spent fuel pool.
Behavior of Aluminum in Borated Water Aluminum is used for many applications in spent fuel pools. In order to understand the corrosion resistance of aluminum within the normal operating conditions".of spent fuel storage pools, a discussion of each of the types**-of corrosion is addressed separately. None of these corrosion mechanisms is expected to occur in the short time period that the cask is s.ubmerged in the spent fuel pool. General Corrosion General corrosion is a uniform attack of the metal over the entire surfaces exposed to the corrosive media. The severity of general corrosion of aluminu~ depends upon the chemical nature and temperature of the electrolyte and can range from superficial etching and staining to dissolution of the metal. Figure 3.4-5 shows a potential-pH diagram for aluminum in high purity water at 77 °F and 140 °F. The potential for aluminum* coupled with stainless steel and the limits of pH for PWR pools are shown in. the. diagram to be well within the passivation domain at both temperatures. The passivated surface of aluminum (hydrated oxide of aluminum) affords protection against corrosion in the domain shown because the coating is insoluble, non-porous and adherent to the surface of the aluminum.
- The protective surface formed on the aluminum is known to be stable up to 275 °F and in a pH range of 4.5 to 8.5 13
- The water aluminum reactions are self-limiting because the surface of the aluminum becomes passive by the formation of a protective and impervious coating making further reaction impossible until the coating is removed by mechanical or chemical
me-ans. -----
The ability of aluminum to resist corrosion from boron ions is evident from the wide usage of aluminum in the handling of borax and in the manufacture of boric acid. Aluminum storage racks with Boral plates (aluminum 1100 exterior layer)in contact with 800 ppm borated water showed only small amounts of pitting after 17 years in the pool at the Yankee Rowe Power Plant. These racks maintained their structural integrity. During immersion in the spent fuel pool, the TN-32 basket temperatures are close to the water temperature, which is typically near 80 °F, and the pH range is typically 4.0 to 6.5. Based on the above discussion, general corrosion is not expected on the aluminum or aluminum spray after the protective coating has been formed. 3.4-4 Rev. O 1/00
Galvanic Corrosion Galvanic corrosion is a type of corrosion which could cause degradation of dissimilar metals exposed to a corrosive environment for a long period of tim~. Galvanic corr.osion is associated with the current of a galvanic cell consisting of two dissimila*r conductors in an electrolyte. The two dissimilar conductors of interest in this discussion are aluminum and stainless steel or aluminum and carbon steel in borated water. .There is little galvanic corrosion in borated water since the water conductivity is very low. There is also less galvanic current flow between the aluminum-stainless steel couple than the potential difference on stainless steel which is known as polarization. It is because of this polarization characteristic that stainless steel is compatible with aluminum in all but severe marine, or high chloride, environmental conditions 19
- At points of contact between the aluminum basket rails and the carbon steel shell, some galvanic reaction may occur, with
- the aluminum acting as a sacrificial anode. The carbon steel shell will be protected from corrosion as a result of this reaction. The corrosion of the aluminum rails will not be sufficient to affect their thermal or mechanical performance given the water purity and *short immersion time.
Pitting Corrosion Pitting corrosion is the forming of small sharp cavities in a metal surface. The first step in the development of corrosion pits is a local destruction of the protective oxide film. Pitting will not occur on commercially pure aluminum when the water is kept sufficiently pure, even when the aluminum is in electrical contact with stainless steel. Pitting and other forms --__,of---1-eea-l..ized-eor.ro_si_o_n__Q_CCUr under~onditions like those that cause stress corrosion, and are subjectt-oa-n--inauct-ion-t-i-tne----------- which is similarly affected by temperature and the concentration of oxygen and chlorides. As with stress corrosion, at the low temperatures and low chloride concentrations of a spent fuel pool, the induction time for initiation of localized corrosion will be greater than the time that*the cask internal components are exposed to the aqueous environment. Crevice Corrosion Crevice corrosion is the corrosion of a metal that is caused by the concentration of dissolved.salts, metal ions, oxygen or other gases in crevices or pockets remote from the principal fluid stream, with a resultant build-up of differential galvanic cells that ultimately cause pitting. Crevice corrosion could occur in the bas.ket plates, around the stainless steel welds. However, due ~~ the short time in the spent fuel pool, this type 3.4-5 Rev. 0 1/00
of corrosion is not expected to be significant. Intergranular Corrosion Intergranular corrosion is corrosion occurring preferentially at grain boundaries or closely adjacent regions without appreciable attack of the grains or crystals of the metal itself. Intergranular corrosion does not occur with* commercially pure aluminum and other common work hardened aluminum alloys. Stress Corrosion Stress corrosion is failure of the metal by cracking under the combined action of corrosion and high stresses approaching the yield stress of the metal. During normal operations, the cask is upright and there is negligible load on the basket. The stresses on the basket plates are very small, well below the yield stress of the basket materials. Behavior of Austenitic Stainless Steel in Borated Water* The fuel compartments and the structural plates which support the fuel compartments are made from Type 304 stainless steel. In addition, the gasket sealing surfaces are stainless steel clad. Stainless steel does not exhibit general corrosion when immersed in borated water. Galvanic attack can occur between the aluminum in contact with the stainless steel in the water. However, the attack is mitigated by the passivity of the aluminum and the stainless steel in the short time the pool water is in the cask. Stress corrosion cracking in the Type 304 stainless steel' welds of the basket to the structural stainless steel plates is also not expected to occur, since the baskets are not highly ___s_tr.e.ss_e_ci_dutln_g_n_o_rmal__o_p_e_r._a.t.i.o_ri_s_._The.r_e_may_b_e_s_om_e__r_e_s.i_du_a_l__ fabrication stresses as a result of welding of the s~ainless steel boxes and fusion welds between the boxes and stainless steel plates. Of the corrosive agents that could initiate stress corrosion cracking in the 304 stainless steel basket welds, only the combination of chloride ions with dissolved oxygen occurs in spent -fuel pool water. Although stress corrosion cracking can take place at very low chloride concentrations and temperatures such as those in spent fuel pools (less than 10 ppb and 160°F, respectively), the effect of low chloride concentration and low temperature is to greatly increase the induction time, that is, the period during which the corrodent is breaking down the passive oxide film on the stainless steel surface. Below 60°C (140°F), stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel does not occur at all. At 100 °C (212 °F), chloride concentration o~ the order of 15% is required to initiate stress corrosion cracking 20
- At 288 °C (550 °F), with tensile stress at 3.4-6 Rev. o 1/00
i00% of yield in PWR water containing 100 ppm 0 2 , time to crack is about 40 days in sensitized 304 stainless steel 21
- Thus, the combination of low chlorides, low temperature and short time of exposu~e to the corrosive environment eliminates the possibility of stress corrosion cracking in the basket welds.
Behavior of Borated Aluminum in Borated Water To investigate the use of borated aluminum in the spent fuel pool, tests were performed by Eagle Picher to evaluate its dimensional stability, corrosion resistance and neutron capture ability. These studies showed that the borated aluminum performed well in a spent fuel pool environment. The 1100 series aluminum component is a ductile metal having a high resistance to corrosion. Its corrosion resistance is provided by the buildup of a .protective oxide film on the metal surface when exposed to a water or moisture environment. As stated above, for aluminum, once a stable film develops, the corrosion process is arrested at the surface of the metal. The film remains stable over a pH range of- 4.5 to 8.5. Tests were performed by Eagle Picher which concluded that borated aluminum exhibits a strong corrosion resistance at room temperature in either reactor grade deionized water or in 2000 ppm borated water. T_he behavior i:? only slightly different than 1100 series aluminum, hence, satisfactory long-term usage in these environments is expected. Neutron irradiation up to 10 17 n/cm2 level did not cause any measurable dimensional changes or any other damage to the material. At high temperature, the borated aluminum still exhibits high corrosion resistance in the pure water environment. However, at temperatures of 80° C, in .2000 ppm borated water, 1oca-l-pi-tting--C.o.rr.o.sJ.on has been observed. At 100° C and room temperature, the pitting attack was less than at--S-6° c. In-a-ld----*---- cases~ passivation occurs limiting the pit depth.
- From tests on pure aluminum, it was found that borated aluminum was more resistant to uniform corrosion attack than pure aluminum. Local pitting corrosion, can occur over time, causing localized damage to the borated aluminum.
There are no chemical, galvanic or other reactions that could reduce the areal density of boron in the TN-32's neutron poison plates. 3.4.1.2 Cask Exterior The exterior of the cask is carbon steel. The grades and types of carbon *steel are presented in the drawings in Chapter 1. The exterior,o; the cask, with the exception of the trunnion 3.4-7 Rev. O 1/00
~---*-*** .
nearing surfaces, is painted using an epoxy, acrylic urethane, or equivalent enamel coating with the appropriate primer. The paint is visually inspected prior to installation of the cask in the spent fuel pool and periodically during storage. Touch up painting is performed if the ~aint deteriorates
- 3.4.1.3 Lubricants and Cleaning Agents The following lubricants and cleaning agents may be used on the TN-32 cask:
- Neolube or equivalent is used to coat the threads and bolt shoulders of the closure bolts. It is also used to coat the contact areas of the top and bottom trunnions during transport and lifting operations to aid rotation of adj~cent metal surfaces and to prevent impregnation of contamination.
- During fabrication, the cask and basket are cleaned in accordance with approved procedures that limit the chloride and fluoride content, conductivity, and pH of water used for cleaning.
The cleaning agents and lubricants have no significant affect on the cask materials and their safety related functions. 3.4.1.4 Hydrogen Generation During the initial passivation stage, small amounts of hydrogen gas may be generated in the TN-32 cask. The passivation stage may occur prior to submersion of the cask into the spent fuel pool. Any amounts of hydrogen generated in the cask are insignificant and do not result in a flammable gas m-i-x-t-u-r-e-w-i-t-h-i-n---t-he--G a-S-k-.-'--- The small amount of hydrogen which is generated during cask operations does not result in a safety hazard. In order for concentrations of hydrogen in the cask to reach levels that could ignite or explode, most of the cask would have to be filled with water for the hydrogen generation to occur, and the lid would have to be in place with both the vent and drain ports closed. This does not occur during TN-32 loading or unloading operations.
- After loading fuel into the TN-32, the lid, with the vent port quick-disconnect coupling removed, is placed on the cask and the cask is raised to the pool surface. At this time the cask is completely filled with water. Any hydrogen generated inside the cask will be released at the vent port. Once the process of .pumping out the water is begun, it is carried through to completion without interruption, a process . which takes 1 to 2
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3.4-8 Rev. 0 1./00
- nours. The vent port remains open during this process, allowing air into the vent. The rate of hydrogen generation is too low and the time period too short to generate an ignitable or explosive mixture. After a short period of passivating the surfaces of the aluminum and aluminum-based neutron poison, there is no source for further generating H2 gas.
An estimate of the maximum hydrogen concentration can be made, ignoring the effects of radiolysis, recombination, solution of hydrogen in water, and passivation. Experiments 18 have measured hydrogen generation from aluminum 1100 in acidic borated water (3000 ppm B, pH 4.5) at 150 °F a rate of l.9x10- 6 std ft 3 /ft 2hr. The surface area of the aluminum and borated aluminum basket plates and aluminum rails is 3710 ft 2
- The surface area of the aluminum metal spray is 296 ft 2
- For the purpose of evaluating the hydrogen generation rate, the surface area of the aluminum metal spray is increased by a factor of 50 to account for the higher rate of hydroge*n generation from the galvanic coupling of carbon steel and porous aluminum22
- In two hours, the amount of hydrogen generated would be 0.073 std ft 3 , assuming that all the aluminum surfaces are immersed. This is equal to 0.04% of the total free volume in the cask, well below the ignitable limit of 4%.
Unlike welded canisters, the TN-32 cask has a bolted closure. There is no source of ignition to result in an exposion or fire during either loading or unloading~ 3.4.1.5 Effect of Galvanic Reactions on the Performance of the Cask There are no significant reactions that could reduce the overall integrity of the cask or its contents during storage. The cask and fuel cladding thermal properties are provided in Chapter 4. The emissivity of the fuel compartment is 0.3, which --- ------i-s--typi-ca-1-for-non-=polishe.d_stainles_~ steel surfaces. If the stainless steel is oxidized, this value wol.ila-increase,- -- -------- improving heat transfer. The fuel rod emissivity value used is O.B, which is a typical value for oxidized Zircaloy. Therefore, the passivation reactions would not reduce the thermal properties of the component cask materials or the fuel cladding. There are no reactions that would cause binding of the mechanical surfaces or the fuel to basket compartment boxes due to galvanic or chemical reactions. There is no significant degradation of any safety components caused directly by the effects of the reactions or by the effects of the reactions combined with the effects of long term exposure of the materials to neutron or gamma radiation, high temperatures, or other possible conditions. 3.4-9 Rev. O 1/00
1.4.2 Posjtjye Closure Positive fastening of all access openings through the confinement boundary is accomplished by bolted closures which preclude unintentional opening. All of the openings in the TN-32 cask are through the lid of the cask. A protective cover is installed around the lid during storage. Security seals are installed in two of the protective cover bolts to ensure that no unauthorized entry into the cask has been attempted.
- 3. 4. 3 I.jfti ng pevices Section 3.4.3.1 provides the analysis of the trunnions, which are the only components which are used to lift the cask. Section 3.4.3.2 provides an analysis of the local stresses in the cask wall due to the effect of a 3G (TN-32 and TN-32A) and 6G (TN-32B) lifting loads on the trunnions. The resulting local stresses in the cask wall are conservative*ly added to the stresses resulting from other load conditions.
3.4.3.1 Tp1nnion Apalysis The cask is provided with two trunnions at*the top spaced 180 degrees apart for lifting. The two trunnions at the bottom of the cask are for rotation of the ~ask. They are att~ched to the cask body with penetration welds. A flat surface is machined on the cask body outer surface at each trunnion location for this purpose.
- This section provides the structural analysis of the TN-32 storage cask trunnions.
Upper Trunnions for TN-32 and TN-32A casks The two top trunnions are used for lifting the cask and are designed to the requirements of ANSI Nl4. 6 121** *They can support a loadin~al to 3 times the weigh_t_of the_c_ask witho.uLgenerating-- - - - - - stresses in excess of the minimum. yield strength of the material. They can also lift 5 times the weight of the cask without exceeding the ultimate tensile strength of the material.
- Figure 3.4-lA shows the basic dimensions of the top trunnions for TN-32 and TN-32A casks. The cask total weight used in this calculation is W = 243,000 pounds. Table ~.4-lA shows the cross sectional areas and moments of inertia at cross sections A-A, .B-B and c-c of the trunnions. In addition the loads applied to these sections (for 3 Wand 5 W loading) to evaluate the yield and ultimate limits are listed.
Table 3.4-2A presents a summary of the stresses at the same locations to compare against the yield and ultimate trunnion strengths. Also listed at the bottom of the table are the allowable stress.es (yield and ultimate strengths). All of the calculated stresses in the trunnions are acceptable.
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3.4-10 Rev. O 1/-00
Upper Trimnions for TN-32B Cask The upper trunnions are considered to be single failure proof lifting devices. They can support a loading equal to 6 times the weight of the cask without generating stresses in excess of the minimum yield strength of the material. They can ~lso lift 10 times the weight of the cask without*exceeding the ultimate tensile strength of the material. *
- Figure 3.4-lB shows the basic dimensions of the TN-32B top trunnions. The cask total weight used in this calculation is W =
267,300 pounds (includes a 10% dynamic load factor}. Table 3.4-lB shows the cross sectional areas and moments of inertia at cross _ . sections A-A, B-B and C-C of the trunnions. In addition the loads applied to these sections (for 6W and lOW loading) to evaluate the yield and ultimate limits are listed. Iiower Tpmnj ons for TN-32, TN.:3aA, apd TN-32B casks The lower trunnions are used to rotate the unloaded cask (without fuel assemblies) from a horizontal orientation to the vertical orientation. The lower trunnions are not used to lift a loaded cask. The geometries of the lower trunnions for TN-32, TN-32A, and TN-32B are identical to the upper trunnions of the TN-32 and TN-32A cask. They can support a loading equal to 3 times the weight of the cask without generating stresses in excess of the minimum.yield strength of the material. They can also supports times the weight*of the cask without exceeding the ultimate tensile strength of the material. Figure 3.4-1C shows'the basic dimensions of the lower trunnions for TN-32, TN-32A and TN-32B casks. 3 *4 . 3 . 2 r,oca J Stresses in Cask Body This section discusses the analysis performed to calculate
the-1.ocal.--.sJ:._r..e..sses ~n the cask body outer gamma shielding at the trunnion locations due to the roadl.ngs applied--through-t-he trunnions. These local effects are not included in the ANSYS stress result tables reported in S~ction 3.4.4. The local stresses are superimposed on the ANSYS stress results for the cases where the inertial lifting loads are reacted at the trunnions. The local stresses are calculated in accordance with the methodology of WRC Bulletin 107 16 > which is based on the Bij laard analysis for local stresses in cyl.indrical shells due to external loadings.
The Bijlaard analysis was performed to support various structural evaluation cases. A summary of the trunnion loads is provided in Table 3.4-3A for analyzed the upper trunnions of the TN-32 and TN-32A casks. Table 3.4-3B summary the trunnion loads for analyzed the upper trunnions of the TN-32B cask. The local stresses induced in the cask body by the trunnions are calculat~d,using Bijlaard 1 s method. The neutron shield and 3.4-11 Rev. O 1/00
tnin outer shell are not considered to strengthen either the trunnions or the gamma shielding cylinder. The trunnion is approximated by an equivalent attachment so that the curves of Reference 6 can be used to obtain the necessary coefficients. These resulting coefficients are inserted into blanks in the column entitled nRead Curves For. 11 in a* ~:tandard computation form, a sample of which is shown on Table 3.4-4. The stresses are calculated ~y performing the indicated multiplication in the column entitled "Compute Absolute Values of Stress and Enter Result." The resulting stress is inserted into the stress table at the eight stress locations, i.e., AU, AL, BU, BL, etc. Note that the sign convention for this table is defined on the figure for the load directions as shown. The membrane plus bending stresses are calculated by completing Table 3.4-4. The cylindrical body is assumed to be a hollow cylinder of infinite length. This is conservative since end restraints reduce the local cylinder bending effects. The only required input data for this analysis, are the dimensions of the trunnion and the cylinder. These are obtained from Section 1.5 drawings. The dimensions and Bijlaard parameters are listed as follows: I,TST OF . BT.U,M.Bp PARAMETERS Parameter Parameter TN-32 & TN-32A TN-32B Description Top Trunnion Top Trunnion Parameter Parameter Value Value R,. Mean Radius 39.465 in. 39.509 in. Effected* T Wall 7.18 iri. 7.269 in. Thickness of Shell y = R,/T Shell 5.497 5.44 Parameter ro outer s.o in. 6.0 in. Radius, Attachment Attachment 0~11 0.13 B.;1s ro/ Parameter R.. Based on the calculation, the maximum stress intensities are: 3.4-12 Rev. O 1~00
SI = 6,624 psi (TN-32 and TN-32A top trunnions) SI = 16,047 psi (TN-32B top trunnions) These stress intensities are well below the yield stress of the gamma shield. The stress intensities due to the local trunnion loading ar~ combined with the finite element results at the top trunnion attachment locations and presented in Section 3A.2. 3.4.4 Re.a.t. 3.4.4.1 summary of Pressures and Temperatures Stress allowables for the cask components are a function of component temperature. The temperatures used to perform the structural analysis are based on actual maximum calculated temperatures or conservatively selected higher temperatures. Chapter Four summarizes significant temperatures calculated for the TN-32 cask. The design temperatures used for stress analysis acceptance criteria for the cask are provided in Table 3.3-3. These temperatures are used to establish the allowables for every normal and accident load combination evaluated in this Safety Analysis Report. The maximum calculated internal cask p.ressure is 22.1 psig under normal conditions and 58.4 psig under accident conditions, as calculated in Section 7.2.2 and 7.3.2. The structural analysis of the cask is conservatively performed using 100 psi as internal presure. 3.4.4.2 pjfferential Thermal Expansjon A thermal evaluation of the cask was performed in Chapter 4 to determine the maximum temperature of the cask components* under norma1-*c:::ond+/-t*+/-ons-;----The--analysis-conside_:i::.s__ J!l..?~imum decay heat and maximum solar heat loading. Analysis of the stresses wnich . resulted from heating the cask from an ambient temperature (?0° F) to the steady state maximum temperature is presented in Appendix 3A for the cask and Appendix 3B for the basket. The results of these calculations are presented in Tables 3A. 2. 3-*9 and 3A.2.3-10 for the cask and 3B.3-4 for the basket. The basket plates are free to expand in the axial direction, since sufficient clearance is provided between the lid and the top of the basket. The clearance between the basket rails and basket plates is also sized to provide sufficient clearance for thermal expansion. 3.4.4.3 Stress CaJcuJatjops 3.4-13 Rev. o 1/00
The stress calculations performed on the cask and basket are presented in Appendices 3A, 3B and 3C. Finite element models of the cask body and basket have been developed, and detailed computer analyses have been performed using the ANSYS computer prograrn 131
- Other components such as the lid bolts and trunnions have been analyzed using conventional textbook methods. Table 3.1-1 lists the specific individual load ~ases analyzed fo~ each major cask component. The SAR sections where these analyses are described and the tables listing the stress results, where applicable, are also indicated.
Section 2.2 categorizes the loads for the cask body as indicated in Tables 2.2-8 and 2.2-9 into Normal (Level A) and** Hypothetical Accident (Level D) Service Loadings and lists the load combinations to be evaluated. Each combination is a set of loads that is assumed to occur simultaneously. The cask body key dimensions are shown in Figure 3.4-2 (Identical to Figure 3A.l-l). The Standard Reporting Locations for the cask body stresses are shown in Figure 3.4-3 (Identical to Figure 3A.2-l2). The stress reporting locations for the basket are shown in Figures 3B.3-2, 3B.3-3 and 3B.3-4. The cask body shells are assembled to provide the best possible contact at the interface of the inner and gamma shield shells. The gamma shield shells are shrunk fit onto the inner shells. The outside diameter of the inner shell and the inside diameter of the outer shell are measured prior to the shrink fit. The nominal interference between the inner and outer shell is 0.015 inches. This results in a calculated fabrication hoop stress of -10,588 psi in the inner shell and 2182 psi at the gamma shield cylinder. The theoretical buckling stress is 51,144 psi. Therefore, this stress will not result in buckling of the inner shell. The buckling stress calculations are very c_onservati ve. Actually, the bu_c.kling_capacit.y_o_f_pr.eshrunk-inner-------- cylinder is much higher than a simple cylinder subjected to external pressure. A thin wall cylinder usually buckles according to a rather define pattern, depending on its relative dimensions and conditions of restraint at its ends or periphery. The most common form assumed is the two lobe buckling which gives the lowest buckling pressure. In this mode, the ideal circular section is deflected into an oval or elliptical section. However, in a preshrunk internal cy+inder, the outer cylinder resists the formation of the lobes {the change of the circular section to oval section) and this restraint prevents the buckling of the inner shell. In accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, the fabrication stresses are not combined with the design and service level stresses. However, the fabrication stresses are included in the ~racture toughness evaluations of the confinement boundary and gamma shield as described in Appendix 3E *
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3.4-14 Rev. O 1/00
3.4.4.3.1 Confjnement VesseJ Table 3.4-5 lists the highest confinement shell, flange, and lid stress intensities for each service condition and identifies the load combination and location where those maxima occur. Also listed in the table are the stress limits for that service condition based on the Section 3 .1.2 str':1.ctural design criteria. The lowest margin to allowable for the normal condition cases is 1.92. The lowest margin to allowable for the accident conditions is 0.41. Therefore, the stresses in the confinement vessel are acceptable. 3.4.4.3.2 Gamma Shielding The load combinations for the gamma shielding and weld locations indicated in Figure 3.4-3 have also been performed and are presented in Appendix 3A *.
- Table 3.4-6 lists the highest cylinder, bottom and weld stress intensities for each service .
condition and identifies the load combination and location where those maxima occur. The lowest margin to allowable for the normal conditions is 1.93, and the lowest margin to allowable for the accident conditions is 0.31. Therefore the stresses in the gamma shielding are acceptable.
- 3 *4 . 4 . 3 *3 Id d BoJ ts The stress intensities in the lid bolts as calculated in Appendix 3A.3 are summarized in Table 3.4-7. These values are well below the allowables.
3.4.4.3.4 Basket Table 3. 4-8 summarizes the stresses :i:n the-ba-sket-.-T-he---------- values listed are for the 304 stainless steel boxes and plug welds. The aluminum conductor plates and borated aluminum poison plates are assumed to have no load carrying capability, except through thickness compression between boxes, to react long duration primary loads. The aluminum conductor plates are assumed to have strength to apply differential expansion induced (thermal) secondary stresses to the stainless steel plates and plug welds. Table 3.4-8 summarizes the maximum stresses in the basket based on SOG elastic analysis as analyzed in Appendix 3B. The analysis presented in Appendix 3B indicates that even in this extreme unlikely hypothetical accident, there is sufficient margin to ensure that the basket performs its function. 3.4-15 Rev. 0 l./00
~- ~
The NRC staff requested additional analysis be performed:
. Peak amplitude of 55 G (lateral inertial loading)
Pulse shape of an isosceles triangle
. Pulse duration of 6 millisecs.
The Dynamic Load.Factor (DLF) of 1.6 was uniformly applied to the analysis. This resulted in an applied acceleration of 88G. For completeness, Transnuclear, Inc. performed a dynamic tipover analysis of the TN-32 cask. Results of this analysis, reported in Appendix 30, showed that a maximum G load of 74 should be used for basket structure analysis. Therefore, using 88G for structure analysis of the basket is conservative. The stresses resulting from an 88G plastic analysis are summarized in Tables 3C.2-6, 3C.2-7 and 3c*.2-a. 3 ,4 .4 .3 *5 Outer Shell The neutron shield outer shell stresses are summarized in Table 3.4-9. The shell stresses are highest when the cask is vertical and subjected to 25 psi internal pressure and 3G inertia load. Stresses in the shell will be much lower during normal-storage of the TN-32 cask on the ISFSI pad. The shell is not analyzed under tornado missile loading, but it would undoubtedly be damaged by either Missile A or Missile B, as defined in Section 2.2.l. Radiological effects have been shown to be acceptable, as shown in Chapter 10. 3.4.4.4 Comparison with Allowable Stresses The stresses for each of the major components of the cask are compared to their allowables in Tables 3.4-5 through 3.4-9. 3.4.5 .ccld ------*--- ----- - - - - - - - - - ------------- --- The cask has been designed for operation at a daily average ambient temperatures as low as -20°F. The confinement seals are all metallic o-rings which are not affected by this temperature. The shielding materials are all solids, so there is no concern over freezing. The Confinement vessel is made from materials* selected for their low temperature fracture toughness properties. The actual materials used for each Confinement vessel will be tested to ensure that the maximum Nil Ductility Transition Temperature does not exceed -80°F. Fracture toughness evaluations of the TN-32 confinement boundary and gamma shield are presented in Appendix 3E. The pressur~ switch used for the overpressure system, which is not a safety related component, is selected to operate at temperatures of/-20°F and above. 3.4-16 Rev. O 1/00
An evaluation has also been performed to evaluate thermal Stresses due to Cold Rain on a Hot Cask. The analysis is provided below. The cold rain is assumed at 32°F. The maximum cask temperature in unprotected flange-lid region is 263°F (see Chapter 4, Table 4.1-1). It is conservatively assumed that the outer flange surface is at 32°F while the inner surface is at 263°F. Thermal stress calculation are based on a temperature differential of 263-32 = 231°F. The maximum flange thermal stress of 3,699 psi is calculated for 100°F temperature differential in Appendix3A, Table 3A. 2*. 3-10. Therefore, Maximum thermal stresses for cold rain on hot cask = (231/100) 3,699 = 8,545 psi. This stress is well below the *flange material (SA 350, Grade LF3) allowable (S~ = 22,200 psi at 300°F - see Table 3.3-2). 3.4.6 pjre Accjdent A thermal stress analysis of the fire accident is conducted using ANSYS in Section 4.5. The nodal temperatures obtained from the thermal analysis are input to the ANSYS structural finite element model for thermal stress analysis. The stress analysis indicates a maximum membrane stress intensity of 32.0 ksi and maximum membrane plus bending stress intensity of 49.2 ksi. These stresses are well below the Level D secondary allowable stress of 70.0 ksi {Su). The lid and lid bolts reach about 438°F (See Table 4.1-1). Since the lid and lid bolts have the same thermal expansion coefficients, no bolt preload will be lost and a positive (compressive) load will be maintained during the fire accident conditions. The *maximum temperature* in* seal *region-i-s---3eo~F-- (See** Table-4 .1-1) which is much lower than the maximum allowable operating temperature of 536°F for the metallic seal. From the analyses sh~wn above, it can be seen that the fire accident will not result in any structure damage of the cask. The confinement function of the cask will be maintained . 3.4-17 Rev. o l/_oo
3.5 Fuel Rods The handling of spent fuel within the Nuclear Generating Plant will be conducted in accordance with existing fuel handling procedures. Fuel with gross cladding defects will not be considered for storage at the ISFSI .. 3.5.1 Fuel Rod Temperature T.j mi ts
. The design criteria for the TN-32 dry storage cask requires that the maximum fuel cladding temperature of the hottest fuel rod in the cask shall not exceed the temperature limit calculated according to PNL-6189 171
- This temperature limit has been *.
calculated as a function of fuel age to account for the effect of fuel age on creep deformation and fuel cladding rupture. As the age of fuel increases, its cooling rate rapidly decreases. If the initial fuel temperature is too high at loading, significant creep deformation can occur as** a result of the decreasing cooling rates with fuel age. The Commercial Spent Fuel Management Program (CSFM) used the TN-24P packaging as one of its models for developing generic fuel cladding temperature limit curves for 40 year dry storage. The CSFM generic curves are used to establish the fuel cladding temperature limit for 10-year cooled fuel. From Reference 7, the midwall hoop stress is given by the
- equation, where smhP' T2 = the midwall hoop=stress (psi) at temperature of interest T2 (°K)
P = the internal pressure- (psi)--at the hot-volume average temperature, T1 (°K) Dmid = the midwall diameter (in. ) after accounting for Cladding corrosion t = the cladding thickness (in. } after accounting for cladding corrosion a = 0.9~ for PWR fuel assemblies Using fuel data provided in Reference 8, a Westinghouse lSxlS assembly with a burnup of 45,000 MWD/MTU has a lead fuel rod pressure of 1073 psia at 100°c. The corresponding pressure for a 17xl7 assembly is 1053 psia. The pressure for a Westinghouse 14x14 fuel assembly with a burnup of 50,000 MWD/MTU is 591 psia at 21°c.
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3.5-1 Rev o 1/00
*cladding corrosion is estimated to redu~e the outside diameter by 0.004 inch. Nominal diameters and cladding thickness are listed in Table 2.1-1.
Substituting values and simplifying, smlloop' T2 = 17. OT2 psi/K for the* 14x14 assembly* smhoopl T2 = 16. OT2 psi/K for the 14x140FA assembly smhoopl T2 = 24. 2T2 psi/K for the 15x15 assembly smhoopl T2 = *22. 9.T2 psi/K for the 17x17 assembly, *ana-*-:--: sinhoopt* T2 = 24. OT2 psi/K for the 1 7x1 ?OFA assembly~. The 15x15 is the limiting case. For conservatism, a bounding* case for the lSxlS .fuel assemb.ly is taken from Reference ? *. .This bounding case shows *an internal gas pressure of 2416 psia at."'a hot volume temperature of 387°C for a W 15x15 rod with 45,000 _MWD/MTU burnup, 1365 psia @ 100°C. Therefore, (Smhoo~~ T2 = 3.0.. 8T2 psi/K = 0. 213 MPa/K) is used to determine the fue.L rod * * *
- temperature limits. The temperature limits are determined .
graphically by plotting the midwall hoop-stress equation on the CSFM generic limit curves of Reference 7. The acceptable . temperature . limits obtained. are 333°°C (631°F) and 328°C (622°F) for 7 year and 10 year cooled fuel, respectively. In the fuel rod analysis above, the Westinghouse lSxlS fuel. bounds the Westinghouse standard 17x17 fuel. It likewise bounds the Mark BW fuel, which is compared to the Westinghouse 17x17 standard fuel as follows . . The cladding OD is the same for both fuels (0.374 inch), but the cladding thickness is greater oil the-Mark -Bw "'fuel-To-:.*0240 ----- -- - inch compared to 0.0225 for the Westinghouse fuel). The end of life pressure in the Mark BW fuel will be lower than that in the Westinghouse 17x1? fuel for the following reasons: (a) Westinghouse 17xl7 fuel is prepressurized up to soo psi. Mark BW fuel prepressurization is less than 500 psi. (b) The U02 mass in Westinghouse standard 17xl7 fuel is 0.364 lb/ft, and in Mark BW fuel, 0.360 lb/ft. Therefore, for a given mass-specific burnup, the Mark BW fuel will have slightly fewer fission products than the Westinghouse 17xl7. (c) The Mark BW fuel pellet density is 96%, compared to 95% for the Westinghouse fuel. Therefore, there will be slightly less fission gas release in the Mark BW fuel. 3.5-2 Rev 1 5/00
3.5.2 Thermal Stress of Fuel Cladding due to IInloadjng Operatjons To evaluate the effects of the thermal loads on the fuel *cladding during unloading operations, the .following assumptions are made:
- A conservatively high maximum* fuel rod temperature of 57S°F (actual calculated temperature is 565°F) and low quench water temperature of 50°F are used.
- Each fuel rod is assum!=!d simply supported at both ends ..
- Th~ outer surf ace temperatures of the fuel rod are conservatively' assumed to be as shown in Fig. 3.5-2. S0°F, 212°F, and 575°~ temperatures occur at three e.qual.heights.
Analysis
. Steady state* thermal and stress analyses were performed. _ : .-.
using the ANSYS <3 > computer program. The finite element model is shown in Figure 3.5-1.
- ANSYS finite elements Plane SS.and Plane 42 (Axisymmetric) were used.
The model was based on W 15 x 15 tube, which has the .maximU:m'fuel rod outer diameter of 0.422 inches and a maximum clad thickness of 0.0243 in. *to bound all Westinghouse type fuel rods.specified in Chapter 2. A tube length of two inches was selected for the. finite element model so that it is* a long cylinder (minimum length = 3.0/A = 0.22 inches) and the maximum stresses are not affected by the boundary conditions. The maximum thickness of the cylinder was so selected a~ to result in higher aT and higher thermal stresses .
,"\ .
.. ~* '
3.5-3 Rev 1 5/00
Material Properties The following material prope~~ies were used for the analyses:
.Material Properties of Zjrcaloy Cirradjated)
Temp Conductivity"' (10) E***I s \UI OF I a. in/in/°F (psi} (ksi} Btu/hr-in-°F .
- 200 .574 3.73 x 10- 12.8 x 10b 248 .579 3.73 x 10- 12.7 x 10" 94.9 6
284 .583 3.73 x io- 12.5 x 10" 93.9 6 334 .588. 3.73 x io- 12.3 x 10" 92.4 6 415 .593 3.73 x io- 12.0 x 10" 90.1 6 615 .614 3.73 x 10- 11.1 x 10" 84.4 6 Thermal Analysis The steady state thermal analysis was conducted using the surf ace nodal temperatures as shown on Figure 3.5-2. The inside surface nodal temperatures are all assumed to be 575°F. The outside surface nodal temperatures conservatively represent the quench water temperature. The temperature distribution resulting from this analysis is shown on Figure 3.5-3. Thermal Stress Analysis and Results A thermal stress analysis was conducted using the same model and nodal temperatures obtained from the thermal analysis. The - resulting nodal stress intensity distribution is shown on Figure 3.5-4. The maximum nodal stress intensity in the fuel cladding is 17.2 ksi. This stress is much less than the yield strength of zircaloy of 85.5 ksi at 575°F.
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3.6 References
- l. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sections II, III, V and IX, 1992.
- 2. American National Standards Institute, ANSI N14.6, American National Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds or More for Nuclear Materials, 1986.
- 3. De Salvo, G. J. and Swanson, J: A~, ANSYS Engineering Analysis System, Users Manual for ANSYS Rev. 4.4, Swanson Analysis Systems, Inc., Houston, PA, June 1989.
- 4. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME B96.l, Welded Aluminum Alloy Storage Tanks, 1989.
- 5. Aluminum Standards and Data, Volume 1, The Aluminum Association, 1990.
- 6. WRC Bulletin 107, March 1979 Revision "Local Stresses in Spherical and Cylindrical Shells Due to External Loadings. 11
- 7. Levy, et. al., "Recommended Temperature Limits for Dry Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Zircaloy - Clad Fuel Rods in Inert Gas," Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-6189, 1987.
- 8. Plannel, et.al, "Extended Fuel Burnup Demonstration Program, Topical Report, Transport Considerations for Transnuclear Casks, 11 DOE/ET 34014-11, TN E-4226, Transnuclear, Inc., December 1983.
- 9. Rust, J. Nuclear Power Plant Engineering, Haralson Publishing Company, Georgia, 1979.
- 10. NUREG/CR-0497, MATPRO-Version ll:A Handbook of Materials Properties for Use in the Analysis of Light Water Reactor Fuel Rod Behavior:, By EG & G, Inc., 2/1979.
- 11. Dynamic Impact Effects on Spent Fuel Assemblies, By Chun, Witte, and Schwartz, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 10/1987.
- 12. Baratta, et al. Eyaluatjon of Dimensj onal Stabil j ty .:inn Corrosj on Resistance of Borated Alund num, Final Report submitted to Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. by the Nuclear Engineering Department, Pennsylvania State University.
- 13. AAR Brooks and Perkins, Bora] Product Performance Report
.E.2A.
3.6-1 Rev o 1/00
- 14. Telefax from Ed Novinski, Sulzer-Metco, Inc., Sept 23, 1996
- 15. ANSI/AWS C2.18-93, Gujde for the Protectjon of Steel with Thermal Sprayed Coatings of Alumjnum and Zjnc and their Alloys and Composites, Table Bl '
- 16. Erich Rabald, ed., Corrosion Gnj de, 2nd ed., Elsevier Publishing Co., 1968, p 108 *
- 17. Shrier, Jarman, and Burstein, ed, Corrosion, 3rd ed, Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd, 1994, pp 12-91, 92
- 18. BNL-NUREG-24532, Hydrogen Release Rates from Corrosion of Zinc and Aluminum, 1978
- 19. - Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report - FY 1979, Spent Fuel and Fuel Pool Component Integrity, May, 1980.
- 20. G. Wranglen, An Introduction to Corrosion and Protection of Metals. Chapman and Hall, 1985, pp. 109-112.
- 21. 19.A.J. McEvily, Jr., ed., Atlas of Stress Corrosion and Corrosion Fatigue Curves, ASM Int'l, 1995, p. 185.
- 22. Vectra document No *. 31-B9604-102, Rev 2, An Assessment of Chemjcal. Galyanjc. and other Beactjons jn NIIHOMS Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks, Proprietary Appendix C (response to NRC Bulletin 96-04)
- 23. Harper, Charles A., ed., Handbook of Plastics and Elastomers. McGraw-Hill, 1975.
3.6-2 Rev 0 1/00
TABLE 3.1-l INDIVIDUAL LOAD CASES ANALYZED COMPONENT/ LOADING TSAR SECTION INDIVIDUAL ANALYSIS STRESS RESULTS TABLES CASK BODY Bolt Preload Pre load 3A. 2. 3 .1 3A. 2. 3-l 3A.2.3-2 Gravity l.G down 3A.2.3.1 3A.2.3-3 3A.2.3-4 Internal 100 PSI 3A.2.3.l 3A.2.3-5 Pressure (l} 3A.2.3-6 External 25 PSI 3A.2.3.l 3A. 2. 3-7 Pressure (1) 3A.2.3-8 Thermal Stress Short Term 3A. 2. 3. l 3A.2.3-9 Temperatures 3A.2.3-10 Lifting 3G on 3A.2.3.1 3A.2.3-11. Trunnion 3.4.3 3A.2.3-12 3.4-3 6G on Trunnion Seismic Load 2G Down + lG 3A.2.3.l 3A.2.3-19 {l} lateral 2.2.3 3A.2.3-20 Tipover - lG Side_Dr_op 3A.2.3.2 3A.2.3-15 through 3A.*2. 3-18
-LID BOLTS Pre load Pre load 3A.3.l.l ---
Tension Thermal Differential 3A.3.l.2 Expansion Effects Torquing Pre load Torsion 3A.3.l.3 --- Bending Bending 3A.3.l.4 --- Rev. O 1/00
---=- :-....*.:.-.*-* - -
~
*-.:-.;..~.
TABLE 3.1-1 Continued INDIVIDUAL LOAD CASES ANALYZED COMPONENT/ANALYSIS LOADING TSAR INDIVIDUAL STRESS
. SECTION RESULTS TABLES Bottom End Drop Impact 3A. 3. 2 .1 ---
Tipover Impact 3A.3.2.2 --- BASKET Bounding Side Load 1 G Lateral 3B.3.2 3B.3-l through (2) 3B.3-3 Bounding Down Load (2) 3 G Down .. 3B.3.3 --- Thermal Stress Short-Term 3B.3.4 3B.3-4 Temperatures Hypothetical End Drop 3B.4.l --- Accident Hypothetical Tipover 3B.4.2 3B.4-7 through Accident 3B.4-15 Hypothetical Tipover 3C.2 3C.2-6 through 8 Accident l?lastic Analysis 3C.3 Fig.3C.3-5 through 8 TRUNNJ:ONS Lifting 3 g and s g 3.4.3 3.4-2 --- ---* - - - ---- -- -- - -- -- - -..- . 6-g-and--l.O-g-- --- ----- - - - - *-------- NOTES
- 1. The above pressures and bounding loads conservatively envelope all possible pressure effects as well as tornado wind load, flood water load and seismic load.
- 2. The bounding loads selected for basket evaluation are extremely conservative. These loads are more severe than any loads that will actually be applied to the basket.
Rev. O 1/._00
TABLE 3.1-2 CONFINEMENT VESSEL STRESS LIMITS (3) Classif .ica ti on Stress Intensity Limit(3) Normal _(Level A) Conditions Pm Sm P1 ' l.S Siil (P111 or P1 ) + Pb 1.5 Siil Shear Stress 0.6 Sm CP111 or P1 ) + P1:i + Q 3 Sm (P111 or P1 ) + Pb + Q + F Sa Hypothetical Accident (Level D) (2) P111 Smaller of 2 .4 Sm or O. 7 Su P1 Smaller of 3.6 Sm or Su
, (Pm or P 1 ) + P1:1 Smaller of 3.6 Sm or Su Shear Stress O. 42 Su NOTES
- 1. Quantities are as defined in ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB.
- 2. Limits are in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Appendix F.
- -----~--.-when -using-ma-te-];'-ials--data--from Section_II.,__ ~art_Q., Ta~l~ 1A, s values may be substituted for S 111 values in these *----- * - **
expressions. Rev. o 1/po
-***~-
"' . 7, .
TABLE 3.1-3 CONFINEMENT BOLT STRESS LIMITS (1) Classif ic:ation Stress :Intensity Limit Normal (Level A) Conditions pm (Tensile) 28111 Pm + Pb (Tensile + Bending) 38111 Combined 3Sm Shear Stress 0 .4Sy (P111 or P 1 ) + pl) + Q + F s. Hypothetical Accident (Level D) (2) . Pm (Tensile} Smaller of Sy or 0.7 Su Pm + Pb (Tensile + Bending) Su Combined Su Shear Stress Smaller of 0.4 Su or 0. 6 Sy Combined Shear & Tension Cftl 2 ( fJZ:l 2
+ 2
~ 1 (Ftb). 2 (Fvb)
NOTES
- 1. Terms ~re as defined in ASME Cod_~ Se~~!9n ;J;_):_~J--~~:Q~~ct;:_ion_____________ _
- 2. Limits are in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Appendix F.
Rev. O 1/:00
TABLE 3.1-4 NON CONFINEMENT STRUCTURE STRESS LIMITS (l) Cl~ssification Stress Intensity-Limit (3) (4) Normal (Level A) Conditions P111 S111 P1 1.5 Sm (Pm + P1) + Pb 1.5 Sin (Pu; + *p1) + Pb + Q 3 S111 Shear Stress O. 60 S 111 Hypothetical Accident (Level D) (2) Pm Smaller of 2. 4' S 111 or 0 . 7 Su P1 Smaller of 3.6 Sm or Su (Pm + P1) + Pb Smaller of 3.6 Sm or Su Shear Stress O .42 S11 NOTES
- 1. Quantities are as defined in ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB.
- 2. Limits are in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Appendix F. *
- 3. These limits may be exceeded for non Confinement structure if the resulting deflection can be accommodated.
4-.-When-us-i-n9'-mate~ia1s-data--from-SectionJ:L, __Ear.t._D.,-1al:>.-le_l.A,. ________* ____ _
S values may be substituted for S111 values in these expressions. Rev. 0 l/!JO
TABLE 3.1-5 BASKET STRESS LIMITS (1) (2) Classification Stress Intensity Lim.it (3) (4) (5) (6) Normal (Level A) Conditions p111 S111 P1 1.5 Sm (Pm + Pf) + Pb 1.5 Sm (Pm + P1) + Pb + Q 3 6 111 (Pm + P1) + Pb + Q + F Sa Shear Stress 0 .6 Sm Hypothetical Accident (Level D) (2) Pm Smaller of 2.4 Sm or 0.7 Su Pi Smaller of 3.6 Sm or Su (Pm + Pi) + Pb Smaller of 3.6 Sm or Su Shear Stress 0 .42 Su NOTES
- 1. Quantities are as defined in ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB. *
- 2. Limits are in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Append+/-x-F.
- 3. Under sustained primary loads the strength of the 6061 T6 basket plates shall not be considered.
- 4. For short duration impact loading the strength of the 6061
*T6 basket plates may be considered. For these conditions . (Level D Impact) the value of S may be substituted for Sm.
- 5. *Stability shall also be evaluated.under compressive loading.
See Sections 3B.4, 3C.2, and 3C.3.
- 6. When evaluating the results from the nonlinear elastic plastic analysis, the general primary membrane stress intensity, Pm, shall not exceed 0.7Su and the maximum primary stress intensity at any location (PL or PL+ Pb) shall not exceed 0
- 9Su.
- Rev. O 1/00
Table 3.2-1 Cask Weight and Center of Gravity
\,;Omponent weighc l.1..DSJ TN-32 Cask TN-32A Cask TN-32B Cask Body lll,860 l.11,860 lll.i860 Bottom 17,540 17,540 17,540 Lid 12,760 11,560 12,760 Aluminum Boxes 1,960 l.,960 l.,960 Resin 1.0,230 10,230 10,230 Outer Shell 7,230 7,230 7,230 Top Neutron shield 1,490 2,920 1,490 assembly Top trunnions 290 290 460 Bottom Trunnions 290 290 290 Protective Cover 1,380 1,380 1,380 Basket and Rails 16,900 16,900 16,900 Fuel Assemblies 49,060 49,060 49,060
{MAX) Cask Weight w/o 228,1.20 226,920 228,290 Protective Cover and Top Neutron Shield Assembly *. Weight on Storage 230,990 231.,220 231.,160 Pad {218,730)** (218,960)** (218, 900) ** Center of Gravity* 92.09 in. 92.2 in. 92.09 in. (92.25)** (92.36)** (92.25)**
- --Center-0£-Grav-it;y--i-s--measu-x:ed--along_the_axi_al cente_rl ine_ from the base of the cask.
- Cask loaded with Wl.4 x 14 or Wl4 x 14 OFA fuel assemblies.
Summary of weights used in Analyses:
- l. Stability of Cask: 218,000 lbs.
- 2. Trunnion and Local Stress Analysis TN-32 and TN-32A: 243,000 lbs.
TN-32B: 243,000 lbs with 10% dynamic load factor
- 3. Cask Body Analysis: 235,000 lbs.
Rev. O 1/90
TABLE 3.3-l MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF BODY MATERIALS (NOTE 1) Material Application Minimum Minimum Design Data Specification Yield Ultimate Stress Source (Nominal Strength Strength Value,Psi (Note 3) Composition) Sir, psi Su, p~i (Note 2) ASME SA-350, Flange 37,500 70,000 S::ol7,500 *.i:ao.Le A Grade LF3 Confinement Table 2A (3 1/2 Ni) Lid Sm= 23, 300 ASME SA-203, Confinement 37,000 65,000 s .. 16,200 Table lA Grade D Vessel ASME SA-2.66 Gamma Shield 36,000 70,000 S= 17,500 Table lA Gr. 2 Cylinder Sm=23,300 Table 2A ASME SA-105 Gamma 36,000 70,000 S= 17,500 Table lA (C-Si) Shielding Trunnions S.,=23, 300 Table 2A ASME SA-516, Weather Cover 38,000 70,000 S=- 17,500 Table lA Grade 70 Outer Shell {C-Mn-Si) ASME SA-320, Closure Lid 105,000 125,000 Sm= 35, 000 Table 4 Grade L43 (1 Bolts 3/4 Ni-3/4 Cr
- 1/4 Mo)
NOTES l.Mechanical properties listed are for metal temperatures up to l00°F to provide a baseline comparison of all structural materials. Temperature dependent properties required for structural analysis are provided in Table 3.3-2. 2.-:va.iues-l-isted- are-the-stress-parameters*-which* form--the-ba*si*s-for**s*c:ruccural_______ -*------- analysis acceptance criteria. . s refers to the ASME allowable stress for Class 2 or Class 3 components, Sm refers to the ASME design stress intensity for Class 1 components, and Sy refers to minimum yield strength. 3.Data are taken from tables in ASME Section II, Part D, 1992 unless otherwise noted. Rev. o 1/_00
TABLE 3.3-2 1EMPERATURE DEPENDENT MATERIAL PROPERTIES I SHEET 1 OF 3 COEFFICIENTS OF THERMAL EXPANSION (1) (2) I Material/Temp. , 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 017 I I SA350 LF3 6.27 6.41 6.54 6.65 6.78 6.88 6.98 7.07 7.16 7.24 7.32
'*sA3~0 L43 SA203 Gr. D SA105 and SA5l6 5.73 5.91 6.09 6.27 6.43 6.59 6.74 6.89 7.06 7.18 7.28 Gr SS I SA516 Gr 70 S.53 S.71 5.89 6.09 6.26 6.43 6.61 6.77 6.91 7.06 7.17
~
- 1. Values listed are the mean of thermal expansion x 10~' {in./in.oF) from 70oF to the indicated temperature.
- 2. Source of data is ASME Section II, Part D, 1992.
II I I I i I I i Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3.3-2 I TEMPE~TURE DEPENDENT MATERIAL PROPERTIES I SHEET 2 OF 3 MODU!iI OF ELASTICITY, E (1) (2)
\) MATER:CAL/
TEMPERATURE I 70 200 300 400 500 600 Op I SA-203 Gr. D 27.8 27.1 26.7 26.1 25.7 25.2 SA-320 L43 SA-350 LF3 I SA-105 I 29.5 28.8 28.3 27.7, 27.3 26.7 II i SA-516 Grade 70 l I I 29.3 28.6 28.1 27.5 27.1 26.5 NOTES: i
- 1. Values listed kre the moduli of elasticity x 10' psi for the indicated temperature. I
- 2. Source of data: is ASME Section II, Part D, 1992.
Rev. O 1/00
I I. I TABLE 3.3-2 TEMPjRATURE DEPENDENT MATERIAL PROPERTIES
'I SHEET 3 OF 3 MATERIAL STRESS ioo°F 200°F 300°F 400°F 500°F 600°F DATA PARAMETER SOURCE (NOTE 1)
II (NOTE 2) SA-350, s 1.7.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.S Table .1A GRADE LF3 sl'll k3.3 22.8 22.2 21.5 20.2 --- Table 2A SA-203, s 16.2 16.2 16.2 16.2 16.2 Table lA Grade D I SA-320, Sy tJ..*o5. o 99.0 95.7 91.8 88.5 84.3 Table Y-1 Grade L43 I SA-105 $111 b3.3 21.9 21.3 20.6 Table 2A Sy /36. 0 32.8 31.9 30.8 Table Y-1 Su 170.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 Table U SA-516, Sy .13a.o 34.6 33.7 32.6 30. 7 28.1 Table*Y-1 Grade 70 s 117.5 I 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.S 17.5 Table.1A NOTES 1.
. I Values listed are the s *tress parameters which form the basis for structural analysis acceptanc~ criteria. ,
1 S refers to the ASME alllowable stress for Class 2 or Class 3 components, Sa refers to the ASME design stress intensity for Class 1 components,*and. Sy refers to minimum yi~ld strength. Su ref er to minimum ten~ile strength
- 2. Data are taken from ASiE Section. II, Part D, 1992 I
I I Rev. O 1/00 I
-~* - *--*-~ ~.:.. ~.
TABLE 3.3-3 REFERENCE TEMPERATURES FOR STRESS ANALYSIS ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.. Component Max. Calculated Selected Design Tempera ture1 OF -Temperature,. op Confinement 314 350 Boundary Outer Shell 240 300 Cask Lid 263 300 Lid Bolts ..263 300 Trunnions 250 300
- Temperatures specified are used to determine allowable stresses. They are not a maximum use temperature for material.
.--- - ----~ ----* ------ ----~------ ---
Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 3.3-4 MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF BASKET MATERIALS (1) (2) Material Minimum Minimum Design Data specification Yield Ultimate Stress Source (Nominal Strength Sy, Strength s"'* Value, psi (Note 3) Composition) psi psi ASME SA-240, 30,000 75,000 Sm = 20, 000 Table 2A Type 304 ASME SB 209, 35,000 42,000 s = 9,500 Table lB 6061-T6/T651 Aluminum Plate NOTES
- 1. Mechanical properties listed are for metal temperatures up to 100°F to provide a baseline comparison of all material.
Temperature dependent properties required for structural analysis are provided in Table 3.3-5.
- 2. Data are taken from tables in ASME Section II, Part D, 1992.
Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 3.3-5 TEMPERATURE DEPENDENT MATERIAL PROPERTIES SHEET 1 OF 3 COEFFICIENTS OF THERMAL EXPANSION i (Note '1) i TEMPERATURE, Op I MATERIAL 100 150 :200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 i i SA 240, TYPE 8.55 8.67 8.79 8.90 9.00 9.10 9.19 9.28 9.37 9.45 9.53
~04 I SB-209, 606l-T6/T65l 12.60 12.76 12.91 13.07 13.22 13.37 13.52 ALUMINUM
- l. Values listed are the mean coefficients of thermal expansion x 10*'
(in. /in. °F from 70°F to the indicated temperature) *
- 2. source of data is ASME Section II, Part D, 1992.
.. ,i Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3.3-5 I
'11EMPERATURE DEPENDENT MATERIAL PROPERTIES SHEET 2 OF 3 I MODULI OF ELASTICITY, E (Note 1)
\. II TEMPERATURE, °F I MATER I~ I 70 200 300 400 500 600 i I SA-240, TY~E 304 STAINLESS STEEL 28.3 27.6 27.0 26.5 25.8 25.3 I SB-.209 I 6b61-T6/T65h. 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.7 8.1 ALUMINUM I NOTES: 1.Values listed areI the moduli of elasticity x 10 6 psi for the indicated temperature. I i 2.Source of data is ASME Section II, Part D, 1992. Rev. 0 1/00
I I TABLE 3.3-5 I TEMPERATURE DEPENDENT MATERIAL PROPERTIES I SHEET 3 OF 3 I DESIGN STRESS PARAMETERS I I TEMPERATURE, 0 F i MATERIAL STRESS PARAMETER 100 : 200 300 400 500 600 DATA SOURCE I (KSI) I (NOTE 1) I I i ASME SA-240 30.0 i 25.0 22.5 18.2 *.rao.Le x -.L Sy 20.7 19.4 Type 304 ! s.. 20.0 20.0 20.0 18.7 17.5 16.4 TABLE 2A ASME SB-209 Sy 35.0 33.7 27.4 13.3 4 .* 4 NOTE 3 Alloy 6061-* ' T6/T651 (Aluminum) Su 42.0 36.7 31. 7 17.7 7.0 .NOTE 3 NOTES:
- 1. Values listed are the stress parameters which form the basis for structural analysis acceptance criteria.
- 2. Sm refers to the ASME design! stress intensity for Class 1 components, and Sy refers to minimum yield strength.
Su refers to minimum ultimatr strength. i
- 3. 87.St of Reference 5 data asI recommended by ASME Subgroup on Non Ferrous Alloys.
pLI*I j Rev. O 1/00 *I '
TABLE 3.3-6 sheet 1 TN~32 Cask Components and Materials Primary Safety Function Component Drawing Class. Codes/Standards Containment Lid 1049*70-2 ll2 A ASME Subsection.NB Inner Conflnement(Shell&Bottom) 1049-70~2 lt.3,5 A ASME-SubsecUon NB Flange 1049-70-2 lt.31 A ASME Subsection NB Lid Bolt (48) 1049-70-2 lt.13 A ASME Subsection NB Lid Seal 1049-70-2 lt.15 A Drain Port Cover 1049-70-2 lt.21 A ASME Subsection NB Vent Port Cover 1049-70-2 lt.22 A ASME Subsection NB Vent & Drain Port Cover Seal 1049-70-2 lt.23 A Vent & Drain Port Cover Bolts 1049-70-2 lt.24 A ASME Subsection NB Criticality Poison Plates 1049-70-2 lt.29 A Control Basket Rail Type 1 1049-70-2 lt.30 A Basket Rall Type 2 1049-70-2 lt.26 A Fuel Compartment 1049-70-2 lt.27 A ASME Subsection NB Shielding Gamma Shield 1049-70-2ll1 A ASME Subsection NF Shield Plate 1049-70-2 ll7 B Bottom 1049-70-2 lt.4 A ASME Subsection NF Radial Neutron Shield 1049-70-2 It. 8 B Outer Shell 1049-70-2 It. 9 B Shim 1049-70-2 It. 33 A Top Neutron Shield 1049-70-2 It. 11/11A B
- . Heat Transfer Radial Neutron Shield Box 1049-70-2 It. 12 B Aluminum Plate 1049-70-2 lt.28 A Basket Rail Type 1 1049-70-2 lt.30 A Basket Rall Type 2 1049-70-2 lt.26 A Structural Gamma Shield 1049-70-2 It.1 A Integrity Bottom 1049-70-2 lt.4 A ASME Subsection NF Operations Trunnion 1049-70-2 It. 6 B ANSI N14.6 Support Protective Cover 1049-70-2 It. 10 c Protective Cover Bolt 1049-70-2 It 14 c
- - - - - - - - ----Protective-Cover-Seal------ --1049-70-2-ll-16-- --C- ---
Top Neutron Shield Bolt 1049-70-2 lt.19/19A c Top Trunnion 1049-70-2 It. 32 A ANSI N14.6 Pressure Relief Valve c Quick Disconnect Couplings 1049-70-3 *C Overpressure Port Cover 1049-70-2 It. 17 c Leakage Overpressure Port Cover Seal 1049-70-2 It. 18 c* MonHorlng Pressure Monitoring System 1049-70-2 It. 20 c Secondary Seal Overpressure Port Cover Bolts 1049-70-2 It 25 c Rev. 2 4/02.
TABLE 3.3-6 sheet 2, TN-32 Cask Components and Materials Primary Strength Function Component Material (70 °F.){ksl) Coating Containment Lid SA-350, LF3 or SA-203 Gr. D 70 SST Cladding on Sealing Surfaces; Epoxy Paint* on External Surfaces Aluminum Metal Spray Interior Inner SA-203 Gr. D 65 Aluminum Metal Spray Interior Conflnement(Shell&Bottom) Flange SA-350, LF3 70 SST Cladding on Sealing Surfaces; Epoxy Paint* on External Surfaces Aluminum Metal Spray Interior Ud Bolt(48) SA320L43 125 Nuclear Grade Neolube Lid Seal Double Metallic 0-Ring None Oraln Port Cover SA-240, Type 304 75 None Vent Port Cover SA-240, Type 304 75 None Vent & Drain Port Cover Double Metallic 0-Rlng None Seal Vent & Drain Port Cover SA-193 Gr. 87 or 88 Nuclear Grade Neolube I Bolts CrlUcallty Polson Plates Borated Aluminum None Control Basket Rail Type 1 8221, 6061-T6 Aluminum 38 None Basket Rall Type 2 B221, 6061*T6 Aluminum 38 None Fuel Compartment SA-240 Type 304 75 None Shielding Gamma Shield SA-266 Class 2 70 Epoxy Paint* on Exterior Shield Plate SA-105 or SA-516, Gr. 70 70 None
*Bottom SA-516 Gr. 70 or SA-266 Cl. 2 70 Epoxy Palnr on Exterior Radial Neutron Shield Borated Polyester _Resin Nooe.
-~.
Outer Shell SA-516 Gr; 70 70 Epoxy Paint* on Exterior Shim SA-516 Gr. 70, SA-414, 70 None orSA-620 Top Neutron Shield Polypropylene None Heat Transfer Radial Neutron Shield Box 6063-T5 Aluminum None Aluminum Plate B209,6061-T61T651 Aluminum 42 Basket Rail Type 1 B221, 6061-T6Aluminum 38 None Basket Rall Type 2 8221, 6061-T6 Aluminum 38 None Structural Gamma Shield SA-266 Class 2 70 Epoxy Paint* on Exterior - -Integrity- ----Bottom-- -*-- -SA-516 Gr.- 70 or-SA-266 Cl. ---- 70-- -- - - --- Epoxy.Paint*-on-Exterior- - - - Operations Trunnion SA-105 70 Epoxy Paint" on Exterior Support Protective Cover SA-516 Gr. 70/SA-105 70 Epoxy Paint" on Exterior Protective Cover Bolt SA-193 Gr. 88 Nuclear Grade Neolube Protective Cover Seal Elastomer None Top Neutron Shield Bolt SA-193 Gr. BB None Top Trunnion SA-105 70 Epoxy Paint* on Exterior (exc. Seating surfaces) Pressure Relief Valve SST None Quick Disconnect Couplings SST None Overpressure Port Cover SA-240 Type 304 75 None Leakage 0.P. Port Cover Seal Single Metallic 0-ring None Monitoring Pressure Monitoring System carbon Steel/Stainless Steel Epoxy Paint" on Exterior Metal Diaphragm Valves Secondary Overpressure Port Cover SA-193 Gr. 87 or 88 Nuclear Grade Neolube I Seal Bolt
*Paint may be epoxy, acrylic urethane, or equivalent Rev. 2 4/02
TABLE 3.3-6 sheet 3 TN-32 Cask Components and Materials. Primary Max. Stress (ksl) Function Component WeldlngM'eld Fnler Metal Normal Cond. Accident Cond. Containment Lid Per Section Ill, NB encl Section IX 2.5 29.5
- Inner Confinement(Shell&~ottom) Per Section Ill, NB and..Section IX 8.3 26.7 Flange Per Section Ill, NB and Section IX 3.4 18.4 Lid Bolt (48) NIA 67.7 80.2 Lid Seal NIA Drain Port Cover NIA Vent Port Cover NIA Vent & Drain Port Cover Seal NIA Vent & Drain Port Cover Bolts NIA 26 47.4 CrlUcallty Poison Plates NIA Control Basket Ran Type 1 NIA 22.8 Basket Ran Type 2 NIA 25.3 Fuel Compartment Per Section Ill, NG and Section IX 32.5 61.6(26.8 Inelastic)
Shleldlng Gamma Shield Per Section IX 10.8 53.5 Shield Plate Per Section IX 2.5 27 Bottom Per Section IX 1.4 9.7 Radial Neutron Shield 8.9 27.8 Outer Shell 11.8 NIA Shim Top Neutron Shield Heat Transfer Radial Neutron Shield Box Aluminum Plate 7 Basket Rail Type 1 NIA 22.8 Basket Rail Type 2 NIA 25.3 Structural Gamma Shield Per Section IX 10.8 53.5 Integrity Bottom Per Section IX 1.4 9.7 Operations Trunnion 9.4 Support Protective Cover 28 Protective Cover Bolt - - - - - - ---Protective-Cover-Sea~-- - ---- ------- Top Neutron Shield Bolt 16.B TopTruMlon 5.1 Pressure Relief Valve Quick Disconnect Couplings Overpressure Port Cover Leakage Overpressure Port Cover Seal Monitoring Pressure Monitoring System Secondary Seal Overpressure Port Cover Bolts Rev. o l/QO
TABLE 3.3-6 sheet 4 TN-32 Cask Components and Materials Primary Temp. (Storage) (aF) Pressure FuncUon Component Min Max Oyr. Storage 20yr. Min(pslg) Max{psig) Gas(type) Storage Containment Lid -20 263 263 197 0 100 Helium Inner -20 314 314 227 0. 100 Henum Confinement(Shell&Bottom) Flange -20 308 308 224 0 100 Helium Lid Bolt (48) -20 256 256 194 0 100 Hell um Lid Seal -20 256 256 194 0 100 Helium Drain Port Cover -20 263 263 197 0 100 Helium Vent Port Cover -2Q 263 263 197 0 100 Helium Vent & Drain Port Cover Seal -20 263 263 197 0 100 Helium Vent & Drain Port Cover Bolts -20 263 263 197 0 100 HeDum Criticality Polson Plates -20 527 527 346 Control Basket Rall Type 1 -20 339 339 240 Basket Rail Type 2 -20 339 339 240 Fuel Compartment -20 527 527 346 Shleldlng Gamma Shield -20 303 303 221
- Shleld Plate -20 263 263 197 Bottom -20 255 255 196 3 5 Air Radial Neutron Shield -20 280 280 208 OuterShell * -20 240 240 187 3 5 Air Shim -20 303 303 221 Top Neutron Shield *20 256 256 194 Heat Transfer Radial Neutron Shield Box -20 280 280 208 Aluminum Plate -20 527 527 346 Basket Rail Type 1 -20 339 . 339 240 Basket Rail Type 2 -20 339 339 240 Structural Gamma Shield -20 303 303 221 Integrity Bottom -20 255 255 196 3 5 Air Operations Trunnion -20 240 240 187 3 5 Air
-support- - - ProleaJVe-cover ~o- --240- --240--- ---f87- ---~- - ~- Protective Cover Bolt -20 256 256 194 3 5 Air Protective Cover Seal -20 256 256 194 Top Neutron Shield Bolt -20 256 256 194 Top Trunnion -20 240 240 187 3 5 Air Pressure Relief Valve -20 263 263 197 Quick Disconnect Couplings -20 263 263 197 overpressure Port Cover -20 263 263 197 Leakage overpressure Port Cover Seal -20 263 263 197 Monitoring Pressure Monitoring System -20 240 240 187 3 5 Air Secondary OVerpressure Port Cover Bolts -20 263 263 197 Seal Rev. O l/Q.O
Table 3.4-1A
- Trunnion Section Properties an~ Loads (TN-32 & TN-32A)
XTBM SBC'l'XON A*A SBCTION B-B SBCTXON C*C 2 CROSS SECTION AREA, IN 58.9 66.0 46.47 AR.EA MOMENT OF INERTIA, xN' 460.2 478.3 264.80 YIELD CONDITION* 364,500 364,500 364,500 SHEAR FORCE, LBS YIELD CONDITION* BENDING 2,330,978 958,635 820,125 MOMENT, IN- LBS ULTIMATE CONDITION** 607,500 607,500 607,500 SHEAR. FORCE, LBS. ULTIMATE CONDITION** 3,884,963 1,597,725 1,366,875 BENDING MOMENT, IN-LBS
- Trunnion Loads to Support 3 times Cask Weight
** Trunnion Loads to Support 5 times cask Weight Table 3.4-lB Trunnion Section Properties and Loads (TN-32B)
J:TBM SBCTI:ON A-A SECTION B-B SBC'l'XON C-C CROSS SECTION AREA, I Ni 105.2 93.S 7SL8
.AREA MOMENT OF INERTIA, IN4' 1242.5 987.2 755.6 YIELD CONDITION* 802,000 802,000 802,000 SHEAR FORCE I LBS YIELD CONDITION* BENDING 5,120,000 2,101,000 l,804,000 MOMENT, IN- LBS ULTIMATrCONDTIION** - - -i.-,-331,0-0u --l;, 3-37 I 000 ,~-3!7T000 f-SHEAR FORCE, LBS.
ULTIMATE CONDITION** 8,534,000 3,502,000 3,007,000 BENDING MOMENT, IN-LBS
- Trunnion Loads to Support 6 times cask Weight (Including lOt DLF)
** Trunnion Loads to Support 10 times Cask Weight (Including 10' DLF)
Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3.4-2A TRUNNION STRESSES (TN-32 & TN-32A) STRESS YIELD LIMIT {ksi) Figure 3.4-lA SECTION A-A SECTIQN B-B SECTION C-C SHEAR STRESS 6.2 5.5 7.8 BENDING STRESS 25.3 10.0 13.4 STRESS INTENSITY 28.2 14.9 20.7 ALLOW~LE STRESS 31.9 31.9 31.9 ULTIMATE LIMIT (ksi) SHEAR STRESS 10.3 9.2 13.1 BENDING STRESS 42.2 16.7 22.4 STRESS INTENSITY 47.0 24.9 34.4 ALLOWABLE STRESS 70.0 70.0 70.0 TABLE 3.4-28 TRUNNION STRESSES (TN-32B) STRESS YIELD LIMIT (ksi) Figure 3.4-lB SECTION A-A SECTION B-B SECTION C-C SHEAR STRESS 7.6 8.6 10.1 BENDING STRESS 26.2 12.B 13.4 STRESS INTENSITY 30.3 21.4 24.2 ALLOWABLE STRESS 31.9 31. 9 31.9 ULTIMATE LIMIT (ksi) SHEAR STRESS 12.7 14.3 16.7 BENDING STRESS 43.G 21.3 22.4 STRESS INTENSITY 50.5 35.6 40.3 ALLOWABLE STRESS 70.0 70.0 70.0 Rev. O 1/00
Table 3 .4-3A Trunnion Loadings Used in Cask Body Evaluation (TN-32 & TN-32A) Loading Description I~ertial Load Max. Trunnion Load (Load Shared by 2 Top
'.r~ions)
Lifting Cask Vertical 3 G VL = 364.5 kips. ML = -2,331 in-kips Table 3.4-3B Trunnion Loadings Used in Cask Body Evaluation (TN-32B} Loading Description Inertial Load Max. Trunnion Load (Load Shared by 2 Top Trunnions) Lifting 6 G (including VL = 801.9 kips. Cask Vertical 10% DLF} ML=. -s,120.1 in-kips Rev. O 1/QO
Table 3.4-4 Bijlaard Computation Sheet
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Table 3.4-5 Comparison of Actual With Allowable Stress Intensity Confinement Vessel Service Component Stress Stress Maximum Allowable* Margin to Conclition Category Resultant stress Stress Allowable Table %ntenllity Intensity . (l'S:C) (PSI) Normal Shell P., 16,200 (S) condition P111 + Pb lA.2.5-10 8,311 24,300 1.92
*Location (1. SS) ' ..
8 Flange P,. 17,500 (S) P. + Pb 3A;2.S-3 3,442 26,250 6.63 Location (1.5S) 19 Lid* P,. 16,200 or 17,500 (S) Pm+ Pb 3A.2.S-3 2,470 24,300 or 8.84 or Location 26,250 21 (J..SS) 9.63 Accident Shell Pm 26,692 38,880 0.46 Condition (2.4S) Pm + Pb 3A.2.5-23 41,283 58,320 0.41 Location (3. 6S) 5 Flange P.. 42,000 (2 .4S) PIO + Pb 3A.2.5-24 18,394 63,000 2.43 Location (3. 6S)
*-20----- - - - - - - - - -------.*- - - - - - -
Lid* Pm 38,880 or 42,000 (2.4S) P111 + Pb 3A. 2. S-20 29,496 58,320 or 0.98 or Location 63,000 1.14 22 (3. 6S) Note: If the primary membrane plus bending stress for a particular component meets the primary membrane stress allowable, only the Normal Condition primary plus pending stress is reported. For components made from alternate materials, the lowest allowable stress is used. Both allowables are provided for the lid materials. Rev. O 1/00
-*,-.1..&2t:r'-
Table 3.4-6 Comparison of Actual with Allowable Stress Intensity Gamma Shielding Service Component Stress Stress Maximum Allowable Margin to Condition Category Resultant Stress Stress Allowable Table :entensity Intensity (PSI) (PSI) Normal Cylinder P.. 21,300 (Sm) Condition P., + Pb 3A.2.5-5 10,897 31,950 1.93 Location (i. 5S111 ) .. 35 Bottom P., 21,300 (Sm) Pm + Pb 3A*.2. 5-9 1,355 31,950 22.58 Location (1. SS.,} 24 Welds Pm 21,300 (S.. ) P., + p" 3A.2.5-1l 8,934 31,950 2.58 Location (l.. ss.. > 39 Accident Cy~inder Pm 30,989 49,000 0.58 condition (0. 7S,.) pill + Pb 3A.2.5-20 53,555 70,000 0.31 Location (Su} 31 Bottom P.. 42,000 (2. 45111) P,. + Pb 3A.2.5-24 9,687 70,000 6.23 - - ----- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - ~ocation. -- - - - - - - - __($,.)______ - * - - - - - - 25 Welds P., 49,000 (0. 7S,.) P,.. + Pb 3A.2 .S-24 27,782 70,000 1.52 Location (S,.) 38 Note: If the primary membrane plus bending stress for a particular component meets the primary membrane stress allowable, only the Normal condition primary plus bending stress is reported . Rev. 0 1/90
Table 3.4-7 Summary of Maximum Stress Intensity and Allowable Stress Limits for Lid Bolts STRESS SERVICE CALCULATED ALLOWABLE Margin to CATEGORY CONDITION STRESS STRESS Allowable (ksi) {kSI) Tensile Level A 39.8 63.8 0.6 (2Sm) Level D 39.8 79.75 1.00 (0. 7 Su) Tensile + Level A 61 .. 2 95.7 0.56 Bending (3Sm) Level D 61.2 113.93 0.86 (Su) Shear Level A 14.5 38.28 1.65 (0.4Sy) Level D 25.9 47.85 o".85 (O .42Su) Combined Level A 67.7 95.7 0.41. S.I. (3S111 ) Level D 80.2 l.13.9 0.42 (S) Rev. O 1/90
-.:~* - - ---
Table 3.4-8 Comparison of Actual with Allowable Stress Intensity in Basket Service Component/ Stress Allowable Reference Margin to Condition Stress Intensity S.tress Table # Allowal:>le Category (psi) Intensity (psi) Normal 304 SS Fuel Boxes lG Lateral P111 394 18,700 (Sm) 3B.3-l (2D} 46.46 Pm+ Pb 12,080 28,050 3B.3-l (lD) 1.32 (1. ssm> .. lG Lateral P., + Pb + Q 32,517 Sl,690 3B.3-5 (l} 0.59
+ Thermal ( 3S111 )
Plug Welds P,. C2t> 547 11,220 - 19.51 (0.6S.,) P., + Q (2t) 34,190 51,690 3B.3-S (7) 0.51 (3$111) Accident 304 SS Fuel Boxes 50G Bottom Pm 6,650 44,900 Section 5.75 End Drop (2. 4Sm) 3B.4.l 50G Side P., 13,140 44,900 3B.4-ll 2.42 Drop (2.4Sm) (2C) Pm+ Pb 62,560 64,400 3B.4-10 0.03 {1B) Aluminum Pl.ate P., 3,046 l.2,400 3B.4-14 (l) 3.07 (2. 4S..,)
- - _!>., + Pb _1_&~4_ _ _ __!7_L1_QQ_ __~uL _ _ 3B.4-:1,_4_ OL _],_!. 5_2_ - ----- -
Plug Welds 21,083 27,000 0.28
't (0. 42911 )
Note: The calculated and allowable stresses for the plastic analysis of the basket for the hypothetical tipover are presented in Appendix 3C. Rev. O 1/00
Table 3.4-9 Comparison of Maximum Stress Intensity with Allowables in Oute~ Shell Load Maximum Stress .*- Allowable Stress
- Intensity (ksi) (kS:I) 25 psi internal 7.23 Sy=. 33. 7 pressure 25 psi + 3G down 11.76 cask Vertical 25 psi + 3G down 10.13 Cask Horizontal Note: The worst loading orientation is horizontal; therefore stresses will be lower in actual operation since the loaded cask in st9rage at the ISFSI is vertical.
Rev. O 1/00
~-:--:-.:.:. '\.
- CONFINEMENT VESSEL LOCATlOH G I>E:Tl.lL A COll."FINEMENT FLANGE LO:J.TlOU 39 1.l D CJ..".....J. LOC:li.TJO?~ l '7 SHlEt.'DING DtTA11. C lB DtTl.lL ~ PXGURE ~.4-4
.... WELD STRESS LOCATIONS REV. o l/Oo
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APPENDIX 3A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE TN-32 STORAGE CASK BODY 3A.l Introductjon This appendix presents the structural analysis of the TN-32 storage cask body which consists of the cask body, the trunnions and the outer shell. Analyses are performed to evaluate the various cask components under t.he loadings described in Section 2.5. The detailed calculations for the cask body are presented in Section 3A.2 and the lid bolt analysis is reported in a separate Section 3A.3. The calculations for the outer shell and top
- neutron shield bolts are reported in Section 3A.4 and 3A.S, respectively. The trunnions are analysed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3.
The design criteria used in the analyses of the cask components are in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB 11 >. The material properties used are those obtained f rem the ASME Code 121
- Key dimensions of the storage cask are shown in Figure 3A.l-l.
3A.l-l Rev. o 1/00
3A.2 Cask Body Structural Analysis 3A.2.1 Description The cask body as shown in Figure 3A.1-l consists of:
- 1. A 1 1/2 in. thick inner vessel with a welded flat bottom, a flange at the top, and a* lid bolted to the flange by 48, 1 1/2 11 diameter high strength bolts *and sealed with two metallic o-rings. This is the confinement vessel, the primary confinement boundary of the cask.
- 2. A thick cylindrical vessel with a welded flat bottom surrounding the confinement vessel: This vessel and a steel disk welded to the lid inner surf ace provide the gamma shielding.
The lid and the flange a~e carbon steel forgings as are the gamma shielding components. The confinement boundary is designed as a Class 1 component in accordance with the rules of the ASME Code. A static, linear elastic analysis is performed on the cask body so that combinations of loads can be obtained by superposition of individual loads. The stresses and deformations due to the applied loads are generally determined using the ANSYS computer program< 3 >. A 20 ANSYS Model was specifically developed for this purpose. Exceptions include the analyses of the local effects at the trunnions and of the lid bolts. 3A.2.2 ANSYS Cask Mode] A two dimensional ANSYS model is used to evaluate the stresses in the cask body due to the individual load cases. The finite elements used in the model are the axisymmetric shell element, Stif 61, and the axisymmetric harmonic shell element, St if 25. Both of these elements consider axisymmetric and non-. axisymmetric loadings. _ . __ _ _ _ _ The cylindrical confinement shell and bottom are modeled using Stif 61 elements. The remainder of the cask body is modelled with Stif 25 elements except for the lid bolts which are modelled with the two dimensional elastic beam, Stif 3. The finite element model of the cask body is shown in Figure 3A.2-1. Figure 3A.2-2 shows an enlarged view of the bottom corner with the weld joining the gamma shielding flat bottom to cylinder simulated by coupling nodes 236-107 and 280-108. The weld connecting the gam~a shielding cylinder to the confinement flange is simulated by coupling nodes 63-328 and 64-329 as shown in Figure 3A.2-3. The gamma shielding is heated prior to assembly with the confinement. shell and flange for ease of installation. During cool down, a gap may result between the 3A.2-l Rev. O 1/00
flange and the gamma shield shell. The gap is filled with shim plates made from SA-516, Grade 70 plate. The plates are fit between the gamma shield shell and the flange behind the weld. These shim plates are not modeled. The weld between the gamma shield and the flange is not affected by the shims. Also shown in this figure are the lid bolts connecting the lid to the confinement flange. The connection is simulated by coupling nodes 505, 506 and 507 of the bolts to the corresponding nodes 81, 74, and 67 of the flange; and nodes 501, 502 and 503 of the bolts to the corresponding nodes 438,439, and 440 of the lid. In this manner the threaded portion of the bolt is fixed to the flange while the bolt head is fixed to the top surface of the lid. In order to prevent *the lid* from .moving into.the flange, nodes 79 and 395 are also coupled in the axial or Y direction. The enlarged view in Figure 3A.2-4 shows the coupling of nodes 394-383 and 395-384 which simulates the weld connecting the confinement lid to the gamma shielding disk. The pairs of nodes listed above, with the exception of nodes 79-395, are coupled in the X, Y and z directions. The coupling of nodes 79-395 is in the Y direction only and is accomplished using a constraint equation. The reaction at the nodes is monitored during the analysis to insure that tensile forces between the cylinder and the lid are not developed. Appropriate boundary conditions are applied to prevent rigid body motion and to show that the system of forces applied to the cask in each of the individual load cases is in equilibrium. Generally a node at the center of the vessel bottom is held in all directions and one at the center of the lid is held in the X and Z directions. 3A. 2. 3 Indjvjdual Load Cases Individual load cases are evaluated to determine the stress cont~ibution-due_~o~P-eci~ic individual loads. Stress results are reported in this Appendix for- eacn ind1vidua1 -load,-- -Si-nee- - ---- - the individual load cases are linearly elastic, their results can be ratioed and/or superimposed as required in order to obtain the load combinations characteristic of the particular loading condition. 3A.2.3.1 Norma) Conditions The following individual loads are analyzed using the ANSYS model described in the previous section:
- 1. Bolt preload and seal seating pressure.
- 2. Internal Pressure loading.
- 3. External Pressure loading.
- 4. 1 g down w.ith cask standing in a vertical position on the concrete storage pad.
- s. Lifting;~Cask Vertical) 3A.2-2 Rev. O 1/00
- =.: : : =; :. . . . :
- 6. Worst normal thermal condition.
7*, 1 g lateral and 2 g down bounding loads on the cask standing in a vertical position on the concrete pad. Loadings for Cases 1 through 6 are axisymmetric. In Case 7 Fourier series representation of the nonaxisymmetric loads are required. Each discrete load acting on the cask body is expanded into a Fourier series and is.input into ANSYS as a series of load steps. Each load step contains all the terms from the applied loads having the same mode number. The number of terms in the Fourier series required to adequately represent a. load varies with the type of load (concentrated or distributed) and the degree of accuracy required. In this case, the load applied by the internals to the inside wall of the confinement is assumed to be a distributed load varying sinusoidally in the arc 90° to 270° and acting on the total length of the cavity. Figure 3A.2-5 shows that only a few terms of the series are required to get a satisfactory representation o~. the load. Since Case 7 is asymmetric, the resulting stresses are also _ asymmetric. Therefore in order to properly characterize the stress condition in the cask body, results are obtained at the two worst diametrically opposite locations and reported for the location where they are maximum. The individual loads are described in the following paragraphs:
- 1. Bolt Preload and Seal Seating Pressure A lid bolt preload corresponding to 25,000 psi direct stress in the bolt shank is simulated by specifying an initial strain in the elements representing the bolts. A portion of this strain becomes elastic preload strain in the bolts, and a portion becomes strain in the clamped parts. The required i-n-i-t;-ial-st-a-i-n--va-lue-of-0-.-00-1-3 4-in/-i-n--(-i-n-the-bol.t s)_was determined by trial and error.
The selected bolt preload is sufficient to insure a full seating of the metallic seals under a maximum design
- internal pressure of 100 psig. The metallic seal seating load is 1713 lb./in./seal141 or 3426 lb.fin. for 2 seals.
This load is simulated by applying a pressure of 3115 psi on an annular ring on both the confinement lid and flange surfaces as shown in Figure 3A.2-6. The stresses in the confinement boundary and gamma* shield are based on bolt preload corresponding to 25,000 psi direct stress in the shank and are listed in Tables 3A.2.3-1 and 2. It is seen that the stresses are very small. The maximum stress intensity is 831 psi at location 19. In Section 3A.3, the lid bolt was reanalyzed for a bolt preload of 39,810 psi direct tensile stress in the shank. The 3A.2-3 Rev. 0 1/00
effect of the bolt preload change on confinement boundary and gamma shield stress is approximately SOQ psi and is, therefore negligible.
- 2. Internal Pressure Loading A conservative design pressure of *100 psig is used as the maximum pressure acting in the confinement vessel cavity as shown in Figure 3A.2-7.
- 3. External Pressure Loading A pressure of 25 psig is used as the.maximum external pressure acting on the outer surface of the cask body* as shown in Figure 3A.2-8.
- 4. lg Down The cask is stored vertically on the concrete storage pad as shown in Figure 3A.2-9, with the following loads acting on it:
a.. A distributed vertical down inertia force of l g acting at each finite element in the model. For practical purposes, the resultant of all these forces is shown acting at the C.G. of the cask .. *Note that the resin, the outer shell and the trunnions are no'f included in the model. They are accounted for by increasing the density of the gamma shielding.
- b. Since the internals are not included in the model, their loading effects are simulated by a distributed pressure acting on the inside bottom surface of the cask cavity.
e-;--A-ll--nodes-on_the outside bottom surface of the cask are fixed in the axial directions.
- s. Lifting: 3g and 6g Vertical Up The cask is oriented vertically in space held by the 2 top trunnions and subjected to a vertical down load of 3g (TN-32 and TN-32A casks) or 6g (TN-32B cask), as shown on Figure 3A.2-10.
3g Vertj cal Up The inertia force acting on the cask elements and the pressure from the internals on the confinement bottom inner surface are as described in Case 4 multiplied by a factor of
- 3. The total cask weight (including internals} is replaced by forces applied to the 2 top trunnions so that the system of forees...acting on the cask is again in equilibrium. A 3A.2-4 Rev. o 1/00
cask weight of 235,000 lb. is used to calculate the global stresses of the cask. For trunnion and trunnion local stress calculations, a conservative cask weight of 243,000 lb. is used. For calculating the cask body global stresses, the two trunnion forces ~n. = 1.SW are replaced by a uniform line force: 3 w 3 x 235,000
= ~~~~~~~~- = 2558.7 lb. I in.
2 1t R 2 x 3 ~ 14. x 4 3
- 8 7 5 acting in the Y direction on the outer surface of the gamma shielding at the trunnion location. Superimposed on thi~
- solution are the local trunnion effects at two locations around the circumference which are determined by using the Bij laard method..
Same methodology as described above is used for calculating the cask body global stresses due to 6g lifting load.
- 6. Worst Temperature Distribution in the Cask Body A thermal analysis of the cask body using a 3D ANSYS thermal model is described in Chapter 4. The thermal model is used to obtain.the steady state metal temperatures in the cask body for the normal condition which includes 100° F ambient air temperature, maximum decay heat and maximum solar heat loading. *.The thermal stress evaluations were conservatively based on an outside gamma shield temperature of 260°F and an inside cavity temperature of 330°F (temperature differential of 70°F) . The actual temperature difference is less than 10°F from the thermal analysis
presented--in-Chapter- 4:----orherefore the therrriarstresses-*
calculated here are conservative. It may be *pointed out that the cask metal temperature differential (b.T) for -20° F ambient and l00°F ambient are about the same. Therefore, . thermal stresses are reported only for l00°F ambient temperature.
- 7. 1 g Lateral and 2 g down Bounding Loads - Cask Standing in a Vertical O~ientation on the Pad The sin0 and cos0 terms of the Fourier series are used to represent the 1 g lateral load acting at the CG of each finite element of the model .. The load applied by the internals to the inside surface of the confinement is assumed to vary sinusoidally on a 180° arc as shown in Figure 3A.2-5, and the same Fourier representation applies.
The 2 g down load is applied simultaneously (as described in 4, above) ,with the 1 g lateral load. The cask is held at
" 3A.2-5 Rev. O 1/00
the bottom and no tilting or sliding is allowed (See Figure 3A.2-ll). This -load combination is an upper. bound loading for tornado wind, flood water, seismic loads, *etc. (See Table 2.2-3). 3A.2.3.2 Accident Conditjons This section evaluates the effects of a hypothetical drop or tipover of the cask on the ISFSI storage pad. The *following cases are evaluated: An 18 inch drop onto a concrete storage pad. This is the maximum height the cask will.be lifted during transport to the storage location. A tipover of the cask onto a storage pad. The stability of the TN-32 storage cask in the upright position on the ISFSI concrete storage pad is demonstrated in Section 2.2 of this TSAR. The effects of tornado wind and missiles, flood water and earthquakes are described in Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, respectively. It is shown in those sections that the cask will not tip over under the bounding natural phenomena specified in this Safety Analysis Report. The cask will not slide on its pad any more than about ..,.eight inches under any of these loadings. .
- The storage pad is the hardest concrete surface outside of the confinement building. The cask is always oriented vertically and is not lifted higher than 18 in. once it leaves the confinement building. Therefore this case is an upper bound drop event since impact onto a softer surface would result in lower cask deceleration and a lower impact force.
- - - - - The-impact-anaLy...si.a......i.s_based on the methodology of EPRI NP-4830151. This report considers the mass and geomet:ry of~he-cask--- but assumes it to be rigid compared to the concrete storage pad. The storage pad properties and the cask geometry are used to determine the pad hardness parameter. The report provides graphs that show the force on the cask as a function of storage pad hardness. Scale model drop testing at Sandia National Laboratories and full scale cask drop testing in England have recently been performed in an attempt to "benchmark" the EPRI methodology. The preliminary results of the tests show excellent correlation with the predicted results. 3A.2-6 Rev. O 1/00
-;-~-...:*.*--*
3A.2.3.2.1 Storage Pad Hardness The target (or storage pad} hardness parameter, S, for the *. end drop case is calculated using the following formula. V~lues of the storage pad parameters are taken from the Virginia Power ISFSI site data. These values are representative of typical storage pad parameters. The resulting g loadings are* increased to allow for the effects of variations on these parameters. Send=~3 r A k Mu OU -120,145 (fonnula4, Reference 5) W (1-e"'* cos pr) Where r = cask bottom radius = 43.875 in. A = bottom area = 'ltr:i. = 6047.6 in. 2 k = --IlE.- = 134,776 psi/in. l - \,2II E,. = Soil modulus = 32,600 psi
- v. = Poisson's ratio of soil = 0.49
~ = is based on pad thickness of 36 in., #11 rebar@
i2 in. spac;:ing (nominal), Sy rebar of 60, 000 psi, 2 in. cover (nominal), Gu of 6000 psi concrete compressive strength 6
= 3.0378 x 10 in.-lb/ft.
~ = 0.0274 w= 230,000 lbs If it is assumed that the entire cask side cr.ushes into the pad during the tipover, the storage pad hardness parameter (S) is:
23,913 (formula 5, Reference 5) Where A= cask length x 10 in. = 1837.S in. 2 p = 0.0075 E, = Soil modulus = 32,600 psi w= 230,000 lbs concrete compressive strength = 6,0QO psi is based on pad thickness of 36 in., #11 rebar@ 12 in. spacing {nominal), Sy rebar of 60,000 psi, 2 in. cover (nominal), Gu of 6000 psi concrete compressive strength
= 3.0378 x 10 6 in.-lb/ft.
3A.2-7 Rev. 0 1/00
3A.2.3.2.2 DeceJeratjons Figure 22 for a 20 in. drop height from EPRI NP-4830 15> can be conservatively used to determine the cask deceleration after the 18 in. end drop. The upper bound.deceleration is 42 g 1 s for a hardness parameter, S, of 120,145. The maximum impact force is then 42 times the weight of the cask. The end drop analysis for the TN-32 cask is per.formed assuming a conservatively high value of so g's deceleration. During tipover, the center of gravity (CG) of the cask moves beyond -the *corner of the' cask *and "then drops, as the cask .falls. .* The CG drops 53.05 in. after moving over the corner. The change in potential energy of the cask is then equal to the rotational kinetic energy as it impacts after tipover. KE = ~ I(l)2 == Wh Where h = 53 .OS in. (dc9 - cask o.d. /2, Figure 2 .2-2) I = Mass moment of inertia of cask about corner
= 8.09 x 10 6 lb.in.sec2 Then (I) = (2Wh/I) 112 = 1. 72-9 rad/sec
- which' is the rotational velocity of the cask as it strikes the pad.
If the cask is pivoting .about the bottom corner, the impact velocity of the top of the cask is equal to the length multiplied by (1): If it is conservatively assumed that the entire side of the cask impacts at this velocity, the equivalent drop height (to produce a velocity of 318.1 in/sec) would be: v2 (318 .1)2 h = - 2g
=
2 x 386
= 131 in.
The impact velocity of the CG is approximately half of the top velocity* or 160 in/sec. .The* drop height to produce this velocity is only 33.2 in. Therefore, the 131 in. height assumed above is very conservative. 3A.2-8 Rev. o 1/00
Figure 19 of EPRI NP-4830< 5 > shows that, for a target hardness of 23,913, the upper bound cask deceleration is 27 g for. any drop height above 15 in. Therefore the maximum side impact force is equal to 27 times the weight of the cask. The stress analyses described below for the TN-32 cask tipover, with one exception, are therefore conservatively performed for a side impact with deceleration of SO g's. The exception is the lid bolt analysis where the tipover can cause lid bolt tension whereas the side impact will not cause bolt tension.* The conservative assumptions made for the bolt analysis are described in Section 3A.3. The analysis results for two hypothetical impact accidents are reported in this section. These are the SO g bottom end drop onto the storage.pad and a side drop which envelops the tip over case. As explained in Section 11.2.8, these accidents have a very low probability of occurrence, but in view of their potential impact on the environs, a detailed analysis was performed.
- 3A.2.3.2.3 Cask Body Analysis A conservative 50 g bottom drop onto the concrete pad was analyzed. The ANSYS model. in Section 3A.2 .2 was used to evaluate the stresses in the cask body due to the drop. The SO g bottom drop individual load case is simply so times the lg vertical load case described previously.
A so g side drop was also analyzed. The applied load is asymmetric* and a Fourier series representation of the loading is required. Figure 3A.2-14 shows the degree of approximation obtained when the series is truncated after 20 terms and the foot print of the external impact force is a rectangular strip 10 in. wide along the cask length. This approximation was used in this analysis. The side impact analysis results, at the selected - - - - - l-ocations,-are-reported-in--T-able-3A--.-2. 3--1-5-t.hrough-3A-.-2-.-3. . . . l.S--for-- a side load of 1 g. Since a linear analysis was performed, the stresses for the so g load case will be so times the l g load case results. 3A.2.3.3 Summary of Ipdjyidnal Load Cases Stress results for these individual loads are reported in Tables 3A.2.3-1 through 3A.2.3-20. Figure 3A.2-12 shows the locations on the cask body, where stress results are reported. These locations are djvided into two groups, confinement and non-confinement. Stress components and stress intensities at nodal locations on the inner and outer surf aces of each cask body component are reported in these t.ables . 3A.2-9 Rev. O 1/00
These results are provided in this report to indicate the relative significance* of the individual loads. These point-wise results are combined in Section 3A.2.5 with the results of several hand computations to provide results for the various load combinations whi.ch are compared to the design criteria in Chapter 3. The stress results presented in Tables 3A.2.3-1 through 3A.2.3-20 are based on the TN-32 and TN-32B lid configurations. In these configurations, the lid and lower shield plate thickness is 10.S inches. For the TN-32A Lid Assembly, the.combined lid and lower shield plate thickness is reduce.d to 9. 38 inches as* shown on TN drawing 1049-70-3. The confinement lid thickness is 4.5 inches for all three lid designs. It is only the shielding plate thickness that has been reduced in the 'l'N-32A lid system. Of the individual load cases, only the internal pressure and external pressure loads are affected by the reduction in lid shield thickness. To determine the stresses in the TN-32A lid, the bending stresses reported in Tables 3A.2.3-6 and 3A.2.3-8 are scaled by the square of the lid assembly thickness.
- The results are reported below:
Condition Type of TN-32 & TN*32B TN-32A Net Stress Lid Design Lid Design Stress Increase 100 psig Bending 1,638 psi 2,053 psi 415 psi Internal (SAR Table Pressure 3A. 2. 3-6) 25 psig Bending 418 psi 524 psi l06'pSi External (SAR Table Pressure 3A.2.3-8)* 3A.2.4 Additional Cask Body Analyses Additional analyses of the cask body were performed using classical methods rather than the ANSYS finite element method. These analyses determine the maximum stresses at local points on the body: (a} due to the trunnion reactions (while lifting the cask) and {b) in the locations where tornado missile impact might occur. 3A. 2. 4. l Tnmnj on I.aqa] Stresses The local stresses in the cask body outer gamma shielding at the trunnion locations due to the loadings applied through the trunnions are described in Section 3.4.3. These local effects are not included* in the ANSYS stress result tables reported above 3A.2-10 Rev. 0 1/00
Jn Section 3A.2.3. The local stresses must be superimposed on the above stress results for the cases where the inertial lifting. loads are reacted at the trunnions. The local stresses are calculated in accordance with the methodology of WRC Bulletin 107 t&> which is based on the Bij laard analysis for local stresses in_ cylindrical shells due to external loadings. The maximum stress intensity due to a vertical lift i~ 6,624 psi for TN-32, TN-32A casks and 16,047 psi for TN-32B cask. These local stresses are combined with the finite element results from Section 3A.2.3 at the same locations and compared with allowables in Section 3A.2.S. 3A.2.4.2 Tornado Missile Impact Local stresses due to tornado missiles are evaluated in Section 2.2.1.3. 3A.2.4.3 Impact on a Trunnion This section describes the analysis of the storage cask tipping over and impacting against the ISFSI concrete pad with the cask oriented so that an upper trunnion contacts the pad. The analyses of the trunnions and *cask body under Normal conditions (when the trunnions are used to lift the cask) are reported in Section 3.4.3. This analysis is a variation of the Hypothetical Tipping Accident .analyzed in 3A.2.3.2 to consider the particular case of the cask.contacting the pad on a trunnion. The upper trunnion could strike the pad during tipover, but the consequences would be minimal. The contact area between the cask and pad would initially be equal to the projected end area of the trunnion. The trunnion would punch into the pad for a few inches until the neutron shield and then the forged gamma shield
strike-t-he-concrete--pad-.---At -thi-a-poi.nt- the-contact_area_betw.e_en_________ _
the cask and pad would be the full side area of the cask (as analyzed in Section 3A.2.3.2). Impact on Trunnion - TN-32 and TN-32A Casks Figure 3A.2-15 shows the upper trunnion geometry for TN-32 and TN-32A casks. The projected trunnion area is(n/4) (10.172 -4 2 ) or 68.67 in2
- For a 3,000 psi concrete compressive strength, the impact force on the end of the trunnion would be (68.67) (3000) =
206,010 lbs. The trunnion is welded to the gamma shielding of the cask body using a weld that has at least as large a cross section as the trunnion base area. The compressive stress in the weld due to the trunnion impact force would be 206,010/((~/4) (10 2 -5 2 )) or 3.5 ksi. The minimum wall thickness of the gamma shielding at the flat machined
. , for the trunnions is 7.275 in. Therefore the 3A.2-11 Rev. O 1/00
shear stress around the plug of gamma shield material behind the io inch diame~er trunnion is 206,010/ht x 10 x 7.275.) or 0.9 ksi. We can conservatively assume that the entire impact force is reacted in bending by a 10 in. high ring (one trunnion diameter) or gamma shielding as shown in the bottom diagram of Figure 3A.2-l6. In this case, w = F/21tR =*206,010/.(27t x 39.88) or 822 lb/in. The maximum moment in the ring section is then (3/2) (w R2J = (3/2) (822) (39. 88 2 ) = (1. 96 x 106) in. -lb. The momerit of inertia of the 10 in. high ring section based on a minimum thickness of 7.275 in. is I = (1/12) (10) (7.2753) = 320.9 in4 and the distance from the center to the surface, c, is t/2 = 3.638 in. The bending stress in the ring section is then Mc/I = (1.96 x 10 6 } (3.638)/320.9 = 22.2 ksi. The allowable stress intensities for nonconf inement structure in Table 3.1-4 for Level D loads can be used to evaluate these Hypothetical Ac.cident stresses, in the gamma shielding.
- Su for the SA-105 gamma shielding (and welds) at 350°F is 70.0 ksi. The allowable membrane stress, P11 , is 0.7 Su or 49.0 ksi. The membrane plus bending allowable, Pm + Pb, is Su or 70.0 ksi. The allowable shear stress is 0.42 Su or 29.4 ksi .
. The 3. 5 ksi compressive stress in the weld is considered t*o be a membrane stress and*this stress level. is* well below the 49.0 ksi 'limit. The 0.9 ksi plug shear stress is also well below the 29.4 ksi shear limit. If the 3.5 ksi compressive stress, the 0.9 ksi shear stress and 22.2 ksi bending stress (compression side at trunnion) are all assumed to occur at the same point, the maximum combined stress intensity is 25.8 ksi, which is well below the allowable of 70.0 ksi.
The center of the trunnion is 16? in. above the corner of ~~-t=h=e=---=cask (the pivot point). The 206,010 lb. impact force would apply a *-tor@.e o:f-momencaoouEl:ne-pi-vorpu+/-nt-of--(-2 06,...0-l-O-)-{-l-&1->-- or 34.4 x 10' in. lb. The moment of inertia of the cask about the corner pivot point is IP = 8.09 x 10' lb. in. sec2
- The rotational deceleration that would occur as the trunnion punches into the concrete can be determined from the relationship Torque
= I a or a = Torque/I. The rotational deceleration, a, = 34.4 x 10' in.lb/8.09 x 10' lb. in. sec. 2 or 4.252 radians/sec 2
- The translational deceleration at any distance (d) from the pivot point is equal to (d) x a. The deceleration at the CG where d = 101. 93 in. from Figure 2. 2-2 is {101. 93) (4. 252) = 433. 4 in./sec 2
- This is a deceleration at the CG of 433.4/386 = 1.l2g.
Therefore, the peak*CG deceleration of the cask during initial trunnion impact after tipover is much less than 23 g deceleration conservatively determined in Section 3A.2.3.2 for full side impact. Therefore the stress analysis cases for ~he cask body 3A.2-l2 Rev. o 1/00
(except for the local gamma shielding stresses due to the trunnion loads) and basket, conservatively determined above assuming SO g deceleration, bound those for the l.12g trunnion impact case. Therefore tipping of the cask onto a trunnion results in acceptable stresses. Impact on Tnmni on - TN-32B cask Figure 3A.2-1SA shows the upper trunnion geometry for the TN-32B cask. The projected trunnion area at contact is {n/4) (12.75 2 -5.0 2 ) or 108.04 in2
- For a 3,000 psi concrete compressive strength, the impact force on the end of the trunnion would be (108.04) (3000) = 324,120 lbs.
The trunnion is welded to the gamma shielding of the cask body using a weld that has at .. least as large a cross section as the trunnion base area. The compressive stress in the weld due to the trunnion impact force would.be: ac0111P* = 324,120/[(7t/4) (12.0 2 -5.25 2 )] = 3,544 psi~ 3.6 ksi The minimum wall thickness of the gamma shielding at the flat machined for the trunnions is 7.538 in. Therefore the shear stress around the plug of gamma shield material behind the 12 inch diameter trunnion is:
~ = 324,120/(n x 12 x 7.538) = 1,141 psi~ 1.2 ksi We can conservatively assume that the entire impact force is reacted in bending by a 12 inch high ring (one trunnion diameter of gamma shielding cylinder) similar to shown in SAR Figure 3A.2-
- 16. In this case, w = F/2nR = 324,120/(2n x 39.88) = 1293.5 lb/in.
The maximum moment in the ring section is then: M = (3/2) (w R2 ) = * (3/2~ (1293. 5) (39. 88 2 ) = (3. 09xl0 6 ) in-lb The moment of inertia of the 12 inch high ring section based on a minimum thickness of 7.538 inch is: I = (1/12) {12) (7 .538 3 ) = 428.3 in4 and the distance from the center to the surface, c, is t/2 = 3.769 in. The bending stress in the ring section is then: Gb =Mc/I = (3.09xl0 6 ) (3.769)/428.3 = 27,192 psi~ 27.2 ksi 3A.2-13 Rev. O 1/00
The allowable stress intensities for the non-confinement structure in SAR Table 3.1-4 for Level D loads can be used to evaluate these Hypothetical Accident stresses. Su for the SA-105 gamma shielding (and welds) at 3.S0°F is 70.0 ksi. The allowable membrane stress, P111 , is 0.7 Su or 49.0 ksi psi. The membrane plus bending allowable, Pm + Pb, is Su or
- 70. O ksi. The allowable shear stress is):>. 42 Su or 29. 4 ksi.
The 3.6 ksi compressive stress in the weld is considered to be a membrane stress and this stress level is well below the 49.0 ksi limit. The 1.2 ksi plug shear stress is also well below the 29.4 ksi shear limit. If the 3.6 ksi compressive stress, the 1.2 ksi shear stress *and 27". 2 ksi bending str~ss *(compression side at trunnion} are all assumed to occur at the same point, the maximum combined stress intensity is 30.8 ksi, which is also well below the allowable of 70.0 ksi. The center of the trunnion is 167 inches above the corner of the cask (the pivot point}. The 324,120 lbs impact force would result in a torque or moment about the pivot point of: Torque = (324,120) (167) = 54.l x 10 6 in-lb The moment of inertia of the cask about the corner p~vot point is:
- IP =
- 7. 93 x 10' lb-in-sec2 The rotational deceleration a that would occur as the trunnion punches into the concrete can be determined from the relationship Torque =I a a = 54. l x l.0 6 in. lb/7. 93 x 10 6 lb-in-sec2
=-6~-8 Z2-radiansJs_ec 2
The translational deceleration at any distance {d) from the pivot point is equal to d x a. The deceleration at the top trunnion is: A= (167.0) {6.822) = 1139.3 in./sec2 or 1139.3/386 = 2.9Sg The peak deceleration of the cask during initial trunnion impact after tipover is much less than SOg deceleration determined in SAR Section 3A.2.3.2 for full side impact. Therefore, the stress analysis cases for the cask body and basket determined in Chapter 3 bound those for the 2.9Sg trunnion impact case. ISFSI concrete storage pads have typical compressive strengths in the range of 3,000 to 6,000 psi. Based on the above evaluation, these concrete compressive strengths would have no significant impact on stresses at the cask and basket. 3A.2-14 Rev. 0 1/00
.-~*
The tipping of the cask onto a trunnion, therefore, results in acceptable stresses in trunnions, cask body and basket. 3A.2.5 Eva1uatjon {Load Combinations Vs. AJJowabJes) The TN-32 cask loading conditions are listed in Section* 2.2.S, Table 2.2-4. The individual loads acting on the various cask components due to these loading conditions have been applied to the cask and the resulting stresses are reported in Tables 3A.2.3-l through Table 3A.2.3-20 .
. The loading conditions listed in Table 2.2-4 are categorized according to the rules of the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB for Class 1 nuclear components. These categories include Normal (Design and Level A) and Hypothetical Accident (Level D) loading conditions. See Tables 2.2-5 through 2.2-7 for these categories. Next, the load combinations are determined based on those loads that can occur simultaneously. The individual loads of each combination are indicated in Tables 2.2-8 and 2.2-9.
The stress intensities for the combined load cases are evaluated at the locations indicated in Figure 3A.2-12 and compared to the stress limits associated with each service loading. The normal condition load combinations are summarized in Table 3A.2.5-l. Stresses due to normal condition load combinations are presented in Tables 3A.2.5-2 through 3A.2.5-ll. The accident condition load combinations are summarized in Table 3A.2.5-12. Stresses due to accident condition load combinations are presented in Tables 3A.2.5-13 through 3A.2.5-28. Tables 3A.2.5-l and 3A.2.5-12 provide matrices of the individual loads and how they are combined to determine the cask body stresses for the specified normal and accident conditions. The thermal stresses are actually secondary stresses that could
~be_e:v:alua ted __us_ing_higher allo_wahl_es_than__ fo_~_pt:i_mary____§l_t;re s ~~~-~
They are conservatively added to the primary stresses and the combined stresses are evaluated using primary stress allowables. Finally, for those load combinations that include trunnion reactions, the local stresses at the trunnion locations found by the Bijlaard method are superimposed on the ANSYS combined stresses at the stress reporting locations near the trunnions. Also the membrane and bending stresses are not separated so the combined stress intensity is compared to the lower membrane allowable. In .nearly all of the locations selected the stress intensities thus calculated are less than the membrane allowable stress. At the two locations where this simple conservative approach does not show margin, the membrane and bending stresses are separated.
- 3A.2-15 Rev. O 1/00
TN-32A Lid Stresses The Normal Condition combined stresses reported in Tables 3A.2.5-2 to 3A.2.5-11 are reviewed to determine the maximum stress intensity in the TN-32 standard lid design. The maximum stress intensity of 2,470 psi occurs due to Bolt preload + 100 psig internal pressure + .19. down + Thermal (see Table 3A .. 2.5-3). Therefore, the maximum stress intensity in the Type A lid is (2,470 + 415) 2,885 psi {2.89 ksi).
- This value is well below the allowable of 24.30 ksi (1.5 Sm
= 1.5 x 16.2 ksi= 24.30 ksi).
The' Accident Condition. combined stresses reported in Tables 3A.2.5-13 to 3A.2.5-28 are reviewed to determine the maximum stress intensity in the TN-32 standard lid design. The maximum stress intensity of 29,496 psi occurs due to Bolt preload + 100 psig internal pressure + SOg ~ip ,over (see Table 3A.2.5-20). Therefore, the maximum stress* intensity in the Type A lid is (29,496 + 415} 29,911 psi (29.9 ksi). This value is well below the allowable of 58.32 ksi (3.6 Sm
= 3.6 x 16.2 ksi = 58.32 ksi}.
Based on the above evaluation, all of the calculated maximum normal and accident condition stre.sses in TN-32A cask are acceptable. 3A.2-16 Rev. O 1/00 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _:=___
3A.3 Ljd Bolt Analyses The lid bolt analysis presented below is performed using the weight of the TN-32A lid (including top neutron shield) since it is slightly heavier than the standard TN-32 lid assembly (with tip neutron shield) . 3A.3.l Normal Conditjons 3A.3.l.l Bolt Preload The lid is secured to the cask body by forty eight 1.5 in. diameter bolts. The selected bolt preload is such that the metallic confinement seals are properly compressed and the lid is seated against the flange with sufficient force to resist the maximum cavity internal pressure and any dead weight loads acting to unseat the lid. The corresponding tensile preload stress in the bolts at temperature is 39,810 psi(corresponding to 980 ft-lb torque with lubrication) which . is less than the stress allowable for the bolt material for Normal (Level A) Conditions. The load per bolt is: FB = As x 39,810
= 1.492 x 39,810= 59,397 lb./bolt Since we have 48 bolts, the total seating force of all 48 bolts is 48 F8 = 2,851,056 lb.
The force required to seat the metallic seals, from Reference 4, is a line load of 1399 pounds per inch of seal circumference. The diameter of the outer seal is 72.65 in. and the diameter of the inner seal 71.05 in. The seal seating force is then: Fseating = 1399 7t(72.65 + 71.05) = 631,574 lb. The maximum cask cavity internal pressure is the Design Pressure of 100 psi. The force required to react the pressure load (conservatively assuming the pressure is applied over the outer seal diameter) is: tr Frressure =100 (-) (72.65) = 414,535 lbs. 2 4 The TN-32 cask is always oriented vertical during loading, during transfer to the ISFSI and during storage on the pad. Dead weight of the lid and cask contents do not actually load the lid bolts. In fact the lid weight .(arid external pressure) helps to seat the lid. However, it is conservative to require that the bolt preload maintain lid seating in any cask orientation. The weights of the lid, fuel and basket are: 3A.3-1 Rev. O 1/00
Lid Assembly Weight = 14,480 lb. Fuel Weight = 49,060 lb. Basket Weight 16.900 lb, WTotal 80,440 lb. The total of the seal seating force*,* pressure load and dead* weight loads is: Fmeating = 631,574 Fprenure = 414,535 wtotal = 80.440 1,126,549 lb. < 2,851,056 lb. Therefore the selected bolt preload stress of 39,810 psi provides ample lid seating force. The average bolt tensile stress required to react the lid loadings under Normal Conditions is the preload stress of 39,810 psi which is well below the limiting value of 28~ (63,800 psi) for the bolt material at 300°F. 3A.3.l.2 Differential ThermaJ Expansion The 48 lid bolts preload the outer rim of the closure lid against the cask body flange. The 1.5 in. diameter bolts are installed through 1.56 in. diameter clearance. holes~,in the 4.50 in. thick lid periphery. Preloading of the bolts against the lid is accomplished by tightening the bolts so that the shank portions of the bolts within the clearance holes are stretched elastically._ The bolt loads will therefore change from the initial installed values if any thermal expansion differences should occur between the lid (through thickness direction) and the bolts. The bolt material is SA 320 Grade L43 (l 3/4 Ni 3/4 Cr 1/4 -.- - Moh--- The -lid -and- body flange .are both SA 3_SQ __ g:r_:_?~e LF3 (3 1/2 Ni). The Section III Code Appendices specify the .E;iame ---- coefficient of thermal *expansion for these materials. The bolts are in intimate contact with the lid and flange and will therefore operate at the same temperature as these components. Therefore there will be no thermal expansion differences between the lid and bolts, and the assembly preload will be maintained under all temperatures. 3A.3.l.3 Bolt Torsion The torque required to preload the bolt is: {Reference 10) Where
,.,. 3A.3-2 Rev. O 1/00
*---=--
- .*~ . *. -..
T = 0.132(1.5) (59,397)=11,760 in-lb= 980 ft-lb K = Nut Factor = 0.132 for neolube lubricant As = Bolt stress area = 1.492 in. 2 DN = Bolt nominal dia = 1.5 in. F8 = 39,810 psi preload stress x As = 59,397 lb The residual torque in the bolt is:
= 0.5625T = 0.5625 x 11,760 = .6,615 in.lb.- *.
The shear stress in the bolt due to the residual torque from preload given by Reference 7: TR r
'ttorsion J
where r and J are based on the bolt effective radius for the above stress area. r = 0.689 in. effective bolt radius J = torsional moment of inertia of threaded bolt 1t r4 J = - = 0.354 inch4 2
'ttorllion = 6,615(0.689)/0.354 = 12,875 psi (Torsional Shear) 3A.3.l.4 Bolt Bendjng It is assumed that bolt bending does not occur during seating of the lid against the cask body during assembly. The
- bolt s-are-rotated_as_they_ar..e_t_orque_d__so_any_s_li_ght re la ti ve movement between lid and body flange during preloading will not result in a net offset between the bolt head and tapped flange holes. In addition, since the lid, flange and bolt materials have the same coefficient of thermal expansion and will operate at essentially the same temperature, differential expansion between components will not produce bolt bending. As internal pressure is applied to the cask cavity, the lid will bulge slightly and its edge will rotate. In addition the body cylinder radius will increase slightly due to the internal pressure resulting in outward radial movement of the tapped bolt ho.lea in the body flange. Since no net membrane stress is developed in the lid, the lid bolt holes (at the mid surface) will remain at the original location. Rotation of the edge of the lid will, however, produce radial movement of the outer surface of the lid at the bolt head location.
,,.* 3A.3-3 Rev. 0 1/00
The hoop stress in the cask body cylinder is: p Rt Shoop= - t Where = 100 psi Design Pressure
= 34.375 in. inside radius
= 9.5 in. thickness 100 x 34. 37 5 -- 361
- 8 psi.
Shoop= 9.5 The radial deflection at the bolt circle is: Shoop S'!. Ub.c. = Rbc
.. X --
E R1:1c = 38. 03 in. bolt circle radius
~.
CJll.&.- 3s.o* 3 x 361.8 - 0*00049.
. 14 inc
- hesoutward 28x10 6 When pressure is. applied to the lid, the edge.,rotation can be calculated assuming the lid is.simply supported. From Reference 8, Table X, Case l:
e = 3W (m - 1) R 211:Emt3 Where a = edge rotation, radians w = total applied load
~~~_.....M~~
R = 36.35 in. outer seal 3-.-33 ifP~n-Ls--3::'-atio ra~d~i_u_s~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~ T = 4.5 in. lid thickness e= 3 x 100 x 'Jt x (36.35)3 x 2.33 = 0.001976 radians 3 21t x 2 8 x 106 x 3
- 3 3 x ( 4
- 5 )
Figure 3A.3-1 shows the net movement of the threaded hole and the Point on the lid under the bolt head. If it is assumed that the bolt head doesn*t slide on *the lid surface, the head will be forced from position a to a' as the lid deflects. Point a' under the bolt head moves outward 0 .. 00444. in. while the threaded hole moves only 0.0004914 in. outward. The bolt head will be bent laterally by 0.00444 - 0.0004914 in. or 0.00395 in. from the threaded end.
,,* Rev. 0 1/00 3A.3-4
The bending model of the bolt is shown in Figure 3A.3-2. The moment on the bolt is calculated assuming the bolt is subjected to affect bending with the head and threaded end prevented from rotating. For a cantilevered bolt free to rotate at the head, the bending moment would be reduced by one half. Therefore the assumption of fixed ends* is the most conservative and results in the highest stress. .. The shear force~ P, and bending moment, M, for a beam subjected to offset bending with ends prevented from rotating are: p = 12EI S 13 6EI 6 M = 12 Where P = lateral load to deflect the bolt distance o, lb. o = lateral displacement
= 0.00395 in .
E = Young's modulus, 28 x 10 6 psi @300°F L = bolt length in bending
= 4.625 in. (including tapped hole.chamfer)
I = 1Cr4 /4
= 0.177 2 in. 4 (r=0.689 in. based on stress area of 1.492 in. )
The ref ore
-- __ M ___ 6_>L2_8__>-<-10~~-.J..TI_JLQ.Jl_Q3.9.5._ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
B = 4. 625 2
= 5 , 4 91 in - lb .
12 x 28 x 10 6 x 0.177 x 0.00395 p =
- 4. 625 3
= 2, 375 lb.
The bending stress in the bolt is Mr 5,49lx.689 CJb= - = I 0 .177
= 21, 375 psi 3A.3-5 Rev. o 1/00
The shear stress due to the lateral force is
'tp = P/A = 2,375/1.492 = 1,592 psi 3A.3.1.S Combjned Stresses The total shear stress is then equal to the residual torsional shear stress plus that due to ~orce P .
.'ttotal = 'ttoraion + 'tp
= 12,875+ 1,592
= 14 46_7 psi I
The average tensile stress is the bolt preload stress: (J*verage = 39 I 810 psi The maximum tensile stress at two locations in the bolt is the preload stress plus the bending stress *
.amu; = 39,810 + 21,375 = 61,185 psi Therefore, the average combined stress intensity is:
SI average
= (39, 810 2 + 4 x 14, 467 2 ) 112
= 49,214 psi (49.2 ksi) < 2Sm = 63.8 ksi The maximum combined stress intensity is:
- . --------**- --------=---(-6.1.,-1.85~+-4 x l 4 ,A_6-'Z_2),_1_12_ _ _ _ _ _ __
= 67,682 psi = 67.7 ksi < 3Sm = 95.7 ksi For Level*A conditions, the average bolt stress is limited to 2 Sm or 2 x 31.9 = 63.8 ksi. The maximum bolt stress is limited to 3 Sm or 95.7 ksi. We are well within these limits as well as the yield strength of the bolt material (also 95.7 ksi).
3A.3.2 Accident Conditions The lid bolts are analyzed in this section under the loadings selected to bound those for the hypothetical bottom end drop and tipover onto the concrete storage pad. 3A.3-6 Rev. 0 1/00
-;._..::._-~
- ...*.:~
3A.3.2.l Bottom End Drop The bottom end drop from a height of 5 feet onto the concrete storage pad is analyzed in Section 3A.2.3.2. That section indicates that. the *cask deceleration may reach 42 g. This analysis conservatively examines the effects (if any) of a SO g quasistatic loading on the lid bolts. During a bottom end drop, the rim of the lid is forced against the flange of the cask body. The lid is initially seated against the flange by preloading (torquing) the bolts. The bolt preload will not be affected if compressive yielding of the contact bearing area does not occur. The contact force on the bearing area, conservatively neglecting internal pressure, is the bolt preload force less the seal compression force plus the 50 g inertial force of the lid system. The preload force, from Section 3A.3.l, is 2,851,056 lb. The seal seating force is 631,750 lb. The weight of the lid system (weight of lid plus weight of top neutron shield assembly, 11560 + 2960 = 14,480 lbs, the highest weight among TN-32, TN-32A and TN-328 casks) is 14,480 lb . Therefore, during a 50 g deceleration in the axial direction the contact force between lid and cask body is: F contact = Faolt Prelcad - Fseal seating + 50 {Wlid system)
= 2,851,056 - 631,574 + 50(14,480)
= 2,943,482 lb Figure 3A.3-3 illustrates the bearing interface between lid edge and body flange. The bearing area equals the area within the
- diameter* of the- lid- rai-sed-seetlon-(-9-4.0-i-n.-}-less-t-he-outside--of_____ --- - ----- ----- the body chamber (70.22 in.) less the area of the seal groove. The bearing stress during ~mpact is then equal to: sbearic.g = 2,943,482/180 = 16,353 psi (16.35 ksi) This contact stress is well below the 33.2 ksi yield strength of the lid and flange material at 300°F. The bolt preload will not be affected by the bottom drop. Therefore, this hypothetical accident case will not affect the bolt stresses. 3A.3-7 Rev. o 1/00
3A.3.2*.2 Tipover The tipover onto the concrete storage pad is analyzed in Appendix 3D.2.5. The tipover scenario is summarized in Figure 3A.3-4. The peak deceleration occurs at the top of the cask.
'l'he deceleration at this* location reaches 67g. The deceleration is much less at the center of gravity and essentially zero at the bottom corner pivot point. The lateral deceleration at the lid end of the body is taken as 67g and that at the pivot point is zero.
There are two dynamic loadings acting on the lid tending to push or throw it off of the cask body (i.e. producing tensile forces in the lid bolts) . There is a small axial (parallel to cask longitudinal axis) centrifugal inertia load due to the internals acting on the lid and the lid weight itself while the cask is rotating. For the evaluation of the lid bolts it is assumed herein that the cask impacts on the corner at the lid end. There is no accident condition postulated that would cause greater load on the lid.bolts. The cask orientation for the analysis is shown in Figure 3A.3-5. The axis of. the cask is s 0 (corresponding to 16 inches pad crush} .from horizontal with the lid down. Note that
'this orientation is well beyond that predict.ed in the tipover analysis (Appendix 30, Figure 30.2-4, maximum displacement is 0.73 inches). The lateral load, GL, is 67g, the axial load used is 67 x tan 5° or S.86g.
The loads acting on the cask are shown in Figure 3A.3-S. The loads acting on the lid are shown in Figure 3A.3-6. Also shown is the reaction load at the cask interface and the pivot
----*--- ____ poin_t_,_Q_, for analysis of lid rotation. Figure 3A. 3-7 shows the lid bolt loads resisting rotation of the lid-about pi~ot~peint.--0~~~~~~
The increase in bolt load beyond the preload varies uniformly from pivot point, 0, to the bolt farthest from o. The moment acting on the lid about pivot point, o,* due to the inertia load is calculated as follows:
= W1 x 5. 86 x R.r + Wi. x s. 86 x ~ + WL x 67 x a + P,. x &i.-
Where = Total moment about pivot point, in-lb W1 = Weight of internals
= 16,900 + 49,060 = 65,960 lb
= Weight of lid system (including shield plate and resin disk), 14,480 lb 3A.3-8 Rev. O 1/00
PA = Internal pressure load
= 414,535 lb
= Distance from center of lid to pivot point
= 39.75*in.
a = Moment arm of lid inertia load, WL, in.
= 2.26 in. (very conservative since shield weight effect moves CG toward O)
Therefore: M1 = (65,960 x 5.86 x 39.75} + (14,480 x 5.86 x 39.75)
+ (14,480 x 67 x 2.26t + {414,535 x 39.75)
= 37.41 x 10 6 in-lb.
This moment is resisted by the effect of the preload on the lid bolts. The moment due to preload is calculated as follows:
~ = N x Fa x R.r Where.
~ = moment due to bolt preload, in-lb N = number of bolts, 48 Fa = preload per bolt
= As x preload stress
= stress area bolt x preload stress
= 1.492 in. 2 x 39,810 psi = 59,397 lb
1'1'---* -=--di.s-tance__.:_:fr-0m-cen-t-e.r-Of-l-i-d--to-p-i-¥0.t-point.,,..,___,3._..9'-',__,7'-5..__..j....n.~~-_ _ _ _ __
Therefore: Mp = 48 x 59,397 x 39.75
= 113.3 x 10 6 in-lb. > 37.41 x 106 in-lb.
Since bolt preload moment ,~, is higher than the moment due to inertial load, M.r, there will not be any additional load due to tipover accident. In the true rotational impact case, the gravitational force to keep the lid on and contents in the cask is greatest as the cask reaches the final tipping angle. In this case, the cask reaches an angle of approximately 1° below horizontal (Figure Figure 3A.3-4). The gravitational forces acting on the lid and contents at this angle (conservatively using 5 degrees), in the direction of the axis of the cask are: 3A.3-9 Rev. 0 1/00
F 114 = Wud (sin a) = 14, 370 (sin 5°) = 1, 252 lb Fcontent = Wconcenc (sin a.) = 65, 960 (sin 5°)" = 5, 749 lb Total gravitational tensile force = 1,252 + 5,749 = 7,001 lb Since the bolt preload seating force, F 8 (2,851,056 lb) is higher than the gravitational tensile force, there will not be any additional tensile load due to tipover accid7nt. The shear stress due to the 67g side impact is calculated as follows: Where WL: weight of lid system (14,480 lb) N: Number of lid bolts (48) A.a: Bolt shank shear area ('It x D2 /4 = 1. 767 in2 ) The shear stress is:
'timpact. = 14,480 X 67/(48 X 1.767) :::: 11,438 psi The total shear stress. is equal to the residual torsional shear stress plus* the shear stress due .to 'internal pressure plus the shear stress due to the.67g side impact:
'teotal = 12 / 875 + l, 592 + 11, 438
= 25,905 psi (25.91 ksi) < 0.42Su = 47.9 ksi The average tensile stress is the bolt preload stress.
The maximum stress at two locations in the bolt is the preload stress plus the bending stress. Gmax = 39,810 + 21,375 = 61,185 psi The average combined stress intensity is: SI average
;:::: (39,810 2 + 4 x 25,905 2 ) 1 2
= 65,338 psi (65.34 ksi) < Sy = 95.7 ksi JA.3-10 Rev. O 1/00
The maximum combined stress intensity is: SI max.
= (61,185 2 + 4 x 25,905 2 ) 112
= 80,174 psi (80.17 ksi) < ~ = 113.9 ksi In addition to the above calculations, the lid bolts are evaluated based on the interaction formula from Appendix F of the ASME Code 161 for tension and shear :
(fi) 2 . (fv) 2
--+--Sl (Ftb)2 (Fw)2 Where:
ft and fv are the applied tensile and shear stresses F~ = allowable tensile stress, smaller of (0.7Su) or Sy(TSAR Table 3.1-3)= 0.7 x 113,930 = 79,750 psi Fw = allowable shear stress, smaller of {0.42Su) or 0.6Sy(SAR Table 3.1-3)= 0_.42 x 113,930 = 47,850 psi 39,810 2 2
+ 25, 905 2 = 0.54 < 1.0 79, 750 47 t 850 2 Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that:
- 1. The maximum normal and accident condition stresses in*
the lid bolts are acceptable.
- 2. A positive (compressive) load is maintained on seals during normal and accident condition loads as bolt preload is higher than the applied loads.
- 3A.3-11 Rev. O 1/00
3A.4 Outer Shell This section presents the structural analysis of the outer shell of the TN-32 storage cask. The outer shell consists of a cylindrical shell section and closure plates at each end which connect the cylinder to the cask body. The normal loads acting on the outer shell are due to internal .arid external pressure and the normal handling operations. Membrane stresses and bending due to the pressure difference and handling loads are determined. These stresses are compared to the allowable stress *limits in Section 3.l to assure that the design criteria are met. 3 A
- 4. 1 Description The outer shell is constructed from low-alloy carbon steel and is welded to the outer surface of the cask body gamma shielding. The cylindrical shell section is 0.50 in. thick and the closure plates are 0.75 in. thick. Pertinent dimensions are shown in Fig. 3A.4-l and Drawing 1040-70-2.
3A.4. 2 Materj al s Input Data The outer shell cylindrical section and closure plates are SA 516-GR 70. The material properties are taken from the ASME Code, Section II, Part D. The yield strength of the material is also obtained from the code at a temperature of 300°F. 3A. 4. 3 Applied Loads It is assumed that a pressure of 25 psi may be applied to the inside or outside of the outer shell. This bounding assumption envelopes the actual expected pressures described in Section 2.2.s. The handling loads acting on the outer shell are a result of . _________lifting. The loads applied to the shell as a result of these op-era ITons consiSt-o-f-tne--va--1-ue s-given-in-Sect.ion-2- 5_. __The___________ --*---- weight or inertia g load can include all of th~ weights of the outer shell, neutron resin shield, and aluminum containers. The most severe Normal Service (Design and Level A} Condition load is assumed 3 g inertia load in the vertical lifting orientation. The shell is also analyzed for 3 g loading when the cask is oriented horizontally to ensure it is not damaged during delivery. The following cases are evaluated:
- Cask in the Vertical Orientation
- Stress due to 25 psi pressure
- Stress due to 3G inertia load (lifting)
, ,,.- Rev. O 1/00
-3A *.4-1
- Cask in the Horizontal Orientation
- Stress due to 25 psi pressure
- Stress due to 3G inertia load 3A.4.4 Method of Analysis ANSYS Model A finite element model was built for the structural analysis of the outer shell and closure plates. The outer shell and closure plates were modeled with ANSYS Plane 42 elements. The element is used as an axisymmetric element. The partial penetration welds are simulated by reducing the thickness at weld locations. The basic geometry of the outer shell and weld sizes used for analysis are shown in Figure 3A.4-1. The finite element model is shown in Figures 3A.4-2, -3, and 4. In finite element model for pressure run, the entire ~ inch cylinder thickness was conservatively reduced to 0.375 inch to simulate the longitudinal partial penetration weld.
A. Cask in the Vertical Orientation
- Stresses due to 25 psi Pressure An external pressure of .25 psi will not induqe any load or stress in the outer shell since it is in contact with and supported by the resin filled aluminum containers.
An internal pressure of 25 psi is used as the maximum pressure acting at the inner surf ace of the outer shell as shown on Figure 3A.4-5. The maximum stress intensity for this load case is 7,238 psi.
- 3G Down The weight of the resin (10,230 lbs) and aluminum containers (1,960 lbs) is modeled as an additional pressure on the bottom inner surface as shown on Figure 3A.4-6.
P = 3 x (10,230 + 1,960)/[n (48.375 2 - 43.875 2 )] = 28.0 psi The maximum stress intensity for this load case is 4,517 psi. B. Cask in the Horizontal Orientation The stress due to 25 psi internal pressure is same as for the vertical orientation. The stress due to 3G inertia load conservatively assumes that the weight of the outer shell, resin, and aluminum co~tainers is uniformly distributed over the 160 in.
,; 3A.4-2 Rev. O 1/00
~ength and at a 45° angle only. Therefore, the equivalent pressure applied to the outershell is:
Weight of outer shell: 7,230 lbs weight of resin: 10,230 lbs Weight of alum. Containers:. 1, 960 lbs Pequipment = (7230+10230+1960) (3) (360) / (7t) (96. 75) (154. 5) _(45)
= 10 psi It is assumed that this pressure is acting like the internal pressure and applied on the full 360° inner surface of the outer shell. Therefore, the stress due to the this 3G inertia load can be ratioed from the 25 psi internal pressure case and is:
- a = 7,238 (10)/25 = 2,895 psi C Maxj mum Combj ned Stress Intensj t j es Based on the above calculations, the stress intensities are summarized in the following table:
Loading Stress Intensities 25 psi Internal Pressure 7,238 psi. 25 psi + 3G Down 11,755 psi (Cask in Vertical Orientation) 25 psi + 3G Down 10,133 psi
(Cask- *in- Hori-zonta-l------. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Orientation} 3A.4.5 Results The stresses acting on the outer shell and closure plates are also listed in Table 3A.4-1. They are compared with the allowable values in Table 3.4-9. 3A.4-3 Rev. O 1/00
3A. 5 TOP NEUTRON SHIELD BOLT AN1\T1YSIS 3A.S.l Ojscussjon The top neutron shield is bolted to the outside of the TN-32 lid using four 1 ~inch diameter, SA-193, Gr. B-8 bolts. The overpressure tank is.attached to the upper surface of the neutron shield. The weight of the top neutron shield assembly (neutron shield plus expansion tank) for the TN-32A cask is 2,920 lb. (see Table 3.2-1, the heaviest weight among TN-32, TN-32A and TN-32B casks). Shielding analyses show that the .dose rate at* the top of the lid without the neutron shield is below* the acceptable accident limit. Therefore, the analysis below i$ limited to design primary loadings. Under normal conditions the assembled and loaded {with fuel) TN-32 cask never experiences a net upward acceleration or a side load exceeding the l.Og bounding load listed in Table 2.2-3. Nevertheless, a 3.0g upward or lateral load (not simultaneous) is assumed to conservatively evaluate these shield attachment bolts. 3A.5.2 Bolt Stress Calculation Under normal conditions, the only loads on the attachment bolt are the assembly preload and 3g upward or lateral load as described above.
- 1. Stresses due to assembly preload
- ----- _. - ----- ------ -An-as-sembl-y-tG~e-Gf-90-{-+J.4-,---0-}-.,f-t-....-lb-is-us.ed__:with _ _ _ _ __
lubrication: Q = K Db Fa (Reference 3) Where Q = applied torque (in.-lb) for the preload K = Nut factor = 0.132 (with lubrication) Db = Nominal bolt dia. = 1.25 in. (Stress area = o. 9034 i.n2 ) Fa = Tensile force (lb)
- Therefore, the maximum tensile force is:
Fa= Q/(K x ~) = 100 x i2/(0.132 x 1.25) = 7,273 lb 3A.5-1 Rev. o 1/00
The maximum tensile stress is: ft = 7,273/0.9034 = 8,050 psi (8.1 ksi) The maximum shear stress due to the residual torque is: f 11 *= 5.093 x Q/d3 (d =*1.0725 _inches, min. bolt dia.)
= 5.093 (100 x 12)/1.0725 3 = 4,954 psi (5.0 ksi)
- 2. Maximum tensile or shear stress due to 3g upward or lateral load Se= S 8 = 2,920 x 3/(4 x 0.9034)= 2,424 psi {2.4 ksi).
Since bolt preload seating force, Fa (7,273 lb) i,s higher than the 3g tensile force, there will not be any additional tensile load due to 3g upward load. Therefore, the maximum tensile stress is: Gmax = 8,050 psi (8.1 ksi) < 2Sm = 15.0 ksi The total shear stress is equal to the residual torsional shear stress plus 3g lateral shear stress:
't"'"x = 4, 954 psi + 2, 424 psi
= 7,378 psi (7.4 ksi) < 0.4Sy = 9.0 ksi and the maximum combined stress intensity is:
2 112 Simax = Cf\ +4f 2 .) 112 = (B,050 2 + 4 x 7,378 )
= 16,810 psi (16.8 ksi) < 3Sm= 22.5 ksi
_____________ .. ___3~_._?_!_~-- __ ~B~e~s~u~l~t~s~-------------------------- The calculated bolt stresses are all less than the specified allowable stresses. 3A. 5-2 Rev. O 1/00
"'~--*-"':,,...*
-,,..~
3A. 6 References
- 1. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, 1992.
- 2. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section II, Part D, -1992.
- 3. De Salvo, G. J. and Swanson, J. A., ANSYS Engineering Analysis System, Users Manual for ANSYS Revision 4.4, Swanson Analysis Systems, Inc., Houston, PA, June 1989.
- 4. Resilient Metal Seals and Gaskets, Helicoflex Catalog H.001.002, Helicoflex Co., Boonton, N.J., 1983 pp.S-7.
- 5. Electric Power Research Institute, Report No. NP-4830, The Effects of Target Hardness on the Structural Design of Concrete Storage Pads for Spent-Fuel Casks, October, 1986.
- 6. WRC Bulletin 107, March 1979 Rev: "Local Stresses in Spherical and Cylindrical Shells Due to External Loadings."
- 7. Hopper, A.G. and Thompson, G.V. "Stress in Preloaded Bolts,"
Product Engineering, 1964.
- 8. Roark, R. J.: "Formulas for Stress & Strain", 4th Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Co.
- 9. Timoshenko and Woinowsky-Krieger, Theory of Plates.and Shells, Second Edition.
- 10. NUREG/CR-6007, Stress Analysis of Closure Bolts for Shipping Casks, April 1992.
3A.6-1 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-1 BOLT PRELOAD (SHELL ELEMENTS)
~---
1
- -~--
I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSIT\' I I ---- I _ I (PSI) I I OUTER I INNER I OUTER I INNER I I I SURFACE I SURFACE! SURFACE! SURFACE! I 1_ _ _ . ____ I I I I I I I I I I I I I .1 .I I -s I I -13 I 13 I INNER I 2 I oI I 7 I I 7 I I 3 I I -31 I -61 6 I BOTIOM 41 -21 I 01 I 2 I 5 I I e I I o I 7 I .PLATE e I -12 I I -5 I I 12 ___ I I I I _ __ 1 I I I -15 I I I I -s I I I 7 15 I 8 I -15 I I -6 I I 15 I 9 I I -15 I I -s I 1s I INNER 10 I -15 I I -4 I I 15 I 11 I I -15 I I -5 I 15 I SHELL 12 I -15 I J -5 I I 15 I 13 I I -14 I I -3 I 14 I 14 I -16 I I -4 I I 16 I 15 I I -42 1 I o I 42 I 16 I 11 I I 16 I I 16 I 17 I I 309 I I 96 I 309 I I . ------ 18 I -334 I I -97 I I 334 I
*1- - * -- -* -** r ----.. *- -- --*----- *--- *-* --1 *- ---- -- - --------- *--- -- * -- * .. -
REV. 0 1/00
TABLE; 3A.2.3-2 BOLT PRELOAD (SOLID ELEMENTS) I I
-- ~ I I I STRESS COMPONENTS {PSI) STRESS I I LOCATION I INTENSITY I II I
I I
-I - - (PSI) I I
I I sx I SY sz SXY I II I
- I I
I I I I 11 FLANGE 19 l -40 I -765 -218 202 831 I II 20 I -182 109 2 270 613 I I I I l I I 21 I 43 1 43 -4 43 I I I LID 22 I 198 4 197 11 195 I I I I 23 I -20 0 -29 o I 29 11 OUTER 24 I 20 2 30 oI 28 II BOTI'OM 25 I *1 0 -11 1 I 11
. I I PLATE 26 I 4 0 14 1 I . 14 II I I 27 I 0 5 -1 oI 6 28 I 0 2 -1 I o I 4 I OUTER I 29 I 0 3 1 I o I 3 30 I 0 4 I 1 I o I 4 31 I 0 3 I 1 I 0 4 32 I 0 4 I 1 I 0 4 33 I 0 9 I 3 I 0 9 I SHELL I 34 I 0 -1 I -1 I 0 2
. --* - - ---- ---- -- . -- ------**I
- 35 I -5
-11_Ll_ _~L1 13 110 _I I 36 I -3 I 114 I 43 I 7 118 I
. I I I I I I I 37 I 1 I -5 I -2 I -1 6 l I WELDS I 38 I 30 I es I o I -25 78 I l 39 I -355 I 44 I -97 I -31 404 I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-3 ONE(1) G DOWN (SHELL ELEMENTS)
----1 -~--
I I I .MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I INTENSITY I I _ _ I (PSI) I OUTER I INNER OUTER INNER I I SURFACE I SURFACE SURFACE SURFACE I I _ I I _ __ I I I I I I 1 I 51 30 I 67 I INNER I 2 -29 I -7 I 29 I* I 3 I 21 17 I 37 I BOTTOM 4 2 I 6 I 6 I 5 I -37 o I 36 I PLATE 6 59 I 23 I 59 I I I _ __ I I I I I 7 I I -eo -1 I ao I 8 I -59 I -1 I 59 I 9 I I -51 oI 51 I INNER 10 I -51 I I o I 51 I 11 I . I -37 I -1 I 37 I SHELL 12 I -37 I I -1 . I 37 I 13 I I -23 I oI 23 I 14 I -24 I I o I 24 -**--* _____.__ J _______J ____ts_ 1-______ j_ _ _-L4-__L __ _1 -1 I 14. I I 16 I -9 I I 1 I I 9 I I 17 I I 1 I I 1 ~ 1 I I 18 I -20 I I ~ I I 20 ___ I I I I I f ___ REV. 0 1/00
TABLE3A2.~ ONE(1) G DOWN (SOLID ELEMENTS) I
-I I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) l STRESS I I LOCATION I ( INTENSITY I I
I I I
-I I I I
I (PSI) I I I I sx I SY I sz I SXY I I I I
-I I
I I I I t I I I I I I I FLANGE I 19 I oI -24 I -9 I 2 I 24 I I I 20 I -1 I -10 I -4 I 4 I 12 I I I I I I I I I I I 21 I 26 I o I 27 I o I 27 I I LID I 22 I -so I -1 I -s1 I -3 I so I I I I I I I I I 23 I 3 I -17 I 3 0 1 20 I OUTER I 24 I 2 I -19 I 2 oI 21 I BOTTOM I 25 I 5 I -17 I 4 oI 21 I PLATE I 26 I 1 I -18 I 2 oI 20 I I I I I I I I 27 I oI -64 I -2 o I 64 I I 28 I oI -56 I 0 oI 56 I OUTER I 29 I oI -52 I 0 oI 52 I I 30 I 0 I. -51 I 0 oI 52 I I 31 I oI -38 I 0 o I 38 I I 32 I oI -38 I 0 oI 38 I I 33 I OI -24 I 0 oI 24 I I SHELL I 34 I oI -2s I 0 oI 2s I I I 35 I o I -23 I -4 I 1 I 23 I I I - ----- --- -- *i----- ---,I I 36 I 37 I o oI I
---- ----,--------,-----1 1 I
-72 I 4 I I
-9 I 1 I 1 I
,------,- 4 72 I
I I WELDS I 38 I oI s I o I 1 I s I I I 39 I 28 I 37 I 18 I 24 I so I I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-5 INTERNAL PRESSURE* 100 PSI (SHELL ELEMENTS)
-I -I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) J HOOP (PSI} I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSITY I I I I (PSI) I I OUTER I INNER I OUTER INNER I I l SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE SURFACE I l I
I
-I I I
I I I I I I I I 1 I -19 I -125 I 106 I I INNER I 2 -151 I I -45 I 151 I I. I 3 I -146 I -193 I 93 I I BOTTOM I 4 -24 I I 23 I 47 I l I 5 I 1113 I 266 I 1213 I I PLATE I 6 -1284 I I -436 I 1284 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 7 I 199 I 304 I 404 I I t 8 214 I I 279 I I 279 I I I 9 I 223 I I 441 I 541 I I INNER I 10 190 I I 401 I I 401 I I I 11 I 228 I I 428 I 528 I I SHELL I 12 185 I I 385 I I 385 I I I 13 I 225 I I 430 I 530 I I I 14 188 I I 389 I I 369 I I ----- I 15 I I 191 I I 304 I 404 I - - - - - --1---- e--r---2221------1 2sr1-- r--~s4-1--- I I 17 I I -221 I I 182 I 403 I I I 18 I 627 I I 407 I I 627 I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.l-6 INTERNAL PRESSURE-100 PSI (SOLID ELEMENTS) I
-I I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSIT't' I I
I I I
-I -I -I I (PSI)
I I I I I sx I SY I sz I SXY I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I FLANGE I 19 I -10 I 687 I 439 I -59 I 707 I I 20 I 3 I 200 I 277 I -122 I 333 I I I I I I I I 21 I . -726 I -30 I -742 I 11 712 I LID I 22 I 1642 I 25 I 1660 I 68 1638 I I I I I I I I 23 I -799 I -91 I -809 I -49 721 I OUTER I 24 I 1088 I 2 I 1095 I -28 1093 I BOTTOM I 25 I -355 I -97 I -581 I 23 486 I PLATE I 26 I 623 I -12 I 851 I 28 865 I I I I I I I I 27 1 -78 I 107 I 199 I 23 279 I I 28 I -6 I 204 I 189 I 17 212 I OUTER I 29 I -78 I 104 I 393 I -6 472 I I 30 I 1 I 201 I 341 I -5 I 341 I I 31 I -78 I 158 I 396 I 0 I 475 I I*
- --- ---- - -- ----,--------1---33 I 32 r- - o I 1s2 I 317 I
--=1a-*1 - - -142-r---39e- r-------2 0 I, 316
--474--
I
-r- - --
I I SHELL I 34 I oI 166 I 324 I 1 I 324 I I I 35 I ..ao I 372 I 342 I -32 I 457 I I I 36 I -3 I -55 I 162 t -27 I 228 I I I I I I I I I I I 37 I 38 I -419 I -111 I -40 I 464 I I WELDS I 38 I 19 I -96 I 182 I -4 I 278 I I I 39 I -683 I -1005 I -438 I -646 I 1332 I I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-7 EXTERNAL PRESSURE- 25 PSI (SHELL ELEMENTS)
-I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) STRESS I I LOCATION I INTENSITI I I I (PSI) I I OUTER INNER I OUTER I INNER I I SURFACE SURFACE I SURFACE) SURFACE I I
I
-I I I
I I I I I 1 52 I I 54 54 I INNER I 2 -41 I -43 I 43 I I 3 36 I I 44 44 I BOTTOM I 4 -25 I -33 I 33 I I 5 -332 I I -90 332 I PLATE I 6 343 I 101 I 343 I I I I I I I I I I 7 ..S7 I I -91 91 I I 8 -82 I -95 I 95 I I 9 -73 I I -126 I 126 I INNER I 10 -76 I -127 I I 127 I I I 11 -75 I I -123 I 123 I I SHELL I 12 -75 I -123 I I 123 I I I 13 -74 I I -122 I 122 I I I 14 -75 I -122 I I 122 I I I 15 -96 I I -128 I 128 I I I 16 I -52 I -115 I I 115 I a I r*-- *- --*--1**--1*r-,-------=-1ser------, I I 17 I
-~
I
-1sn--* -113 I I
121 ra2-*1 I -----* I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-a EXTERNAL PRESSURE - 25 PSI (SOLID ELEMENTS) I
-.I I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I ( INTENSITI I I
I I I I
-I I (PSI) I I
I I sx I SY I sz I SXY I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I FLANGE I 19 I ~ I -184 I -181 l 10 181 I I I 20 I -16 I -80 I -144 I 26 138 I I I I I I I I I. I 21 I 165 I -18 I 170 I -2 187 I I LID I 22 I ~45 I -32 I ~9 I -19 418 I I I I I I I I I I 23 I 195 I -2 I 207 I 10 210 I I OUTER I 24 I -316 I -28 I -328 I 8 300 I I BOTTOM I 25 I 64 I -1 I 132 I -7 133 I I PLATE I 26 I -183 I -22 I -250 I -S 229 I I I I I I I I I I 27 I -5 I -51 I -74 I -6 69 I I I 28 I -23 I -75 I -72 I -4 53 I I OUTER I 29 I -5 I -50 I -124 I 2 119 I I I 30 I -25 I -75 I -111 I 1 86 I I I 31 I -5 I -64 I -125 I 0 120 I I I 32 I -25 I -62 I -105 I 0 80 I - - - - - - - - - -- I I 33 I -s I -59 I -123 I oI 118 I
--- l SRElr-- 1--- 34---T -- - ---~2s--r--
--..a1-r ----.;10a-1-- 0 --- --1 I I 35 I -6 I -142 I -147 I 5 I 141 I I I 36 I -25 I 12 I -81 I s I 93 I I I I I I I I I I I 37 I -35 I 86 I 5 I 10 I 122 I I WELDS I 38 I -29 I 17 I -106 I 1 I 123 I I I 39 I 164 I 234 I 100 I 159 I 326 I I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-9 THERMAL STRESS (SHELL ELEMENTS) I I I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I. I INTENSITY I I I I I OUTER I INNER I I OUTER I INNER I (PSI) I I I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE! I -I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I -795 I I -797 797 I INNER I 2 I -1153 I I -1151 I 1153 I I 3 I I -785 I I -792 792
.BOTTOM I 4 I -1164 I I -1156 I 1164 I 5 I I 245 I I -387 631 PLATE I 6 I -2193 I I -1562 I 2193 I I I I I I I I I I I 7 I I -887 I I -6689 6689 I 8 I -5714 I I -8137 I 8137 I 9 I I -3544 I I -2140 3544 INNER I 10 I -3106 I I -2009 I 3106 I 11 I I -3309 I I -2505 3309 SHELL I 12 I -3337 I I -2513 I 3337 I 13 I I -3385 I I -2370 3385 I 14 I -3262 I I -2333 I 3262 I 15 I I -4306 I I -103 I 4306
*-- _______ 1.________1_1~ -'-- ___:_2359___1 _ _ _ _ _ L_________~!_L ____l _ 28~
I I 17 I I -7890 I I -1788 I 7890 I I 18 I 1175 I 1 931 I I 1175 I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-10 THERMAL STRESS (SOLID ELEMENTS) I
-I I I STRESS COMPONENTS {PSI) I STRESS l LOCATION I I INTENSITY I I l (PSI)
I I I I I I I sx SY I sz I SXY I I
-I I I
I I I I I FLANGE I 19 I -1478 815 I -603 I -1452 3699 I I 20 I -2365 -3029 I -2020 I -1695 3454 1 1 I I I I I 21 I -1865 -36 I *1859 I 95 1838 1 LIO I 22 I 14e -3 I 150 I -11 154 I I I I I 1 I 23 I 1074 -3 I 1069 I 78 1088 I OUTER I 24 I -1124 -22 I -1121 I 53 1107 I BOTTOM I 25 I 1068 -10 I 1070 I 27 1080 I PLATE I 26 I -1115 0 I -1115 I 52 1120 I I I I I I I 27 I -99 399 I 457 I 517 1148 I I 28 I 2 692 I 447 I 1508 3093 I OUTER I 29 I -104 -1486 I 224 I -209 1741 I I 30 I 7 I 2420 I 1221 I -167 2436 I I I 31 I -:ro-3-1--*553--r- -54e---1----*s-1--1se--1--* I I 32 I 0 1 453 I 385 I 5 I 453 I I I 33 I -104 I 319 I eo2 I 39 I 710 I I SHELL I 34 I 6 I 780 I 599 t 31 I 756 I I I 35 I ~6 I 1815 I 3339 I -111 I 3997 I I I 36 I -787 I -2842 I 1055 I -216 J 3919 I I I I I I I I I I I 37 I 94 I -1136 I 99 I -215 I 1304 I I WELOS I 38 I 902 I -3581 I 1317 I -390 I 4931 I I I 39 I 9533 I 708 I 4826 I 1392 I 9253 I I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-11 THREE(3) G ON TRUNNION (SHELL ELEMENTS)
~~~- -~~~
- I I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSITY I I _ I I (PSI) I I OUTER I INNER I OUTER INNER I I I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE SURFACE! I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I -138 I -206 I . 157 I I -INNER I 2 -137 I I -70 I 137 I I I 3 I -192 1 -222 I 174 I I BOTTOM I 4 -83 I I -53 I 83 I t I 5 I 451 I 18 I 499 I I PLATE I 6 -726 I I -293 I 726 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 7 I 92 I -75 I 167 I I I 8 99 I I -72 I 172 I I I 9 I 117 I -6 I 123 I I INNER I 10 124 I I -4 I 128 I I I 11 I 161 I -8 I 169 I I SHELL I 12 162 I I -8 I 169 I I I 13 I I 21 o I I a I 21 o I
______________ j ________ J _____ J_!_ I 196 I I 4 1 I 196 I I I 15 __ I___ -------,---184_1 ________l__ --:251---209 I I 1e I 295 I I 8 I I 295 I I I 17 I I 211 I I -119 I 391 I I I 18 I 220 I I -135 I I 355 I ___ I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3--12 THREE(3) G ON TRUNNION (SOUD ELEMENTS) I I I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSITY I I I I (PSI) I I I I I I I sx SY sz SXY I I I I -I I I 1 I I I I FLANGE I 19 I 46 127 -200 66 I 364 I I I 20 I 51 151 -178 75 I 369 I I I I I I I. LID I I 21 22 I I 67
-224
-1
-4 69
-226 -10 0 I I
70 222 I I I I I I I I I 23 I -598 -45 -625 -35 I 582 I I OUTER I 24 I 741 9 768 -19 I 759 I I BOTTOM I 25 I -292 -49 -449 13 I 401 I I PLATE I 26 I 431 -6 588 16 I 594 I I I I 1 I I I 27 I 0 186 -71 18 I 259 I I I 28 I -3 74 -86 14 I 162 I I OUTER I 29 I 0 126 -7 -2 I 133 I I I 30 I 0 176 8 -2 I 176 I I I 31 I 0 193 1 0 I 193 I I I 32 I 0 193 1 0 I 193 I I I 33 I 0 269 I 15 I -2 I 269 I
-- -- - -SHELL--+--34- - - - -D-1--202--1--- _-6__ j_ I 20_8_)
I I 35 I -4 I -185 I -137 I -11 I 182 I I I 36 I -61 I 244 I -13 I 241 I 570 I I I I I I I I I I I 37 I 21 I -232 I -102 I -26 I 259 I I WELDS I 38 I -39 I -179 I -276 I -11 I 238 I I I 39 I 202 I 244 I 130 1 116 I 236 I I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
j --- TABLE 3A2.3-13 ONE(1) G LATERAL (SHEU. ELEMENTS) I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I LOCATION I INTENSITY I I OUTER INNER OUTER I- INNER I I (PSI) I SURFACE SURFACE SURFACE I SURFACE I I I I I I I I '1 27 I 25 I 27 I INNER 2 4 12 I I 12 1 3 40 I 86 I ea t BOTTOM 4 39 83 I I 83 I 5 *27 I 146 I 173 I PLATE 6 188 242 I I 242 I I I I I 7 322 55 I 323 I 8 310 58 I 310 I 9 228 *13 I 241 I INNER 10 237 2 I 237 I 11 107 -20 I 127 I SHELL 12 116 1 I 116 I 13 21 -15 I 36 I 14 27 7 I 27 I 15 I -40 .so I 60 I 16
{ -- - ----,----11
-16 I -35 I 35 I .S3 -97 I 96 I I 18 3 I ~o I 63 I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A2.3-14 ONE(1) G LATERAL (SOLID ELEMENTS) T I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION ! INTENSITY I. I -I I (PSI) I I I I I I I sx I SY I sz I SXY I I I -I I I I 1 I I I -I I I I I FLANGE I 19 -22 I -34 I -114 I -6 t 94 I I I 20 -24 I -25 I -95 I -7 I 77 I 1 I I I I I I I I 21 2 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 3 I I - LID I 22 3 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 3 I I I I I I I I I I 23 -18 I -1 I -36 I -5 I 36 I I OUTER I 24 -95 I 42 I -142 I 7 I 184 I I BOTIOM I 25 -72 I -1 I -75 -5 I 74 I I PLATE I 26 -75 I 5 I -109 2 I 114 I I I I I I I I I 27 2 I 365 I 25 2 I 362 I I I 28 1 I 333 I 15 -7 I 332 I I OUTER I 29 1 I 245 I -45 6 I 290 I I I 30 -1 I 274 I -5 -3 I 279 I I I 31 0 I 119 I -61 3 I 180 I I I 32 0 I 160 I 18 .3 I 161 I I I 33 I o I 44 I -66 2 I 110 I LSJ:tE_LL__ ,___3A_J___ _ o I 68 I 22 -2 I 68 I I I 35 I ' - - f f----- 1-- *- -100--1-*--01*---fo1--r I I 36 I -1 I 63 I 8 I oI 64 I I I I I I I I I I I 37 I -14 I 696 I 170 I -15 I 711 I I WELDS I 38 I 0 I 66 I -17 I 6 I 84 I I I 39 I 86 I 86 I 65 I 36 I 72 I I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-15 ONE(1) G SIDE DROP- CONTACT SIDE (SHELL ELEMENTS) I
-I I
I I "MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I I INTENSITY I I I I I (PSI) I I I OUTER I INNER I OUTER I INNER I I I I SURFACE I SURFACE! SURFACE I SURFACE! I I -I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I -112 I 96 I 209 I I INNER I 2 I -122 I 93 I I 215 I I I 3 I I -167 I 103 I 269 I I BOTTOM I 4 I -148 I 113 I I 262 I I. I 5 I I -819 I -258 I 819 I I PLATE I 6 I 235 I 96 I I 235 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 7 I I 51 125 I 132 I I I 8 I -106 I -250 I 250 t I I 9 I I -1 190 I 197 I I INNER I 10 I -174 I -297 I 297 I I I 11 I I -12 231 I 243 I I SHELL I 12 I -197 l -311 I 311 I I I 13 I I 11 191 I 199 I I I 14 I -162 I -305 I 305 I I I 15 I I 134 52 I 142 I I I 16 I 64 I -259 I 323 I ___ _j .J 17 J I 299 107 I 306 I 18 -~248_1 __ 2~s--1 I I I -23 I l I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-18 ONE(1) G SIDE DROP - CONTACT SIDE (SOLID ELEMENTS) I I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSO I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSln' I I I I I I
-I I I (PSI)
I I I I I sx I SY I sz I SXY I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I FL.ANGE I 19 I 71 I 45 l 21 I 51 I 106 I I I 20 I 59 I 125 I -183 I 63 I 346 I I I I I l ~ I I I I 21 I 0 I 104 I -90 I -16 I 197 I 1- LID I 22 I 553 I 39 I 159 I -92 I 546 I I I I I I I I I I I 23 I -80 I 0 l 43 I -9 I 125 I t OUTER I 24 I -62 I 0 I s2 I 1 I 114 I I BOTTOM I 25 I -178 I 0 I 13 I -12 I 193 I I PLATE I 26 I -15 I 3 I e2 I -3 I 98 I I I I I I I I l I I 27 I -8 I 217 I 617 I -11 I 625 I I I 28 t -142 I -368 I -602 I -11 I 460 I I OUTER I 29 I -3 I 247 I 897 I -1 I 900 I I I 30 I -144 I -470 I -868 I -2 I 724 I I I 31 I -1 I 257 I 1061 I 0 I 1062 I I I 32 I -144 I -508 I -983 I 0 I 840 I I I 33 I -2 I 248 I 975 I 1 I 977 I I SHEL~ _ _l _ _~_l _ __:!~_J_ -478 I -920 I 2 I 776 I I I 35 I -18 I 163 1-ss11----121 570- I I 36 I -146 I -287 I -640 I 4 I 493 I I I I I I I I 1 I I 37 I -159 I 153 I -142 I -11 I 312 I I WELDS I 38 I -128 I -232 I -677 I -49 I 568 I I I 39 I -132 I -121 I -93 I -55 I 111 I I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-17 ONE(1) G SIDE DROP - SIDE OPPOSITE CONTACT (SHELL ELEMENTS)
-I -I I I MERIDIONAL {PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSITY I I
I -OUTER I - I INNER I OUTER I INNER I I (PSI) I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I I I
-I I
I I I I I 1 I -106 I 75 181 I INNER I 2 -93 I I 82 175 I I 3 I -88 I 49 137 I BOTTOM I 4 -76 I I 53 128 I I 5 I -241 I -54 241 I PLATE I 6 109 I I 63 109 I I I I I I I I I I 7 I 1 I 6 6 I I 8 -26 I I -43 43 I I 9 I -36 I 24 60 I INNER I 10 -75 I I -62 75 I I 11 I -54 I 46 100 I SHELL 1 12 -104 I I -68 104 I I 13 I -36 I 24 60 I I 14 -75 I I -62 75 I I 15 I 33 I -48 81 I I 16 36 I I -68 103 I I 17 I I 70 I -59 129
~-1 --l--18---1----36_j_ _J -83 119 I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.3-1 B ONE(1) G SID~ DROP- SIDE OPPOSITE CONTACT (SOLID ELEMENTS)
-I I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) ~STRESS I l LOCATION I I INTENSITY I I I I (PSI) I I I sx I I I I r I I I SY I sz I SXY I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l FLANGE I 19 I 10 I 9 -90 19 I 119 I I I 20 I 9 I 36 -98 21 I 151 I I I I I I I I 21 I s I -104 85 15 190 1 I LID I 22 I -514 I -39 -201 94 511 I I I I I I I I 23 I -62 I 0 24 -5 87 I I OUTER I 24 -15 I 1 35 0 so I I BOTTOM I 25 -a2 I 0 5 -4 87 I I PLATE 1 26 19 I 1 26 -4 26 I I I I I I I 27 o I 15 95 -3 95 I I I 28 -1 I -76 -76 -5 76 I I OUTER I 29 1 I 2s I 173 0 173 I I I 30 -2 I -151 I -169 -3 167 I I I 31 2 I 2a I 255 0 253 I I I 32 -1 I -204 I -228 0 221 I I I 33 1 I 22 I 199 I 1 1sa I I SHELL I 34 -2 I -112 I -187 I 2 I 186 I I I 35 -4 I -18 I 31 I 4 I so I
1------r-- -3s- ----- -.3 --1----;;;3s-1-- -1----4--1 62-J I I I I I l I I I I 37 l -7 I 62 t 23 I 3 l 70 1 I WELDS I 38 I -2 I -29 I -as I -3 I 83 I I I 39 I -33 I -57 I -19 I -7 I 40 I I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE JA.2.3-19 SEISMIC LOAD - 2G DOWN + 1G LATERAL (SHELL ELEMENTS) I -I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I . HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSITY I I I I (PSI) I I OUTER I INNER I OUTER I INNER I I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I
- I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I 129 I I 85 I 162 I I INNER I 2 -54 I I -3 I I 54 I I I . 3 I 82 I I 119 I 151 I I BOTTOM I 4 42 I I 94 I I 94 I I I 5 I -101 I I 146 I 246 I PLATE I 6 306 I I 288 I I 306 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 7 I 203 I I 53 l. 203 I I 8* 193 I I 56 I I 193 I I 9 I 126 I 1 -14 I 140 I INNER I 10 135 I I 1 I I 135 I I 11 I 32 I I -21 I 54 I SHELL I 12 41 I I o I I 42 I I 13 I -26 I I -15 I 26 I 1 14 -21 I I 6 I I 27 I I 15 I J!J7 I I -62 I 67 I I 16 I -33 I I -34 I I . 34
---- -*--- -L- *--------'- _J_L J _______ L____~g___I I -95 I 95 I I I 18 I -37 I I -~12-1----1---12-1--
I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A2.3-20 SEISMIC LOAD-2G OOWN + 1G LATERAL (SOLID ELEMENTS) I
-1. I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSQ I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSITY I I (PSQ I.
I I I I I I I I I I I sx I SY I sz I SXY I I I I
-I I I
I I I I I I I I I I l FLANGE I 19 l -22 I -82 I -131 I -2 I 109 I I I 20 I -26 I -45 I -104 I 1 I 78 I I I I I I I I I I I 21 I 55 I o I 53 I -1 I 55 I I LID I 22 I -117 I -2 I -121 I -5 I 119 I I I I I I I I I I I 23 I -12 I -35 I -30 I -s I 24 I I OUTER I 24 I -90 I 4 I -137 I 7 I 142 I BOTTOM I 25 I. -62 I -34 I -67 I -4 I 33 I PLATE I 26 I -73 I -30 I -10s I 3 I 75 I I I I I I I 27 I 2 I 237 I 21 I 2 I 235 I I 28 I 1 I 221 I 16 I -7 I 220 I OUTER I 29 I 1 I 141 I -44 I 6 I 186 I I 30 I -1 I 171 I -4 I -3 I 175 I I 31 I o I 43 I -61 I 3 I 104 I I 32 I o I 84 I 1a I -3 I as I I 33 I o I -3 I -65 I 2 I es I SHELL I 34 I o I 18 I 22 I -2 I 23 I - . --+---------!-- - _35 1- ------0-1----~93___,_ --~toz._1._____ 2 J ______1Q~__J__ . I . I 36 I -1 I ee I 16 I 2 I 67 I I I I I I I I I I I 37 I -14 I 553 I 151 I -13 I 567 I I WELDS I 38 I oI 76 I -17 I 7 I 93 I I I 39 I 142 I 161 I 101 I as I 171 I I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
II TABLE 3A.2.5-1 NORMAL CONDITION LOAD COMBINATIONS I It:UJIVIDUAL LOAt BOLT lG I~TERNAL EXTERNAL 3G OR 6G TUNNION STRESS COMBINED LOAD PERLOAD DOWN P~ESSURE PRESSURE THERMAL ON LOCAL TABLE I 110 PSI 25 PSI TRUNNION STRESS NO. 3G OR 6G
- Nl *X x II x x 3A.2.5-2
. I I
3A.2.5-3 N2 x x x xu' xu' 3A.2.5-4 3A.2. 5-5 NJ x x I x 3A.2.5-6 I I 3A.2.5-7 I I N4 x x x x 3A.2 .5-8 JA.2.5-9 NS x II x x x<11 x111 3A. 2. 5-10 I JA.2.5-11 N6 x I x x x<21 x'21 3A.2. 5-4 I 3A.2.5-5 I I N? x x x x'21 x'2*1 3A.2.5-10 Notes: I 3A.2. 5-11
- 1) Load combination Jased on 3G lifting weight (TN-32 & TN-32A Casks)
- 2) Load combination Based on 6G lifting weight (TN-32B Cask)
.I .
I REV. O 1/00
*TABLE 3A.2.S.-2 BOLT PRELOAD+100 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE+1 G DOWN+THERMAL (SHELL ELEMENTS)
I
~~~----- -
I
-~~~
I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I LOCATION I I INTENSIT'Y I _ I _ I (PSI) I I OUTER I INNER I OUTER I INNER I I I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I I _ _,...;.) I I I 1--- 1 I I I I I I 1 I I -768 I I -905 I 789 I INNER 2 I -1333 I I -1196 I I 1333 I 3 I I -913 I I -974 I 858 I BOTIOM 4 I -1188 I I -1127 I I 1188 I s I I 1328 I I -121 I 1449 I PLATE 6 I -3429 I I -1980 I I 3429 I -1 I I I _ __ I I I I I I 7 I -764 I I -6392 I 6292 I 8 I -5574 1 -7865 I l 7865 I 9 I -3387 I I -1705 I 3287 I INNER 10 I -2982 I -1613 I I 2982 I 11 I -3133 I I -2os2 I 3033 I SHELL 12 I -3205 I -2133 I I 3205 I 13 I -3197 I I -1943 I 3097 I I 14 I -3114 I -1948 I I 3114 I I .15 I -4171 I I 200 I 4371 I I 16 I -2135 I 781 I I 2916 I I I 17 I -7800 I I -1509 I 1100 I
1------ 18 +----1448 --t::: 123_6 I ; __144_8 !------------
REV. 0 l/'00
TABLE 3A.2.~3 BOLT PRELOA0+100 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE+1 G OOWN+THERMAL (SOLID ELEMENTS) I
--- I
- I I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSIT'i I
- I I
__ , I - I (PSI) I I I I I I I I sx I SY I sz SXY I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I FLANGE I 19 I -1528 I 112 I -391 -1307 I 3442 I I I 20 I -2545 I -2729 I -1744 -1543 I 3091 I I 1_1 I I I I I I 21 I -2522 I -ea I -2532 102 I 2470 I I LID I 22 I 1928 I 25 I 1946 65 I 1924 I I 1_1 I I I I I I 23 I 257 I -112 I 233 30 I 374 I I OUTER I 24 I -13. I -37 I 6 24 I SB I l BOTTOM I 25 I_ 717 I -123 I 4S2 s1 . I 846 I I PLATE I 26 I -487 I -30 I -248 81 I 485 I I 1_1 I I I I 1 I 21 I -177 I 448 I 653 540 I 1248 I I l 28 I -4 I B42 I 634 1524 I 3164 I I OUTER I 29 J -183 I -1431 I 618 -215 I 2085 I I I 30 I a I 2574 I 1564 I -111 I 2589 I
_J_ ____J __31 I -182 I 776 I 944 I e I 1125 I 1 1 32,-------oi----s11-r-1ot-1--*---s-1 102--1-- -- -----------
I I 33 I *183 I 447 I 1001 I 40 I 1186 I I SHELL I 34 I eI goo I 923 I 32 I 917 I I I 35 I -730 I 2052 I 3657 I -189 I 4400 l I I 36 I -793 I -21s1 I 1264 I -234 I 4072 I I 1_1 I I I I I I I 37 I 133 I -1633 I -24 I -255 I 1837 I I WE LOS I 38 I 951 I -3608 I 1498 I -418 I 5144 I I I 39. I 8524 I -215 l 4309 I 738 I 8862 I I 1_1 I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
*TABLE 3A.2.s.4 BOLT PRELOAD+100 PSI PRESSURE+THERMAL+3G UP+TRUNNION LOCAL STRESS (SHELL ELEMENTS)
I I
- I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP {PSI) I STRESS I LOCATION I I tNTENSIT't I
---- I _ I (PSI) I OUTER I INNER I OUTER I INNER I I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I I
----- I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I -957 I -1141 I 992 I INNER I 2 *1442 I I -1258 I 1442 I I 3 I -112e I -1213 I 1065 I BOTTOM I 4 -1273 I I -1186 I 1273 I I s I 1816 I *103 I 1964 I PLATE I 6 -4215 I I *2296 I 4215 I
___ t_l l I I I I I I I I 7 I I -612 I -6466 I 6366 I s I -5416 I I -7937 I 7937* I 9 I I -3219 I -1110 I 3119 I INNER 10 I *2807 I. I -1617 I 2807 I 11 I I -2934 I -2089 I 2834 I SHELL 12 I -3006 I I -2140 I 3006 I 13 1 I *2964 I -1934 I 2864 I 14 I -2895 I I -1944 I 2695 I 15 I I -3973 I 177 I 4149 I 16 I -1831 I I 789 I 2e20 I 17 I I -7531 I I -1629 I 7431 I
-T- re-r- *1es8_T _ --- -- -11oi-1------1---1esa--1---------------
1 1-1 I I I I 1
- Maximum combined stress intensity due to 6 G up is 8,775 psi REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.S-5 BOLT PRELOA0+100 PSl(INT. P)+THERMAL+3G UP+TRUNNION LOCAL STRESS (SOLID ELEMENTS)
~--------- -~--~
I I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I LOCATION I
- I INTENSIT'Y I I _ _ _ I (PSI) I I I I I I I I SX I SY I sz I SXY I I
-----1 I I I I I I I I I I FLANGE I 19 I -1482 I 863 I -582 I -1242 3416 I I 20 *2492 I -2567 I -1918 I -1472 2944 I
-- I I I I I 21 -2481 -ee I -2489 I 102 2427 I LID I 22 1764 21 I 1780 I 58 1761 I
-- I I I I 23 -343 -140 I -395 I -5 255 I OUTER I 24 725 -9 I 772 I 6 781 I BOTTOM I 25 420 -155 I 29 I 64 589 I PLATE I 26 -56 -18 I 337 I 97 474 I
-- I I I I 27 -177 698 I 584 I 558 1419 I I 2s -7 973 I 548 I 1538 3229 I OUTER I 29 I -183 -1253 I 611 I -217 1906 I I 30 I 8 2801 I 1571 I -173 2815 I I I 31 I -182 1006 I 945 I e I 11 ss I
1----1--32 0--1-----802---1-- --103-1-----5-1------802__ ,_ --*------- -*-- - -
1 I 33 I -183 I 739 I 1016 I 38 I 1201 I I SHELL I 34 I 7 I 1127 I 917 I 30 I 1122 I I I 35 I -734 I 1890 I 3523 .1 -200 I 10897* I I I 36 I -854 I -2538 I 1247 I e I 10410 I I 1-1 I I I I I I I 37 I 154 I *1793 I -11e I *282 l 2021 I I WELDS I 38 I 912 I -3791 I 1222 I -430 I 5052 I I I 39 I 8698 I -8 I 4421 I 830 I 8863 I I 1__:1 I I I I I
- Maximum combined stress Intensity due to SG up is 20,975 psi REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.5-6 BOLT PRELOA0+1 G DOWN+25 PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE (SHELL ELEMENTS)
--~---- ---~-
I I I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I ~TRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSlll I I _ I _ I (PSI) I I I OUTER I INNER I OUTER I INNER I I I I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACe I SURFACE I I I --1 I I I I I I I I I
- I I I I I I 1 I I 98 I I 72 I 11s I I INNER 1 2 I -70 I I -43 I 70 I I I 3 I I 54 I I 55 71 I I BOTTOM I 4 I -25 I I -27 I 27 I I I s I I -362 I I -91 346 I I PLATE I a I 391 I I 119 I 391 I I l_I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 7 I I -142 I I -99 142 I I a I -156 I I -103 I 156 I I 9 I I *140 I I -131 140 I I INNER 10 I -142 I I -132 I 142 . I I 11 I I -121 I I -128 12e I I SHELL 12 I -127 I I -128 I 128 t I 13 I I -111 I I -125 125 I I 14 I -115 I I -126 I 126 I I 15 I I *153 I I -129 153 I I 1e I -49 I I -98 I 98 I I 17 I I 319 I I -16 335 I I 18 I -511 I I -265 I I 511 l
--r.---1:=:--1----. ---1--- I 1-----1-------------- REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.5-7 BOLT PRELOAD+1 G DOWN+25 PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE (SOLID ELEMENTS) I
--- -I.
I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I LOCATION I INTENSln I I
-I I. -.I I (PSI)
I I sx I SY I sz *I SXY I I I I I-I I I I I I I I FLANGE I 19 -44 I -974 I -408 I 214 I 1024 I I 20 -199 I 19 I -146 I 300 I 638 I f _ I I I
-17 I -e I
I I I LID I 21 I 22 I 23 234 I
-307 178 I I
I
*29 I I
-19 I 239
-313 181 I
I I I
-11 10 256 284 201 I OUTER I 24 -294 I -45 I -296 I 8 251 I BOliOM I 25 69 I -17 I 124 I -6 142 I PLATE I 26 -178 I -40 I -234 I -5 194 I
I I I 27 I 28
-e I
*24 I
I -129 I
-110 I I
-77
..73 I
I I
-e
-4 105 106 I OUTER I 29 -e I -99 I -123 I 1 117 I I 30 -25 I -122 I -110 I 1 97 I I 31 -6 I -98 I -124 I 0 119 I I 32 -25 I -96 I -104 I 0 79 I I 33 -6 I -74 I -120 I -1 115 I SHELL I 34 I -25 I -93 I -101 I -1 I 82 I
1---- -T- s-s-r-- - *:-r1-r *-:211-1---111-r- --19--1---2e9-1---------- -
I I I I 36 I I 37 I
-28
-34 I I
I 121 I 9 I I
*34
-6 I
I I 13 10 I I I . 162 47 I I I I WELDS I 38 I 1 I 86 I -107 I -23 I 199 I I I 39 I -163 I 316 I 20 I 152 I 567 I I 1_1 I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.5-8 BOLT PRELOA0+1G OOWN+25 PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE+THERMAL (SHELL ELEMENTS) I
--- -I -I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSIT'r I I
I I OUTER I
- INNER I I
OUTER I INNER I I (PSI} I I I I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I I I - ___;,,,. I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I -697 I I -725 709 I I INNER 2 I -1223 I I -1194 I 1223 I I 3 I I -731 I I -737 721 I I BOTTOM 4 I -1189 I I -1182 I 1189 I I 5 I I -117 I -477 461 I I PLATE 6 I -1802 I -1442 I 1802 I I -1 I I l I I I I I I 7 I I *1030 I -6788 6788 I I 8 I -5870 I -8240 I 8240 I I 9 I I -3683 I -2271 3683 I I INNER 10 I *3247 I *2141 I 3247 I I 11 I I -3436 I -2633 3436 I I SHELL 12 I -3464 I -2642 I 3464 I I 13 I I -3496 I -2494 3496 I I 14 I -3378 I -2459 I 3378 I I 15 I I -4459 I -232 4459 I I 16 I -2408 I 383 I 2791 I I I 17 I I -7571 I -1804 7571 I L~ _I __ 66!_J__
' L 667 I I
667 I I 1-1 I I I REV. 0 1/00
. TABLE 3A.2.5-9 BOLT PRELOAD+1G OOWN+25 PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE+THERMAL (SOLID ELEMENTS)
I
--- - - - -I ,
I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I LOCATION I INTENSIT'f I I
-I -I -I I (PSI)
I I sx I SY I sz I SXY I I I -- I I I I I I I I I I I I -159 I I -1238 I FLANGE 19 -1s22 -1011 2826 I I 20 -2563 I -3009 J -2166 I -1395 I 2825 I 1 I I I I I 21 -1630 I -53 I -1e20 I 89 I 1587 I LID I 22 -159 I -33 1 -163 I -22 I 134
*1 1_1 I I I I I I 23 I 12s2 I -22 I 1250 I 89 I 1286 I OUTER I 24 I -1417 I -fJ7 I -1416 I s1 I 1355 I I 25 I I I I 21 I BOTTOM 1136 -21 1194 1222 I PLATE I 26 I -1293 I -39 I -1349 I 46 I 1312 I I I I I I I 21 I -10s I 289 I 380 I s12 I 1097 I I 28 I -22 I 563 I 374 I 1503 I 3063 I OUTER I 29 I -110 I *1585 I 101 I -201 I 1715 I I 30 I -18 I 2298 I 1111 I -1ee I 2339 I I 31 I -109 I 554 I 422 I e I 663 I I 32 I , -2s I 357 I 281 I 5 I 382 I I 33 I -110 I 245 I 482 I 38 I 595 I SHELL I 34 I -19 I 667 I 492 I 30 I 669 I
- - - , - - -- ---1-3s-1--;as1-1--*1531-1----31sa-r --;152-1-- --3e3s--1-- I I I I 36 I I 37 I
-815 I so I I
-2715 I
-112e I
I 1021 I 93 I I
-203 I
-20s I
I 3757 I 12s1 I I I WELDS I I I I I I I 38 903 -3494 1210 -413 4743 I I 39 I 9370 I 1024 I 4846 I 1544 I 8899 I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.5-10 BOLT PRELOAD+25 PSl(EXT. P)+THERMAL+3G UP+TRUNNION LOCAL STRESS (SHELL ELEMENTS)
--- -I -I I MERIDIONAL (PSO I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I LOCATION I I INTENSIT'Y I
- I OUTER I INNER I OUTER I INNER I
- I (PSI)
SURFACE I SURFACE! SURFACE! SURFACE! I I 1 -886 -961 913 INNER I 2 -1332 *1256 1332 I 3 -944 -976 928 BOTTOM I 4 -1273 -1241 1273 I 5 370 -459 829 PLATE I 6 I . -2588 -1758 2588 I I I 7 I -878 -8861 6861 I 8 I -5712 -8311 8311* I 9 I -3515 -2277 3515 INNER I 10 I -3073 -2144 3073 I 11 I -3237 -2640 3237 SHELL I 12 I -3265 -2649 3265 I 13 I -3263 -2486 3263 I 14 I -3158 I -2455 3158 I 15 I -4261 I -256 4261 I 16 I -2105 I 391 2496 I 17 I -7301 I -1924 7301 1_1s __ j ___9_0:4___ L ___ .-1___ 538 904 1_1 I I
- Maxi!Tium combined stress intensity due to BG up is 8,591 psi REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.S-11 BOLT PRELOAD+25 PSl(EXT. P)+THERMAL+3G UP+TRUNNION LOCAL STRESS (SOLID ELEMENTS) I ---I -I I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSIT'Y I I I -I -I -I I (PSI) I I I I I I I I sx I I SY I I I sz I I I I I SXY I I I I I I I I I FL.ANGE I 19 I -1476 I -9 I -1202 I -1173 I 2768 I I I 20 I -2511 I -2848 I -2339 I -1324 I 2669 I I 1_1 I I I I I I I 21 J -1589 I -54 I -1578 I 90 I 1546 I I LID I 22 I -323 I -36 I -329 I *29 I 296 I I J_I I I I I I I 23 I 651 I -51 I 622 I 54 I 710 I I OUTER 24 I ""679 I -39 I -651 I 42 I 645 I I BOTTOM 25 I 839 I -59 I 741 l 33 I 901 I I PLATE 26 I -863 I -28 I -764 I 62 I 845 I I _J I I I I I I 21 I -105 I 540 I 311 I 530 I 1240 I I 2s I -25 I 693 I 288 I 1517 I 3118 I I OUTER 29 I -110 I -1407 I 94 I -209 I 1534 I I 30 I -18 I 2525 I 1119 I -167 I 2565 I I 31 I -109 I 785 I 423 I 6 I 894 I I 32 I -25 I 588 I 282 I 5 I 613 I I 33 I -110 I 537 I 497 I 36 I 651 I I SHELL 34 I -19 I 894 I 487 I 29 I 915 I
1---- 1-3s-1---aa1--1---1-3-7a-1---3034-I 1e4 -f-1033P-I---- - - - - - - -
I I 36 I -877 I -2472 I 1004 I 37 I 10101 I I 1_1 I I I I I I I 37 I 82 I -1288 I 0 I -232 I 1446 I I I I 864 I -3678 I I -425 I 4651 WELDS 38 934 I I I 39 I 9544 I 1230 I 4958 I 1636 I 8934 I I I I I I I
*Maximum combin~ stress intensity due to 6G up is 20,659 psi REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.5-12 ACIIDENT CONDITION LQAQ COMBINATIONS INDIVIDQAL LOAD BOLT INTERNAL EXTERNAL 18" TIP SEISMIC, STRESS COMBINED LOAD PERLOAD PRESStlRE I PRESSURE BOTTOM OVER TORNADO, TABLE 100 PPI 25 PSI END DROP SIDE OR FLOOD NO. SOG DROP lG-f SOG LATERAL+ i 2G-DOWN Al x x x 3A.2 .S-13 3A.2~5-14 A2 x x x 3A.2 .5-15 3A.2.5-16 A3 x x x 3A.2.5-1'7 3A.2.5-1B 3A.2.5-19 I 3A.2.5-20 A4 x I x x 3A.2.5-21 3A.2.5-22 3A.2.5-23 3A.2.5-24 AS x x x JA.2. 5-25 3A.2.5-26 A6 x x x 3A.2.5-27 3A.2.5-28 REV. 0 1 /00
- TABLE 3A.2.5-13
- BOLT PRELOAO + SOG DOWN ENO DROP+ 100 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE (SHELL ELEMENTS) 11
-----~-
II
-I -----
II
- I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I I INTENSIT't I I I _ I _ I (PSI) I I I OUTER I INNER I OUTER I INNER I I I ti SURFACE 11 SURFACE I SURFACE 11 SURFACE II I I --11 II I II II I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I 2543 I I 1362 I 3449 I INNER I 2 I *1591 I I -411 I I 1591 I I 3 I I 892 I r 638 I 1798 I BOTTOM I 4 I 60 I I 313 I 313 I I s I I -711 I 2s1 I 1157 PLATE I e I 1663 I I 701 I 1663
_ _ _ Jl_IJ I I JI _ __ I I I I I 7 I -2a12 I 230 I 3042 I a I -2129 I 22s I 2954 I 9 I -2343 I 41 s I 2758 INNER I 10 I -2374 I 375 I 2750 I 11 I -1es2 l 393 I 2045 SHELL I 12 I -1693 I 351 I 2044 I 13 I -962 I 417 I 1378 I 14 I -1011 I 372 I 1383 I 1s I -545 I 257 I 802 I 16 I -196 I 332 I 527
1-- _____ J_1J_L_ ----'----1~J I 303 _J 403 I I 18 I -100 I I 20 I I 719 II 11-11 II I II II _ __
REV. 0 1/00
. TABLE 3A.2.5-14 BOLT PRELOAO + SOG DOWN ENO CROP+ 100 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE (SOLID ELEMENTS) 11
---II -II
- I I I STRESS COMPONENTS {PSI) l STRESS I I LOCATION I 11NTENs1n 1 I
I I I
-I -
I -I I I (PSI) I I I __ IIu sx I SY I sz II S'X:f II I I I II I I I I I I FLANGE I 19 I -1297 I
--66 -212 244 l 1325 I I 20 I -228 -110 I 72 355 I 713 I I I I I 21 I 658 -38 I 671 -13 I 709 I LID I 22 I -1201 -31 I -1217 -47 I 1188 I 1_1 I I I I 23 I .S75 -940 I -687 -36 I 274 I OUTER I 24 I 1230 -948 I 1235 -35 I 2184 1 BOTTOM I 25 I -113 -927 1 -403 47 I 819 I PLATE I 26 I 671 -900 I 967 47 I 1869 I 1_1 I I I I 21 I -79 -3083 I 83 15 I 3166 I I 2s I -9 -2599 I 201 11 I 2800 I OUTER I 29 I -80 -2488 I 415 -10 I 2903 I I 30 I 1 -2363 I 366 -8 I 2728 I I 31 I -79 -1734 I 400 0 I 2134 I I 32 I 0 -1739 I 320 0 I 2059 I I I 33 I -79 -1029 I 413 *1 I 1442 I
~- ____ j _Sr.-fELL __ L_~_J 1 --~'Q7__LI___ 320 *1 I 1391 I I I 104$-fl I I 35 -90 I -903 142 31 I I I 36 I -5 I 132 I 396 28 I 406 I I I I I I I I 37 I 39 I -4011 I -581 -8 I 4050 I I WELDS I 38 I 40 I 198 I 176 0 I 156 I I I 39 I 370 I 911 I 368 543 I 1213 I I 1_1 I I I I REV. 0 1/00
*TABLE 3A.2.S..15 BOLT PRELOAD + 50G DOWN END DROP+ 25 PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE (SHELL ELEMENTS)
II
---II -I -II . I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I I INTENSIT'r I I
I I I - OUTER I INNER I I - OUTER I INNER I (PSI) I I II SURFACE 11 SURFACE I SURFACE II SURFACE II I --11 II I u II I I I I I I I I I 1 I I 2e14 I I 1542 I 3420 I INNER I 2 I -1481 I I -409 I I 1481 I I 3 I I 1074 I I 875 I 1880 I BOTIOM I 4 I 59 I I 258 I I 258 I I 5 I I -2156 I I -105 I 2051 I PLATE I e I 3289 I I 1239 I I 3289 I 1-11 II I II II I I I I I I I 7 I I -3078 I I -165 I 3078 I 8 I -3024 I I *149 I I 3024 I 9 I I -2639 I I -152 I 2639 I INNER 10 I -2640 I I -152 I I 2640 I 11 I I -1955 I I -158 I 1955 I SHELL 12 I *1952 I I -157 I I 1952 I 13 I I -12eo I I -135 I 1260 I 14 I -1274 I I -140 I I 1274 I 15 I I -833 I I -170 I 833* I 16 I -470 I I -e1 I I 470 I 17 I I 374 I I 16 I 374
,--- ---1*1a -r---=-14a2r------r---S41-1-- I 1-is2 II 11_11 II I II II REV. 0 1/00
- TABLE 3A.2.5-18 BOLT PRELOAO + SOG DOWN ENO DROP + 25 PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE (SOLID ELEMENTS)
II
---II -JI
- I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I LOCATION 1INTENSIT'r I
I
-I -I -I I (PSI)
I sx II SY. I sz II sxv I I -- II I I I II I l FLANGE 19 -56 I -2191 I -851 I 313 2225 I 20 -243 I -437 I -357 I 508 1034 I I I I I 21 1606 I *23 I 1640 I -28 1664 .I LIO 22 -3344 I -89 I -3383 I -136 3300 I I I I I 23 319 I -850 I 329 I 23 1180 I OUTER 24 -175 I -979 I -187 I 1 804 I BOTTOM 25 307 I -831 I 310 I 16 1141 I PLATE 26 -135 I -910 I -134 I 12 776 I I I I I 27 .7 I -3241 I -189 I *13 3234 I 28 -27 I -2879 I -eo I -10 2852 l OUTER 29 ..7 I -2642 I -103 I -2 2636 I 30 -24 I -2639 I -87 I -2 2615 I 31 -6 I -1956 I -121 I 0 1949 I 32 -25 I -1953 I -102 I 0 1928 I 33 I -e I -1230 I ~107 I -3 I 1224 I 1-.~HELL 34 I -25 I -1304 I -110 I -2 l 1279 I 35 -t-~6T--f4le-,-*-------..-341r1-----eB1--t401-1 I I I I 36 I 37 I
-27 I
-33 I
I 197 I
-3506 I
I 156 I
-465 I
I ss I 42 I I 254 I 3473 I I I WELDS 38 I -8 I 311 I -104 I 6 I 415 I I I 39 I 1180 I ' 2151 I 912 I 1347 I 2865 I I 1_1 I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
*TABLE 3A.2.5-17 BOLT PRELOAD +TIP OVER(SOG) + 100 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE OPPOSITE CONTACT SIOE(SHELL ELEMENTS)
II
--- -II ,
I MERIDIONAL (PSI) HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I LOCATION I INTENSIT'r OUTER INNER OUTER I INNER I I (PSI) SURFACE SURFACE SURFACE( SURFACE II I I I 1 -5337 3604 8941 INNER I 2 -4803 4082 8885 I 3 -4552 2244 6796 BOTTOM I 4 -3817 2651 6467 I 5 -10931 -2425 10831 PLATE I 6 4135 27~8 4135 11_ II I I I I 7 I 233 I I 580 691 I 8 -1088 I I -1876 I 1876 I 9 I ~1593 I I 1619 3211 INNER I 10 *3569 I I *2687 I 3569 I 11 I -2487 I I 2707 5194 SHELL I 12 .-5017 I I -2999 I 5017 I 13 I -1579 I I 1592 3172 I 14 -3578 I I -2697 I 3578 I 15 I 1835 I I -2043 3878 I I 16 2031 I I -3030 I I 5061 _____________ L___ ____ _J_17_ - - - - - _L 3652 I__ _L~S81_J_ 6233 **---- I I 18 J 2102 ' I -3752 I I 5854 II 11_11 II I II II REV. 0 1/00
. TABLE 3A.2.5-18 BOLT PRELOAD +TIP OVER(SOG) + 100 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE OPPOSITE CONTACT SIDE(SOLID ELEMENTS)
--- -II . I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) STRESS I LOCATION INTENSIT'r I
-I -I (PSI) I I I sx II SY I sz II SXY I II I II I I I I I I FLANGE I 19 466 I 270 I -4411 I 1120 5903 I I 20 266 I 2177 I -4715 I 1550 7757 I I_ I I I I.
I 21 -358 I -5174 I 3657 I 744 8943 I LID I 22 -24175 I -1924 I -8418 I 4833 24260 I 1_1 I I t I I 23 I -3929 I -82 I 360 I -308 4314 I OUTER I 24 I 354 I 42 I 2882 I -31 2843 I BOTTOM I 25 I -4431 I -98 I -336 I -186 4349 I PLATE I 26 I 1582 I 24 I 2144 I -174 2139 I 1_1 I I I I I 21 I -so I 855 I 4929 I -145 5031 I I 28 I -68 I -3607 I -3606 I -253 3575 I OUTER I 29 I -34 I 1370 I 9056 I -10 9090 I I 30 I -81 I -7334 I -8095 I -130 8016 I I 31 I 5 I 1538 I 13114 I -2 13109 I I 32 I -72 I -10028 I -11061 I -18 10989 I I 33 I -25 I 1216 I 10317 I 31 10342 I I SHELL I 34 1 -76 I -8416 I -9003 I 111 I 8928 I - - - - -----l-----l-35-l----"262-1--~6j_l____1_83_5_ J_ ____1_9_7_j_ _~77 _1 I I 36 I -136 I -1661 I -2929 I 192 I 2817 I I 1_1 I I l I I I I 37 I -327 I 2100 I 1049 I 123 I 3037 I I WELDS I 38 I -54 I -1403 I -3948 I -131 I 3906 I I I 39 I -2765 I -3904 I -1566 I -1086 I 2994 I I 1_1 I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
*TABLE 3A.2.5-19 BOLT PRELOAD + TIP OVER(50G) + 100 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE CONTACT SIOE(SHELL ELEMENTS) 11
-----~---
II
------ I II
- I ( MERIDIONAL (PSI) HOOP (PSI) I STRESS (
I LOCATION I I INTENSITY I I I _ _ I (PSI) I I I OUTER I INNER OUTER I INNER I I I II SURFACE 11 SURFACE SURFACE 11 SURFACE II I I --11 II II II I I I I I I I I I t 1 I I -5637 I 4674 10311 I INNER I 2 I -6228 I 4629 I 10857 I I 3 I I -8477 I 4946 13423 I BOTTOM I 4 I -7448 I 5693 I 13142 I I 5 I I -39838 I -12641 39738 I PL6.TE I 6 I 10473 I 4350 I 10473 I 11~11 II 11--- 1 I I I I I I 7 I 2730 I I 6538 1002 I I a -5089 I I -12211 I 12211 I I 9 I 164 I I 9922 10387 I INNER I 10 -8516 I I -14459 I 14459 I I 11 I -395 l I 11968 12433 I SHELL I 12 -9670 I I *15175 I 15175 I I 13 I 734 I I 9965 10430 I I 14 -7957 I I *14861 I 14861 I I 1s I 6939 I I 2825 7404 I I 16 3576 I I -12523 I 16099 I I I I I 5561 I 15828 I ______._,- - - 1 11 18 1 15363
--:-aar1______ 1_ -11s80-r---,---1r9a-cr-r------ -----
11 11-11 II I II II I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.5-20 BOLT PRELOAD + TIP OVER(50G) + 100 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE CONTACT SIDE(SOLID ELEMENTS) II
---II -II I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSIT'f I I I -I -I -I I (PSI) I I .I I I I II sx II SY I sz II SXY II I
--11 II I II II I I I I I I I I I 19 t I I 2795 I I
,_, I FLANGE 3637 1810 1101 5881 I 20 I 2878 I 6834 I -9177 I 3476 I 18032 I I I I I I 21 I -857 I 5115 I -5460 -761 I 10671 I LID l 22 I 30050 I 2001 I 9973 -4561 I 29496 I 1_1 I I I I I 23 I -4829 I -90 I 1325 -515 I 6210 I OUTER I 24 I -1986* I 7 I 3715 43 I 5701 I BOTTOM I 25 I -9274 I *104 I 80 -570 I 9389 I PLATE I 26 I *135 I 119 I 4974 -125 I 5160 I 1_1 I I I I I 27 I -457 I 10941 I 31033 -502 I 31511 I I 28 I -7100 I *18191 I -29886 -537 I 22812 I OUTER I 29 I -213 I 12450 I 45232 -52 I 45445 I I 30 I -7194 I -23325 I -43048 -113 I 35856 I I 31 I -126 I 13020 I 53429 -13 I 53555 I I 32 I -7189 I -25243 I -48826 -7 I 41638 I I I 33 I -183 I 12527 I 49046 67 I 49229 I
- ------- ---- i--sAei::i::-r --34-,--- *-:;1191 -;;231es-r---4'.ss2s 102-1---38435-1---*--.- ------
I I 35 I -101s I 8322 I 27455 I sos I 28511 I I I 36 I -7323 I -14279 I -31374 I 166 I 24055 I I 1-1 I I I I I I I 37 I -7888 I 7233 I -7218 I -603 I 15168 I I WELDS I 38 I -6399 I -11584 I *33019 I *2359 I 27532 I I I 39 I -7683 I -7277 I *5255 I -3508 I 7027 I I 1_1 I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
. TABLE 3A.2.5-21 BOLT PRELOAD +TIP OVER(SOG) + 25 PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE OPPOSITE CONTACT SIOE{SHEU. ELEMENTS) 11
--------It ----
11, I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I LOCATION I I INTENSITY I I _ I (PSI) I I OUTER INNER OUTER I INNER I II SURFACE SURFACE SURFACE 11 SURFACE I
----- 11 _ __
I I I 1 -5266 I 3784 9050 INNER I 2 -4693 4084 I 8777 I 3 -4369 I 2481 6850 BOTTOM I 4 -3817 2596 I 6413 I s -12.376 I -2781 12376 PLATE I 6 5761 3276 I 5761
-- I II _ __
I I I I 7 -32 I I 185 211 I s -1383 I -22so I 22so I 9 -1889 I I 1os2 2941 INNER I 10 *3834 I *3215 I 3834 I 11 -2790 I I 2156 4946 SHELL I 12 *5276 I -3507 I 5276 I 13 -1878 I I 1041 2s1a I 14 -3841 I -3209 I 3841 I 1s 1548 I I -2471 4018 I 16 1757 I -3423 I 5180 I I 11 I I 3881 I I -2869 6749 I
- * - - - - - - - - 1 * -i----1-320-1------l--4513-l--*--1---5533-1-------
11 11-11 II I II 11 I REV. 0 1/00
.TABLE 3A.2.5-22 BOLT PRELOAD +TIP OVER(50G) + 25 PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE OPPOSITE CONTACT SIOE(SOLID ELEMENTS)
II
--- -II I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSO 1 smess I I LOCATION 11NTENs1n 1 I
I
-I -I -I I (PSI)
I I I I sx II SY I sz II SXY ll I I I I II I I t II I II I I I 475 I I I FLANGE I 19 -623 -5049 I 1190 I 6286 I I I 20 251 I 1910 I -5144 I 1703 I 8118 I I 1 I I I 1 I I 21 591 I -5159 I 4626 l 729 I 9876 I I LIO I 22 -26318 I -1982 I -10585 I 4744 I 26120 I I 1- I I I I I 1 I 23 -2935 I 7 I 1377 I -250 I 4332 I I OUTER I 24 -1050 I 11 I 1459 I 5 I 2510 I I 25 -2 I I BOTTOM -4011 I 376 I -216 I 4399 I I PLATE I 26 ns I 14 1 1043 I -209 I 1082 I l I I I I I I I 27 .7 I 697 I 4657 I -173 I 4704 I I I 28 -86 I -3887 I -3867 I -274 I 3840 I I OUTER I 29 39 I 1215 I 8539 I -3 I 8500 I I I 30 -107 I -7611 I -8547 I -124 I 8443 I I I 31 78 I 1317 I 12593 I -2 I 12515 I I I 32 *98 I -10243 I -11483 I -18 I 11385 I I I 33 48 I 1014 I 9797 I 29 I 9750 I I SHELL I 34 I -102 I -8649 I .9433 I 110 I 9333 I +---------1-35-f--- -188-I- -----1-1'14- --- --1352--1 235-. , ____ 2529__ 1__ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- I I 36 I *158 J -1596 I -3169 I 224 I 3044 I I I I I I I I I 37 I -400 I 3205 I 1166 I 173 I 3621 I I WELDS I 38 I -102 I -1288 I -4228 I -126 I 4139 I I I 39 I -1956 I -2663 I -1023 I -281 I 1738 I I 1_1 I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.5-23 BOLT PRELOAO +TIP OVER(50G) + 25 PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE CONTACT SlDE(SHELL ELEMENTS) 11
--------- II
------- II I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I INTENSIT'r I I .I ---- ---- I (PSI) I I I OUTER I INNER OUTER I INNER I I I II SURFACE II SURFACE SURFACE II SURFACE II ' I I --11 II II II I I I I I I I I I I 1 l I *5566 I 4853 I 10419 I I INNER I 2 I -6118 I 4631 I I 10749 I I I 3 I -8294 I 5183 I 13477 I I BOTTOM I 4 .7449 I 5638 I I 13087 I I I s I -41283 t I *12997 I 41283 I I PLATE I 6 12100 I I 4888 I I 12100 I I 11- II I II II I I I I I I I I I I 7 I 2464 I I 6142 I 6507 I I I e -5384 t I *12585 I I 12585 I I I 9 I *132 I I 9356 I 9721 I I INNER I 10 .£1781 I I -14986 I I 14986 I I I 11 I -698 I I 11417 I 12115 I I SHELL I 12 *9929 I I *15683 I I 15683 I I I 13 I 435 I I 9413 I 9778 I I I 14 -a220 I I -15372 I I 15372 I I I 15 I ees2 I I 2398 I 1011 I I I 16 3302 I I -12e1e I I 16218 I
I ---------1**17_1______1___1559~-I --.---5273 I f59Srr-I I 18 I -1eas I I *12541 I I 12541 I II 11-11 II I II II I REV. 0 1/00
*TABLE 3A.2.5-24 BOLT PRELOAO + TIP OVER(SOG) + 25 PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE CONTACT SIDE(SOLIO ELEMENTS)
II
---II -II , I I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) l STRESS I LOCATION 11NTENs1n 1
-I -I -I l (PSI)
I I I sx II SY I sz II SXY II I II I II II I I I I I I I I FU\NGE I 19 3647 I 917 462 I 2864 I 6346 I I 20 2864 I 6566 I -9606 I 3628 I 18394 I I I I I I LIO I I I 21 22 23 27907 91
-3835 I
I I I 5130 1942
-1 I
I I I
-4491 7806 2342 I
I I I
-776 I
-4650 I
-456 I I
9737 27580 6230 OUTER I 24 -3390 I -23 I 2292 80 I 5684 I -e I
,_, I BOTIOM 25 -8854 792 -600 I 9687 PLATE I 26 -941 I 109 I 3873 -160 I 4838 I I I I 27 I -384 I 101s3 I 30760 -530 I 31169 I 28 I -7118 I -18470 I -30147 -558 I 23056 OUTER I 29 I -140 I 12296 I 44715 -44 I 44855 I 30 I -7220 I -23602 I -43501 -107 I 36282 I 31 I -53 I 12799 I 52908 -13 I 52961 1 32 I -7214 I -25457 I -49248 -7 I 42034 I I 33 I -110 I 12326 I 48526 65 I 48637 j_SJ:lELL__l-3-4_1 -7216 l~3_99LJ -46055 ___ JQ_Q__L ______ 3s84~_ L I 35 I 1aoa I I I I -942 I 26972 645 27962 I I 36 I -7345 I -14214 I -31613 I 1es I 24274 I I I I I I I 37 I -7960 I 7738 I -7102 I .554 I 15737 I WELDS I 38 I .e.447 I -11470 I -33299 I *2353 I 27782 I I 39 I -6873 I -6036 I -4712 I -2703 I 5471 I 1_1 t I I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.5-25 BOLT PRELOA0+100 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE+SEISMIC(rORNAOO,FLOOO) (SHELL ELEMENTS) II
---II -I -II I I I MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I I 11NTENs1n 1 I
I I I OUTER I INNER I I - OUTER I INNER I I (PSI) I I I _ _ 11 11 SURFACE 11 SURFACE I SURFACE II SURFACE II I I II I II II I I,, I I I I I I I I 1 I I 105 I I -53 I 237 I I INNER I 2 I -205 I -40 I I 205 I I I 3 I I ~8 I -79 I 65 I I BOTTOM I 4 I 16 I 117 I I 117 I I I 5 I I 1019 I 411 I 1152 I I PLATE I 6 I -989 I -153 I 989 I I 11-11 II II I I I I I I I I I 7 I I 387 351 I 487 I I I 8 I 392 I 328 I 392 I I I 9 I I 334 422 I 522 I I INNER I 10 I 310 I 397 I 397 I I I 11 I I 246 402 I 502 I I SHELL I 12 I 211 I 380 I 380 I I I 13 I I 185 I 412 I 512 I I I 14 I 152 I I 392 I 392 I I I 15 I _L-1~ _f_ --~1_1 I 83 I I 263 240 I I 340 263 I I 211--,---- I I 11 I I 19 I I 177 I I I 1s I 267 J I 239 I I 267 I II 11_11 II I II II I REV. 0 1/00
. TABLE 3A.2.5-26 BOLT PRELOA0+100 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE+SEISMIC(TORNAOO,FLOOO)
CONTACT SIDE (SOLID ELEMENTS) II
---II -II
- I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I INTENSIT'r I I
I
-I -I I (PSI)
I I I I sx 11 SY sz II SXY II I I I I II . I II I *1 II I I I FLANGE I 19 -75 I -149 97 l 140 I 354 I I I 20 -210 I 266 180 I 146 I 559 I I 1- I I I I I 21 I -673 I -31 -692 I 7 I 661 I I LlD I 22 1767 I 27 1781 I 76 I 1757 I
*1 I I I I I 23 -831 I -126 -868 -53 746 I I OUTER I 24 1018 I 9 988 -21 1010 I I -418 20 529 I I BOTTOM 25 I -131 -659 I PLATE I 26 I 554 I -43 760 32 805 I I I I I I 21 I *76 I 349 218 25 428 I I I 28 I .5 I 427 203 10 432 I I OUTER I 29 I -78 I 248 350 0 428 I I I 30 I 0 I 377 338 -8 377 I I I 31 I -78 I 204 337 3 415 I I I 32 I 0 I 240 336 -3 336 I I I 33 I -78 I 148 334 3 412 I I SHELL I 34 I oI .183 346 -1 346 I
--- -- -------1------ -35*-1--- ---84--l*------170-1---2~3-I-*-- 1- 1----298-1---* -----------*---- I I 36 I -1 I 124 I 219 I -18 I 228 I I I I I I I I I 37 I 25 I 129 I 38 I -54 I 149 I I I I ,_, WELDS I 38 I I 39 I 48
-849 I I
I 37 I
-sos I I
160 I
-436 I I
-24
-594 I
I I 142 I 1188 I I REV. 0 1/00
TABLE 3A.2.S-27 BOLT PRELOAD+25 PSI EX1ERNAL PRESSURE+SEISMIC(TORNADO,FLOOOJ (SHELL ELEMENTS) I I I I I 1 MERIDIONAL (PSI) I HOOP (PSI) I STRESS I LOCP..TION I I I INTENSIT~ I I I I (PSI) I I OUTER INNER I OUTER I INNER I I I SURFACE St1RFACE I SURFACE I SURFACE I I I I I I I I I I I I l I 176 I I 126 I 209 I INNER 2 I -95 I -38 I. I 95 I 3 I 115 I I 158 I 190 I BOTTOM 4 I 15 I 62 I 62 I 5 I -426 I I SS 481 I PLATE 6 I 638 I 384 I 638 I I I I I I I I I 7 I 121 I I -44 165 I e I 96 I -46 1 142 I 9 I 39 I. I -145 162 I INNER 10 I 44 I -131 I 175 I 11 I -57 I I -149 149 I SHELL 12 I -48 I -128 I 128 I 13 I -113 I I -140 140 I 14 I -112 I -120 I 120 I 15 I -205 I I. -187 204 I I 16 I -73 I I -130 I I 130 - *-** ------,------- -- *11-1-----*- ~-n-.---------i----11~-i---'3*se--1 I I 16 I -515 I I -322 I I 515 I I I I I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
. TABLE 3A.2.S.28 BOLT PRELOA0+2S PSI EXTERNAL PRESSURE+SEISMIC(TORNAOO,FLOOO)
CONTACT SIDE (SOLID ELEMENTS) II
---II - - - -II .
I I STRESS COMPONENTS (PSI) I STRESS I I LOCATION I l INTENSIT'r I I I I I
-I -I -I I (PSI)
I I I I 11 sx II SY I sz II SXY II I I _ _.:_II II* I II II I I I I I I I I I FLANGE I 19 I I -1042 I I 210 I 1063 I
-65 -541 I 20 I -225 I *1 l -249 I 299 I 638 I I I l I I I I I -16 I I I 294 I
,_,21 275 278 -7 LIO I 22 I -376 I -31 I -386 I -13 I 356 I I I I I I 23 I 163 I -37 149 I e I 200 I OUTER I 24 I -386 I -22 -435 I 16 I 414 I BOTTOM I 25 I 2 I -35 54 I -11 I 92 I PLATE I 26 I -252 I -52 -341 I -3 I 289 I 1_1 I I I I I 21 I -3 I 191 -54 I -4 I 245 I I 28 I -22 I 148 -57 I -11 I 206 I OUTER I 29 I -5 I 94 -167 I 8 I 2s2 I I 30 I -26 I 100 -114 I *2 I 215 I I 31 I -5 I -18 -185 I 3 I 1eo I I 32 I -26 I 26 -86 I -3 I 112 I I 33 I -s I -53 I -186 I 1 I 181 I SHELL I 34 I -25 I -so I . -85 I -3 I so I
t-- ---- +--35--1--- J --- --343--1--- ~210_ 1..... ___ 20.. (_____3_35._I ______
I I 36 I -29 I 189 I -20 I 14 I 219 I I 1_1 I I I I I I I 37 I -48 I 634 I 154 I -4 I 681 I I WELDS I 38 I 1 I 152 I -120 I *18 I 274 I I I 39 I -39 I 433 I 101 t 211 I 633 I l 1_1 I I I I I REV. 0 1/00
Table 3A. 4-1 Stress lfl outer shell .. nd closure plate Load
- Maximum Stress Allowable Stress Intensity (PSI) .** (PSI) 25 psi lnt~ma1 7,238 S,..=33,700 pressure 25 psi= 3G down ~1.755 Cask Verllcal 25 psi = 3G down
- 10,133 Cask Horizontal Note: The worst loading orientation Is horizontal; therefore stressess will be tower at In actual operation since the loaded cask In storage the ISFSI Is vei:tical.
REV. o* 1/00
THIS PAGE INTENTIALLY BLANK Rev. 0 1/00
SOLID (STIF 2~J LIO FIJ\NGE SEPARATE NODES IN INNER SH~LL AND OUTER SHELL
\
1 ~--~ SOLID (STU" 25) 1 II" v*OUTER SHELL t:~
!f-~ ..
!t-~
I. __ _ I *t-- L- - r-.. II
~~._
~
1-1.... 11 11
*---*------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------~---- i - ' - - - - * - - * - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
L ... _ I!
,-L-L SH£Li (STIF 61)
IN! ~R SHELL I FIGURE 3A.2-1 CASK BODY ANSYS MODEL I REV. O 1/00
GAMMA SHIELDING\
~3 ' zeo JO 7 108 WELD. SIHtn.ATION .7\T JUNCTION OF GAMMA SHitLDlr;~ CYLINDRICAL SHELL 'l'O FLAT BOTTOM BY COUPLim; NODES 107-236 1Jm 109-280 FIGURE 3A.2-2 CASIC BODY
~OTTOM CORNER REV. 0 1/.00
CONFINEMENTLID~ 501 soz .503
'f4j,8 431 440
,,,,- .LID BOLT
/
3 WELD ATTACHING GAMMA SHIELDING "l'O Fu.!~':i& FIGURE 3A.2*3
- CASK BODY TOP CORNER REV. 0
- 1/00
CONFINEMENT LID \ 3'14 ~15
.383 384 LID DISC_/
SIMULATION OF WELD CONNECTING CONFINEMENTUD 'l'O LID DISC SY COU'PLING NODES 383-394 .1\ND 384-395 FIGURE 3A.2-4 CASK LID TO SHIELD PLATE CONNECTION REV. o. 1/00
1 ; NUMB.ER OF FOURIER TERHS* 9 VAL ***** FOURIER COEFFICIENTS ***** 0.125 TERM MODE*ISVM COEFFICIENT 0 a 1 2 0 1
*-0.31790103£+00 0.4q9:J1477E+OO
- J 2 *-0.21206110E+OO 4 3 0. 1904,333E-13
~
~
4 0.42~29724E-01
-O.;l9,74939E-13 7 6 -0. 193101BOE-01 e 7 0.6B~724~BE-13 9 e O. lO::Z:J7762E-01
-a.s
-0.?5
-0.87
-1
-1 .12 0 I STEP 40 80 120 160 200 24
? 280 320 360 400 PR-9,FOURIER COEFF. GENERATION!
I fOURIER COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FUNCTION! COS 1210* WITll SERIES TRUNCATED AFTER TllE FIRST 90* 9 TERMS I i I I I I F:IGURE 3A.2-5 I FOURIER COEFFICIENTS FOR THE ._______...________________________________________._____________lg .,......,,,_.,_ LATERAL REV. 0 1/00
-~
LID LlD l>lSC l's CO~TAINMENT FLAN COE 70.75" I.ti. 72.95" O.D. 70.06" D.B.L SEAL lf.>iU Fs
- 2 >e 1713 @/in.
- 3426 f!/in. at Da,,*
- 71.SS"
.. . h. (71.85)(3426)
S.EhL Pr.!:SSUP.E Ps *
- 3115 psi r:..14 (72.9S2-70.7Sl)
FIGURE 3A.2-6
- BOLT PRELOAD AND SEAL REACTION REV. *O 1/00
~--- --~----------
-":tr-~ ............ -
FIGORE 3A.2-7 .. ;* z DESIGN INTERNAL
~- PRESSURE (100 PSIG)
REV .. O 1/00
y -~. - z.. PIG ORE 3A.2-8 EXTERNAL PRESSURE LOADING (25 PSIG) REV. o* 1/00
y w* TOTAL WEIGHT or CASK (BASED ON 235,000 LBS.)
- TOTAL WEIGHT OF INTERNALS (BASED ON 62500 LBS.)
- 172,500 LBS.
Pi
- PRESSURE ON CONTAINMENT BOTTOM INNER SURFACE DUE TO WEIGH'I:' OF INTER?~ALS 62500 Ill r.:(34. 3752)
- 16.84 psi w
- --- --~--
Pi z
- FIGURE 3A.2-9 lg DOWN LOADING RE\T-. 0 1/00
TN-32 i TH-32A CASES I' .. A.
- 3 x 2 3S.OOO. 353 500 LBS.
TR 2 2 I PI s: 3 x 62,500 s 50.51 pei K(34.37S)2 TN_-32B CASK p TR 2 2
.!!!...- 6 x 235,000 SI ?05 000 LBS.
I P .. 6 x 62;soo
- 101 psi
--- ----- --1---- ----- I K (34.375)2 1
I I I PI
- 235,000 LBS WAS t1SEI> 'l'O CALC'OLATB '1'HE GLOBAL STRESSES A'l' 'l'HE CASK
*- A CONSERVATIVE FOR TRUNNION AND 'l'RUNNION LOCAL S'l'RESS ANALYSIS, .
WEIGHT OP 243,000 LBS WAS t1SEp. FIGlJJtE 3A.2-10 loIFTING: 3g Is 6g VERTICAL VP REV. O 1/00
... --..o:-.:...:_.-- ~CG
- ELEME?~T - -..... I
---.,..-T-- FORCE FROM ----"'<"""
lt~T.ER.~ALS Vl!:\o: A*A P.O'I'ATEO go* CC'rl
*. FIGURE 3A.2-11 lg LATERAL
-REv. 0 1/00
DETAU. ~ "J"R~1:JO.>: LOCi.TJONS
~'.
FIGURE 3A.2-12 STANDARD REPORTING LOCATIONS FOR CASK BODY REV. o i/-00
__.... ~~~- - .... .. CONFINEMENT VESSEL G"-"J"'.A SHlCLDJt:c; DEThlL A CONFINEMENT FLANGE LO-J.Tlo**
~B ,,
LOCJ.TlOll 39 LU> GJ..'IJo'.J. U>C:1.TJOU 17 SMltLDlt:C t>E:TAlL C lB DE:Tl.Jl. ~
*FIGURE 3A.2-13 WELD STRESS LOCATIONS REV.* o 1/00
/ . I I I NUMBER OF FOURIER TERHS* 20 .. I 1 i *****FOURIER CO£FF1CJENTS ***** TERH tlODE*tSVM COEFF't.CIENT e.1es 0 UAL
- v r~- - *:
I 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3
-0.41,,2,24£-01 O. 82764:!44E-0*1
...0.917479B1E-Ol 0.90074:S70E-Ol
-0.12!
., i 6
7
' 6 4
-0.7777409:ZE-01 0.74997691£-01
-0.71466769E-Ol I 9 7 0.67~71767£-01
-a.as I I
9 e -0.6327089,E-Ol 10 9 O.:JB639646£-0l u 10 -0.,37,4182E-02
-0.3?! 12 u 0.49699634£-01 13 12 -0.43:J,83:JOE-01
-e.s
- 14 13: 0.39413124£-01 1, 14 -O.:J334446SE-01
-0.62!
-e. ?5 16 15 O.:Z94209:J9E-01 17 16 -O.:Z37:J7~BlE-Ol
-0.8?! UJ 17 O. 19334!'10E-01 19 10 -0.1~27~668E-01
- lO 19 0.1160770~E-01 i
FOUUER COEFFICil:."NTS FOi~ 'J'llE FUNCTION COS WITll SERIES TRUNCATED J\FT£R TUE FIRsT I1--------------------------t I '
- ?O ITEMS FJ:GURE 3A.2~14 1 FOURIER SERIES APPROXIMATION OF THE
/ FOOTPRINT PRESSURE FOR THE SID.E DROP
" ., Inn
...... :.*.~
IMPACT LOAD TRUNNION RUNNION. REACTION 10" LENGTH OF
- GAMMA SHIELDING IMPACT FORCE, F f IDEALIZED IMPACT MODEL CASE 18 FROM TABLE VIII OF ROARK
. FIGURE 3A.2-16 IDEALIZED IMPACT ON TRUNNION (REFERENCE 8)
ONTO -GAMMA.SHIELD CYLINDER REV. 0 l/00
THIS POINT REMAINS APPROXIMATELY FIXED.
~V-'-~;:=::~---~--.c:---~~*0-40199 RAD. I EDGE ROTATION LID '
I POINT a MOVES TO a~ WHICH IS AN OUTWARD I I I DISPLACEMENT OF I 2 t X & = 2 4.S X .0019Bj
=
I J
.00444 IN. !
I i I LlrL THREADED HOLE MOVES OUTWARD .000491 IN. 0 FIGURE 3A.3-l
...... SUMMARIZING THE BOLT END ....... MOTIONS DUE TO 100 PSIG PRESSURE 0
0 IN THE CASK CAVITY
- i'I I
-i r- 8 s= .00395 IN.
\
FIGURE 3A.3-2 LID BOLT BENDING DUE TO LID EDGE ROTATION UNDER INTERNAL PP.ESSUllE REV. 0 1/00
LID BEARING AREA (SUBTRACT SEAL GROOVE) 70.75* DIA. 72.95" DIA. 7 4.00 11 . DIA. *
- BODY FLANGE
-~------- FIGURE 3J.** 3-3 BEARING AREA BE~WEEN LID AND CASK BODY FLANGE REV. 0 1/00
,__... _,._.,,, ~ r - 4. *a *., -.. * -
-'-~ .
'l'N-32 NITI ALL
.VERTICAL PAD CRUSH
£1**
67G 'l'OP DECELERATION
\ ....:..u..-1--..1...
J:NI'l'IAL CG BEYOND CASK CORNER OF FINAL TN-32 ORIEN'l'A'l'ION CASK ORIENT A 'l'ION ON SIDE
.. -* -- - - - ,..1--
- 1*- - --- - l o - - --------
e:: SIN lSi L
*MAX. DISPLACEMENT FROM 'l'IPOVER ANALYSIS (PIG. 3D.2-4) XS 0.73*.
FIGURE 3A.3-4
'1'IPOVER ON'l'O CONCRETE S'l'ORAGE PAD REV. 0 1/00
REACTION FORCE
- 5° WAS CONSERVATIVELY- USED INSTEAD OF CALCULATED 1° FIGURE 3A.3-5 SYSTEM OF INERTIA LOADS A?PLIED ON CASK REV. 0 1/00
WL X 5.86g WL X 67g R = 79.50 = 39. 75 T c-=_==-===~*~------dr=-0-==-*~===~=----..lj H _ _ _ REACTION FORCE FIGURE 3A.3-6 i INERTIA LOADS APPLIED ON LID REV. 0 1/00
1.72" REACTION FORCE FIGURE. 3A.3-7 LID BOLTS REACTING
* *INERTIA LOADS REV. 0 1/00
~-=-~-*-
"""'=--------uo*--------=---i 3/8" 3/lfi~
'3.Sl*ll
~-~--~I _____ L_____ _
FIGURE 3A.4-l CASK OUTE~ SHE~L AND CONNECTION WITH CASK BODY REV. 0 1/00
I l
\ .
'- ~ S~ Figu~
{_ 3A.4-3 for Detail
------~ --*-- ------------ --- ----~--------
-! See Figure 3A.44 for Detail TN-32 out~r Shell '
FIGURE 3A.4-2 FINITE ELEMENT MODEL OUTER SHELL REV. O 1/oo
__-. *-=~*.:::_:-* .:;. :-." .
~~.,_~1-""~t---1r----f-~-l-~-1-~-l-~4-~-1--~l----t.~~-l-l-..U
,,.,_--t~-r~;---t---+-~+--+---4-~~..;..+~-J----il-J-J-J..1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -- -- ---~--- - -------- --- ------- - - - - - -
lN-32 Outer Shell FIGURE 3A.4-3 FINITE ELEMENT MODEL TOP CORNER UV. 0 l/00
~ .. -- . *- - . -..... ~ -.
~...-;....
-~.
- - - - --- --- J;.F==l-.....,..~..................--+--+---1----1"---il--t--....,....,*""'='1==~-H--~-- --- - - - -- -- -- -- -- --
TN-32 outer Shell FIGURE 3A.4-4 FINITE ELEMENT MODEL
... **~
BOTTOM CORNER REV. 0 1/00
.... -:::*::~--***- ...
P=25 psi L TN-32 outer Shell, 25 PSI FIGURE 3A. 4-5 INTERNAL PRESSURE (25 PSIG)
, , REV. 0 1/00
~ ..
P=2_8psl \ I _L TN-32 Outer Shell, 30 LOAD
' FIGURE 3A. 4-6 3 G DOWN REV. o 1/00
- _, This page intentionally blank
, ~-
APPENDIX 3B STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE TN-32 BASKET 3B.1 Introduction This appendix presents the structural analysis -of the TN-32 fuel support basket. The basket is a welded assembly of stainless steel boxes. The fuel compartment stainless steel box sections are attached together locally by cylindrical stainless steel plugs (that pass through the aluminum and poison plates) that are fusion welded to both adjacent box sections. The poison and aluminum plates are thus sandwiched between the stainless steel walls of adjacent box sections. The basket contains 32 compartments for proper spacing and support of the fuel assemblies. G loads used for evaluation of the basket structure were based on the following methodologies:
- G loads calculated using the methodology of EPRI report NP-4830 as described in Section 3A.2.3.2. The maximum calculated G loads are 36 G's for an 18 11 end drop and 23 G's for a tipover side drop. The basket analysis presented in this appendix is performed using SO G for both end drop and tipover side drop.
- G loads calculated using dynamic tipover analysis as described in Appendix 3D. Appendix 3C performed Additional basket analyses based on the G loads calculated' from this dynamic tipover analysis.
The deformations and stresses induced in the basket structure due to the applied lateral loads are determined using the ANSYS computer program 11l. The most severe loading for which the basket is evaluated is the 50 g lateral inertial loading selected in Section 3A.2.3.2 to conservatively represent a hypothetical tipover accident. A SO g vertical loading of the basket is also evaluated to represent a hypothetical end drop accident. Also a 3 g loading is applied to the basket in the vertical directions and l g loading is applied to the lateral direction as a bounding load to represent Level A (normal) Conditions. In addition, primary plus secondary (thermal) stresses due to differential thermal expansion are evaluated against Level A limits. The inertial loads of the fuel assemblies are applied to the basket structure as distributed loads applied to the plate surfaces. Quasistatic stress analyses are performed with applied loads in equilibrium with the reactions at the periphery of the basket. The calculated 3B.l-1 Rev.O 1/00
stresses in the basket structure are compared with the stress limits to demonstrate that the established design criteria are met. 3B.l..1 Geometry The details of the TN-32 basket are shown on TN Drawing Nos. 1049-70-5 and -6. As described above, the basket structure consists of an assembly of stainless steel boxes or cells joined by fusion welded steel plugs and separated by aluminum and poison plates. The stainless, aluminum and poison wall between fuel compartments is effectively a sandwich panel. The panel consists of two 0.105 in. (12 gage) thick 304 stainless plates and one.0.5 in. thick 6061 T6 aluminum plate (except at the center cross panels, which have two 0.5 in. aluminum plates) surrounding the poison plate. The aluminum provides the heat conduction path from the fuel assemblies to the cask cavity wall, and the poison. material provides the necessary criticality control. A representative basket wall panel between fuel compartments is shown in Figure 3B.l-1. The panel plates are fastened together at discrete locations (2 attachments every 8 inches} along their lengths. The adjacent fuel compartment stainless steel walls are fusion welded to cylindrical plugs that pass through holes in the poison and aluminum plates. This method of construction forms a very strong honeycomb-like structure of boxes. The open dimension of each fuel compartment cell or box is 8.7 in. x B.7 in. which provides a minimum of 1/8 in. clearance around the fuel assemblies. The pitch of the cells is approximately 9.485 in. The overall basket length (160 in.) is less than the cask cavity length to allow for thermal expansion and tolerances. Several of the aluminum conductor plates are continuous
-------- across the -diameter of the basket to provide upinterru:f>ted heat ,
conduction paths. Other shorter plates are provfded___between aiia*----*-----*-- perpendicular to these continuous plates. Some of the aluminum plates are as short as one cell dimension in width. Structural rails oriented parallel to the axis of the cask are attached to the inner cavity wall of the cask body to establish and maintain basket orientation, to prevent twisting of the basket assembly, and to support the edges of those plates adjacent to the rails which would otherwise be free to slide tangentially around the cask cavity wall under lateral inertial loadings. 3B.l..2 Weight A conservative value of 1,533 lb. is assumed for the weight of each fuel assembly. Under lateral inertial loading each assembly is assumed to be uniformly supported across the width and along the length of the basket wall. The inertia of the 3B.1-2 Rev.a 1/00*
basket structure (weight of the basket x g load) is* also included in the analysis. 3B.l.3 Temperature Thermal analyses are performed to obtain the.temperature distributions .in the basket for various conditions. These analyses are presented in Chapter 4. Stress analysis of the basket using the thermal results are described in Section 3B.3.4. 3B.l-3 Rev.O 1/00
3B.2 Basket Fipjte Element ModeJ Development (For Side Impact Analysis> The basket model is an extremely large and complex ANSYS model. Because of the number of plates in the basket and the size of the basket certain modeling approximations are necessary. The basket structure construction is repetitive s"Ymmetry (2 plug welds every B inches along their length) . It is prac~ical to model only a single transverse slice {4 inches length) using a three~dimensional finite element model. The elements used in the model to represent the plates are STIF 63 quadrilateral shell elements and the plug welds are modeled by STIF 16 pipe elements. For conservatism, the borated aluminum (poison material} is not assumed to carry the structural load and is not included in the model, but its weight (inertia load} is included in the stress calculation. Several of the aluminum conduction paths consist of two O. 5"* aluminum plates. These two 0.5" plates are replaced with a single plate having equivalent bending and tensile stiffness in the model. The fuel compartment corners and basket periphery are carefully modeled to define each plate connection. Interface elements are provided between the corner nodes of the stainless steel shell elements to simulate the through thickness support provided by the aluminum. 'The basket has one axis of symmetry; therefore only one half of the slice is modeled. Figures 3B.2-1 and 2 show the typical basket panel ANSYS finite element model simulation. The system model is shown on Figures 3B.2-3 and the computer plot is shown on Figure 3B.2-4. 3B.2-1 Rev 1/00
3B.3 Basket Under Normal Condjtjon I.cads 3B.3.l Description The aluminum plates in the TN-32 basket are primarily heat conductors. The 304 stainless steel members are the primary structural components. For long term sustained loading the 6061.aluminum strength is generally neglected (except for through thickness strength) under primary loading where the aluminum can share the load with the 304 stainless steel. This analysis approach*produces . conservatively high calculated values of primary stresses in the stainless steel components. Since the aluminum*strength is already neglected in this approach, creep, relaxation, yielding, etc. in the aluminum cannot increase the stainless steel primary stresses above these bounding* results. The actual aluminum strength is considered, however, when determining the secondary (thermal) stresses that it can apply to the 304 stainless steel members. Thus the aluminum strength is neglected when it might reduce the calculated primary stresses in the stainless components but it is considered completely effective when it can induce secondary stresses in the stainless steel. The primary stress analysis *of the basket . under the bounding loads for Level A and sustained Level D (not impact accidents) conditions are described below. 3B.3.2 Basket Anal ysj s Under 1 g Side I.oad The basket analysis is performed with a 1 G lateral inertial load at the 90° orientation shown in Figure 3B.3-l. The elastic modulus of the aluminum is assumed to be small (10,000 psi) to simulate very weak material. Tables 3B. 3-1, 3B. 3-2 and 3B. 3-3 list the stresses at the corners, central regions and plug regions, respectively. Their corresponding locations are shown on Figures 3B.3-2 through 3B.3-4. These stresses will be evaluated below to verify that the design criteria are met. 3B.3.3 Basket Anal ysjs Under Vertj cal J,oad Under vertical loads, the fuel assemblies and basket are forced against the bottom of the cask. It is important to note that, for any vertical or near* vertical loading, *the fuel assemblies react directly against the bottom of the cask cavity and not through the basket structure as in lateral loading. The fuel assemblies weigh 49,056 lbs. and the basket weighs 13,374 lbs. Therefore the basket weight is only about 21% of the total cask internals weight (of fuel and basket). Therefore the vertical basket inertial loading is only about 21% of the lateral loading for a.given g level. 3B.3-l Rev.a l/OO
3 g Vertical r.oad Without Credit for Aluminum Strength The analysis of the basket subjected to the 3 g bounding vertical load (bounds all Level A (Normal condition) and Level D sustained loads) for the panels with two aluminum plates is shown in Figure 3B.3-5. A full length of compartment wall (160 in. long) with a span length of 8.7 in. is evaluated for compressive loading. A maximum compressive force of 729 lbs. occurs at the bottom of the wall. Stresses are conservatively calculated by assuming all of the load is taken by the 304 stainless steel. The ref ore 6 = Total Campressiye Load Cross Section Area of 304SS
= 729 lb 1.827 in. 2
= 399 (psi)
Based on the above results it is concluded that the stress in the stainless steel panel due to the 3 g vertical load is insignificant and additional analysis is not necessary. There are cutouts in 4 locations at the bottom of the basket for lifting. In addition-there are chamfers at the corners of the basket (in 8 locations) to prevent interference with the inner shell to bottom plate weld. The location of the cutouts and chamfers are shown in Figure 3B.3-7. For these locations, an analysis of the vertical g loadings has been evaluated* for each box section. The weight of the load for each box consists of the weight of 8 panels of stainless steel {.105" thick), 4 aluminum panels (0.5" thick) and 2 sheets of borated alum~num {0.075" thick) 6 = Tqtal Compressjye Load Cross Section Area of 304SS
= 659 Jb x 3
- s. 39 in. 2
= 0.4 ksi This is much l~ss than the allowable stress.
3B.3.4 Thermal Stress The thermal analysis of the basket is described in Chapter
- 4. That analysis is performed to determine the basket temperatures for the condition with maximum solar heating, maximum decay heat from the cask contents, and 100°F ambient air.
The temperatures from that thermal analysis are used directly in 3B.3-2 Rev.O 1/00
the ANSYS structural models to calculate the basket panel stresses due to differential thermal expansion. Stresses occur due to the differences between the coefficients of thermal expansion of the 304 stainless, the_aluminum and the poison material. When a panel consisting of aluminum.(and poison} and stainless plates is heated, the aluminum expands mo~e than the stainless steel. For example, if a 6 in. long strip (the plug to plug centerline spacing across the panel) of 304 stainless is heated from 70°F to 400°F, it expands 0.01819 in. A 6 in. strip of aluminum expands 0.02676 in. or 0.00857 in. more than the stainless. A simple hand analysis (assuming tight plugs)-would result in an aluminum bearing stress of 74,559 psi, far above the aluminum yield stress of 13,300 psi at 400°F. Therefore local plastic deformation of the aluminum plates in areas adjacent to the plugs will occur (if the plugs are not centered in the holes at assembly) and this effect must be properly considered to accurately determine the 304 stainless steel secondary stress state. The detailed panel model used for the panel thermal stress analysis is shown in Figure 3B.3-6 (thermal analysis was based on maximum panel temperature of 531°F, the actual temperature at the hottest central part of the panel is 527°F as shown on Figure 4.4-8, therefore, the thermal stresses calculated here are conservative). It is conservatively assumed that the 1.375 in. diameter stainless steel plugs that penetrate the 1.5 in. diameter holes in the aluminum (and poison} plates are not centered. The plugs are assumed to be in contact initially (at 70°) with the opposing sides of the two holes in the aluminum (the sides toward the center of the panel) so that the maximum interference of aluminum and steel will occur when the panel is heated. It shoul~ be noted that this is a condition that cannot reverse. If the temperature decreases after initial heatup, the
--- - -- plug- to -aluminum-contact-wi1Lbe_J.os.t_but_t_e_n$.i.op canno~~
developed at the plug to aluminum interface. --------- The holes in the aluminum and poison plates are modeled (see square holes in Figure 3B.3-6). Also the bearing interfaces between the aluminum plates and plugs are approximately modeled using rigid members connected between the edges of the holes and nodes on the axis of the pipe elements representing the plugs. Plasticity is considered in the local regions (only} of the aluminum plates at the plug/aluminum bearing interfaces. In the local areas of the aluminum the ANSYS STIF 63 elastic shell elements are replaced with STIF 43 plastic shell elements. The 304 stainless steel structural members are still modeled elastically. The stress vs. strain curve used for the aluminum was based on the following table from the Aluminum Association data 12 ' . 3B.3-3 Rev. 0 1/00
STRESS VS. STRAIN CURVE FOR 6061 T6 ALUMINUM (BASED ON TEMPERATURE of 550°F} STRAIN (LB. -IN/IN) STRESS (PSI) - 0.00032 2500 0.00243 3370 0.6 5650 Table 3B.3-4 lists the thermal stresses from this detailed panel analysis. These stresses in the 304 stainless steel structural plates are elastic*stresses. The stainless steel is modeled as an elastic material even though local plasticity is considered in the aluminum (which applies differential expansion loading to the stainless steel) . These stresses are conservatively combined with the stresses from the 1 g side load by adding stress intensities at the stress reporting locations. The combined primary plus secondary (thermal) stresses are listed in Table 3B.3-5. The stresses are compared with the specified limits below. 3B.3.S Desjgn Crjterja The primary stress analysis of the basket for Level A (Normal Service) and sustained Level D Service Conditions does not take credit for the aluminum conductor plates except for through thickness compression. The aluminum strength is, however, considered when determining secondary stresses in the stainless steel. The basis for the 304 stainless steel fuel compartment box section stress allowables is Section III of the ASME Code. The primary membrane stress intensity and primary membrane plus bending stress intensities are limited to Sm (Sm is the Code allowable stress intensity} and 1.5 Sm, respectively, at any location in the basket for Level A {Normal Service) load combinations. The ASME Code provides a basic 3 Sm limit on primary plus secondary stress intensity for Level A conditions. That limit is specified to prevent ratcheting of a structure under cyclic loading and to provide controlled linear strain cycling in the structure so that a valid fatigue analysis can be performed. The Code also provides guidance in the application of plastic analyses which can be performed to demonstrate shakedown (absence of ratcheting) and to determine stresses for fatigue evaluation. Ratcheting and fatigue cannot occur in the basket since thermal 3B.3-4 Rev.O 1/00
cycling will not occur and interference loading at the plug/aluminum interfaces cannot reverse. 3B.3.6 Eyah1atjon Tables 3B.3-l, 3B.3-2 and 3B.3-3 list the stress intensitie~ for the 1 G side load in the basket at the corners, central regions and plug regions, respectively. *Note that these stresses have been calculated elastically (assuming structurally ineffective aluminum) . The highest membrane stress intensity is 394 psi (Table 38.3-1, 2D). The highest membrane plus bending stress intensity is 12,080 psi (Table 3B.3-l, lD). These stresses are well below the allowable membrane stress intensity(Sm) of 18,700 psi and the allowable membrane plus bending stress intensity {1.5 Sm) of 28,050 psi based on the temperature of 400°F at these panel locations. The maximum shear stress at the stainless steel plug is 547 psi, this stress is less than the allowable shear*stress (0.6 Sm) of 11,220 psi based on a temperature of 400°F at the plug location. Table 3B.3-4 lists the stress intensities due to differential thermal expansion in the basket panel. These stress intensities are conservatively combined with the stress intensities from the 1 G side load in Table 3B.3-5. The basic primary plus secondary stress limit at any location on the 304 Stainless steel panel is 3 Sm or 51,690 psi at.the maximum temperature of 531°F. The maximum primary plus secondary stress intensities of 32,517 psi occurs at stress location 1 of Table 3B.3-5 and is well below the allowable stress. The maximum weld stress intensity is 2 x 17095 = 34190 psi which is also below the limit. Based on the results of these analyses, it is concluded that:
l-.--'l'he--maximum-stresseg__in__the_3c0Ls_t_ai_n.less steel lf.uel* - - - - - - - - - - - -
co mp art men t box} both in the center and corner regions of the basket, are well below the specified allowable stresses under normal service (1 g side load) and sustained Level D service (1 g side load plus thermal 'stress) .
- 2. The maximum shear stress in the plug welds is low under the 1 g side loading above. The stainless and aluminum plates may push against the plugs due to differential thermal expansion if the plugs are not centered in the holes in the aluminum at assembly. In the worst plug misalignment case, the weld shear stress could reach a maximum of 17,095 psi.
The corresponding stress intensity is 2 x cr or 34,190 psi. This stress intensity is below the basic 3 S~ limit of 51,690 psi. This basic limit ensures that thermal ratcheting of a structure does not occur. This primary. plus secondary limit could be exceeded in the TN-32 basket since 3B.3-5 Rev. 0 1/00
the stress does not cycle and since the loading cannot reverse.
- 3. The aluminum plates are generally not considered to have a structural function under Level A conditions. Nevertheless, the primary plus secondary (thermal) stress in the aluminum plates midway between the stainless plugs (stress reporting location 3) is no greater than 2,238 psi. This upper bound stress was calculated assuming the stainless plugs were misaligned in the aluminum holes in the worst possible way.
The 2,238 psi stress is also far below the 5,470 psi allowable compressive stress (based on stability or buckling). in the aluminum from Table 3B.4-4. Therefore . compressive*stress developed in the aluminum cannot cause the plates to buckle.
- 4. The basket is structurally adequate and it will properly support and position the*fuel assemblies.
3B.3-6 Rev.a 1/00
3B.4 Basket Under Accjdept Conditjon I.cads 3B.4.1 Basket Analysis Under 50 g Bottom Epd Prop Appendix 3A presents the dynamic impact analysis of the TN-32 cask during a hypothetical end drop accident. I~ that section of the SAR, the cask is conservatively evaluated for a 50 g vertical load. This section evaluates the basket stresses for a so g vertical load which is a conservative representation of the end drop. Appendix 3B.3.3 presents the analysis of the basket due to a 3 g vertical load neglecting the*strength *contribution from the aluminum. It is conservatively assumed that all the load is taken by the 304 stainless steel. Therefore: a = Total Compressive Load/Cross Section of 304 SS on a single wall panel a= 50 {Weight of 304SS, Aluminum, Poison)/Area of SS
= so x (243 lb)/1.827 in2
= 6,650 psi This 6,650 psi compressive stress is acceptable since the Section 3B.4.3 Level D membrane stress intensity limit for 304 stainless is 44,900 psi (2.4 s~ at 400°F, the approximate maximum temperature at the end of the basket).
. -------- -----ThE;!-re are -cu tou fs-iff~IOcaflo-:ns-aJ:-*t::tre--uott:om-0£--the-basket for lifting. In addition there are chamfers at the corners of the basket (in 8 locations) to prevent interference with the inner shell to bottom plate weld. The location of the cutouts and chamfers are shown in Figure 3B.3-7. For these*locations, an analysis of the vertical g loadings has been evaluated for each box section. The weight of the load for each box consists of the weight of 8 panels of stainless steel (.105 11 thick), 4 aluminum panels (0.5" thick) and 2 sheets of borated aluminum °(0.075 11 thick) er = Tota J Compressive I.oad Cross Section Area of 304SS
= 659 lb x so 3B.4-1 Rev. O 1/00
- s. 39 in. 2
= 6 ksi This is much less than the allowable stress.
3B.4.2 Basket lmalysis Under 50 g Sjde Impact This section describes the analysis of the TN-32 basket in the unlikely event of cask tipover on the concrete pad. The analyses performed assume a so g lateral inertial loading of the basket as shown to be conservative in Appendix 3A where the cask impact analysis is described. The design criteria established for the TN-32 basket for the hypothetical accident condition are described in Section 3B.4.3. These criteria were selected to ensure that the basket is structurally adequate under these loads. The results from the analyses presented in this section are evaluated against the design criteria in Section 3B.4.3. The finite element basket models for this accident analysis are described in Section 3B.2. The aluminum plates are assumed to be effective for the short duration dynamic loading from the tipover accident. The so g loading selected for the basket analysis is conservatively selected to be higher than the deceleration of the top end of the cask during tipping. Analyses were performed for three different loading orientations relative to the basket plates: 90°, 45°, and, 0°. It should be noted that, for the 4S 0 and 0° load orientations, the total inertial force from the half of the basket not modeled is applied to the Y-Z plane (basket centerline) on the left side of the model. The boundary condition at each point of contact between the basket and cask body cavity depends on the direction of the applied_.iner_tia1-loacL__ As_the_b_a_s_ket is forced in a particular lateral direction it separates from the cask wall on one side and reacts against the wall on the other side. At the locations where the basket loses contact with the wall, no restraint or support is provided in the model. For vertical inertial loading on a horizontal cask and basket, contact is lost between the basket and cask wall at the top half of the structur~. The load distributions and boundary conditions are shown on Figures 3B.4-l through 3B.4-3. A large deflection analysis of the basket model is performed s~nce the basket structure is redundant and the support is indeterminate without considering deflections. Also the basket panels subjected to both bending and compression require a large deflection analysis to determine the correct panel center moments under combined loading (beam-column effects) . 3B.4.3 Design criteria For Impact Accident 3B.4-2 Rev. o 1/00
Section 3B.3.S presents the basket design criteria for Level A (Normal Service} and sustained Level D conditions. This section describes the design criteria for the hypothetical impact accident which is evaluated as a very short duration Level D loading. There are four general types of structural criteria discussed below. These, are the stress criteria, the criteria to ensure stability under compressive loading, the criteria to ensure stability under bending and the criteria to prevent failure under combined loading. 3B.4.3.1 Stress Criteria The stress criteria are taken from Section III, Appendix F of the ASME Code 131 which is applied directly to the 304 stainless steel components. The Appendix F basis is also applied to the 6061 T6 aluminum members, but the material strength is based on the yield strength (at actual *temperature) for this impact event rather than the Code Section III Appendix values of allowable stress, S, which are based on creep limits. The thermal stresses are self-relieving and cannot cause failure of a structure from a one-time occurrence. Therefore, as stated in the Code, they are not combined with the primary stresses due to the inertia loads from the accident. The aluminum conductor plate .strength is considered ..for *short duration dynamic events. Since elastic quasistatic analyses are performed, the primary membrane stress is limited to the smaller of 2.4 Sm or 0.7 Su and the membrane plus bending stress is limited to the smaller of 3.6 Sm or Su. The average primary shear stress across a section is limited to 0.42 Su (Su is the minimum ultimate strength) . For the aluminum plates the value of 2/3 Sy is substituted for Sm. Table 3B.4-1 summarizes these . stress criteria and Table 3B.4-2 provides numerical values of the limits for 400°F metal temperature. Numerical limits for other
vemperaturea-can_be._readily_c_al.rnlated using__the Code Section III Appendices.
3B. 4. 3. 2 Stahjl j ty Under AppH ed Cornpressi ye I.cad CWj thput Bendjngl The.basic structural element of the basket is considered to be a wall between fuel compartments which consists of one poison plate (neglected structurally when computing Pa) and one 0.5 in. aluminum plate sandwiched between two 0.105 in. stainless plates. The overall dimensions of this wa~l are 8.7 in. wide x 160 in. long x 0.785 in. thick. For analysis purposes, a unit length of the wall (called a panel) is studied since lateral loading of the basket produces panel planar loads in the 8.7 in. direction and bending about axes running along the 160 in. length of the wall. The structural elements (panels) are connected together at the fuel compartment corners to form a frame that is supported on 3B.4-3 Rev. O 1/00
the cask body inner wall and rails (see Figure 3B.4-7). When the basket is loaded as shown in Figure 3B.4-1, the vertical frame members (or panels) are braced laterally at the ends of each panel by the horizontal frame members as indicated in Figure 3B.4-7. . It is assumed that any panel may fail as a column (column buckling), may fail locally or both failures may occur simultaneously. The failure mode with the lower ASME limit will be assumed to govern. The 8.7 in. long panel is conservatively assumed to have hinged ends since the fuel box corners are not reinforced. It is assumed that the welds tie the stainless fuel box sides and aluminum plates together at the weld lines {down the length of the basket) . The overall panel as sketched on the left side of Figure 3B.4-8 is evaluated for column buckling. It is also assumed that the plates might *separate (shown on the right side of Figure 3B.4-8) since there is no structure or surface loading holding the plates together. Therefore, the individual plates are evaluated between the plug weld lines assuming they can bulge apart. Detailed calculations and results are presented in Tables 38.4-3 and 3B.4-4. From Tables 3B.4-3 and 3B.4-4, the allowable compressive stress at 400°F for the 304 stainless steel plates is 7,670 psi and for the aluminum plates is 5, 4 7 O ps.i. It is not correct to assume that both the stainless steel and aluminum plates will reach these stresses at ~he same time. If the panel is compressed as shown by an axial load (Figure 3B.4-8), and if sliding between plates does not occur until one material or the other buckles, the strain in all plates is equal. By looking at the elastic strain level in each plate when it reaches its limit: _ _ _ _ _ _ _304 SS & = 7 I 670/ (26. 5 x 10 6 ) = 0. 000289 Aluminum 6 =a/E = 5,470/{8.7 X 10 6 ) = 0.000629 The limiting stainless steel strain of 0.000289 will be reached first since the corresponding strain level is lower than in the aluminum.
- These allo~able compressive loads or stresses are well below the yield points (see Tables 3B.4-3 and 3B.4-4). Therefore it is assumed that, for each material, as the strain is increased beyond that where the allowable compressive load is developed, the load will remain relatively constant until the other material*
reaches its limit. Therefore the allowable compressive load on the basket panel is the aluminum allowable plus the steel allowable. Looking at the 400°F situation, the total compressive load limit for a panel that might buckle as a column or could 3B.4-4 Rev. 0 l./00
experience local plate separation is: Pa panel = Pa (304 *ss) + P8 (Aluminum)
= 1611 lb/in. + 2735 lb/in.
= 4346 lb/in.
NOTE:The allowable compressive load for panels with two o.s inches aluminum plates is shown on Figure 3B.4-9 and Tables 3B.4-S and 3B.4-6. 3B.4.3.2A IneJastjc AnaJysjs of Basket to petermjne Bucking I.cads The cask has been analyzed to show that the cask does not tip over. However in the hypothetical event of cask tipover on the concrete pad, the aluminum plates carry a portion of the short duration dynamic loading from the impact. The basic structural element of the basket is considered to be a wall between fuel compartments which consists o~ one poison plate (neglected structurally when computing P8 ) and one 0.5 in. aluminum plate sandwiched between two 0.105 in. stainless plates. The overall dimensions of this wall are 8.7 in. wide x 160 in. long and 0.785 in. thick. For analysis purposes, a unit length of the wall (called a panel) is studied. In order to calculate the buckling load, a two-dimensional inelastic ANSYS finite element model is constructed using a stif 23 plastic beam element to represent the TN-32 basket panel configuration. This two-dimensional beam element is a uniaxial element with tension-compression and bending capabilities. The element has three degrees of freedom at each node: Translations in the Nodal X and Y directions and rotation about the Nodal Z axis.
µ~~g~ deformation of the beam and inelastic behavior of the material were included in the analysis to properly determine-Elle~~~
effect of geometry and material behavior on the buckling calculation. The load applied to the top of the basket panel is shown in Figure 3B.4-18 and the finite element model is shown in Figure 3B.4.,..19. Tables 3B.4-19 and 3B.4-20 summarize the mechanical properties used for the 2-D ANSYS analysis. The load exerted on the top of the basket panel is simulated by imposing a displacement at Node 14 (Nodes 7, 14 and 21 are coupled in the Y direction, so they will have the same vertical movement) . A nonlinear solution was calculated with the deflection forced through seven load steps. The analysis was continued until the buckling load was exceeded. 3B.4-5 Rev. O 1/00
The ANSYS results include stresses, forces and displacements at all load steps. The results are shown below. Maximum Vertical Deflection 0.007" Maximum Lat;eral.Deflection 0.004138 11 Maximum Compressive Load before 7,974 lbs. Reaching Buckling Mode The maximum compressive load before reaching the buckling load is 7,974 lbs. This load is considerably greater than the hand calculated allowable compressive load of 4,346 lbs. {Ref. Tables 3B.4-3 and 4). Therefore, the allowable buckling load (4,346 lbs) is conservative. *The compressive stress developed in the 304 stainless steel and aluminum plates cannot cause the panel to buckle. Under the above compressive load, the maximum lateral deflection occurs at Node 4 and is 0.004138 inches. Therefore, the open dimension of the fuel compartment will.be reduced to 8.7-2 {0.004138) = 8.6917 inches. This opening is greater than the size of a fuel assembly {8.426 in. x B.426 in.) and provides sufficient clearance for fuel removal. An additional analysis was made by assuming the aluminum panel is the only supporting structure. The results are shown below. Maximum Vertical Deflection 0.01 11 Maximum-LateraLDef.lectil"I,., _o_ nnn1 in Maximum Compressive Load before 4,999 lbs. Reaching Buck~ing Mode Based on the analysis described above, the aluminum panel can withstand the SO G load due to the side drop by itself without-buckling. The basket* is structurally adequate and will properly support and position the fuel assemblies during and after the side drop. 3B.4-6 Rev. O 1/00
3B.4.3.3 Stahjljty Under Applied Bendjng Moment (:Wjtbout Compression) When determining the allowable compressive load in a basket wall panel (above), it is conservatively assumed that the panel edges are hinged and that there is no edge restraint to stabilize the panel against buckling. However, the various stainless and aluminum plates forming the panel extend *beyond the panel and connect into other panels so that moments can be developed at the panel edges. Thus, the bending moment in a panel may be developed by the lateral (surface) loading in combination with edge reactions or it may. be entirely applied through edge . reaction(s) from adjacent panels. Accordingly, evaluation of the bending stability of the multiple plate panels must d~stinguish between panel bending induced by lateral (surface) loading and that applied through edge reaction{s). The loading arrangement for the first case, (surface loading), is shown .in Figure 3B.4-10. The strain developed in the various plates as the panel bends is a linear function of y, the distance from the common neutral axis. It is assumed that the plug welds effectively tie the various plates together into a laminated or composite panel. The steel outer fiber stress is conservatively limited to the yield stress at temperature. When the outer fiber of steel reaches its yield strength, the aluminum stress is well below*the*yield strength. Figure 3B.4-10 shows the derivation of the section moment, M, required to produce yielding of the steel. Note that the compression side of the panel is subjected to the applied load which prevents the outer stainless plate from buckling away from the panel between welds. This 1,739 in-lb/in bending moment limit, Ma, is used to evaluate only those panels subjected to surface loading as shown in.Figure 3B.4-10. In the other case, panel bending is induced by edge eact-+/-ons-{moment-s}-as-shewn----i-n-Fi-gur.e-3E.~4=1L__Ther_e i~s~n~o~-------- surface loading on the compression side of the panel. It is, therefore, conservatively assumed that the outer stainless plate might buckle away from the panel as illustrated in Figure 3B.4-ll, although the initial curved shape of the panel makes that unlikely. The stainless steel stress is limited to the value determined in Table 3B.4-3 of 7,670 psi which is the Level c-allowable compressive stress in the 6 in. long 0.105 in. thick plate between welds. In this case, the allowable bending. moment, M4 , is limited as determined in Figure 3B.4-11 to 644 in-lb/in. NOTE: The allowable bending moments for panels with two 0.5 inches aluminum plates are shown on Figures 3B.4-12 and 3B.4-13. 38.4.3.4 Crnnhined I,oadjng 313.4-7 Rev. O 1/00
The ANSYS Finite Element System Model is used to perform a large deflection analysis. The beam-column effects {where a compressive force applied to a bent member increases the bending moment due to the deflection) have already been considered. Therefore, Tables 3B.4-7 through 3B.4-9 results already include these interactive effects. The allowable panel compression and bending loadings are determined above. These allowables ensure, stability of the panel under compression loads (in the absence of bending) and under a bending moment (in the absence of compression) . The 4,346 lb/in.' compressive load limit ensures that, in the* absence of bending, the overall panel will not buckle as a column or fail locally due to plate separation and buckling between welds. The 4,346 lb/in. value is the total of 1,611 lb/in. (or 7,670 psi) in both steel plates and 2,735 lb/in. {or 5,470 psi) in both aluminum plates. These values are listed in Tables 3B.4-3 and 3B.4-4. If a bending moment is applied to the above panel loaded in compression at 4,346 lb/in., the compressive stresses on one side of the neutral axis will decrease and those on. the other side of the neutral axis will increase. If there is no surface loading on the side of the panel where the compressive stresses increase, the 0.105 in. stainless plate could separate since the 7,670 psi allowable stress ensuring that it does not buckle as indicated in Figure 3B.4-ll will be exceeded. Therefore, as the moment is applied the compressive force must be decreased. In order to maintain the compressive plate stress at 7,670 psi, the interaction limits are: (1) Applied Compressiye Load + Applied Bending Moment ,$,, 1. 0 ________ All.o.w.ab_l_e_Com2._r_e_s~s_i_v~e--=L'-'-o--O._a_d__A__l-=-l_o=-w_a_b~l_:__e--=--B_e_n_d_i_::._n_.'.:'.g'.__M_o_m_e_n_t_______._____ (lA) Applied Compressjye Load + Applied Bending Moment ~ 1.0 4,346 lb/in 644 in-lb/in If a bending moment is developed in a panel loaded in compression at 4,346 lb/in by means of surface loading (with appropriate edge reactions}, compressive* stresses in the plates on the unloaded side of the neutral axis decrease and those on the loaded side of the panel increase. The outer stainless plate on the loaded side of the panel cannot separate and buckle away from the panel toward the load. Since the compressive stress on the stainless plate on the unloaded side of the panel is decreasing, it will not buckle. Therefore, the surface loading prevents buckling of the panel due to plate separation and permits higher stresses to be developed before column buckling can occur. 3B.4-8 Rev. O 1/00
For conservatism, no credit is taken for the surface loading other than that it will prevent the compressive stainless plate from buckling away from the panel. Therefore the interaction limit for a panel with surface loading is: (2) Applied Compressive Load + Applied Bending Moment ~ 1.0 Allowable Compressive Load Allowable Bending Moment Where, with surface load: (2A) AppJied Compressive Load + Applied Bendjng Moment £ 1.0 4,346 lb/in 1,739 in-lb/in 3B.4.4 Eyaluation Analyses using the basket system model are performed for the three different load orientations relative to the basket plates (90°, 45°, $nd 0°) as indicated in Figures 3B.4-l through 3B.4-3. The displacement plots for the entire basket are shown in Figures 3B.4-4 through 3B.4-6. The panel load results from these three system analyses are presented in Tables 3B.4-7 through 3B.4-9. Their corresponding locations are shown on Figure 3B.4-l4. These tables show the
- highest forces (F) and Moments (M) for each load.orientation.
These are the panels most likely to buckle when the basket is subjected to lateral inertial loads. The maximum force of 3, 240* lb/in. occurs in the 0-degree case. The highest moment of 146 in-lb/in occurs in the 45 degree case. These forces and moments are evaluated using the intera,ction equation described in the structural design criteria, Section 3B.4.3. The interaction equation for compression and bending is: The allowable compressive force and bending moment, Pa and Ma, are determined as described in Section 3B.4.3. ~t 400°F, the resulting values of Pa and M. are 4,346 lb/in. and 1,739 in-lb/in. respectively {or 8,046 lb/in. and 5,051 in-lb/in. for panels with two 0.5 inches aluminum plates). Note that the 1,739 in-lb/in. limit is for a panel with surface loading. For a panel without surface loading, Ma is 644 in-lb/in. See Section 3B.4-3. The buckling interaction total, also listed in Tables 3B.4-7 through 3B.4-9, s a maximum of 0.679 for the panel at location 1 for the 90° load orientation case. The design meets the criteria with margin at a load level of so g's. The basket satisfies the criteria at loads up to about 74 g*s, much higher than would occur in the TN-32 cask during the tip-over onto a concrete pad {23 g) . This buckling analysis is performed conservatively assuming .the maximum temperature of all panels is*400°F. The 3B.4-9 Rev. O 1/00
temperature varies along and across the basket and is only 330°F at the outer basket panels at the top of the cask. The loads in the center of the basket at the mid length position where the temperature can reach 527°F are much less than the loads reported in Table 3B.4-7 through Table 3B.4-9. Tables 3B.4-10 through 3B.4-12 list the stresses at the corner regions and Tables 3B.4-13 through 3B.4-15 list the stresses at the central regions. Their corresponding locations are shown on Figures 3B.4-14 and 3B.4-15. Based on the results in the.stress tables, it is concluded that: 304 S.S Plate* The maximum membrane stress intensity at 50 G's is 13,140 psi and occurs at location 2 corner C (Table 3B.4-ll) in the 45° load case. This stress is below the allowable stress of 44,900 psi (2.4 S,,) at a temperature of 400°F. The maximum membrane plus bending stress intensity is 62,560 psi and occurs at location 1 corner B (Table 3B.4-10) in the 90° load case. This stress is below the allowable stress of 64,400 psi (Su) at a temperature of 400°F. Shear Stress jn 1/2 jn. Plug Welds* The maximum shear stress in the plug weld is 21,083 psi at location 3 (Figure 3B.4-l4) in the 0° load case. This stress is below the allowable stress of 27,000 psi ( 0.42 Su} at a temperature of 400°F. Aluminum Plate: The maximum membrane stress intensity due to SO G's is 3,046 psi and occurs at location 1 (Table 3B.4-14) in the 45° load case. This stress is below the allowable stress of 12,400 psi
ro-*:7sufaf-atemper-ature of 400°F. --------- -----------
The maximum membrane plus bending stress intensity is 7,034 psi and occurs at location 3 (Table 3B.4-14) in the 45° load case. This stress is below the allowable stress of 17,700 psi (SJ __at a temperature of _40Q_0_F.
-- The basket plates are therefore structurally satisfactory under these loads.
3B.4.S Basket Bails Ifuder 50 g Side Impact The details of the TN-32 aluminum rails are shown on Drawing 1049-70-2. The rails are aluminum alloy 606l-T6 extrusions which are oriented parallel to the cask longitudinal axis and are attached to the inner cavity wall. The rails establish and maintain basket orientation, prevent twisting of the basket assembly, and support the edges of those plates adjacent to the 3B.4-l0 Rev. o l/00
rails which would otherwise be free to slide tangentially around the cask cavity wall under normal and accident lateral inertial loadings. Two-dimensional elastic ANSYS finite element models were constructed using stif 3 beam elements to represent the TN-32 ba~ket rail configurations. (Significant dimensions used in creating the models are shown in Figures '3B.4-l6 and 38.4-17). This two-dimensional beam element is a uniaxial element with tension-compression and bending capabilities. The element has three degrees of freedom at each node: Translations in the Nodal X and Y directions and rotation about the Nodal Z axis. This element can properly model both the tensile*and flexural stiffness of the aluminum rail. The lateral inertia loads (SOG) on the aluminum rail applied by the fuel assemblies and the weight of the basket plates are represented by distributed loads (P) on the rail contact surfaces as shown on Figures 3B.4-l6 and 3B.4-17. These loads are taken from the SO G side drop analysis. Table 38.4-16 summarizes the aluminum alloy mechanical properties used for the 2-D ANSYS Analysis. The maximum membrane and membrane plus bending stresses in the aluminum rails for the SOG side drop load are summarized in Table* 3B.4-17. The stress criteria are taken from Section III, Appendix F of the ASME Code and are listed in Table 3B.4-18. The stress results in Table 3B.4-17 are evaluated using these criteria. The maximum membrane stress is 4,533 psi and occurs at Location 2 in the bottom rail. This stress is below the allowable stress of 20,090 psi at a temperature of 300oF. The maximum membrane plus bending stress is 25,187 psi and occurs at Location 1 in the bottom rail. This stress is also below the allowable stress of 28,700 psi.
---lfhe allowao1-e-ct:5mpr-es*srve-stre*ss-+/-s-2/-3-of--the-buckl-ing-load-----------
based on Paragraph F-1334.3 of Appendix F of the ASME Code. The critical buckling load is determined using the Euler~equation: where n = the end condition constant E = modulus of elasticity, 9.2x10 6 psi I = moment of inertia, in 4 l = length of the vertical member, inches The rail vertical members are fixed at both ends. The theoretical value for the end condition constant is 4, but a value of 1 was used for conservatism. 3B.4-11 Rev. O 1/00
The allowable compressive stresses for the most highly stressed location in the vertical member of each rail are listed below. Critical Allowable Allowable Compress. Load Compressive Compressive Stress fa LOCATIONS (lbs) Load Stress ANSYS run {psi) (Table per P=2/3 Fa=P/A 3B.4-17) Pc:r Bottom Rail 1=4.715 11 , 35,534 23,689 50,402 4,533 t=0.47" (Fig. 3B.4-16, Location 2) Side Rail 1=7.83", 37,174 24,783 36,989 2,250 t=0.67 11 (Fig. 3B.4..:17, Location 2} As indicated above, the compressive stresses from the accident loads are well below the allowable compressive stresses. 3B.4-12 Rev. O 1/00
For combined ~xial compression and bending, equations 20 and 21 of Paragraph NF-3322.l (e) (1) apply. and The allowable stresses for the above equations are determined as follows: Allowable Stress ASME Reference Fa P/A {see above table) F-1334.S(a) Fb 1. 5 Sy = 4 0I 650 psi F-1334.S(c) c_ 0.6 NF 3322 .1 (e) {l) {b) Note The allowable stress Fa is multiplied by 1.4 as allowed by Paragraph F-1334 3B.4-13 Rev. 0 1/00
The value of Fe is calculated by the formula below per Paragraph F-1334.S(b): Fe = 7t2 E/ [l. 30 X (kl/r) 2
]
where k is conservatively taken as 1 l is the free length of the member, in. r is the radius of gyration, in. E is the modulus of elasticity, 9.2 x 10 6 psi This formula gives the following results for F9 : Location Fe (psi) Bottom rail l = 4.715 11 , r = 0.1361" 58,196 {Fig. 3B.4-16, Location 2) Side Rail 1 = 7
- 83 II I r = 0.1936 11 42,700 (Fig. 3B.4-17, Location 2)
The interaction equations were evaluated for the stresses presented in Table 3B.4-17. The highest stress combination occurs at Location 2 of the side rail resulting in the left hand side of Equation (2) of 0.5 which is less than 1. Based on the results of this analysis, it was concluded that - -- ---- the-- stresses- in-the-a-lumi-num-ra-i--ls-under-t-he---50~ s ide---drep-- load----- -- ---------- are acceptable. 3B.4-14 Rev. o 1/00
3B.5 References
- l. ANSYS Engineering Analysis System User's Manual, Volume l and Volume 2, Rev. 4.4, 1989.
- 2. Aluminum Standards and Data, 1990.
- 3. ASME B&PV Code Section III Division and Appendices (1992).
- 4. American Institute of Steel Construction, Manual of Steel Construction, 1980.
S. ASME B&PV Code, Subsection NF, 1992.
- 6. ASME B96.l, Welded Aluminum Alloy Storage Tanks, 1989.
3B.5-l Rev. 0 1/00
THIS PAGE INTENTIALLY BLANK Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 3B.3-l BASKET PANEL CORNER REGION STRESSES UNDER lG LATERAL 90° LOAD ORIENTATION Location STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI) Fig 38.3-2 MEMBRANE (Pm) MEMBRANE + BENDING (Pm + Pb) AVERAGE TOP SURFACE BOTTOM SURFACE 1 A* 244 1384 1817 B 243 1383 1839 c 381 10180 10910 D 383 11350 12080 2 A 203 957 1337 8 309 2225 2816 c 178 192 164 D 394 10290 11050 3 A 221 1417 1836 B 200 1442 1805 c 169 1678 1655 D 167 1651 1554 4 A 174 995 1313 B 218 2000 2404 c 209 1883 1897 D 153 1147 1051 5 A 178 1492 1826 - - - ---- - _B --- -- --- _141_ ------- ----- 1394- - --- -- -*-- 1634 c 141 172 282 D 158 673 550 6 A 167 1492 1817 B 131 1589 1821 c - 137 1636 1632 D 147 1635 1600 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 3B.3-2 BASKET PANEL CENTER REGION STRESSES UNDER lG LATERAL 90° LOAD ORIENTATION LOCATION MAXIMUM STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI) FIG 3B.3-3 304 S.S. ALUMINUM Pm Pm + Pb Pm Pm + Pb 3 75 1052 --- --- 4 56 1018 --- --- 7 78 1065 --- --- 8 62 1025 --- --- Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 3B.3-3 BASKET PANEL 304 6S.S.STRESSES AT PLUG WELD REGION 90 LOAD ORIENTATION LOCATION MAXIMUM STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI) FIG 3B.3-4 304 S.S. ALUMINUM Pm Pm + Pb Pm Pm + Pb 1 159 3215 --- --- 2 136 2667 --- --- 3 99 1824 --- --- 4 189 3817 --- --- 5 156 3215 --- --- 6 134 2658 --- --- 7 98 1819 --- --- 8 188 *3823 --- --- 9 144 2789 --- --- 10 153 3031 --- --- 11 86 1437 --- --- 12 209 4225 --- --- 13 . - 133 2783 14 147 3015 --- --- -- --- --- 15 83 1442 --- --- 16 206 4376 --- --- Rev. 0 1/00
..... :-.a..* - - ~-* -.
TABLE 3B.3-4 BASKET PANEL STRESSES - THERMAL LOCATION MAXIMUM STRESS. INTENSITIES (PSI) FIG 3B.3-6 THERMAL STRESS (SECONDARY STESS) Q SHEAR 304 S.S. ALUMINUM STRESS AT PLUG WELD AVERAGE TOP OR AVERAGE TOP OR BOTTOM BOTTOM 1 3474 29302 2 3066 30:]4
*3 2228 2238 4 1518 1564 5 3589 28479 6 3207 3221 7 16812 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3B.3-5 BASKET PANEL STRESSES THERMAL STRESS + lG LATERAL
. LOCATION MAXIMUM STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI)
FIG 3B.3-6 PRIMARY + SECONDARY STRESS (Pm + Pb + Q) SHEAR 304 S.S. ALUMINUM STRESS AT PLUG WELD AVERAGE TOP OR AVERAGE TOP OR BOTTOM BOTTOM 1 3633 32517 2 3144 4139 3 2228 2238 4 1518 1564 5 3798 31694 6 3285 4286 7 17095 . -- *---- --- --** ~--~-- -~- -----*--- - Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-1 TN-32 BASKET STRUCTURAL DESIGN CRITERIA FOR LEVEL D IMPACT ACCIDENT CONDITIONS PRIMARY STRESS ASMEl 3 > LIMITS FOR ELASTIC REFERENCE ANALYSIS MEMBRANE STRESS LESSER OF 2. 4 S'ff APPENDIX F INTENSITY, Pm 0 . 7 Su ( 1. 6 Sy) l F 1331. la MEMBRANE PLUS LESSER OF 3. 6 S'ff APPENDIX F BENDING STRESS 1. 0 Su (2
- 4 Sy) l F 1331.lc INTENSITY, Pm+ Pb SHEAR STRESS, o 0.42 Su APPENDIX F F 1331. ld NOTE:
(l)Sm - 2/3 Sy FOR MOST CLASS 1 MATERIALS. THE 6061 ALUMINUM LIMITS FOR A SHORT DURATION IMPACT EVENT ARE BASED ON THIS RELATIONSHIP ~INCE 6061 COD.E Sm VALUES ARE BASED* ON CREEP LIMIT. (2)SELF RELIEVING (SECONDARY) STRESSES ARE NOT CONSIDERED FOR LEVEL D SERVICE LIMITS (F-1310C). (3)SINCE COMPRESSIVE STRESSES ARE PRESENT THE STABILITY OF THE COMPONENT IS ALSO CONSIDERED (F-13100) . Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-2 TN-32 BASKET STRUCTURAL DESIGN CRITERIA FOR LEVEL D IMPACT ACCIDENT CONDITIONS NUMERICAL VALUES OF PRIMARY STRESS INTENSITY LIMITS.AT 400°F 304 6061 T6 STAINLESS STEEL ALUMINUM (PSI) (PSI) MEMBRANE STRESS 44,900 12,400 INTENSITY, P111 MEMBRANE PLUS 64,400 17,700 BENDING STRESS INTENSITY, Pm+ Pb SHEAR STRESS, 6 27,000 7,400 NOTE:THESE LIMITS ARE FOR METAL TEMPERATURE OF 400°F. THE SAR EVALUATES RESULTS AT SEVERAL TEMPERATURES. Rev. 0 1/00
--.. - -- . -=* :--. . -
TABLE 3B.4-3 BUCKLING LIMITS - 304 S.S. PANEL - ONE 0.5" ALUMINUM AND TWO 0.105" S.S. EVALUATING THE PANEL ASSUMING EVALUATING INDIVIDUAL PLATES STABLE CROSS SECTION WITH EACH ASSUMING PLATES SEPARATE BETWEEN MEMBER BENDING ABOUT COMMON WELDS & BEND ABOUT OWN N.A. {FIG. N.A. (FIG. 38.4-8.A) 3B.4-8.B) I= 1/12 W(0.713 -0.5 3 )=0.0194 in4 I= 1/12 W(0.105) 3 =0.0000965 in 4 A= 2xWx0.105=0.21 in 2 /in. A= 0.105 in 2 /in. r = -../I/A= 0.304 in. r = 0.0303 in. Assuming Hinged Ends Assuming Fixed Ends 1 = 8.7 k = 1 kl/r=28.62 1 = 6 k = 0.5(Ref. 4) kl/r=99 Kbk=l. 5 {Ref. 5, NF-3523b-l) Kbk=l. 5 Ref. NF-3322.1-E2.ba) Fa=l.5 S:'o(0.47- kl/r/444) (Ref. 5) Fa = 1. 5 Sy (0.47 -kl/r/444} at T=400 F Sy=20700 psi at T=400°F Sy=20700 psi Fa=7670 psi Fa=l2592 psi Pc= Fax 2A Pcritical = Fa X A Pc= 7670x2x0.105 = 1611 lb/in. Pc=12592x0. 21 = 2644 lb/in. CONCLUSION: THE LOWER VALUE OF Fa (7670 PSI) WILL BE USED TO
- -- - - - ----- ESTABLISH--THE ALLOWABLE COMPRESSIVE LOAD. __ .. ,----*-*----- *-- - -
Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-4 BUCKLING LIMITS - ALUMINUM PANEL- ONE 0.5 ALUMINUM AND TWO 0.105" S.S. 11 EVALUATING THE PANEL ASSUMING EVALUATING INDIVIDUAL PLATES STABLE CROSS SECTION WITH EACH ASSUMING PLATES SEPARATE BETWEEN MEMBER BENDING ABOUT COMMON WELDS & BEND ABOUT OWN N.A. (FIG. N.A. (FIG~ 3B.4-8.A} 3B.4-8.B) i.*zazzzzrzzzz22zzz22Z2Z1
~ -~-~
Cl
~ pzzzzzzzzzzzz2zz>>2ZfZ
,...~--.-.....---.-.. .-.----*o I= 1/12 W{0.5 3 )=0.0104 in 4 /in I= 1/12 W(0.5) 3 =0.0104 in 4 /in.
A = 0.5 in 2 /in. A= 0.5 in2 /in. r = ~I/A ~ 0.1443 in. r =~I/A= 0.1443 in. Assuming Hinged ~nds Assuming Fixed Ends l ~ 8.7 k ~ 1 kl/r=60.29 1 = 6 k = o.s* kl/r=20.79 at T=400°F at T=400°F F c = 7
- 4-0
- 0 3 2 kl Ir Fc:;;7. 4-0. 032 kl/r (Ref.6 Tab. 10) (Ref. 6, Tab. 10)
= 5.47 ksi = 6.734 ksi
= 5470 psi = 6734 psi Pc = Fe x A Pc:dtieal = Fe X A Pc = 6734x0.5 = 3367 LB/IN
-Pe;;;;.5_4.J_QxO .-5. =_ _2_~7~3~5_l=b"'-'/c_;:i=-n:...::.._ _ _ _~I------~----:-----,--- ____ , _ CONCLUSION: THE LOWER VALUE. OF Fe (5470 PSI) WILL BE USED TO ESTABLISH THE ALLOWABLE COMPRESSIVE LOAD.
*TOTAL ALLOWABLE. COMPRESSIVE LOAD= Pss + PALu.= 1611 + 2735
= 4346 LB./IN.
Rev. o l/OO
TABLE 3B.4-5 BUCKLING LIMITS - 304 S.S. PANEL - TWO 0.5" ALUMINUM AND TWO 0.105" S.S. EVALUATING THE PANEL ASSUMING EVALUATING INDIVIDUAL PLATES STABLE CROSS SECTION WITH EACH ASSUMING PLATES SEPARATE BETWEEN MEMBER BENDING ABOUT COMMON WELDS & BEND ABOUT OWN N.A. (FIG. N.A. (FIG. 3B.4-9.A) 3B.4-9.B)
.... ~ I
- 1. ; ' *.I - 0. .... *1 ii Vml!Wtlhl I. varrw*ne 1J 0 I= 1/12 W(l.21 3 -1 3 )=0.0643 inf I= 1/12 W(0.105) 3=0.0000965 in 4 A = 2xWx0. 105=0. 21 in2 /in. A= 0 .105 in2 /in.
r = ~I/A= 0.553 in. r = 0.0303 in. Assuming Hinged Ends Assuming Fixed Ends 1 = 8.7 k = 1 kl/r = 15.73 l = 6 k = 0.5 kl/r=99 Kbi.:=l. 5 . Ki:.1c=l .S Fa=l.5 S:b (0.47 - kl/r/444) Fa=l.SSy(0.47- kl/r/444) at T=400 F Sy=20700 psi at T=400°F Sy=20700 psi Fa=l3493 psi Fa=7670 psi Pcritical = Fa X A Pc = Fa X 2A Pc=l3493x0.21 = 2834 lb/in. Pc= 7670x2x0.105 = 1611 lb/in. CONCLUSION: THE LOWER VALUE OF Fa (7670 PSI} WILL BE USED TO ESTABLISH THE ALLOWABLE COMPRESSIVE LOAD.
*TOTAL ALLOWABLE COMPRESSIVE LOAD = Pss + PALo.= 1611 + 6435
= 8046 LB./IN.
Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-6 BUCKLING. LIMITS - ALUMINUM PANEL - TWO 0. 5" ALUMINUM AND TWO 0. 105" S.S.* EVALUATING THE PANEL ASSUMING EVALUATING INDIVIDUAL PLATES STABLE CROSS SECTION WITH EACH ASSUMING PLATES SEPARATE BETWEEN MEMBER BENDING ABOUT COMMON WELDS & BEND ABOUT OWN N.A. (FIG. N.A. (FIG. 3B.4-9.A) 3B. 4-9. B}
~---P -....
iI I}
' -- 'I o ~ ..
.,.,.. ,. *J 0 I= 1/12 W(1 3 )=0.0833 in 4 /in I= 1/12 w(0. 5) 3 =0. 0104 in 4 /in.
A = 1 in 2 /in. A= 0.5 in 2 /in. r = ~I/A= 0.2886 in. r = ~I/A = 0.01443 in. Assuming Hinged Ends Assuming Fixed Ends l = 8.7 k = 1 kl/r=30.145 1 = 6 k = 0.5 kl/r=20.79 at T=400°F at T=400°F Fc=7.4-0.032 kl/r Fc=7.4-0.032 kl/r
= 6.435 ksi = 6.734 ksi = 6435 psi = 6734 psi Pcritical = Fe X A Pc = Fe x 2A Pc=6435xl = 6435 lb/in. Pc = 67 34x2x0. 5 = 6734 lb/in.
CONCLUSION: THE LOWER VALUE OF Fe (6435 PSI) WILL BE USED TO ESTABLISH THE ALLOWABLE COMPRESSIVE LOAD. Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 38.4-7 BASKET PANEL LOADS - COMPRESSION AND BENDING UNDER 50G SIDE DROP 90° DROP ORIENTATION PANEL Fy Mz INTERACTION MARGIN LOCATION #/in. in-#/in. .* F + M OF FIGURE Pa Ma SAFETY 3B.4-14 1 2592 ::: 0 0.679 0.473 2 1023 ::: 0 0.235 3.26 5 2377 =::i 0 0.546 0.83 6 2262 *43 0.587 0.704 NOTE:AT 400°, Pa=4346 #/in, Ma=l739 in-#/in WITH SU~FACE LOAD
*Ma=644 in-#/in WITHOUT SURFACE LOAD Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-B BASKET PANEL LOADS - COMPRESSION AND BENDING UNDER SOG SIDE DROP 45° DROP ORIENTATION PANEL Fx F-i Mz INTERACTION MARGIN LOCATION #/in. #/in. in-#/in. F + M. OF FIGURE P; Ma SAFETY 3B.4-14 1 2073 113 0.542 0.845 3 1307 146 0.385 1.59 4 1716 129 0.469 1.13 5 1672 88 0.435 1.29 6 1605 72 0.411 1.43 8 1306 66 0.338 1. 96 9 1691 116 0.456 1.19 10 1295 72 0.339 1. 95 11 1158 144 0.349 1. 86 NOTE:AT 400°, Pa=4346 #/in, Ma=l739 in-#/in WITH SURFACE LOAD
*Ma=644 in-#/in WITHOUT SURFACE LOAD Rev. o
- 1/00
~-=--
.- r~* ..:.
~:**1-:c-..
-~
TABLE 3B.4-9 BASKET PANEL LOADS - COMPRESSION AND BENDING UNDER SOG SIDE DROP 0° DROP ORIENTATION PANEL Fx Mz INTERACTION MARGIN LOCATION #/in. in-#/in. F + M OF FIGURE ' Pa Ma SAFETY
- 38. 4-14 4 2451 *32 0.614 0.629 8 1887 *9 0.448 1. 23 9 2439 ~ 0 0.561 0.783 12 **2637 ~ 0 0.328 2.05 13 **3240 ~.o 0.403 1. 48 NOTE: At 400°, Pa=4346 #/in, Ma=1739 in-#/in WITH SURFACE LOAD
*Ma=644 in-#/in WITHOUT SURFACE LOAD
**Pa=8046 #/in AT THIS PANEL LOCATION Rev. O lfOO
TABLE 3B.4-10 BASKET PANEL CORNER REGION STRESSES UNDER SOG SIDE DROP 90° DROP ORIENTATION LOCATION STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI) FIGURE 3B.4-15 MEMBRANE MEMBRANE + BENDING (Pm) (Pm + Pb) Average Top Bottom Surf ace *surface 1 A . 9526 47340 61390 B 11010 43900 62560 c 8647 13370 10010 D 5189 7994 8102 2 A 10940 42990 61550 B 7196 47260 60840 c 8257 7977 8541 .. D 8443 13010 10170 3 A 8666 48280 61350 B 7544 44190 57670 c 5064 49890 56030 D 5131 50880 57230 . ____ A_____ - *----667_0______ ---~.411..Q .. - --*-
-*-A**--~.
46740 B 5116 10340 19240 c 6366 51610 52010 D 4658 49170 54650 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 38.4-10 BASKET PANEL CORNER REGION STRESSES UNDER SOG SIDE DROP 90° DROP ORIENTATION (continued) LOCATION STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI) FIGURE 38.4-15 MEMBRANE (Pm) MEMBRANE + BENDING (Pm + Pb) Average Top Bottom
.. Surf ace Surface A 4839 31540 7867 5
B 3110 7361 10770 c 9775 8053 12370 D 10820 10500 11200 A 5293 36790 45180 6 B 3967 3773 10690 c 3824 49410 52350
-D 4-363 S-19-3-0 S-?-s-3*0 Rev. o 1/.00
TABLE 3B.4-11 BASKET PANEL CORNER REGION STRESSES UNDER SOG SIDE DROP 45° DROP ORIENTATION LOCATION STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI} FIGURE 3B.4-15 MEMBRANE (Pm) MEMBRANE + BENDING (Pm+ Pb)
~ *- ..
Average Top Bottom Surface Surf ace 1 A 5057 40300 38890 B 8396 26250 40720 c 8892 6242 12480 D 3933 6736 3870 2 A 9328 29400 46690 B 10800 28400 48810
*c 13140 9696 16860 D 6528 14960 8550 3 A 2764 39820 42430 B 3996 28320 35240 c 3578 40380 44870 D 9329.. 29600 42350 4 A 7027 24470 37600 B 3795 22430 18720 c 1751 47500 47800 D 3833 29480 28420 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-11 BASKET PANEL CORNER REGION STRESSES UNDER 50G SIDE DROP 45° DROP ORIENTATION (continued) LOCATION STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI) FIGURE 3B.4-15 MEMBRANE (Pm) MEMBRANE + BENDING (Pm + Pb) Average Top Bottom Surface Surf ace A .7882 24320 39100 5 B 4426 11840 8310 c 12370 9453 15350 D .11850 8374 23030 A 7765 32240 *45820 8 B 3143 8731 6972 c 6910 5372 9038 D 6808 28100 39420 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-12 BASKET PANEL CORNER REGION STRESSES UNDER 50G SIDE DROP 0° DROP ORIENTATION LOCATION STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI) FIGURE 3B.4-15 MEMBRANE (Pm} MEMBRANE + BENDING (Pm + Pb} Average Top Bottom Surf ace Surf ace 2 A 4742 1701 8885 B 10750 9798 12130 c 12820 10400 16990 D 4960 9295 12060 4 A 3587 1482 7407 B 3239 42120 45870 c 7886 16030 16340 D 3699 7477 14130 5 A 8031 37450 51490 B 6846 10690 8144 c 10240 9688 10860 D 7248 10950 24070 6 A 3347 4384 5160 B 1978 39930 42750 c 4222 6330 11770 D 4878 6217 - 5726 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-12 BASKET PANEL CORNER REGION STRESSES UNDER SOG SIDE DROP 0° DROP ORIENTATION (continued) LOCATION STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI) FIGURE 3B.4-15 MEMBRANE {Pm) MEMBRANE + BENDING (Pm + Pb) Average Top Bottom Surface Surf ace A 5225 37280 46240 7 B 5393 49670 57790 c 4094 49450 54860 D 5345 4955 13990 A 9220 46510 61930 8 B 5225 8265 7786 c 7093 10840 8197
*--o-- ---9e92 ~PfS7cr-'- ----6()070 Rev. O 1./00
TABLE 3B.4-13 BASKET PANEL CENTER REGION STRESSES UNDER 50G SIDE DROP 90° DROP ORIENTATION . LOCATION MAXIMUM STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI) . FIGURE 3B.4-14 304 S.S. ALUMINUM Pm Pm +. Pb Pm Pm + Pb 3 2772 7115 295 6626 4 2436 7226 319 6657 7 2834 .8022 271 6704 8 1956 5336 268 5213 Rev. O l/00
TABLE 38.4-14 BASKET PANEL CENTER REGION STRESSES UNDER SOG SIDE DROP 45° DROP ORIENTATION LOCATION MAXIMUM STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI) FIGURE 3B.4-14 304 S.S. ALUMINUM Pm Pm + Pb Pm Pm + Pb 1 4926 6766* 3046 6353 3 5860 9058 2575 7034 4 5853 10660 1548 6041 5 4418 6280 1853 4836 6 5834 9317 1284 5183 7 4715 7830 1832 6311 8 3745 6363 1671 5199 9 4086 5673 2532 5668 10 4149 7031 1413 5085 11 3917 8133 1126 5721 Rev. O l/OQ
TABLE 3B.4-15 BASKET PANEL CENTER REGION STRESSES UNDER SOG SIDE DROP 0° DROP ORIENTATION LOCATION MAXIMUM STRESS INTENSITIES (PSI} FIGURE 3B.4-14 304 S.S. ALUMINUM Pm Pm + Pb Pm Pm + Pb 5 1110 3419 195 4342 6 2188 5865 195 5884 10 2084 5792 192 5386 11 2397 7678 199 6612
- -----~--------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----
Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-16 MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF ALUMINUM ALLoy<ll ASTM 8221 6061-T6 Minimum Ultimate Strength, Su 28,700 psi Minimum Yield Strength, Sy 27,100 psi Design Stress Value, Sm 9 t 567 psi (2 ) Modulus of Elasticity, E 9. 2 x 10 6 psi Density 0 .105 lbs/ in 3 NOTES:
- 1. Mechanical properties listed are for a metal temperature of 300°F.
- 2. According to the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Appendix III, the design stress intensity value (Sm) is the smaller of the following:
a.One-third of the tensile strength at temperature; b.Two-thirds of the yield strength at temperature. Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-17
SUMMARY
OF ALUMINUM RAIL STRESSES MEMBRANE BENDING MEMBRANE + BENDING LOCATION Pm (psi) Pb (psi) Pm+Pb (psi) Bottom 1 89 25,187 25,276 Rail (Fig. 2 4,533 650 5,183 3B.4-16) Side Rail 1 301 22,524 22,825 (Fig. 2 2,250 16,350 18,600 3B.4-17) Rev. 0 1/00
'l,'ABLE 3B.4-18 ALUMINUM RAIL DESIGN CRITERIA FOR LEVEL D ACCIDENT CONDITIONS PRIMARY STRESS LIMITS ASME FOR ELASTIC ANALYSIS REFERENCE Pm 20,090 Appendix F F-1331.la Pm + Pb 28,700 F-1331.lC Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 3B.4-19 Mechanical Properties of SA-240- Type 304 SST ( 400°F) E = 26.5 x 10 6 psi Sy= 20,700 psi Su = 6 4 , 4 0 0 psi STRAIN (in./in.) STRESS (psi) 0.000781132 20,700 0.1 31,000 0.2 42,000 0.3 53,000 0.4 64,400 TABLE 3B.4-20 Mechanical Properties of Aluminum 6061-T6 (400oF) E = 8.7 x 10 6 (psi) Sy= 13,300 (psi) Su= 17,700 (psi)
------------- - -STRAIN___ ------ ---- - --sTRESS-(psi ) -
(in. /in.) 0.0015287 13,300 0.1 14,500 0.2 15,600 0.28 17,700 Rev. o 1/00
THIS PAGE INTENTIALLY BLANK Rev. O 1/00
WEl.D l.OCATION WALL
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II STIF ~3 SHELL CORNER OF SST SrLL PARTMENT FUE~ STIF 63 SHELL ELEMENTS ALUMINUM 1
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........ MODEL SIMULATION 0
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STU 63 SHELL ELEMEN'l' lTYP.) 304 SST STIF 16 PIPE ELEMENT 7 t B.'1" PANEL LENGTH ./ NOTE: STRESSES REPORTED AT THESE FIGURE 3B~3-6 LOCATIONS ARE AN AVERAGE ALONG DETAILED PANEL MODEL THERMAL RUN & STR!SS THE SECTION OF THE PLATE. REfOR~ING_LQCAT!ONS REV. o 1/00
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-* ANSYS 4 *.4A
~* NJV 22 1993 12:11:25 POST1 DISPL. .. STEPss1 ITER*1 OMX *0. 044303 iOSCA*15 zv *1
..... DIST*31.S56
- XF *14.525 ZF *-1.SSS
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TN32 BASKET ANALYSIS-Sa DEGREE ORIENTATION DROP FIGURE 3B.4-4 DISPLACEMENT PLOT 90° DROP REV. o 1/00
ANSVS 4'.4A t-DU 22 1SS3 12:32:2? POST1 DISPL. STEPsz1 IT£Ra:1 OM>< *0.032833 l0SCA*15 zu *1 DIST*31.S56
~ *14.525 ZF =-1. S99 Tti32 BASKET ANALYSIS-45 DEGREE ORIENTATION DROP
!'IGORE 3B.4-S DXSPLACEMENT DROP
'5° DROP REV. O 1/00
-=* .* --.. . . ~
ANSYS 4.4A NOU 22 1993
. .. .. 12:21:42
*- .1 P05T1 OISPL
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I ZF 1:-1 .999 TN32 BASKET ANALYSIS-0 DEGREE ORIENTATION DROP PIGtJJlE 3B.,-6 DISPLACEMENT PLOT 0° DllOP REV. 0 l/00
CONSERVATIVELY ASSUMED BOCXLING SHAPE HINGED CORNERS CORNERS
.. AC'l't1ALLY HAVE RIGIDlTY r-------1------ - - - -
MORE LIKELY BUCKLING MODES FIGURE 3B.,-'7 BASKET B~CKLING MODES REV. 0 1/00
LOAD LOAD I HINGED ENDS (CONS!RVA'l'IVE, MANY PLATES ARE CONTINUOUS) 6.00 11 SPACING OF WELDS B.7" ANEL WELD A) COL~MN BUCKLING OF OVERALL PANEL B) LOCAL INSTAEILITY OF INDIVIDUAL PLATES BETWEEN WELDS FIGURE 3B.4-8 PANEL STABILITY UNDER COMPRESSIVE LOAD - SINGLE ALUMINUM PL1'. TE REV. 0 1/00
l.OAD
-'--'~L..l"-..L.J'. HINGED ENDS (CONHJI. VATIVE, MANY Pl.ATES ARE CONTINUOUS) 6.oo* SPACING OF WELDS y
WELD - *- - - - - - -- - - - - - -,_)-cOliUMN-BUCKL-ING-OF--OV-ER-A-LL- PANEL- -JU-LOCAL--XNS.TABII.I'U'__Q_F_______________ _ INDIVIDUAL PLATES BETWEEN WEt.DS FIGURE 3B.4-9 PANEL STABILITY UNDER COMPRESSIVE LOAD - DOUBLE ALUMINUM PLATES REV. 0 1/00
LOADED SURFACE BENDING MOMENT Ox*~ y .!'!... (CLASSICAL BENDING OF A FLAT PLATE> I-Ji.£ JJ THEREFORE: E y SUSSTI'l'UTING; 6 E SST* 26.S x 10 PSI i 400°F 304 y 1:: .355 'lO OUTER FIBER Ox* Sy 9 400°F
- 20700 J?SI D "' .8686 x 10 6 IN.-LB.
'l'HE ALLOWABLE BENDING MOMEN'l' WITH SURFACE LOADING IS:
- - - - - - - - - - - - --- --~1739-IN.-i;s-:-JIN~ FIGURE 3B.4-10 PANEL STABILITY EVALUATION - BENDING MOMENT LIMIT WITH APPLIED LOAD ON COMPRESSIVE SURFACE PLATE
- SINGLE ALUMINUM PLATE REV. 0 1/00
- MAY
)
ADGE BENDING MOMENT THEREFORE: ax D (l-p.2) M * ~--- E y StJBSTITO'l'ING~ 6 E 304 SST " 26.5 x 10 PSI 8 400°F y * .355 '1'0 OUTER FIBER C'x* 7670 PSI (ALLOWABLE LEVEt. C STRESS IN STAINLESS PLA'l'E TO ENSURE I'l' DOES NOT BUCKLE AS SKETCHED). D * .8686 x 10 6 IN.-LB. THE ALLOWABLE BENDING MOMENT IS THEN: M a-;-644-IN.-LB./IN. . FIGURE 3B.4-ll PANEL STABILITY EVALUATION BENDING MOMENT LIMIT WITH COMPRESSION SURFACE PLATE FREE TO SEPARATE - SINGLE ALUMINUM PLATE REV. 0 1/00
BENDING MOMENT 0 x=-E_ y JL (CLASSICAL BENDING OF A FLAT PLATE) 1-SL2 D THEREFORE: E y SUBSTITUTING: 6
£ 304 SST* 26.S x 10 PSI a 400°P y c .605 TO Ot1TER FIBER Ux= Sy 9 400°F
- 20700 PSI D = 4.299 :x 10 6 !N.-LB.
THE ALLOWABLE BENDING MOMENT WITH SURFACE LOADING IS: -- - - - - - - - - - ---- - --Y.-g--.,--5051-!-N-;-I.;-B-;-(-I-N~------- FIGURE 3B.4-12 PANEL STABILITY EVALU~TION - BENDING MOMENT LIMIT WITH APPLIED LOAD ON COMPRESSIVE SURFACE PLATE
- DOUBLE ALUMINUM PLATES REV. 0 l/00
HIS PLATE MAY SEPARATE EDGE EDGE
- BENDlNO BENDING MOMEN'l' MOMENT CJ:x*..L... y _!L l-J12 D THEREFORE:
E y SUBS~I'l'UTING: 6 E SST s: 26.S x 10 PSI 8 400°F 304 y s: .605 TO OT1TER FIBER O'x"' 7670 PSI (ALLOWABLE LEVEL C STRESS IN STAINLESS PLATE TO ENSURE IT DOES NOT BUCKLE AS SKETCHED) I> s: 4.299 x 10 6 IN.-t.B. THE ALLOW ABLES-ENDING-MOMENT--W-I-Tff-STJ:RF-AG&-LOADING-IS: _ _ _ _ , Ma s: 1872 IN.-LB./IN. FIGURE 3B.4-13 PANEL STABILITY EVALUATION BENDING MOMEN_T LIMIT WITH COM?RESSION SURFACE PLATE FREE TO SEPARATE - DOUBLE ALUMINUM PLATES REV. 0 1/00
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APPENDlX 3C INELASTIC ANALYSIS OF THE TN-32 BASKET 3C.l Int~oductjon The details of the TN-32 Basket are* shown on TN Drawing Nos. 1049-70-5 and 1049-70-6. The basket structure consists of an assembly of stainless steel cells joined by fusion welded stainless steel plugs and separated by aluminum and poison plates. The stainless steel, aluminum and poison material between fuel components is effectively a sandwich panel. The* panel consists of two 0.105 in. thick 304 stainless plates and one 0.5 inch thick 606l-T6 aluminum plate (except at the center cross panels, which have two*0.5 in. aluminum plates) surrounding the 0.040 in. thick poison plate. The aluminum provides the heat conduction path from the fuel'assernblies to the cask cavity wall and the poison material provides the necessary criticality control. The NRC staff requested additional analyses be performed:
- Peak amplitude of 55 G (lateral inertial loading)
- Pulse shape of an isosceles triangle *
- Pulse duration of 6 millisecs.
In order to form a basis for this evaluation, equivalent static acceleration values are established by determining the maximum dynamic load factor (DLF) possible for an isosceles triangle input pulse. Referring to NUREG/CR-3966 111 , Methods for Impact Analysis. of Shipping Containers, Figure 2.3 {reproduced here in Figure 3C.1-
- i_t!__D~~~~ _=_!_* ~ -~-o! an isoscele~ triangle input- pulse.
- For completeness, Transnuclear, Inc-:- performeffanro-a-a-1------ ---- - - -
analysis of the TN-32 basket. Results of this analysis, reported for reference only, showed a peak DLF of 1.35 for the TN-32 basket. The DLF of 1.6 was uniformly applied to the analyses. This corresponds to an acceleration of 88 G. This DLF is larger than the maximum achievable under an isosceles triangle* input pulse and larger than the value obtained from the modal analysis. This larger value was chosen to alleviate any concerns about the effect of slightly higher input accelerations or slightly different input pulse shapes. 3C.l-l Rev. o l/OO
~--------------------
The dynamic load factors are summarized in Table 3C.1-l. Table 3C.1-1 Maximum Dynamic Load Factors For Isosceles Based on Used in Triangle TN Modal Structural (Based on Ref. 1) Analysis Analysis Max DLF 1.5 1.35 1.6 Corresponding 83G 74G 88G Acceleration Transnuclear, Inc. also performed a tipover analysis of the TN-32 cask. Results of this analysis, reported in Appendix 3D, showed a maximum G load of 74 should be used for the basket structure analysis. Therefore, using 88G's for structural analysis of the basket is conservative. Elastic-plastic analyses of the TN-32 basket were performed and are presented in Appendix Sections 3C.2 and 3C.3. Section 3C.2: 88G side impact analysis. Modeling aluminum plates elastically while allowing plastic material behavior to develop in the stainless steel plates, all material properties at 400°F temperature (maximum calculated temperature at top section of the basket is 391°F, see Figure 4.4-9). Section 3C.3-l: B8G side impact analysis. Including support - - - - -------------rails-in-the-modeL,-alL- materials_ar.a_model_e_d______ plastically. Basket material properties at 400°F temperature and support rail material at 3S0°F temperature (maximum rail temperature in the hottest section is 339°F, see Table 4.1-1). Section 3C.3-2: 52G side impact analysis. Including support rails in the model, all materials are modeled plastically. Basket material properties at 531 °F temperature (maximum calculated basket temperature in the hottest central part of basket is 527°F, see Figure 4.4-8) and support rail material at 3S0°F 3C.1-2 Rev. o 1/00
temperature (maximum rail temperature in the hottest section is 339°F, see Table 4.1-1). 3C.l-3 Rev. O 1/00
3C.2 Stress Analysjs of the Basket Structure The ANSYs< 2 > finite element model described in the Appendix 3B was used to perform the structural analysis with the following modifications: The new model has approximately four times as many elements as the previous model to ensure that the plastic behavior of the 304 stainless steel is properly represented. In the previous model, several of the aluminum conduction path~ which consist of two 0.5 11 aluminum. plates were represented as a single plate having equivalent bending and tensile stiffness. Both plates are included in the new model and carefully modeled to define each plate c?nnection. The corner geometries have been updated to reflect current basket configuration shown in Drawings 1049 5 and 1049-70-6. The fuel assemblies are modeled by increasing the density of the contact surface of the stainless steel plate, rather than as a pressure loading. In Appendix 3B, analyses were performed for three different basket orientations (90°, 45°, and o 0 ) . The results show that the 90° orientation yielded the highest stresses on the basket structure. Therefore, the structural analysis of the basket was performed for the 90° load case. This section presents the structural analysis of the TN-32 basket in the unlikely event of cask tipover on the concrete pad. ~-------The--*st-ainless--steel--is-*modeled-as-a-plas-t ic -mat.erial-anci--Ehe-- - - - - - - - - - aluminum plates are modeled elastically. The analysis performed assumed an 88 G lateral inertial loading of the basket. The basket structure is designed to provide sufficient structural rigidity to maintain separation of the fuel assemblies and a subcritical configuration under the applied loadings. The deformations and stresses induced in the basket structure due to the applied loads are determined using the ANSYS computer program. The inertial G loads due to the fuel assemblies are distributed evenly over the contact layers of the 304 stainless steel boxes. The weight of the basket structure itself is also considered. The new basket model is shown on Figure 3C.2-l. Boundary and loading conditions used for the structural analysis are shown on Figure 3C.2-2. 3C.2-l Rev. O 1/00
r.oadjng An inelastic analysis requires an iterative solution and the actual load-history needs to be followed. The magnitude of the first load step is such as to produce stress near yield. The subsequent load steps are small. The in~lastic analysis is extended to an inertial loading of SS G.* Following *is the detail of the load step history used in the analysis: Table 3C.2-l Load Steps for Inelastic analysis Load Step No. of Iterations Inertial Loading {G's) 1 3 35 2 7 50 3 12 55 4 19 60 5 27 70 6 35 75 7 44 80 8 53 85 9 57 88 Basket Material prapekties 3C.2-2 Rev. o 1/00
The material properties of the 304 stainless steel plates are taken from the ASME 131 Code, Section II, Part D. The material properties of the aluminum alloy (6061-T6/T651) are also taken from the ASME Code. These properties are listed with specific references in Chapter 3. The following accident drop case was analyzed* assuming plastic behavior of the 304 stainless steel plates but elastic aluminum plate behavior. A summary of the stress-strain properties of .the 304 stainless steel used for the analysis is given in Table 3C.2-2 below. This is a bilinear stress-strain relationship. Table 3C 2-2 Mechanical Properties of SA-240 Type 304 SST (400°F) E = =?6.5 X 10 6 psi Siil = ta, 100 psi SY = 20, 700 psi Su = 64,400 psi Strain {in. /in.) Stress (psi) 0.000781132 20,700 0.1 31,000 0.2 42,000 0.3 53,000 0.4 64,400 3C.2-3 Rev. O 1/00
Stress Crjterja The stress criteria are taken from Section III, Appendix F of the ASME Code. The acceptance criteria for elastic analysis are provided in Tables 3B.4-l and 2, and are reproduced below. Table 3C.2-3 TN-32 Basket Stn1cturaJ Design Crjterja for I.evel D Condjtjons {El as t 'ic Ana 1.ysis ' ) Numerical Values of Primary Stress Intensity Limits at 400°F 304 SS 6061 T6/T651 (ksi) Aluminum (ksi} Membrane Stress 44.9 12.4 Intensity, Pm Membrane Plus 64.4 17. 7. Bending Stress Intensity, Pm + Pb Shear Stress, 't 27.0 7.4 The acceptance criteria for plastic analysis are also taken from Section III, Appendix F of the ASME Code and.are provided below. Table JC.2-4 TN-32 Basket Structural Design Crjterja for !revel D Conditjons (Pl as t 'l.C Ana l ,YSl.S
' )
Numerical Values of Primary
- - - - - -- - - - - - Stress Intensity Limits at 400°F
- -- --- -- --- - - - --ASME-*---
304 SS ~-------- (ksi) Reference Membrane Stress 45.l Appendix F Intensity, P111 F-134l.2a Membrane Plus 58.0 Appendix F Bending Stress F-1341.2b Intensity, pm + Pb Shear Stress, 't 27.0 Appendix F F-J.341.2c 3C.2-4 Rev. O 1/00
Evaluation Analysis using the basket system model is performed for the 90°load orientation relative to the basket plates as indicated in Figure 3C.2-2. Detailed stresses and displacements of the basket are obtained and stored for every node location for each individual load case (9 load cases) . These stored results are postprocessed to printout the stresses, forces and moments at load case no. 9 (88 G) at the locations on the basket shown on Figures 3C.2-3 through 3C.2-5. The locations selected are key points that indicate the behavior of the enti~e basket structure. The displacement plot for the 88 G load case is shown on Figure 3C.2-6.
~he panel load results from this analysis are presented in Table 3C.2-S. Their corresponding locations are shown on Figure 3C.2-4 . . This table shows the.forces and moments for the 88 G load case. These are the panels most likely to buckle when the basket is subjected to the above lateral inertial load. These forces and moments are evaluated using the interaction equation described in Section 3B.4.3. The interaction equation for compression and bending is:
1 The allowable compressive force, Pa (Pa= 7,974 lbs/in.) was determined in Section 3B.4.3.2. The allowable bending moment, Ma (Ma= 644 in.-lb/in.) was determined in Section 3B.4.3.4. The buckling interaction total, also listed in Table 3C.2-5, results in a minimum margin of safety of 0.52 for the panel location 1. Therefore the design meets the criteria with margin at a load level of 88 G's.
- Ta:bTes-3-c~Z=E>-1-+/-sts-the-*stres-ses-at-t-he-eorne~:r;eg-i-ens-and-------
Tables 3C.2-7 and 3C.2-8 list the stresses at the central regions. Their corresponding locati.ons are shown O:\'l Figures 3C.2-3 through 3C.2-S. Based-on the results of this analysis, it is concluded that:
- 1. 304 Stainless Steel Plate The maximum membrane stress intensity at 88 G's is 15.9 ksi and occurs at location l of Table 3C.2-7. This stress is below the allowable stress of 45.1 ksi (0.7Su) at a temperature of 400°F. The maximum membrane plus bending 3C.2-5 Rev. O 1/00
stress intensity is 22.6 ksi psi and occurs at location 1 corner B (Table 3C.2-6). This stress is below the allowable stress of 58.0 ksi (0.9Su) at a temperature of 400°F.
- 2. Shear Stress in 1/2 in. Plug Welds The maximum shear stress in-the plug weld is 17.2 ksi at location 5 (Table 3C.2-8). This stress is below the allowable stress of 27.0 ksi (0.42 Su} at a temperature of 400°F.
- 3. Aluminum Plate The maximum membrane stress intensity due to 88 G's is 4.4 ksi and occurs at location l (Table 3C.2-7). This stress is below the allowable stress of 12.4 ksi (2.4 Sm) at a temperature of 400°F. .
The maximum membrane plus bending stress intensity is 16.B ksi and occurs at locations 3 and 4 (Table 3C.2-7). This stress is below the allowable stress of i7.7 ksi(Su) at a temperature of 400°F.
- 4. The maximum deflection of 0.066 in. occurs in the center of the top panel. The panels deflect in the same direction.
Therefore, the relative spacing between fuel assemblies remains approximately the same. This would allow the fuel assemblies to be removed after a hypothetical accident.
- 5. The basket plates are structurally adequate under the accident load. The plates will remain in place and maintain separation of adjacent fuel assemblies.
3C.2-6 Rev. O 1/00
Table 3C 2-5 Basket Panel Loads - Compression and Bending (88G 90° Drop Orientation) Panel Mz Interaction Margin to Fr Location lb/in. in-lb/in. F/P4 + M/Ma Allowable (Figure 3C.2-4) 1 ?,289 ~o 0.66 0.52 2 1,759 42 0.29 2.45 5 4,258 ~o 0.53 0.89 6 2,499 29 0.36 1. 78 -- ---~---- --- ------------------* --- 3C.2-7 Rev. O 1/00
Table 3C 2-6 Basket Panel Corner Region Stresses Under 88G Side Drop ( 90 0 Drop Orientation) Location Stress Intensities (ksi) (Figure 3C.2-3) Membrane (P111} Membrane + .Bending (P111 + Pb) Average Top Surface 'BTM Surface 1 A 7.4 22.5 19.0 B a.a 15.9 22.6 c 8.8 8.8* 8.8 D 6.6 6.4 6.9 2 A 8.5 16.7 22.5 B 6 .*s 20.0 22.5 c 2.6 2.6 8.7 D 8.7 8.7 2.4 3 A 6.7 21.0 22.S B 7.6 17.6 22.1 c 6.0 17.3 20.l D 6.5 18.0 21.1 4 A 6.1 12.3 21.9 B 6.3 13.7 21.a c 7.8 17.3 20.2 D 8.2 17.5 20.6 5 A 5.4 5.0 6.0
- - B - - - --7-.-6----- - 5--L-7 12.7 c 6.0 6.4 5.7 D 8.6 5.5 11.9 6 A 8.1 8.6 18.6 B 7.4 5.8 13.0 c 6.8 17.3 21.1 D 6.8 18.0 21.l 3C.2-8 Rev. o 1/00
TabJe 3C 2-7 Basket Panel Center Region Stresses Under 88 G Side Drop (90° Drop Orientation) Location Maximum Stress Intensities (ksi) (Figure 3C.2-4) 304 S.S. Aluminum Pm PUI + Pb pm pm + Pl:) 1 15.9 17.0 4.4 4.4 3 8.8 18.7 .02 16.8 4 8.9 18.8 .02 16.8 7 8.9 18.8 .02 16.7 8 6.7 13.6 .04 11.8 3C.2-9 Rev. 0 1/00
/
Table 3c 2-8 Basket Panel Shear Stresses at Plug Weld Region Under 88G Side Drop (90° Drop Orientation} Location 304 SS Plug Weld (Figure 3C.2-5) Shear Stress (ksi) l 17.1 2 17.0 3 12.7 4 12.5 5 17.2 6 17.1 7 17.1 8 17.2 3C.2-10 Rev. O 1/00
3C.3 plast1c Analysis of the Basket and Support Rajl Structures 3C. 3-1 Stress lmaJ ysj s Based on Basket Material Temperature at 400°F and Support Raj J Material Temperature at 3S0°F. In this analysis, the basket model has been modified to allow plastic material behavior to develop in the aluminum plate (all materials are modeled plastically in the revised basket model). *The aluminum plates used the following mechanical properties (bilinear stress-strain relationship) at 400°F (reference Section 3C.3-3): E 8.7 x 10 3 ksi Sy 13.3 ksi Su 17.7 ksi at 28%" strain The earlier analysis {Section 3C.2) assumed that the peak basket stresses due to the side impact would occur in the horizontal basket plates one compartment away from the support rails. To remove the uncertainties associat-ed with this assumption, the basket rails were explicitly modeled with. solid elements and plastic material properties. The extruded aluminum rails have a peak temperature of 339°F, as reported in Table 4.1-
- 1. The analysis conservatively used the following mechanical properties (bilinear stress-strain relationship) of the extruded aluminum rails at 350 °F (reference Section 3C.3-4}:
E 9.0 x 10 3 ksi s __ y __ 20.0 ksi Su 22.4. ksi at 24% strain The new basket model including support rails is shown on Figure 3C.3-1. Boundary and loading conditions used for the structural analysis are shown on Figure 3C. 3-2. The displacem-ent plot for the 88G load case is shown on Figure 3C.3-3 for th~ basket and rails and Figure 3C.3-4 for the bottom rail. To facilitate interpretation of the stress analysis results, color contour plots of stress intensities were obtained for each of the membrane and membrane plus bending stress intensities of the stainless steel and aluminum plates. 3C.3-1 Rev. O 1/00
Based on the results of this analysis, it is concluded that:
- 1. 304 Stainless Steel Plate The maximum membrane stress intensity at 88 G'f3 is 23.3 ksi as shown on Figure 3C.3-5. This stress is below the allowable stress of 45.1 ksi (0.7Su) at a temperature of 400°F. The maximum membrane plus bending stress intensity is 26.B ksi as shown on Figure 3C.3-6. This stress is below the allowable stress of 58.0 ksi (0.9Su) at a temperature of 400°F. .
- 2. Shear Stress in 1/2 in. Plug Welds The maximum shear stress in the plug weld is 16.5 ksi at location 5 (Figure 3C.2-5) . This stress is below the allowable stress of 27.0 ksi (0.42 Su) at a temperature of 400°F.
- 3. Aluminum Plate The maximum membrane stress intensity due to 88 G 1 s is 8.0 ksi as shown on Figure 3C.3-7. This stress is below the allowable stress of 12.4 ksi (0.7Su> at a temperature of 400°F. The maximum membrane plus bending stress intensity is 15.4 ksi as shown on Figure3C.3- 8. This stress is below the allowable stress of 15.9 ksi (0.9Su) at a temperature of 400°F.
- 4. Under the 88 G, compressive load, the maximum vertical plastic deflections are -0.061'1 , -0.057 and +0.009 11 at locations 1, 2, and 3 (Figure 3C.3-2) respectively.
Therefore, the open dimension at locations 2 and 3 of the fuel compartment will be reduced to 8.7 11 ..:o.os1 11 -o.009 11 = 8.634 11
- This opening is greater than the cross section of the fuel assembly (8.426 11 x 8.426 11 ) and provides sufficient clearance-for -fue -removal--;-----4!h-i-s--i-s-the--compartment which shows the most deformation.
- 5. Aluminum Support Rail The collapse load in accordance with ASME B .& PV Code, Section III, NB-3213.25 and Appendix F, F-1341.3 was calculated and plotted in Figure 3C.3-9 for the_ b9ttom support rail at location 1 (Figure 3C.3-4). As shown on Figure 3C.3-9, the collapse load for the rail is 96G and is higher than the design G load of 88.
Additional analyses were performed to evaluate the stability of the vertical rail plates. The membrane and bending stress intensities at the locations most likely to buckle 3C.3-2 Rev. O 1/00
are listed in the following table. Location Membrane Bending Stress Stress Intensity Intensity pm (ksi) Pb (ksi) Bottom Rail 2 7.4 14.5 (Figure 3C.3-4) 3 6.2 14.3 The allowable compressive stress is 2/3 of the buckling load based on Paragraph F-1334.3 of Appendix F of the ASME Code. The critical buckling load is determined using the Euler equation: Where n = the end condition constant E = modulus of elasticity, 9.0x10 6 _psi (at 3S0°F) I = moment of inertia, in4 l = length of the vertical member, inches The rail vertical members are fixed at both ends. The theoretical value for the end condition constant is 4, but a value of 1 was used for conservatism. 3C.3-3 Rev. O 1/00
The allowable compressive stresses for the locations 2 and 3 of the rail are listed in the following table. Rail Compressjye Stresses ye. Allowable Cornpressjye Stresses Allowable Allowable Compress. Critical Compressive Compressive Stress fa Load Load Stress (ksi) ,ANSYS Run LOCATIONS (kips) P=2/3 Pc:r Fa=P/A Per Bottom Rail (Fig. 41.6 27.7 55.4 7.4 3C.3-4, Location 2) Bottom Rail (Fig. 55.0 36.7 73.4 6.2 3C.3-4, Location 3) As indicated above, the compressive stresses from the accident loads are well below the allowable compressive stresses. For combined axial compression and bending, equations 20 and 21 of Paragraph NF-3322.1 (e) (1) apply. and 3C.3-4 Rev. O 1/00
The allowable stresses for the above equations are determined as follows: Allowable Stress ASME Reference Fa P/A F-1334.S(a) Fb 1.5 Sy = 30,000 F-1334.S(c) psi cmx NF 3322 .1 (e) (1) (b} 0.6 Note The allowable stress Fa is multiplied by l.4 as allowed py Paragraph F-1334 The value of Fe is calculated by the formula below per Paragraph F-1334.S{b): 2 2 Fe= 7t E/ [1.30 x (kl/r) ] Where k is conservatively taken as 1 1 is the free length of the member, in. r is the radius of gyration, in. --- E- ---+/-s--the-modu-lus-of- e-J:astici ty,---9--; -x--:i:oLpsi------ - - - - - - - - - --- - 3C.3-5 Rev. O 1/00
This formula gives the following results for Fe: Location Fe (ksi) Bottom rail l = 4.715 11
, r = 63.9 0.1442 11 (Fig. 3C.3-4, Location 2)
Bottom Rail 1 = 4.1 11 , r = 84.5 0.1442 11 (Fig. 3C.3-4, Location 3) The interaction equations were evaluated for the stresses at the location 2 and 3. The highest stress combination occurs at Location 2 of the bottom rail resulting in the left hand side of Equation (2) of 0.92 which is less than 1. Based on the results of this analysis, it was concluded that the stresses in the aluminum rails under an SBG side drop load are acceptable.
- 6. The basket plates and support rails are structurally adequate under the accident load. The plates will remain in place and maintain separation of adjacent fuel assemblies.
3C.3-6 Rev. O 1/00
3C.3-2 Stress Analysis Based on Basket Material Temperature at 531°F and Support Rail Material Temperature at 3so°F. The SAR indicates in Figure 4.4-9 that the average temperature at the top section of the basket is about 348°F (maxi. Temperature about 391°F). The top of the basket is where the G loads from a tipover would be the highest, and therefore an analysis using a temperature of 400°F is appropriate. The temperature in the hottest central part of the basket will average about 457°F, but could be as high as 527°F locally for a few hours under Off Normal Conditions (Figure 4.4-8). The G load at the mid height of the basket will be half <~ 44 G) of that at the top during tipover, since impact velocity is linear with height above the pivot point. The basket model has been rerun using mechanical properties at 531°F (bilinear stress-strain relationship) of stainless steel (ASME Section II, Part D) and aluminum (reference 3C.3-3). The mechanical properties at 350°~ (reference 3C.3-4) for the support rails were used (maximum rail temperature in the hottest section is about 339°F). The analysis performed assumed a 52 G lateral inertial loading of the basket which conservatively bounds the approximate 44 G loading at the middle of the basket. The analysis shows that the stainless steel and aluminum plates at 531°F are capable of withstanding the tipover accident loads. Based on the results of this analysis, it is concluded that:
- 1. 304 Stainless Steel Plate The maximum membrane stress intensity at 52 G's is 17.2 ksi as shown on Figure 3C.3-10. This stress is below the allowable stress of 44.5 ksi (0.7Su) at a temperature of 531°F. The maximum membrane plus bending stress intensity is 24.4 ksi as shown on Figure 3C.3-11. This stress is below the allowable stress of 57.2 ksi (0.9Su) at a
-- ------------temperatu-re--of;--5-3-1°-F---;----------- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -
- 2. Shear Stress in 1/2 in. Plug Welds The maximum shear stress in the plug weld is 8.9 ksi at location 8 (Figure 3C.2-5). This stress is below the allowable stress of 26.7 ksi (0.42 Su) at a temperature of 531°F. .
- 3. Aluminum Plate The maximum membrane stress intensity due to 52 G's is 3.8 ksi as shown on Figure 3C.3-l2. This stress is below the allowable stress of 4.3 ksi (0.7Su) at a temperature of 531°F. The maximum membrane plus bending stress intensity is 4.7 ksi as shown on Figure 3C.3-13. This stress is below 3C.3-7 Rev. O 1/00
the allowable stress of 5.6 ksi (0".9S\l) at a temperature of 531 Op*
- 4. Under the 52 G compressive load, the maximum vertical plastic deflections are -0.133", -0.141 11 , and +0.006" at locations 1, 2, and 3 (see Figure 3C.3-2) respectively.
Therefore, the open dimension at locations 2 and 3 of the fuel compartment will be reduced to 8.7"-.0.141 11 -0.006 11 = 8.553 11
- This opening is greater than the cross section of the fuel assembly (8.426 11 X 8.426 11 ) and provides sufficient clearance for fuel removal. This is very conservative since the maximum temperature at locations 2 and 3 is about 475°F (see Figure 4.4-8) and the above deflections are calculated based on a temperature of 531°F.
- s. Aluminum Support Rail The temperature of the support rail remain 350 °F for this analysis. The results ar~ provided in Section 3C.3-l.
Based on this analysis, the strength of stainless steel and aluminum at 531°F are sufficient to accommodate the hypothetical tipover accident load in the central portion of the basket. Based on the results of the 88 G analysis with basket plates at 400°F representing the top of the basket and the analysis performed with 52 G with basket plates at 531 °F representing the center region of the basket, it is concluded that the basket can withstand the hypothetical tipover event.
--- ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - *-------------- - - - - - - - - - - -
3C.3-8 Rev. O 1/00
3C.3-3A]umjnum Material Prapertjes pf Basket Plates The aluminum properties of basket plates are taken from ASME *
- Section II, Part D (1992) and Aluminum Association "Aluminum Standards and Data" (1990) c4 >.
ASME Section II. Part D bas the folJowing alumimtm properties: Material Temperature, OF 100 200 300 400 500 ASME SB-209 6061-T6/T651 {Aluminum) s 35.0 33.7 27.4 13.3 Ckefi) Su 42.0 (ksi) - E 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.7 8.1 3 xl0 (ksi) Aluminum Association "Aluminum Standards and Data" has the following aluminum properties: Material Temperature, °F
- - - - - - - - - - - - - _____ _7_5_____ _2.l.L __ 3_Q_0_ ,_3_00 __ __§00 __ _§_~~---
6061-T6/T651 (Aluminum) s 40.0 33.2 31 15 5 2.7 (ksii) Su 45 42 34 19 7.5 4.6 (ksi) Elongation 17 18 20 28 60 85 in 2 in., Percent 3C.3-9 Rev. 0 1/00
The material properties for the aluminum are taken as follows: Use Sy minimum values at 100°F, 200°F, 300°F, and 400°F from ASME Section II, Part D. .
- Ratio the Sy minimum value at 500 °F from "Aluminum Standards and Data 11 based on Sy(ASME)/Sy(Alu.. Standards and Data) at 100 °F and is 5 x 35/40
= 4 .4 ksi. Use Su minimum value at l00°F from ASME Section II, Part D of 42 ksi. Obtain Su minimum values at higher temperatures from 11 Aluminum Standards and Data" by ratioing sulASMSl/Su(Alu. Sl:andardG and Dal:a) at 100 OF. Temperature, OF Su (ksi) From Ratio Su (ksi) Aluminum Standards and (minimum) Data 100 *45. 0 42.0 200 39.3 42/45 36.7 300 34.0 42/45 31.7 350 26.5 42/45 24.7 400 19.0 42/45 17.7 500 7.5 42/45 7.0 531 6-:-o-*-- 4-2f4-5-- ---6-..-2---- 600 4.6 42/45 4.3 3C.3-10 Rev. O 1/00
,. **I -
Therefore, the aluminum properties of the basket plates used for the structure analysis are as follows: Material Temperature, Op 100 .200 300 400 500 531 600 ASME SB-209 606l-T6 Aluminum Sy 35.0 33.7 27.4 13.3 4.4 3.8 2.4 (ksi)
. Su 42.0 36.7 31.7 17.7 7.0 6.2 4.3 (ksi)
E 10.0 9. 6* 9.2 8.7 8.1 7.8 7.4 xl0 3 (ksi) Elon- 17 18 20 28 60 68 85 gation in 2 11 , Percent 3C.3-11 Rev. O 1/00
3C.3-4 A)umjm1m Material Properties of Support Rails The aluminum properties of rails are also taken from ASME Section II, Part D (1992) and Aluminum Association 11 Aluminum Standards and Data 11 (1990) . . The following table shows the material properties used for structure analysis. Material Temperature, °F 100 200 300 350 400 ASME SB-221 6061-TG (Aluminum) s 35.0 33.7 27.4 20. o* 13.3 (kJ'i) Su 38.0 33.2 28.7 22.4 16.0 (ksi) E 10.0 9.6 9.2 9.0 8.7 xl0 3 (ksi) Elongation 17 18 20 24 28 in 2 11 I Percent 3C.3-12 Rev. 0 1/00
3C.4 References
- 1. NUREG/CR-3966 "Methods for Impact Analysis of Shipping Containers".
- 2. ANSYS Engineering Analysis System, Rev. 5.2, 1994.
- 3. ASME B&PV Code Section II, Part D. (1992}.
- 4. Aluminum Association "Aluminum Standards and Data" (1990) .
3C.4-1 Rev. O 1/00
Figure 3C.1-1 Dynamic Load Factors vs Frequency Ratio~ Reproduced From NUREG/CR-3966 1.6
./ '\ *.
1.4 I "'
\
1.2 J \ "*\ I I I\ ,/ V'" f"o... r-.... 1.0
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~ j ,-...e p.. 0.8 P1~
Q 0.6 O.Std td 0.4 0.2 I L ... 0 0 1.0 3.0 4.0 REV. 0 1/00
Figure 3C.2-1 Finite *Element Model of the Basket Structure 304 .SS PJ.ATES .
.STJf-'/43 PLASTIC SHEl.L ELri/1E/J7S * .STA#/LESS ST&cJ.. P/.llqS .STIF 20 Pl..A.STIC ptPc \ . *"'ELEMENTS
- ALUMIJ.Jll/4 PLATES STI~ 63 Et."AS7./C SJIELl ~LEMENTS
_,,, REV. o 1/00
__ a.._".'!..~-- ... -.
, Figure JC.2-2 Boundary and Loading Conditions.for Stress Analysis of the Basket
..- ...s,, "Y
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Figure 3C.2~3
*Basket Panel .Cornei: Region - Stress Report Locations *
.A 8 A 13 It . 8.
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0 c D c D . c.
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c . Tr.J-3?. r.nskc.t Plastic Anrilysis REV. 0 1/00
_,,.7'1_~*---****
.- Figure 3C.2-4 Basket Panel Center Region - Stress Report Locations
. *c
. I (j) ls) fj)
- .. (45 - -- - ------- ---- ------ -
(§) - - --* ------~ - L .JII cc I
~
TM-3i nnskct Plnstic An~lysis REV. 0. 1/00
- Figure 3C.2-5 Basket Panel Plug Weld Region - Stress Report Locations
. I .
I 2 ,.3 4-
.5 h 7 lJ II L
.. I
. II REV. 0 1/00
*Figure 3C.2-6 Displacement Plot - 880 (90° Drop Orientation)
TN-32 nn~ket Plnstic Analysis
~*
REV. 0 1/00
.figure JQ.3~1 Finite Elem n ~\1odel of tbe Basket an Rall Strnc,;tlres ANSVS 5 .2 AUG l J 1996 Cl!!:l3:2.ll U fMUHS MAl mm l
TN3? __ BASK~T, ( as G) OU " 1. fi *- ,,,_,~no,_,F__BA_S_K_r_r_r~~~2.~~.~-~:.~.~-~-n_T_H_S_J REV :J l /Oto
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APPENDIX 30 TIPOVER ANALYSIS OF TN-32 DRY STORAGE CASK The purpose of this analysis is to determine the peak rigid body accelerations of the TN-32 storage cask due to a tipover accident. The rigid body accelerations are predicted analytically using the LS-DYNA3D explicit nonlinear dynamic analysis finite element program 111
- The methodology used in performing the anal~sis is based on work done at Lawrence Livermore National Labs 21 where an analysis methodolo~ was developed and verified through comparisons with test data . Benchmarking of the analyses presented herein is achieved through comparison with the Lawrence Livermore National Labs analyses as well as full scale end drop tests performed by BNFL"0
- 3D.l TN-32 Cask Tjpoyer Model This section describes *the model used to determine the g loads during the TN-32 cask tipover.
The TN-32 finite element model is made up of four components: the cask body, the cask internals, concrete and soil. Each of these components is modeled using 3-D a-node brick elements. The finite element models were developed in ANSYS s. 3 <5 > and transferred to LS~DYNA through the .ANSYS-LS-DYNA interface. Modifications were made to the LS-DYNA input to add the material definition and state variables since they are not available through the ANSYS translator. The finite element model of the TN-32 cask is developed in a similar manner to the model represented in Reference 2. The cask and basket meshes are totally independent of each other with surf ace-to-surface contact elements transferring load between the two components. The geometry of the cask and basket has been simplified since the purpose of the analysis is to predict the
_.....ig-id--bedy--1"espense-0-f-the-cask. Features on the cask such as the trunnions, neutron shield and weather cover are neglected in terms of stiffness but their weight is lumped into the density of the cask. The geometry of the cask body used in the analysis is illustrated in Figure 3D.l-l.
- Figures 3D.l-2 through 4 illustrate the finite element model of the cask, basket, concrete, and soil. Mesh sizes in this analysis are in reasonable agreement with those represented in Reference 2. Contact elements are used between the cask and concrete pad and between the concrete pad and the soil.
Boundary conditions and material properties used in the analysis are discussed in the following.sections. 30.1-1 Rev. 0 1/00
3D.2 Analysis Description_ 3D.2.l. Analysis Program The LS-DYNA 111 finite element program was. used for the analyses presented in this Supplement. Model generation was performed using the ANSYS 15 ) finite element program. Data filtering was performed using the DADisp 16 ) software. LS-DYNA is a general purpose, explicit finite element program used to model the nonlinear dynamic response of three-dimensional models. Applications of LS-DYNA include crash worthiness, sheet metal forming, high velocity impact, explosive phenomena and drop tests. ANSYS is a general purpose program capable of solving structural, mechanical, electrical, electromagnetic, electronic, thermal, fluid, and biomedical problems. It has extensive preprocessing (model generation), solution, postprocessing, and graphics capabilities. DADisp is an interactive graphics worksheet which is used to manipulate data. It is a visually oriented software package for the display, management, analysis and presentation of scientific and technical data. Its filtering package is a menu-driven module for FIR and IIR digital filter design and analysis. 3D.2.2 Analy5js Assumptions Several assumptions were required to perform this analysis. These are summarized as follows:
- 1) Coefficient of Friction of 0.25 was assumed between all sliding surfaces.
- 2) Nonlinear material response of the cask internals and soil, if any, is neglected.
- 3) Reinforcement in the concrete pad is assumed to be 1% of the pad volume.
- 4)
- Strain rate effects on all material properties are neglected.
The use of these simplifying assumptions is justified through the comparison of the analytical results with experimental tests. 3D.2.3 Material Properties The material properties required to perform the analysis include the modulus of elasticity (E), Poisson's ratio,(v) and material density (p) for the cask, internals and soil. 30.2-1 Rev. 0 1/00
The concrete requires a more detailed material model since all the significant nonlinear deformations occur in the concrete. Material properties used for the concrete and soil are based on those developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory<2 >
- Spjl Propertjes Reference 2 includes results of. analytical simulations of cask drops onto concrete pads with varying soil elastic properties. The results of the simulations showed that the soil under the concrete pad has only a secondary effect on the initial response qf the LLNL test billet, and has little effect on the peak accelerations predicted in the cask. Thus for the purpose of the TN-32 tipover analyses, the soil properties are taken from the Livermore Report 121
- The soil material properties assumed for the analyses are:
E = 6,000 psi v = 0.3 p = 0.225E-3 lb-sec 2 /in" Concx:ete P::c:opei:t ies The concrete pad is modeled using material law 16 in LS-DYNA that was developed specifically for granular type materials. The data used in the analysis was originally developed by.LLNL for the Shippingport Station Decommissioning Project in 1988. This model was also used in the LLNL cask drop analyses. Material constants - were input into Material Model 16 Mode II.B in DYNA. A summary of the input used in the analyses is as follows: P = 2.09675E-4 lb-sec 2 /in4 v = 0. 22 ao = 1,606 psi ai = 0.418 a2 = 8.35E-5 psi" 1 bi =0 aof = 0.0 psi alf = 0.385 30.2-2 Rev. 0 1/00
Effectjve plastic Strajn Scale Factor, ll 0 0 0.00094 0.289 0.00296 0.465 0.00837 0.629 0.01317 0.774 0.0234 0.893 0 .*04034 1.0 1.0 1.0 The maximum principal stress tensile failure cutoff is set at 870 psi. Strain rate effects are neglected in the analysis. Dilger suggests in Reference 8 that the major impact of strain rate effects.is in the softening part of the stress-strain curve. 1 Since the primary purpose of these analyses is to predict peak accelerations, the strain rate effects on the material behavior can be neglected. The pressure-volume behavior of the concrete is modeled with a tabulated pressure vs. volumetric strain rate relationship using the equation of state feature in LS-DYNA. VoJumetrjc strain (El. Pressure {psi} 0 0
-0.006 4,600
-0.0075 5,400
-0.01 6,200
-0.012 6,600
-0.02 7,800
-0.038 10,000
-0.06 1.2,600
-0.0755 15,000
-0.097 18,700
*An-unleadi-ng-bu1k-modulus_of__7_Q_O_,_O_O_Q___psLis u~ed and is assumed to be constant at any volumetric strain (Reference i)-.-One percent_________ _
_reinforcement is assumed in the concrete pad to account for the pad reinforcement. The 1% reinforcement is also used in analyses presented in EPRI report NP-7551 (Reference 10) . The material properties used for the reinforc~ng bar are as follows: E = 30E6 psi v = 0,3, Yield Stress = 30,000 psi Tangent Modulus = 30E4 psi 3D.2-3 Rev. 0 1/00
TN-32 Cask Material Properties The same modulus of elasticity used in the LLNL Report(z> is used for the TN-32 tipover analyses. The material properties used for the casks are as follows: E = 30 E6 psi v = 0.3 p = 0.865E-3 lb-sec2 /in4 The density of the cask was adjusted to include the mass of those entities not explicitly modeled. The density of the cask has*been adjusted so that the weight of the TN-32 cask minus the basket and fuel is 166,200 lb. TN-32 Fuel/Basket Material properties The fuel and basket are modeled as a set of hollow cylinders inside the cask wall (similar manner to those models represented in Reference 2). The material properties of the.fuel/basket are defined to match the correct weight and to approximate the stiffness of the basket. The cask and basket finite element model meshes are totally independent of each other with surface-to-surface contact elements transferring load between the two components. Because the cask stiffness is so much greater than the basket.stiffness this is a reasonable assumption. The modulus of elasticity used for the basket is adjusted such that the fundamental frequency of the simplified basket model is approximately the same as the fundamental frequency of the detailed basket model used for stress analysis. Material properties used for the basket are as follows: E = 8.1E6 psi v = 0.3 p = O.B63E-3 lb-sec2 /in' The density of the basket has been adjusted to account for the weight of the fuel. The weight used for the basket plus fuel is 65,800 lb. 3D.2.4 Dampjng The true damping characteristics of the cask impact event are hard to quantify. Typical values for reinforced concrete structures subjected to dynamic loads are in the 5 to 10% range (See References 13 and 14 and Figure 3D.2-1) . During the drop events, the concrete, cask and soil absorb energy as a result of 30.2-4 Rev. 0 1/00
damping. Since the response of the concrete is nonlinear, a single damping ratio can not be defined. In order to define a relatively uniform damping ratio over a range of frequencies, damping is defined proportional to both the stiffness and mass matrices. Known as Rayleigh damping (Reference 12}, two factors can be defined relative to mass and stiffness proportional to damping to provide a range of damping. Since the damping ratio must be assumed, both an upper and lower bound ratio of damping are used in the preliminary analyses. A damping ratio of 6% was used in the final analysis, and is justified in the benchmarking analysis presented in Section 3D.4. 3D.2.5 Tjpoyer Analysis An angular velocity is applied to the TN-32 cask body to simulate a non-mechanistic cask tipover accident. The center of rotation is set at the edge of the cask bottom located at the center of the coordinate system as illustrated in Figure 30.2-2. DYNA calculates the initial *velocity components associated with each node for this' rotational motion. The load applied to the cask is 1.729 radians/sec. A ~ model is used in the analysis, with symmetry boundary conditions used to simulate the full structure. Non-reflecting boundaries were used around the soil non-symmetry boundaries to prevent artificial stress waves from reflecting from the boundaries of the soil. Figure 3D.2-2 also illustrates the boundary conditions used in the finite element model. A modal analysis of the TN-32 cask was prepared using the finite element model. The first mode of vibration for the TN-32 cask is illustrated in Figure 30.2-3. The first mode frequency for the cask is 188 Hz. The critical damping ratio (relative to the cask response) and---natura-1-f reqt;ieney-of--the-cask-ar.e_summa_ri zed in the f cl lowing table: * ---=---- Cask Mass Damping Stiffness Natural Damping Design Constant Damping Frequency Ratio (a.) Constant
TN-32 122 1.SE-5 188 Hz 6% Figures 3D.2-4 through 3D.2-6 illustrate the results for the TN-32 tipover analysis. The plots illustrate both the displacement and Von Mises stress distribution over time and at their maximum values. 3D.2-5
- Rev. 0 1/00
Figures 30.2-7 and 30.2-8 illustrate the acceleration history results from the TN-32 tipover analysis comparing the LLNL and Transnuclear data. In both analyses, the acceleration histories are averaged over the nodes on the cask lid. The following table lists the LLNL and Transnuclear analysis results. Comparison pf TN-32 Tjpoyer Analyses LLNL DYNA Analysis Transnuclear DYNA Analysis Peak Acceleration 66.7 g 67 g (350 Hz Filter) Duration of 0.003 sec 0.003 sec Pulse Pulse Shape Triangle Triangle Excellent correlation is achieved for the tipover analysis. 3D.2.6 Dynamj c I.cad Factor Cal cul at ion Since the basket is not modeled in detail in the transient dynamic analysis, it is necessary to transfer the loads from the dynamic analysis model to the detailed model of the basket. The basket structure is designed using a quasi-static analysis {using a dynamic load factor computed from the transient dynamic *analysis). The dynamic load factor is a function of the rise time of the applied load, the duration of the load, the shape of the load~ and the natural period of the structure. Figure 2.3 of ---referenee-1-5-(l.'epr-e<iuced-in-F.igure_3D~_c9J_shows the maximum dynamic load factor for a triangular load. ~~~~-:c:.--=---------- The tipover is modeled as an equivalent side drop. For*the first mode shape of a side drop, the deformed shape of the central basket panels resembles a simple-simple supported beam. The frequency of the fundamental mode of vibration for the simple-simple supported beam is calculated below. Reference 16, page 369, case 6, "Single span, end supported, uniform load W"~ provides the following equation for the fundamental frequency: f = 3.55/(SWL3 /384EI) 3
- 30. 2-6 Rev. 0 1/00
Where: w = 10.58 lb L = 8.7 in. 6 Estainless steal = 26. 5 x 10 psi (304 SST at 400°F) Ea.1umiI1U111 = 8. 7 x 10 6 psi (Aluminum 4 at 400°F) !stainless steal = 0
- 000193 in
!aluminum = 0. 0104 in 4 Substituting the values given above, f = 118 Hz From Figure 30.3-9, the dynamic load factor is calculated as follows: t = impact duration= Q.003 sec T = l/f = 1/118 = 0.0085 t/T = 0.003/0.0085 = 0.35 Therefore, the dynamic load factor is approximately 1.1. 30.2-7 Rev. 0 1/00
- 30. 3 EQJ1iyalent Sjde I,oadj ng- on the Cask and Basket for Stress Analysis 30.3.1 Cask Body The tipover analysis of TN-32 results in a peak deceleration of 67g averaged through the cask lid. An equivalent s'ide drop of SOg along the length of the cask is used to perform the stress analysis in the TN-32 SAR. This is conservative, since:
A. The tipover analysis neglects the outer shell and aluminum boxes. During the drop, these components will deform and absorb energy. Thus the actual deceleration will be less than the above calculated G loads. B. During the tipover drop accident, the G loads vary from minimum to the maximum value along the length, from bottom end to the top surf ace of the lid (This corresponds to a 33.Sg uniform load). A peak stress intensity of _about 54,000 psi (TN-32 SAR Chapter 3, Table 3.4-6) results from the static analysis due to a SOg uniform load. The tipover dynamic analysis indicates a peak stress of about 25,000 psi (see Figure 30.2-6). This shows that the overall effect of the assumptions made in the static analysis is very conservative and there is an approximately 50% additional . margin of safety in the cask stresses. 30.3.2 Basket The dynamic load factor calculated from Section 30.2.6 is about 1.1. Thus the basket structural analysis is performed by modeling the side impulse as a steady-state acceleration equal to 74g (67 x l.1=74). The structural analysis of the basket is conservatively.performed using 88g for the accident analysis (TN-32 SAR Appendix 3C)
- 30.3-1 Rev. 0 1/00
3D.4 Benchmarking The tipover evaluation of the TN-32 cask corresponds well with the results of the drop testing performed at Lawrence Livermore< 2l. As a second validation of the dynamic model, an analysis of a 60 inch end drop was performed to simulate a full scale end drop test performed by BNFL (*l_ As shown in this section, the analysis and the test results are in good agreement. 3D.4.l BNFL End Drop Mode] The analysis of the BNFL End Drop test is performed using a similar model to that used in EPRI's validation of its methodology for analysis .of spent-fuel cask drop and tipover events<4 l . One exception is that the concrete model is the same as used in the LLNL analysis presented in Reference 2. Figure 3D.4-l illustrates the geometry used in EPRI 1 s analysis validation. Figure* 3D.4-2 illustrates the finite element model used in the validation analysis. A one-quarter segment was used in the LS-DYNA analysis because of model and load symmetries. Symmetry boundary conditions are used at O and 90 degrees. Ma.terjal Propertjes Material properties were extracted from the EPRI report with the exception of the concrete properties which are described in Section 3D.2.3. The density of the cask is modified so that the weight of the cask matches the cask weight of 142,000 lb. Summaries of the cask and soil properties are: Ecask = 30 E6 psi Esoil = 82, 000 psi V soiL = 0 * ~-- _ __ Pcask = 2.08 E-3 lb-sec2 /in4 Psoil = 0.1.80 E-3 lb-sec 2 /in4 3D.4.2 BNFTr Cask End Drop AnaJysis The end drop analysis is performed on the 60 11 drop te_st since the cask velocity is similar to the tip velocity during the ti paver event.. This drop event is modeled using an equivalent initial velocity of 215 in/sec applied to the cask body. Two separate damping values are used in the analysis. A 4% and a 10% damping analysis are performed. In order to define the Rayleigh damping coefficients, a modal analysis is performed of the cask model. Figure 30.4-3 illustrates the first mode response of the cask. The fundamental frequency of the cask is 86 Hz. 3D.4-1 Rev. 0 1/00 Results from the 10% damping case are illustrated in Figures 3D.4-4 and 3D.4-5. A history of the cask bottom displacement is illustrated in Figure 3D.4-4. Figure 3D.4-5 illustrates the displacement of the cask at time t = 0.01 seconds after impact. Almost all the deformation occurs in the concrete. Results from the 4% damping case are illustrated in Figures 3D.4-6 and 3D.4-7. Figure 3D.4-6 illustrates the vertical displacement history. Figure 3D.4-7 shows the displacement distribution in the concrete. The accelerations were computed by taking double derivatives of the displacement history in the ANSYS53 postprocessor with the second derivative scaled by 1/386 to convert from in/sec2 to G's. These analyses resulted in peak accelerations in range of 102g to 130g. Taking an average of the two analyses yields a damping ratio of approximately 6-8% and a peak G level of ll6g which is close to the BNFL test data <4 > {112-121g) . A similar amount of damping is expected for the TN-32 cask tipover since most of the damping is a result of concrete damage. 3D.4-2 Rev. 0 1/00 30.5 References
- 1. LS-DYNA3P User's Manual (Nonlinear D.ynamjc Analysis of Structures jn Three Djmensjons), August 1, 1995 Version 936, Livermore Software Technology Corporation
- 2. Witte, M. et. Al Evaluatjon of I.ow-Velocity Impact Testjng of Solid Steel Bjllet onto concrete pads and Application to Generic ISFSI Storage Cask for Tjpover and Side Drop, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-ID-126295, Livermore, California. March 1997
- 3. Witte, M. et. Al., Letter forwarding data diskettes containing the drop and tipover tests, NTFS97-76/MW, June 4.
1997 .
- 4. Valinarion Of EPRI Methodolog:y of Analysis of Spent-Fuel Cask Drop and Tipoyer Eyents, BPRI TR-108760, August 1997, Prepared by ANATECH Corp., San Diego, CA
- 5. ANSYS User's Manual, Revision 5.3, Ansys Inc., P.O. Box 65, Houston, PA 15342-0065
- 6. DADisp Worksheet User Manual, DSP Development Corporation, March 1996
- 7. A. J. Sparkes, J.E. Gillard, P.A. Sims, Eull-Scale Drop Tests for Bepchmarkjng Concrete Pads for Dry Spent Fuel.Storage casks, AEA Technology, Report No. AEA-D&W-0622, July 1993
- 8. Ductility of Plain and Confjned Concrete Under Pifferent Strain Rates, By W.H. Dilger; ACI Journal, Jan-Feb, 1984
- 9. The Effect of Target Hardness on the Structural nesign of Concrete Storage Pads for Spent-Fuel Casks, EPRI NP-4830,
October_19_0_6_ __
- 10. Stp1ctural nesjgn pf Concrete Storage Pads for Spent-Fuel
.cask, EPRI NP-7551, August 1991
- 11. Y.R. Rashid, R.J. James and O. Ozer, Validation of EPRI Methodology for Analysis of Cask Prop apd Tjpover Accidents at Spent Fuel Storage Facilities
- 12. Clough and Penzien, Dynamics of St01ctures McGraw Hill, 2nd Edition 1993
- 13. R.B. Matthiesen, Qbservatjons of strong Motions From Earthq:uakes, ASCE Convention and Exposition, Portland, Oregon, April 1980
- 14. R.C. Dove, et. Al., Seismic Tests on Models of Rejnforced-Concrete Category r Bujldjngs, Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology, SMIRT 8, Brussels, Belgiurn,1985 3D.5-l Rev. 0, 1/00
- 15. NUREG/CR-3966, Methods For Impact Analysis of Shipping Containers
- 16. R. J. Roark, Formulas For Stress and Strain, 4th Edition 3D.5-2 Rev. 0 1/00
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APPENDIX 3E FRACTURE TOUGHNESS EVALUATION OF TN-32 CASK 3E.l Introduction This appendix documents the calculation of the allowable flaw sizes for TN-32 spent fuel dry storage cask confinement boundary, gamma shield, and welds. The results of this evaluation can be used to develop an appropriate inspection program and select an appropriate inspection technique to properly inspect the cask. It can also be used as an initial screening criteria to disposition any indications which are detected during inspection. 3E.1.1 Fracture Toughness Evaluation of Confinement
*Boundary The TN-32 cask is designed for an ambient temperature of -20°F. It is unlikely that the confinement boundary components would reach -20°F, since the heat load of the fuel would keep the cask temperatures elevated. In addition, the ambient temperature would not be at -20°F for an extended period of time. However, if the ambient temperature were to drop to -20°F, it would remain at that temperature for only a short period of time, on the order of a few hours during the coldest part of the night. This time period would be insufficient to bring the confinement boundary components down to ambient temperature due to its large thermal mass and the heat load of the fuel.
NUREG-1536t 1 >, " The Standard Review Plan for Dry Cascy---------- Storage Systems" specifies on Page 3-10: The potential for brittle fracture of some components important to safety has resulted in conditions of use that preclude transfer operations under extremely low temperature conditions. Ensure that any assumptions about internal heat generation for the brittle fracture analysis are defined on the basis of the maximum storage life and the possibility of a partial load in the cask. Regulatory Guides 7 .11 <2 > and 7. 12 t 3 > were written to address shipping cask confinement vessels which are subject to severe impact loads at low temperatures. Shipping casks are often shipped empty or loaded with non-fuel components. 3E-1 Rev O 1/00
Therefore, it is appropriate to neglect the heat load of the cask contents in determining the minimum service temperature. Unlike shipping casks, storage casks are not subject to severe impact loads at severe temperatures. Restrictions can be imposed on the casks to preclude transport to or from a storage pad during extreme cold conditions, and during storage, the casks are stationary and are shown by calculation not to.tipover due to seismic loads, tornado missiles and high winds. For casks that are built under the TN-32 Certifi6ate of Compliance, the required Nil Ductility Transition Temperature is -80°F (TNoT = LST - 60°F, conservatively assumed that the Lowest Service Temperature, LST, is -20°F). The confinement boundary components will be tested in accordance with NB-2331 9f Section rrr< 4l, Division I, Subsection NB of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. In addition to determining the nil ductility transition temperature, charpy v-notch testing shall be performed at a temperature no greater than 60°F above the TNbT* The acceptance criteria is that the material exhibit at least 35 mils lateral expansion and not less than 50 ft-lbs . absorbed energy. This testing is sufficient to ensure that the confinement boundary materials will not be susceptible
- to brittle fracture at -20°F.
Despite the fact that the confinement boundary material meets the fracture toughness requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NB, Transnuclear has performed a fracture mechanics evaluation of the TN-32 Dry Storage Cask cont +/-rrement --bounda-ry-;-~-The-wo-r-k--ine-ludes-~e-4-e-1-1-0w.i-n.~*---------
- Methodology
- Loadings
- Material fracture toughness
- Fracture toughness criteria
- Primary stress criteria
- Allowable flaw calculations
- Conclusions
- NOE Inspection Plan Methodology This section documents the calculation of the allowable flaw sizes for the TN-32 confinement boundary.
3E-2 Rev O 1/00
The allowable flaw sizes were calculated using linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) methodology from Section XI of ASME Codecs> (1989). Flaws in the welds, if they occur, are expected to be welding defects, rather than initiated cracks. There is no active mechanism for crack initiation and growth at any of the weld locations. Thus, the calculated allowable flaw sizes can be use~. during fabrication and future inspections. Loadings The following table lists the maximum membrane and bending stresses at the confinement boundary under normal and accident conditions. Figure 3E-1 shows the selected locations on the confinement boundary numbered 1 through 7 for fracture toughness analysis. These locations were selected to be representative of the stress distribution in the confinement boundary with special attention given to areas subject to high stresses and weld locations. The maximum stress may occur at a different location for different load combinations (bolt preload, pressure, temperature, lifting load, fabrication stress, end drop, and tipover side drop) . All welds in the conf1nement boundary have been stress relieved. There is one longitudinal weld in the confinement shell, a circumferential weld between the flange and shell and a circumferential weld between the bottom and shell. In addition, the shell may be made from ________ _ 2 courses so there may also be a circumferential weld about
----inidway along the length ofl:ne-sttell. :After we-l-di-ng,-t-h.1;:--------
conf inement shell is stress relieved in accordance with Subsection NB requirements. Weld residual stresses will be significantly reduced due to the stress relief.. Weld residual stresses are steady state secondary stresses. The ASME Code does not prescribe limits for weld residual stresses. These stresses are displacement (or strain) controlled, and are self equilibrating through the weld thickness. For the purpose of this calculation, residual stresses are considered to have a constant tensile magnitude of 8 ksi. This is similar to the value used in the evaluation of reactor pressure vessels to account for the potential for remaining residual stress after post weld heat treatment. The following table also shows the residual stresses *used at each weld location. In addition 3E-3 Rev o 1/00
to the applied stresses, the weld residual stresses are included in the fracture toughness evaluation at the weld locations. Summary of Stress Components (TN-32 Confinement Boundary} Locatio Normal Conditions Accident Conditions n (Fig. Axial Hoop Axial Hoop 3E-1) Stresses Stresses Stresses Stresses (ksi) (ksi) (ksi) (ksi) Gm crb O'm crb CJ'm crb O'm (J'b 1 - 0.28 -1.05 0.15 2.01 8.43 3.74 0.13 1.05 2"" - 2.65 -1.12 1.00 - 23.9 -5.11 7.91 1.12 15.66 2 3"" - 2.41 -17.5 0.55 -'-4. 48 6.33 - 9.90 3.07 20.62 4... - 0.04 - 0.19 -8.36 4.66 - 13.33 3.07 12.48 14.50 5** - 4.63 - 1.59 3.73 3.42 - 7.28 3.07 10.56 14.03 6 - 1. 72 - 0.46 3.26 0.27 - 5.56 0.94 11.51 15.48 _]_______ --- - - - 2.21 --o. 31 2.23 13.55 16.0 1. 45 8.51 0.31 9
- In addition to these applied stresses, a weld residual stress of 8 ksi was added to these locations for fracture toughness evaluations.
3E-4 Rev O 1/00
Material Fracture Toughness The TN-32 cask design has the following material in the confinement boundary:
- Confinement shell and bottom SA-203. Gr.D
- Confinement Flange SA-350 LF3
- Confinement lid SA-350 LF3 or SA-203 Gr.D These alloy materials are classified as cryogenic* and will provide good toughness properties at low temperature.
However, for conservatism the value of Kio(47 ksi~in at -20°F) was used for fracture toughness evaluation of the confinement boundary. This assumption is extremely conservative, since this Kio typically is calculated based on Charpy value of 15 ft-lb at -20°F, while typical Charpy values of SA-203 Gr. D and SA-350 LF3 are 210 ft-lb and 115 ft-lb at -20°F, respectively.
- Fracture Toughness Criteria
- Using the rules of Section XI, IWB-3613, the limiting fracture.toughness values are reduced by a factor of ~10 for normal conditions and ~2 for accident conditions, to define the limiting Ka11owable. That is, Ka11owable S Kia/ ("'10) = 14. 86 ksi-"Jin. for normal conditions Ka11owable S K ic I (~2} = 33. 2 ksi-'/in. for accident condrt:-:-1-,o;;o=n'""s.---------
Where: Kia = the available fracture toughness based on crack arrest K ic = the available fracture toughness based on crack initiation For conservatism, the K1a value is used for fracture toughness evaluation of both the normal and accident conditions. 3E-5 Rev 0 1/00
Primary Stress Criteria ASME Section XI, IWB-3610 requires that any flaw evaluation include verification that the primary stress limits of ASME Code Section III continue to be met for the flawed component. The following formula conservatively assumes that the available thickness is equal to the original thickness minus the allowable flaw depth. aa11 = t (1 - S/Sa11) Where: aa11 = allow. flaw depth based on ASME Code Sect. III limits t = original local thickness S = maximum calculated 19cal stress intensity S~1 = allowable stress intensity per ASME Section III. It is conservatively assumed that all stresses are pure tensile membrane stresses and that the stresses will increase linearly with decreasing wall thickness. Allowable Flaw Size Calculation Using the above.load definitions and fracture toughness, .a series of allowable flaw size calculations were performed using the Structural Integrity Associates computer program pc-CRACK' 161 (Structural Integrity Associates, pc-CRACK' for Windows, version 3.0, March 27; 1997)
- For purpose of analysis, the postulated surface flaws are oriented in both the axial and circumferential direction. The cracks selected for each location are shown in the above table. For the confinement boundary, due to th~ very s~all t/R ratio, a single edge cracked plate (SECP) model was used.
The results of the pc-CRACK calculations are shown in the following table. Subsurface Flaws The above discussion addresses the determination of allowable sizes for flaws that are connected to the surf ace 3E-6 Rev O 1/00
of the material, under a conservative set of assumptions. The bare metal or weld could also contain subsurface defects. An evaluation of allowable subsurface defects was performed using the same linear elastic fracture mechanics technique as described above for surface defects. For this case, a center cracked panel (CCP} model was used to evaluate an assumed flaw length. The flaw must be sufficiently embedded such that treatment as a subsurface flaw is justified. In general, if a flaw is closer to the surface than 0.4 of its half-depth, it must be considered a surface flaw. The results of the pc-CRACK calculations are shown in the following table. Allowable Surface Flaw Depth (inches) {TN-32 Confinement Boundary) Location Normal Conditions Accident Conditions (Fig. 3E-1} J_ Axial l. Hoop .l Axial J_ Hoop Stress Stress Stress Stress 1 --- --- 0.79 0.97 (1.41) (1.41} 2 0.8 0.94 --- 0.93 ( 0. 69) ( 0. 69) 3 --- --- --- ---
- --- -- - - - __ (_0~9-9-J_ _ (_Q_. 99} {1.17) (1.17) 4 --- --- --- ~- -
(1.28) (1.28) (1. 09) (1.09) 5 1.0 --- 0.58 --- ( 1. 02} (1.08) 6 --- --- --- --- (1.26) (1.26) (0.97} ( 0. 97} 7 3.30 3.29 0.34 1. 75 3E-7 Rev 0 1/00
Allowable Sub-Surface Flaw Depth (inches) (TN-32 Confinement Boundary) Location Normal Conditions Accident Conditions (Fig. 3E-l) l. Axial .L Hoop .l Axial .L Hoop Stress Stress Stress Stress 1 --- --- 1. 3 --- (1.41) (1.41) (1. 22) { 1. 22) 2 1. 34 --- 1.18 1.36 (1. 5) (0.69) (0.69) 3 --- --- --- --- (0.99) (0.99) (1.17) (L 17) 4 --- --- --- --- (1.28) (1.28) (1.09) (1. 09) 5 1.34 --- 1.22 --- ( 1. 02) ( 1. 02) (1. 08) (1. 08) 6 --- --- --- --- (1. 26) (1.26) (0.97) (0.97} 7 --- --- 0.77 3.16 (4.07) (4.07) (2.39) Note:"---" indicates that the allowable flaw depth is not limited by fracture mechanics calculation.
) indicates that the allowable flaw depth is limited by primary stress criteria.
. _;__ -~
Specific conservatisms included in the above analysis are listed below: All factors- of safety on applied stresses required by ASME Section XI (1989 Edition) were included in the evaluation. Weld residual stresses were treated as constant tensile stresses normal to the flaw orientation. Flaws were assumed to be long (infinitely long or full circumference) . A charpy value of 15 ft-lbs at -20 °F was used for calculating the allowable stress intensity factor. 3E-8 Rev O 1/00
Conclusions The results of the fracture toughness analysis show that the flaws in the confinement boundary which would result in unstable crack growth or brittle fracture are larger than those generally observed in the plate or forged steel components. Note that these *allowable flaw sizes are calculated based on extremely conservative assumptions (using Charpy value of 15 ft-lb vs. typical value of 115 ft-lb for -SA-350 LF3 or 210 ft-lb for SA-203 Gr. D). The actual allowable flaw sizes are at least twice those shown on the above table. NOE Inspection Plan The plate and forging materials used in the confinement boundary are examined by the ultrasonic methods in accordance with ASME Section III, Subsection NB, Paragraph NB-2530 and NB-2540, respectively. The external and accessible internal surfaces of the forging materials are examined by the liquid penetrant method or' the magnetic particle method in accordance with paragraph NB-2546 or NB-2545. The welds are examined by the radiographic and either the liquid penetrant or magnetic particle methods in accordance with Section III, Subsection NB, paragraphs NB-5210, NB-5220, and NB-5230. These NDE inspections ensure that any defects at or above the sizes specified in the table are detected and repaired prior to cask use for fuel storage. The fracture toughness requirements of the lid bolts will meet the criteria of ASME Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB (Para. NB-2333). Charpy v-notch testing shall be ---pe-r-formed--a-t--20~F----.----- --The--ac;:c;:eptance--criter.ia-is__that __the_materi_al________________ _ exhibit at least 25 mils lateral expansion {Table NB-2333-1) . 3E-9 Rev 0 1/00
3E.1. 2 Fracture Toughness Evaluation of gamma shield The gamma shield shell is forged from SA-266 Grade 2 material. The bottom shield plate and.top shield plate (plate welded to the bottom of the lid) are.constructed from either SA-266 Grade 2 material;** or SA-516 Grade 70 material. The main function of the gamma shield is to provide shielding. It is not part of the confinement, and its shielding properties are not temperature dependent. In storage, the gamma shielding is not subjected to
- any significant loads. The worst case loading is due to the non-mechanistic tipover. The TN-32 cask is shown not to tipover during storage due to normal, off-normal or accident events. Nevertheless, a tipover event is evaluated. If the cask were to tipover at an ambient temperature of -20°F, it would not crack due to its reasonable fracture toughness at low temperature. However, even if it were to crack, there would be no breach of confinement, since the confinement materials have exceptional fracture toughness at low temperatures.
Furthermore, if the cylindrical gamma shielding were to crack, there is no credible mechanism for the shielding to separate from itself or the confinement. In order for this to occur, the 8 inch thick shell must become completely severed, and there would need to be a sufficient axial force to overcome the frictional forces holding the confinement vessel and the gamma shielding together --i;:esu-l-t-i--Bq-f-r-0m-t-he-shr-i..nk fit . The top shield_p-1.a..t_e~i=s~-------- welded to the lid and is captured by the confinement vessel. Even, if it is postulated that the weld fails completely, the shield plate will still remain ~nside the confinement boundary and will not lose its shield capability. The one exception is the weld of the gamma shield shell to the bottom plate. In this reg.ion, if the weld were to completely fail, the bottom plate could become detached and have an impact on the shielding capability of the cask. Preliminary charpy test data of the same material (SA-266) from a similarly sized shield shell has been provided by one of the material manufacturers for the shield shell, and the results are tabulated below. 3E-l0 Rev 0 1/00
Charpy V-Notch Test - Results for SA-266 Gr. 2 Temperature Specimen No. Absorbed Energy (ft-lbs) Avg. of 3 specimens 0°C {32°F} Vl 63 V2 60
-10°c (14°F) V3 :56 V4 50
-20°c (-4°F) vs 45 V6 40
-30°C {-22°F) V7 18 VB 20
-40°C {-40°F) V9 17 VlO 10 The TN-32 cask is designed for an ambient temperature of -20°F. As can be seen from the materials testing, even at temperatures as low as -20°F the gamma shi.elding has relatively good charpy impact properties. It is unlikely that the gamma shield would reach -20°F, since the heat load of the fuel would keep the cask temperatures elevated.
Shipping casks are often shipped empty or loaded with non-fuel components. Therefore, it is appropriate to neglect the heat load.of the cask contents in determining the minimum service temperature. Unlike shipping casks, storage casks* are not subjected to severe impact loads at severe temperatures. During storage, the casks are stationary and do not tipover due to seismic loads, tornado missiles and high winds. Despite the fact that the shielding material is not part of the confinement boundary and it is unlikely that the gamma shield would reach -20°F, a fracture of the gamma shield will have no safety implications. However, Transnuclear has performed a fracture mechanics evaluation of the TN-32 Dry Storage Cask gamma shield based on a service temperature of -20°F. The work includes the following:
- Methodology
- Loadings
- Material fracture toughness
- Fracture toughness criteria 3E-11 Rev o 1/00
- Primary stress criteria
- Allowable flaw calculations
- Conclusions
- NOE Inspection Plan Methodology The allowable flaw sizes were performed using linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) methodology from Section XI of ASME Code.Section (1989). Flaws in the welds, if they occur, are welding defects, rather than initiated cracks. There is not an active mechanism for crack initiation and growth at any of the weld locations. Thus, the calculated allowable flaw sizes can be used during fabrication.
Loadings The following table lists the maximum membrane and bending stresses at the gamma ~hield under normal and accident conditions. Figure 3E-2 shows the selected locations on the gamma shield numbered 1 through 7 for fracture toughness analysis. These locations were selected to be representative of the stress distribution in the gamma shield with special attention given to areas subject to high stresses and weld locations. The maximum stress may occur at a different location for different load combinations (bolt preload, pressure, temperature, lifting load, fabrication stress, end drop, and tipover side drop) . 3E-12 Rev O 1/00
Summary of Stress Components {TN-32 Gamma Shield} Locatio Normal Conditions Accident Conditions n (Fiqure Axial Hoop Axial Hoop Stresses 3E-2) Stresses Stresses Stresses (ksi} (ksi) (ksi) *( ksi} O'm O'b O'm O'b <f111 O'b Urn <fio 11.LI - 1.91 2.28 0.78 -1.58 1. 78 2.25 0.75
- 1. 70 2121 - 0.18 -0.01 0.01 4.76 1. 33 -6.08 1.04 1.46 3 0.10 2.79 0.34 Pm + Pb +Q Pm + Pb +Q =
0.67 = 30.84 131 30. 84 (J) 4 - 3.-91 4.40 3.93 Pm + Pb +Q = Pm + Pb +Q = 0.34 30.84 13 ) 30. 84 <3 > 5 0.12 0.60 0.12 0.37 -4.71 3.48 2.49 1. 36 6 2.68 2.50 1. 69 1. 52 4.17 4.00 2.43 1. 67 71J.) 6.85 1. 67 3. 76 0.55 9.03 0.87 4.64 0.55 Notes:
- 1. In addition to these applied stresses, the weld residual stress of 8 ksi was added at these locations for fracture toughness evaluations.
- 2. In addition to these applied stresses, the weld residual st-~ess-0-f-3-6-ksi--was-added __ at__thes_e_ _l_o_c_a_tj.ons foJ_Jracture toughness evaluations.
- 3. This stress results from the combination of:
Maximum stress from dynamic impact analysis (presented in Appendix 30) is 25.0 ksi and occurs at the lid. The maximum stress at the gamma shield is 18.5 ksi. However, 25. 0 ksi is conservatively u*sed for gamma shield fracture toughness evaluation) Bolt preload stress 100 psi internal pressure stress Thermal stress Fabrication stress This combined stress is modeled as a tensile membrane stress for fracture toughness evaluations. 3E-13 Rev o 1/00
The gamma shield welds at locations 1 and 7 are partially stress relieved. However, the lower gamma shield welded to the bottom shield plate (location 2) does not undergo stress relief. Weld residual stress is included in the calculations for all weld locations. The weld residual stress is reduced due to the stress relief at all weld locations except the weld at location 2. Weld residual stresses are steady state secondary stresses. The ASME Code does not prescribe limits for weld residual stresses. These stresses are displacement (or strain) controlled, and are self equilibrating through the weld thickness. For the purpose of this calculation, residual stresses will be conservatively assumed to be a constant tensile magnitude of 36 ksi at location 2. This value corresponds to the 'minimum specified yield stress of the base material (SA-266, Gr. 2). For other welds, which have been stress relieved, it is conservatively assumed that not all of the weld residual stress is relieved during the stress relief process. A stress value of 8 ksi has been included for welds at locations 1 & 7 for fracture toughness evaluations. This is similar to the procedure used in evaluation of reactor pressure vessel to account for the potential for remaining residual stress after post weld heat treatment. The K due to residual stresses is applied with a safety factor of 1, as recommended in ASME, Section XI, Appendix H, Paragraph H-7300. Therefore, the total Ki (applied) is determined from membrane, bending, and residual stresses. Material Fracture Toughness The gamma shield shell is a forged cylinder, nominally 8 inches thick by 167.4 inches long, made from SA-266, Gr. 2 material. The welding at the top flange and bottom plate may be performed using SAW, FCAW, or SMAW processes. The results of the Charpy testing tabulated above are used. Figure 3E-3 shows a summary of the Charpy impact data used. The actual data points are shown along with a smoothed line that connects the average values at each test temperature. This data demonstrates that a lower bound 3E-14 Rev O 1/00
Charpy impact value of 18 ft-lbs is appropriate for an exposure temperature of -20°F. The Charpy impact measurement may be transformed into a fracture toughness value by using the empirical relation below (Ref.7}: K1d = [5E (Cv) ] 112 = 51, 960 psi- {in) 112 Where Kid = Dynamic Fracture Toughness., psi - (in) 112 E = Modulus of Elasticity, 30 x 10 6 Cv = Charpy Impact Measurement, 18 ft-lbs For conservatism, tqe above calculated Kid was reduced by another 10% to 47 ksi-{in) 112 (corresponding to 15 ft-lbs charpy values at -20°F) for fracture toughness evaluations. Both the FCAW and SMAW electrodes used in the gamma shield weldments are alloyed with manganese, nickel, chromium, and vanadium. They are essentially matching filler metals for alloys such as ASME SA-533 Gr. B, the most commonly used reactor pressure vessel steel. The higher alloy content of the FCAW and SMAW electrodes and their typical usage in applications where good toughness is required indicate that the expected fracture toughness values for the FCAW and SMAW weld fillers are as good as or better than that of the SA-266 material. Use of the fracture properties from the wrought material for locations at or near the weld joints is conservative. Fracture Toughness Criteria Using the rule of Section XI, IWB-3613, the limiting fracture toughness values are reduced by a factor of VlO for the normal_condition and ~2 for the accid~nt condition, to define the limiting allowable Ka11owab1e. That is, Ka11owao1e S Kia/ ("'10) = 14. 86 ksi-"'in for normal conditions Ka11owable :s; K ic I ("12} = 33.2 ksi-"'in for accident conditions Where: Kia = the available fracture toughness based on crack arrest 3E-15 Rev o 1/00
K ic = the available fracture toughness based on crack initiation The Kia value is conservatively used for fracture toughness evaluation for both normal and accident conditions. Primary Stress Criteria ASME Section XI, IWB-3610 requires that any flaw evaluation include verification that the primary stress limits of ASME Code Section III continue to be met for the flawed component. The following formula is conservatively assumed that the available cross section is equal to the original thickness minus the allowable flaw depth. aa11 = t (1 - S/Sa11) Where: aa11 = allowable flaw depth based on ASME Code Section III limits t = orginal local thickness S = maximum calculated local stress intensity S~1 = al~owable stress intensity per ASME Section III. All stresses are considered to be pure tensile membrane stresses and that the stresses will increase linearly with decreasing wall thickness. Allowable Flaw Size Calculation Using the above load definitions. and fracture toughness, a series of allowable flaw size calculations was performed using the Structural Integrity Associates computer program pc-CRACK'. Surface Flaws For purpose of analysis, the postulated surface flaws are oriented in both the axial and circumferential direction. The cracks selected for each location are shown in the above table. For locations 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7, due to the 3E-l6 Rev 0 1/00
very small t/R ratio, a single edge cracked plate (SECP) model was used. The results of the pc-CRACK calculations are shown in the following table. Subsurface Flaws The above discussion addressed the determination of allowable flaw sizes for flaws that are connected to the surface of the shield shell. Tpe shell or weld could also contain subsurface defects. An evaluation of allowable subsurface defects was performed using the same linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) techniques as were described above for surf ace defects. For th{s case, *a center cracked panel (CCP} model was used to evaluate an assumed length flaw. The flaw must be sufficiently embedded such that treatment as a subsurface flaw is justified. In general, if a flaw is closer to the surface than 0.4 of its half-depth, it must be considered a surface flaw. The results of the pc-CRACK calculations are shown in the following table. Allowable Surface Flaw Depth (inches) (TN-32 Gamma Shield) Location Normal Conditions Accident Conditions (Fig. _3E-2)___ --L--AxiaL. __j__ _Ho_o.p____ _l._Axial .l Hoo2 Stress Stress Stress Stress 1 0.37 0.26 0.34 0.34 (0.3) (0.3) 2 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.29 3 --- 2.66 0.29 0.29 (7.7) 4 --- 0.80 0.29 0 .29 (5.27) 5 6.23 --- --- 3.97 (8.39) (7.53) 6 1. 47 2.31 2.08 3.14 7 0.22 0.31 0.31 0.37 3E-17 Rev O 1/00
Allowable Sub-Surface Flaw Depth (inches) (TN-32 Gamma Shield) Location Normal Conditions Accident Conditions (Fig. 3E-2) .l Axial .l Hoop .l Axial .l Hoop Stress Stress Stress Stress 1 --- --- --- --- (0.41) (0. 41) (0.30) (0.30} 2 0. 86 0.76 0.58 0.94 3 --- 5.85 0.71 0.71 (7.70) 4 5.39 1. 89 0.71 0.71 (5.27) 5 --- --- --- 7.19 (8.39) (8.39) (7.53) 6 3.35 4.66 4.36 --- (3.85) (4.12) (4.12) 7 0.52 0.64 0.64 --- (0.49) (0.49) (0.66) Note:~---~ indicates that the allowable flaw depth is not limited by fracture mechanics calculation. ( } indicates that the allowable flaw depth is limited by primary stress criteria. Specific conservatisms included in the above analysis are listed below: All factors of safety on applied stress required by ASME Section XI (1989 Edition) were included in the evaluation. Weld residual stresses were treated as constant tensile stresses normal to the fl~~ prientation. Flaws were assumed to be long (infinitely long or full circumference) Lower bound material properties were used. 3E-18 Rev o 1/00
Conclusions The gamma shield is not part of the confinement boundary. Cracks postulated in the gamma shield will not propagate into the confinement boundary due to the geometry of the cask. If the gamma shield were to fracture along the length or around the circumference or around the weld between the ganuna shield and top flange, there is no credible mechanism which would result in the gamma shielding separa~ing from the confinement boundary. The top shield plate is welded to the lid and is captured by the confinement vessel. Therefore, if the weld were to completely fail the shield plate will still remain inside the confinement boundary and will not lose its shielding capability. Therefore, even if a fracture were to occur in the ganuna shield shell or the weld between the gamma shield and top flange or top shield plate or weld between top shield plate and lid, there would be no safety significance, since confinement would be maintained, and shielding would not be impaired. The one exception is in the region of the weld of the gamma shield shell to the bottom plate. Irt this region, if the weld were to completely fail, the bottom plate could become detached and have an impact on the shielding capability of the cask .
.NDE Inspection Plan The results of the fracture toughness analysis shows that the flaws in the gamma shield shell and top and bottom shield plates which would result in unstable crack growth or brittle fracture are larger than those generally observed in forged steel and plate components. No special examination requirements on the gamma shiela-slierl-;-Eop and bottom shield plates are required.
The flaw sizes in the welds which could result in brittle fra~ture at -20°F will be detected by NDE methods. The welds at locations 1 if it were_ to completely fail-, would be no safety significance. Therefore, only PT or MT of the final is be specified. If the bottom plate weld were to completely fail, the bottom plate could become detached and have an impact on the shielding capability of the cask. The minimum allowable flaw sizes for surface and subsurface are 0.29 in. and 0.58 in., respectively. Therefore, the following NOE will be* used to ensure defects of the minimum flaw 3E-19 Rev o 1/00
sizes calculated are detected and repaired prior to used for fuel storage.
- PT or MT at weld preparation surfaces (base metal)
- PT or MT at root pass
- PT or MT for each 0.375 inches of weld
- PT or MT at final surface The weld at location 7, if it were to completely fail, could result in a drop of the shield plug into the cask cavity. Therefore the NDE requirements specified for the location 7 weld will be the same as that specified for the location 2 weld above.
The liquid penetrant or magnetic particle method will be in accordance with Section V, Article 6 of ASME Code. 3E-20 Rev O 1/00
3E.l.3 References
- 1. NUREG-1536, Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage System.
- 2. Regulatory Guide 7.11, Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment (Vessel With A Maximum Wall Thickness of 4 Inches)
- 3. Regulatory Guide 7.11, Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment (Vessel With A Maximum Wall Thickness Greater Than 4 Inches, But Not Exceeding 12 Inches).
- 4. ASME Code Section IlI, Subsection NB, 1992.
- 5. ASME Code Section XI, 1989.
- 6. Structural Integrity Associates, pc-CRACK' for Windows, Version 3.0, March 27,1997.
- 7. NUREG/CR-1815, Recommendations for Protecting Against
- Failure by Brittle Fracture in ~erritic Steel Shipping containers up to foui: Inches Thick
------------- ~ ----~-~-
3E-21 Rev 0 1/00
THIS PAGE INTENTIALLY BLANK Rev. 0 1/00
*Figure~JE~l .
Locations of Fracture Toughness evaluations (TN-32 Confinement Boundary) LID~- ff> GAMMA SHIELDING~._~...,~::~::~_:-=~--=~--=:. .r:_-.::_-::_-:=:-=.=_--=-.::1~l CONFINEMENT FLANGE
'!RUNNION LOCATIONS CONFINEMENT VESSEL CYLINDER (GAMMA SHIELDING) I I
- - - --- - ------ - -- -~-- - -- ,
I I I I aOTTOM (GAMMA SHIELDING) REV. Cl 1}..oo.:.
Figure JE-2 Locations of Fracture Toughness Evaluations (TN-32 Gamma Shield) LID GAMMA SHIELDING CONFINEMENT FLANGE
'l'RtJNNION LOCATIONS CONFINEMEN'I' VESSEL CYLINDER (GAMMA SHIELDING}
BOTTOM (GAMMA REV. 0 l/00_-_ ....~
- .~:
Figure 3E-3 Charpy V-Notch Test -Results for SA-266 Gr. 2 GO * - - - ' , - i I
-**...11---i-- I
"' GO --i--. , .;*1-*--
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i
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~
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~o - - - *. . * * - * - 4 **a
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"' 20 .... *- .. I*
I H****M _ _ _ _ _ --*-1-- I 10 * . ******-* -:---* ..... 0 ~----------+------P-----f------.;.-------------1------ I
-40 -30 .20 *10 D 10 20 Tnl Tomperah1re, f REV. 0 l/p_o _
CHAPTER 4 THERMAL EVALUATION 4.1 Discussjon The TN-32 cask is designed to passively reject decay heat under normal conditions of storage, accident and loading/ unloading conditions while maintaining appropriate cask temperatures and pressures within specified limits. Objectives of the thermal analyses performed for this evaluation include:
- Determination of maximum and minimum temperatures with respect to material limits;
- Determination of temperature distributions to support the calculation of thermal stre*sses;
- Determination of the cask cavity temperature to support confinement pressurization calculations;
- Determination of the maximum fuel cladding temperature.
Chapter 2 presents the principal design bases for the TN-32 cask. A significant thermal design feature of the TN-32 is the basket described in Section 1.2. The basket consists of an assembly of 32 stainless steel fuel compartments with aluminum and poison {borated aluminum) plates sandwiched between them. The compartments are plug-welded together to form the basket. The aluminum basket rails (peripheral inserts) bolted to the cavity wall provide a conduction path from the basket periphery to the cavity wall. The design of the basket allows the heat - from-tlie~ue!asrs-emblies-to*-be-conducted along--the--aluminum- --* _________ _ plates to the basket rails and to be dissipated to the cavity wall. Another design feature is the conduction path created by the aluminum boxes in the neutron shielding layer described in Section 1.2. The neutron shielding is provided by a resin , compound cast into long slender aluminum containers placed around the cask shell and enclosed within a smooth outer shell. By butting against the adjacent shell surfaces, the aluminum containers allow decay heat to be conducted across the neutron shield. The TN-32 dry storage cask falls under the jurisdiction of 10CFR Part 72 when used as a component of an ISFSI. To establish 4.1-1 Rev. 0 1/00
the heat removal capability, several thermal design criteria are established for the TN-32. These are:
- Confinement of radioactive material and gases is a major design requirement. Seal temperatures must be maintained within .specified limits to satisfy the leak tight confinement function during normal storage conditions. An allowable temperature range of -40 to 536°F (-40 to 280°C) is set for the Helicoflex seals (double metallic 0-rings) in the confinement vessel closure lid (Reference 18).
- To maintain the stability of the neutron shield resin during normal storage conditions, an allowable temperature range of
-40 to 300°F (-40 to 149°C) is set for the neutron shield.
- Maximum and minimum temperatures of the confinement structural components must not adversely affect the confinement function.
- Maintaining fuel cladding integrity during storage is another design consideration. To minimize creep deformation that can occur over the storage duration, the maximum initial storage fuel cladding temperature is determined as a function of the initial fuel age using the guidelines provided by the Commercial Spent Fuel Management Program 11 l (CSFM) . These temperature limits are reported in Section 3.5. For normal conditions of storage, a *fuel temperature limit of 328°C (622°F) has been established. During loading/unloading (including vacuum drying of the cask) and accident conditions, the fuel temperature limit is 570°C (1058°F} as recommended in Reference 11.
The ambient temperature range for normal storage is -30 to 115°F (-34 to 46°C). The cask temperature response to changes in ambient conditions will be relatively slow because the cask
* -*--*--~ therma-l--ine~1;-i-a-is--larga._D_a_ily averaged maximum and minimum temperatures are used for the thermal evaluation.
The ambient temperature as a function of time during a peak summer-month day is shown below for a typical site (Reference 12) with a maximum ambient temperature of 115°F: Time 12a 2a 4a 6a Sa lOa 12p 2p 4p 6p Sp lOp Temperature, °F 82 78 75 74 85 97 103 111 115 113 100 89 The daily temperature over a 24-hour period is 94°F. For conservatism, a maximum daily averaged ambient temperature of 100°F is used for the m~ximum cask temperature evaluation. Similarly, for a cold winter day, the ambient temperature as a 4.1-2 Rev. o 1/00
function of time (Reference 13) is tabulated below: Time 12a la 2a 3a 4a Sa 6a 7a Sa 9a lOa lla Temperature, °F 25 30 -29 29 28 -26 -21 -18 Time 12p lp 2p 3p 4p Sp 6p 7p Sp 9p lOp llp Temperature, "F 11 10 -13 15 14 -13 -12 -11 The daily averaged temperature is -l9.6°F. The minimum daily averaged ambient temperature of -20°F is used for the thermal. evaluation. In general, ~11 the thermal criteria are associated with maximum temperature limits and not minimum temperatures. All materials can be subjected to.the minimum average environment temperature of -20° F (-29° C} without adverse effects. The TN-32 is analyzed based on a maximum heat load of 32.7 kW from 32 fuel assemblies with BPRAs or TPAs. The heat flux profile for a typical PWR fuel assembly with a peak power factor of approximately 1.2 and an active length of 144 in. is used. A description of the detailed analyses performed for normal storage conditions is provided in Section 4.4, accident conditions in Section .4.5, and loading/unloading conditions in Section 4.6. A summary of the results from the analyses performed for normal and fire accident conditions (maximum and* minimum temperatures, with allowable range) is provided in Table 4.1-1. The thermal evaluation concludes that with this heat load, all design criteria are satisfied for normal,* accident and loading/unloading conditions. 4.1-3 Rev. o 1/00
4.2 Summary of Thermal prapertjes of Materials The thermal properties of materials used in the thermal analyses are reported below. The values are listed as given in the corresponding references.
- a. Helium 191 Used for: Gaps in cask cavity Temperature Thermal Conductivity oF Btu/hr-ft-oF 0 0.0774 200 0.1000 400 0.1206 600 0.1398
- b. Carbon Steel, C-Mn-Si Used for: Steel portions of cask Temperature Thermal Conductivity 131 Specific Heat 131 Density 1i 6
)
oF Btu/hr-ft-oF Btu/lb-°F
- - lb/in3 100 23.9 0.110 0.284 200 24.2 0.117 300 24.4 0.122 400 24.2 0.128 500 23.7 --
0.133 600 23.1 0.136 700 22.4 0.143 800 21.7 0.148 900 20.9 0.156 1000 20.0 0.164 1100 19.2 0.172 0.284 4.2-1 Rev. O 1/00
- c. Aluminum, 6061 Alloy Used for: Basket plates, basket rails (peripheral inserts)
Temperature Thermal Conductivity 13 l Specific Heat <3 > Density 115
)
oF Btu/hr-ft-oF Btu/lb-°F lb/in3 100 96.9 0.215 Q.098 l.50 98.0 0.218 200 99.0 0.221 250 99.8 0.223 300 100.6 0.226 350 101.3 0.228 400 101.9 0.230 0.098
- d. Resin - Polyester Used for: Neutron shielding Thermal Conductivityl 4 l = O .1 Btu/hr-ft-°F Densityt 4 > = O. 057 lb/in. 3 Specific Heat' 4 > = 0.31 Btu/lb-°F
- e. Air 18 l Used for: Gaps in cask Temperature Thermal Prandtl No. Specific Vol. Dynamic Vise.
OF Conductivity Pr ft"'3/lbm Lbm/ft-h Btu/hr-ft-°F - - BO 0.0152 0.708 13.79 0.0448 260 0.0194 0.694 18.39 o. 0"556 440 0.0233 0.688 23.00 0.0653 620 0.0269 0. 690 27.60 0.0740 980 0.0333 0.705 36.Bl 0.0895 1340 0. 0393 0.707 46.00 0.1026 4.2-2 Rev. 0 1/00
- f. Concrete - stone Used for: Concrete pad Thermal Conductivity<sJ = 1. o Btu/hr-ft-°F Surface emissivity<'> = O.94
- g. Aluminum, 6063 Alloy Used for: Radial neut~on shielding containers Temperature Thermal Conductivity 131 Specific Heat 131 Density' 15
)
oF Btu/hr-ft-oF Btu/lb-"F lb/in3 70 120.8 .216 0.097 100 120.3 .217 150. 119.7 .221 200 119.1 .223 250 118.3 .225 300 118.3 .228 350 117.9 .231 400 117.6 .234 0.097
- h. PWR Fuel The fuel properties calculations are presented in Appendix 4A.
The results are tabulated below: Temperature, "F 300 400 640 1090 Density, lb/in3 0.135 0.135 Spec it ic .1:1ea't'., ()--;-051!- L()-;-06 " n"I~ 0 O'ZS Btu/lbm-"F Axial Direction Temperature, "F 200 300 400 500 600 BOO Thermal Conductivity, 0.804 0.850 0.894 0.937 0.979 1.062 Btu/hr-ft-"F Transverse Direction Temperature, DF 221 300 400 505 606 805 Thermal Conductivity, 0.281 0.318 0.371 0.434 0.502 0.659 4.2-3
- Rev. O 1/00
jBtu/hr-ft-°F The effective conductivity is the lowest calculated value for the PWR fuel arrays (Wl4xl4, WlSxlS & W17x17) that may be stored at 1.02 kW per assembly and corresponds to the W17x17 assembly. This combination of heat load and conductivity bounds the combined effect of: (a) the lower heat load {8% lower due to its lower U content) and the slightly lower effective conductivity for the Wl7xl7 OFA assembly, .and (b) the lower heat load (11% lower due to its lower U content} and slightly lower effective conductivity for the Wl4x14 standard and OFA assemblies. The analyses use interpolated values when*appropriate for intermediate temperatures where the temperature dependency of a specific parameter is deemed significant. The interp9lation assumes a linear relationship between the reported values. Thermal radiation effects at the external surface of the cask are considered. The external surfaces of the TN-32 are painted white (emissivity= 0.93, solar absorptivity= 0.12-0.18, Reference 8} . To accourit for dust and dirt, the thermal analysis uses a solar absorptivity of 0.3 and an emissivity of 0.9 for the exterior surfaces in the thermal models. After a fire, the cask surface will be partially covered in soot (emissivity = 0.95, Reference 17). 4.2-4 Rev. O l./00
4.3 Specificatjpps for Components The only cask components for which a thermal technical specification is necessary are the seals. The seals used in the cask are the Helicoflex seals (double metallic 0-rings) . The seals will have a minimum and maximum tem~erature rating of -40°F and 536°F, respectively 4.3-1 Rev. O 1/00
4 .4 Thennal EyaJnatjon for Normal Condj t;j pns pf Storage The normal conditions of storage are used for the determination of the maximum fuel cladding temperature, TN-32 component temperatures, confinement pressure and thermal stresses. These steady state environmental conditions correspond to the maximum daily averaged conditions: a daily averaged ambient temperature of 100°F and the 10CFR Part 71.7l(c) insolation averaged over a 24 hour period. The analyses include the effect of storing the TN-32 casks in an array that is 2 wide and infinitely long (see Figure 4.4-5). 4.4.l Thermal Model 4 4.1 1 AnaJytjcaJ Model. A three-dimensional finite element computer model of the TN-32 is used to simulate heat transfer in the cask. The ANSYS computer .programt 71 is utilized for the analyses. This program is a large scale, general purpose finite element computer code which can perform steady state and transient three dimensional thermal analyses. The thermal model represents the TN-32 standing vertically on the concrete pad. The model includes the geometry and material properties (Section 4.2) of the basket, the basket rails (peripheral inserts), the cask shells, the neutron shielding (resin in aluminum containers/top neutron shield), the outer shell, the lid and the *concrete pad. The model simulates the thermal performance of the fuel with a homogenized material occupying the volume within the basket where the fuel is stored. This homogenized approach is based on an effec~ive fuel conductivity model. Only the fuel rod length region is modeled. This is described in 'Fuel Model' below and Appendix 4A. A quarter slice of the TN-32 is modeled with the appropriate symmetry boundary conditions. Figures 4.4-1 and 4.4-2 show ---*---sketches of radial and axial cross-sections through the model. The basket comprises of 32 stainless steel boxes {8.70 x 8.70 x 160 in.) with typically one 0.5 in. thick aluminum and one 0.040 in. thick poison plate (borated aluminum) placed between 0.10 inch thick adjacent boxes. The boxes are held together by plug welds which pass through the aluminum and poison plates. The plug welding design.causes the aluminum and poison plates to be tightly sandwiched between adjacent box sides. The basket portion of the thermal model simulates the conduction paths provided by the stainless steel fuel compartments and the aluminum plates. No credit is taken for the heat transfer paths provided by the poison plates in*the cask thermal model. The decay heat from the fuel assemblies is applied directly to the elements that comprise the homogenized fuel as volumetric heat generation in the 144 inch active fuel length. As shown in 4.4-1 Rev. O 1/00
~igure 4.4-1, some aluminum plates are interrupted to allow other plates a direct conduction path to the basket periphery. As a conservative modeling approach, a nominal gap of 0.02 in. is used between the interrupted and continuous plates. This causes heat to be transferred across a gaseous medium (helium) between the two plates (or through the fuel) rather than along the more conductive stainless* steel boxes sandwiching the gap.
The basket bottom and the fuel assemblies rest *on the cask bottom during normal storage. No credit is taken for the direct contact of the fuel assemblies and basket with the cask bottom. Instead a 0.25 inch gap is assumed between the basket bottom and
*the cask bottom.
The plug weld holes in the aluminum basket plates reduce its thermal conductivity. To evaluate the effect of the holes, simple two dimensional finite element models of the plates with and without holes were developed. The analysis concluded that for the same temperature difference across symmetry boundaries, the conductivity for the basket plates is effectively reduced less than 10% with weld holes. Accordingly, the thermal conductivity for the aluminum plates is reduced 10% in the thermai model. The effective conductivity for the basket plates is based on the reduced conductivity of the o.s in. aluminum plates and the 0.10 in. thick stainless steel box sides. Basket rails, bolted to the cavity wall, increase the surf ace area for heat dissipation while providing structural support for the basket. The thermal model assumes a nominal gap of 0.188 in. at thermal equilibrium between the periphery of the basket and the rails. Although the rail surface bolted to the cavity wall makes surface contact with the cavity surface, a 0.01 gap is assumed between these surfaces in the thermal model. These gaps are --- ------shown-1n-F+/-gure-4-;-4---J;--;--A-H.-heat---&r-ansf-er-acros.s_th_e_gap~~i=s~b-".;y~----- gaseous conduction. Other modes of heat transfer are neglected. The ANSYS three dimensiona.l isoparametric thermal shell element, SHELLS?, is used to simulate heat transfer*along the aluminum plates and basket rails, and across helium gaps in the basket.- The three dimensional isoparametric solid element, SOLID70, is used to represent the fuel, and to model gaseous conduction across gaps between the basket, basket rails and the cavity wall. The cask body portion of the model consists of the cask bottom, the inner and outer cask body shells, the radial neutron shield (resin in aluminum containers), lid, lid neutron shield, the cask weather protective cover, and the outer shell. The cask bottom consists of an inner plate (containment) and an outer plate (gamma shielding) . Although the inner and outer plates 4.4-2 Rev. 0 1/00
will be in contact, a 0.125 inch gap is assumed between the plates. The lid consists of an inner plate (gamma shield) attached to an outer plate (containment) . The geometry of the standard lid was compared with the type A lid. Since the overall thickness of the steel and neutron portions of the two lids with its neutron shield are the same, the temperature distribution in either lid will be similar. The geometry .of the standard lid is modeled in the thermal model. Although the inner and* outer plates will be in contact, a 0.010 inch gap is assumed between the inner and outer plates in the lid. The top portion of the lid neutron shield is assigned an adiabatic boundary condition resulting is no heat dissipation from the lid neutron shield to the protective cover. The bottom portion of the lid is subjected to direct heat transfer from the top of the fuel anq basket by radiation and gas conduction. As a result, temperatures in the lid and lid neutron shield regions will be conservatively bounded. The protective cover is bolted to the cask lid as shown in Figure 4.4-2. A 0.010 inch gap is assumed at the protective cover/lid contact interface. The inner and outer cask body shells will be assembled with an interference fit. This will assure thermal contact at the shell interface. A contact conductance of 375 Btu/hr-ft 2 is estimated for interface resistance between steel surfaces in contact 181 (air gaps) . *For conservatism the analysis uses a contact conductance of 200 Btu/hr-ft 2
- The neutron shielding consists of 60 long slender resin-filled aluminum containers placed between the cask body and outer steel shell. The aluminum containers butt against the shells. However, an air gap of 0.01 in. is used in the model.
______ The concrete pad in the thermal model is 36 in. thick and extends 36 in. around---r:Iie bottom or-the cask-;---'l'-he--bet.-t-Gm-of-th_______ cask is assumed to be in perfect thermal contact with the concrete pad. The bottom of the pad, which is in contact with soil, is treated as a constant temperature boundary.. For the normal ambient conditions, a soil temperature of 70°F is used. The finite element model for the stainless steel shells, the protective cover flange, the resin, the air gaps and the concrete pad, are developed using SOLID70 elements. The aluminum - containers for the resin ahd the weather protective cover are generated using SHELLS? elements. Figure 4.4-3 shows the three-dimensional ANSYS finite element model developed. Details of the model are shown in Figure 4.4-4.
...- Rev. O 1/00 4.4-3
Decay Heat Load The homogenized fuel assemblies are included in the thermal model. An axially varying decay heat load of 1.02 kW per assembly is applied to the homogenized fuel elements as volumetric heat generation. The figure below shows the predicted heat flux profile for a typical PWR fuel <4 l assembly with an
- active length of 144 in.
DECA.YBEA.TAXIALPROnLE u ---****+* ""T
~ 1.0 ----* .L ...... l. .......;. ....... J......... ; ........ L--**-***--
1: -: :*:J.: : :!-: *.:t: ._: t.:~=-1: _: : 1: _: :_;: : OJ .......... ~------- .. t............. ~ ............ ~.............. ~ .. ---*-**t-****'"*~* *
! ~
OJ..__--'~~~-'-~'----'-~-'-~...___.
~ i i ~ !
0 6G 'llO 100 140 Z,ID. Fuel Mode] In the cask thermal model, the fuel is modeled as a homogenous material occupying the volumes within the basket that the fuel is stored in as in Ref. 10, Appendix II.5.4. The fuel volume length corresponds to the 151.63 inch rod length of a standard W17x17 fuel assembly. The decay heat of the fuel is applied to the homogenized fuel elements directly as volumetric heat generation in the 144 in active length of the fuel. A1though-t-he-st.a-i-nle-sS-steeL£ue1_b_oxes that form the fuel compartments are in good.contact with the aluminum basket plates, a 0.020 inch gap is assumed between each stainless steel box side and the adjacent aluminum plate. This gap is included in the fuel model which results in lower effective fuel conductivity. The analytical basis for the homogenization of the fuel is described in Appendix 4A. The homogenized fuel is assigned non~ isotropic effective conductivities. The thermal properties for axial (from top to bottom) and transverse (side to side} conduction are listed in Section 4.2, item h.
.,.* Rev. 0 1/00 4.4-4
Solar Heat Load The maximum solar heat load is applied as a constant value to all external surfaces of the thermal model. A solar absorptivity of 0.3 is used for the painted surfaces of the cask and 0.9 for the concrete pad. The total insolation for a 12-hour period is 1475 Btu/ft2
- for curved surfaces and 2950 Btu/ft 2 for flat surfaces per 10CFR Part 71.7l(c). Since the cask has a large thermal inertia, the total insolation is averaged over a 24-hour period and applied to the cask external surface.
Heat Djssjpatjon to the Enyironmen~ Most of the heat from the TN-32 cask is dissipated to the environment by radiation and natural convection. If the cask is stored in an array, partial radiation 11 blockage" occurs which reduces the overall view factor from the cask to the environment. The analyses assume that the casks will be stored in an array that is two wide and infinitely long, and placed 16 ft (nominal) (center to center) apart (Figure 4.4-5). Convection heat transfer -is assumed to be unaffected. Heat transfer between casks is neglected. To simplify the cask environment view factor calculation, the TN-32 is assumed to be a cylinder of diameter 8.2 ft and length 12.88 .ft. This represents the surface.dimensions for the outer shell. Based on its location.in a 2 wide and infinitely long array, it is possible for 46% of the outer shell surface area to be surrounded by other casks. The radiation heat transfer for this "blocked" region can be approximated to that between two concentric cylinders with the inner radius corresponding to the cask diameter and the outer radius corresponding to the spacing between the two casks in the array. The equation for the view factor F2-:1. for two concentric cylinders ~~~~o-f-~1ni~e-~ength-1fil--:~*s-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ F,, I I {
==--- cos.1-B-- I [~(A+2) 2 -(2R)2 cos*-+
/ B !Zi4]}
1 -- Bsin.1 -
-a R trR A 2L RA . R. 2 Equivalent Smface of
@)-'b~ surrounding Cask Blocking Radiation Ieat Dissipation Heat Transfer ftomCask
... 4.4-5 Rev. O 1/00
- where, ra = inner cylinder radius rb = outer cylinder radius 1 = cylinder length R = rb/ra L = 1/ra A = L2 + R2 B = L2 - R2 + 1
- 1 From the reciprocity theorem, Fa-b = Fb-a (rb/ra)
The view factor from the outer surface to the environment, Fa*amb = 1 - Fa-b Based on an array spacing of 16 ft (nominal) and a cask diameter*of 8.2 ft, an overall view factor of 0.77 is calculated between the cask and the ambient. The heat transfer coefficient, Hr, for heat dissipation by radiation, is given by the equation: Hr=G12[ u(Ti-TV JB1ulhr-Jt2 .° F TrT2
- where, G12 = the gray body exchange coefficient
= (surface emissivity) (view factor)
T1 = ambient temperature, °R 2 = surface temperature, °R For horizontal surfaces, G12 = (0 . 9 ) ( 1 ) = 0 *9 For the vertical blocked surfaces, G12 = {0. 9) ( 0. 77) = O. 6 9 The thermal analysis is based on the above minimum grey body exchange coefficients calculated using empirical equations. Analyses using numerical methods could be used to calculate a smaller array spacing for the same.exchange coefficients. Alternate array schemes may be used if it is shown by analysis that the minimum values for the grey body exchange coefficients are achieved. Heat dissipation by natural convection from vertical surf aces is described by the following equation for the average Nusselt number_ (Reference 2): 4.4-6 Rev. o 1/00
- where, Gri.= Grashof number = p2gf3 (T11 -Ta) L 3 /µ2 p = density, lb/ft 3
- g = acceleration due to gravity, ft/sec 2 p= temperature coefficient of volume expansion, l/R
= absolute viscosity, lb/ft-sec
~ = characteristic length, ft Pr = Prandtl number He= natural convection coefficient Simplifying in terms of He, Hc=(k)(0.13)[ P gft(T~-T 0)Prl µ 2 2 f/J Btulhr-fi 2 -° F For horizontal surfaces (per Reference 2),
and The total heat transfer coefficient ~ = Hr + Re, is applied as a boundary condition on the outer surfaces of the finite element model. Maximum Fuel Cladding Temperature The finite element model of the cask includes a representation of the spent nuclear fuel that is based on a fuel effective conductivity model. The decay heat of the fuel is applied directly to the fuel elements. The fuel temperatures reported are the results of the thermal cask model analysis, ~hich includes the homogenized fuel. As described in Appendix 4A, the homogenized fuel properties are chosen-to match both the temperature drop between basket walls and fuel assembly center pin, and the effective conductivity of the fuel assemblies. Average Cavity Gas Temperature The cavity gas temperature is maximum at the hottest fuel cladding and minimum at the cooler surfaces in the lid region.
,.,* 4.4-7 Rev. 0 1/00
Por simplicity and conservatism, it is assumed that the average cavity gas temperature is the average value of the maximum fuel cladding and the minimum cavity wall temperatures. 4 4 1.2 Test Model. The detailed evaluation described above ensures that the casks are capable of dissipating the design heat load. The conservative approach precludes the necessity to perform extensive thermal testing. To test the method of manufacture for the radial thermal conductance through the cask body including heat dissipated to the ambient, testing for one cask will be performed as described in Chapter 9. 4.4 *2 Maxjw1m Temperatures A steady state thermal analysis is performed using the maximum decay heat load of 1.02 kW per assembly (32.7 kW total), 100°F ambient temperature and the maximum insolation. Figure 4.4-6 shows the temperature distribution predicted by the finite element model. The specific temperature distributions in the hottest cross-section of the model, the hottest cross-section of the basket, the top 4 in. of the basket, and the cask body are shown in Figures 4.4-7, -8, -9 and -10 respectively. A summary of the calculated cask temperatures is listed in Table 4.1-1. Additional analyses are performed using the heat loads corresponding to 10 and 20 year storage periods. The results of these evaluations are listed in Table 4.4-l. 4.4.3 Mjnjmum Temperatures Under the minimum daily averaged temperature condition of
-20°F (-29°C) ambient, the resulting cask component temperatures will approach -20°F if no credit is taken for the decay heat load. Since the cask materials, including confinement structures and the seals, continue to function at this temperature, the minimum temperature condition has no adverse effect on the
per-fe:t'rnance--Of-thELTN_::_3_2__.______________________________
Temperature distributions in a minimum ambient temperature of -20°F and no insolation are performed using the heat loads corresponding to O, 10 and 20 year storage periods. Table 4.4-2 lists the results of the analyses. 4
- 4. 4 Maxj mllm Tnt'ernal Pressure The maximum cask cavity internal pressure during normal conditions of storage is calculated in Chapter 7.
4.4.S Maximum Thermal Stresses The maximum thermal stresses during normal conditions of storage are calculated in Section 3.4.4.
,,,- Rev. O 1/00 4.4-8
4-.4.6 Evaluation of Cask Performance for Normal Condjtjons of Storage The thermal analysis for normal s~orage concludes that the TN-32 cask design meets all applicable requirements. The maximum temperatures calculated using cons~rvative assumptions are low. The maximum temperature of any confinement structural component is less than 315°F (157°C) which has an insignificant effect on the mechanical properties of the confinement materia1s*used. The maximum seal temperature {256°F, 124°C) during normal storage is well below the 536°F long-term limit specified for continued seal function. The maximum neutron shield temperature is below 300°F (149°C} and no degradation of the neutron shielding is expected during the storage life. The predicted maximum fuel cladding
- temperature is .well below the allowable fuel temperature limit of 622°F (328°C)
- The comparison of the results with the allowable ranges is tabulated in Table 4.1-1.
~*
4.4-9 Rev. o 1/00
4.5 Thermal Eyaluatjon for Accident Condjtjons The TN-32 casks will be stored on a concrete pad away from combustible material. Therefore, a credible fire would be very small and of short duration such as that due to a fire or explosion from a vehicle or portable crane. However a hypothetical fire accident is evaluated for the TN-32 cask based on a fuel fire, the source of fuel being that from a ruptured fuel tank of the cask transporter tow vehicle. The bounding capacity of the fuel tank is 200 gallons and the bounding hypothetical fire is an engulfing fire around the cask. Another accident evaluation performed on the cask is the thermal response of the cask in the postulated event of it being completely buried by dirt and debris with very low thermal conductivity. The temperature-time history of the cask components during this event is reported. 4.5.1 Fj re Acd dent Eyal uati on From IAEA requirements (l 4 l, the "pool" of fuel is assumed to extend 1 meter beyond the cask surface. Based on an outer shell diameter of 98 inches, this gives a "pool" diameter of 2 approximately 176 inches and a pool surface of 24,500 in
- A fuel consumption rate of 0.15 in/min. was selected from a Sandia Report(lSl concerning gasoline/tractor kerosene ,experimental burning rates. This translates into a fuel consumption rate of approximately 15.9 gal./min. Therefore, the 200 gallon of fuel will sustain a fire for about 13 minutes and hence a 15 minute fire is evaluated. The Sandia Report also reports an average flame temperature of 1550°F and an average convective heat transfer coefficient of 4.5 Btu/hr-ft 2 -°F for a railroad tank car
f-ire-te st-.-'I'he--same-pa-r amete.r:.g_ are_util i_z_e.Q__f_or C_Q~_pl ing__ the
.-c----
fire energy to the cask surface during fire accident conditibns. The fire thermal evaluation is performed primarily to demonstrate the confinement integrity of the TN-32.
- This is assured as long as the metallic lid seals remain below 536°F and the cavity pressure is less than 100 psig. Two models, a cross-section model and a lid seal model, are used for the evaluati9n.
4.5-1 Rev. O ~./00
A. Cross-section Model The cross-section finite element model is developed using a cross-sectional slice of the finite element model for the normal storage analysis (Section 4.4.1.1). The cask components and their geometry are shown in Figure 4.5-1. Thermal properties of the materials used are listed in Section 4.2. (Thermal capacities of gases are neglected for the transient analysis.) Initial temperatures before the fire condition are established by using steady state temperatures in the hottest cross-section for normal storage conditions. All gaps in the cask body region of the model were eliminated to conservatively maximize the heat into the cask from the fire. For the entire duration of the fire and cooldown period, the decay heat flux applied to the fuel region of the model corresponds to 1.02 kW/assy with a peaking factor of 1.2. Insolation on the outer surface of the cask is assumed during the cooldown period. During the fire condition period (15 min.), heat absorption at the outer surface is by radiation and forced convection, and is given by the following equation: qure = (He + Hr) (Tf - Ts) where, qfire = heat flux into cask from fire, Btu/hr-ft 2 Tt = flame temperature = 1550°F Ts = surface temperature of the cask, °F He = convection heat transfer 2 coefficient
= 4. 5 Btu/hr-ft -°F H:r = radiation heat transfer coefficient, Btu/hr-ft 2-°F 4
H:r = (0.1714E-8)(F8 ) [(E) (Tf + 460) 4 - {Ts+ 460) ]/(Tf - Ts) where, Fs ~ outer surface absorptivity= 0.8 (Reference 14) (This is also consistent with 10CFR71.73.) E =flame emissivity=- 0.9 (Reference 14) {This is also consistent with 10CFR71.73.) During the cooldown period after the fire condition, heat dissipation from the outer surf ace is by radiation and natural convection to an ambient temperature of 100°F (as in the normal storage conditions). After a fire, the cask surface will be partially covered in soot (emissivity= 0.95, Reference i7). In order to bound the problem an emissivity of 0.9 was used for the cask external surfaces after the fire accident condition . 4.5-2 Rev. o ')./00
The results of the analysis show that no melting of the metallic cask components occu~s. The peak transient temperatures in selected locations in the cask are listed in Table 4.5-1. B. Lid-Seal Region Model To demonstrate the integrity of the seals in the lid during the fire accident, a finite element model of the top portion of the TN-32 is developed. A comparison of the standard lid and the Type A lid was made to select the lid that would provide the peak
'seal temperatures during the fire accident. In the Type A lid configuration, 1.12 inch of steel is transferred from the bottom of the lid to the neutron shield, which is mounted on the top of the lid. The total mass of the lid and the neutron shield is approximately the same. Hence the geometry of the standard lid is modeled.
The model is an axisymmetric two-dimensional model and includes the geometry and material properties of the lid, resin disk, protective cover and upper region of the cask body shells. Figure 4.5-2 shows the geometry of the model. Figure 4.5-3 is an element plot of the 2-D axisyrrunetric ANSYS model. The outer surfaces* of the protective cover and the cask body are subjected to the heat flux from the 15 minute fire, and during the cooldown period, heat is dissipated from these surfaces to an ambient temperature of 100°F. Most of the heat transfer in the enclosure under the protective cover is by radiation in the fire condition. Hence, heat transfer in this enclosure is modeled by radiation with all surfaces being assigned an emissivity of 0.9. Near the seal region where the air gap between the lid and protective cover is small, heat conduction through air is assumed. The region where heat --- - --c-onauctron- through--a-i-r--i-s-a-s-sumed--is -shown- -in --Figur.e-4-5=-3-~ ________ The initial temperature distribution before the fire condition corresponds to the maximum temperature distribution during normal storage. The effects of insolation are considered during the .cooldown period. A constant decay heat load from the top of the basket and fuel to- the lid is assumed as calculated for the normal storage evaluation in Section 4.4. The results of the computer analysis show that no melting of the metallic components in the lid region occur. The maximum lid seal temperature does not exceed 380°F (194°C). C. Conclusion Based on the thermal analyses for the fire accident conditions, the-TN-32 cask can withstand the hypothetical fire accident event without compromising its confinement integrity . 4.5-3 Rev. O J./00
Peak seal temperature remains well below 536°F. The cavity pressure, as evaluated in Chapter 7, remains below 100 psig. Table 4.5-1 lists the peak transient temperatures in the cask components. The peak transient fuel temperature is 647°F {342°C) and is well below the short term limit of 1058°F (570°C). The neutron shield will off-gas during the hypothetical accident. A pressure relief valve is provided on the outer shell to prevent the pressurization of the outer shell. Shielding (Chapter 5) analyses have been performed showing acceptable consequences even if all the resin disappears. 4.5.2 Buried Cask Thermal Eyaluatjon The TN-32 cask dissipates heat to the environment by radiation and convection. If .the cask is accidentally buried in medium.that will not provide the equivalent cooling of natural convection and unrestricted radiation to the environment, component temperatures will increase to a higher .steady state condition after long-term burial. Of interest is the confinement integrity which is assured as long as the metallic seals remain below 536°F (280°C) and the cavity pressure remains below 100 psig. The TN-32 finite element model developed in Section 4.4.1.l
'is modified for the** buried cask analysis. A cross section model is created by selecting the nodes and elements in the hottest region along with its temperatJre distribution. For this analysis, the cask is assumed to be completely buried in dry soil with such poor heat transfer characteristics that it effectively insulates the cask. The resulting analysis therefore determines the time required to reach limiting temperatures for the confinement integrity.
-'------'!In-i-t-ia-l-c-enditions befor_e_burial are established by using the steady state temperatures reported for normal condition~sl"'lo~f---~-~~-- storage. The transient analysis is performed with a cask heat load of 32.7 kW with a 1.2 peaking factor. The results of the a~alysis show that if the cask is not uncovered within-3 hours, _the neutron shield temperature will exceed the allowable value of 300°F (149°C) . -- Thereafter, cask body temperatures will reach 536°F {280°C) about 38 hours after burial. At this time the cavity gas temperature is 644°F * (340°C) . The cavity pressure at this time is calculated in Chapter 7 concludes that if all fuel fails the maximum cavity pressure will not exceed 100 psig. The fuel temperature loading/unloading limit of 1058°F (570°C) is reached about 93 hours after burial occurs. 4.5-4 Rev. o ~Joo
4.6 Thermal Evaluation for I.oaaing/Unloading Conditjons All fuel transfer operations occur when the cask is in the spent fuel pool (with the cask lid removed}. The fuel is always submerged in free-flowing pool water permitting heat dissipation. After fuel loading is complete, the cask is removed from the pool, drained and dried. The loading condition evaluated for the TN-32 would be the heatup of the cask before its cavity can be backfilled with helium. This typically occurs during the performance of the . vacuum drying operation of the cask cavity. Transient thermal analyses are performed to predict the heatup time history for the cask components assuming air is in the cask cavity. Due to the low pressure in the cask, natural convection heat transfer by air is ignored. Unloading of the cask would require the 'flooding of the cask prior to the removal of the fuel. A quench analysis of the fuel is performed in Chapter 3 and concludes that the total stress on the cladding as a result of this operation is below the cladding material's minimum yield stress. The pressure evaluation is presented below. 4.6.1 Pressure DudnQ' Uploadjpg pf Cask To unload the fuel from, the cask, flooding of the cask cavity is required. This occurs by first releasing the pressure in the cask to atmospheric conditions followed by introducing water into the cask through the drain port and venting using the vent port. Since fuel temperatures are expected to be above 400°F, flooding of the hot cask will result in steam being ---~~--g~nerated which if not vented instantly, will result in a higher cavity pressure. The flow rate of water into the cask during unloading is controlled such that the pressure within the cask st.ays below the design pressure of lOOpsig (ll4.7psia). The initial flow rate used keeps the internal pressure of the cask below 75.3psig (90psia) in the bounding event that all of the flow is evaporated. This flow rate, 0.144 lbm/s, is determined by calculating the flow rate of water vapor leaving the cask at an internal pressure of 75.3psig (90psia). By limiting the initial flow rate to 0.140 lbm/s (1.0 gpm) the steady state pressure will not exceed 75.3psig (90psia). After the steady state pressure stays below SOpsig (64.7psia) for 45 minutes the flow rate can gradually be increased. In the event that the cask internal pressure increases to 75.3psig {90psia) the check valve shuts off the flow of wa~er into the cask preventing the pressure from increasing. 4.6-1 Rev. O ;l/00
4.6.2 Cask Heatup Analysis Heatup of the cask prior to being backfilled with helium typically occurs as cask operations are being performed to drain and dry the cask. The vacuum drying of the cask generally does not reduce the pressure sufficiently to reduce the thermal conductivity of the air in the cask cavity. The TN-32 finite element model developed in Section 4.4.1.l is modified for this transient analysis. A cross section model is created by selecting the nodes and elements in the hottest region, and by making the following modification. All gaseous heat conduction within the cask cavity is through air instead of helium.
- Radiation heat transfer within the cask cavity is neglected. The fuel conductivity was recalculated using air properties instead of helium. All temperatures in the cask are initially assumed to be at l15°F (the maximum spent fuel pool temperature, typically).
Radiation and natural convection heat transfer is from the cask outer surf ace to the building environment at a temperature of l15°F. The decay heat load for the model corresponds to the 32.7 kW total heat load in the cask. The results of the transient thermal analysis for the maximum heat load of 32.7 kW predict that the fuel cladding temperature reaches a maximum temperature of 93SoF (502°C) and is well below the loading/unloading limit of 1058°F. Therefore the duration of the cask drying evolution is not constrained by the fuel cladding temperature limit. Several transient analyses were performed at lower decay heat loads. In order to maintain cask component peak temperatures below that during fire accident conditions, the cask drying evolution can be varied between 36 hours for the design basis heat load to no limit for 56% of the design heat load.
~Below is a plo__t.__showing the P-ercent maximum decay heat load versus cask drying time.
- Time vs. Percent Max. Heat Load 150 120 \ - -
I - f E. I s:D c c
.lll 90 60
"~ ~
I I u 30 0 I 0.50 .,.* 0.60 D.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 Percent Max. Dec:ay Heat Load 4.6-2 Rev. o l/00
4.6.3 Pressure Durj pg I,oadj pg of Cask The cask is vented during the draining procedure, however a small internal cask pressure is expected due to the possible boiling of water within the cask. A bounding case is considered of all the decay heat load (111,582 Btu/hr) boiling the water within the cask (heat of vaporization = 881 Btu/lbm 100psig, Reference 8). The rate of evaporation is less than 0.036 lbm/s. This is much less than the flow rate corresponding to the steady state pressure of 75.3psig {90psia) calculated in section 4.6.1. The cask internal pressure during draining remains well below the design pressure of lOOpsig. 4.6-3 Rev. o 1/00
4.7 Supplemental Information 4.7.1 Supplemental Information from References 12 & 13 Reference 12 Data Table Sa. Hanford Air Temperature Time Temperature (of) Time Temperature (oF) 12a.m. 82 2p.m. 111 2a.m. 78 4p.m. 115
. 4a.m. 75 6p.m. 113 6a.m. 74 8p.m. 100 8a.m. 85 10p.m. 89 10a.m. 97 12p.m. 82 12 p.m. 103 Reference 13 Data Hourly Temperature Readings Wl,14898,GREEN BAY AUSTIN STRAUBE TMPD deg. F 01/30/1951 25 30 29 30 26 18 . .
11 10-13 15 14-13 11
,.* 4.7-1 Rev. O 1/00
4.8 References
- 1. Levy, et. al., "Recommended Temperature Limits for Dry Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Zircalloy - Clad Fuel Rods in Inert Gas, 11 Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-6189, 1987. .
- 2. Perry, P.H. and Chilton, C.H., Chemical Engineers' Handbook, Fifth Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1973 *.
- 3. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME Boiler And Pressure Vessel Code, Section II, Materials, Part D Properties, 1998.
- 4. Transnuclear, Inc. *, TN-24 Dry Storage Cask Topical Report, Revision 2A, Hawthorne, NY, 1989.
- 5. Bolz, R.E. and Tuve, G.L, Handbook of Tables for Applied Engineering Science, Second*Edition, CRC Press, Cleveland, Ohio, 1973.
- 6. Siegal et. al., Thermal Radiation Heat Transfer, Second Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1981.
- 7. ANSYS Engineering Analysis System, User's Manual for ANSYS Revision 5.4, ANSYS, Inc., Houston, PA.
B* Rohs en ow, W. M. , and Hartnett, J. P. , Handbook of Heat Transfer, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1973.
- 9. NUREG/CR-0497, A Handbook of Material Properties for Use in the Analysis of Light Water Reactor Fuel Rod Behavior, MATPRO - Version 11 (Revision 2), EG&G Idaho, Inc., 1981.
- 10. SAND90-2406, Sanders, T. L., et al., A Method for Determining the Spent-Fuel Contribution to Transport Cask Containment Requirements, 1992.
- 11. PNL-4835, Johnson et. al., Technical Basic for Storage of Zircaloy-Clad Spent Fuel in Inert Gases, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1983.
- 12. WHC-SD-TP-RPT-004, Environmental Conditions for On~Site Hazardous Material Packages, Westinghouse Hanford Company, 1992.
- 13. Letter from Wisconsin Electric to Transnuclear, NPL 98-0916, Local Extreme Temperatures.
4.8-1 Rev. O 1/00
i4. IAEA Safety Standards, "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 1985 Edition.
- 15. SANDBS-0196, TTC-0659, Gregory et. al., "Thermal Measurements in a Series of Large Pool Fires," Sandia National Laboratories, 1987.
- 16. American Society for Metals, Metals Handbook, Ninth Edition, 1979.
- 17. Baumeister & Marks, Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, Seventh Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1967.
- 18. Helicoflex High Performance Sealing Catalog, Carbone Lorraine, Helicoflex Components Division.
4.8-2 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 4.1-1 COMPONENT TEMPERATURES IN THE ~N-32 CASK ,, I Normal Storage ~*i ...... .... Component Maximum Minimum* (oF) Allowable Allowable Peak (oF) (oF) Range (oF) Range (°F) outer Shell 240 -20 ** 945 ** Lid (Standard/Type A) 263 -20 ** 438 ** Seal 256 -20 -40 to 536 380 -40 to 536 Top Neutron Shield 256 -20 -40 to 300 N/A N/A Radial Neutron Shield 280 -20 -40 to 300 N/A N/A Inner Shell 308 -20 ** 375 ** Gamma Shield Shell 303 -20 ** 370 ** Inner Bottom Plate 314 -20 ** *** ** Outer Bottom Plate 255 -20 ** *** ** Basket Rail 339 -20 ** 398 ** Basket Plate 527 -20 ** 610 ** I Fuel Cladding 565 I -20 622 max. 647 1050 I I
- Assuming no credit for decay heat[and a daily average ambient temperature of -20oF
- The components perform their intei;ided safety function within the operating range.
- Not Modeled I I
- The components perform their intei;ided safety function within the operating range.
I I I Rev. 0 1/00
.I i . i i
TABLE 4.4-1
!NORMAL STORAGE CASK TEMPERATURES I
; AS A FUNCTION OF STORAGE TIME
\. o yr. Stora$Je I 10 yr. Storage 20 yr. Storage LOcATION l.02 kw/assy 0.66 kw/assy 0 53 kw/assy Maximum Temperatures Seal 256°F 124°
~ 210°F 99°C 194°F 90°C OUter Surface 249°F 121° 208°F 98°C 192°F 89°C Outer Shell 24 0°F 116° 201°F 94°C 187°F 86°C Lid 263°F 128°d 214°F 101°C 197°F 92°C Resin (Top) 256°F 124°0 210°F 99°C 194°F 90°C Resin (Radial) 280°F 138°0 227°F 1oa 0 c 208°F 9*a c 0
Gamma Shield 3 03°F 151°0 243°F 117°C 221°F 105°C Btm. Plt. (inner) 314°F 157°d 250°F 121°C 227°F 1oe 0 c Btm. Plt. (outer) 255°F 124°tj 212°F 100°C 196°F 91°C Inner Shell 308°F 153°0 246°F 119°C 224°F 107°C Basket Rail 339°F 171°0 266°F 130°C 240°F 116°C Basket Plate 527°F 27S 0 q 394°F 201°C 346°F 174°C Fuel Rod 565°F 296°0 425°F 218°C 381°F 194°C Average Temperatures I Cavity Gas 411°F 211°9 318°F 159°C 288°F 142°C I I Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 4.4-2 CASK TEMPERATURES AS A FUNCTION OF STORAGE TIME I {-20°F AMBIENT TEMPERATURE) II I \. O yr. Storage I 10 yr. Storage 20 yr. Storage LOCATION 1.02 kw/assyl 0.66 kw/assy 0.53 kw/assy Maximum !empeJ:atm:es Seal l46°F 63°C 98°F 37°C 79°F 26°C Outer Surf ace l46°F 63°C 99°F 37°C 82°F 2e c 0 Outer Shell 134°F 57°C 89°F 32°C 73°F 23°C Lid 152°F 67°C 102°F 39°C 83°F 28°C Resin {Top) 146°F 63°C 98°F 3?°C 79°F 26°C Resin {Radial) 175°F 79°C 116°F 47°C 95°F 3*5°c Gamma Shield 199°F 93°C 133°F 56°C l09°F 43°C Btm. Plt. (inner) 215°F 102°C 145°F 63°C 119°F 48°C Btm. Plt. (outer) 154°F 68°C 104°F 40°C 86°F 30°C Inner Shell 205°F 96°C 137°F 58°C 111°F 44°C Basket Rail 237°F 114°C 158°F 70°C 129°F 54°C Basket Plate 436°F 224°C 295°F 146°C 243°F 117°C Fuel Rod 480°F 249°C 330°F 166°C 274°F 134°C ruz:ez:age :rempeJ:at1n:es~ Cavity Gas 313°F 156°C 214°F 101°C 177°F 81°C
- The minimum TN-32 .cask temperature distribution, assuming no credit is taken for decay heat, is a uniform - 20°F.
1 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 4.5-1 MAXIMUM TRANSIENT TEMPERATURES I
- FIRE ACCIDENT Location Initial Temper!ature Peak Transient Temperature Outer Shell
\. 240°F I 945°F @ 0:2so hr.* Fuel Cladding 565°F 647°F @ 31 hr. Neutron Shield 280°F 929°F @ 0.255 hr. Cavity Wall 308°F 375°F @ 2 hr. Basket Rail 339°F 398°F @ 3 hr. Basket Plate 527°F 610°F @ 30 hr. Lid Seal 256°F 380°F @ 1 hr. Avg Cavity Gas 410°F 497°F @ 22 hr. Gamma Shield 303°F 370°F @ 2 hr.
- Time from start of fire accident Rev. o 1/00
FIGURE 4.4-1 THERMAL MODEL, RADIAL CROSS SECTION BTEBL BODY SBELLS OUTER STEBL SHELL GAPS BAS:CET PLATE FIQ'CJllB 4.4-1
'l'HBRMAL MODEL RADIAL CROSS SECTlO~
Rev. 0 1/00
FI GURE 4. 4- 3 r**,.- **--*****"-..... ****-,,** -**--*-* ** *** **** *-*-***~ - -**- *'** **-n .;w*-*.--..- - -*- -* ******** **"** 1 i i I I I I I I *n; 3.2 sn1 1~J?. "' TF~?i-.1..~t... ~r:HtL
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- 4 - 4
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m.:v. o 1/10
FIGURE 4.4-5 STORAGE CONFIGURATION
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FIGURE 4.4 -6 cr...sK TEEMPERATURE DTS'I'RIBU 'fION , NORM1\I, STORAGE CONDITIONS
,------**~*------------
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- 7'1ERMAL MOOE1. _____ ,,_ ,,_...., ... _ _ .....................
I
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f'TGUHE 4 . 4 - 7 CASK TEMPERTUR.E DISTRIBUTION,
- 01'TES'1' c~oss S£CTJON hNSVS 5~4 t.'QV l 1958 OC!!061 13 f{Tf:P=*l S~B .:::11
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APPENDIX 4A EFFECTIVE THERMAL PROPERTIES OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 4A.l Discussion In order to determine the appropriate effective fuel assembly thermal conductivity, the fuel assembly with the lowest effective thermal conductivity at the maximum heat load is selected. Use of these .properties would conservatively predict' bounding maximum temperatures for the TN-32. In order to simulate the thermal performance of the fuel in the basket, the fuel's effective thermal conductivity is calculated in longitudinal and transverse*directions. In the longitudinal direction, the dominant mode of heat .. transfer is . conduction of heat through the zircaloy tubes that make up the assembly. In the transverse case, the heat transfer occurs via conduction and radiation. Longitudinal Effective Conductivity The longitudinal fuel effective conductivity* *is determined directly from the geometry and conductivities of the helium and zircaloy tubes by hand calculations. No credit is taken for the conductivity of the U02 pellets. No credit is taken fo~ radiation or.convection. Transverse Effective Conductivity No credit is taken for convection's contribution to the heat transfer within the fuel assembly region. The transverse effective conductivity is derived using methods similar to those found in SAND90-2406, Section II.5.4( 4 >.
- In general, a fuel assembly centered within a square compartment
- - --------is--th-e-rma*1-1-y*-si'Ill+/--J:ar--to-the-two-dimens-iona-l-pr-eb-lem-e':Ef-aa,------------- uni f ormly heated square region with a constant thermal conductivity Kett. The thermal resistance between the stainless steel box and the adjacent aluminum plates further reduces the transverse effective conductivity. Although the stainless steel boxes are in good contact with the adjacent aluminum plates, a 0.020 inch gap is evaluated. 4A.1 Rev. 1 5/00
4A.2 Worst Case Payload The TN-32 is designed to store 32 Westinghouse 15x15, 17x17, 17x17 OFA, 14x14 or 14x14 OFA or B&W 17xl7 Mark BW spent fuel assemblies. The physical characteristics of these PWR assemblies. are given in Chapter 2, Table 2 .1-L The maximum heat loads for the Westinghouse fuels are tabulated below. 1* Fuel Assembly Maximum Heat Load Westinghouse 15x15 0.980 kW Westinghouse 17x17 Std 0.986 kW Westinghouse 17x17 OFA 0.896 kW Westinghouse 14x14 Std 0.876 kW Westinghouse 14x14 OFA 0. 752 kW The worst th~rmal case is the fuel assembly that will .result in the"hottest cladding" temperature for a* given fuel assembly heat - load. The analysis of the Westinghouse 17x17 fuel bounds the B&W *1 Mark BW fuel. * . . . . The maximum fµel temperature is calculated using a PC BASIC code SFBTA <1
- 2 > The temperatures of the fuel rods arranged in an assembly are calculated based on the energy transferred by thermal radiation (per the Wooton-Epstein correlation 13 l) and/or thermal conduction between the rows of rods. The Wooton-Epstein correlation is based on a simplified radiative heat transfer model, which replaces the fuel rod rows with equivalent.
concentric tubes. The modified Wooton-Epstein correlation is given by the equation A1 = Area of fuel assembly envelope C1 = Geometric constant (radiation) C2 = Empirical dimensional constant (free convection) F1 =Empirical.constant (radiative) Q =.*Heating rate of assembly Tg = Maximum fuel cladding temperature Tc = Cask wall temperature U = Overall conductance coefficient . s = Empirical exponent coefficient (convection) 4A.2-l Rev. 1 5/00
- For square fuel rod. (irrays,
- th~. ov_erall . conduct,ance is:
where, d = Fuel rod diameter p = Fuel rod pitch .
-Kg =Thermal conductivity .for fill.gas Kr =*Thermal.conductivity of fuel rod *...
Assuming a zero thermal convection: coefficient, a comparison of the maximum fuel cladding temperature was made. us~ng the . .* . geometry data for the *different fuel .assemblies and the maximum
- decay heat.ioad; ~he eyaluation.concluded the Wl7x17 fuel assembly: at the maximum heat load of 0. 99 kW is the bounding *. *
- case.
The rod outside diameter, rod pitch, and envelope dimensions of the Mark BW fuel are all identical to the Wl7x17*fu~l. The decay heat is 0. 98 kW *per assembly per* Section 5. 2. s-.*
- The evaluation of the Wl7x17 fuel for hottest cladding temperature and fo*r effective fuel conductivity therefore bounds the Mark _BW fuel.
,* ~ ..
I : ~
. . .. _. *~ ~ *. **: .. '.; *;*: .
4A.2-2 Rev. 1 5/00
4A.3 Summary of Thermal Properties of Materials The thermal properties of materials used in the thermal analyses are reported below. The values listed are based on the corresponding references. .,
- a. Thermal Conductivity -of U02 Pellets Ref. 5, Appendix A - Fuel Material Properties, Chapter 2 K = 5 W/m-K = 2.9 Btu/hr-ft-°F
- b. Thermal Conductivity of Zircaloy . ** *
. Ref. 5, Appendix B - Cladding Material.
- Properties, Chap~er 2 200 300 400 500 60.0 800 Temperature,*°F Thermal 7.86 8.28 8.68 9.06 9.44 10.20 Conductivity, Btu/hr-ft-°F
- c. Surface Emissivity of Zircaloy .
Ref. 5, Appendix .B - Cladding Material Properties,. Cha~ter 2 e = o. 8 d; Thermal Conductivity of Helium Ref. 5, Appendix C - Gas Material Properties, Chapter 1 Temperature, OF 200 300 400 500 600 800 Thermal 0.1000 0.1104 0.1206 0.1303 0.1398 0.1580 Conductivity, B_t_uLhr-f_t- 0 E'___ - - - - - - - - - -
- e. Surface Emissivity of Fuel Compartment Unpolished Stainless Steel, Ref. 6
& = 0.3 The analyses use interpolated values when appropriate for intermediate temperatures where the temperature dependency of a specific parameter is deemed significant. The interpolation assumes a linear relationship between the reported values.
~A.3-1. - Rev. 1* 5/00
4A.4 Fuel Assembly Geometry The W 17xl7 fuel assembly geometry is taken from Ref. 7. Rod Array: 17 x 17 Rod Pitch: 0.496 inc~ Fuel Rod Guide Tubes Instrument Tube 264 24 1 Number: 0.545 in. OD: 0.374 in. 0.482 in. Wall Thick.: 0.0225 in. 0.016 in. 0.015 in. Material: Zr 4 Zr 4 Zr 4 The instrument tube is in the center of the assembly. The location of the guide tubes can be seen in the plot of the finite element model (Figure 4A.6-l). 4A.4-l Rev. O 1/00
-~---~ -*** *-** ""-...
4A.5 Longitudinal Effective Conductivity Calculation The helium, fuel pellet, and the zircaloy act like resistors in parallel. The contribution of the fuel pellet to the total axial conductivity is conservatively neglected. The basket opening in the TN-32 is 8. 70 inches square (nominal) *. The _equation for resistors in parallel is: Reff = [ l/R1 + l/R2 r1 Substituting R = (L/KA); Kett = 1/Aetf [(KA) zirc + (KAheuum] The total cross sectional area of zircaloy*is: Azircaloy = 264
- 1tl4 (0.374 2 - 0.329 2 ) +
2 24 * 'lt/4 (0.482 2
- o.4*so 2 ) + 1t/4 (0.545 2 - o.s1s >
2 Azircaloy = 6.5594 in 2 + 0.5622 in2 + 0.0250 in2 = 7.147 in The total cross sectional area of the U02 fuel is given below. The diameter of the fuel pellet is 0.3225 inches< 1 >. Auo2 = 264
- n/4 (0.3225 in.) 2 = 21.565 in 2 The total cross sectional area of the helium is taken to be the remaining area.
Ahel111111 = (8.70 in.) 2 - (21.565 in2 + 7.147 in 2 ) = 46.98 in2 The effective fuel conductivity as a function of temperature in the longitudinal direction is tabulated below: Temp. Hel.:l..um ~::i.rcai.oy Ei:i:ece1ve irue.1.. Area cond. Area cond. Area Cond. (F) (in2) (B/hr-ft-F) (in2) (B/hr-ft-F) (in2) (B/11;"-ft-F) 200 46.98 0.0996 7.J.47 7.8553 75.69 0.8036 300 46.98 O.l.l.04 7.l.47 8.2742 75.69 0.8498 400 46.98 0.J.200 7.147 8.6759 75.69 0.8937 500 46.98 0.1308 7.l.47 9.0652 75.69 0.9372 600 46.98 O.l.404 7.147 9.4464 75.69 0.9791 800 46.98 O.l.584 7.l.47 10.2033 75.69 1.0618 4A.5-1 Rev. o 1/00
4A.6 Transverse Effective Conductivity Calculation A two-dimensional quarter~symmetry section of a W 17x17 fuel assembly centered within a TN-32 basket compartment is modeled using ANSYS' 8 >. A 0.020 inch helium gap is modeled around the stainless steel box. *The finite element model simulates heat transfer by r~diation and conduction to the stainless steel bo~, and conduction across the helium gap to the perimeter of the model. Convection is not modeled. The perimeter of .the model is held at a fixed temperature, and a decay heat is applied directly to the fuel pellets as volumetric heat generation. A decay heat load of 1.02 kW per assembly is used which includes the
- contribution from the BPRAs. The relevant result of the analysis is the maximum fuel cladding temperature.
_ Radiation between and within the basket walls and the fuel. pins was simulated using the radiation super-element processor (AUX12). Conduction was modeled using 2-D thermal solid elements{PLANE55) to represent the helium and the fuel pellets (U02). The zircaloy tubes and the basket plates were modeled with 2-D conducting bar elements (LINK32), using real constant thicknesses as appropriate. The symmetry lines we~e meshed with 2-D thermal conducting bars (LINK32) and assigned an extremely low emissivity (8 = 0.01) to simulate reflection. The symmetry lines and the basket elements were used only during the super-element formulation phase (/AUX12), and were removed from the model prior to solution phase, so their conductivity and re~l constant values are immaterial. A plot of the finite element model is shown in Figure 4A.6-l. The results of this finite element model are compared to an analytical solution for a uniformly heated square region of the same size (8.70 inches) with a constant temperature at the perimeter of the square. The uniform square is assumed to have a ______cons"t.ant_ .conducti_vity_*. Tbe total heat load i$ the same for the uniform square as for the fuel asselnbly moder.--*----- ------------
. The effective conductivity of the fuel assembly region is taken to be that constant value which results in the*same temperature drop from center to edge in the uniform square as occurs in the fuel assembly model between maximum fuel cladding and basket box.
The analytical solution for the temperature in the center of the uniform square is given below (Ref. 4, equation II-100): 2 . Tc = To + 0.29468 ( Q a I Keft ) where: Tc =temperature in the center of .the square 4A. 6-1. Rev. O 1/00
--*~-- --* -- . -- -
To = temperature on the outside (perimeter) Q = decay heat per unit area per unit depth a =half-length of square=~ ( 8.70 in. ) = 4.35 in Ketf = conductivity of square region This equation can be re-arranged to.allow solution .of Keff* Substituting and rearranging for Keff, .
- Kett = 0.29468 [ Q a 2 I (Tc - To) ]
The fuel effective conductivity is a function of the .temperature of the perimeter because the material properties are temperature dependent and radiation is strongly temperature .. dependent. A table associating fuel effective conductivity with temperature (i.e. - a temperature-conductivity relationship) is derived. The analysis associates Kett with-the average temperature, given by ~.(Tc + T0 ) . The results of the analyses are tabulated below. See the following pages for the temperature distribution for each case. Tempera cure ,,. J. CODC1UCC1V1CY Avg. 11oundary .naximum f1T (BtU/ nr-:c~-l!' J 221 175 266 91 0.2814 301 260 341 81 0.3184 400 365 434 69 0.3713 sos 475 534 59 0.4340 606 580 631 51 0.5018 805 785 824 39 0.6588 A temperature distribution for the 400°F average temperature case* is shown in Figure 4A.6-2. 4A.6-2 Rev. O 1/00
4A.7 Effective Specific Heat and Density Calculations Effective Specific Heat The effective specific heat of the fuel assembly is determined by* taking a mass weighted average of the component specific heats! Specific Heat of Zircaloy (Ref. 5, Appendix B - Cladding Material Properties, Chap. 1) Temperature Temperature Specific Heat Specific Heat (K) (F) (J/kg-K) (Btu/lbm-F) 300 80.33 281 0.067 40_0 260.33 302 0.072 640 692.33 331 0.079 1090 1502.33 375 0.090 Specific Heat of U02 (Ref. 5, .Appendix A - Fuel Material Properties, Chap. 1) 2 FCP= K18 exp(8/T) +KiT+(O/M)IGEclex (-Bi) (E n.A-1.l) T 2 [exp(8/T)*l] 2 2 RT 2 p RT q FCP = specific heat capacity (J/kg-K) T = temperature (K) 0/M = oxygen to metal ratio, assumed to be 2
---*--R- =--8-.-3-143-(Jfmol-K)-- -- -------- ----------------- _____ _
9 = the Einstein temperature = 535.285 Ki = 296. 7 K2 = 2.43E-2 KJ = 8. 745E+7 Ed = 1. 577E+5 Specific Heat of U02 Temperature Temperature Specific Heat Specific Heat (K) (F) (J/kg-K) (Btu/lbm-F) 300 80.33 236 0.056 400 260.33 266 0.063 640 692.33 296 0.071 1090 1502.33 317 0.076 4A. 7-1 Rev. O 1/00
M' totCeff = M' zirCzirc _ + M' uo2Cuo2 Azircaloy;::: 7.147 in2 (Section 4a.5) Auo2 = 21.565 in2 2(Section 4a.5) Atot = ( 8
- 7 0 in. ) = 7 5. 69 in2 p:z:irc. ~ *6.56 g/cm3 = 0.237 lbm/in3 (Ref. 9) puo2 = 10. 96 g/cm.3 = 0. 396 lbm/in 3 (Ref. 9)
M' zirc = pzircAzirc = 1. 694
.M' uo2 == puo2Auo2 = 8. 540 M' tot = M' zir + M' U02 = 10. 234 Effective Specific Heat of Fuel ~Btu/lbm-F)
T T Czirc 1 M %ire Cuo2 M'uo2 M1 tot Ceff (K) (F) (lbm/i (lbm/i (lbm/i n) n) n) 300 80.33 0.067 1.694 0.056 8.540 10.234 0.058 400 260.33 0.072 1.694 0. 064 8.540 10.234 0.065 640 692.33 0.079 1.694 0.071 8.540 10.234 0.072 1090 1502.3 0.090 1.694 0.076 8.540 10.234 0.078 3 Effective Density
- - ------- --vtotpeff =-M' totL --------
peff = M'tot / Atot = (10.234/75.69) = 0.135 lbm/in3 4A.7-2 Rev. O 1/00
4A.8 Conclusions The thermal analysis of the TN-32 cask presented in Chapter 4 is based on the following non-isotropic, temperature dependent ther.mal conductivities for the homogenized fuel region which were calculated in this_ Appendix: Longitudinal Direction Temperature, °F 200 . 300 400 500 600 800 Thermal Conductivity, 0.804 0.850 0.894 0.937 0.979 1.062 Btu/hr-ft-°F Transverse Directions Temperature, °F 221 300 400 505 606 805 Thermal Conductivity, 0.282 0.318 0.371 0.434 0.502 0.659 Btu/hr-ft-°F The transient thermal analysis of the TN-32 cask is based on the following temperature dependent thermal sp~cific heats, and effective densities which were calculated in this Appendix: Temperature, 0 t 80.33 260.33 692.33 1502.33 Specific Heat, 0.058 0.065 0.072 0.078 Btu/lbm-°F
- IDensity, Lbm I in3 I0~135 I 4A. 8-1 Rev. O 1/00
4A. 9 References ..
- 1. L.E. Fisher, "Spent Fuel Heatinq Analysis Code for Consolidated and Unconsolidated Fuel," LLNL, PATRAM '89 CONF-890631-Vol III.
- 2. SFBTA: A Version of SFHA, Memorand.um S90-1~~ from J. 1:1ovingh to L.E. Fisher dated October 15, 199'0.
- 3. Wooton et. al., Scoping Design Analysis for Optimizing Shipping Casks Containing 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, or 10 Year Old PWR.
Spent Fuel, ORNL/CSD/TM-149, 1983 (Appendix J only).
- 4. ~AND90-2406, Sanders, T. L., et al., A Method.for Determining the Spent-Fuel Contribution to Transport Cask Containment Requirements, 1992.
- 5. NUREG/CR-0497, .A Handbook* of Material Properties for Use the Analysis of Light Water Reactor Fuel Rod Behavior MATPRO -
Version 11 (Revision 2), EG&G Idaho, Inc., 1981.
- 6. COBRA-SFS: A Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Computer Code,Vol. III, Validation Assessments, PNL-6049, 1~86.
- 7. Viebrock and Malin, Domestic Light Water Reactor Fuel Design Evolution, Volume III,*prepared by Nuclear Assurance Corporation for.U. S. Department of Energy, September 1981.
- 8. ANSYS Engineering Analysis System, User's Manual for ANSYS Revision 5.4, ANSYS, Inc., Houston, PA.
- 9. NUREG/CR-0200, SCALE Manuals, Volume 3, Miscellaneous (Revision 5) 4A. 9-1 Rev. O 1/00
CHAPTER 5 SHIELDING EVALUATION 5.1 Discussion and Results Shielding for the TN-32 cask is provided mainly by the thick-walled cask body. For the neutron shielding, a borated polyester resin compound surrounds the cask body and a. polypropylene disk covers the lid. Additional shielding i.s provided by the steel shell surrounding the resin layer and by the steel and aluminum structure of the fuel basket. Geometric attenuation, enhanced by attenuation .by air and* ground, provides additional shielding for distant locations at restricted area and site boundaries. Figure 5.1-1 shows the configuration of shielding in the cask. Table s.1-1 lists the compositions of the shielding materials. The TN-32 is designed to store 32 Westinghouse 14 x.14 (standard or OFA}, 15 x 15, and 17 x 17 (standard or OFA} or .. B&W 17x17 Mark BW spent fuel assemblies with or without burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs) and thimble plug assemblies (TPAs) . Source terms for.the five Westinghouse fuel desi~s ar.e calculated using the SAS2H/ORIGEN-S module of SCALE4. 3 <1 >. The W17x17 source bounds the Mark BW 17x17, which has a slightly lower fuel mass. Each fuel assembly is modeled with a total . burnup of 45,000 MWd/MTU combined with an initial minimum. average. enrichment of 3.5 wt% U-235 and cooling time of 7 years . . These source terms are then passed through a SAS2H cask shield model for a 1-dimensional dose assessment. The source (assembly type) which provided the highest dose rate is used in the subsequent 3-dimensional shielding calculations.
- Through this analysis, the Westinghouse 1 7xl 7 standa.rd fuel
- --- --- -array -i-s- -j:dentified-as -the-:I.:argest fue-1-*source-.-section--S-; 2- *--*------ **---- * --- - -*----
describes the source specification and Section 5.3 describes the shielding analyses performed for the TN-32 cask. An evaluation was also performed to determine the fuel assembly parameters of burnup, percent initial enrichment and cool time that would result in dose rates less than the current design basis fuel mentioned above and thus would be acceptable for storage in the TN-32 storage cask. This evaluation is described in Section 5.2. 5.1-1 Rev. 1 5/00
In addition to the spent fuel, the TN~32 is capable of storing BPRAs and TPAs. BPRAs and TPAs with combinations of cumulative exposures and cooling times are permissible for storage in the TN-32 cask. The source evaluation of the BPRAs and TPAs is described in Section 5.2. Normal and off ~normal conditions *are modeled with .the TN-32 intact. This sh~elding calculation is performed using the SAS4 module of SCALE4.4 4 which* is a 3-dimensional Monte Carlo method.
- Average dose rates on*the side, top and bottom of the TN-32 cask are* calculated. Maximum dose rates are also calculated above and below the radial neutron shield. Appendix SA provides actual doses (both gamma .and neutron) measured around *loaded TN-32 casks. * *
- Accident conditions .assume radially the neutron *shield". and I
steel outer sheil are removed, and, ...axially the polypropylene** disk and protective cover are'removed. This evaluation bounds the accident conditions in Secti9n 11.2. Shielding calculations for accident conditions are. also performed using_ the SAS4 module (3~imensio~al shielding analysis) of the SCALE4.4.-code. j The expected maximum dose rates (for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions) from the TN~32 are provided in Table 5.1-2. The locations of the dose points are provided in Figure 5.1-2. The direct dose from one* caSk at the po$tulated site . * * '* boundary is calculated using the Monte Carlo computer code MCNP 5
- The analysis results are presented in Table 5.1-3.
Based on the shielding models developed in this chapter, the* dose rate around the cask at accessible locations to personnel are presented in Chapter 10. Dose rates from cask operations are also presented in Chapter 10. The effects of accidents on dose rates in the vicinity,. of the casks is discussed in Chapter 11. 5.1-2 Rev. 1 s/o"o
*s.2 Source Specification There are five principal sources of radiation associated -
with cask: storage that are of concern for radiatio~ protection. These are:
- l. Primary.gamma *radiation from, spent fuel.
- 2. Primary neutron radiation from spent fuel. .
- 3. Gamma radiation from activated fuel structural materials*
- 4. Capture gamma radiation produced by attenuation of neutrons by shielding material of the cask.
- 5. Neutrons produced by sub-critical fission in fuel.
The TN-32 is designed to store these fuel types: Westinghouse 14x14 standard, 14x14 optimized, lSxlS, 17xl 7. *- standard and 17x17 optimized, and B&W 17xl7 Mark BW. The SAS2H/ORIGEN-S modules of the SCALE code are used to generate a gamma and neutron source term for each fuel assembly type. The W17x17 source bounds the Mark BW 17x17, as described in Section. 5.2.5. Each fuel assembly has an initial enrichment of-3.5 wt% U 235 and the fuel zone is irradiated at* a constant* specific power . of 20 MW/assembly to a total burnup of 45,000 MWD/MTU. A conservative three-cycle operating history is utilized with 30 day down time for each cycle exc~pt for no down time in the last cycle. source terms are generated for the active fuel region, the plenum region and the end regions. Irradiation of the fuel assembly structural materials (i.e. plenum and end fittings) are included in the irradiation of the fuel zone. The fuel assembly hardware, BPRA and TPA materials and masses on a per assembly basis are listed in Table 5.2-1. Table 5.2-2 provides the material composition of fuel assembly hardware, TPA and BPRA materials. Cobalt impurities are included in the SAS2H model.
----In--pa-l.'-ti-cular-,-t-he-coba-l-t-impur-it-i-es-+/-n-:fnconel--,-Z*irca-loy-and--------
stainless steel are O. 47%, o. 001% and O. 08% respectively. 12 , The masses for the materials in the top end fitting region is . multi~lied by 0.1 and in the plenum and bottom end fitting by 0.2. 13 These factors are used to correct for the spatial .and spectral changes of the neutron flux outside of the fuel zone. The material compositions of the fuel assembly hardware are included in the SAS2H/ORIGEN-S model on a per assembly basis ..
- 5. 2-1 . Rev. 1 5/00
~-------*
Gamma and neutron source terms are calculated for each of the five Westinghouse fuel designs. Table 5.2-3 presents the gamma and neutron source terms for a 7 year cooling time and the results of the SAS2H dose evaluation. Table S.2.4 presents the source terms for the selected W 17x1 7 standard fuel assembly. . .. ** Combining the results of the source term evaluation and the 1-dimensional shielding model, the Westinghouse 17x17 standard fuel assembly is identified the most limiting source term. This fuel is used for the shielding analysis. An evaluation was also performed to determine the fuel assembly parameters of burnup, percent initial enrichment and* cool time that would result in dose rates less than the current design basis fuel mentioned above and thus would be acceptable for storage in the TN-32 storage cask. The *1-dimensiortal SAS2H shielding model *was used for t;:his
- evaluation. *.
The SAS2H calculation determined the contact dose rate at the midplane on the side of the cask to be 104 mrem/hr (13 neutron and 91 gamma). (Note: the Monte Carlo 3-D, SAS4 calculation showed the dose to be 153 mrem/hr.)
- A series of SAS2H runs were performed for the Westinghouse 17xl? standard fuel assembly with variations in the burnup and percent initial enrichment. A description of this analysis is present in Section 5.2.4.
- S.2.1 Gamma Source Table S.2-4 shows the total primary gamma source for the W 17 x 17 standard fuel assembly. Table S.2-S shows the total primary gamma source for the BPRA's and TPA's. Fission product activities and activation activities for the W 17x17 standard
~~~~fuel assembly are provided in Tables 5.2-6 and S.2-7, respectively. The primary gamma source spectrum for the fuel, plenum, and end fittings is listed in Table 5.2-8. The primary gamma source spectrum for the TPAs and BRPAs are listed in Table S.2-9 and 5.2-10, .respectively. The gamma source spectra are presented in the 18-group . structure consistent with SCALE4 27n-18y cross section library. The conversion of the source spectra from the default ORIGEN-S energy grouping to the SCALE 27n-18y is performed directly through the ORIGEN-S code. The SAS2H/ORIGEN-S input file for the W17x17 standard assembly is provided in Section S.S. 5.2-2 Rev. 1 5/00
The gamma source for the fuel assembly hardware is primarily from the activation of cobalt. This activation contributes primarily to the SCALE Energy Groups 36 and 37. Based.on the weight fraction of cobalt in each zone of the fuel assembly model * (as adjusted by the appropriate flux ratio), the gamma source term in SCALE Energy Groups 36 and 37 are redistributed accordingly. The gamma sources for the plenum region, the top fitting region and the bottom fitting region are provided in Table 5.2-8. The gamma source for the TPAs and BPRAs are caiculated using separate SAS2H/ORIGEN-S models. The mass of the TPA/BPRA {as adjusted by the appropriate flux ratio) in each zone of the fuel
.. ~ssembly are included in the light elements of the SAS2H/ORIGEN-S model. (Only the mass of the TPA I BPRA is included in the source model. Fuel hardware materials are not included in these models.) The gamma source is from the activation- of the metal components of these assemblies (light elements) .
To determine the source term from TPAs, TPAs with 210,000 MWD/MTU cumulative exposure and 20 year cooling time are evaluated. Each TPA is within a fuel assembly with an initial enrichment of 3.5 wt% U-235 and the fuel zone is irradiated at a constant specific power of 20 MW/assembly to a total cumulative burnup of 45,000 MWD/MTU. A conservative three-cycle operating history is used with a 30 day down time for each cycle except for no down time in the last cycle .. The source term results from* this SAS2H I ORIGEN-S run are multiplied by the ratio of 14 cycles I 3 cycles to* determine.:the total source from, a cumulative exposure of 210,000 MWD/MTU. The gamma source and spectrum are provided in Tables 5.2-5 and 5.2-9, respectively. The activation of these components is primarily due to Co-60 and the source term apportioned between SCALE Energy groups 36 and 37. This source term was used in the shielding analysis described in Section 5.4. To determine the permissible source for TPAs with lower
~e~~osures and shorter cooling times, the source terms from exposures of 45, 000 MWD7RTU, 9*070-0-0-MWDfMT--tJ, 135,0.0-0-MWD/M'I'll,-and_ _ _ _ __
180,000 MWD/MTW are evaluated. The amount of cooling time required such that these gamma sources are equivalent to the source presented in Table 5.2-9 is evaluated. These results are
**presented in Chapter 2, Figure 2.1-5. Intermediate*cumulative exposures are evaluated by a straight line extrapolation between calculated values.
To determine the source term from BPRAs, BPRAs with 30,000 MWD/MTU cumulative exposure and 4 day cooling time are evaluated. Each BPRA is also within a fuel assembly with an initial enrichment of 3.5 wt% U-235 and.the fuel zone is irradiated at a constant specific power of 20 MW/assembly to a total cumulative burnup of 30,000 MWD/MTU. A conservative three-cycle operating history is used with a 30 day down time for each cycle except for no down time in the last cycle.
- 5.2-3 Rev. 0 l./00
..-...:a-::..-****~.
The gamma source and spectrum are provided in Tables 5.2-5 and S.2-10, respectively. This source term was used in the shielding analysis described in Section 5.4. To evaluate BPRAs with greater exposures and longer cooling times, BPRA source terms are evaluated for cumulative exposures of 40,000 MWD/MTU, 50,000 MWD/MTU, and 60,000 MWD/MTU were evaluated. At these greater exposures ~nd longe~ cooling times, Co-60 from the activation of components is the primary source. The amount of cooling time required such that these gamma sources are equivalent to the source presented in SCALE Energy Groups 36 and 37 (which is primarily due to Co-60 activation) of Table 5.2-10 is evaluated. These results are presented in Chapter 2,
- Figure 2.1-4. Intermediate cumulative exposures are evaluated by a straight line extrapolation between calculated values.
The SAS2H/ORIGEN-S input files for the TPA and BPRAs are provided in Section S.S. Since there are various combinations of BPRAs and TPAs, the two extremes are considered; a BPRA with 24 rods and a TPA with 24 plugs. These extremes provide the largest amount of irradiated material present in the top portion of the fuel assembly. (In the case of the BPRA this results in the largest amount of SS304 and in the case of the TPA this results in the largest amount of Inconel.) Also for this analysis, BPRAs are considered to be of SS304. Zircaloy clad BPRAs are also
- manufactured but their source from activation would be much less than a stainless steel BPRA. Both types of BPRAs are acceptable for loading in the TN-32 cask. Combinations of BPRAs and TPAs are also acceptable for loading in the TN-32 cask.
An axial burnup profile has been developed on the basis of exposure data provided by Virginia Power and Wisconsin Electric. Discrete peaking factors were generated and normalized to the ~~~~~aqtual exposure values. Figure s.2-1 illustrates the design axial burnup profile versus the actual data. Table 5.2-11 provides design axial gamma peaking £actors that were utilized in the SAS4 shielding model. The maximum peaking factor for the gamma source is 1.135. The SAS4 analyses are performed with a top and bottom model, each with its own axial fuel source distribution, based on Table 5.2-11. The gamma source from the fuel zone is multiplied by a normalization factor based on the axial distribution utilized for the model. The gamma normalization factors for the top and bottom model are 0.98 and 1.06 respectively. 5.2-4 Rev. O 1/00
s.2.2 Neutron Scjnrce Table s_.2-12 provides the total neutron source spectra for the W 17 x 17 fuel assembly. The SAS2H/ORIGEN-S code provides the neutron spectra in the SCALE 27n-18y energy groups. Table 5.2-4 also provides the total neutron source. The SAS2H/ORIGEN-S input file.for the W 17xl7 fuel assembly .is provided in Section S.S. To determine a neutron source in the spent fuel assembly,
~he axial burnup profile shown in Figure 5.2-1 was utilized. The neutron source is not linearly dependent with burnup, and
'** therefore analyses were performed to determine the axial neutron source distribution. SAS2H/ORIGEN-S analyses were performed for a range of burnups from 21,600 MWD/MTU to 51,075 MWD/MTU (peak). The neutron peaking factor is determined as the ratio of the neutron source term obtained from the SAS2H/ORIGEN-s analysis to the maximum bundle average burnup neutron source. Table 5.2-11 provides the design axial neutron source distribution. The maximum peaking factor for the neutron source is 1.68. Figure 5.2-2 illustrates the neutron source distribution which was used in the SAS4 model. The normalization factors for the neutron source are 1.16 and 1.39 for the top and bottom model respectively. 5.2.3 Airborne Radioactive MaterjaJ Sources Tables 5 .2.:.6 and*'S .2-,7 show the inventory of fission gases, volatile nuclides, fines and crud from each W 17xl7 *standard fuel assembly (these are the total curies in the fuel assembly) . Most of the fission products are retained within the fuel pellet and only a small fraction is released in to the fuel rod plenums. Chapter 7 provides the confinement analysis for the TN-32. Off-norrnal and accident off-site airborne dose rates are also presented in Chapter 7. 5.2.4 EvaJuatjon of Burnup. Enr3chmenr-s;::a~oo+/---.!l!i-me---:for the Fuel As stated previously, a series of SAS2H runs were made for various combinations of % initial enrich~ent, burnup and decay times. Cool times were selected such that the total dose rate calculated was approximately 90% of the design basis fuel value given above. A table was generated showing the minimum cool time necessary for various combinations of burnup and bundle average enrichment and is shown in Table 2.1-3. This table is used to evaluate burnups from 15,000 MWD/MTU to 45,000 MWD/MTU and enrichments from 1.2 wt% to 4.05 wt%. The values in bold in this table are calculated values. s.2-s Rev. O l/00
.... *:.~*-* ...
-* Since the neutron dose is a relatively small fraction of the total dose, coupled with the relatively faster reduction of gamma dose with cool time, the minimum cool time is not required to increase significantly above 7 years even for low enrichment/high burnup fuel assemblies. Based on the calculated results {which are presented in bold type), other values may be interpolated/extrapolated* based on *. simple logic, i.e. for the same burnup, an increase in enrichment produces a lower source. Additionally, some simple algorithms can be formulated based on the calculated values. Enrichment For example, comparing the ratio of neutron and gamma doses for 42, GWd/MTU, 9 year cooling time with 2.5% and 2.2% initial enrichment, the lower enrichment increases the neutron and gamma dose by factors of 1.18 and 1.:06, respectively. Therefore, the dose rate increase can be predicted as a function of the enrichment by forming the ratio of the two enrichments and taking it to the power of 1.3 for neutrons and 0.45 for gammas.
<2 . sI 2 . 2 > =
0 45 (2.5/2.2) 1 " 3 = 1.18 - 1
- o6 Burn up Comparing the ratio of the neutron and gamma doses for 3~
enriched, 7 year cooled 40, 43, and 45 GWD/MTU cases, the iarger burnup increases the dose by factors of l.19 and 1.06, neutron and gamma respectively for 43 to 45 GWD/MTU and by factors of 1.35 and 1.10, neutron and gamma respectively for 40 to 43 GWD/MTU. Again, the dose rate increase can be predicted as function of burnup by forming the ratio of the two burnups and taking it to the power of 4 for neutrons and 1.3 for gammas. c45/ 4-3 y4 -,;;-1-:-2---- (45/43) 1 ' 3 = 1.06
<43/4o)4 = 1.34 (43/40) 1
- 3 = 1.10 5.2-6 Rev. O 1/00
Cool Time
*comparing the ratio of neutron a~d gamma doses for the following cases: 43 GWD, 2.3%, 7 and 8 years cooling; 42 GWD, 2.5%, 8 and 9 years cooling; the following values for the reduction in dose rate are predicted~
- Year tn Year Neutron Factor Gamma Factor 7 to 8 0.96 0.85 8 to 9 0.96 0.85 9 to 10 0.96 0.88 7 to 9 0.92 .0.73 7 to 10 0.89 0.64 These simple algorithms were used to fill in the .
combinations in the table that* were not explicit.ly. c"alculated . 5.2.5 Comparison of Mark ~W and Nestjnghouse 17x17 *Fuels Mark BW fuel is physically nearly identical to the Westinghouse standard 17xl7 fuel, and is operated in the same' reactors under identical operating conditions. The only differences are a slightly thicker cladding and a slightly s~aller pellet diameter with a slightly.higher density (see Table 6.2-1). The net effect is a lower stack density and overall lower fuel mass in the Mark BW fuei. The U0 2 mass in . Westinghouse standard 17x17 fuel is 0.364*lb/ft, and in Mark BW fuel, 0.360 lb/ft, about 1% less. Therefore, both the actinide and fission product inventory on a mass-specific basis will be nearly identical for the Mark BW and Westinghouse 17x17 standa~d fuel, given the same enrichment, cooling time, and burnup. Likewise, the axial burnup curves used for the Westinghouse fuel are appropriate for the Mark BW fuel. Because the fuei.--ma-ss-:ts-aiJout-1% smal-fe-r-+/-n~--+~~~~~ the Mark BW fuel, it will have about a 1% lower fission product and actinide inventory. In turn, it will have about 1% less decay heat than the Westinghouse standard 17x17 fuel. The decay heat listed in Table 5.2-3 for the Westinghouse 17x17 standard fuel is 0.987 kW. For the Mark BW, it would be (0.360/0.364)0.987 = 0.98 kW. The mass of hardware available in the most important zone for shielding, the top end zone, is.smaller in the Mark BW fuel than the values used in this analysis for the Westinghouse fuel. The following table compares the mass of hardware in the fuel assembly top end fitting and the BPRA. 5.2-7 Rev. 1 5/00
.. ... mass, -Kg
.... I Wes.tinghouse Std '. ..
Mark BW
.. . 17x17. .. . .
(Table 5.2-1) : Upper end fitting stainless 304 .. 6.8 " 5.85 Inconel 1.37 1*. 04 BPRA spider stainless 304 2.47 2.22 Inconel 0.36 0.36 The cladding weight in the Mark BW fuel will *be slightly greater than that *in the Westinghouse fuel, due* to the increased . :
- thickness. However, cobalt impurity iri Zircaloy cladding is very low and- the contribution *of a,ctivated .*cladding to the. cask dose I
rate is negligible compared to that of the fuel itself. The source in the spent fuel will be lower*for the Mark-BW fuel as noted above.
- .* _j.:'. :;: .... ~j **
\ ~ ~i * ** ' -~
Rev. 1 5/00
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK 5.2-9 Rev. 1 5/00
5.3 Model Specjfjcation The SAS4 module of the SCALE4.4 code is.used for calculating the gamma and neutron doses immediately around the cask. SAS4 is a 3-dimensional Monte Carlo based methodology. For dose rates at long distances from the cask, the MCNP code is*used. 5.3.1* Descriptjon of the Radial and Axial Shielding Confjgurat j on . The differences among the three TN-32 cask designs are tabulated below.
- Design Trunnions Id d Configuration TN-32 Non-Single Failure Proof 10.s inch thick lid Top Trunnions 4.0 inch polypropylene encased in O. 25 inch thick steel disk' .
TN-32A Non-Single Failure Proof 9.38 inch thick lid Top Trunnions 4.0 inch polypropylene encased in 0.25 inch thick steel around the* top and sides and 1.25 inch thick steel on the bottom TN-32B Single Failure Proof Top 10.5 inch thick lid Trunnions 4.0 inch polypropylene encased in 0.25 inch thick steel disk
*With the exception of the top trunnions, the lid, and top neutron shield all other cask dimensions are the same for the three designs. Within SAS4, the model must be symmetrical around the cask midplane. Therefore, for each shielding configuration (e.g. normal, off-normal and accidents) two models must be developed; a top half model and a bottom half model.
Sections 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2 describe the SAS4 radial and axial shielding models (for the vicinity immediately around the cask) developed for the TN-32 under normal, off-normal and .accident conditions. Section 5.3.1.3 describes the MCNP model deveioped for the TN-32 at large distances from the cask. 5.3-1 Rev. l. 5/00
5.3.1.1 Radj al and kdal ShieJ djng ConfiQJ-Jrat j on upder Normal and Off-Normal Conditjons of Storage Under normal and off-normal conditions, one shielding configuration is used for the TN-32, TN-32A and TN-32B designs. The top half model is illustrated in Figures 5.3-1 through 5.3-4 and the bottom half model is illustrated in Figures 5.3-5 through 5.3-7. The dimensions of this shielding model correspond-to the dimensions of the TN-32 standard design. The axial locatio.ns of the plenum and end fittings for the fuel assembly are taken from Reference 2 .
.1 The smaller non-single failure proof trunnions are used in the model since this configuration would have slightly less
.. shielding present in the area of the trunnions. In the Type A lid configuration, 1.12 inch of steel is transferred from the inside of the lid (the lid shielding plate} to the neutron shield which is mounted on the outside of the lid. The net thickness of shield at the top of the cask remains unchanged. As shown Figure 5.3-8, the shielding thickness beyond the perimeter of the top neutron shield is less than with the standard TN-32 lid. The total shielding thickness in this area is about equal to the radial shielding thickness near the top of the cask. Therefore the top dose rates beyond the perimeter of the neutron shield will be no higher than the radial dose rates near the top of the cask, and the shielding evaluation for the TN-32 cask with the standard lid is valid for the Type A lid. RadjaJ Djrectjon Model The fuel region is assumed to consist of uranium dioxide. The fuel cladding and steel basket are included in the homogenized fuel region. The fuel region is modeled as a cylinder with the actual cavity diameter. Subsequent-regions are cylindrical shells corresponding to actual dimensions. In flfet:op-*na-lf-mode-1-,--t;-he--pl-enum_and_end fittings are homogenized within their regions. The basket is included in tn~e~~~--~~ homogenization.
*. * . Voids are neglected within the fuel.assembly itself. The voids within the cask cavity and within* the protective cover are modeled.
AxjaJ Direction Model The axial direction model is identical to the radial direction model with the exception that the plenum and the end fittings are homogenized within their regions but the basket is neglected in the homogenization of these regions. 5.3-2 Rev. o 1/00
5.3.1.2 Radial and A>daJ Shielding Configuration under Hypothetical Accjdent Conditions of Stora~e For the accident conditions, the neutron shield, the outer shell, the polypropylene disk with its steel encasement, and the protective cover are removed. To further simplify the model, the trunnions are also removed under the accident configuration. (As stated in Chapter 1, these components are not completely lost during accident conditions. These components are removed from the model to perform a bounding shielding analysis.) Three models have been developed for accident conditions; two top half models and one bottom half model (see Figures 5.3-9, 5.3-10, and 5.3-11, respectively). The two top half models that have been developed are: one with the standard TN-32 lid (which is also used for the TN-32B) and one with the TN-32A lid. The bottom half model remains the .. same among the three designs. RadjaJ Directjon Model Similar to normal and off-normal conditions, under accident conditions, the fuel region is assumed to consist of uranium dioxide. The fuel cladding and steel basket are included in the homogenized fuel region. The fuel region is modeled as a cylinder with the actual cavity diameter. Subsequent regions are cylindrical shells corresponding to actual dimensions. In the top half model, the plenum and end fittings are homogenized within their regions. The basket is included in the homogenization. Voids are neglected within the fuel assembly itself. The voids within the cask cavity and within the protective cover are modeled. Axial Direction Model Similar to the normal and off-normal conditions, the axial direction model is identical to the radial direction* model with the exception that the basket is neglected in the homogenization of *the plenum and end fitting regions.
/
5.3-3 Rev. O 1/00
*----*-*-*~ -
5.3.1.3 SbjeJdjng Confjgnratjon at Long Distances from the Cask At long distances from the cask, a model was developed for MCNP. The MCNP cask model was essentially the combination of the top and bottom half models of the SAS4 analyses discussed earlier. The trunnions were not modeled because they have a negligible effect on far field doses. The cask was modeled as sitting on a concrete.pad which extends 10 meters out from the cask. The ground and air were included in the model as scattering media for the neutron and gamma emissions from the cask. Similar to the SAS4 model, the central fuel region is .
- .considered to consist of uranium dioxide. The fuel cladding, .and the basket are included in the homogenized fuel region. The fuel region is modeled as a cylinder with the actual cavity diameter.
Subsequent regions are cylindrical shells corresponding to actual dimensions. Three models were used which differed only in the definition of the source. One for neutron, one for gamma from the fuel and one for gamma from the fuel hardware(plenum and end fittings) . The fuel inserts are not included in the MCNP analysis. The MCNP calculated dose at far distances consists of contributions from direct, air scatter (skyshine) and ground scatter. The dose is calculated as F4 tallies in a 200 cm high by 100 cm thick air volume which is converted into a dose rate using energy dependent dose conversion factors' .. 5.3.2 Sh1eld Regional nensitjes For the SAS4 model, four source areas, shown in Table 5.2-1 are utilized: fuel zone, plenum, upper fitting and lower fitting. The sources are uniformly homogenized over the cavity diameter and the appropriate length, as shown in Figures 5.3-1 and 5.3-2.
--Oepending--upon-t-he-se'U-rc~erm_wi_thin the cask, the regional densities are adjusted accordingly. Three ba_sic source ---
configurations are considered:
- .. 32 spent fuel assemblies loaded into the TN-32; 32 spent fuel assemblies with 32 Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (24 poison rods each); or 32 spent fuel assemblies with 32 Thimble Plug Assemblies (24 plugs each).
The fuel basket is homogenized over the source diameter and active fuel length in the active fuel zone for both the axial and radial directions.
- In. the radial models, the basket is homogenized over the source diameter and the appropriate length (of the plenum and end fittings) . In the axial models, the basket is neglected in the regions of the..plenum and end fittings.
5.3-4 Rev. o 1/00
The radial resin and aluminum boxes are homogenized into a single composition based on the mass of each component. Dose measurements from similar designs in use have not shown dose streaming effec~s due to the aluminum boxes. The material input for the SAS4 models depending upon source .term are listed in Tables 5.3-1, 5.3-2, and 5.3-.3. Atom densities of the materials used in the calculations are also listed in Tables 5.3-1 through 5.3-3. These atom densities were calculated in the SAS4 module of the SCALE4.3 utilizing standard compositions within SCALE4.3 and supplying appropriate densities or volume fractions. Material and atomic densities listed in Table 5.3-1 are the basis for the material data used in the MCNP analysis . s.3-s Rev. o 1/00
5.4 ShjeJding Eyaluation Dose rates around the TN-32 are determined by choosing the most conservative source (W 17x17 Standard) and using it within a three dimensional SAS4 model. SAS4 uses XSDRNPM to calculate adjoint fluxes to derive .biasing parameters -for the Monte Carlo analysis (MORSE-SGC) . These biasing parameters are then automatically input to MORSE-SGC. ANSI standard flux to dose factors, within SCALE, are used for the dose calculation at the selected points (Table 5.4-1). The SCALE code accounts for subcritical neutron multiplication and the generation of .. secondary gamma dose due to neutron interactions in the shielding materials, principally the neutron shield resin ... The shielding evaluation is performed with the TN-32 loaded with three combinations of sources: 32 spent fuel assemblies; 32 spent fuel assemblies plus 32 BPRAs (24 rods each); and* 32 spent fuel assemblies plus 32 TPAs (24 plugs each). The SAS4 top and bottom models were run with each of' the three combinations of fuel/BPRA/TPA loadings listed above. The top model is prepared as ten separate computer runs consisting of contributions from the *'following sources : Primary gamma radiation from the active fuel region(axial and radial directions). Neutron radiation from the top half of the active fuel region (axial and radial directions}. Cap_t_ive _gp.m!l!_a r~~}:_ation from the top half of the active fue*1 region (axial and radialatrecttomr-)--;--- ----------- Gamma radiation from activated hardware within the plenum region (axial and radial directions) . Gamma radiation from activated hardware within the top fitting region (axial and radial directions). 5.4-1 Rev. O 1/00
.- Similarly, the SAS4
- bottom model is prepared as eight separate computer runs consisting of contributions from the following sources:
Primary gamma radiation from the active fuel region (axial and radial directions) . Neutron radiation from the bottom half of the active fuel region (axial and radial directions) . Captive gamma radiation from the bottom half of the active fuel region (axial and radial directions) . Gamma radiation from activated hardware within the bottom fitting region (axial and radial directions) . The sources in the active fuel region (gamma, neutron, and capture gamma) are uniform radially but vary axially. The sources in the structural hardware regions (plenum, top fitting, and bottom fitting) are uniform both radially and axially. The incremental dose rates for the BPRAs and TPAs presented in Table 5.1-2 were determined by subtracting the SAS4 runs containing the TPAs and BPRAs from the SAS4 runs with only the fuel as~emblies present. Surf ace *detectors were placed in several radial and axial locations in order to evaluate the dose rate around the cask body. These surface detectors provide an averaged surface dose rate based on the size of the detector (surface)
- The surface detectors can be subdivided into segments in order to determine the location and magnitude of maximum dose rates. In particular, approximately 10 cm high detector segments were utilized above and below the radial neutron shield.
For normal conditions, the contribution of each source (from the top half model and bottom half model) to each dose point is summed to calculate the total gamma and/or neutron dose for each location. Figure 5.4-1 presents the average dose at contact, 1 m,and 2 m from surface detectors along the length of the neutron shield surface. Figures 5.4-2 and 5.4-3 presents the average dose at contact, 1 m,and 2 m from surface detectors along the diameter of the top and bot.tom of the cask, respectively. For accident conditions, Figure 5.4-4 presents the average doses at contact, 1 m,and 2 m, from surface detectors along the cask body length. 'Figure 5.4-5 and 5.4-6 presents the average doses at contact, 1 m,and 2 m, from detectors along the standard lid and the Type A lid surfaces, respectively. For axial doses from the bottom of the cask, accident conditions are identical to normal conditions. 5.4-2 Rev. O 1/.00
Dose rates at long distances from a single TN-32 loaded with
- thirty two design basis fuel assemblies (no BPRAs or TPAs)are evaluated with the MCNP code. The total dose rates, direct, skyshine and ground scatter are reported in Table s.i-3.
The source term and SAS4 shielding evaluation were performed using SCALE 4.3/4.4, *"Modular Code System for Performing
.Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation for
- Workstations and Personal Computers 111 *" by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The far field dose rate analysis was performed using MCNP, "MCNP4B2 Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System" 5 by Los Alamos National Laboratory. SCALE4.3 is implemented on a Hewlett Packard 9000/715 Workstation. SCALE 4.4 and MCNP are
- ..... *.implemented. on: Pentium based PCs using Windows NT. These program(s) have been verified in accordance with the Transnuclear quality assurance program.
Dose rate measurements have been taken on two loaded TN-32 casks. Appendix A to this chapter presents and discusses the measured data and the evaluation performed to "benchmark" this data by calculation. Selected input for the SAS4,MCNP and SAS2H models are included in Section S.S . 5.4-3 Rev. O 1/00
--."'T~ -* *-*
5.5 Su;gpJemental Data 5.5.1 SAS2H/ORIGEN-S Input.Fjles 5.5.1.1 Fuel Assembly ssas2h parm='skipcellwt' i.7x17ofa-sas2.inp, 3.5 w/o 0235, 45,000 MWD/MTU, *7-30 year cooling 27groupndf4 latticecell uo2 1 0.95 900 92234 0.0294 92235 3.5 92236 0.0152 92238 96.4554 end zircalloy 2 1.0 750 .end h2o 3 den=0.725 1.0 575 end arbm-bormod 0.725 1 l O o 5000 100 3 700.0E-06 575 end mixutres of shipping cask ss304 4 den=0.299 end al 4 den=0.306 end carbonsteel s l.O end arbmtnres 1.58 5 1 0 0 5000 1.05 6012 35.13 . 8016
- 41. 73 13027 14.93 1001 s.os 6 0.896 end al 6 0.104 end end comp
*----------------------------------~--------------------------------
fuel pin geometry
'----~--------------------------------------------------------------
squarepitch 1.259984 0.78486 1 3 0.9144 2 0.8001 O end npin/assm=264 fuelength=365.76 ncycles~3 nlib/cyc=l printlevel=lO lightel*6 inplevel=l numholes=24 nurninstr=l ortube=0.61214 srtube=0.5715 end power=20.0 burn=317.25 down=30 end power=20.0 burn=317.25 down=30 end power=20.0 burn=3l7.25 down=2555 end light elements kg per assembly er 2.7433 .mn 0.1503 fe 6.0047 co 0.0353 ni 4.6388 zr 101.8
*------~------------------------------------------~-------------------
zone description of cask
- mixt4-fuel+basket mix.ts-cask body+shell mixt6-resin+al 21n-1scouple tempcask(k)a452 numzones=4 detect=S dryfuel=yes end o.s 100 200 300 400 4 87.31 5 111.44 6 122.87 s 124.14 zoneel fuelbndl=32 end end 5.5-1 Rev. O 1/.00
s..s.1.2 Thjmble Plug Assembly
=sas2h parm=(halt03,skipshipdata) 17x17tpa-top.inp, 3.5\ w/o U235, 45,000 MWD/MTU, TPAs 27groupndf4 latticecell uo2 l 0.95 900 92234 0.0294 92235 3.5 92236 0.0152 92238 96.4554 end zircalloy 2 1.0 750 end h2o 3 den=0.725 1.0 575 end arbm-bormod 0.725 l 1 0 o 5000 100 3 700.0E-06 575 end end comp fuel pin geometry *-~~--~-------------------------------------------------------------
squarepitch 1.25984 0.81915 l 3 0.94996 2 0.83566 o end assembly and cycle parameters npin/assm;264 fuelength=36S.76 ncycles~3 nlib/cyc=l printlevel=6 lightel=S inplevel=1 numholes=24 numinstr=l ortube=0.61214 srtube=0.5715 end power=20.0 burn=346.0S down=30 end power*20.0 burnz::346.05 down .. 30 end power-=20.0 burn=346.0S down=3 end
' light elements - TPA - top fitting zone - kg per assembly er 0.0537 mn 0.0050 fe 0.1763 co 0.0004 ni 0.0406 end .. orig ens 0$$ a4 21 a8 26 aio 51 71 e 1$$ 1 1t cooling to 30 years and fission product gamma reordering 3$$ 21 O 1 a33 -86 e 54$$ as 1 e t 35$$ _Q__ ~--
56$$ o 8 al3 -2 4 3 e 57** 3 e t cooling to 30 years and fission product gamma re-ordering single reactor assembly 60*** 4.0 7.0 30.0 365.0 .1825.0 2555.0 3650.0 7300.0 65$$.
- a10 l e
,61'** f .1 .~1$$ 2 51 26 1 e 82$$ f4 t light element scale group structure - 4 days cooled light element scale group structure - 7 days cooled light element scale group structure - 30 days cooled light element scale group structure - 1 year cooled light element scale group structure - 5 years cooled light element scale group structure - 7 years cooled light element scale *group structure - 10 year cooled 5.5-2 Rev. o 1/00
-* -r-.-... ... -* -
light element scale group structure - 20 year cooled 5'6$$ fO t end 5.5-3 Rev. 0 1/.00
5.5.1.3 BnrnabJe Poison Rod Assembly
-sas2h parrn=(halt03,skipshipdata}
17xl7bpra-plen.inp, 3.5\ w/o U235, 30,000 MWD/MTU, BPRAs 27groupndf4 latticecell uo2 1 0.95 900 92234 0.0294 92235 3.5 92236 0.0152 92238 96.4554 end zircalloy 2 1.0 750 end h2o 3 den=0.725 1.0 575 end arbm-bormod 0.725 l 1 0 o 5000 100 3 700.0E-06 575' end end comp fuel pin geometry
..squarepitch
!--~----~~-----------------~---------~------------------------------
1.25984 0.81915 l 3 0.94996 2 0.83566 O end assembly and cycle parameters npin/assm=264 fuelength=365.76 ncycles=3 nlib/cyc=1 printlevel=6 lightel=S inplevel=1 numholesc24 numinstr=l ortube=0.61214 srtube=0.5715 end power=20.0 burn=230.7 down=30 end power=20.0 burn=230.7 down=30 end power*20.0 burn=230.7 down=l end
*------~--------------------------------------------------------------
' light elements - BPRAs plenum zone - kg per assembly t----------------*--------------------------------------~-------------
er 0.0239 mp.. 0.0025 fe 0.08674 co 0;000101 ni 0.01124 end
*Origens 0$$ a4 21 aB 26 alO 51 71 e 1$$ 1 lt cooling to 30 years and fission product gamma reordering 3$$ 21 0 1 a33 -86 e 54$$ as 1 e t 35$$ 0 t
-- -* -- ----S6$$--o-s--a1.,.3--""'2..---..4--3"-e-------- 57** 3 e t cooling to 30 years and fission product ganuna re-ordering single reactor assembly 60** 4.0 7.0 30.0 365.0 1825.0 2555.0 3650.0 7300.0 65$$ alO 1 e 6J.** f.l 81$$ 2 51 26 l e 82$$ £4 t light element scale group structure light element scale group structure light element scale group structure light element scale group structure light element scale group structure light element scale group structure light element scale group structure light element scale group structure 5.5-4 Rev. O 1/00
56$$ f O t
- end s.s-s Rev. 0 1/00
s.s.2 SAS2H Input Fjle csas2h pannc*skipcellwt* 17x17ofa-sas2.inp, 3.5 w/o 0235, 45,000 MWD/MTU, 7-30 year cooling 27gr~upndf4 latticecell uo2 1 0.95 900 92234 0.0294 92235 3.5 92236 0.0152 92238 96.4554 end zircalloy 2 1.0 750 end h2o 3 den=0.725 1.0 575 end arbm-bormod 0.725 l 1 O o 5000 100 3 700.0E-06 575 end mixutres of shipping cask ss304
- 4 *dens:0.299 end al 4 den=0.306 end carbonsteel 5 1.0 end arbmtnres 1.58 5 l 0 0 5000 1.05 6012 35.13 8016 41.73 13027 14.93 1001 5.05 . 6 0.896 end al 6 0.104 end end comp fuel pin geometry squarepitch 1.259984 0.78486 l 3 0.9144 2 0.8001 O end npin/assm=264 fuelength=365.76 .ncycles=3 nlib/cyc=l printlevel=lO lightela6 inplevel=l numholes=24 numinstr~1 ortube=0.61214 srtube=0.5715 end power~20.o burn=317.25 *down=30 end powera20.0 burn=317.2S doWii=30 end power~20.o burn=317.25 down=2555 end light elements kg per assembly er 2.7433 mn 0.1503 fe 6.0047 co 0.0353 ni 4.6389 zr 101.8
-'----- ------~ _____ zone_des.cripti_on_Q.f_<;ask mixt4-fuel+basket mixtS-cask body+shell mixt6-resin+a1~-
27n-18couple tempcask(k}s452 numzoness4 detect=S dryfuel=yes end o.s* 100 200 300 400 4 87.31 5 111.44 6 122.87 5 124.14 zone=l fuelbndle32 end end 5.5.2 SAS4 Models 5.5.2.1 Sample Input fjJ e for l\ctj ve Fuel Region I Normal CondjtipnsD prjmary Gamma Dose, Tap Half Model, Axial, Fuel Only asas4 D 5.5-6 Rev. O 1/00
NAT-F-AF-Gl, TN-32 Normal-Axial-Top-Fuel Only-Active Fuel-Primary Gamma
*13 27n-18couple infhommedium
*o
'Fuel-Basket Zone 0
uo2 1 den=l.912 1.0 293. 92235 3.5 92238 96.5 end 0 zircalloy 1 den=0.376 end inconel 1 den=0.022 end aluminum l dena0.306 end ss304 1 den*o*. 316 end
'Plenum Zone (no basket) zircalloy 2 den=0.459 end ss304 2 den=0.159 end
'Top Fitting Zone (no basket) inconel 3 den=0.212 end ss304 3 den=l.052 end
'Cask Body, Outer Shell, Polydisc shells carbonsteel 4 l.O end
'Polypropylene/steel disk arbrnpropylene 0.90 2 1 0 0 1001 14.3 6012 85.7 5 0.89 end carbonsteel 5 0.11 end
'Resin/Aluminum arbrntnres 1.58 5 1 0 0 1001 5.05 5000 1.05 6012 35.13 8016 41.73 13027 14.93 6 0.896 end al 6 0.104 end end comp idr=l ity=2 izrn=8 isn=8 mhw=O frd=87.31 end 182.88 200.53 209.17 220.72 247.39 258.92 292.B 293.76 end 1 2 3
- 0 4 5 0 4 end xend tim-=3000 nst=4000 nit=l50 nmt=BOOO sfa=l.62e17
' frl=l.O fr2=1.0 fr3=1.0 fr4=1.0 igo=4 isp=O ipf=8 isd=4 end soe 35z l.077e-02 4.699e-02 4.523e-02 4.319e~o1 8.820e-02 9.124e-03 1.468e-02 S.372e-02 6.586e-02 2.334e-01 end
s,--x.,..,..y,--~/.31:-eT-:-"3~*1.3r-s-?-:-3r-o-:-o--ra"2. ea 8 7. 32 rsr.-0**0-- - - - - - - - - - - -
124 .14 293.76 end bub 0.0 76.2 106.68 137.16 154.31 165.74 180.02 182.88 end buf 1.12 1.119 1.1 1.02 0.87 0.73 0.48 0.002 end surf ace detectors
*--~------------------------------------------
sdl 258.82 293.76 393.76 '493.76 end sdr 0. 100. O. 102. O. 102. 0. 102. end sds 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 end gend TN-32, radial calculation, primary gamma, active fuel zone 0 0 1 20 rec 1 0. O. -182.88 0. o. 365.76 87.31 rec 2 0. 0. -200.53 o. o. 401.06 87.31 rec 3 0. O. -209.17 o. o. 418.34 87.31 rec 4 o. o. -220. 72 o. o. 441.44 87.31 rec 5 0. 0. -235.96 o. o. 471. 92 111.44 rec 6 O. 0. ,,., -247.39 o. o. 494. 78 100.97 S.5-7 Rev. o l}OO
rec 7 0. o. -258.82 o. o. 517.64 89.34 rec 8 o. 0. -292.80 o. o. 585.60 101.92 rec 9 o. o. -293.76 o. o. 587.52 102.87 rec 10 o. o. -163.57 o. o. 327.14 122.87 rec 11 o. o. -163.57 o. o. 327.14 124.14 rec 12 o. o. -393. 76 o. o. 187.52 224.14 rec 13 o. o. -493. 76 o. o. 987.52 324.14 rec 14 o. o. -593.76 0. o. 1187.52 424.14 rec 15 o. o. -2293. 76 o. o. 4587 .52. 2124 .14 rec 16 0. o. -2393.76 o. o. 4787.52 2224 .14 rec 17 o. o. -202.3 o. o. 404.6 122.87 rec 18 0. o. -204.21 o. o. 408.21 124.14
~ 19 120.60 124.14 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 20 -124.14 -120.60 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21
.rpp 21 . 118. 69 120.60 -30.48 -30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 22 -120. 60 -118. 69 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rec 23 -131.47 o. 204.21 262.94 o. o. 11.01 rec 24 120.04 o. 204.21 ll.43 0. 0. 5.08 rec 25 -1:31. 47 o. 204.21 11. 43 o. o. 5.08 end ful 1 pln 2 -1 tpf 3 -2 vdl 4 -3 shd 5 -4 lid 6 -s PPY 7 -6 res 10 -s osh 11 -10 -5 tvl 24 tv2 25 tru 23 -5 25 bxl 19 -23 bx2 20 -23 stl 21 -23 st2 22 -23 rsl 17 21 -20 -22 -10 -5 st3 18 19 -21 -20 -22 -11 -5 vd2 B -J_ -=-6 -5 cov 9 -8 -s de2 12 -11 -18 -17 -19 -20 -23 25 -9 de3 13 -12 de4 14 -13 inv 15 -14 exv 16 -15 end 20Rl 2 1 2 1 1 25RO 1 2 3 1000 4 4 5 6 4 1000 1000 4 1000 1000 4 4 6 4 1000 4 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 0 end 5.5.2.2 Sample Input fjle for Act:iye Fuel Region, Normal Cpndjtjons. Prjmary Gamma Dose, Bottom Half Mpdel. Radial, Fuel Only 5.5-8 Rev. O 1/00
*~...:.::. -...
....... ~
"";. *~ ... -. *. ';
- sas4 D
NRB-F-AF-G, TN-32 Normal-Rad-Bottom~Fuel Only-Active Fuel-Primary Gamma 27n-18couple infhommedium 'Fuel-Basket Zone . uo2 1 den=l.912 1.0 293. 92235 3.-5 92238 96.5 end zircalloy 1 den~0.376 end inconel 1 den=0.022 end aluminum l den=0.306 end ss304 1 den~0.316 end 'Bottom-Basket Zone aluminum 2 den=0.306 end ss304 2 den=l.409 end 'Cask Body, Outer Shell, Polydisc shells carbonsteel 3 1.0 end 'Polypropylene/steel disk arbmpropylene 0.90 2 1 0 0 1001 14.3 6012 85.7 4 0.89 end carbonsteel 4 0.11 end 'Resin/Aluminum arbmtnres 1.58 5 1 0 0 1001 5.05 5000 1.05 6012 35.13 8016 41.73 13027 14.93 5 0.896 end al 5 0.104 end end comp idraO ity-2 izm=4 isn=8 mhw=O frd=87.31 end 87.31 111.44 122.87 124.14 end 1 3 5 3 end xend tim=3000 nst=4000 nit=l50 nmt=BOOO sfa=l.62el7
- frl=l.O fr2=0.7 fr3=0.7 fr4=0.7 igo=4 isp=O ipf=ll isd=4 end soe 35z 1.077e-02 4.699e-02 4.523e-02 4.319e-Ol B.820e-02 9.124e-03 1.468e-02 5.372e-02 6.SB6e-02 2.334e-Ol end sxy l -87.31 87.31 -87.31 87.31 0.0 182.88 87.32 182.88 124.14 219.97 end bub o.o 11.43 34.29 102.87 125.73 142.88 154.31 165.74 174.31 180.02 182.88 end
- buf-l--;-1Z--~l-2-i--l--;-12*6---i--;J.-J-S-1-:-o9i--l-;-02-079-.i---0~5------------
0.54 0.002 end surface detectors sdl 111.44 124.14 224.14 324.14 end sdr
- 189. 219. 0. 188. 0. 219. 0. 219. end sds 3 12 10 0 10 0 10 0 end gend TN-32, radial calculation, primary ganuna, active fuel zone 0 0 1 20 rec 1 0. 0. -182.88 o. o. 365. 76 87.31 rec 2 O. o. -193.93 o. o. 387.86 87.31 rec 3 O. 0. -219.97 0. o. 439.94 111. 44 rec 4 O. 0. -160.28 o. o. 320.56 122.87 rec 5 0. O. -160.28 o. o. 320.56 124 .14 rec 6 O. o. -319.97 o. o. 787.52 224.14 rec 7 0. 0. -419.97 0. o. 987.52 324.14 rec 8 O. 0. -519.97 o. o. 1187.52 424.14
/
5.5-9 Rev. 0 1/QO
rec 9 o. o. -2219.97 o. 0. 4587.52 2124.14 ~cc 10 o. o. -2319.97 o. o. 4787.52 2224.14 rec 11 o. o. -186.32 o. o. 372. 64 122.87 rec 12 o. o. -188.22 0. o. 376.44 124.14 rpp 13 120.60 124.14 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rpp 14 -124.14 -120.60 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rpp 15 118.69 120.60 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rpp 16 -120.60 -118.69 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rec 17 .-131.47 o. 200.92 262.94 o. o. .*-11. 01 rec 18 120.04 0. 200.92 11.43 o. o. 5.08 rec 19 -131. 47 o. 200.92 11.43 0. o. 5.08 end ful 1 btf 2 -1 shd 3 -2 res 4 -3 osh 5 -4 -3 tvl 18 tv2 19 tru 17 -3 -18 -19 bxl 13 -17 bx2 14 -17 stl 15 -17 st2 16 -17 rsl 11 -13 -15 16 3 st3 12 -11 -13 14 5 -3 de2 6 -s -12 -11 15 -14 -16 3 de3 7 ;..6 de4 8* -7 inv 9 -8 exv 10 -9 end 14Rl 2 1 2 1 1 23RO 1 2 3 4 3 1000 1000 3 1000 1000 3 3 4 3 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 end 5.5.2.3 Sample Input file for Acflve Fuel Region=:::NQpna:J----------""'--- Condjtjons. Neutron Gamma Dose. Top Half Model, AxjaJ, Fuel Only -=sas4 a*. NAT-F-AF-N, TN-32 Normal-Axial-Top-Fuel Only-Active Fuel-Neutron D 27n-18couple infhom.medium 0 'Fuel-Basket Zone D uo2 1 den=l.912 1.0 293. 92235 3.5 92238 96.5 end 0 zircalloy l denc0.376 end inconel 1 den=0.022 end aluminum 1 den~0.306 end 5.5-10 Rev. O 1/00
ss304 1 den=0.316 end '*Plenum Zone (no basket) zircalloy 2 den=0.459 end ss304 2 den=0.159 end 'Top Fitting Zone (no basket) inconel 3 den=0.212 end ss304 3 den=l.052 end 'Cask Body, Outer Shell, Polydisc shells carbonsteel 4 1.0 end .:* 'Polypropylene/steel disk arbmpropylene 0.90 2 1 0 0 1001 14.3 6012 85.7 5 0.89 end carbonsteel 5 0.11 end 'Resin/Aluminum arbmtnres 1.58 5 l 0 0 1001 5.05 5000 1.05 6012 35.13 8016 41.73 13027 14.93 6 0.896 end al 6 0.104 end end comp idr=l ity=l izm=S isn-8 mhw*O frd=87.31 end 182.88 200.53 209.17 220.72 247.39 258.92 292.8 293.76 end 1 2 3 o 4 *s o 4 end xend
' ******* sfa is not normalized *******
tim=3000 nst=4000 nit=lSO nmt=BOOO sfa=l.05e+l0 frl~l.O fr2=0.7 fr3=0.7 fr4=0.7 igo=4 isp=O ipf=S isd=4 end soe 1.ase-2 2.099e-l 2.318e-l 1.309e-l 1.774e-1 1.936e-1 3.789e-2 20z end sxy 1 -87.31 87.31 -87.31 87.31 0.0 182.88 87.32 .182.88 124.14 293.76 end bub 0.0 76.20 106.68 137.16 154.31 165.74 180.02 182.88 end buf 1.6 1.595 1.48 1.09 0.55 0.25 0.04 0.002 end surface detectors sdl 258.82 293. 76 393.76 493.76 end sdr 0. 100. 0. 102. o. 102. o. 102. end sds 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 end gend TN*32, axial calculation, neutron, active-fuel zone 0 0 1 20 rec 1 o. o. -182.88 0. 0. 365. 76 87.31 rec 2 o. o. -200.53 o. o. 401.06 87.31 rec 3 o. o. -209.17 0. o. 418.34 87.31 rec 4 o. o. -220.72 0. o. 441.44 97.31 rec 5 o. 0. -235.96 o. o. 471.. 92 111.44 rec 6 o. o. -247.39 0. o. 494.78 100.97 rec 7 o. 0. -258.82 0. 0. 517.64 89. 34 rec 8 o. o. -292.80 o. o. 585.60 101.92 rec 9 o. 0. -293. 76 0. o. 587.52 102.97 rec 10 o. o. -163.57 o. o. 327.14 122.87 rec 11 o. o. -163.57 0. o. 327 .14,. 124.14 rec 12 o. o. -393.76 0. o. 787.52 224.14 rec 13 o. o. -493.76 o. o. 987.52 324.14 rec 14 o. o. -593.76 o. o. 1187 .52 424.14 rec 15 o. o. -2293.76 o. o. 4587.52 2124 .14 rec 16 o. o. -2393.76 0. o. 4787.52 2224.14 rec 17 o. o. -202.3 JI
- o. o. 404.6 122.87 5.5-11 Rev. 0 1/PO
rec 18 o. o. -204.21 o. o. 408.21 124.14 rpp 19 120.60 124.14 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 20 -124 .14 -120.60 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 21 118.69 120.60 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 22 -120.60 -118.69 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rec 23 -131. 47 o. 204.21 262.94 o. o. 11.0l rec 24 120.04 0. 204.21 11.43 o. o. 5.08
. rec 25 -131. 47 o. 204.21 11.43 0. 0 *. 5.08 end fUl 1 pln 2 -1 tpf 3 -2 vdl 4 -3 shd 5 -4
- . "],id- 6 -5 ppy 7 -6 res 10 -5 osh 11 -10 -5 tvl 24 tv2 25 tru 23 -5 -24 -25 bxl 19 -23 bx2 20 -23 stl 21 -23 st2 22 -23 rsl 11 -19 -21 -20 -22 -10 -5 st3 18 -17 -19 -21 -20 -22 -11 -5 vd2 8 -1 -6 -5 cov 9 -8 -5 de2 12 -11 -18 *-17 -19 -20 -23 25 -9 de3 13 -12 de4 14 -13 inv 15 -14 exv 16 -15 end 20Rl 2 1 2 1 1 29RO 1 2 3 1000 4 4 5 6 4 1000 1000 4 1000 1000 4 4 6 4 1000 4 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 0 ------- end 5.5.2.4 Sample Input file for Active Fuel Regjon. Normal Conditjons, Neutron Gamma pose, Bottom Half Model. Radjal. FneJ Only
..sas4 0
NRB-F-AF-N, TN-32 Normal-Rad-Bottom-Fuel Only-Active Fuel-Neutron D 21n-18couple infhommedium D
'Fuel-Basket Zone uo2 1 den""l.912 1.0 293. 92235 3.5 92238 96.5 end zircalloy 1 den,.,0.376 end inconel 1 den=0.022 end 5.5-12 Rev. O 1/00
aluminum 1 denm0.306 end ss304 l den~0.316 end
'Bottom-Basket Zone aluminum 2 denc0.306 end ss304. 2 den=l.409 end
'Cask Body, Outer Shell, Polydisc shells carbonsteel 3 1.0 end
'Polypropylene/steel disk arbmpropylene 0. *90
- 2 1 0 0 1001 14. 3 6012 85. ?-. 4 O. 89 end carbonsteel 4 0.11 end
'Resin/Aluminum arbmtnres 1.58 5 1 0 0 1001 5.05 5000 1.05 6012 35.13 8016 41.73 13027 14.93 5 0.896 end al 5 0.104 end end comp idr=O ity=l izm=4 isn=8 mhw=O frd=87.31 end
- 87. 31 111. 44 122. 87 124.14 end l 3 5 3 end xend tirn=3000 nst=4000 nit=lSO nrnt=8000 sfa=l.05e10
' frl=l.O fr2=0.7 fr3=0.7 fr4=0.7 igo=4 isp~O ipf=ll isd~4 end soe 1.85e-2 2.099e-1 2.318e-l 1.309e-1 1.774e-1 1.936e-1 3.789e-2 20z end sxy 1 -87.31 87.31 -87.31 87.31 0.0 182.88 87.32 182.88 124.14 219.97 end bub o.o 11.43 34.29 102.87 125.73 142.88 154.31 165.74 174.31 180.02 182.88 end buf 1.60 1.601 1.63 1.68 1.43 1.09 0.77 0.36 0.15 0.064 0.002 end surface detectors sdl 111.44 124.14 224.14 324.14 end sdr 189. 219. 0. 188. 0. 219. 0. 219. end sds 3 12 10 0 10 0 10 0 end gend TN-32, radial calculation, neutron, active fuel zone
- - - - - - 0 0 i~--* rec 1 O. O. -182.88 0. o. 365.76 87.31 rec 2 0. O. -193.93 o. o. 387.86 87.31 rec 3 0. O. -219.97 o. 0. 439.94 lll.44 rec 4 0. 0. -160.28 o. 0. 320.56 122.87 rec 5 O. 0. -160.28 o. o. 320.56 124.14 rec 6 O. 0. -319.97 o. o. 787.52 224.14 rec 7 O. 0. -419.97 0. o. 987.52 324.14 rec 8 O. O. -519. 97 o. 0. 1187.52 424.14 rec 9 0. O. -2219.97 o. o. 4587.52 2124.14 rec 10 o. o. -2319.97 o. o. 4787.52 2224.14 rec 11 O. O. -196.32 o. o. 372.64 122.87 rec 12 O. 0. -198.22 o. 0. 376.4~ 124.14 rpp 13 120.60 124.14 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rpp 14 -124.14 -120.60 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rpp 15 118.69 120.60 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rpp 16 -120.60 -118.69 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rec 17 -131.47 o. 200.92 262.94 o. o. 11.01 rec 18 120.04 ~
- o. 200. 92 11.43 o. o. 5.08 S.5-13 Rev. o 1/00
rec 19 -131.47 o. 200.92 11.43 o. o. 5.08
*end ful 1 btf 2 -1 shd 3 -2 res 4 -3 osh s -4 -3
.tvl 18
'tv2 19 tru 17 -3 -18 -19 bxl 13 -17 bx2 14 -17 stl 15 -17
..st2 16 -17 rsl 11 15 ..:14 5 -3
-*st3 12 13 -15' 16 -5 -3 de2 6 -5 -12 -11 15 -14 -16 -17 -3 de3 1 -6 de4 8 -7 inv 9 -8 exv 10 -9 end 14Rl 2 l 2 1 1 23RO 1 2 3 4 3 1000 1000 3 1000 1000 3 3 4 3 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 1000 1000 1000 0 0
end
- 5. 5. 2. 5 Sample Input fil P fnr Act hre Fuel Region, Normal Conditj ans, Capture 'Gamma Dose, *Top Half Model, Axial, Fuel Only
.. sas4 0
NAT-F-AF-C, TN-32 Normal-Axial-Top-Fuel Only-Active Fuel-Cap Gamma 0 27n-18couple infhommedium 0
'Fuel-Basket Zone
--uo2 1 den=1-:-91.2-r.o-z93-;--92"23"5-3-;-5--9-2-2~-8--,-96-.-5-end------------- zircalloy 1 den=0.376 end inconel 1 den=0.022 end aluminum 1 den=0.306 end ss304 1 den=0.316 end
'Plenum Zone (no basket)
- zircalloy 2 den*0.459 end ss304 2 den~0.159 end
'Top Fitting Zone (no basket) inconel 3 den~0.212 end ss304 3 den=l.052 end 'Cask Body, Outer Shell, Polydisc shells.
carbonsteel 4 1.0 end
'Polypropylene/steel disk arbmpropylene 0.90 2 1 0 0 1001 14.3 6012 85.7 5 0.89 end carbonsteel 5 0.11 end 'Resin/Aluminum 5.5-14 Rev. O 1/00
arbmtnres 1. 58 5 1 0 0 1001 s. 05 500*0 1. 05 6012
-35.13 8016 41.73 13027 14.93 6 0.896 end al 6 0.104 end ..
end comp idr=l ity=2 izm=8 isn=8 mhw=O frd=87.31 end 182.88 200.53 209.17 220.72 247.39 258.92 292.8 293.76 end 1 2 3 O 4 5 0 4 end xend I ******* Sfa not normalized ********* tim=3000 nst=4000 nitR150 nmta8000 sfa*l.05el0 frl=l.O fr2=0.7 fr3=0.7 fr4=0.7 igo=4 isp=O ipf=S isd=4 end soe l.85e-02 2.099e-Ol 2.318e-Ol l.309e-01 l.774e-Ol ~.936e-Ol 3.789e-02 38z end sxy 1 -87.31 87.31 -87.31 87.31 0.0 182.88 87.32 182.88 124.14 293.76 end bub 0.0 76.20 106.68 137.16 154.31 165.74 180.02 182.88 end buf 1.6 1.595 1.48 1.09 0.55 0.25 0.04 0.002 end surf ace detectors sdl 258.82 293.76 393.76 493.76 end sdr o. 100. 0. 102. O. 102. o. 102. end sds 10 l 10 1 10 1 10 1 end gend TN-32, axial calculation 0 0 1 20 rec 1 0. 0. -182.88 O. 0. . 365.76 87.31 rec 2 0. O. -200.53 0. O. 401.06 87.31 rec 3 0. O. -209.17 o. 0. 418.34 87.31
- rec 4 O. o. -220.72 o. O. 441.44 87.31 rec 5 O. O. -235.96 0. 0. 471.92 111.44 rec 6 o. O. -247.39 0. 0. 494.78 100.97 rec 7 0. O. -258.82 O. o. 517.64 89.34 ice 8 O. 0. -292.80 0. O. 585.60 101.92 rec 9 O. O. -293.76 o. 0. 587.52 102.87 rec 10 O. 0. -163.57 o. O. 327.14 122.87 rec 11 0. 0. -163.57 O. O. 327.14 124.14
rcc**-*-i-2-----0-.-cr.--~-9-r.1-o-cr.-o:--,-ar.-s~Z4-:J. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
rec 13 O. O. -493.76 0. 0. 987.52 324.14 rec 14 O. 0. -593.76 O. 0. 1187.52 424.14 rec 15 O. O. -2293.76 O. 0. 4587.52 2124.14 rec* 16 0. O. -2393.76 0. o. 4787.52 2224.14 rec 17 O. O. -202.3 0. 0. 404.6 122.87 rec 18 o. O. -204.21 o. O. 408.21 124.14 rpp 19 120.60 124.14 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 20 -124.14 -120.60 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 21 118.69 120.60, -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 22 -120.60 -118.69 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rec 23 -131.47 o. 204.21 262.94 0. O. 11.01 rec 24 120.04 o. 204.21 11.43 Q. O. 5.08 rec 25 -131.47 o. 204.21 11.43 O. 0. 5.08 end ful 1 pln 2 -1 tpf 3 -2 vdl 4 -3 ..,,,.. S.5-15 Rev. o 1/00
shd 5 -4 did 6 -5 ppy 7 -6 res 10 -5 osh 11 -10 -5 tvl 24 tv2 25 tru 23 -5 25 bxl 19 -23 bx2 20 -23 stl 21 -23 st2 22 -23 rsl 17 21 -20 -22 -10 -s st3 18 19 -21 -20 -22 -11 -5 .. vd2 a .. -7 -6 -5 cov 9 -8 -s de2 12 -11 -18 -17 -19 -20 -23 25 -9 de3 13 -12 de4 14 -13 inv 15 -14 exv 16 -15 end 20Rl 2 1 2 1 1 29RO 1 2 3 1000 4 4 5 6 4 1000 1000 4 1000 1000 4 4 6 4 1000 4 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 end 5.5.2.6 Sample Input* ;!!jle for Actjye Fuel Regjc;m, Normal Condjtjons. Capture Gamma pose. Bottom Half Model, Radjal, Fuel Only
=sas4 0
NRB-F-AF-C, TN-32 Normal-Rad-Bottom-Fuel Only-Active Fuel-Cap Gamma 27n-18couple infhommedium
'Fuel-Basket Zone uo2 1 a-e-n=~-;912--1~0-293-.--92-2-35-3-.-5-9223.8-96~.!Lend_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
zircalloy 1 den=0.376 end inconel 1 den=0.022 end aluminum 1 den=0.306 end ss304 1 den=0.316 end
- ~Bottom-Basket Zone
- aluminum 2 den=0.306 end
.ss304 2 den=!. 409 end 'Cask Body, Outer Shell, Polydisc shells carbonsteel 3 1.0 end 'Polypropylene/steel disk arbmpropylene 0.90 2 1 0 0 1001 14.3*6012 85.7 4 0.89 end carbonsteel 4 0.11 end 1
Resin/Aluminum arbmtnres 1.58 5 l 0 0 1001 5.05 5000 1.05 6012 35.13 8016 41.73 13027 14.93 5 0.896 end al 5 0.104 end end comp 5.5-16 Rev. o 1/00
**-:.. *.*.--**.*:":. ~.
idr~o ity=2 izm=4 isn=S mhw=O frd*B7.31 end 87.31 111.44 122.87 124.14 end 1 3 5 3 end *. xend tim=3000 nst=4000 nit=l50 nmt*8000 sfa=l.05e10
'frlml.O fr2=0.7 fr3=0.7 fr4=0.7 igo=4 isp=O ipf=ll isda4 end soe 1.85e-2 2.099e-l 2.318e-l l.309e-l l.774e~l 1.936e-l 3.789e-2 38z end sxy 1 -87.31 87.31 -87.31 87.31 0.0 182.88 87.32 182.88 *.
124.14 219.97 end bub o.o 11.43 34.29 102.87 125.73 142.88 154.31 165.74 174.31 180.02 182.88 end buf 1.60 1.601 1.63 1.68 l.43 1.09 0.77 0.36 0.15 0.064 0.002 end surface detectors sdl 111.44 124.14 224.14 324.14 end sdr 189. 219. O. 188. O. 219. O~ 219. end sds 3 12 10 0 10 0 10 0 end gend TN-32, radial calculation, neutron, active fuel zone 0 0 1 20 rec 1 o. o. -182.88 o. o. 365.76 87.31 rec 2 O. 0. -193.93 O. 0. 387.86 87.31 rec 3 0. 0. -219.97 O. O. 439.94 111.44 rec 4 0. 0. -160.28 0. 0.. 320.56 122.87 rec
- 5 0. 0. -160.28 0. 0. 320.56 124.14 rec 6 0.
- 0. -319.97 0. O. 787.52 224.14 rec 7 O. 0. -419.97 O. 0. _987.52 324.14 rec 8 0. 0. -519.97 0. 0. 1187.52 424.14 rec 9 0. 0. -2219.97 0. O. 4587.52 2124.14 rec 10 O. 0. -2319.97 0. O. 4787.52 2224.14 rec 11 O. 0. -186.32 O. 0. 372.64 122.87 rec 12 0. 0. -188.22 O.
- O. 376.44 124.14 rpp 13 120.60 124.14 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rpp 14 -124.14 -120.60 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rpp--15--1-18-;-69-l-20-;-60----3-0-;-4-s--90-; 4 B~f-88-;-2-2-188-;-22---------------
rpp 16 -120.60 -118.69 -.30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rec 17 -131.47 o. 200.92 262.94 O. O. 11.01 rec 18 120.04 0. 200.92 11.43 0. 0. 5.08 rec* 19 -131.47 O. 200.92 11.43 0. 0. 5.08 end ful l btf 2 ... 1 shd 3 -2 res 4 -3 osh 5 -4 -3 tvl 18 tv2 19 tru 17 -3 19 bxl 13 -17 bx2 14 -17 stl 15 -17 st2 16 -17 rsl 11 15 16 3
~*
5.5-17 Rev. 0 1/00
st3 12 -11 -13 -15 16 -s -3 lie2 6 -5 -12 -11 15 -14 -16 3 de3 7 -6 de4 8 -7 inv 9 -8 exv 10 -9 end 14Rl 2 1 2 1 1 23RO l 2 3 4 3 1000 1000 3 1000 1000 3 *3 4 3 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 1000 1000 1000 0 0 epd
- 5. 5 *. 2. 7 Sample Input file for Plenum Reg:ion. J'ilormal Conditions, Gamma Dose, Top Half.Model. Axial, Euel Only
=sas4 parm=mo 0
NAT-F-PL-G, TN-32 Normal-Axial-Top~Fuel Only-Plenum-Primary Gamma 27n-18couple infhommedium
'Fuel-Basket Zone uo2 1 den=l.912 1.0 293. 92235 3.5 92238 96.5 end zircalloy 1 den=0.376 end inconel 1 den=0.022 end aluminum 1 den=0.306 end ss304 1 den=0.316 end
'Plenum Zone (no basket) zircalloy 2 den=O. 459 end
- ss304 2 den=0.159 end
'Top Fitting Zone (no basket) inconel 3 den=0.212 end ss304 3 den=l.052 end
'Cask Body, Outer Shell, Polydisc shells carbonsteel 4 1.0 end
'Polypropylene/steel disk arbmpropylene 0.90 2 1 O O 1001 14.3 6012 85.7 5 0.89 end carbonsteel 5 0.11 end
'Resin/Aluminum
==-=.:=
arbmtnres I. ss-*ns-- --i--o-e--H>G-1--5-.-05--5 O.Q.Q_LJ)_5__60~1=2~------
- 35. l3 8016 41.73 13027 14.93 6 0.896 end al 6 0.104 end end comp idral ity=2 izm=8 isn=8 mhw=2 frd~87.31 end 182:88 200.53 209.17 220.72 247.39 259.92 292.8 293.76 end 1- 2 3 o 4 5 0 4 end xend timm3000 nstc4000 nit=lSO nrnt=8000 sfa=4.95E+13
' frl*l.O fr2c0.7 fr3~0.7 fr4c0.7 igo=4 isp=O ipf=O iso=2 isd=4 end soe 35z 2.202e-Ol 7.79Be-01 8z end.
sxy 2 -87.31 87.31 -87.31 87.31 182.88 200.53 97.32 182.88 124.14 293.76 end surface detectors
'--------------------------~------------------
5.5-18 Rev. o 1/00
'":,_~* ..*.-_:*... ~ :-; . -...
sdl 258.82 293.76 393.76 493.76 end $dr 0. 100. 0. 102. 0. 102. O. 102. end sds 10 l 10 l 10 l 10 l end 9end TN-32, axial calculation, primary ganuna 0 0 1 20 rec l* 0. 0. -182.88 0. o. 365. 7 6 87.31 rec. 2 o. o. -200.53 0. o. 401.06 87.31 rcc 3 o; o. -209.17 0. 0. 418. 3'4 87.31 rec 4 0. o. -220.72 o. 0. 441.44 87.31 *. rec 5 o. o. -235.96 o. o. 471.92 111.44 rec 6 o. o. -247.39 0. 0. 494.78 100.97 rec 7 o. o. -258.82 o. o. 517.64 89.34 rec 8 o. 0. -292.80 o. o. 585.60 101.92 rec 9 o. o. -293.76 0. 0. 587.52 . 102.87 rec 10 o. o. -163.57 0. o. 327.14 122.87 rec 11 o. o. -163.57 o. o. 327.14 124 .14 rec 12 0. 0. -393.76 o. o. 787.52 224.14 rec 13 o. o. -493.76 o. o. 987.52 324.14 rec 14 o. o. -593.76 0. 0. ll:87.52 424.14 rec 15 o. o. -2293.76 o. o. 4587.52 2124.14 rec 16 o. o. -2393.76 0. 0. 4787.52 2224.14 rec 17 0. o. -202.3 0. 0. 404.6 122.87 rec 18 o. o. -204.21 o. o. 408.21 124.14 rpp 19 120.60 124.14 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 20 -124.14 -120.60 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 21 118.69 120.60 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 22 -120.60 -118.69 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rec 23 -131. 47 o. 204.21 262. 94 o. o. 11.01 rec 24 120.04 o. 204.21 11.43 o. o. 5.08 rec 25 -131. 47 0. 204.21 11.43 0. 0. 5.08 end ful 1 pln 2 -1 tpf 3 -2 vdl 4 -3 shd 5 -4 lid 6 -5 ppy 1~ res 10 -5 osh 11 -10 -5 tvl 24 tv2 25 tru 23 -5 25 bxl 19 -23 bx2 20 -23 stl 21 -23 st2 22 -23 rsl 17 21 22 5 st3 18 19 20 11 -5 vd2 8 -7 -6 -5 cov 9 -8 -5 de2 12 -11 -18 -17 -19 23 25 -9 de3 13 -12 de4 14 -13 inv 15 -14 exv 16 -15 :; 5.5-19 Rev. O l/00
- *-**-*-* -- . ~
end
- 20Rl 2 l 2 l l 29RO 1 2 3 1000 4 4 5 6 4 1000 1000 4 1000 1000 4 4 6 4 1000 4 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 1000 1000 1000 0 0
end 5.5.2.8 Sample Input file for Top Fjttjng Region, Normal Condjtipns. Gamma Dose, Top Half Model. Radjal. Fuel
~
msas4 a
.. *NRT-F-EF-G,
- TN-32 Normal-Radial-Top-Fuel Only-T1:>p Fit-Primary Gamma 27n-18couple infhommedium
'Fuel-Basket Zone uo2 1 den=l.912 1.0 293. 92235 3.5 92238 96.5 end zircalloy 1 den=0.376 end inconel 1 den=0.022 end aluminum 1 den=0.306 end ss304 1 den~0.316 end
'Plenum-Basket Zone zircalloy 2 den=0.459 end aluminum 2 den=0.306 end ss304 2 den=0.458 end
'Top Fitting-Basket Zone inconel 3 den=0.212 end aluminum 3 den=0.306 end ss304 3 den""l.351* *end
'Cask Body, Outer Shell, Polydisc shells carbonsteel 4 1.0 end
'Polypropylene/steel disk arbrnpropylene 0.90 2 1 0 0 1001 14.3 6012 85.7 5 0.89 end carbonsteel 5 0.11 end
'Resin/Aluminum arbmtnres 1.58 5 1 0 0 1001 5.05 5000 1.05 6012 35.13 8016 41.73 13027 14.93 6 0.896 end
- - - - - a-J; - *-*-*--6-0-;-104---ena--------------- end comp idraO ity=2 izm=4 isn*8 mhw=3 frd=87.31 end 87.31 111.44 12.87 124.14 end 1 4 6 4 end xend ... tim=3000 nsta4000 nit*l50 nmt=8000 sfa=l.9BE+l4
' frl=l.O fr2=0.7 fr3=0.7 fr4=0.7 igo=4 isp=O ipf=O iso=3 isd=5 end soe 35z 2.202e-Ol 7.798e-Ol Sz end sxy 3 -87.31 87.31 -87.31 87.31 200.53 209.17 87.32 182.88 124.14 293.76 end surface detectors sdl 111.44 122.87 124.14 224.14 324.14 end sdr 205. 236. 164. 193. 0. 164. 0. 235. O. 235. end sds 3 12 1 24 10 O 10 O 10 0 end S.5-20 Rev. O 1/00
gend
!l'N-32, radial* calculation, primary ganuna, active fuel zone 0 0 1 20 rec 1 o. 0. -182.88 0. 0. 365. 76 87.31 rec 2 o. 0. -200.53 o. o. 401. 06 87.31 rec 3 0. o. -209.17 o. o. 418.34 87.31 rec 4 0. o.. -220.72 o. o. 441. 44 87.31 rec 5 0. o. -235.96 o. o. 471.92 111.44 rec 6 o. o. -247~39 o. o. 494.78 100.97 rec 7 o. o. -258.82 0. o. 517.64 89.34 rec 8 o. o. -292.80 0. 0. 585.60 101. 92 rec 9 o. o. -293.76 o. o. 587.52 102.87 rec 10 o. o. -163.57 0. 0. 327 .14 122.87 rec 11 o. o. -163.57 0. 0. 327.14 124.14 rec 12 o. o. -393.76 o. o. 787.52 224.14 rec 13 o. o. -493.76 o. o. 987.52 324.14 rec 14 0. 0. -593. 76 0. o. 1187.52 424 .14 rec 15 0. o. -2293.76 o. o. 4587.52 2124.14 rec 16 o. o. -2393.76 0. 0. 4787.52 2224 .14 rec 17 o. o. -202.3 o. o. 4*04. 6 122.87 rec 18 o. o. -204.21 o. o. 408.21 124.14 rpp 19 120.60 124~14 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 20 -124.14 -120.60 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 21 118.69 120.60 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rpp 22 -120.60 -118.69 -30.48 30.48 -204.21 204.21 rec 23, -131.47 0. 204.21 262.94 o. 0. 11.01 rec 24 120.04 o. 204.21 11.43 0. 0. 5.08 rec 25 -131. 47 0. 204.21 11.43 0. o. 5.08 end ful 1 pln 2 -1 tpf 3 -2 vdl 4 -3 shd 5 -4 lid 6 -5 ppy 7 -6 res 10 -5 osh 11 -10 -5
----- *tv1--- -..-2-4--------------------- ------------- --*------ -* - - - - ----
tv2 25 tru 23 -5 25 bxl 19 -23 bx2. 20 -23 stl 21 -23 sti 22 -23 rsl 17 21 22 5 st3 18 19 20 11 -5 vd2 8 -7 -6 -5 cov 9 -8 -5 de2 12 -11 -18 -17 -19* 23 25 -9 de3 13 -12 de4 14 -13 inv 15 -14 exv 16 -15 end 20Rl 2 1 2 1 1 25RO ~* 5.5-21 Rev. 0 1/00
1 2 3 1000 4 4 5 6 4 1000 1000 4 1000 1000 4 4 r 6 4 1000 4 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 0 end 5.5.2.9 Sample Input fjle for Bottom Fjttjng Regjpn. Normal Condjtjons, Gamma pose. Bottom Half Model, Axial, Fuel
.Qn.4£
-sas4 parrncmo 0
NAB-F-EF-G, TN-32 Normal-Axial-Bottom-Fuel Only-Bottom Fitting-Pri Gamma 27n-18couple infhomrnedium
'Fuel-Basket Zone
- . --uo"2 *
- 1 den...1.912 1.0 293. 92235 3.5 92238 96.5 end zircalloy 1 den=0.376 end inconel 1 den=0.022 end aluminum 1 den=0.306 end ss304 1 den=0.316 end
'Bottom - no basket ss304 2 den=l.110 end
'Cask Body, Outer Shell, Polydisc shells carbonsteel 3 1.0 end
'Polypropylene/steel disk arbmpropylene 0.90 2 l 0 O 1001 14.3 6012 85.7 4 0.89 end carbonsteel 4 0.11 end
'Resin/Aluminum arbrntnres l.SB 5 1 O 0 1001 5.05 5000 1.05 6012 35.13 8016 41.73 13027 14.93 5 0.896 end al 5 -0.104 end end comp idr-1 ity=2 izm=3 isn=8 rnhw=2 frd=87.31 end 182.88 193.93 219.97 end 1 2 3 end xend tim=3000 nst=4000 nit=l50 nrnt=BOOO sfa=l.49E14
' frl=l.O fr2=1.0 fr3=1.0 fr4=1.0 igo=4 isp=O ipf=O iso=2 isd=3 end soe--35z--2-.-202e-Ol--7-.-7-9Be--01--8.z---end_________ _
sxy 2 -87.31 87.31 -87.31 87.31 182.88 193.93 87.32 182.88 124.14 219.97 end surface detectors
'----------------------------,--.-~--------------
sdl 219.97 319.97 419.97 end sdr o. 115. o. 115. 0. 115 *. end sds 10 1 10 l 10 l end gend TN-32, axial calculation, primary ganuna 0 0 1 20 rec 1 o. o. -182.88 o. o. 365.76 87.31 rec 2 o. 0. -193.93 0. o. 387.86 87.31 rec 3 0. o. -219. 97 o. o. 439.94 111.44 rec 4 o. o. -160.28 o. o. 320.56 122.87 rec s o. o. -160.28 0. o. 320.56 124.14 rec 6 o. o. -319.97 o. o. 787.52 224.14 5.5-22 Rev. 0 1/00
rec 7 0. 0. -419.97 0. 0. 987.52 324.14 -rec 8 o. 0. -519.97 0. o. 1187.52 424.14 rec 9 0. 0. -2219.97 o. o. 4587.52 2124.14 rec 10 o. o. -2319.97 o. 0. 4787.52 2224.14 rec 11 o. 0. -186.32 0. 0. 372.64 122.87 rec 12 o. o. -188.22 o. o. 376.44 124.14
;pp 13 120.60 124.14 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 ,188.22 rpp 14 ~124.14 -120.60 -30.48 30.48 -188.22. 188.22 rpp 15 118.69 120.60 -30.48 30.48 -188.22.* 188.22 rpp 16 -120.60 -118.69 -30.48 30.48 -188.22 188.22 rec 17 -131.47 0. 200.92 262.94 o. 0. 11.01 rec 18 120.04 o. 200.92 11.43 o. 0. 5.08 rec 19 -131.47 o. 200.92 11.43 o. o. 5.08 end ful 1 btf 2 -1 shd 3 -2 res 4 -3 osh 5 -4 -3 tvl 18 tv2 19 tru 17 -3 -18 -19 bxl 13 -17 bx2 14 -17 stl 15 -17 st2 16 -17 rsl 11 -13 -15 16 3 st3 12 -11 -13 14 . 5 -3 de2 6 -5 -12 -11 15 -14 -16 3 de3 7 -6 de4 8 -7 inv 9. -8 exv 10 -9 end 14Rl 2 1 2 1 1 23RO 1 2 3 4 3 1000 1000 3 1000 1000 3 3 4 3 1000 1000 1000 1000 0 1000 1000 1000 1000 o---
end 5.5.3 Sample MCNP Input File TransNuclear TN-32 cask: Far-Field model; gammas from fittings/plenum. c Volumetric F4 detectors used. Geometry splitting/routlette added. c NOTE: Dose are from "direct" + "skyshine" radiation. No Berm. c *********************** BLOCK l: CELL CARDS ************************ c GEOMETRY (r-z) c (j.k.shultis 12/28/98 mod by MM 1/9/99)) c "z-axis c I AIR c I c I cask +=+ c 1---------+ I I berm c c I
.-------+ I I 1-I I I I
~
5.5-23 Rev. 0 1/.00
c . FUEL 11 I I c_ I II I I c 0 II ----> r-axis I I c I 11 I I c II ------------------! l---1-1---1-1---1-1---1-1---1 c I- I I I I I I I I I I I I c .-------+ I I I I I. I I I I I I I I c 1---------+--------------------1-1---1-1---1-1---1-1-~-1-1---1 c I I *\ ... c 20m \ det vols c CONCRETE c SOIL c c c.*~**** Cask cells c decomposed case bottom into 10 sublayers 110 9 -7.8212 1 -110 -209 imp:n,p=1024 $ Fe cask bot-sublayer 1 111 9 -7.8212 110 -109 -30 imp:n,p=512 $ Fe cask bot-sublayer 2 112 9 -7.8212 109 -108 -208 imp:n,p~256 $ Fe cask bot-sublayer 3 113 9 -7.8212 108 -107 -207 imp:n,p=l28 $ Fe cask bot-sublayer 4 114 9 -7.8212 107 -106 -206 imp:n,p*64 $ Fe cask bot-sublayer 5 115 9 -7.8212 106 -105 -205 imp:n,p=32 $ Fe cask bot-sublayer 6 116 9 -7.8212 105 -104 -204 imp:n,p=l6 $ Fe cask bot-sublayer 7 117 9 -7.8212 104 -103 -203 imp:n,p~8 $ Fe cask bot-sublayer 8 118 9 -7.8212 103 -102 -202 imp:n,p~4 $ Fe cask bot-sublayer 9 119 9 -7.8212 102 -2 -201 imp:n,p=2 $ Fe cask bot-sublayer 10 c decompose cask side into 10 sublayers 201 9 -7.8212 102 -122 201 -202 imp:n,p*2 $ Fe cask side-sublayer 1 202 9 -7.8212 103 -123 202 -203 imp:n,ps4 $ Fe cask side-sublayer 2 203 9 -7.8212 104 -124 203 -204 imp:n,p~8 $ Fe cask side-sublayer 3 204 9 -7.8212 105 -125 204* -205 imp:n,~16 * $ Fe cask side-sublayer 4 205 9 -7.8212 106 -13 205 -206 imp:n,p~32 $ Fe cask side-sublayer 5 206 9 --7.8212 107 -13 206 -207 imp:n,pQ64 $ Fe cask side-sublayer 6 207 9 -7.8212 108 -13 207 -209 imp:n,p=l28 $ Fe cask side-sublayer 7 208 9 -7.8212 109 -13 208 -30 imp:n,p=256 $ Fe cask side-sublayer 8 209 9 -7.8212 110 -13 30 -209 imp:n,p=512 $ Fe cask side-sublayer 9 210 9 -7.8212 1 -13 209 *-21 imp:n,p=l024 $ Fe cask side-sublayer 10 c decompose cask lid into 10 sublayers
301--9~1-.8212--12-,,,_122_.,,_2oi_ _ _imp_;_n,_p_=~4---"- $ Fe cask lid-sublayer 1 302 9 -7.8212 122 -123 -202 imp:n,pc8 $ Fe cask lid-sublayer 2 303 9 -7.8212 123 -124 -203 imp:n,p=16 $ Fe cask lid-sublayer 3 304 9 -7.8212 124 -125 -204 imp:n,pg32 $ Fe cask lid-sublayer 4 305 9 -7.8212 -13 125 -205 imp:n,pa64 *$ Fe cask lid-sublayer ~
306 9 -7.8212 13 -126 -208 imp:n,p~12s $ Fe cask lid-sublayer 6 307 9 -:7 _._8212 126 -127 -208 imp:n, p*256 * $ Fe cask lid-sublayer 7
.. 308 9 -7.8212-127 -128 -208 itup:n,p=512 $ Fe cask lid-sublayer 8
.309 9 -7.9212 128 -129 -208 imp:n,p-=1024 $ Fe cask lid-sublayer 9 310 9 -7.8212 129 208 imp:n,p=1024 $ Fe cask lid-sublayer 10 c other cask cells 3 7 -l. 715 2 -s -201 imp:n,p*l $ bottom basket 4 6 -1.223 7 201 imp.:n,p-=2 $ top plenum basket 5 5 -1.869 8 201 imp:n,p .. 2 $ top fitting c 6 8 -7.92 26 -27 2 -28 imp:n,pc2 $ ss side basket c 1 10 -2.702 27 -201 2 -28 imp:n,ps2 $ Al side basket/rails 8 l -0.0013 11 201 imp:n,p..,2 $ top void - partl (air) c 9 1 -0.0013 28 -12 26 -201 ilO imp:n,p*2 $ top void - part2 (air) c 10 9 -7.8212 _,,. 28 -19 24 -201 imp:n,p=2 $ hold down ring 5.5-24 Rev. O 1/00
13 11 -0.90 14 25 imp:n,p~l024 $ polyprop top shield
*14 1 -0.0013 15'-16 -25 imp:n,p=l024 $air under top cover -ptl 15 1 -0.0013 (14 -16 25 -209):(13 -16 209 -29) imp:n,p=1024 $air under top cover -pt2 16 9 -7.9212 16 30 imp:n,p=l024 $ top Fe cover - top 17 9 -7.9212 13 -16 29 -30 irnp:n,p=l024 $ top Fe cover - side 19 9 -7.9212 21 -23 9 -10 imp:n,p=l024 $ top side-shld Fe shell 20 9 -7.8212 22 -23 4 -9 imp:n,p=l024 $ side side-shld Fe shell 21* 9 -7.8212 21 -23 3 -4 imp:n,p=l024 $ bot side-shld Fe shell 22 12 -1. 687 21 -22 4 -9 imp:n,p=l024 $ side resin/Al shield 23 1 -0.0013 1 -3 21 -23 imp:n,p=1024 $ air under side shld 24 1 -0.0013 21 -23 10 .::13 imp:n,p=l024 $ air above side shld -
ptl 25 l -0.0013 30 -23 13 -17 imp:n,p=1024 $ air above side shld pt2 c **** fuel regions 40 4 -2.932 5 201 imp:n,p=l $ FUEL region 1 (bottom) 41 4 -2.932 40 201 imp:n,p=l $ FUEL region 2 42 4 -2.932 4l 201 imp:n,p=l $ FUEL region 3 43 4 -2.932 42 201 imp:n,p=l $ FUEL region 4 44 4 -2.932 43 201 imp:n,p=l $ FUEL region 5 45 4 -2.932 44 201 i.mp:n,p=l $ FUEL region 6 46 4 -2.932 45 201 imp:n,p=l $ FUEL region 7 47 4 -2.932 46 201 imp:n,p=l $ FUEL region 8 48 4 -2.932 47 201 irnp:n,p=l $ FUEL region 9 49 4 -2.932 48 201 imp:n,p=l $ FUEL region 10 (top) c ***** outside cells above/below cask 140 2 -2.32 150 23 imp:n,p=1024 $ concrete beneath cask 145 1 -0.0013 17 -151 -23 imp:n,p=1024 $ air above cask-ptl c ***** cells for detector volumes and air/soil layers beyond cask c -- cells before and at 2m detector 600 2 -2.32 150 -1 23 -60 imp:n,p=1024 $ concrete before detector 601 1 -0.0013 1 -53 23 -60 imp:n,p=l024 $ air before detector 602 1 -0.0013 53 -54 23 -60 imp:n,p=1024 $ top air before detector 603 1 -0.0013 54 -151 23 -60 imp:n,p=1024 $ top-top air before det. c 610 2 -2.32 150 -l 60 -61 imp:n,p=1024 $ concrete beneath detector c 611 1 -0.0013 l -53 60 -61 imp:n,p=1024 $ air for detector c 612 1 -0.0013 53 -54 60 -61 imp:n,p=l024 $ top air above det. c 613 1 -0.0013 54 -151 60 -61 imp:n,p=I024$~o~-a:i-r-above-dMie.r'tt---.- - - - - - - - - - c -- cells be.fore and at 3m detector 620 2 -2.32 150 -1 60 -62 imp:n,pcl024 $ concrete before detector 621 1 -0.0013 1 -53 60 -62 imp:n,p=1024 $ air before detector 622 1 -0.0013 53 -54 60 -62 irnp:n,p~l024 $ top air before detector
- 623 1 -0.0013 54 -151 60 -62 imp:n,p=l024 $ top-top air before det.
c 630 2 -2.32 150 -1 62 -63 imp:n,p=l024 $ concrete beneath detector c 631 1 -0.0013 1 -53 62 -63 imp:n,p=l024 $ air for detector c 632 1 -0.0013 53 -54 62 -63 imp:n,p=l024 $ top air above det. c 633 1 -0.0013 54 -151 62 -63 imp:n,p=1024 $ top-top air above det. c -- cells before and at Sm detector 640 2 -2.32 150 -1 62 -64 imp:n,p=l536 $ concrete before detector 641 l -0.0013 l -53 62 -64 imp:n,p~1536 $ air before detector 642 1 -0.0013 53 -54 62 -64 imp:n,p=1536 $ top air before detector 643 l -0.0013 54 -151 62 -64 imp:n,p=l536 $ top-top air before det. c 650 2 -2.32 150 -1 64 -65 imp:n,p=l536 $ concrete beneath detector c 651 l -0.0013 1 -53 64 -65 imp:n,p=1536 $ air for detector c 652 l -0.0013 53 -54 64 -65 imp:n,p=l536 $ top air above det. c 653 1 -0.0013 54 -151 64 -65 imp:n,p=l536 $ top-top air above det. 5.5-25 Rev. O 1/00
c -- cells before and at 7m detector
- 660 2 -2.32 150 -1 64 -66 irnp:n,p=l536 $ concrete before detector 661 1 -0.0013 1 ;-53 64 -66 imp:n,p=l536 $air before detector 662 l -0.0013 53 -54 64 -66 irnp:n,p=l536 $ top air before detector 663 l -0.0013 54 -151 64 -66 irnp:n,p-1536 $ top-top air before det.
c 670 2 -2.32 150 -1 66 -67 imp:n,p=l536 $ concrete beneath detector c 671 1 -0.0013 1 -53 66 -67 imp:n,p=l536 $ air for detector c 672 1 -0.0013 53 -54 66.-67 imp:n,p=l536 $ top air above det. c 673 1 -0.0013 54 -151 66 -67 imp:n,p=l536 $ top-top air above det. c -- cells before and at lOm detector 680 2 -2.32 150 -1 66 -68 imp:n,p~2176 $ concrete before detector 681 1 -0.0013 l -53 66 -68 imp:n,p=2176 $ air before detector 682 1 -0.0013 53 -54 66 -68 imp:n,p=2176 $ top air before detector 683 1 -0.0013 54 -151 66 -68 irnp:n,p=2176 $ top-top air before det. c 690 2 -2.32 150 -1 68 -69 irnp:n,p=2176 $ concrete beneath detector
***c*691 l -0.0013 *l -53 68 -69 imp:n,p*2176 $air for detector c 692 1 -0.0013 53 -54 68 -69 imp:n,p=2176 $ top air above det.
c 693 l -0.0013 54 -151 68 -69 irnp:n,p*2176 $ top-top air above det. c -- cells before and at 20m detector 700 3 -1.625 150 -1 68 -70 ilnp:n,p*3200 $ soil before detector 701 1 -0.0013 1 -53 68 -70 imp:n,p=3200 $ air before detector 702 1 -0.0013 53 -54 68 -70 imp:n,p=3200 $ top air before detector 703 1 -0.0013 54 -151 68 -70 irnp:n,p~3200 $ top-top air before det. c 710 3 -1.625 150 -1 70 -71 imp:n,p=3200 $ soil beneath detector c 711 1 -0.0013 1 -53 70 -71 imp:n,p~3200 $ air for detector c 712 1 -0.0013 53 -54 70 -71 irnp:n,p=3200 $ top air above det. c 713 1 -0.0013 54 -151 70 -71 irnp:n,p=3200 $ top-top air above det. c -- cells before BERM centered at 20m from cask center 720 3 -1.625 150 -1 70 -72 itp.p:n,p=3200 $ soil before berm 721 1 -0.0013 l -53 70 -72 imp:n,p=3200 $ air before berm 722 1 -0.0013 .'53 -54 70.-72 imp:n,p=3200 $top air before berm 723 1 -0.0013 54 -151 70 .. 72 irnp:n,p=3200 $ top-top air before be. 730 3 -1.625 150 -1 72 -73 irnp:n,p=3200 $ soil beneath no BERM 731 l -0.0013 1 -53 72 -73 irnp:n,p=3200 $ bottom half of no BERM 732 l -0.0013 53 -54 72 -73 irnp:n,p=3200 $ top half of no BERM 733 1 -0.0013 54 -151 72 -73 imp:n,p=4800 $ top-top air above no BERM c -- cells before and at SOm detector 740 3 -1.625 150 -1 73 -74 imp:n,p=4800 $ soil before detector 741 1 -0.0013 1 -53 73 -74 imp:n,p=4800 $ air before detector
7-4-2---l--G.OG.i3-53---54--7.J--1-4-imp: n, p*4.M.OJ_t_op air be.f.Qr=e,,__,,d=e~t=e=c=t=o=r__________
743 1 -0.0013 54 -151 73 -74 imp:n,p=4800 $ top-top air before det. 750 3 -1.625 150 -1 74 -75 imp:n,p=4800 $ soil beneath detector 751 1 -0.0013 1 -53 74 -75 irnp:n,p=4800 $ air for detector 752 1 -0.0013 53 -54 74 -75 imp:n,p=4800 $ top air above det.
-.. '753 1 -0. 0013 54 -15L 74 -75 :imp:n,p=4800 $ top'.""top air above det.
c -- cells before and at 70m detector 760 3 -1.625 150 -1 75 -76 imp:n,p=5440 $ soil before detector 761 1 -0.0013 1 -53 75 -76 imp:n,p=5440 $ air before detector 762 1 -0.0013 53 -54 75 -76 imp:n,p=5440 $ top air before detector 763 1 -0.0013 54 -151 75 -76 imp:n,p=5440 $ top-top air before det. 770 3 -1.625 150 -1 76 -77 imp:n,p=5440 $ soil beneath detector 771 1 -0.0013 1 -53 76 -77 imp:n,p=5440 $ air for detector 772 l -0.0013 53 -54 76 -77 irnp:n,p=5440 $ top air above det. 773 1 -0.0013 54 -151 76 -77 irnp:n,p~5440 $ top-top air above det. c -- cells before and at lOOm detector 780 3 -1.625 150 -1 77 -78 imp:n,p=8000 $ intermed soil cell 781 1 -0.0013 ,,.*1*. -53 77 -78 imp:n,p*BOOO $ intermed air cell 5.5-26 Rev. O 1(00
_, .. ;.~. 782 1 -0.0013 53 -54 77 -78 imp:n,p=BOOO $ intermed top air cell
- 7B3 1 -0.0013 54 -151 77 -78 imp:n,p=BOOO $ intermed top-top air cell 790 3 -l.625 150 -1 78 -79 irnp:n,p=8000 $ soil before detector *.
791 1 -0.0013 1 -53 78 -79 irnp:n,p=BOOO $ air before detector 792 1 -0.0013 53 -54 78 -79 imp:n,p=8000 $ top air before detector 793 1 -0.0013 54 -151 78 -79 imp:n,p=BOOO $ top-top air before det. c -- cells before and at 150m detector 800.3 -1.625 150 ~1 79 -80 imp:n,p=l.5E4 $ intermed soil cell 801 1 -0.0013 1 * -53 79 -80 imp:n,p=l.5E4 *$ intermed aii cell 802*1 -0.0013 53 -54 79 -80 imp:n,p=l.5E4 $ intermed top air cell 803 1 -0.0013 54 -151 79 -eo imp:n,p=l.5E4 $ intermed top-top air cell 810 3 -1.625 150 -1 BO -81 imp:n,p=l.5E4 $ soil before detector 811 l -0.0013 l -53 BO -81 imp:n,p=l.SE4 $ air before detector
. 812 1 -0.0013 53 -54 BO -81 imp:n,p=l.5E4 $ top air before detector 813 l -0.0013 54 -151 80 -Bl imp:n,p=l.5E4 $ top-top air before det.*
c -- cells before and at 200m detector 820 3 -1.625 150 -1 81 -82 irnp:n,p=2.8E4 $ intermed soil cell 821 l -0.0013 1 -53 81 -82 irnp:n,p=2.BE4 $ intermed air cell 822 1 -0.0013 53 -54 81 -82 imp:n,p=2.8E4 $ intermed top air cell 823 l -0.0013 54 -151 81 -82 ilnp:n,p=2.8E4 $ intermed top-top air cell 830 3 -1.625 150 -1 82 -83 imp:n,p=2.BE4 $ soil before detector 831 1 -0.0013 1 -53 82 -83 imp:n,p=2.8E4 $ air before detector 832 l -0.0013 53 -54 82 -83 imp:n,p=2.8E4 $ top air before detector 833 1 -0.0013 54 -151 82 -83 irnp:n,p=2.BE4 $ top-top air before *det. c -- cells before and at 300m detector 840 3 -1.625 150 -l 83 -84 imp:n,p=5.5E4 $ intermed soil cell 841 1 -0.0013 l -53 83 -84 imp:n,p=5.5E4 $ interrned air cell 842 1 -0.0013 53 -54 83 -84 irnp:n,p=5.5E4 $ intermed top air cell 843 1 -0.0013 54 -151 83 -84 irnp:n,p=5.5E4 $ intermed top-top air cell 850 3 -1.625 150 -1 84 -85 irnp:n,p';"8.3E4 .$ soil before detector 851 1 -0.0013 1 -53 84 -85 irnp:n,p=8.3E4 $ air before detector 852 1 -0.0013 53 -54 84 -85 irnp:n,p=B.3E4 $ top air before detector 853 1 -0.0013 54 -151 84 -85 irnp:n,p=8.3E4 $ top-top air before det. c -- cells before. and at 500m detector 860 3 -1.625 150 -1 85 -86 imp:n,p=l.7E5 $ interrned soil cell 861 1 -0.0013 1 -53 85 -86 imp:n,p=l. 7E5 $ interrned air cell 862 1 -0.0013 53 -54 es -86 irnp:n,p=l.7~5 $ interrned top air cell 863 1 -0.0013 54 -151 85 -86 irnp:n,p=l.7E5 $ intermed top-top air cell
a-TO~ -1.625 150 -1 B6 -87 irnp:n,p-3-:-3:gs-$ soil before detector 871 1 -Oi0013 l -53 86 -87 imp:n,p=3.3E5 $ air before detector 872 l -0.0013 53 -54 86 -87 imp:n,p=3.3E5 $ top air before detector 873 1 -0.0013 54 -151 86 -87 imp:n,p=3.3E5 $ top-top air before det.
c -- cells before and at 700m detector (2 cells before detector.vol.) 570 3 -1.625 150 -1 87 -57 imp:n,p=6.7E5 $ interrned soil cell 571 1 -0.0013 1 -53 87 -57 imp:n,p=6.7E5 $ intermed air cell 572 1 -0.0013 53 -54 87 -57 imp:n,p=6.7E5 $ interrned top air cell 573 1 -0.0013 54 -151 87 -57 irnp:n,p=6.7E5 $ intenned top-top air cell 880 3 -1. 625 150 -1 57 -88 imp:n,p=l.3E6 $ intermed soil cell 881 1 -0.0013 1 -53 57 -BB imp:n,p=l.3E6 $ intermed air cell 882 l -0.0013 53 *54 57 -88 imp:n,p=l.3E6 $ intermed top air cell 883 1 -0.0013 54 -151 57 -88 imp:n,p=l.3E6 $ intermed top-top air cell 890 3 -1.625 150 -1 88 -89 irnp:n,p=2.6E6 $ soil before detector 891 1 -o. 0013 1 -53 88 -89 imp:n,p-=2.6E6 $ air before detector 892 1 -0.0013 53 -54 88 -89 imp:n,p=2.6E6 $ top air before detector 893 1 -0.0013 }4 -151 88 -89 imp:n,p=2.6E6 $ top-top air before det. 5.5-27 Rev. 0 l/fJO
c -- cells before and at lOOOm detector (2 intermed cells before detector)
- 590 3 -1. 625 150 -1 89 -59 imp:n,p=5.2E6 $ intermed soil cell 591 1 -o. 0013 1 -53 89 -59 irnp:n,p=5.2E6 $ intermed air cell 592 1 -0.0013 53 -54 89 -59 imp:n,p*5.2E6 $ intermed top air cell 593 1 -0.0013 54 -151 89 -59 imp: n, P""'5 . 2E6 $ intermed top-top air cell 900 3 -1.625 150 -1 59 -90 imp:n,p=l.4E7 $ intermed soil cell 901 1 -o. 0013 1 -53 59 -90 imp:n,p=l.4E7 $ intermed air cell 902 l -0.0013 53 -54 59 -90 imp:n,p=l. 4E7 *. $ intermed top air cell 903 1 -0.0013 54 -151 59 -90 imp:n,p=l.4E7 $ intermed top-top air cell 910 3 -1. 625 150 -1 90 -91 imp: n, p=2. BE7 $ soil before detector 911 1 -0.0013 1 -53 90 -91 imp:n,p=2.8E7 $ air before detector 912 1 -0.0013 53 -54 90 -91 imp:n,p=2.8E7 $ top air before detector .
913 1 *-0.0013. 54 -151 90.-91 imp:n,p=2. 8E7, $ top-top air before det. c 920 3 -1.625 150 -1 91 -152 imp:n,p=2.8E7 $ soil after 1000-m detector 921 1 -0.0013 1 -53 91 -152 imp :n, p-=2. 8E7 $ air after 1000-m detector 922 1 -0.0013 53 -54 91 -152 imp:n,P=2.8E7 $ top air after 1000-m det 923 1 -0.0013 54 -151 91 -152 imp:n,p=2.8E7 $ top-top air after det. 90 0 -150:151:152 imp:n,p=O $ problem boundary c **i******************** BLOCK 2: SURFACE CARDS ************************ c **** Horizontal cask planes 1 pz -219.97 * $ cask bottom - ground surface 110 pz -217.37 $ cask bottom - top of sublayer 10 109 pz -214.77 $cask bottom - top of sublayer 9 108 pz -212 .17 ;., $ cask bottom - *top of* sublayer 8 107 pz -209.57 $ cask bottom - top of sublayer 7 106 pz -206.97 $ cask bottom - top of sublayer 6 105 pz ~204.37 $ cask bottom - top of sublayer 5 104 pz -201.77 $cask bottom - top of sublayer 4 103 pz -199.17 $ cask bottom - top of sublayer 3 102 pz -196.57 $ cask bottom - top of sublayer 2 2 pz -193.93 $cask bottom - top of bot Fe plate 3 pz -188.22 $ side Fe jacket - outside lower bottom
.4--pz---1-8-6-.-32---.-.$-:s-i-de-Fe jacket - inside lower bottom 5 pz -182.88 $ top bottom basket/bottom of fuel 7 pz 182.88 $ bottom of plenum basket/top of fuel 8 pz 200.53 $ top of plenum basket 9 pz 202.30 $ side Fe jacket - inside top
, lQ pz.
- 204'. 21 $ side Fe jacket - outside top 11 pz 209.17 $ top of top fitting 12 pz 220.72 $cask top - bot of lid 122 pz 223.72 $cask top - top of sublayer 1 123 pz 226.72 $cask top - top of sublayer 2 124 pz 229.72 $cask top - top of sublayer 3 125 pz 232.72 $cask top - top of sublayer 4 126 pz 238.00 $ cask top - top.of sublayer 6 127 pz 240.15 $ cask top - top of sublayer 7 128 pz 242.31 $ cask top - top of sublayer 8 129 pz 244.85 $ cask top - top of sublayer 9 14 pz 247.39 $ cask top - top of lid 13 pz 235.96 _ $ cask side - top of Fe side 15 pz 258.B~ . $ top of polyprop on top of cask 5.5-28
--~.--:-:-:.=:*-*-:.-:. *
... *.~
16 pz 292.80 $ top Fe cover - bot surface
- 17 pz 293.76 $ top Fe cover - top surface c 18 pz 266.35 $ top cover flange c 19 pz 248.56 $ top hold down ring c 28 pz 214.91 $ bottom hold down ring c ***** cylindrical cask surfaces 201 CZ 87.31 $ cask wall - inner surface 202 CZ 89.31 $ cask wall - inner surface of sublayer 1 203 CZ 91.31 $ cask wall - inner surface of sublayer 2 204 CZ 93.31 $ cask wall - inner surface of sublayer 3 205 CZ 95.31 $ cask wall - inner surface of sublayer 4 206 CZ 97.31 $ cask wall - inner surface of sublayer 5 207 CZ 99.31 $ cask wall - inner surface of sublayer 6 208 CZ 101. 31 $ cask wall - inner surface of sublayer 7 209 CZ 106.0 $ cask wall - inner surface of sublayer 9 21 CZ 111. 44 $ cask outer surface 22 CZ 122.87 $ side Fe jacket -- inside 23 CZ 124.14 $ siOe Fe jacket -- outside c 24 CZ 85.73 $ inside radius of hold down ring 25 CZ 89.34 $ top polyprop disk radius c 26 CZ 87.31 $ inside radius ss basket c 27 CZ 87.31 $ inside radius Al backet/rails 29 CZ 101. 92 $ inside radius top cover 30 CZ 102.87 $ outside radius top cover c ***** surfaces for fuel regions 40 pz -146.30 $ top of fuel region 40 41 pz -109.73 $ top of fuel region 41 42 pz -73.15 $ top of*.fuel region 42 43 pz -36.53 $ top of fuel region 43 44 pz -o.o $ top of fuel region 44 45 pz 36.53 $ top of fuel region 45 46 pz 73.15 $ top of fuel region 46 47 pz 109.73 $ top of fuel region 47 48 pz 146.30 $ top of fuel region 48 c ***** problem boundaries 150 pz -500.E2 $ bottom of soil (problem boundary) 151 pz 2000.E2 $ top of air (problem boundary) 152 CZ 2000.E2 $ radial air limit (problem boundary) c ***** surfaces for detector volumes 53 pz -19.97 $ top of detector volumes 54 pz 252.03 $ top of berm 60 CZ 175.00 $ detector at 2 m - inner face {2-m from cask center) c 61 CZ 225.00 $ detector at 2 m - outer face 62 CZ 275.00 $ detector at 3 m - inner face c 63 CZ 325.00 $ detector at 3 m - outer face 64 CZ 475.00 $ detector at 5 m - inner face c 65 CZ 525.00 $ detector at 5 m - outer face 66 CZ 675.00 $ detector at 7 m - inner face c 67 CZ 725.00 $ detector at 7 m - outer face 68 CZ 975.00 $ detector at 10 :m - inner face c 69 CZ 1025.00 $ detector at 10 m - outer face 70 CZ 1975.00 $ detector at 20 m - inner face c 71 CZ 2025.00 $ detector at 20 m - outer face 72 CZ 2000.0 $ front face of berm 73 CZ 2304.8 $ back of berm 74 CZ 4950. 00 ~ $ detector at 50 m - inner face 5.5-29 Rev. o 1~00
75 CZ 5050.00 $ detector at 50 m - outer face
- i6 CZ 6950.00 $ detector at iO m - inner face 77 CZ 7050.00 $ detector at 70 m - outer face 78 CZ 9950.00 $ detector at 100 m - inner face 79 CZ 10050.0 $ detector at 100 m - outer face 80 CZ 14950.0 $ detector at 150 m - inner face 81 CZ 15050.0 $ detector at 150 m - outer face 82 CZ 19950.0 $ detector at 200 m - inner face 83 CZ 20050*.o $ detector at 200 m - outer face 84 CZ 29950.0 $ detector at 300 m - inner face 85 CZ 30050.0 $ detector at 300 rn - outer face 86 CZ 49950.0 $ detector at 500 m - inner face 87 CZ 50050.0 $ detector at 500 m - outer face
-57 CZ 60000.0 $ extra surface at 600 rn 88 CZ 69950.0 $ detector at 700 rn - inner face
....* 89* CZ 70050;0 $ detector at 700 m - outer face 59 CZ 85000.0 $ extra surface at 850m 90 CZ 99900.0 $ detector at 1000 m - inner face 91 CZ 100100.0 $ detector at 1000 m- outer face c *********************** BLOCK 3: DATA CARDS *************************** c c c --- 3 volumetric cylindrical sources in cells 3,4,5 for bottom fitting, c plenum basket and top fitting SDEF CEL=dl POS=FCEL d2 AXS=O 0 l RAD=d9 EXTmFCEL dlO ERG=dl4 c -- define cells for each source Sll L 5 4 3 $ cell: top fit. I plenum I bot. fitting SPl 0.50121 0.12532 0.37589 $ relative source strengths c -- set POS for each source 052 s 3 4 5 ** $ based on cell choosen, set distribution for POS SI3 L 0 0 204 . 85 $ center for spatially sampling of source 1 (top fit.) SP3 1 $ prob. distn for src 1 center SI4 L 0 0 191.705 $ center for spatially sampling of source 2 (plenum) SP4 1 $ prob. distn for src 2 center SIS L 0 0 -188.405 $ center for spatially sampling of source 3 (bot.fit.} SP5 1 $ prob. distn for src 3 center c -- set~O-for eacn-s-ourc-~-(mu-st- comp-l-etely-inel-ude-cel-l-s-~3-)------------ SI 9 0 87.31 $ radial sampling limits for all 3 sources SP9 -21 1 $ radial sampling weight for all 3 sources c -- set EXT for each source (must completely include cells 5, 4, or 3) DSlO S 11 12 13 $ distns for sampling axially for each src Slll * -4.32 4.32 $axial sampling limits.for.srcl SPll -21 0 $ axial sampling weight for srcl SI12 -8.825 8.825 $ axial sampling limits for src2 SP12 -21 0 $ axial sampling weight for src2 SI13 -5.525 5.525 $ axial sampling limits for src3 SP13 -21 0 $ axial sampling weight for src3 c -- gamma energy spectrum: same for all three sources SI14 H l.O 1.33 1.66 $ energy bins - same for the 3 source regions SP14 0.0 .77977 0.22023 $bin probs. same for the 3 source regions c c c c ---- Detector tYfeS. and locations 5.5-30 Rev. O l/.00
----=-*** --*-**,~* --
FC4 *** Dose in Sv per photon *** F4:p 751 771 791 811 831 851 871 891 911 FC14 *** Dose in mrem/h *** Fl4:p 751 771 791 811 831 851 871" 891 911 FM14 l.426406e23 $ convert Sv/photon to mrem/h for fittings/plenum c c c Physics and problem control* mode *p phys:p 0 l 1 nps 7000000 c void c c ------------------------------------------------------------------ c ambient photon dose equiv. H*(lOmm) Sv (from T-Dl of S&F) c ------------------------------------------------------------------ deO 1.000E-02 1.SOOE-02 2.000E-02 3.000E-02 4.000E-02 5.000E-02 6.000E-02 8.000E-02 1.000E-01 l.500E-01 2.000E-01 3.000E-01 4.000E-01 5.000E-01 6.000E-01 8.000E-01 l.OOOE+OO 1.SOOE+OO
- 2. OOOE+OO 3. OOOE+OO 4. OOOE+OO* 5. OOOE+OO 6. OOOE+OO 8. OOOE+OO l.OOOE+Ol dfO 7.690E-14 8.460E-13 l.OlOE-12 7.BSOE-13 6.140E-13 5.260E-13 5.040E-13 5.320E-l3 6.llOE-13 8.900E-13 l.lBOE-12 l.BlOE-12 2.380E-l2 2.890E-12 3.380E-l2 4.290E-12 5.llOE-12 6.920E-12 8.4BOE-12 l.llOE-11 1.330E-ll l.540E-11 l.740E-11 2.120E-ll 2.520E-ll c
c c ***** MATERIAL CARDS c ************************************************************ c AIR: ANSI/ANS-6.4.3, Dry air; density= 0.0012 g/cmA3 c Composition by mass fraction c ************************************************************* ml 7014 -.75519 8016 -.23179 6000 -.00014 18000 -.01288 c c ************************************************************ c CONCRETE: ANSI/ANS-6.4.3; density c 2.32 g/cmA3 c Composition by mass fraction c ************************************************************ m2 1001 -.0056 8016 -
- 4983 11023 -.0171 12000 -.0024 13027 -.0456 14000 -.3158 16000 -.0012 19000 -.0192 20000 -.0826 26000 -.0122 c
c ************************************************************** c SOIL: [Jacob, Radn. Prat. Dos. 14, 299, 1986) c derisity*c 1.625 g/cmA3; Composition by mass fraction c ************************************************************** 5.5-31 Rev. O 1/.00
m3 1001 -.021 6012 -.016 19000 -.013 26000 -.Oll 20000 -.041 13027 -.050 14000 -.271 8016 -.*577 c c **********************************************************~**** c Fuel-Basket TN-32 Cask (Table 5.3-1) c Density = 2.932 g/cm"3; Composition by atom fraction c ************************************************************** m4 92238 0.14291 92235 0.00494 40000 0.09981 28000 0.02423 26000 0.18629 25055 0.00545 24000 0.05470 13027 0.18597 8016 0.29570 c c ************************************************************* c Top Fitting TN-32 Cask (Table 5.3-1) c Density = 0.491 g/cm"3; Composition by atom fraction c ************************************************************* m.5 26000 0.50712 28000 0.06595 25055 0.01483 24000 0.14890 40000 0.26320 c c ************************************************************* c Plenum/Basket TN-32 (Table 5.3-1) c Density = 1.158 g/cm."3; Composition by atom fraction c ************************************************************* m6 26000 0.34907 ~~~~~~~-~~ao~a~o-.~01~s~3~s~~~~~~~~~~- 4 o oo o 0.17975 25055 0.01021 24000 0.10246 13027 0.31316
*c c *************************************************************
c Bottom/Basket TN-32 (Table 5.3-1) c Density = 1.918 g/cm.... 3; Composition by atom fraction c ************************************************************* m7 26000 0.48631 28000 0.06329 25055 0 .01423 24000 0.14285 13027 0.23378 40000 0.05954 c c ************************************************************** c Basket Pei;i~hery
.... (SS304) TN-32 (Table 5.3-1)
S.5-32 Rev. O 1/00
c Density= 7.92 g/cmA3; Composition by atom fraction
- c **************************************************************
mB 26000 0.68826 25055 0.02013 24000 0.20209 28000 0.08952 c c ************************************************************** c Carbon Steel TN-32 (Table 5.3-1) c Density c 7.8212 g/cmA3; Composition by atom fraction c ************************************************************** rn9 26000 0.95510 6000 0.04490 e c *************************************************************** c Outer Basket/Rails TN-32 (Table 5.3-1} c Density* 2.702 g/cmA3; Composition by atom fraction c ************************************************************** mlO 13027 1.00000 c c ************************************************************* c Polypropylene Disk TN-32 (Table 5.3-1) c Density = 0.90 g/cmA3; Composition by atom fraction c ************************************************************* mll 6012 .33480 1001 .66520 c c ***************************~********************************* c Resin/Aluminum Composite for TN-32 (Table 5.3-1) c Density= *1.687 g/cmA3; Composition by atom fraction c ************************************************************* rnl2 13027 0.10331 6012 0.24658 8016 0.21985 1001 0.42207 5010 0.00164 5011 0.00655 c c ************************************************************* c Berm (Silica+ water) for ISFSI Site (SAR Page 7a-5}; c density= 1.400 g/cmA3; Composition by atom fraction c ************************************************************* m13 14000 0.26524 8016 0.59855 1001 0.13621 c c prdmp 2j 1 c print 0 5.5-33 Rev. o 1/00
5.6 References
- 1. SCALE4.3, ~A Modular Code System for Performing Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation for Workstations and Personal Computers." CCC-545, ORNL. .
- 2. Croff et al, Revised Uranium-Plutonium Cycle PWR and BWR Models for the ORIGEN Computer Code.
- 3. Luksic, 'Spent Fuel Assembly Hardware:
Characterization and 10 CFR 61 Classification for Waste Disposal,' PNL-6906, UC-85, June 1989.
- 4. SCALE4 . 4, "A Modular Code System for Performing Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation for Workstations and. Personal Computers." CCC-545, ORNL. . .
- 5. MCNP4B2, "Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System." Los Alamos National Laboratory, CCC-660, RSIC.
- 6. "Data for Use in Protection Against External Radiation," Publication ,51, International Conunission on Radiological Protection, Annals of the ICRP, 17,
- No. 2/3, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1987.
5.6-1 Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 5.1-1 TN-32 CASK SHIELD MATERIALS Density Thickness Component Material (g/crn 3 ) (in.)
*cask Body Wall Carbon Steel 7.82 9.50 Lid Carbon Steel 7.82 10. 5 (1)
Bottom Carbon Steel 7.82 10.25 Resin Polyester resin Styrene 1.58 4.26 Aluminum hydrate
*zinc borate Aluminum Box Aluminum 2.70 0.12 Outer Shell Carbon Steel 7.82 a.so Basket Stainless Steel 7.92 2 x 0.105 Aluminum 2.70 0.5 Borated Aluminum 2.65 0.040 Protective Cover Carbon Steel 7.82 0.38 Polypropylene Drum Polypropylene 0.90 4.0 Polypropylene Drum Carbon Steel 7.82 0. 2s 12 >
Shell ~-*-~-~~-The.-Type~A-Lid-i-S-9.-3-8----i-nGhes-&hiek~.~~*~~~~~~~ 121 The steel encasement of the polypropylene drum is O. 25 inches on the top and sides and 1.25 inch thick on the bottom.
~*
Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 5.1-2
SUMMARY
OF DOSE RATES (mrem/hr) Average Dose Rates (fuel w/o inserts) Cask Surface I meter (3 feet) Side 1 above shield1 along shield below shield4 Top Bottom Side Toe Bottom Nonnal Conditions Gamma 206 138 90.0 45.4 158 54.3 21.6 48.3 Neutron 131 15.3 193 6.7 340 7.9 2.6 65.2 Total 337 153 283 52.l 498 62.3 24.2 113 Accident Conditions Gamma 541 584 158 225 309 48.3 Neutron 1150 281 340 398 90.2 65.2 Total 1690 865 498 623 399 113 [1) Average dose rates along the side of the cask, above, below and along the neutron shield. (2) Accident " Top" dose rates are for the Type_ A Lid. Accident " Top" dose rates for the standard TN-32 lid {TN-32 and TN-32B) are presented in Figure 5.4-5. Maximum sur-face dose .-rates above the neutron shield are 293 mret;tt/hr (gamma) and 186 mrem/hr (neutron) [4) Maximum surface dose rates below the neutron shield are 203 mrem/hr {gamma) and 324 mrem/br {neutron) Incremental Gamma Dose(average)for Fuel Inserts (mrern/hr)
~
Cask Surface 1 meter (3 feet) Radial above 5 below 6 Top bottom radial above below top bottom Middle neutron neutron middle neutron neutron shield shield shield shield 30 73 21 16 9 B B 2 TPAs Cask Surface 1 meter (3 feet} Radial Above below top bottom radial above below top bottom Middle neutron neutron middle neutron neutron shield shield shield shield 1 28 0 7 0 1 4 0 lS) The maximum gamma dose rate above the neutron shield with BPRA inserts is 404 mrem/hr. (6) The maximum gamma dose rate below the neutron shield with BPRA inserts is 222 mrem/br. Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE S.l-3 DIRECT DOSE RATES AT POSTULATED SITE BOUNDARY FROM ONE CASK1 Distance f:i::cm Neut::r::cD Des es Gamma Doses !ct.aJ Doses Source (m:i::emLb:r::) (m:r::emLb:i:::l (mx:emLlu:l 100 meters l.06E-02 2.96E-02 4.02E-02 150 meters 3.39E-03 l.04E-02 l.38E-02 200 meters 1.43E-03 4.13E-03 S.56E-03 300 meters 3.59E-04 9.44E-04 1. 30E-o'3 500 meters 2.74E-OS 9.44E-OS 1.22E-04 1 No fuel inserts Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 5.2-1 MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION IN WESTINGHOUSE FUEL ASSEMBLIES Mass (kg/assembly) Material 14x14 15x15 17x17 Fuel Assembl~ Tap Fitting Upper Tie Plate SS 304 4.29 6.8 6.8 Hold Down Springs Inconel 718 0.7 1.1 1.37 Plenum
- .. Cladding & Guide Tubes Zr-4 5.1 6.1 5.5 Plenum Spring SS 302 1.3 1.5 1. 9 Fuel Zone Cladding & Guide Tubes Zr-4 87.1 99.2 102.9 Grids Zr-4 6.6 Inconel-718 1.4 5.9 5.9 Grid Brazing Material Nicrobraze 50 1.2 1.2 1.2 Miscellaneous SS 304 4.6 4.6 4.6 Bottom Fitting-Bottom Tie Plate SS 304 4.54 5.7 5.7 Total (Fuel assembly) 116.8 132.1 135.6 Thimble Plug Assembly Tqp Fittjpg Baseplate, yoke, SS 304 2.468 holddown bar, etc TPA Spring Inconel 718 0.358 Plenum Thimble Plugs SS 304 3.266 Burnable Poison Rod Assembly Top Fitting
_ _ _ _ _ H __B_asepla~yoke, SS 304 2.468 holddown bar, etc BPRA Spring Inconel 718 0.358 Plenum Cladding and Liner SS 304 0.80 Fuel Zone... .
. *-cladding* and Liner SS 304 15.0 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 5.2-2 MATERIAL COMPOSITIONS FOR FUEL ASSEMBLY HARDWARE MATERIALS Mater:ial Element Wejght % Chromium 0.125 Manganese 0.002 Iron 0.225 Zircaloy Cobalt 0.001 Nickel 0.002 Zirconium 97.911 Chromium 18.0 Manganese 2.0 Stainless Steel (SS 302) Iron 69.774 Cobalt 0.08 Nickel 8.92 Chromium 19.0 Manganese 2.0 Stainless Steel (SS 304) Iron 68.844 Cobalt 0.08 Nickel 8.92 Chromium 18.9753 Manganese 0.1997 Inconel 718 Iron 17.9766 Cobalt 0.46'94 Nickel 51.9625 Chromium 14.9709 Manganese 0. 01 ' Iron 0.0471 Nicrobraze SO cobalt 0.0381 Nickel 74.4438 Zirconium 0. 01:: Data taken from Reference 2. Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 5.2-3 PWR SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY SOURCE 3.5 wt% U-235, 45,000 MWd/MTU, 7 YEARS COOLING l?x17 OFA 17xl 7 Std1 l4xl4 OFA 14X14 Std ~ Thermal Power (W/assembly) Light Elements 15.4 15.1 *37.9 38.3 37.6 Actinides 142 188 198 170 203 Fission Products 595 673 744 688 746 752.4 876.1 979.9 896.3 986.6 Total Neutron Source 2.411E+OB 3.l64E+08 3.224E+08 2.754E+08 3.278E+08
,{n/~ec/assembly)
Gamma Source (y/sec/assembly) 7.589E+l3 7.447E+13 l.B66E+14 l. 891E+l4 l.853E+l4 Light Elements l.664E+l3 2.17BE+l3 2.329E+l3 2.026E+l3 2.427E+l3 Actinides 3.867E+15 4.409E+15 4.847E+15 4.469E+l5 4.870E+l5 Fission Products 3 * .959E+l5 4.SOSE+lS 5.057E+15 4.678E+l5 5.078E+l5 Total 1 A copy of this input file is provided in Section* S.S. SAS2H 1-DIMENSIONAL PWR DOSE EVALUATION
.contact (124. 64 cm) 1 111eter (224 .14 Cltl)
Detector Location neutron gamma ~ neutron ~ ~ 14 x 14 Optimized 10.9 65.6 77 4.43 30.B 35 13.B 66.6 BO 5.6 31.2 37 14 x 14 Standard 13 91.4 104 5.29 42 . .9 48 15 x l.5 11.4 92.7 104 4.64 43.6 48 17 x 17 Optimized 90.5 104 5.37 42.5 48 17 x 17 Standard1 13.2
. i_A copy of this input file is provided in Section S.S.
Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE S.2-4 GAMMA AND NEUTRON RADIATION SOURCES WESTINGHOUSE 17xl7 STANDARD 3.5 wt% U-235, 45,000 MWD/MTU, ?YEAR COOLING TIME Fission Product, Actinides, and Activation Activity 3.041E+OS (Curie/Assembly) Neutron Source 3.278E+08 (n/sec/Assembly} Fuel Zone Gamma Source 5.067E+15 (y/sec/Assembly) Plenum Zone Gamma Source 1.548E+12 Cy/sec/Assembly) Top End Fitting Zone Gamma Source 6.191E+12 Cy/sec/Assembly} Bottom End Fitting Zone Gamma Source 4.643E+l2 Cy/sec/Assembly) Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 5.2-5 GAMMA :RADIATION SOURCES THIMBLE PLUG ASSEMBLY AND BURNABLE POISON ROD ASSEMBLY THIMBLE PLUG ASSEMBLY Plenum Zone Gamma Source 2.186E+12 CyI sec/Assembly} Top End Fitting Zone Gamma Source 1.736E+l2 CyI sec/Assembly) BURNABLE POISON ROD ASSEMBLY Fuel Zone Gamma Source 2.203E+14 Cy/sec/Assembly) Plenum Zone Gamma Source 2.337E+12 (y/sec/Assembly} Top End Fitting Zone Gamma Source 7.525E+12 Cy/sec/Assembly) Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 5.2-8 PRIMARY GAMMA SOURCE SPECTRUM SCALE 18 GROUP STRUCTURE WESTINGHOUSE 17Xl7 STANDARD FUEL ASSEMBLY 3.Swt% u-235, 45,000 MWd/MTU, 7 YEAR COOLING TIME Bottom Scale Active Fuel Plenum TOE Fitting fitting Group Energy: Interval, MeV Zone Zone zone ~ 28 8.000E+OO to 1.000E+Ol l.SSBE+OS 29 6.SOOE+OO ,to B.OOOE+OO B.7SOE+OS 30 5.000E+OO to 6.SOOE+OO 4.461E+06 31 4.000E+OO to S.OOOE+OO l.112E+07 32 3.000E+OO to 4.000E+OO 3.247E+09 33 2.SOOE+OO to 3.000E+OO 2.616E+l.O 34 2.000E+OO to 2.SOOE+OO 5:737E+l1 35 l.660E+OO to 2.000E+OO 3.992E+l1 36 l.330E+OO to l.660E+OO 5.457E+13 3.408E+ll l.363E+12 l.022E+l2 37 l.OOOE+OO to .1.330E+OO 2.381E+l4 1.207E+l2 4.827E+12 3.620E+l2 3S 8.000E-Ol to l.OOOE+OO 2.292E+l4 39 6.000E-01 to B.OOOE-01 2.lBBE+lS 40 4.000E-01 to 6.000E-01 4.469E+l4 41 3.000E-01 to 4.000E-01 4.623E+13 42 2.000E-01 to 3.000E-01 7.437E+l3 43 1.000E-01 to 2.000E-01 2.722E+l.4 44 5.000E-02 to l.OOOE-01 3.337E+l4 45 l.OOOE-02 to S.OOOE-02 1.183E+l5 Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 5.2-9 PRIMARY GAMMA SOURCE SPECTRUM SCALE 18 GROUP STRUCTURE THIMBLE PLUG ASSEMBLY Scale Plenum Top Fitting Group Energy Interval, MeV zone ~ 36 l.330E+OO to 1.660E+OO 4.814E+l.l. 3.823E+l.1 37 1. OOOE+OO to 1. 330E+OO l.705E+l2 l.354E+l2 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 5.2-10 PRIMARY GAMMA SOURCE SPECTRUM SCALE lB*GROUP STRUCTURE BURNABLE POISON ROD ASSEMBLY SCALE Active Fuel Plenum Top Fitting Group Enersn: Interval (MeV} Zone ~ !2!!! 28 8.00E+OO to 1.000E+Ol 0.00E+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO 29 6.SOE+OO to 8.000E+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO 30 5.00E+OO to 6.SOOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO 31 4.00E+OO to S.OOOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO 32 3.00E+OO to 4.000E+OO 1.63E+Ol l.718E-Ol 3.430E-Ol 33 2.SOE+OO to 3.000E+OO 6.69E+OS 7.ll9E+03 2.810E+04 34 2.00E+OO to 2.SOOE+OO 4.31E+08 *4.590E+06 l.810E+07 35 l.66E+OO to 2.000E+OO 2.14E+ll 2.267E+09 B.190E+09 36 l.33E+OO to 1.6601!;+00 1.82E+13 1.934E+ll 7.630E+ll 37
- l.OOE+OO to l.330E+OO 6.44E+l3 6.848E+ll 2.700E+l2 38 8.00E-01 to 1.000E+OO 7.16E+13 7.SB7E+ll 2.220E+12 39 6.00E-01 to 8.000E-01 l.44E+l0 1. S21E+08 S.490E+08 40 4.00E-01 to 6.000E-01 1.39E+l3 1.474Jl;+ll S.320E+ll 41 3.00E-01 to 4.000E-01 4,74E+13 S.OlSE+ll l.130E+l2 42 2.00E-01 to 3.000E-01 l.24E+ll 1.316E+09 4.700E+09 43 l.OOE-01 to 2.000E-01 4.63E+ll 4.906E+09 1.740E+l0 44 5.00E-02 to l.OOOE-01 B.73E+l1 9.260E+09 3.260E+l0 45 l. OOE-02 to s:oooE-02 3.14E+l2 3.32BE+l0 l.170E+ll Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 5~2-11 AXIAL BURNUP PROFILE Distance from pj5tance from Neutron Bottom of Active Bottom of Actjye Gamma Peaking Fuel Ccm) Fuel ( jn) Profile Factor 0.00 0 0 0.000 2.86 1.125 0.54 0.06 8.57 3.375 0.65 0.15 17.15 6.75 0.79 0.36 28.58 11.25 0.94 0.77 40.01 15.75 1. 02 1.09 57.15 22.5 1.091 l.43
. 80. 01 31.5 1.135 1.68 148.59 58.5 1.126 l.63 171.45 67.5 1.12 1.60 182.88 72 1.12 1.60 259.08 102 1.12 1.60 289.56 114 1.1 1.48 320.04 126 1.02 1.09 337.19 132.75 0.87 0.55 348.62 137.25 0.73 0.25 362.90 142.875 0.48 0.04 365.76 144 0 0.000 Rev. O .1/00
TABLE 5.2-12 NEUTRON SOURCE DISTRIBUTION WESTINGHOUSE 17xl7 STANDARD FUEL ASSEMBLY 3.Swt% INITIAL ENRICHMENT, 45,000 MWD/MTU, 7 YEAR COOLING TIME TOTAL (ALPHA,N PLUS SPONTANEOUS FISSION) NEUTRON SOURCE SCALE STRUCTURE USING SPECTRA FOR URANIUM DIOXIDE Gz:p Energy Interval CmeV) N/sec/assernbly 1 6.430E+OO 2.000E+Ol 6.066E+06 2 3.000E+OO 6.430E+OO 6.880E+07 3 l.850E+OO 3.000E+OO 7.598E+O? 4 1. 400E+OO 1.SSOE+OO 4.292E+07 5 9.000E-01 l.400E+OO S.816E+07 6 4.000E-01 9.000E-01 6.347E+07 7 1. OOOE-01 4.000E-01 1.242E+07 Total 3.278E+OB Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 5.3-1 MATERIALS INPUT FOR SAS4 MODEL TN-32 CASK - FUEL ASSEMBLIES ONLY RADIAL DIRECTION SCALE Atomic Number Dens it~ Elementl *Library Density Material Jgllli Nuclide Identifier !atoms£barn-cm!
~ 92235 1.51E-04 Fuel/Basket uo, l.912 U-235 U-238 92238 4.llE-03 0 8016 8.53E-03 Zircaloy 0.376 Zr 40302 2.<lBE-03 Inconel 0.022 Si 14000 l.18E-05 Ti 22000 6.92E-06 Cr 24404 3.82E-05 Fe 26404 l.66E-05 Ni 28400 l.65E-04 Aluminmn 0.306 Al 13027 6.83B-03 SS304 0.316 Cr 24304 6.95E-04 Mn 25055 6.93E-05 Fe 26304 2.37E-03 Ni 28304 3.08E-04 Zircaloy 0.459 Zr 40302 3.0JE-03 Plenum/Basket Aluminum 0.306 Al 13027 6.83E-03 SS304 0.458 er 24304 l.OlE-03 Mn 25055 1.00E-04 Fe 26304 J.43E-03 Ni 28304 4.46E-04 Inconel 0.212 Si 14000 l.14E-04 Top Fitting/Basket Ti 22000 6.67E-05 Cr 24404 3 .68E-04 Fe 26404 1.60E-04 Ni 28404 1.59E-03 Aluminum 0 .306 Al 13027 6.83E-03 SS304 l.351 er 24304 2.97E-03 Mn 25055 2.96E-04 Fe 26304 1.0lE-02 Ni 28304 l.32E-03 Aluminum 0.306 Al 13027 6.83E-03 Bottom SS304 1.409 Cr 24304 3.lOE-03 Fitting/Basket Mn 25055 3.0!IE-04
" - - - - - - - - - --*------- -*--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -------Fe----2630.4..._ _ _ _ _ 1_._ou:_:Jl~--- __ Ni 28304 l.37E-03 carbon Steel 7.8212 Fe 26000 8.35E-02 cask Body c 6012 3.93E-03 Polypropylene 0.90 Fe* 26000 9.18E-03
*Polypropylene I c 6012 3.49E-02 Steel H 1001 6.84£-02 Resin 1.687 0 8016 2.22E-02 Resin/Aluminum Al 13027 l.lOE-02 (1.58 g/cc> "
Aluminum (2.702 c 6012 2.50E-02 g/cc) H 1001 4.27E-02 B-10 5010 l.65E-04 B-11 5011 6.63E-04 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 5.3-1 (continued} MATERIALS INPUT FOR SAS4 MODEL TN-32 CASK - FUEL ASSEMBLIES ONLY AXIAL DIRECTION SCALE Atomic Number Density Element! X..ibrary Density
~ Material .1.9illl Nuclide Identifier (atoms/barn-cm)
Fuel uo, l. 912 U-235 92235 1.51.E-04 U-238 92238 4.ll.E-03 0 8016 8.53E-03 Zircaloy 0.376 Zr 40302 2.48E-03 Inconel 0.022 Si 14000 l.lBE-05 Ti 22000 6.92E-06 Cr 24404 3.82E-05 Fe 26404 l.6'6E-05 Ni '28404 l.65E-04 Aluminum 0.301? Al 13027 6.SJE-03 SS304 0.316 Cr 24304 6 .95E-04 Mn 25055 6.93E-05 Fe 26304 2.37E-03 Ni 28304 3.0SE-04 Plenum Zircaloy 0.459 Zr 40302 3 .03E-03 SS304 0.159 Cr 24304 3.50E-04 Mn 25055 3.49E-05 Fe 26304 l.l9E-03 Ni 28304 l.55E-04 Top Fitting Inconel 0.212 Si 14000 l.14E-04 Ti 22000 6.67E-05 Cr 24404 3.68E-04 Fe 26404 l.60E-04 Ni 28404 l..S9E-03 SS304 l.052 Cr 24304 2.44E-03 Mn 25055 2.43E-04 Fe 26304 B.32E-03 Ni 28304 l.OBE-03 Bottom Fitting SS304 1.110 Cr 24304 2.44E-03
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - M n - - - ---25055--*--- .-43E-04-- -- -------------- -----
Fe 26304 8.32E-03 Ni 28304 l.OBE-03 cask Body Carbon Steel 7.8212 Fe 26000 B.3SE-02 c 6012 3.93E-03 Polypropylene I Polypropylene 0.90 Fe 26000 9.lBE-03 Steel c 6012 3.49E-02 H l.001 6.84E-02 Resin/Aluminum Resin 1.687 0 8016 2.22E-02 (1.58 g/cc) & Al l.3027 l..l.OE-02 Aluminum (2.702 c 601.2 2.SOE-02 g/cc) H 1001. 4.27E-02 B-10 5010 l..EiSE-04 B-11 501.l. 6.63E-04 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE S.3-2 MATERIALS INPUT FOR SAS4 MODEL TN-32 CASK - FUEL ASSEMBLIES WITH THIMBLE PLUG ASSEMBLIES RADIAL DIRECTION Zone Material Density Element/ SCALE Atomic Number (9/cc:) Nuclide Library Density Identifier (atoms/barn-cm) Fuel/Basket uo2 1.912 U-235 92235 1.518-04 U-238 92238 4.llE-03 0 8016 8. S3E-03 Zircaloy 0.376 Zr 40302 2.48E-03 Inc:onel 0.022 Si 14000 l.l8E-OS Ti 22000 6.92E-06 Cr 24404 3.82E-OS Fe 26404 l.668-05 Ni 28400 l.6SE-04 Aluminum 0.306 Al 13027 6.83E-03 SS304 0.316 Cr 24304 6.9SE-04 Mn 25055 6.93E-05 Fe 26304 2.37E-03 Ni 28304 3.08E-04 Plenum/Basket Zircaloy 0.459 Zr 40302 3.0JE-03 Aluminum 0.306 Al 13027 6.838-03 SS304 0.731 Cr 24304 l.61E-OJ Mn 25055 1.60E-04 Fe 26304 S .48E-03 Ni 28304 7.13E-04 Top Fitting/Basket Inconel 0.267 Si 14000 1.438-04 Ti 22000 8.40E-OS Cr 24404 4.64E-04 Fe 26404 2.02E-04 Ni 28404 2.00E-03 Aluminum 0.306 Al 13027 6.83E-03 SS304 l.733 Cr 24304 3.SlE-03 Mn 25055 3.80E-04 Fe 26304 1.30E-02 Ni 28304 l.69E-03 Bottom Aluminum 0.306 Al 13027 6.83E-03 Fitting/Basket SS304 1.409 Cr 24304 3.lOE-03 Mn 25055 3.09E-04
- - - - - - Fe-* - - - J04----- - - - - - . - 0 6 E - 0 2 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ni 28304 l.37E-OJ Cask Body Carbon Steel 7.8212 Fe 26000 8.35E*02 c 6012 3.93E-03 Polypropylene*/ Polypropylene. 0.90 Fe 26000 9.lBE-03 Steel c 60i2 3.49E-02 H 1001 6.84E-02 Resin/Aluminum Resin 1.687 0 8016 2.22E-02 (l.58 g/ccl & Al 13027 l.lOE-02 Aluminum (2.702 c 6012 2.SOE-02 g/cc) H 1001 4.278-02 B-10 5010 l.6SE-04 B-11 5011 6.63E-04 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 5.3-2 (continued) MATERIALS INPUT FOR SAS4 MODEL TN-32 CASK - FUEL ASSEMBLIES WITH THIMBLE PLUG ASSEMBLIES AXIAL DIRECTION
~ Atomic Number Densitz: Elementl Libran: Density
!QM Material (g/cc) Nuclide Identifier (atoms/barn-cm)
Fuel U02 1.912 U-235 92235 l.51E-04 tJ-238 92238 4. llE-03 0 8016 8.53E-03 Zircaloy 0.376 Zr 40302 2.4BE*03 Inconel 0.022 Si 14000 l.lSE-05 Ti 22000 6.92E-06 Cr 2004 3.82E*05 Fe 26404 l.66E*05 Ni 28404 1.65E*04 Aluminum 0.30~ Al 13027 6. 83E-03 SS304 0.316 er 24304 6.9SE*04 Mn 25055 6. 93E-05 Fe 26304 2.37E-03 Ni 28304 3.08E-04 Plenum Zircaloy 0.459 Zr 40302 3.03E-03 SS304 0.432 Cr 24304 9.51E-04 Mn 25055 9.47E-05 Fe 26304 3.24E-03 Ni 28304 4.21E-04 Top Fitting Inconel 0.267 Si 14000 1.43E-04 Ti 22000 B.40E-05 Cr 24404 4.64E-04 Fe 26404 2.02E-04 Ni 28404 2.00E-03 SS304 1.434 Cr 24304 3.16E-03 Mn 25055 3.14E-04 Fe 26304 l.07E-02 Ni 28304 l.40E-03 Bottom Fitting SS304 1.110 Cr 24304 2.44E-03
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- -~----------
---Mn------2soss-- ---- --2-;-43*E~o4---- ----- - ' - - - - - - - - -
Fe 26304 8.32E-03 Ni 28304 l.08E-03 cask Body Carbon Steel 7.8212 Fe 26000 8.3SE-02 c 601.2 3.93E-03 Polypropylene I Polypropylene 0.90 Fe 26000 9.18E-03 Steel c 6012 3.49E-02 H 1001 6.84E*02 Resin/Aluminum Resin 1.687 0 8016 2.22E-02 (l.58 g/cc:) & Al 13027 l..l.OE-02 Aluminum (2.702 c 6012 2.50E-02 g/cc) H 1001 4.27E-02 B-10 5010 l..65E-04 B*l.l. 501.J. 6.63E-04 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 5.3-3 MATERIALS INPUT FOR SAS4 MODEL TN-32 CASK FUEL WITH BURNABLE POISON ROD ASSEMBLIES RADIAL DIRECTION
~ Atomic Number Density Element/ Library Density Zone Material .!9.l!a£1 Nuclide Identifier (atoms/barn-cm}
FUel/Basket ~ 1.912 U-235 92235 1.SlE-04 U-238 92238 ol.llE-03 0 8016 8.53£-03 Zirc:aloy 0.376 Zr .40302 2.48E*03 lnconel 0.022 Si 14000
- 1.lBE-05 Ti 22000 6.92E*06 Cr 24404 3.82E-05 Fe 26404 l.66E-05 Ni 28400 1.6SE-04 Aluminum 0.306 Al 13027 6 .83E-03 SS304 0.359 Cr 24304 7.90E-04 Mn 25055 7.87E*05 Fe 26304 2.69E*03 Ni 28304 3.SOE-04 Plenum/Basket Zircaloy 0.459 Zr 40302 3.03E-03 Aluminum 0.306 Al 13027 6.B3E-03 SS304 0.511 er 24304 1.12E-03 Mn 25055 l.12E*04 Fe 26304 3.83E*03 Ni 28304 4.98E*04 Top Fitting/Basket lnconel 0.267 Si 14000 1.43E-04 Ti 22000 8.40E*OS Cr 24404 4.64E-04 Fe 26404 2.02E-04 Ni 28404 2.00E-03 Aluminum 0.306 Al i3027 6.83E-03 SS304 1.733 Cr 24304 3.81E*03 Mn 25055 3.BOE-04 Fe 26304 l.30E-02 Ni 28304 l.69E-03 Bottom Aluminum 0.306 Al 13027 6.83E-03 Fitting/Basket SS304 1.409 er 24304 3.lOE-03
. Mn 25055 3.09E*04
_ _ _ _ _ F.e_____ 263Q_4._ __ l.06E*02 * - - - - - - - Ni 28304 1.37E-03 Cask Body Carbon Steel 7.8212 Fe 26000 8.3SE-02 c 6012 3 .93E-03 Rolypropylene I Polypropylene 0.90 Fe .26000 9.lBE-03 Steel c 6012 3.49E-02 H. 1001 6.84E*02 Resin/Aluminum Resin 1.687 0 8016 2.22E-02 (1.SB g/cc:) & Al 13027 1. lOE-02 Aluminum (2.702 c 6'012 2.SOE*02 g/ccl H 1001 4.27E*02 B-10 5010 1.65E*04 B-11 5011 6 .'3E*04 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 5,3.:..3 (continued) MATERIALS* INPUT FOR SAS4 MODEL TN-32 CASK FUEL WITH BURNABLE POISON ROD ASSEMBLIES AXIAL DIRECTION SCALE Atomic Number Densit:z: Elementl Library Density Zone Material i9.illl.. Nuclide Identifier (atomslbarn-cm) Fuel uo, l.912 U-235 92235 l.5lE-04 0-238 92238 4.11.E-03 0 8016 8.53E-03 Zircaloy 0.376 Zr 40302 2.48E-03 Inconel 0.022 Si 14000 l.l8E-05. Ti 22000 6.92E-06 Cr 24404 3.82B*OS Fe 26404 l.66E*OS Ni 28404 l.65E-04 Aluminum 0.306 Al 13027 6.83E-03 SS304 0.359 Cr 24304 7.!IOE-04 Mn 25055 7.87£-05 Fe 26304 2.69E-03 Ni 28304 3.50E*04 Plenum Zircaloy 0.459 Zr 40302 3 .03£-03 SS304 0.212 Cr 24304 4.67E-04 Mn 25055 4.65£-05 Fe 26304 l.59E-03 Ni 28304 2.07£-04 T9P Fitting Inc:onel 0.267 Si 14000 l,43E-04 Ti 22000 B.40E-05 Cr 24404 4.64E*04 Fe 26404 2.02E-04 Ni 28404 2.00E-03 SSJ04 1.434 Cr 24304 3.16£-03 Mn 25055 3 .14E-04 Fe 26304 l.07E-02 Ni 28304 l.40E-03 Bottom Fitting SS304 1.110 Cr 24304 2.44E-03
* Mn 5055 2A3E_,,Jt4 --------- - -
Fe 26304 8.32E-03 Ni 28304 1.08E*03 Cask Body Carbon Steel 7.8212 Fe 26000 B.JSE-02 c 6012 3.93E-03 Polypropylene I Polypropylene 0.90 Fe 26000 9.l8E-03 Steel c 6012 3.49E*02 H 1001 6.84E-02 Resin/Aluminum R.esin *1.687 0 8016 2.22E-02 Cl.SB g/ccl &. Al 13027 l.lOE-02 Aluminum (2.702 c 6012 2.SOE-02 g/c:c) H 1001 4.27E-02 B-10 5010 l.6SE*04 B-ll 5011 6.63E-04 Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 5.4-1 PARAMETERS FOR THE SCALE 27N-18G LIBRARY Group Max Energy Flux-Dose Factor No (eV) (rem/hr/~ 1 2.000E+07 1.492E-04 2 6.434E+06 1.446E-04 3 3.000E+06 l.270E-04 4 l.SSOE+OEi 1.281E-04 5 l.400E+06 l..29BE-04 6 9.000E+OS l.02BE-04 7 4.000E+OS 5.llBE-05 8 l.OOOE+OS 1.232E-OS 9 l.700E+04 3.B37E-06 10 3.000E+03 3.725E-06 11 5.SOOE+02 4.0lSE-06 12 i.0*00E+o2 4.293E-06 13 3.0DOE+Ol 4.474E-0Ei 14 l.OOOE+Ol 4.SEiBE-06 15 3.0SOE+OO 4.SSBE-06 16 1. 77DE+OO 4.519E-06 17 l .300E+OO 4.4BBE-06 18 .l.130E+OO 4.466E-06 19 l.OOOE+OO 4.435E-06 20 8.000E-01 4.327E-06 21 4.000E-01 4.19BE-06 22 3.250E-Ol 4.098E-06 23 2.250E-01 3.839E-06 24 l.OOOE-01 3.67SE-06 25 5.000E-02 3.675E-06 26 3.000E-02 3.675E-06 27 l.OOOE-02 3.675E-06 28 l.OOOE+07 B.772E-06 29 B *. OOOE+06 7.47BE-06 30 6.SOOE+06 6.37SE-;:-cr~ 31 S.OOOE+OEi S.414E-0Ei 32 4.000E+06 4.622E-0Ei 33 3.000E+OEi 3.960E-06 34 2.SOOE+06 3.469E-06 35 2.000E+06 3.0l9E-06 36 l.660E+06 2.628E-06 37 l.330E+06 2.20SE-06 38 l.OOOE+OEi 1.833E-06 39 8.000E+OS l.523E-06 40 6.000E+OS 1.173E-06 41 4.000E+OS 8.759E-07 42 3.000E+OS 6.JOEiE-07 43 2.000E+OS 3.834E-07 44 ' l.OOOE+OS 2.669E-07 45 S.OOOE+04 9.347E-07 Rev. 0 1/00
POLYPllOPYLENE CARBON S'l'EBL
.50 '!'HICK CARBON S'l'EEL 68.75* l.D. STEEL*-......._
I I I
---a1.1s* O.D. STEEL-ft--~
II I
---as.oo* I.D. RESIN---
.12 'l'HICR ALUMINUM
'I I
-.-.i---9s.so* O.D. RESIN-.,~--...~I BORATED POLYESTER RESIN COMPOUND I
- --r---*----- _;lt----
I .*
~
97.75* O.D. STEEL*-~-- FIGURE 5.1-1 CASK SHIELDING
.. CONFIGURATION REV. 0 J../00
I
- r**
i fOP PlfflHO SOHi ~----*~---- ll'L:!HtlK ZONE.
----~------M.
I I AC'l'?VI :rD'IL ZOHl!l Li XITZrl2 XlflJt.J.l lllT!Jl.J FIGURE 5.1*2 N-32 NORMAL CONDITIONS DOSE POINT LOCATIONS REV. 0 1/00
'.1I . FIGURE *s.2-1 AXIAL BURNUP PROFILE FOR DESIGN BASIS FUEL l ,~
........._,- Jly I*~*
I .,- i!
".:I ._.
ffi' hi
~
) l
!I 0.8
....Ito!
e 0.6 .,. flt I . Cl. a
!I
& 0.4 0.2 0
0 l2 24 36 . 48 60 72 84 96 108 120 132 144 Distance from Bottom of Active Fuel (in)
*Notes:
- 1. Points scattered on the graph represent actual data from Virginia Power, North Anna Station and Wisconsin Electric, Point Beach Nuclear Unit
- 2. Solid line represents burnup profile design value.
\
;~ .
**REV. 0 1/00
*~ .. '
- I
. FIGURE 5.2-2 : *::.. .,
NEUTRON SOURCE . DISTRIBUTION PROFILE FOR. DESIGN BASIS. FUEL 1.8 v--
.... * *, ~
.. I. ~ ~
~~-- .
1.6 l!*
. ~* 1.4 I
I t
" \
-. I I
I I
', v* ..
0.4 I \ i\ 0.2 o.o o
~' 12 24 36 48
&o n 84 96 *1oa 120* 132
..... \
144 Distance from Bottom o~ Active Fuel (in) REV. 0 1/00
FIGURE 5.4-1 NORMAL CONDITIONS. -* RADIAL DIRECTION - MIDPLANE AVERAGE OF rop AND.* BO'l'TOM SAS4 RADIAL MODELS : 2IDO 110 1'0 .,"'..' . 1-:! "-' """ *""-,, IOJ
~ ..
*_. *j IO
~
fO
"°20 0
0 150 Nclllnll Dose 11.aic I:_.,...__....,______
~..-~~~~--~~~~~~~~-
I:" r...... " lell+""c,..-~~~--~~~~~~-.:...~--1 11+-~~~~~~~~~~-
*! IO .j 1~----~---*~--
--- *- r ;r-*----~-~~~=-~---~---A~t+-.-,,_..,,....,.........,.----*-----__.:.*__;;~~----I --------!_~
~t-~--t-~~..+=:::::::;:::~~::! ... -. - - - -----* _ : _ *- - - - - - - - -
- IO '.
o----~--~~~~-----------~- o O"--~--------~--~--~----~---
~ IGD * . aco .o *IS)
.......cu..-.. 1111. . . 1:1mc.111 . . . . (all
_,_.:._,_.+...... -.11-:l'ld+llA ...:..111111'wl+arJIA.M+1'A
- REV. 0 . l/00
FJ:GORE *s.* 4._2: NORMAL.~.CONDITIONS *~,AXIAL. DIRECTION.*-. **AVERAGE ... .....
. ... ...... . 'l'OP. (STANDARD ANIT-TYPE:,*A LJ:D) i .....'/,
Total Dose Rate . ID 10
'C' 1! SI
.. 40 I
J 30 20 JO 0 0 .50 JOO .150 l>IJClllCI tnllll Sorfect (CID) NemDllDasellar. Ga.. Dme llale ---*-------'Jll-.p;;;-;;;;-;;;;~;.;;;::::::::::::~;;;;::::::::::=:.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~ 1:~~--f-----1 l*+-~~~~~~~~+-~---t 1.:io,~-,~~~ o.._....:...~~--~~~~------ .......-------- 0 ~ a ~ a. 1.L...--~~~----~--~----~~--~-- 0 1511
- 1>11-.rn.s.-r*
REV. 0 1/00
FlGURB S.4-3 NORMAL AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
. AXIAL DIREC'l'ION - AVERAGE' .
. BQTTOM .
Total Dclse Rate O""----~--'----~_.._~------'-----~ 0 !IO
. 100 . 150 J>llllllcc ha! Cull Slllllcc (cm)
Ganina Dan Rate NcllliGD Dost Ritt
~
Ml
""""'===------------...,------""-~- -----,,, *------
31111,J......:~--...:..----------~--1*--:--- 1:i i
*-i~
fm"-__:...-~-------- ID I lfO J UQ Cl .. I 0 O; * :Ill 1Gll . UD ol-~~----------------~ 0 1111.... rr.ou llmfmsCmO
--Fnl.ftld*'1PA-hd*""" -hc1.hd*IPAA.Fuel
- TI'A REV. 0 1/00
~CCIDENT CONDITIONS - IW>IAL DIRECTION"-.. MIDPLANE.
*-* . AVERAGE* OF TOP AND BOTTOM*SAs4 RAD;tAL MODELS
~------------------..-.--------~~~--.
1100 .....-------1-------~i-------- HOO~
......~-------f I JC am
- lCXD
""" ~
""'~
. r-.,..,
.i .. ~
J..., ~...._ .j
~t::======:t:=:::::::::::~::::§~~~;::::::l lir>+--------+-~------i--~~---+--.-_J____..-{
o~-------'---------~-------'--------' 0 50 .IOO ; ISO lllalmftl'rllCllMSarfse(Cll\l *
=~---------------*-* -
JCDr*~--~-.----------*---------1 IDlll"-~-=---..1--------------~- 1-~~-----i
*I*.
- l. a .. i - . -~----,~
J*r-----~~~...-...:~-------------t
*+-.._____________ ..,.;:::.....,~-=---._,,,__--1
.. *!1*.~----~~------~-*-*~
0--------------------------~----i
*o ,, Jal .
I>> . ,, .
- Ill)'
- UD. - .llJ)
'*-flmc.ll.1.... (111) riia-ir.~111..,..bl
.. :-M--llld+~ ..-1'111!+1PA.
-lllcl,;IWl~IP&A. ....l*>>A ... " I
FIGURE 5.4-5 ACCIDENT CONDITIONS - AXIAL DIRECTION - AVERAGE STANDARD LID (TN-32 and TN-32B) - TOP MODEL Total Dose Rate O"---~--..L;...----------~--......,~~--_..J
. ~
-ruc1--FucJ+Jll'RA--J'ucl+TPA r* -
1~+----~~..-:...c:~~--~~~--1
-----:--~---1~--------;*-*1.,_ _
. llOO '* 11111 0 50, 0 ......------~--------~--...:-~~--i lQO
...,..(.-)
uo 0 ~
..._,,_...,..... m oJ.,_,----------------------------
B *.
-+-J'llCI .....FllCl+DPKA .....fud+11'A -1'1111.M+lllA.r.ct+TPA REV.. 0 1/00 I I i.
...t ,
i:
*t! .
- l*
. '/~
~
\
FI~ :5.4~~*--: ..... H ACCIDENT "CONDITIONS: - AXIAii*'DIREC'l'IbN --; 'AVERAGE 1,l . ....
- '* -.~
TYPE A LID "(TN-32A}:-.- 'l'OP -~~DEIJ .. ~.*.
. . . : .*~ ~
Total Dose Rate l2IXI lax> llXI
.,...._ 1.
!. ClllD
~ .
I <<JO 200
.. I 0
0
.... Tt"
~*'
-+-Fael --Fu;l+BPRA -.-Fuel+TPA
{
*:1
*_,;, i Neutnm DoH lllite a - Dose Ralf ..
Jll) 211 i:,.., .1: J. I IGO 11111
*o* 50
~ ......,...,
1111
-~ __....hel+ll'IA -hd+Tl'A .
uo :m 0 D 150 *. :ICG
--Ftcl.r..l+TPA.f'tld*lf!"
t)T."t 7 . " 1 , ,., ,..
APPENDIX SA EVALUATION OF MEASURED DOSE RATES SA.l Measured Dose Rates Dose rates have been measured on two TN-32 casks which are currently stored at Virginia Power's Surry Station ISFSI. Radial gamma *and neutron dose rates were measured at the cask surface,18 inches and 1 meter from the cask surface at various axial locations. The gamma dose rates were measured with a RS0-50'."'"E* instrument and the neutrons with a Ludlum "Remball". One of the casks contained spent fuel assemblies with BPRA inserts (TN-32-05) and the other cask (TN-32-07) had spent fuel without any inserts. Measurements were taken axially along the trunnion line (0°} and also at 90° from the trunnion. Figures 5A-1,5A-2, SA-3 and SA-4 show the measured dose rates. The neutron dose rates shown have been reduced by a factor of 2 to account for the conservative "Remball" readings. This reduction is based on a PNL report on measurements performed at Surry July 1998. 5A.2 Fuel Data The fuel parameters for the two casks were similar except, as mentioned above, TN-32-05 contained BPRAs. The average burnup, enrichment and cool time for each cask was 35,975 MWD/MTU, 3.60%, 10.7. years and 3_6,300 MWD/MTU, 3.59%, and 10* years respectively. Because no.BPRAs were involved, cask TN 07 was selected to perform a "benchmark'"' shielding evaluation against. The specific fuel data is shown in Table SA-1 with the peripherally located assemblies shown in bold print. Since the ---p*eripheral assemblies strongly control the exterior dose rate, the average parameters for these assenlb-"l+/-e-s-wa-s-d-t-e-~minecLand___________ source terms wer~ prepared using these parameters of 35,000 - MWD/MTU, 3.60% and 11 years cool time. SA.3 Source Terms A SAS2H/ORIGEN-S analysis (similar to Chapter 5) was performed using the 17x17 standard assembly with the fuel parameters listed above: Table SA-2 lists the gamma spectra obtained from this analysis. The gamma source due to the assembly hardware, end fittings and plenum, was removed from the gamma spectrum and only the active fuel source, Table 5A-3, was conservatively used in the shielding analysis. SA-1 Rev. 0 1/00
SA.4 Shielding Analysis Gamma and neutron dose rates were calculated using the SAS4 shielding models, both top and bottom, utilized in Chapter 5. Primary_ gamma, capture gamma and neutron evaluations were made using the gamma and neutron sources cal'culated above. The. average radial gamma and neutron doses at* the surface and 1 meter from the surface in the neutron shield region were calculated and the results are shown below. Dose Rate (mrem/hr} Bottom model contact 1 meter Capture Gamma 6.46 2.15 Primary Gamma 43.8 17.7 Neutron 1.89 1.23 Top Model Capture Gamma 1.22 0.43 Primary Gamma 50.2 20.3 Neutron 4.74 1.86 Averaging the results from the top and bottom models, the calculated dose rates for the TN-32-07 cask are: Contact 1 meter Gamma Dose 50.8 mrem/hr 20.3 mrem/hr Neutron Dose 3.3 mrem/hr 1.5 mrem/hr Total Dose 54.1 mrem/hr 21 . 8 mrem/hr 5A.5 Comparison of Measured and Calculated
t<F.:.-rr-em--t-he-Gat--a-s.oown-i-n-Zigu-r.es-SA°=3-ancL.5A~, an avei:.ag.e _________
value can be calculated, in the resin shield area, for the measured data from the six readings each at contact and 1 meter, the following values are obtained. Contact 1 meter Gamma Dose 7.0 rnrern/hr 4.2 rnrern/hr Neutron Dose 10.7 rnrem/hr 7.5 rnrern/hr Total Dose 17.7 rnrem/hr 11.7 mrern/hr SA-2 Rev. O 1/00
"Correction" factors, the ratio of the calculated/measured, can be produced as shown below.
Factor (calculated/measured) contact 1 meter Gamma Dose 7.3 4.8 Neutron Dose 0.31 0.21
'Total Dose 3.1 1~9 It can be seen that the calculated gamma dose rate in the resin region is over predicted by a factor of about 1 and 5 at
.qontact* and" 1 meter respectively *. While the calculated neutron dose rate is under pr~dicted by a factor of about 3 and 5 at contact and 1 meter respectively. Since the gamma makes up a larger portion of the total dose, the total calculated dose rate is still seen to be conservat~ve by a factor of about 3 and 2 at contact and 1 meter respectively. 5A.6 Dose Above and Below Neutron Shield In addition to the dose rates measured in the resin area, dose rates were also measured above and below the neutron shield (resin area)
- Calculation _of dose rates in these areas using SCALE4.3 (SAS4) are difficult because point detectors must be used and meaningful results with good statistics are difficult.
Therefore, it will be informative to evaluate the measured dose rates in the area above and below the neutron shield to determine their relative value (factor) compared to the average in the resin. This "factor" will be useful in predicting dose rates above and below the *neutron shield for design basis fuel. The-mea-s-w;.ea--Q.ose-.r:a.-tes__f_o_r _b_oth casks will be used in this evaluation since it does not appear that the BPRAs in the fuel had a significant affect on the measured dose rates. The measured dose rates above and below the neutron shield are shown p~low for both casks. Measured Dose Rates Contact (mrem/hr) Above Neutron Shield Below Neutron Shield Gamma Neutron Ganuna Neutron Cask oo goo 0° 90° 0° 90° oo goo TN-32-.05 12 -- 20 - 35
-40
-6 10 23 55 TN-32-07 16 16 30 - 30 5 4 38 60 SA-3 Rev. 0 1/00
Measured Dose Rates 1 Meter (mrem/hr) Above Neutron Shield Below Neutron Shield Gamma Neutron Gamma Neutron Cask 0° 90° oo goo 0° 90° TN-32-05 5 5
-0° 10 90°
--8 5 .6 13 20 TN-32-07 4 4 *0 / 9 . 4 4 . 9 20 Note: Values for 0° below shield are measured at the trunnion. Neutron dose at bottom is larger than top because of concrete reflection If the measured dose rates above and below the neutron shield are compared to the average measured dose rate in the shield area (shown above as 7.0 and 10.7 contact gamma and neutron respectively and 4.2 and 7.5 at 1 meter), the following "factors" (above or below/cenier) are obtained.
Factors (above or below/midplane) At Contact Above Neutron Shield Below Neutron Shield Gamma Neutron Gamma Neutron Cask oo 90° ao 90° oo 90° oo 90° TN-32-05 1. 7 2.8 3.3 3.7 0.9 1. 4 2.1 5.1 TN-32-07. 2.3 2.3 2. 8 . 2.8 0.7 . 0. 6 3.6 *s.6 Factors* {above or below/midplarie) At 1 meter Above Neutron Shield Below Neutron Shield Gamma Neutron Gamma Neutron
-a-s-~ ..go goo go 900 . go 90° ao 9Qo___
TN-32-05 1.2 1.2 . 1. 3 1.1 1. 2 1.4 1. 7 2.7 TN-32-07 1.0 1. 0 1.1 1.2 1. 0 1.0 1.2 2.7 An evaluation of the Factors determined above, gives the - following ooservations: At
Contact:
- The largest ratio (Factor) of gamma dose above the neutron shield to average rnidplane dose is 2.8 while the average ratio is 2.3.
- The largest ratio of neutron dose above the neutron shield to average*midplane dose is 3.7, while the average ratio is 3.2.
SA-4 Rev. O 1/00
- The largest ratio of gamma dose below the neutron shield to average midplane dose is 1.4 while the average ratio 0.9.
- T~e largest ratio of neutron dose below the neutron shield to average midplane dose is 5.6 while the average ratio is 4 .1.
At 1 Meter:
- The* largest ratio of gamma dose above the neutron shield to average midplane dose is 1.2 while the average ratio is .
1.1.
- The largest ratio of neutron dose above the neutron shield to average midplane dose* is 1.3 while the average ratio is
- 1. 2.
- The largest ratio of gamma dose below the neutron shield to average midplane dose is 1.4 while the average ratio 1.2.
- The largest ratio of neutron dose below the neutron shield to average midplane dose is 2.7 while the average ratio is 2.1.
SA-5 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE SA-1 FUEL DATA FOR TN-32-07 All Fuel Assemblies PeriEheral Assemblies Cooling Cooling: Initial Time Initial Time Enrichment BurnuE (Days since Enrichment BurxiuE (Days since (Wt% U-235) (MWD/MTU) Discharge) (wt% U-235) (MWD/MTU) Discharge) 3.40 37198 2703 3.61 32646 4729 3.40 38384 2703 3.61 32267 4729 3.60 36536 2703 3.61 30280 4729 3.60 39964 2703 3.61 32824 4729 3.61 32646 4729 3.61 30119 4729 3.61 32267 4729 3.61 32658 4729 3.61 30280 4729 3.61 35702 4729 3.61 32824 4729 3.61 36478 3459 3.61 30119 4729 3.61 36716 3459 3.61 32658 4729 3.61 37305 3459 3.61 35702 4729 3.59 36837 3459 3.61 36410 3459 3.59 36377 3459 3.61 36677 3459 3.59 36386 3459 3.61 37426 3459 3.59 36583 3459 3.61 39431 3459 3.59 37363 3613 3.61 38908 3459 3.60 32611 3459 3.61 36478 3459 3.60 34572 4024 3.61 38731 3459 3.61 37305 3459 3Si000 MWd/M'l'Ui 3.60 wt% initial 3.61 38650 3459 enrichment, 4015 da~s (11 ~ears) 3.61 36716 3459 used for anal~sis 3.61 38447 3459 3.61 37305 3459 3.61 36868 3459
3.61 38616 3459 3.61 38643 3459 3.59 36837 3459 3.59 36377 3459 3.59 36386 3459 3.59 36583 3459 .
3.59 37363 3613 3.60 32611 3459 average 3.59 36306 3647 max 3.61 39964 4729 min 3.40 30119 2703 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE SA-2 PRIMARY GAMMA SOURCE SPECTRUM WESTINGHOUSE 17X17 ASSEMBLY 3.6 WT% U-235, 35,000 MW.O/MTU, 11 YEAR COOLING TIME (GAMMA/SEC/ASSEMBLY} SCALE Energy Fission Light Grou:e No. Products Actinides Element Total 28 1.31E-07 5.03E+04 O.OOE+OO 5.03E+04 29 9.79E-07 2.37E+05 O.OOE+OO 2.37E+05 30 7.69E-06 1.21E+06 O.OOE+OO 1.21E+06 .. 3.01E+06 31 2.67E-05 3.01E+06 O.OOE+OO 32 1.60E+08 8.93E+06 1. 77E-14 1.69E+08 33 1.27E+09 3.48E+08 6.68E+05 1.61E+09 34 2.~8E+l0 1. 72E+07 4.31E+08 2.42E+l0 35 8.94E+10 3.52E+07 l.55E+03 8.95E+10 36 4.39E+12 3.90E+07 1. 82E+13 2.26E+l3 37 4.51E+13 2.70E+08 6.43E+l3 1.09E+14 38 5.57E+13 3.39E+08 6.17E+09 5.58E+13 39 1.32E+15 6.72E+08 7.62E+07 .1. 32E+l5 40 9.26E+l3 9.13E+08 2.19E+08 9.26E+l3 41 2.93E+13 1.55E+l0 3.46E+09 2.93E+13 42 4.58E+13 1.89E+ll 2.64E+09 4.60E+l3 43 l. 60E+l4 2. 67E+ll 5.31E+l0 1. 60E+14
.44 2.04E+14 1.11E+l3 2.20E+ll 2.15E+l4 45 7. 44E+l4 B.18E+l2 l.12E+l2 . 7 .54E+l4 Totals 2.70E+l5 1.97E+13 8.39E+13 2.81E+15 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE SA-3 GAMMA AND NEUTRON SPECTRA FOR ACTIVE FUEL REGION WESTINGHOUSE 17X17 ASSEMBLY 3.6 WT% U-235, 35,000 MWD/MTU, 11 YEAR COOLING TIME GAMMA/SEC/ASSEMBLY SCALE Energy Fission Light GrOUE No. Products Actinides Element Total Fractions 28 1.31E-07 5.03E+04 O.OOE+OO 5.03E+04 1.SOE-11 29 9.79E-07 2.37E+05 O.OOE+OO 2.37E+05 8. 46E-11 30 7.69E-06 1.21E+06 O.OOE+OO l.21E+06 4.32E-10 31 2.67E-05 3.01E+06 O.OOE+OO 3.01E+06 1. OSE-09 32 l.60E+08 B.93E+06 1. 27E-14 1.69E+08 6.02E-08 33 1.27E+09 3.48E+08 6.68E+05 l.61E+09 5.76E-07 34 2.38E+l0 1. 72E+07 4.31E+OB 2.42E+l0 8.64E-06 35 8.94E+l0 3.52E+07 1. 55E+03 8.95E+10 3.19E-05 36 4.39E+l2 3.90E+07 1. 69E+l3 2.13E+l3 7.61E-03 37 4.51E+13 2.70E+08 5.99E+l3 1. 05E+14 3.75E-02 38 5.57E+l3 3.39E+OB 6.17E+09 5.58E+l3 l.99E-02 39 1.32E+15 6. 72E+08 7.62E+07 l.32E+l5 4.72E-01 40 9.26E+l3 9.13E+08 2.19E+08 9.26E+13 3.30E-02 41 2.93E+13 1. 55E+10 3.46E+09 2.93E+13 1. 04E-02 42 4.5BE+l3 l.89E+ll 2.64E+09 4.60E+l3 l.64E-02 43 1.60E+14 2. 67E+ll 5.31E+10 1. 60E+l4 5.71E-02 44 2.04E+14 l.11E+l3 2. 20E+ll 2.15E+l4 7.69E-02 45 7.44E+l4 B.1BE+l2 l.12E+l2 7.54E+l4 2.69E-01 total 2.70E+l5 1. 97E+l3 7.83E+l3 2.80E+l5 NEUTRON/SEC/ASSEMBLY SCALE Energ~ GroUE No. Source fraction 1 1. 64E+06 1.82E-02 2 l.89E+07 2.lOE-01 3 2.13E+07 2.37E-01 4 l.18E+07 1.31E-01 5 1.58E+07 1.76E-01 6 1. 72E+07 l.91E-01 7 3.36E+06 3.74E-02 Total 9.00E+07 Rev. O 1/00
A.BOVS: S HIELD ABOV E LlO i! * *
"1 TOM
- l'tO'!'E: 1:10$$ l>l EASO?.EMEN'l'S A.RE AT FIGURE 5.A -1 CDNTA C~ A ND Fl\OM SURF ACE. CASK TN 05 DOSE MEAS UREMEN TS ARB IN mr emfhr. DOSE MEASUREMENTS
'-------~-*** -=*w.
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CON'!'A CT, AND PROM SURF A CE. I CASK TN 05 DOSE MEASUREMENTS DOS E Ml'JAS U'Rt:REN 'l 'S A RE I N mrern/hr. 90* PERl>EN rtlCU L AR *ro TR!JNlUO NS I 90c FROM TRUNNIONS REV. 0 1/DO
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CAS.K B OTTOM
- NOTS: DCSE M ~ASURfnHmTS r.. RE A'r' CONTT;.C'l', 13 :ucHES AND i };;;_; . ::::r
.FROM SURF ACE.
I c~~~u~ ~~~~-~=-.* ~ -- DOSZ ME~SUHgHBITS ARB IN mrem/hr. 1 DOSE MEASUREMENTS I t I O~ FRON TRUNNIO NS
*-**-L_..***- * * * -- -- -- - - --
REV . \} L/UO ~.
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,. . . ;~BOVE LU:!
. -~. .;.. :.:
" N OTE: DOS S M2 ASUR.EM E: NTS ARE AT F IGURE SA-4 CON'l'AC'! ', A'!>1D FR OM SURFACE. CJi~S K TN 07 DOSE MEAfHJREM£NTS ARB IN lt\rem/h:r . DOSE MEASUREMENTS
~Ht !'EP,PSNUICUL AR TO 'l'RUNNIQNS __.__9
_0_"~FROM TRUNNIONS .J
CHAPTER 6 . CRITICALITY EVALUATION 6.1 Djscu55jon and Results. Criticality control in the TN-32 is pe~forrned.by the basket structural components, which maintain the relative position of . the spent fuel assemblies under normal and acqident* conditions by the neutron absorbing plates between the basket compartrnents,.and by dissolved boron. in the spent fuel pool water.. The structural analysis of the TN-32 basket is presented in Chapter 3.*
- The TN-32 contents are limited to the Westinghouse arid B&W fuel designs listed in Chapter 2, with a maximum enrichment of 4.05 wt % 0235. Fuel assemblies with or without:.burnable poison rod assemblies are acceptable. Criticality control does not
- require special* loading patterns or special orientation of the* .
fuel assemblies. The criticality evaluation is divided into several sections: a) Determination of the most reactive fuel configuration is provided' in Section 6.4.2A. All of the design basis fuels are evaluated to determine the most reactive geometry. Placement of fuel assembles shifted off the center of the compartment cross section is also evaluated here. b) TN-32 criticality evaluation is provided in Section 6 .4 .2B. The most reactive fuel is used for this evaluation. The TN-32 cask is evaluated for the following conditions, which bound normal conditions and the off-normal and accident events listed in Chapter 11:
- varied water density and partial drain-down,
- variation in critical basket dimensions,
*-axiaL....off.se.LoLac.t.ix.e_f..u.el__and neutron absorber plate*s, and
- loading of a single fuel assembly with higher than TN-32 design basis enrichment,
- fresh water in the fuel pellet - cladding annulus
- postulated reduction of pin pitch due to fuel grid crushing in a tipover accident.
Appendix 6A provides a structural analysis which demonstrates that the fuel rods will remain intact under the tipover and 18 inch end drop accident conditions. Non-uniform flooding of the basket is not evaluated because all the spaces in the basket are interconnected, and therefore this is not a credible condition. The various effects are evaluated individually, and are combined as required to demonstrate compliance with the 6.1-1 Rev. 1 5/00
requirement of 10CFR72.124 that "before* a criticality accident is possible, at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent or sequential changes have occurred in the'coiiditions essential to nuclear criticality safe~y." The evaluation demonstrates that the TN-32 cask meets the require'ment *ke~£ ... *~
- 2cf"S;: Upper $ubcritic~l Lim.it for. all these '", .. .
condition~
. . - . .. *; * ....' .._**.. '. :": ....., .._. . . . *.. _:. .. :. :i: *~ *..
c} a*enchmarking ...(Section* 6'~ S} .*_ An. upp~r subcriticaf .limit (USL) is determine.d by subtracting* from . unity_ .an administrative *
- margin of o. 05,
- the bias determined from* benchmark * *
- calcula.tions and _any-mode.ling .. .:
. bias.
*-Ail calcu1at.ions *assume fr~sh fuel coinp~sitiori ahd ignore burnable 'poison~ w~en ,evaluating burnable 'poison rod assemblies.
* ', < * ~ * '*r" ', ' * ': * ** '..: *
-~* . : .. t. *...: ..... : ~: .* .
.. ~ ~ . . .. . .. . .
~
* ..*;1 i .
*.* ') ~* . ..:; ..... **.* . -: .. -~ !' :' ~:.. . *: .. '-~
*. *... . ... ... *. :. *. t.*:. 1 * * : : I ,~. ' * *. :..
. .. - . 'i. ~~ . : ,.. :"..*** . ..,;: ....
~
.. * ~. 6 .f-2 ,.. Rev *. 1 5/00
6.2 Fuel *specification The allowable contents are* listed* in Chapter-2: and :in-* the Functional and Operating Limits (Section 2.1) of the Technical .* Specifications provided in . Chapter* 12. ** FUel characteristics us.ed in the criticalit;y calculations are list~d in Table 6. 2-l.. * .. * * ':
- To maintai~ -~ub~riti~ality; .the maximi:im enrichmerit*of "the fuel* 11\USt. be less ~han. or equa.l to 4. _05 we*ight. %. 0235:. .
Each of the *fuel a~sembiy tYi>es listEid "in the Techiiical Specifications has been evaluated in Section 6. 4. 2A~* * * ** The acceptable contents of the TN.:.32 do not include failed : . fuel other than .fuel with hairline cracks or pinholes in the*.:. *-
. cladding. Fuel bundles from which* fue.l pins .are mi~sing are* not allowable contepts unless.the missing pin is replaced by a fuel pin or dummy pin that. displaces
. *.. equivalent . volume.
-~--------
------------ ----~
~ . . ~
6.2-1 Rev. o 1/00
--~ -- ..,_. -
6.3 Model Specification 6.3.1 Description of Calculational Model
- A 3 -dimensional model of the fuel, basket, cask body*, and water reflector is used as shown in Figures 6.3-1, 6.3-2 and 6.3-
- 3. Fue~ pins guide tubes, and instrument tubes are modeled *.
individually. The top and bottom fuel hardware are modeled as pure water. The stainless steel basket compartment .tube*s I stainless steel bars, neutron poison. plates, and gap*s are modeled explicitly. Table 6.3-1 compares the model dimensions with the design dimensions.
- All analyses use 2300 ppm boron in the water, except at the ;
basket perimeter, where the aluminum rails are homogenized with 2000 ppm borated water. The lower boron concentration in the .'
. ~.
basket perimeter is conservative. There are some minor differences between the criticality model and the actual basket de.sign. These differences are* described below. The most significant difference between the model and the actual basket is that the basket has holes in the neutron absorber plates at the location of the sta"inless steel plugs to which the compartment tubes are welded. See Chapter 1, drawing 1049-70-6, details A and B. The model does not include these holes. In the model, the gaps on either side of the neutron absorber plates, which under actual loading conditions will be filled with borated water, are modeled as void spaces.* To evaluate the difference between the actual basket and the model, a single basket compartment with plugs was.modeled with a centered fuel assembly, and reflected on 4 sides *to simulate an infinite array of such cells. This model is shown in Figure 6.3-
- 4. This model includes 2300 ppm borated water in the fuel compartment, in the gaps on either side of the neutron absorber plates, and in the clearance holes around the plugs. This model is then modified to look like the general cask model, with ________
__Qont;:_:ln_uous_neutron-poison-pl-ates,-no-stainl-ein;--si::eerpiugs, ancf ____ void gaps. The model with the plugs yields k.if = *o.9467 +/- 0.0012. The
*model 'without plugs yields keff = 0.9461 +/- 0.0013. Note that the k,u's here are not representative of the TN-32 cask. They are for an infinite array of compartments, and are only for comparison with each other. The results are statistically
- . equivalent, but the 0.0006 Ak*ff will be treated as a modeling
*bias in _determining the upper subcritical limit.
f?.3.2 Cask Regional Densities Materials are converted to atom densities by the Material Information Processor in the CSAS25 code sequence <1 >
- The mass densities supplied to the code are reported in Table 6.3-2.
6.3-1 Rev. O 1/00.
The specific gravity, of borated water at 4350 ppm is given as 1.0078 in Ref 1, Section M.7.5.7, Example 2. Interpolating between sg=l. 0 at 0 -ppm arid .. sg",;;1". 0078 at" 4350 ppm yields sgi:::1l. 0045. For water density of.. 0. 9982. g/cm3 , the. corresponding density of 2300 ppm borated water is -1.0045(0.9982)=1.0027 g I cm3 * * . * ** ., * ... * *
- The neutron absorber-*. is* an alloy of aluminum and about 4. 5 **
wt % boron, 'the boron being enriched to about 95 atom wt% BlO. This*material is subjected to the extensive acceptance testing as described in Section 9 .1.:7A. Therefore, the calculations take credit for 90% of the minimum specified boron 10 *areal density,* which is 10 mg Bl0/cm2 * . The SCALE mixing table output lists a weight fraction of 0.0329724 for BlO; using the density and thickness of the plate confirms the areal density: 2.693 g/cm3 (0.0329274)0.1016 cm= 0.0090 g B10/cm2 This material is not subject to degradation in the dry storage environment.. It is a solid, non-friable material physically similar to its base aluminum alloy. It does not include any organic components or binders. The plates are held in place and protected from damage by.the surrounding stainless steel.bar and tube structure. The basket structure encloses the neutron absorber plates on all six sides. The neutron absorber materials are exposed to borated water for a short time during fuel* loading. After.loading, the inert* environment of the cask assures that there will be no degradation due to corrosion. Boron depletion due to neutron absorption is evaluated as follows. * * * *
- Using the total scalar flux of 8.41x 10 5 n/cm2 sat the*
center of the basket* {see Table 14.1-1),* assuming that flux to be constant and thermal, and using the thermal neutron cross section for boron*10, (3837.barn), the fr~ction of the original boron 10
.--deplet-ed--a.f-t~l-0.0-0-y.ears-WOuld__b_ ~*- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - *
*a. 41xl0 5 n/cm 2
s" (3837x10- 24 cm2 ) 3° .156xl0 7 "a/year. (1000 year).
*4
= lxlO ,_
which is neglig~ble. The actual flux is mostly fast and
-epithermal, and declining.with time, so the actual depletion during dry storage will be less than the depletion calculated.
Therefore, the continued efficacy of the neutron poison is assured.
- 6. 3-2. Rev~ 1 5/00
- 6. 4 Cd ticali ty Cal cill atj on 6.4.l ** Calculatjonal or.Experimental Method All calculations are performed using the CSAS25 sequence from the SCALE4. 3 code system 111 with the SCALE 27-group BNDF/B-IV cross** section* library.. Within this sequence, resonance correction based on the fuel pin cell* description is performed by NITAWL. using the _Nordheim Integ~al method, and keff is determined .
- by the KENOVa code using the Monte Carlo technique. A
- sufficiently large number of neutron histories is run so that the standard deviation is below 0.0020 for all calculations.
6.4.2 Fuel Loadjng or Other Contents r,oading Optimization A. Determination Of The Most Reactive Fuel Configuration All fuels.listed in Table 6.2-l are evaluated with the maximum TN-32 design basis fuel enrichment, 4.05%. The fuels. are analyzed with voids in the fuel pellet-cladding annulus, with and without burnable poison rod*assemblies, and with fuel both centered in the compartment and shifted toward the cask vertical axis. The calculations in this section only use a density of 1.0078 g/cm3 for 2300 ppm borated water. Where there* are variations in a reported value for a given fuel.design, values are chosen for the analysis* as follows:
- maximum fuel pin diameter, conservative when fuel/cladding annulus is void or borated water
- maximum ~ctive length
- minimum cladding thickness, conservative when fuel/cladding annulus. is borated water; unimportant for void
. .
- maximum guide tube diameter and maximum guide tube wall thickness for maximum displacement of borated water; except for the 14xl4 OFA, the instrument tubes are modeled with t~h-e~~-~
*same dimensions as-the guide tubes. The effect is negligible, as there is only one instrument tube per assembly.
Since no credit" is taken for burnable absorbers, fuel with burnable poison *rod assemblies (BPRA's), are assumed to have all guide tubes filled with aluminum instead. of borated water. No
- qredit is taken for any boron in the.burnabl~ poison rod assemblies; only the effect of borated water displacement is analyzed. It is*conservatively assumed that there is no .
clearance between the burnable poison rod and the gµide.tube and that all guide tubes are filled with aluminum .. This appro~ch bounds the effect of burnable poison rods. A typical input file is included in Section 6.6.1. The results of these calculati'ons are listed in Table 6.4-1. The most reactive fuel lattice evaluated for the TN-32 is the 6.4-l Rev. 1 5/0Q
- most reactive fuel lattice evaluated for the TN-32 i~ the Westinghouse standard 17xl7 with BPRA, fuel shifted toward the cask vertical axis.
B.
- TN-3_2 Criticality Evaluation The**TN-32 is evaluated in a variety of configurations .. :.
- intended to-bound all normal, off-normal, and accident **
conditions. The following conditions ~re evaluated individually: *
- Baseline: Most reactive TN-32 design basis *fuel :configuration,* . *.
100~ borated water density. The fuel assemblies are shifted .. **
. _toward the cask vertical axis until the cuter pin cells ..
contact the compartment wall. This is not a realistic
""configuration, but bounds all possibilities of fuel off-cente:r;
._in the compartment. *
- The neutron absorber plates and the active fuel zone are
- offset by 2 inches axially. This might occur due to fuel design*differences in the distance from the bottom of the fuel assembly to the beginning of the active fuel, or due to*fuel pins slipping in the spacer grids during handling. *- .
- The inside dimension of the compartment is increased and decreased 0.06 inches. All compartments move correspondingly further apart or closer together. This is greater than the dimensional tolerance on the basket tubes.
- The width of _the neutro~ poison plate is reduced by 0.06 inch, corresponding to its dimensional tolerance. It is not .
necessary*to evaluate the tol~rance in. length because it is . bounded by the 2 inch axial offset condition above.
- Fresh water is placed in the annulus of all fuel rods.*
Although a fuel rod that develops a cladding breach in core could be saturated with non-borated water at the end of the cycle, it is unlikely that the water in the fuel pin would remain non-borated after years of storage in borated water.
- Borated water density is varied except in the homogenized
baske~ai-1/.borat.e.d water zone to simulate the reduction in density that might occur during unl"oading-eperations_.____~
*. Borated water is drained down to the top of the active fuel, - - - - -
except in the basket rail zone. This is the most reactive configuration expected during loading and unlo~ding, because it reduces the boron capture of reflected neutrons.
. The results of these investigations are presented in Table 604-2. As expected physically, reduction of the neutron absorber
_plate width, reduction of c9mpartment size, borated water drain-
- down, and inclusion of fresh water in "the tuel pin annulus all
. cause a slight increase in k.u** Optimal borated water density is
!ound at about 95%.
- These conditions are all combined for a worst case normal
~ondition, and the borated water density is again varied from BS 6.4-2 Rev. o 1/00
to 100%, resulting in.a. maximum k.rt 111: 0.9264 +/- 0.0009.... at 90% borated water density. To evaluate accident conditions, the worst case normal model is re-run with a single fuel assembly with enrichment in excess of .the TN-32 design basis in one ot the four center compartments of the basket. Fuel with St enrichment **is assumed.* This case demonstrates compliance with the requirement of 10CFR72.l24 by. combining at least. two unlikely, independent,. and concurrent. . ~* changes in the conditions essent;ial to nuclear criticality ..
- safety: worst case geometry and accidental loading of non-de.sign .
basis fuel. . The result is k.rt = o. 9315 +/- o. 0009. The input f iie
*for this case is included in Section 6.6.4, and the model is *
- shown,* in Figures 6.4-l and -2.
C. Evaluation of Tipover and 18 inch Drop Accidents Based on the structural evaluation presented.in Appendix 6A, 'the criticality analysis assumes that under tipover and drop accident conditions, the fuel pins remain intact. In the end drop accident, the fuel rods may slide in the grid spacers until they contact the bottom plate. This condition has alr~ady been considered above by the two inch offset between the active fuel and the neutron absorber plate.
- In the tipover accident, the fuel pin spacer grids may collap~e, resulting i~ the fuel rods movi~g closer together. Therefore, reduced pin pitch is ev~luated as the credible *tipover accident configuration. The fuels are modeled with pin pitch uniformly
- reduced using the worst case normal.model developed above and varying densities of .2300 ppm borated water *. Results shown in Table 6 .4-3 indicate that kett decreases uniformly with pin pitch .
6.4-~ . Rev. O 1/00
. -~- .. * - : !9:-; ~- -~
D. Conclusion ANS/ANSI-8 .1 <7 l recommends that calculational methods used in determining criticality safety limits for applications outside reactors be validated by comparison with appropriate critical experiments. An upper. subcritical limit (USL} provides a high degree of confidence that a given 'system is subcritical if a criticality calculation based on the system yields a multiplication factor (k*ff) below the US'.L. The upper subcritical limit is determined in Section 6.5 to be 0.9341. The analysis provided above verifies that in normal, off-normal, and* accident conditions, keu + 2cr ~ O. 9341 There.fore,. the. fuel will remain s~ci;itical. 6.4-4 Rev. O 1/00
6.5 Critical Benchmark: Experiments 6.5.l Benchmark Experiments and Applicability The critical experiments and input files are taken from NUREG/CR-6361 121
- The input files are obtained from ORNL, and modified to change the cross section library to the SCALE 27 group library that is used in all the TN-32 criticality evaluations.
Experiments which feature simple arrays,- separator plates, steel reflector walls, water holes, borated poison plates, and dissolved boron are selected. Experiments with features that are
*not characteristic of the TN-32 storage cask are not used. Such features include poisons other than boron, poison rods, reflector walls other than steel, and flux traps. The 98 critical experiments chosen are listed in Tables 6.5-1 and 6.5.2.
An upper subcritical limit {USL) is determined using Method 1, "confidence band with administrative margin", described in Section 4.1.1 of NUREG/CR-6361'. The administrative margin will be 0.05, and the confidence level i-y1 will be 0.95. It is assumed that the actual value of ketf in all the experiments is exactly l. Statistical analysis of benchmark resu;i..ts was performed using the PC version of the USLSTATS program, Version
- l. 3. 4, distributed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory 12 ' * .
The characteristics water/fuel volume, hydrogen to fissile atom ratio (H/X), fuel pin pitch, and enrichment, are listed in Tables 2.1 and 3.5 of NUREG/CR-6361. One additional characteristic, boron 10 concentration in the separator plates, is calculated in Table 6.5-3. A comparisqn of the range of these characteristics in the experiments, and the corresponding values for the TN-32 and its contents verifies that the TN-32 falls within the range covered by the critical experiments. See Table 6.5-4. 6.5.2 Results of the Benchmark Calculatjons The results of the benchmark calculations are listed in Table 6.5-1 and 6.5-2. Seven subsets of the results are analyzed to determine if there is a trend in the bias (calculated ketf -1) as a function of an experimental variable. In all subsets, the data test normal, although the sample size for the boron density is too small for this determination to be conclusive. A least mean squares linear regression is performed to fit the data of keu as a function of each independent variable, and the Pearson correlation coefficient r is determined. A coefficient of zero indicates no correlation, and a coefficient of Ill indicates exact correlation. The results are listed in Table 6.5-4. The values of the correlation coefficient indicate that there is very little correlation between the bias and any of the experimental variables, and therefore, no discernible trend. 6.5-1 Rev. O 1/00
The minimum value of the* ust *irc>ni air the* data sets ip o. 934 7, which is correlated with dissolved*boron concentration as shown in Table 6 ~ 5-4 ... As shoWll. in .. Section 6. 3 .1, there . is. a modeling
- bias of *0:0006-and tlierefore**o.93_47.:0.0006*= -'0~9341 is* the.;upper ....
subcritical limit to be used for the criticality safety*;:**:. *:
- evaluation.
*..... .. 1.~.. *.
~
- l *.
. ...~ ~:'* .~ .
*, .. .* a ' '~
,; .. : .~
. ~ . .
. *:*~- *.
. .* ** ... . ~**
*-. :" .:.:_ *~ - ..
6.5-2 Rev. o 1/00
6.6 Supplemental Data
- 6. 6 .1 Sample* Input File for Determination *of Most Reactive * * * * ;
Configuration * * *. . * " -:: * * *
.. . '( .
z::CSAS25 TN32 bl7shift 17xl7 non-ofa I off center I 2300 ppm borated water, 90t blO . 21GROUPNDF4 LATTICECELL U02 1 0.95 293. 92235 4.05 92238 95.95 END ZIRCALLOY 2 1.0 END H20 3 1.0 END
- SS3 04 4 1. 0 END I BORATED H20 2300 PPM ARBMH3B03 0.013253 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 5 1.0 293 END H20 S 0.996340 END
'BORAL CORE 10MG/CM2 l!JNOT USED111 B4C 6 DEN=2.64 0.417 END AL 6 DEN=2.64 0.583* END CARBONSTEEL 7 1.0 END AL 8 l.O END 1
EAGLE PICHER BORATED AL (.040") 1!190% BlO CREDIT!JI BORON 9 DEN=2.693 0.03811 293. 5010 86.4 5011 13.6 END AL 9 DEN=2.693 0.96189 . END I BORATED H20/AL HOMOG mix AT PERIPHERY 1112000 PPM!!J AL 10 . 0.303 END .. ARBMH3B03 O. 01152 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 10 O. 697 293 .END H20 10 0.69566 END . END COMP SQUAREPITCH 1.2598 0.8192 l 5 0.9500 2 0.8357 0 END TN32 CRITICALITY 2300 PPM BORATED H20 WITH BAL (0.040") READ PARAM RUN=yes*PLT=no TME=SOOO GEN=203 NPG=2000 END PARAM READ GEOM BOX TYPE 1 COM=& NEXT EIGHT BOXES ARE +X+Y QUADRJ.laNT & ARRAY 1 -11.049 -11.049. -182.88 * - - - ------ CUBOID 3 l 10. 3676 -11. 04_9__10_.3.6"l6----l-1--.04*9--2*1"3-;-04--------*-
- - - - 193-.-36---------
CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 * -193.36 CUBOID 8 1 11.9507 -12.5857 11.9507 -12.5857 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID
- 0 l 11.9507 -12.6365 11.9507 -12.6365 213.04 -193.36 HOLE. 33 -12.6365 O.. O.
HOLE 34 0. -12
- 5 8 5 7 0 ..
"BOX TYPE 2
*
- ARRAY 1 -11.049 -11.049 -182.88
'*CUBOID 3 1 10.3676 -11.049 10.3676 ~11.0~9 213.04 193.36
.CUBOID
- 5 1 4Pli.-049 213.04 -193.36*
CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 cOBOID O 1 11.3157 -11.4173 2Pl1.3157 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 -11.3665 o. o. CUBOID 8 l 12.5857 -12.0523 11.9507 -12.5857 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID *o l 12.5857 -12.0523 11.9507 -12.6365 213.04 ~193.36 6.6-:l Rev. o l/oo*
- ~--**-.;. "=*
HOLE 34 o. :.12.5857 o. BOX TYPE 3 ARRAY 1 -11.049. -11.049 * -182.88 CUBOID 3 1 l.0.3676 -11.049 *10.3676 -11.049 213.04 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193 .36 . CUBOID 4 1 4P11.3157 213.04 ~193.36 . CUBOID 0 1* 11.3157 -11.41?3 2Pl1.3i57 213.04 *~193.3~ HOLE 35 -11.3665 0. 0. .. . CUBOID *a 1 11.3157 -ll.4173 11.9507 -12.5857 .. 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 11.3157 -11.4173 11.~soi ~12.6365 . 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 34 O. --12.5857 o*.
*BOX TYPE 4.
~y ., 1 . -11. 049 -11. 049 *-182. 88 .
CUBOID 3 1 10 .3676 -11. 049
- 10 .3676 * -11. 049 2*13. 04 193.36 CUBOID 5 l 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 ..
CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 -19 3
- 3 6 . -- . - *: - .: ..
CUBOID 0 1 3Pll.3157 -li.4173 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 36 o. -11~3665 0. CUBOID 8 l 11.9507 -12.5857 11.9507 -12.0523 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 l 11.9507 -12.6365 11.9507 -12.0523 213.04. -193.36 .. HOLE: 33 -12.6365 o. o. BOX TYPE 5 ARRAY l -11.049 -11.049 -182.88 CUBOID 3 1 10.3676 -11.049 10.3676 -11.049 213.04 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 4P11.3157 213.04 -193 .36' CUBOID 0 1 11.3157 -11.4173 11.3157 -11.4173 213.04 -193.39 HOLE 35 -11.3665 O. 0. HOLE 36 0. .-11. 3665 0. CUBOID 8 1 12.5857 -12.0523 11.9507 -12.0523 213.04 -193.36 BOX TYPE 6 ARRAY 1 -11.049 -ll.049 -182.88 CUBOID 3 l 10.3676 -11.049 10.3676 -11.049 213.04 ---:1:93-;-3-6-- ------
=--::---::-=-~
CUBOID 5 l 4Pll.049 213.04: -1:93-:-3-s~------- CUBOID 4 l 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 --~------ cUBOID 0 l 11~3157 -11 .. 4173 ll.3157 -11.4173. 213.04 -193.36 HOLE .35 -11.3665 O. -0 *
. HOLE 36 O.* * -11.;3665 .. 0. . . .. . _.
CUBOID 8 1- ll.3i57 -11.4173 12.5857 -12.052~* .213.04 -193."36
. CUBOID 4 1 11.3157 -11.4173 12.8524 -12.0523 213.04 -193.36*
BOX TYPE 7 ARRAY l -11.049 -11.049.. -182.8~
- CUBOID 3 l 10.3676 -11".-0.49 10.3676 -11.0*9 213.0.4
_19a.36 ..
- c;:uBOID 5 l 4Pll. 049 213. 04 . -193. 36
- CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157.213.04 -193.36 *****
CUBOID 0 l 3P11.3157 -11.4173 213.04- ~193.36.. HOLE 36 O. -11.3665 0. CUBOID 8 1 11.9507 -12.5857 11.3157 :-12.0523* 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID O l 11. 9507 -12. 63.65 11. 3157 -12. 0523 213. 04 -193. 36 6.6-2 Rev. O 1/00
~ .. -
HOLE 33 -12.6365 o. o. *' BOX TYPE 8 ARRAY 1 -11.049 -11.049 -182.88 CUBOID 3 1. 10.3676 -11.049 *10.3676. *.-11.049 213 .* 04 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 ~193.36 .. CUBOID 0 1 11.3157 -11.4173 11.3157 ~11.4173 ~13.04 ~193.36 . HOLE .35 -11.3665 o. *o. I :\ ' HOLE 36 o. : -11.3665 o.. . CCJBOID 8 1 12.5857 -12.0523 11.3157 -12.0523 213.04 -193.36 .* CUBOID 4 1 12.5857 -12.0523* 11.3157 ~12.0523 . 213.04 -193~36 BOX TYPE 9 COM=& NEXT EIGHT BOXES ARE +X-Y QUADRANT &
. ARRAY 1 -11.049 -10.3676 -182.88 . . . . .
CUBOID 3 l 10.3676 -11.049 11.049 . -10.3676' . 213.04 193.36 CUBOID 5. 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193 .36 . CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36. . . . CUBOID 8 l 11.9507 -12.5857 12.5857 -11.95'<)?. :2.13.04 -193.36 CUBOID O 1 11.9507 -l2.636S 12.6365 -11.95.07 '21'3.04 _..:193.36 HOLE 33 -12.6365 0. O. HOLE 34 0. 12.6365 0. BOX TYPE 10 ARRAY l -11.049 -10.3676 -182.88 CUBOID 3 1 10.3676 -11.049 ll.049 -10.. 3676 213.04 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID . 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36
.CUBOID O 1 li.3157 -11.4173 2Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 . -11.3665 o. o~
CUBOID 8 1 12.5857 -12.0523 12.5857 -11.9507 :213.04 -193.36 CUBOID. 0 1 12.5857 -12.0523 12.6365 -11.9507 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 34 o. *12.6365 o. BOX TYPE 11 ARRAY 1 -11.049 -10.3676 -182.88 CUBOID 3 1 . 10 . 3 676 -11. 04 9 11 . 04 9 . -1:..:0::..-*~3~6-=-7-=-6 _..:2:.::1=3.::._-=-04.:.___~::--:------ 193.36 --CUBUID 5 l 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 COBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36* CUBOID 0 1 11.3157 -11.4173 2P11.3157 213~04 -193.36
- HOL~ . 35 -11.3665 o. o.. .
CUBOID 8 1 11.3157 -11.4173 12.5857 ..;1~.9507. 213.04 -193.36**, CUBOID 0 1 *11.3157 -11.4173 12.63~5--11.9507 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 34 o... 12.6365 0. . .*. BOX TYPE 12
.. ARRAY 1 -11~049 -10.3676 -182.88
*CUBOID 3 l . 10. 3676 -11*~ 049 11. 049 -10 .3676 . 213. 04 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pil~049 213.04 -193.36 ciJBOID 4 l 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 2Pll.3157 11.4173 -11.3157 .. 213. 04 .. ;.:193 ~36 HOLE 36. o. 11.3665 0.
CUBOID 8 1 11.9507 -12.5857 12.0523 -11.9507* 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 11.9507 -12.6365 12.0523 -11~950~' 213.04. -193.36 6.6-3 .. Rev. O 1/00
*HOLE 33 . -12 .6365 o.
BOX TYPE 13 ARRAY 1 -11.049 -10.3676 -1e2.aa* CUBOID 3 1 10.3676 -11.049 ~11.0~9 :~10.3676 213.04 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 :193.36 .. CUBOID. 4 1" 4Pl1.3157 213.04 .i..193. 36 :_* "" . CUBOID 0 1 11.3157 -11.4173 li.4173 ....:11.3157 . 213.04 -193.*3.6 HOLE 35 -11.3665 o. o. HOLE 36 . o. 11.3665 o. CUBOID* 8 1 12.5857 -12.os23 *12.os23 ~ii.9507. 213~04 -193.36 BOX TYPE 14 . : .. ARRAY 1 -11.049 -10.3676 . -182.88 CUBOID * *3 1 10.3676 -11.049. 'il.04~. ;..10~'3676 .. 213.04* - 193.36 CUBOID S 1 4P11.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 l 11.3157 -11.4173 11.4173 -11.3157 213.04 -193.36~.-- HOLE 35 -11.3665 0. . 0. . HOLE 36 o. 11.3665 o. . CUBOID 8 l 11.3157 -11.4173 . 12.0523 -12.5857 213.04 -193.36~. CUBOID 4 1 11.3157 -11.4173 12.0523' -12.8524 .213.04 -193.36" BOX TYPE 15 . ARRAY 1 -11.049 -10.3676 -182.88 CUBOID 3 l 10.3676 -11.049 11.049 -10.3676 213.04 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 . 4Pll. 04.9 2.13. 04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36. CUBOID O l 2Pll.3157 11.4173 -11.3157 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 36 o. . 11.3665 o. CUBOID 8 l 11.9507 -12.5857 12.0523 -l~.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 11.9507 -12.6365 12.0523 -11.3157 213 .04 -193_.36. HOLE 33 -12.6365 o. 0. BOX TYPE 16 ARRAY 1 -11.649 -10.3676 -182~8~ CUBOID 3 1 10.3676 -11.049 11.049 -10.3676 213~04 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213 .. 04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 . cUBOID 0 1 11.3157 -11.4173 11.4173 -11.3157 213.04 -193.36
.HOLE .. 35 -11.3665 o. o. .
HOLE 36 o. 11.3665 o.* CUBOID 8 l 12.5857 -12.0523 12.0523 -11.3157 213.04*-193.3t CUBOID 4 1 12.5857 -12.0523 12.0523 -11.3157 213.04 -193.36. BOX TYPE 17 COM=& NEXT 8 BOXES ARE -X-i-Y .. QUADRANT & ARRAY l -10 .. 3676 -11.0~9 -182.88."**"
- CuBOID 3 *1* il.049 -10;36~6.10.3676.-11.-049 *213.04. -193.36 CUBOID 5 1
- 4Pl1.049* 213.04 ~1~3.3~ *
~OID. 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 . -193.36 . .
CUBOID 8 1 12.5857 -11.9507 11.9507 -.12.585.7 . 213.04 -193~36 CUBOID 0 1 12~6365 -11.9507 11~9507 -12.6365 -.~13.04 -193~36 HOLE 33 12.5857 o. . o. .. HOLE 34 o. -12.5857 0. BOX TYPE 18 6.6-4 Rev. o 1/00
ARRAY 1 -10.3676 -11.049 . -182.88 CUBOID 3 1 11.049 -10.3676 10.3676 -11.049 213.04 -193.36 . CUBOID 5 1 4P11.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 * *-.4Pll.3157 213. 04 . -193 .36. * *.
- CUBOID 0 1 11.4173 -11.3157 2Pll.3157 -213.04 _.193.36 HOLE 35 11.3665 0. O.
CUBOID 8 1 12.0523 -12.5857 11.9507 -12.5857 213.04 -193.3~ CUBOID O 1 12 *. 0523 .-12.5857 11.9507 -12.6365 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 34 o. -12.5857 o .. BOX TYPE 19 ARRAY 1 -10.3676. -11.049 -182.88 CUBOID 3 1 11.049 -10.3676 10.3676 -11.049 213.04 -193.36
. CUBOID S 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4P11.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1. 11.4173 -11.3157 2Pll.3157 .213.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 11.3665 0. 0.
CUBOID 8 1 11.4173 -11.3157 11.9507 -12.5857 -213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 ii.4173 -11.3157 11.9507 -12.6365 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 34 o: -12.5857 0. BOX TYPE 20 ARRAY 1 -10.3676 -11.049 -182.88 CUBOID 3 1 11. 049 -l.O. 3676 10. 3676 -11. 0*49 213. 04 -193. 36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 3P11.3157 -11.4173 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 36 0. -11.3665 O. CUBOID 8 1 12.5857 -11.9507 11.9507 -12.0~23 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0
- 1 12.6365 -11.9507 11.9507 -12.0523 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 33 12.5857 O. O.
BOX TYPE 21 ARRAY 1 -10.3676 -11.049 -182.88 CUBOID 3 1 11.049 -10.3676 10.3676 -11.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 11.4173 -11.3157 11.3157 -11.4173 213.04 -193.36. HOLE 35 11.3665 0. 0.
=H=OLE_3_6_ ___Q_. -1.L.366.s_ _o_._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~----*
CUBOID 8 1 12.0523 -12.5857 11.9507 -12.0523 213.04 -193.36 BO~ TYPE 22 ARRAY 1 -10.3676 -11.049 -182.88 CUBOID. 3 l 11.049 -10.3676 10.3676 -11.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 5 l 4P11.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 11.4173 -11.3157 11.3157 -11.4173.'. 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 11.3665 0. . 0.
.. HOLE 36 0. -11.3665 O*
**CUBOID 8 J., *11.4173 -11.3157 12.*5957 -12.0523 213.04 -.193.36 CUBOID 4 . 1
- 11. 4173 -11. 3157 12. 8524 -12*. 0523 .. 213. 04 ,...193. 36 .
J;!OX*TYPE 23 ARRAY l -10.3676 -11.049 -182.88. CUBOID. 3 1 11.049 -10.3676 10.3676 *-11.049. *213-.04 -193.36 CUBOID. 5 1 .4Pll.049 213.04 -193 .* 36 CuBOID 4 1 4Pl1.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID O 1 3Pll.3157 -11.4173 213.04 -193.36 6.6-~ Rev. 0 1/00 *
* .-===-:
..; -=- .. *--*.r. .:. .. ---=-
HOLE* 36. 0. -11.3665 0. ,,. CUBOID 8 1 12.5857 -11.9507 . 11.3157 -12.0523 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 12.6365 -11.9507 11.3157 -12.0523 . 213.04 -J.93 .* 36 ..
- HOLE. 33 12.5857 O. O.*
BOX TYPE 24 ARRAY 1 -10.3676 -11.049 -182.88 . , CUBOID 3 l 11.049 -10.3676 10.3676 -110049 213 *. 04 -193.3~ .
- _...
CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04. -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36' .
~OID .O 1 11.4173 -11.3157 11.3157 -11.4173 213.04 -193.36,*.
HOLE 3 5 11" 3 6 65 O.
- 0. -
HOLE 36 0. -ll.3665 O. . . CUBOID 8 l. 12.0523 -12.5857 11.3157 "".1~.0523 213.04 -193.36. *;, CUBOID .,*4.
- i
- 12.0523 ~12.5857 ll.3157 -12.0523 213.04 -193.36 BOX TYPE 25 COM=& NEXT 8 BOXES ARE IN -X-Y QUADRANT & ..
ARRAY .. 1 . -10.3676 -10.3676 -182.88 CUBOID
- 3 1. i l .* 049 -10.3676 11.049 -10.3676 213.04 -193.36 .* .
CUBOID 5 l .4Pll. 049 213. 04 -193. 36 CUBOID 4 l 4Pll. 3157 213 ,,'04 .-193. 36 CUBOID 8 l 12.5857 -11.9507 12.5857~-11.9507 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID O 1 12.6365 -11.9507 .12.6365 -11.9507 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 33 12.5857 0. 0. HOLE 34 0. 12.6365 O. BOX TYPE 26 . ARRAY l -10.3676 -10.3676 -182.88 . . .. CUBOID 3 l 11.049 -10.3676 11.049 -10.3676 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID
- 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID O l 11.4173 -11.3157 2Pll.3157 .213.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 11.3665 0. O.
CUBOID 8 l 12.0523 -12.5857 12.5857 -11.9507 .213.04 -193.36 GUBOID O l 12.0523 -12.5857 12.6365 -11.9507 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 34 O. 12.6365 O. . .: ..
- BOX TYPE 27 ;
ARRAY l -10.3676 -10.3676 -182.88 ---CUBOID 3 l 11.049 -J.0.3676 11.049 -;L0.3676 213.04 -193.3.6
- CUBOID 5 l 4Pll.049 213704-~9a-;a6---.-..:.-,-.---
CUBOID 4 l . 4Pil.3157 213.04. -.193.36. CUBOID 0 l ll.4173 -11.3157 2Pll.3157 213.04 .'."'193.36 '.~ ...*:* * .:._ *
- HOLE 35 11.3665 O. *.. O.
CUBOID .8 1 11.4173 .-11.3157 12.5857 -11.9507 *213.04 -193~36
- CUBOID 0 l 11.4173 -11.3157. 12.6365. -11.9507 .213.04 -193;36 HOLE 34 O. 12.6365 O.
BOX TYPE 28 ARRAY l -10.3676 -10.3676. -182.88 . __
!=UBOID 3 l 11.049 -10.3676 11.049 -10.3676 . 213.04 -*193~36 .
. CUBOID 5 1 4Pl1:049 213 *.04 -193.36 .. .. * *
.CQBOID 4 l 4Pll.315.7 213.04 * -19.3.36 * .....- ... :* ..
~OID O l 2Pll.3157 11.4173 -ll.3157 213.04 ~193.36 HOLE 36 O. 11.3665 O~ . * '* .
CUBOID 8 1 12.5857 -11.9507 12.0523 -11.9507 :* 213.04. -193.3~" ... CUBOID 0 l 12.6365 -11.9507 12.0523 -ll.*9507 213.04* -193~36. HOLE 33 12.5857 O. O. BOX TYPE 29 6.6-6 Rev. O 1/00
ARRAY 1 -10.3676 -10.3676 -182.8~ ~ CUBOID 3 1 11.049 -10.3676 11.049 -10.3676 213.04 -193.36: *:: .. COBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 .... CUBOID. 4 1 4Pll .3157 213 .04 -193 .36 .' CUBOID O 1 11.4173 -11.3157 11.4173. -11.3157 213.04 -193.36 -*_..*_. HOLE 35 11.3665 o. 0. .._ .* . .'~.-_. HOLE 36 o. 11.3665 O. CUBOID
- 8 1 12. 0523 -12. 5857 12. 0523 -11. 9507 213. 04 -193. ~6 :-...'
BOX TYPE 3 0 .. ,. '.""- - .. . . ARRAY 1 -10 .3676 -:10. 3676 -182. 88 ...... - . CUBOID 3 1 11.049 .:10.3676 11.049 -10.3676 213.04 -193.36 _: ~ . CUBOID 5 1 4Pll. 049 213. 04 -193 .36 .....* CUBOID 4 1 4Pll. 3157 213. 04 -193. 36 ..
~CID* 0 1 11.4173 -11.3157 11.4173 . ..:11.3157 .. 213.04 -193~36'~--.*
HOLE 35 11.3665 o. O. . ** HOLE 36 O. 11~3665 O. . *. .-- . CUBOID 8 1 11.4173 -11.3157 12.0523 -12.5857 213.04 -193.36. '. CUBOID 4 1 11.4173 -11.3157 12.os23,. .:.12.ss24 213.04 -193.3~. *
- BOX TYPE 31 .
ARRAY l -10.3676 -10.3676 -182.88-CUBOID 3 1 ll.049 -10.3676 11".049 -10.3676 . 213.04 -193.36. CUBOID 5 1 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 4Pll.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 2Pll.3157 11.4173 -11.3157 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 36 0. 11.3665 O. CUBOID 8 l 12.5857 -11.9507 12.0523 -11.3157 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 12.6365 -11.9507 12.0523 *-11.3157 213.04 -193.36 _HOLE 3 3 12
- 5 8 5 7 0. . .0
- BOX TYPE 32
- ARRAY .1 -10.3676 -10.3676 -182.88 CUBOID 3 1 11.049 -10.3676 11.049 -10.3676 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 5 l 4Pll.049 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4P!l. 3157 213. 04 -193. 36 . .
CUBOID 0 l 11.4173 -11.3157 11.4173 -11.3157 213.04 -193.3~ . HOLE 35 11.3665 0. O. . . :* ,** HOLE 36 0. 11. 3665 0. . . CUBOID 8 l__l2_...Q523 __.,_i2....sa5-'1--l-2-.-0S2-3--l-1.-.3-1-5-~21;3-;-<M-----ttr.:tG-..- - - - - CUBOID 4 1 12.0523 -12.5857 12.0523 -11.3157 * .213.04 -193.36.* -. BOX TYPE 33 COM=& 1/2 BORATED AL VERTICAL PLATE &: CUBOID 9 1 0.0508 -0. 2Pl0.4775 2Pl82.88 .- . BOX TYPE 34 COM=& 1/2 BORATED AL HORIZONTAL PLATE &: . . .....*.. CUBOID; 9 1 2P10.4775 o. -0.0508 2Pl82.88 BOX TYPE 35 COM=& BORATED AL VERTICAL PLATE &: CUBOID 9 1 2P0.0508 2P10.4775 2P182.88 BOX TYPE 36 COM= & BORATED AL PLATE HORIZONTAL &
.. CUBOID 9 1 2P10.4775 2P0.0508 2P182.88 * .
- BOX TYPE 37 .COM=&: PERIPHERAL PLATE .VERTICAL &
CUBOID 8 1 1.27 -0. 2P46.7 213.04 -193.36 .... * .: ..
"CUBOID 4- l 1.5367 -o* . . 2P46.7 213.04 -193'.36 .* . ~ .
BOX TYPE 38 COM=& PERIPHERAL PLATE HORIZONTAL & CUBOID 8 l 2P46.7 1.27 -0. 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l **2P46.7. 1;5367 -0. 213.04 -193.36 BOX TYPE 39 COM=& FUEL PIN CELL &
"CYLINDER 1 1 0.4096 2Pl82.88 .**.r*
6.6-7 Rev. o 1/00
~*.r-1 .... _ ......
CYLINDER 0 1 0.4178 2P182.88 CYLINDER 2 1 0.4750 2Pl82.88 CUBOID S l 4P0.6299 2Pl82.88 BOX TYPE 40 COM=&: GUIDE TUBE WITH BPRA (ALUM) & CYLINDER 8 1 0.5715 2Pl82._88 CYLINDER 2 1 0.6121 2Pl82.88 CUBOID . 5 1 4P0.6299 2Pl82.88 . . BOX .TYPE 41 COM=&: 4 BOX HORIZONTAL ARRAY TOP & ~. ARRAY 2 -49.2252 O., -193.36.:,:** . *.* *.. BO~ TYPE 42 * . COM=&: 4 BOX HORIZONTAL* ARRAY BOTTOM.&: _ ARRAY 3 -49.2252 -23.368 . -i93.36 . BOX TYPE . 43 COM=&: 4 BOX VERTICAL ARRAY +X &
*ARRAY 4 O. -49.4919 -193.36 BOX. TYPE . 44 *, COM=& 4 BOX VERTICAL ARRAY -X &:
ARRAY 5 -22.733 -49.4919 -193.36 ' BOX TYPE 45 CoM=&: PERIPHERAL SS PIECE (TYPE 8 BOXES) &:* COBOID 4 1 0.2667 -0. 22.4537 -0. 213.04 --193.36 BOX TYPE 46 COM=& EMPTY GUIDE/INSTRUMENT TUBE & CYLINDER 5 1 0.5715 2Pl82.8B CYLINDER 2 1 0.6121 2Pl82.8B CUBOID S* 1 4P0.6299 2Pl82.88 GLOBAL BOX TYPE 47 ARRAY 6 -49.2252 -48.5902 -193.36 CYLINDER 10 l 87.34 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 41 O. 48.5903 O. HOLE 42 0. -48.5903 O. HOLE 43 49.2253 O. o. HOLE 44 -49.2253 0. *O ** HOLE 37 71.9584 O. O. HOLE 37 -73.4951 O.
- o.
HOLE 38 O. 71.9584 O. HOLE 38 0. -.73.4951 O. HOLE 45 49.2253 49.4920 O. HOLE 45 -49.4920 49.4920 O. ~ HOLE 45 49.2253 -71.9457 O. HOLE 45 -49.4920 -71.9457 O. *
CYLINOER-s-1-~87~-0--221.-.-2-9----1-93-.-3..... 6~-------"
CYLINDER 7 1 111.73 247.96 -219.4 REPLICATE 3 2 3*3.o* 10 END GEOM READ ARRAY* ARA=l NUX=l7 NUY=l7 FILL F39 ~4.0 4'? A43 40 A46 40 ASS 40 A65
*~. .. ..
40 : . . . .. . ~ . A88 40 A91 40 A94 40 A97 40 AlOO 40 Al39 40 A142 40 "A145 *46
*.. 1Bl44
. .END FILL ._. .
*
- ARA=2 NUX=4 FILL 24 23 7 ; 8 : END FILL .
ARAa3 NUX=4 FILL 32 31 15 l6 . END* FILL* ARAa4 NUY=4 FILL 14 11 3 6 : END FILL ARA=S NUY=4 FILL 30 27 19 22 END FILL ARA=6 NUX=4 NUY=4 FILL 29 28 12 13 26 25 .9 io . *1a 17 1 2 ..
- 21 20 4 5 END FILL END ARRAY READ BIAS 10=500 2 11 END BIAS 6.6-8 Rev. o 1/00
END DATA END 6.6.2 Sample Input Fne. TN-32 Criticaiity Eyalnation 31 assemblies enriched 4
- 05% I Olle. 5!fr; minimum. COmi;)artment i minimum neutron absorber plate; ~ puFe water. in f.uel pin*
- annulus; 95% density borated wa~er.drained d~wri.to top of active fuel; 2 inch offset between*active .fuel. and neutron absorber plates. * *
- s::CSAS25 TN32 fiver95 17xl 7 non-of*a** I off center I 2300_ ppm. /90% *b10 l miil: * .
- compartment 27GROUPNDF4 LATTICECELL '.
U02 1 0.9S 293. 92235 4.05 92238 95.95 END ..... ZIRCALLOY
- 2 1. 0 END .
H20 3 1.0 END SS304 4 1.0 END 1 BORATED H20 2300 PPM 95% ARBMH3B03 0.01252656 3 1 l 0 5000 l 1001 3 8016.3 .5 1.0 293 END H20 5 0.9417257 END 1 BORAL CORE 10MG/CM2 lllNOT USED!!! B4C 6 DEN=2*.64 *o.417 END AL 6' DEN=2~64 0.583 END CARBONSTEEL 7 1.0 END AL 8 1.0 END 1 EAGLE PICHER BORATED AL (. 040 11 ) ! I ! 90% BlO CREDIT l 1 l BORON 9 DEN=2.693 0.03811 293. 5010 86.4 5011 13.6 END ...
. AL 9 DEN=2.693 0.96189 END I BORATED H20/AL HOMOG mix AT PERIPHERY l I l 2000 PPM! 1 i AL 10 0.303 END ARBMH3B03 0.01152 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001.3 8016 3 10 0.697 293 END.*
H20---'l0--0-;-6-9SS-S-END-------------.c__--~----------
U02 11 0.95 293. 92235 5 92238 95 END END COMP SQUAREPITCH 1.2598. 0.8192 l 5 0.9500 2 0.8357 3 END MORE DATA res=ll cylinder 0.40959999 dan(ll)=0.2728.89 END MORE DATA . . . . TN32'CRITICALITY 2300 PPM BORATED H20 WITH BAL. (0.040") READ PARA~t°RUN=yes PLT=YES TME=SOOO GEN=203 NPG=2000 END PAR.AM READ GEOM ' . * . * . BOX TYPE 1 COM=& NEXT EIGHT BOXES ARE +X+Y QUADRANT &
'ARR.Ay l" . -10.9728. -10.9728 -187.96 .
CUBOID* 3 1 10.4438 -10.9728
- i0.4438. -10 .* 9728. - 177.80 -: ..
193 .36 . *.:... : . ~ . CUBOID 5 1 4Pl0.9728 177 .. 80 .:.*193.36
- CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 4Pl1.2395 213.04* -i93.36 CUBOID 8 1 11. 8745 -12. 5095 11. 8745 -12. 5095 .. 213. 04 -193 *. 36
- 6. 6-.~ Rev. O 1/00
*--*----~-
- CUBOID O 1 11.8745 -12.5603 11.8745 *-'1*2.5603. 213.Jl.4 -193.36 HOLE 33 -12.5603 o. o.
HOLE 34 o. . -12.5095 o. BOX TYPE 2 ARRAY 1 -10.9728 -10.9728 -187.96 .. CUBOID 3 l 10.4438 -10.9728 10.4438 .-10~9728 177.80 193.36 ... CUBOID 5 1 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 *. CUBOID 3 1 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36 *~ CUBOID 4 1 4P11.2395 213.04* -193.36 .. :*. **
- COBOID 0 1 11.2395 -11.3411 2Pl1.2395 213.04 -i~3.36 HOLE 35 -11.2903 o. 0. .
COBOID . 8 1 12.5095 -11.9761 11.8745 -12~5095 213.04 -193. 3-6 CUBOID. o* l 12.5095 -11.9761. 11.8745 -12~5603 '213.04 -193.36 .. HOLE 34 0. -12.5095 o. BOX TYPE 3 ARRAY 1 -10 .*9728 -10. 9728 -187. 96 CUBOID 3 l i0.4438 -10.9728 10.4438 -10.9728. 177.80 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4P10.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4Pl0.9728 213;04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pl1.2395 213.04 -193.36 . CUBOID 0 1 11.2395 -11.3411 2Pll.2395 213.04 ~193.36 HOLE 35 -11.2903 0; o. CUBOID 8 1 11.2395 -11.3411 11.874~ -12.5095 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID *O 1 11.2395 -11.3411 11.8745 -12.5603 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 34 . o. -*12.5095' 0. BOX TYPE 4 ARRAY 1 -10.9728 -10.9.728 -187.96' CUBOID 3 1 10.4438 -10.9728 10.4438 -10.9728 111. eo* - 193.36
*CUBOID 5 1 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 l 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36-,
CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 3Pll.2395 -11.3411 213.04 -193.36 ~-HOLE.__3_6
- o. -11.2903 o. . .
CUBOID 8 1 11.87~5 2--;-5-G-95-l-L.-814.S'.'-11.9761 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 l 11. 8745 -12. 5603 11. 8745 -11. 9'T~~1"3-.04--l-93-.-3~6_ _ _ __ HOLE 33 -12.5603 o. o. . . . BOX.TYPE 5 ARRAY * *1 -10. 9728 . -10. 9728 ..:107. 96* CUBOID 3 1 10.4438 -10.9728 10.4438 -10'~ 9728 *177. 80 - . 193.36 CUBOID 5 l
- 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4Pl0.9728 213 .. 04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213~04 -193;36
*cuao10 o
- 1 il.2395 .-11.34'11 11.2395.-11.3411 213 .. 04 .-193.36 HOLE 35 -11.2903 o. b; ....
HOLE 36 o. -11.2903 o. . CUBOID 8 *1 12.5095 -11.9761 11.8745 -11~9761. 213;04 -1~3.36 BOX TYPE 6 . . . - ARRAY 1 ~10.9728 -10.9728 -187.96* ... CoBOID 3 1 10.4438 -10.9728 10.443~ ~10.9728 r 177.80 193.36
- 6. 6-1.0 Rev. o '1/00
CUBOID 5 l 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.3~ CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 ~ *
- CUBOID 0 l 11.2395 -11.3411 11.2395 -11.3411 .213.04 -193.36 ....
HOLE 35 -11.2903 o. o. HOLE 36 o. -11.2903 o. . CUBOID 8 1 11.2395 -11.3411 12.5095 -11.9761 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 11.2395 -11.3411. 12.7762 -11.9761 213.04 -193.36 BOX TYPE 7 ARRAY 1 -10.9728 -10.9728 -187.96' CUBOID 3 *l 10.4438 ~10.9728 10.4438 -10~9728 177.80 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID O 1 3Pll.2395 -11.3411 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 36 o. , -11.2903 o. . CUBOID 8 l ll'.8745 -12.5095 11.2395 -11.9761 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 11.8745 -12.5603. 11.2395 ~11.9761 *213. 04 -193. 36 HOLE 33 -12.5603 o. o. BOX TYPE 8 ARRAY 1 -10.9728 -10.9728 -187.96 CUBOID 3 1 10.4438 -10.9728 10.4438" -10.972~ 177.80 193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 * -193.36 . CUBOID 0 l 11.2395 -11.3411 11.2395 -11.3411 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 -11~2903 o. o. HOLE 36 o. -11.2903 o. CUBOID 8 1 12.5095 -11.9761 11.2395 -11.9761 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 12.5095 -11.9761 11.2395 -11.9761 213.04 -193.36 BOX TYPE 9 COM=&* NEXT EIGHT BOXES ARE +X-Y QUADRANT & ARRAY 1 -10.9728 -10.4438 -187.96 CUBOID 3 1 10.4438 -10.9728 10.9728 -10.4438. __ 177.80 193.36 ---~CUBJllD__S 1 ~Rl0-...-9-+28--l-'7-1-.-8Q----l-99~3~:*3+16!i-~---------*----- CUBOID 3 l 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36. CUBOID* 4 1 4Pll.2395. 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 8 1 11.8745 -12.5095 12.5095 -11.8745 213.04 -193~36 CUBOID .. 0 1 11.8745 -12.5603 12.5603 -11.8745 213.~4 -1~3.36: HOLE
- 33 -12.5603 o. o.
HOLE* 34 o. 12.5603 0. BOX TYPE 10 . ARRAY 1 -10.9728 -10.4438 *-187.96 CUBOID 3 1 10. 4438 -10. 9728 10. 9728 -10 ."4438 :**; *177. 80 . - .. 193.36 . .: ;. .. CUBOID 5 * .1 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193 .* 3G CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 cUBOID 4 1
- 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 . . .
CUBOID O 1 11.2395 -11.3411 2Pll.2395 . 213.04*--193.36
- HOLE 35 -11.2903 O. 0.
cimoro a i 12~5095 -11.*9761 12.5095 -11.8745 *213.04 -193.36 : - CUBOID O 1 12.5095 -11.9761 12.5603 -11.8745._: 213.04 ~193~36~'**- *. 6.6-11 Rev. o 1/00
HOLE 34 o. 12.5603 o. .,,
- BOX TYPE 11 ARRAY l * ~10.9728 -10.4438 -187.96 CUBOID 3* 1 10.4438 . -10.9728 *10.9728* -1~-~438 177.80 193.36 CUBOID 5 1
- 4P10.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 l 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36 COBO:tD 4 1 4Pl.l..239S ~1].04 -l~J,36 .
CUBOID 0 1 11.2395 -11.3411 2Pl.i.2395 213.04 -~193.36 HOLE 35 -11.2903 0. o. ." . CUBOID 8 1 ll.2395 -11.3411 12.5095 -11.8745
- 213.04 -193.36* . .
- COBOID 0 1 11.2395 -11.3411 12.5603 -11.8745 **2l3.04 -193.36 *.*
HOLE 34 0. - 12. 5603 . O. BOX ..TYPE. 12 ARRAY .1 -10 ."9728 -10 .4438. -187. 96 CUBOID 3
- 1 10."4438. -10.9728 10.9728 -10.4438 177.80.
193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pl0.9728* 177~80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 *-193.36 . CUBOID O 1 2Pll.2395 11.3411 -11.2395 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 36 0. 11.2903 O. . CUBOID 8 l 11.8745 -12.5095 11.9761 -11.8745 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID O l 11.8745 -12.5603 11.9761 -11.8745* 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 33* -12.5603 O. O. BOX TYPE 13 . . ARRAY l -10.9728 -10.4438 -187.96 CUBOID 3 1 10.4438 -10.9728. 10.9728 -10.4438 177.80 .. 193.36 CUBOID S 1 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 l 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 11.2395 -11.3411 11.3411.-11.2395 2'13.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 -11.2903 o. o. HOLE 36 o. 11.2903 o. CUBOID
- 8 l 12.5095 -11.9761 ll.~761 -ll.8745 213.04 -193.36
~~~~Ox-.t'Y~E 14 . . .*. ARRAY 1 -10. 912a -:T4"Ja a-au_~ * * * . CUBOID 3 l 10.4438 -10.9728 10.9728 :<<*3-a-11-1-.B-O--_ _ _ __ 193.36 CUBOID* 5 1 4Pl0.97~8 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4Pl0.9728 213.04 *-193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.239S 213.04. -193.36. CUBOID 0 l 11.2395 -11.3411 11.3411 -11.2395. *213*.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 -11.2903 O. O.
~OLE 36 0. . 11.2903 '0.
"COBOID *a 1 *11.2395 -11.3411 11.9761 -12:so95 . .-213.04* -193.36 CUBOID 4
- 1- 11-.2.395 -11.34li 11.9761 -12.7762 213.04 -i~J*.~6 BOX TYPE 15 ARRAY l -10.9728 -10.4438 -187.96 CUBOID 3 l 10.4438 ~10.9728 10.9728 -10.4438 177.80 193 .36.
CoBOID 5 1 4Pl0.9728 177.80 * -193 .* 36 CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 6.6-12 Rev. O 1/00
CUBOID 4 1 4P11.2395 213.04 -193.36 , CUBOID 0 1 2Pll.2395 11.3411 -11.2395 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 36 o. 11.2903 o. .. CUBOID B 1 11.8745 -12.5095 11.9761 -11.2395, _213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 11.8745 -12.5603 11.9761 -11.2395 . 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 33 -12.5603 o. o. BOX TYPE 16 .. . . ARRAY 1 -10.9728 -10.4438 ~187~96 ~. CUBOID 3. 1 10. 4438 -10. 9728 10. 9728. -10 .44~~. . 177. 80 193.36 CUBOID 5 l 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 .213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 4P11.2395 213.04 -193.36 . CUBOID 0 1 11.2395 -11.3411 11.3411 -11.2395. . 213.04 -193.36 *, HOLE 35 -11.2903 0. O. HOLE 36 0. 11.2903 O. CUBOID 8 l 12.5095 -11.9761 11.9761 -11.2)95
- ii3~04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 12.5095 -11.9761 11.9761 -11.2395 213.04 -193.36 BOX TYPE 17 COM=& NEXT 8 BOXES ARE -X+Y QUADRANT &
ARRAY 1 -10 .4438 -10. 9729* -187. 96. . CUBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10.4438 -10.9728** *177.80 -193.36 - CUBOID 5 1 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 8 1 12.5095 -11.8745 11.8745 -12.5095 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 12.5603 -11.8745 11.8745 -12.5603 2~3.04-~193.36 HOLE 33. 12.5095 0. 0. HOLE. 34 O. -12.5095 O. BOX TYPE 18 ARRAY 1 -10.4438 -10.9728 -187.96 CUBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10.4438 -10.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4P10.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 l 4PlU.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 11.3411 -11.2395 2Pll.2395 213.04 -i93.36 HOLE 35 ll.2903 O. O* ._ _COB_QID_B__l_ll_._9_'l.6_l -12__._5095 ll_._874'5 -12. 5095 213. 04 -193 .36 CUBOID 0 1 11.9761 -12.5095 11.8745 -12.5603. 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 34 0. - -12. 5095 0. BOX TYPE 19 ARRAY .. 1 -10.4438 -10.9728 -187.96 CUBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10.4438 -10.9728 177.80 -193.-36
- CUBOID 5 l 4P10.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID* 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 .. -19:;L3.6
*. CUBOID 0 1 11.3411 -11.2395 2Pl1.2395 213.04 -193.36
- .HOLE 35. 11.2903 . 0. *-.* 0 .
. CUBOID 8 1 11~3411 .:.11.2395 11.8745 -12.5095-.. 213.04 -193~36:
CUBOID* O 1 11.3411 -11.2395 11.8745 ~12.5603 -213.04. -193.36. HOLE 34 O. -12.5095 O. BOX TYPE 20 : ARRAY 1 -10.4438 -10.9728 -187.96 -*"
- CUBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10.4438 -10.9728 j,77~ao *-193.3~
CUBOID 5 1 *4p10.9728 177.80 * -1.93.36 . 6.6-13 Rev. o 1/00
~
. *~
...,..*:-r~ *.-_.._
CUBOID 3 l 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36 . ,,. CUBOID 4 1 4Pl1.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 3Pl1.2395 -11.3411 213. 04 -193 .36 . HOLE 36 O. -11.2903 O.
- CUBOID 8 1 12.5095 -11.8745 11.8745 -11.9761 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 12.5603 -l.l.8745 11.8745 -11.9761 . 213.04 .-193.36 HOLE 33 12.5095 O. O.
BOX TYPE 21 ARRAY l -10.4438 -10.9?28 -187.96<* CUBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10.4438 -10.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID S 1 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 COBOID 3 1 4Pl0.9728 213.04 .-193.36 CUBOID. 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 " CUBOID * *o ;t 11. 3411 -11. 2395 11. 2395 -l.l. 3411 .213. 04 ... J.93. .36 ... .. HOLE 35 11.2903 O. O. ~. HOLE 36 O. -11.2903 O. CUBOID 8 l 11.9761 -12.5095 11.8745 -11.9761 213.04 -193.36 ..
- BOX TYPE 22 ARRAY 1 -10.4438 -10. 9728. -187 .96 CUBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10.4438 -10.9728 177.80 -193.36.~-*
CUBOID 5 l 4P10.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID O 1 11.3411 -11.2395 11.2395 ~ll.34ll 213.04 -193.36 .. HOLE 35 11.2903 0. 0. HOLE 36 O. -11.2903 . O. CUBOID 8 1 11.3411 -11.2395 12.5095 -11.9761 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4* 1 ll.3411 -11.2395 12.7762 *-11.9761 213.04 *-193.36 BOX TYPE 23 . ARRAY l -10.4438 -10.9728 -187.96 CUBOID 3 l 10.9728 -10.4438 10.4438 -10.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4P10.. 9728 177. 80 -193 .36 CUBOID 3 1 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36
- CUBOID 4 l 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 3Pll.2395 -11.3411 213.04 -193.36
---HOLE-3-6 O. -11.2903 O. . . CUBOID 8 .1 12. 5095 -11. S-74-S--1-l-"o-2-3-95--=l.1...Jl76l ***213. 04 -193. 36 .. CUBOID 0 1 12.5603 -11.8745 11.2395 -11.9761 213.04 -:r93"73-6&----'------ HOLE 33 12.5095 O. 0. .. BOX TYPE 24 ARRAY. :i . -10.4438 -10.9728 -187.96 CUBOID 3 .1 -10.9728 -10.4438 10.4438 -10.9728 177.80 :. -193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4P10.9728 177.80 -193.36 . CUBOID 3 1 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4P11.2395 213.04 :-193.36 , *., CUBOID 0 1 11~3411 -11.2~95 11.2395 :..11 *. 3411
- 213.04. *-193.36 HOLE 35 . .11.2903 O *. " O *
. HOLE' 36 O. -ll.2903 . O. * , . .
CUBOID 8 1 11. 9761 -*12 ~ 5095 11. 23.95 ~11~9761" 213. 04 -193 ~36. CUBOID 4 l 11.9761 -12.5095 11.2395 -11.9761 213.04--193.36 . BOX TYJ?E 25 COM=& NEXT 8 BOXES .ARE. IN -:X-Y QUADRANT & ** ARRAY 7 -10.4438 .;.10.4438 -187.96 . .. * *. CoBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10.9728. -10.4438* 177.a*o -193.36 "CUBOID 5 1 4Pl0.9728 1?7.ao ~193.36 6.6-14 Rev. O 1/00
-- *-........ a.. -.
CUBOID 3 l 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 4P11.2395 213.04 -193.36
*cusoID 8 1 12.5095 -11.8745 12.5095 -11.8745 :213.04 -193.36 *~.
CUBOID 0 1 12.5603 -li.8745 12.5603 -11.8745*~213:04 -193.36 HOLE 33 . 12. 5095 0. 0. HOLE 34* . 0. 12.5603 O. BOX TYPE 26 ARRAY 1 *-10.4438 -10*.4438 -187.96 CUBOID 3 l .10.9728 -10.4438 10.9728 -10.4438 177.80 -193~36
. *~.
CUBOID 5 . l 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 2i3.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 .. CUBOID 0 1 11.3411 -11.2395 2Pll.2395 *213.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 11.2903 O. O. * ..
- CUBOID. 8 1 11.9761 -12.5095 12.5095 -11.8745 213.04 -193~36
CUBOID 0 1 11.9761 -12.5095 12.5603 -11.8745 .213.04 -193.36 HOLE 34 O. 12.5603 O. BOX TYPE 27 ARRAY 1 -10.4438 -10.4438 -187.96 CUBOID 3 l 10.9728-i'0.4438'10.9728 -10.4438 177.ao* -193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4P10.9728 177.80* -193.36 . CUBOID 3 l 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID O. 1 11.3411 -11.2395 2P11.2395 213~04-.-193.36 HOLE 35 11. 2903 0. 0. .. CUBOID 8 1 ll.3411 -11.2395 12.5095 -11.8745 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 l 11.3411 -11.2395 12.5603 -11.8745. 213.04 -193.36 HOLE. 34 O. . 12.5603 0. BOX TYPE 28. ARRAY 1 -10.4438 -10.4438 -187.96 CUBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10.9728 -10."4438 177.80. -193.36 CUBOID 5 l 4P10.9728 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36. CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213. 04 -193 .36 . . . . . CUBOID 0 1 2P11.2395 11.3411 -11.2395 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 36 0. 11.2903 O. . *. _ _ _ _C~OB~O=I=D_8 1 12
- 5-Cl95-=ll-...8-7-45-l.l-.--9-76l:..:__.._1-l-..-8-14-5-.2~04---1-93.-36-------
CUBOID 0 1 12.5603 -11.8745. 11.9761. -11.8745:**~213.04 -193.36 HOLE 33 12.5095 O. O. BOX 'TYPE 29 ARRAY .. 1 -10.4438 -10.4438 -187.96 CUBOID 3 . l " 10. 9728 -10. 4438 10. 9728 *-10-. 4438 177. 80 -193. 36. - CUBOID 5 1 4Pl0. 9728 177. 80- -193. 36 .... *. :-.
- 2 ::
CUBOID 3 1 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 . * -- CUBOID 4 1 4P11.2395 213.04 -193.36. . ., _ CUBOID O 1 11. 3411 -11. 2395 .. 11. 3411 -11. 2395 . 213. 04* -193. 36 *
'HOLE 35 11. 29.03 0. ""* 0. ; ..
. ~OLE 36 . O *. ll. 2903 0. .
CT:JBOID 8 1 11. 9761 -i2
- 5095 11. 976*1. -i1-.*a745 213. 04 *-193 .36 BOX TYPE 30 ARRAY 1 *-10.4438 -10.4438 -187.96 ........
CUBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10."9728 -10.4438 177.80 -193.36. CuBOID 5 1 4P10.9728 177.80 -193.36 .. CUBOID 3 1 . 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 6.6-15 Rev. o l/Oo
- . . *.:.....* --=--
--**:~*
~**-
CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 .* CUBOID 0 1 *11.3411 -11.2395 11.3411 -11.2395 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 11.2903 O. 0. HOLE 36 O.
- 11.2903 0.
CUBOID . 8 1 11.3411 -11*.2395 11.9761 -12.5095 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 l 11.3411 .-11.2395 11.9761 *-12.7762
- 213.04 ;..193.36 BOX TYPE 31 . *..
ARRAY 1 -10.4438 -10.4438 *-187~96 CUBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10.9728 -10.4438 177 .* 80 -193.36 . CUBOID 5 1 4P10.972B 177.80 -193.36 . CUBOID 3 l 4P10.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1
- 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID O 1 2Pll.2395 11.3411 -11.2395 213.04 ~193.36 HOLE .. 36 ... . 0. . . 11. 2903 0.
CUBOID 8 1 12.5095 -11.8745 11.9761 -11.2395 *. 213.04 -193~36*
- CUBOID 0 1 12.5603 -11.8745 11.9761 -11.2395 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 33 12.5095 O. 0.
BOX TYPE 32 ARRAY 1 -10.4438 -10.4438 .. -187.96 CUBOID 3 1 10.9728 -10.4438 10.9728 -10.4438 177.80 -193.36 CUBOID 5 1 4Pl0.9728 177.80 -193.36 . CUBOID 3 1 4Pl0.9728 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 4Pll.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 0 1 11.3411 -ll.2395 11.3411 -11.2395 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 35 11.2903 0. o. HOLE 36 0. 11.2903 0. CUBOID . 8 1 11.9761*-12.5095 11.9761 -11.2395 213.04 -193.36 CUBOID 4 1 *11.9761 -12.5095 11.9761 -11.2395 213.04 -193.36 BOX TYPE 33 COM=& 1/2 BORATED AL VERTICAL PLATE & : CUBOID 9 1 0.050799 -0. 2Pl0.4013 2Pl82.88 BOX TYPE 34 COM=& 1/2 BORATED AL HORIZONTAL PLA.TE & CUBOID 9 1 2P10 ..4013 0. -0.050799 2Pl82.88 BOX TYPE 35 COM=& BORATED AL VERTICAL,PLATE & CUBOID 9 l 2P0.050799 2Pl0.4013 2Pl82.88 BOX TYPE 36 COM= & BORATED AL PLATE HORIZONTAL & CUBOID 9 1 2Pl0.40l3 2P0.050799 2P~82.88 --sox-T¥PE--37 CQM;;;_&_E_ERIPHERAL PLATE VERTICAL & CUBOID 8 l 1.27 -0. 2P46.3952 213.04 :.19~*s,-~--------- CUBOID 4 l 1.5367 ~o. 2P46.3952 213.04 -193.36 BOX *TYPE 38 COM=& PERIPHERAL PLATE HORIZONTAL & CUBOID
- 8 l 2P46. 3952 1.27 -0. 213. 04 -193 .36 .
CUBOID. 4* l
- 2P46.3952 *1.5367 -0 * . 213.04 -193.36 BOX TYPE 39 COM=& FUEL PIN CELL &
CYLINDER 1 l 0.4096 2Pl82.88 CYLINDER 3 1 0.4178 2Pl82.88 CYLINDER 2 1 0. 4 750 2Pl82*. 88 "CUBOID *. *5 1 **4P0.6299 2Pl82.88
.BOX TYPE 40
- COM;,.&: GUIDE TUBE WITH BPRA _(ALUM) &:
CYLINDER 8 l O. 5715 2PlS2. 88 .. . .- CYLINDER 2 1 0. 6121 . 2Pl82. 88
- CUBOID 5 1 4P0.6'2.99 2Pl82.88 BOX TYPE 41 COM=& 4 BOX HORIZONTAL ARRAY TOP &
ARRAY 2 -48.9204 o. -193.36 BOX TYPE 42 COM=& 4 BOX HORIZONTAL ARRAY BOTTOM &: 6.6-16 Rev. o 1/00
~ -. --*
--~- ... :. ;. ***- ....
ARRAY 3 -48.9204 -23.2156 -193.36 BOX TYPE 43 COM=& 4 BOX VERTicAL ARRAY +X-& ARRAY 4 O. * -49.1871 -193.36 BOX TYPE 44 COM=& 4 BOX.VERTICAL ARRAY -X & ARRAY 5 -22.5806 -49.1871 -193.36 . BOX TYPE 45 .COM=& PERIPHERAL SS PIECE (TYPE 8 BOXES) & ** CUBOID 4 l *o.2667 -0. 22.3013 *-o. 213.04 -193.36 BOX TYPE 46 COM=& EMPTY GUIDE/INSTRUMENT TUBE & CYLINDER 5- 1. 0.5715 2P182.88:: * .. .. . CYLINDER 2 1 0. 6121 2P182. 88.
- CUBOID 5 1 4P0.6299 2Pl82.8's BOX TYPE 47 COM=&: ~L PIN CELL,- 5%*ENRICHED &
. CYLINDER 11 1 0.4096 2Pl82.B8 ..,
CYLINDER *3 1 0.4178 2Pl82.B8 . -
'* ~-*
CYLINDER 2 -1 0.4750 2Pl82.8B CUBOID 5
- l 4P0.6299 2Pl82.88 GLOBAL BOX TYPE 48 ARRAY 6 -48.9204 -48.2854 -193.36 CYLINDER 10 1 87.34 213.04 -193.36 HOLE 41 O. 48.2855 o.**
HOLE 42 0. -48.2855 O. HOLE 43 48.9205 o. o. HOLE 44 -48.9205 O. 0 .- HOLE 37 71.5012 0. 0. HOLE 37 -73. 0379- 0. o. HOLE 38 0. 71.5012 0. HOLE .38 0. -73.0379 O. HOLE 45 *48.92051. 49.18720 0. HOLE 45 -49.18721 49.18720 O. HOLE 45 48.9205 -71.4885 0. HOLE 45 -49.18720 -71.4885 o.* CYLINDER 5 1 87.60 213.04 -193-.36 CYLINDER O 1 87 :so 221. 29 -193. 36 . CYLINDER 7 1 111.73 247.96 -219.4-' REPLlCATE 3 2 3*3.0 10 END GEOM ~~~~REAlLARRAY~~~~~--~~'--;_:_~~-----,-~~~--~~~~~--~~.~~~~~ ARA=l NUX=l 7 NUY=l 7 FILL F39
- A40 40 A43 40 A46 40 ASS 40 A65 40 ABB 40 A91 40 A94 .40 A97 40 AlOO 40 Al39. 40 A1~2 40
- Al45 46 1Bl44 ..
END FILL ARA=2 NUX=4 FILL 24 23 7 8
- END FILL ARA=3 NUX=4 FILL 32 31 15 16 END FILL .
ARAa4 NUY=4 FILL 14 11 3 6 END FILL*.*.. ARA=S NUY=4 FILL 30 27 19-22 END FILL. - _
- ARA=6 NUX=4 NUY=4 . FILL 29 28 12 1;3 26. 25 .9 *10 . 18 1'.7 1 2 : .
21 20 4 5 . END FILL . * . * . : - . ~ ..
~=7 Nux=17 NUY=17 'FILL F47 A40 40 A43 40 A46* 40 ASS.40 A65 40 A88 40 A91 40 A94 40 A97 40 AlOO 40 . Al39 .. . . 40. .Al.42 40 Al45 46 1Bl44 * * "a. ~'!. ... '
END ARRAY READ BIAS ID=SOO 2 11 END BIA,$- *. .
~
6.6-17*'.' Rev. O 1/00
END DATA END
~* ::... . -* - ,;.*.
- 6. 6
- 3 * *
- Computer Plat forms and Codes .
Criticality calculations were performed using SCALE 4.3 1 ,
"Modular.Code System for .Performing . Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation for Workstations and Personal Computers" on a Hewlett Packard 9000/715 Workstation.
Calculations and benchmarks were performed ori the . same platform. Statistical analysis of benchmark results was performed using the PC version of the USLSTATS pro~ram, Version 1.3.4, distributed by Oak Ridge National Laboratciry<2. * . * . * * *' 6.6-:.10 ..
- Rev. 1 5/00
6.7 References 1.. *SCALE 4.3, A Mod11Jar Code System For Performjng Standardized Computer AnaJyses For Licensing EvaJuation, .Program.P~ckage, CCC-545, ORNL.
* ' 'I * * ' ' *
- 2. NUREG/CR-6361, CriticaJjty Benchmark GJdae for I.jgbt-Water-Reactor Fuel in Transportation and Storage Packages*,. 1997.
- 3. Domestic Light water Reactor Fuel Design Evolution, DOE/ET/47912, vol III, Sept 1981, Table 4-2.
- 4. Cbaracteri st jcs of Potential Repos j tory Wastes, DOE/RW-:
-0184-Rl, Vol 1, July 1992, Appendix.2A.
- 5. Reference Core Report 17 x 17 Fuel Assembly. WCAP-9500, Westinghouse Nuclear Energy Systems, Table 4.3-1.
- 6. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RAI to Transnuclear dated Sept 14, 1998, question 6-3.
- 7. ANS/ANSI-8.1, American National Standard for Nuclear
*criticality Safety in Qperatjons wjtb FissioDable MaterjaJs 011tsjde Reactors, 1983.
- 8. McGuire Nuclear Station Final Safety Analysis Report, January 1, 1998, Appendix 4 6.7-1 .... Rev. 1 5/00
TABLE 6.2-1 Fuel Parameters for PWR Fuel Parameter 14x14 14x 14 15x15 17x 17 17x17 17x17 Std OFA Std MkBW OFA - -Enrichment, wt% U235 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 - 4.05 4.05 Active fuel length 141.2- 135.2- 142-144 144 144 144 Iii! 144 Pellet OD 0.3640-0.3444 0.3649- 0.3225 0.3195 0.3088 Rod OD 0.422 0.400 0.422 0.374 0.374 0.360
~-
Clad wall thickness (Zr) 0.0243 0.0225 0.0240 0.0225 0.0243 Rod pitch 0.556 0.556 0.563 0.496 0.496 . 0.496 UCh density (% 95 95 95 95 96 95 theoretical) No of fuel rods 179 179 204 264 264 264 No of guide/instrument 16 I 1 16I1 21 25 25 25 tubes Guide tube OD Guide tube wall (Zr) 0.4805-mm 0.017-0.526 0.017 0.484-
~
0.015 0.429-SB 0.016 0.482 0.016
*0.429-0.016 Instrument Tube OD b.!-01.4
~
l!!l 0.422-f' ' 0.400 0.545 Pill 0.482
- 0.545
.'.l.::A.. :*: 0.545 Instrument Tube Wall 0.0240- 0.0235 0.015 0.015- 0.016 0.015-(Zr) - - - - - - - - - mnt-i ;, * .
- ~. ijj Bottom of assembly to 3.876 na 3.873 4.176 4.5 na bottom of active fuel Gap between bottom end 0 na 0 0.75 0 na plate and fuel rod
- 1. All dimensions in inches
- 2. Data from references 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8
- 3. Where there are variations for a given design, the values highlighted are chosen for the analysis. See Section 6.4.2.
- 4. In all cases except the 14xl4 OFA model, the instrument tube is modeled with the same dimensions as the guide tube. This has no significant effect on the results.
- 5. For evaluation of axial offset of the active fuel and neutron poison plate, located 4.12 inches from the cask bottom Rev. 1 5/00
Table 6.3-1 . Comparison of Design. Dimensions* . with .*criticality Model Description * . .. . TN.;;3.2 Design* Model* compartmE7ht inside " ... ' 8.70 +/- 0.04 8.64 - 8.76 compartment wall ; " 0.105 " 0.105 aluminum thicknes,s *-* . 0.50:. .. 0 .so .. neutron absorber plate 144 144 height ; neutron absorber plate.. 0.040 *,
' , ' 0.040 thickness ,.**
neutron absorber plate*.: 8 .25 +/-' 0 ~ 06" 8~19 "".: 8 .25 width .. ' . cavity inside radius*. 34 .38. 34.38 cask wall thickness ". .. 9 .so . . 9.50* .. All dimensions in inches I ..
*'I :,_*:***:*
..., .l, :\
- I '
Rev. 1 5/00
Table 6.3-2 Model Mass Densities Material Component Density Volume Notes g/cm3 Fraction Fuel U02 10.412 0.95 1 Cladding ZIRCALLOY 6.56 1.0 Water H20 0.9982 1.0 Borated Aluminum AL 2.659 BlO 0.08867. Bll 0. 0.1396 Borated water, 2300 ppm H20 0.98952 0.9913 2 H3B03 0.01319 2, 3 Basket rails/ 2000 ppm H20 0.69441 0.69566 borated* water H3B03 0.00803 3 AL 0.8187 o*. 303 Compartment tubes SS304 7.92 1. 0 Basket plates AL 2.70'2 1.0 Containment and gamma CARBONS TEEL 7.9 . 1. 0 snie.J.a Component identifiers are from the SCALE Standard Composition Library; where input is by volume fraction (percent of standard density), that fraction is listed along with the derived density Notes:
- 1. U234 and 0236 are ignored.
- 2. The 2300 ppm borated water composition is calculated:*
- ----*---g H BO g7cm3- solution.=
3 (sol 'n density) (B concentration) (molecular wt H3 B03 ) atomic weight boron - -
= (i.0027) (2300 x 10- 6 ) (Gi.022)/10.0126 = 0.01319 volume fraction water= [solution density - {g H3B03 /cm: sol'n)]
water standard den'Sicy
= (1.0021 - 0.01319} I o.9982 = o.9913 For cases with reduced density of borated water, both of these input values are multiplied by the same density factor.
- 3. SCALE standard boron istotopic composition, 18.431 wt% BlO Rev. 1 5/00
Table 6.4-1 Results, Most Reactive Fuel Evaluation Case description kerf' O' no BPRA, centered in compartment 0.8373 0.0013
. 14x14 14x14 std, ofa, no BPRA, centered in compartment 0.8063 0.0013
., ofa, no BPRA, shifted toward cask center 0.8133 0.0012 14x14 14x14 std, no BPRA, shifted toward cask center 0.8470 0.0013 15x15 std, no BPRA, centered in compartment 0.9068 0.0011 15xl5 std, no BPRA, shifted toward cask center .0.9086 0.. 0012 17x17 of a, no BPRA, centered in compartment 0.8883 0.0012 17x17 ofa, no BPRA, shifted toward cask center 0.8928 0.0011 14x14 std, with BPRA, centered in compartment 0.8361 0.0013 14xl4 ofa, with BPRA, centered in compartment 0.8063 0.0014 14xl4 ofa, with BPRA, shifted toward cask center 0.8173 0.0013 14x14 std, with BPRA, shifted toward cask center 0.8455 0.0013 15x15 std, with BPRA, centered in compar~ment 0.9123 0.0013 15x15 std, with BPRA, shifted toward cask center 0.9124 0.0012 17x17 ofa, with BPRA, centered i.n compartment 0.8952 0.0012 17x17 ofa, with BPRA, shifted toward cask center 0.8950 0.0009 17x17 MkBW, no BPRA, centered in compartment 0.9103 0.0012 17x17 MkBW, no BPRA, shifted toward cask center 0.9106 0.0012 17x17 MkBW, with BPRA, centered in compartment 0.9134 0.0012 17x17 MkBW, with BPRA, shifted toward cask center 0.9144 0.0009 17x17 std, no BPRA, centered in compartment 0.9121 0.0012 17x17 std, no BPRAl shifted toward cask center~ .0.*-916-L .0-.-0-0-1 - 17x17 std, with BPRA, centered in compartment 0.9137 0.0013 17x17 std, with BPRA, shifted toward cask center 0.9171 0.0009 Rev. 1 5/00
- Table 6. 4-2 .**
TN-32 Criticality Calculation Results with Most Reactive Fuel* Configuration*** Case Cas~ Description .. ke!'f (J' k*ff+20' 1 Baseline 17xl7 shifted toward cask.*. 0.9167 0.0008 o*.9183 .. axis 2 Active fuel *shifted down 2 inch;
- o. 9170* 0.0009 0.9188 off set from absorber plates 3 Compartment reduced from 8.70 to 8.64 0.9193 0.0009 0.92~.1 inch*
4 Compartment increased from 8.70 to 0.9153 0.0010 0.9173 .. 8.76 inch 5 Neutron poison plate width reduced to 0.9185 0.0009 0.9203 8.19 lnch * . '
- 6 Fresh water in fuel rod annulus 0.9199 0.0009 0.9217 7 Borated water 99% density 0.9166 0.0010 0.9186 8 Borated water 95% density 0.9171 0.0009 0.9189 9 Borated water 90% density 0.9156 0.0009 0.9174 10 Borated water 75% density 0.9077 0.0010 0.9097 11 Bqrated water 50% density 0.8639 0.0009 0.8657 12 Borated water 25% density 0.7402 0.0008 0.7418 13 Borated water 5% density. 0.5466" 0.0007 0.5480 14 Borated water 1% density 0.4898 0.0007 0.4912 15 Borated water drained to top of 0.9167 0.0010 0.9187 active fuel*
Note: The final case in Table 6.4-1 was run.with the 2300 ppm borated water density at 1. 0078 g/cm3 *** The baseline case here is a repeat of that case witJrth-e-2-3{)0-ppm-bo-E-a-t.ed-....water-dens_i_t_y--;;--"-a_t______ the correct value of 1.0027 g/cm.3
- The difference is negligible.
Rev. 0 1/00
Table 6.4-2, continued
*. TN-32 Criticality C~lculation Results with Most Reactive Fuel ....
Configuration Case C~se Description kef~ a ket~+2a 16 C~mbined worst case normal, 100% 0.9224 0.0009 0.9242 borated water density 17 . Combined worst case normal, 97.5% 0.9241 0.0009 0.9259 borated water : 18 Combined worst case normal, 95% 0.9238 0.0009 0.9256 borated water
- 19 . Combined. worst case normal-, 92.5% o. 9264 0.0008 0.9~80 borated water 20 Combined worst case normal, 90% 0.9264 0.0009 0.9282 borated water 21* Combined worst case normal, 87.5% . o. 9261 0.0009 o. 9279
.. borated water 22 Combined worst case normal, 85% 0.9241 0.0008 0.9257 borated water 23 Combined worst case with single 5% 0.9312 0.0009 0.9330 fuel assy, *100% borated. water. density 24 Same, 97.5% borated water 0.9307 0.0009 0.9325 25 Same, 85% borated water 0.9310 0.0009 0.9328 26 Same, 92. 5-% borated water 0.9309 0.0009 0.9327 27 Same, 90% borated water 0.9314 0.0009 0.9332 28 Same, 87.5% borated *water 0.9315 0.0009 0.9333 29 Same, 85% borated water *. 0.9299 0.0009 0.9317 Rev. 0 1/00 w * ........_..
- Table 6. 4-3 * *. ,...
Criticality Results, Accident, Reduced Pin Pith-due to Fuel Grid Damage Case Desc~ipt~on kef~ . *a k.n.+2cr Base Case- 100% Borated water density, 0.9224 0.0009 *o. 9242
. Pitch=l.2598 cm As Above but Pitch ~-1.24 cm 0.9192 0.0009 0.9210 As Above. but Pitch = 1.22 cm 0.9105 0.0010 0.9135 As Above but Pitch = 1,20 cm 0.9019 0.0009 0.9037 Base Case - 95% Borated Water Density, 0.9238 0.0009 0.9256 Pitch =1.2598 cm *
- As Above but Pitch = 1.24 cm 0.9195 0.0009 0.9213 As Above but Pitch = 1.22 cm 0.9111 0.0009 0.9129 As Above but Pitch = l.;20 cm 0.9001 0.0009 0.9019 B~se C~se- 90% Borated Water Density, 0.9264 0.0009 0.9282
-- Pitch = 1.2598 cm . .*
.As Above *but Pitch = 1.24 cm 0.9188' 0.0009 0.9206 As Above but Pitch = 1.22 cm 0.9095 0.0008 0.9111 As Above but* Pitch = 1*.20 cm 0.9003 0.0010 0.9023 Base Case - 85%*Borated Water Density~ 0.9241 0.0008 0.9257 Pitch = 1.2598 cm As Above but Pitch = 1.24 cm 0.9165 0.0008 0.9181 As Above but Pitch = 1.22 cm 0.9085 0.0008 0.9101 A-s-Abev-e-bu-t-P-i-tch-= ] .20__cm 0.8973 0.0009 0.8991 Rev. 0 1/00
Table 6.5-1 ' Dissolved Boron Critical Experiments and Results with CSAS25 and 27 Group Library .**. case k.ff' O' B ppm B1645S01 0.9886 0.0011 1068 Bl645S02 0.9899 0.0011 1156 BW1231Bl 0.9895 0.0014 1152 BW1231B2 0.9892 0.0011 3389 BW1273M 0.9904 0.0011 1675 BW1484Al 0.9949 0.0014 . 15 BW1484A2 0.9849 0.0014 72 BW1484Bl 0.9932 0.0011 .. 1037 . .. ; . . -: BW1484B2 0 .. 9899 0.0012 769 BW1484B3 0.9884 0.0012 143
*~ . '. BW1484Sl 0.9936 0.0012 432 BW1484S2 0.9908 0.0011 514 BW1645Sl 0.9849 0.0013 746 BW1645S2 0.9899 0.0012 886 BW1810F 1.0000 0.0010 1337 BW1810G 0.9899 0.0011 1776 BW1810H 0.9930 0.0011 18*99 EPRU65B 0.9918 0.0013 463 EPRU75B 0.9935 0.0012 568 ***: ~
EPRUB7B 0.9959 0.0011 286 .; P4267Bl 0.9922 0.0013 2150 P4267B2 0.9970 0.0012 2550 P4267B3 0.9964 0.0014 1030 P4267B4 0.9904 0.0013 1820 P4267B5 0.9923 0.0012 2550 Rev. 0 1/00
Table 6.5-2 * : ,,
. ~ritica~* Experiment Results with CSAS25 and 27 Group Library
\ case enrio fP:iD water H/X ~late assy second ~~ a
.. h . pitch I BlO spacin assy (am) fuel (g/amz g (cm) spacin volum ) g.
a . ANS33AL 4.74 1.35 2.302 138.4 5 1.002 0.001 .. 1 ' 4 *s ANS33AL 4.74 1.35 2~302 138.4 *2.5 1.006 0.001
.2 6 *6' ANS33AL 3* .... .. 4.74 1.35 2.302 138.4 .. 10 .. 1.000 o. 00.1 7 5 ANS33SL 4.74 l.35 2.302 13B.4 5 0.994 0.001 G 0 6 BW1484S 2.46 1.636 1.841 216.1 6.54 0.989 0.001 L 1 3 EPRU65 2.35 l.905 1.196 163.6 0.988 0.001 0 3 EPRU75 2.35 1.905 2.408 329.:4 0.9~!> 0.001 1 4 EPRU87 2.35 2.21 3.687 504.2 0.996 0.001 1 4 NSE71Hl 4. 7,_4 1.35 1.804 108.3 0.992 0.001 -- .. .3 6
- NSE71H2 . 4. 7.4 1.2~ 3.811 228.B o. 998. 0.001 4 6 NSE71H3 4.74 2.26 7.608 456.8 - o. 999 0.001 4 5 NSE71SQ 4.74 1.26 1.823 110 0.995 0.001 4 6 NSE71Wl 4.74 1.26 l.823 110 0.995 0.001 6 7 NSE71W2 4.74 1.26 1.823 110 0.996 0.001 l 5 P2438AL 2.35 2.032 2;.918 398.7 8.67 0.993 o~o-o-i 8 3 P2438.BA 2.35 2.032. 2.918 398.7 0.067 5.05 0.994 0.001 5 3 P2438SL 2.35 2.0.:S:l 2.918 398.7 8.39 0.992 0.001 G 4 4
.. P2438SS 2.35 2.032 2.918 398.7 6.88 0.992 0.001 5 4
** P2615AL '4.31 2.54 3.883 2S6.1 10~72 0.996 0.001*
8 6 i>2615BA 4.31 2.54 3.883 256.1 0.067 6.72 0.993 0.001 9 5 P2615SS 4.31 2.54 3.883 256.1 8.58 0.995 0.001 7 5 P2827SL 2.35 2.032 2.918 398.7 8.31 0.991 0.001 . Rev. 0 1/00
~
G .. 3 3 P3314AL 4.31 lo892 1.6 105.4 9.04 2.83 0.991 O. QOl
- 1 -~
P3314BA . 4~31 1.892 1.6 105.4 0.067 .4.8 2.83 0.995 0.001
' 3 5 P3314BC 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 0.0263 3.53 2.83 0.995 0.001
.. 6 6 P3314BF 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 0.0263 *. 3 .6 2.83 0.997 0.001 1 *9 P331.BF 4 *.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 0.0472 4.94 2.83 0.998 0 .001.
5 ; . 2 0 5 P3314BS 2.35 1.684 L6 218.6 0.0045 3.86 0.992 0.001 1 6 2 *.4 P3314BS 2.35 1.684 1.6 218.6 0.0069 3.46 0.987 O_.OQl 2 .. 1 1 4 P3314BS 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 0.0045 7.23 0.994 0. 001* 3 6 8 6 P3314BS* 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 0.0069 6.63 0.998 0.001 4 .. 1 4 - 5 P3~14SL 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 10.86 2.83 0.996 0.001 G 5 6 P3314SS 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 3.38 2.83 0.993 0. 001. 1 1 5 P3314SS 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 11.55 2.83 0.997 0.001 2 8 5 P3314SS 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 4.47 2.83 0.993 0.001 3 7 -~
.5 P3.314SS 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 8.36 2.83 0.991 0.001 4 8 4 P3314SS 2.35 1.684 1.6 218.6 7.8 0.989 0.001 5 2 4 P3314SS 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 10.52 0.996 0.001 6 .Q 6 P3314Wl 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 1.000 o.oo;i.
3 6 Rev. 0 1/00
*Table 6.5-2, continued fl' case enric pin water B/X boz::on assy second k.rlf a h pitch I 10 spaoin assy (cm) f ue1 (q/cm2 q *_(cm) spacin vo1um ) . g e
P3314W2 2.35 1.684 1.6 218.6 0.993 0.001
' 0 4 P3~02BA 4.31 1.892 1.6 105 *. 4 0.0408 8.3 0.996 0.001 5 9 5 P3602BS 2.35 1.684 1.6 218.6 .4.8 0.995 o. 001*
- 1. ' 0 *_3 P3602BS 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 9.83 0.996 0.001 2 I 7 5 P3602Nl 2.35 1.684 1.6 218.6 8.98 0.995 0.001 l 7 3 P3602Nl 2.35 1.684 1.6 218.6 9.58 0.995 0.001 2 8 4 P3602Nl 2.35 1.684 1.6 218.6 9.66 0.992 0.001 3 0 5 P3602Nl 2.35 1.684 1.6 218.6 8.54 0.990 0.001 4 0 4 P3602N2 2.35 2.032 2.918 398.7 10.36 0.997 0.001 1 1 4 P3602N2 2.35 2*.032 2.918 398.7 11.2 0.998 0.001 2 6 2 P3602N3 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 14.87 1.001 0.001 1 8 5 P3602N3 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 15.74 1.001 0.001 2 9 6 P3602N3 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 15.87 1.002 0.001 3 1 6 P3602N3 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 15.84 0.996 0.001 4 3 5 P3602N3 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 ~S":ll-S 07995 0.001 5 4 5 P3602N3 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 13.82 0.996 0.001 6 6 5 P3bU2N4 4.31 2.54 3.883 256.l 12.89 1.000 0.001 1 6 6 P3602N4 4.31 2.54 3.883 256.1 14.12 1.004 0.001
.. 2 4 6
. P3602N4 4.31 *2.54 3.883 ._256.1 12.44 0.999 0.001 3* 4 5 P3602SS 2.35 l.684 1.6 218.6 . 8 .28 0.993 0.001 l 5 *4 P3602SS 4.31 1.892 1.6 105.4 l3e75 0.998 0.001 2 6 5 P3926SL 2.35 1.684 1.6 218.6 6.59 0.990 0.001 1 6 4 Rev. 0 1/00
P3926SL 4.31 1 *.892 1.6 105.4 .. 12.97 ;I' 0.994 0.001 2 4 6 P49-l.94 4.31 1.598 0.509 . 33 .6 . -. 0.995 0.001
*1 8 PAT80L1 4.74 . 1.6 3.807 *228...6 0.-0461 2 1..000 0.001
... . 0 6 PAT80L2 4.74 . 1.6 3.807 228.6 o*. 0461 2 0.993 0.001.
6 6 PATSOSS 4.74 *1.6 3~807 228.6 0.0461 **. 2 . - 1.001 0.001
- .\
1" 9 6 PAT80SS 4. 74 1.6 3.807 228.6 0.0461 2 0.995 0.001 2 5 6
*W3269SL 2.72 1.524 1.495 156.1 .. .. 0.989 0 .*001.
l 6 .5 W3269SL *5.7 1.422 1.932 98.3 ' 0.999 0.001 2 .. 7 5 W3269Wl .. 5.7 1.524 1.495 156.1 - 0.992 0.001 9 4 IW3269W2 5.7 1.422 1.932 98.3 0.998 0.001 1 5 W33BSSL 5.74 1.422 1~933 97.6 0.994 0.001 1 1 6 W3385SL 5.* 74 2.011 5.067 255.9 0.998 0.001 2 6 5
- 1. H/X is the atom ratio of hydrogen to U235 in the pin ~ell
- 2. Wa.te:t/fuel volume ration is defined by the pin cell* only Rev. 0 1/00 I
~ ~.*
Table 6.5-3 ~ Critical Experiments, Boron Plate .Areal De~sity case matez:ial
.. core .. core weight fll bOJ:OD thickness densitY boron in*** l(f *
(cm) .. (g/ans) core g/c::m2 P2438BA Boral .* 0.509 ... 2.49 28.1 0.0670 P2615BA Boral . o. 509 2.49 28.7 0.0670 P3314BA' Boral 0.509 2.49 28.7 0.0670 P3314BC Boral 0.181 . 2.47 31.88 0.0263 P3314BF1 Boroflex . . 0.226 1.731 ... 32.74 0.0236 P3314BF2 Borof lex 0.452 l.731 32.74 0.0472 P3314BS1 borated. .. 0.298 7.9 - .l.05 .0. 0046 . : SS P3314BS2 borated 0.298 7.77 1.62 0.0069 SS P3314BS3 borated. 0.298 7.9 /' l.05 0.0046 SS .. P3314BS4 borated 0.298 7.77 1.62 0.0069 SS P3602BA Boral 0.292 2.5 30.36 0.0408 PAT80Ll Boral 0.43 2.6189 22.2 0.0461 PAT80L2 Boral 0.43 2.6189 22.2 0.0461 PAT80SS1 Boral 0.43 2.6189 22.2 0.0461 PAT80SS2 Boral 0.43 2.6189 22.2 0.0461 Notes: .
- 1. Boron 10 is assumed to be 18.431 weight % of natural boron.
- 2. "Core" refers to the borated part of the plate. For Boral, this does not include the aluminum cladding, and for Boroflex, this does not include the plexiglas plates
- Rev. 0 1/00
..: .~:-....* F:-~
Table 6.5-4 Trend Analysis of Benchmark Results Independent variable range 'm-32 number correlation range of coefficient cases z: Pin pitch, cm. 1.26 2.54
- 1.26~
1.43 . 73 0.10 Bo~on*areal density in 0.0041 - 0.010 . 17 0 .. 23 separator plates,
- g/cm2 0.067 ...
. Pin cell hydrogen to U235 33.6 - 114-140. 73 -0.11 - ..
atom ratio (H/X) 504.2 Pin cell water / fuel pellet volume ratio 0.509 7.608
- 1. 6-2. 0 . 73 0.30 ..
Assembly separa~ion, cm 2 - 2.65- 55 0.26 ; 15.87 4.33 Assembly separation using 2 -. 2.65- 55 0.27--:. '. second assembly distance, 15.87 4.33 cm Soluble .boron 15-3389 12300 25 0.11 concentration, ppm Enrichment, wt% U235 2.35- 4.05 96 0.53 5.74 Independent variable, x OSL ~-32 x USL Pin pitch, cm 0.9364+1.2243x10- 1.26 0.9379 3x Boron areal density in 0.9377+3.1765x10- 0.010 0.9380 separator plates, g/cm2 2x Pin cell hydrogen to .. 0.9392-4.0608x10- 140 0.9386 U235 atom ~a~io (H/X) sx Pin cell water / fuel 0.935B+l.0398x10- 1.6 0.9375 pellet volume ratio ** lx x < 6.305 Assembly se~aration, cm 0.9365+2.5985xlo- 2.65 0.9372 4x Assembly separation 0.9367+2.5336xlo- 2.65 0.9374 using second assembly 4x .- distance, cm
.* Soluble boron 0~9337+4.430Sxlo-1*
2300 0.9347
. concentration, ppm x Enrichment, wt% 0235 0.9308+2.0196xl0~ 4.05 0.9390 3x Rev. 0 1/00
APPENDIX 6A EVALUATION OF FUEL UNDER ACCIDENT ACCELERATIONS This appendix evaluates the effect of TN-32 cask impact (tipover or bottom-end ~rop) on the integrity of fuel rod cladding. The material properties of irradiated zircalloy cladding and the rod impact stress analysis approach are based on LLNL Report UCID-21246 111
- The fracture analysis of the fuel rod cladding is based on the ASME Code, Section XI, 1989 121
- The irradiated zircalloy fracture toughness data is obtained from ASTM Special Technical Publication 551 <3 > *
- presented below are the analyses and results that are used .to conclude that the fuel rod cladding will remain intact and retain the fuel pellets during all accident scenarios.
6A.1 Material Propertjes This section establishes the basis for assuming particular material properties. The value of some of the parameters used in the analysis are temperature dependent. The maximum temperature during dry storage is not expected to exceed 575°F. Consequently, material properties will be based upon this temperature, with the expectation that the ability of the zircalloy to absorb impact loads without rupture will increase as the temperature decreases with time. Wejght Density The weight density of both Zircalloy-2 and Zircalloy-4 is very close to the weight density of Zirconium itself. From Reference l, Ptube = 0. 234 lb/in3 Young ' s MOou l us The Young's modulus for typical Zircalloy-4 PWR cladding is illustrated in Table 5 of Reference 1. Thus, ~t 575°F, Eeube = 11. 29 X 10' psi E fuel pellet -- 13. 7 x 10' psi (conservatively assume a lower value) Yield -Strength The yield strength for typical Zircalloy cladding is illustrated in Table 5 of Reference 1. Thus, at 575°F, Syield*tube = 85, 530 psi 6A-1 Rev. o 1/00
6A. 2 Tjpover The fuel rod side impact stresses are computed by idealizing fuel rods as continuous beams supported at each spacer grid. Continuous beam theory is used to determine the maximum bending moments and corresponding stresses in the cladding tube. The methodology used in performing.the analysis is based on work done at Lawrence Livermore National Labs (Ref. 1). The fuel gas internal"pressure is' assumed to be present and the resulting axial tensile stress is added to the bending tensile stress due to 74G load (Appendix 30, Section 3D.3.2). The stresses for different Westinghouse fuel
.assemblies are computed in Table 6A-l. It is seen that the 51,196 psi is the highest stress and occurs in 17xl70FA fuel assembly. This stress is lower than the yield strength of zircalloy (85,530 psi}. It is, therefore, concluded that the fuel tube will not fail and will withstand the side drop load without excessive plastic deformations. The grid supports (spacers} are expected to crush before 74G load is developed and the actual tube stresses will be much lower than the above noted stress.
"6A. 3 Bottom End Drop In case of an end drop, the inertial forces load the rod as a column having intermediate supports at each grid support (spacer) . The tube limit load is that at which the fuel rod segments between the supports become unstable.
An elastic-plastic stress analysis was performed using the ANSYS Finite Element Program (Ref. 6). A three-dimensional finite element model of entire active tube length was constructed using plastic PIPE20 element for cladding tube and elastic PIPEl6 element for fuel. The hinge supports were modeled at 7 grid support locations. The finite element model ~-__..and support conditions for a typical tube model are shown in Figure 6A- l. The tube and fuel nodes were coup-i--e-d-i-u-X,-Y"-and Z directions. The following material properties (at 575 °F) were input as a bilinear kinematic stress-strain curve for Zircalloy cladding tube. These properties are taken from Reference 1. Yield Strength = 85,530 psi Ultimate Strength= 97,000 psi Modulus of elasticity = 11.29 x 10 6 psi Elongation= 1.75% Max. elastic strain = 85530/11.29 x 10 6 = 0.00757 in/in Tangent Modulus = (97000 - 85530) / (.0175 - .00757) = 1.155 x 10 6 psi For Fuel elements, Modulus of elasticity= 13.7x 10 6 psi is conservatively used for analysis. The tube and fuel densities were modified to compensate for the extra tube length and the components which were not modeled. 6A-2 Rev. o 1/00
. -**---------~
In order to get the tube-buckling load, the large displacement option of ANSYS was used. The maximum inertia force of 200G was used. This load was applied gradually in a number of sub-steps.* The analysis was continued to load sub-step till the tube model became unstable and did not converge. In each case, the lowest segment became unstable as it was supporting the entire tube and .fuel weights. The last converged load sub-step was taken as the plastic ip.stability load. The above analysis was repeated for one fuel rod of each fuel subassembly. All the input data and the resulting plastic instability loads are summarized in Table 6A-2. 70% of ANSYS plastic instability load is used as the allowable buckling.load (Reference 7, Para. F-1341.4). Since the internal pressure produces tensile stresses in the cladding, it will reduce the compressive stresses caused by the end drop impact. The pressure is therefore conservatively neglected in*this analysis. From the results in Table 6A-2, it is seen that the lowest tube-buckling load of 84G occurs in Wl7x17 OFA and Wl7x17 fuel assemblies. The actual end drop impact load is 50 G (Chapter 3, Section 3A.2.3.2.2). It is, therefore, concluded that the fuel cladding tubes will not be damaged during an end drop. ResnJt From Hand Calculation Alternate method #1 As an order of magnitude check, the allowable buckling load based on material properties and geometry of W17x17 OFA fuel rod is calculated below and compared to the ANSYS analysis results. In case of a bottom end drop, the inertial forces load the rod as a column having intermediate supports at each grid
*-support-(-spacer) -.- -The fuel- rod cladd-ing~i-m-i-e-load-is---t-ha-E--at=-t--
which the fuel rod segments between the supports become unstable. The segment selected for analysis is the lowest one since it must support the entire weight of the fuel rod. The length to radius-of-gyration ratio of the column is such that Euler buckling applies. The axial buckling load is computed from, Where: L = length of fuel rod segment between spacers
= 24 in.
E = equivalent 6 modulus of elasticity of tube/fuel
= 12.77 x 10 psi (see below)
I = moment of inertia of the cladding and fuel
= .000305 (tube) 4
+ 0.000483 (fuel pellets)
= O. 000788 in 6A-3 Rev. O l./00
Equivalent E for Tube and Fuel, E = [11.29 x 10 6 (.000305) + 13.7 x 10 6 (.000483))/(.000788)
= 12.77 x 10 6 psi Since the fuel rod is a continuous tube extend beyond the support grid so moments will be developed at the intermediate support. This reactive end moment will keep the end from rotating during buckling. Thus the lowest segment will have fixed end condition at top and hinged at the bottom.
Reference to "Formulas for Stress and Strain" by Raymond "Roar~< 9 >, Fourth Edition, Table XV indicates that for a uniform straight bar under axial load, one end hinged, and other end fixed, a constant C = 2.25 can be used for calculating the buckling load. Therefore, the allowable buckling load. is, Per= C1t2 EI / 1 2 = 2. 25 (1t2 ) (12. 77 X 10 6 } (0. 000788) /24 2 = 388 lbs The weight of tube/fuel is taken at the middle of the bottom column, W = 5.477 x (132/144) = 5.02 lbs Therefore, the allowable G load is: G = 388/5.02 = 77 This value is reasonably close to the solution given by the ANSYS result (84 G) . Alternate method #2 As an alternate analysis, the critical W17x170FA fuel rod is__ cons_en!at_i_yely____gn~ly:zed as a Qri~matic bar with both end hinged by using Euler formula: Where: L = length of fuel rod segment between spacers
= 24 in.
E = equivalent modulus of elasticity of tube/fuel 6
= 12. 77 x 10 psi I = moment of inertia of the cladding and fuel
= 0.000788 in4 P .. Cn2 x 12.77 x 10' x o.0001a8}/ 24 2 = 172.4 lb.
Fuel rod weight {tube and fuel pellets), W = 5.477 lb. G load = 172~4/S.477 = 31.5 g 6A-4 Rev. O 1/00
Experiments show that when the compressive force in a slender strut approaches this value, lateral deflection begins and increases so rapidly with increase of the compressive force that a load equal to the critical value is usually sufficient to produce complete failure of the structure (Ref .8). However, lateral constraints (spacers) on the assembly play an important role in determining the fuel rod response. These supports and continuous basket design in TN-32 cask provides a continuous lateral* *constraint along the length of the assembly and results in significantly less . lateral displacement. Figure 6A-1 illustrates the process by which lateral deformation is limited to the width of gaps between the assembly and basket, and between rods in the ...assembly during an end-drop. The lateral restraints, shown in "Figure 6A-1~ are based on all fuel rods having the same deformation pattern, with their lateral deformation constrained by the assembly and basket. In order to study the actual deflection, moment and stress, an individual tube between two supports in W17x17 OFA assembly tube is conservatively evaluated as a simply-supported beam-column. lG distributed transverse load (w) and varying G axial (P) load was applied so as to result in a maximum deflection equal to the complete bowing of central tube of the array due to
- bending plus the clearance between the basket and fuel assemblies.
The maximum deflection allowed by the clearances between tubes and between assembly and basket, y = [(Rod pitch-Rod OD) x No. of tubes in array/2 ]+Clearance between basket and assembly
=[(0.496-0.356) x 17/2] + ( 8.700-8.426)
= 0.5(2.38)+ 0.274
= 1.464 in.
From Ref .9, in a beam-column, the maximum deflection due to distr..ib.u.t_e_d transverse load 1 w 1 and compressive axial load
'P' is given by:
Max. y = (-wj 2 /P)[sec (U/2) (U2 /8)] The *constant distributed transverse load, w = 5.477/24 = 0.2282 lb/in The compressive axial load, P = S.477G G is varied in the above formula and the resulting axial loads P and transverse deflection "Y" are shown in Table 6A-3. It is seen that beyond 29G axial load, the deflection begins to increase rapidly and P load corresponding to 29.4G results 6A-5 Rev. o 1/00
in 1.487" deflection. The typical calculations of deflection, bending moment and bending stresses for this load are produced below: p = 29.4 x 5.477 = 161 lb. Equivalent E for Tube and Fuel =,12.77 x 10' psi Total I = 0.000788 in~ j = (EI/P) o.s = 7. 905 U = L/j = 24/7.905 = 3.036 radians y =-[0.2282(7.905} 2 /161] [18.944 .125(3.036} 2 ]
= 0.08857 x 16.792 = 1.487 in.
M = wj 2 (secU/2 - 1)
= 0.2282(7.905) 2 (18.944-1) = 255.82 in-lb.
Therefore, the maximum bending stress is, $bending = MC/I = 255. 82 X 0. 178 / 0. 000788 = 57 / 787 psi After the fuel rod contacts the basket (y > 1.464 in.), there will no additional transverse deflection or bending stresses due to increase in axial load. The additional axial G load will result in axial stress only. The combined stresses for SOG load are computed below: Axial load = 50 x 5.477 = 273.85 lb. Section area, A= n/4(0.356) 2 = 0.09954 in2 Axial stress = 273.85/0.09954 = 2,751 psi
------ - ~- - -- - --- ----- --- -- - -- - - - -- - - - - -- *- -
Max. combined stress = 57,787 + 2,751 = 60,538 psi This conservatively calculated stress is also less than the tube yield strength. 6A.4 Brjttle Fracture Evaluation The following section is to demonstrate that the fracture toughness of the irradiated zircalloy cladding is sufficiently high to preclude brittle fracture failure during accident conditions. The TN-32 cask is designed for storage of intact fuel assemblies. Fuel assemblies known or suspected to have cladding defects greater than hairline cracks or pin holes shall not be loaded into TN-32 1 s for storage. The EPRI report, reference 5, provides a definition of pin holes or 6A-6 Rev. o 1/00
hairline cracks to include cracks of maximum width about 100µm (0.004") but whose length could be anywhere between 200-300 µm (.008 11 - 0.012 11 ) and several millimeters. For conservatism, the following surface flaw size is used for brittle fracture evaluation of the fuel rod cladding: a= flaw* depth= 150 µm = 0.006" 1 = flaw length = 4 mm ~ 0.16" Stress intensity factor K1 is calculated using the equation in ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix A, Article A-3000. The crack location and orientation are assumed as to be most
... detrimental to the rod cladding:
Where am, ab = membrane and bending stresses in psi a = flaw depth Q = flaw shape parameter as determined from Appendix A, Fig. A-3300-1
~ = correction factor for membrane stress from Appendix A, Fig. A-3300-3 Mb = correction factor for bending stress from Appendix A, Fig. A-3300-5 It is seen from Table 6A-l, that the combined tensile stress in Wl7 x 17 OFA fuel rod cladding is the highest (51,19G psi). This fuel rod is, therefore, selected for a
.------fractu-re--evaluation. ______ "__________________*__ *-------------
t = cladding thickness = 0.0205 inch a = crack depth = 0.006 inch l = crack length= 0.16 in
.~/t = 0.2926 a/l = 0.0375 zircalloy yield strength, Sy= 85,530 psi am+ ab) I Sy= (12,450 + 38,746)/ 85,530 ~ 0.6 Q = 0.95 Mm = 1.45 MD= 1.0 K1 = [ {12 I 4 5 0 x l . 4 5 + 3 8 I 4 7 6 x 1
- 0) ( ..J1t x ..J 0
- 0 0 6 I 0
- 9 5) ]
= 8,001 psi ..Jin~ 8.0 ksi Vin 6A-7 Rev. O 1/00
The calculated Stress Intensity Factor for the flaw should satisfy the code faulted condition criteria (ASME Code Section XI, para. IWB-3612): Where K 1e is the material fracture toughness based on fracture initiation for the corresponding crack tip temperature. Kie from Ref. 3 at 200° F (conservatively use lower temp.) = 30.0 ksi Vin
- Allowable fracture toughness= 30.0 I 1.414
= 21.2 ksi .../in > 8.0 ksi ..Jin Based on the above eva.luations, it is concluded that the fracture toughness of the irradiated zircalloy cladding is sufficiently high to preclude a brittle fracture failure during accident conditions. Therefore, the fuel cladding tube will remain intact to retain_ the fuel pellets during the accident conditions.
6A-8 Rev. o 1/00
6A.5 Refer~nc;:es
- 1. LLNL Report UCID-2i246, Dynamic Impact Effects on Spent Fuel Assemblies.
- 2. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,* Section XI, 1989.
- 3. ASTM Special Technical Publication 551, Variation of Zircalloy Fracture Toughness in Irradiation, Walker and Kass. * *
- 4. PNL-6189, Recommended Temperature Limits for Dry Storage of
- Spent Light Water Reactor Zircalloy-Clad Fuel Rods in Inert ..
Gas, May 1987.
- 5. EPRI report.*, 1994, Irradiation Damage to Fuel Assemblies ..
- 6. ANSYS Engineering Analys'is System User's Manual, Rev. 5.2.
- 7. ASME Code Section III, Division 1 Appendices, 1995.
of
- 8. Timoshenko, *11 strength Materials", Part II", 3rd Edition.
- 9. Roark,. 11 Formulas for Stress and Strain", 4th .Edition~
6A-9 Rev. 1 5/00
Table 6A-1 Tipover/ Side Drop Impact Stress Calculations Tube Arrays 15 x 15 17xl 7 101 17 x 17 14 x 14 14 x 14 OFA OFA Assembly 1,525 1,533 1,446 1,345 1,195 Weight (lb) -L No.* of fuel rods 204 0.563 264 0.496 264 0.496 179 179 0.556 'r;* Rod Pitch (in) 0.556 Max. active 144 144 144 144 144 fuel length (in) No *. of 7 7 7* 7 7 Spacers, n L = length/n-1 24 24 24 24 24 Tube OD'" in) 0.418 0.370 0.356 0.418 0.396 Clad thick. "' 1 1 0.0223 0.0205 0.0205 0.0223 .Q.0223 (in) Tube ID '" in) 0.3734 0.3290 0.3150 0.3734 0.3514 Sy (psi) 85,530. 85,530 85,530 8.5, 530 85,530 Tube E (psi) 11. 29xl01) 11.29x10 11. 29xl0" 11.29x10° 11.29xl0" 6 Tube I1, (in") .000544 .000345 .0.000305 .000544 .000459 Fuel I2, (in") .000954 .000575 .0.000483 .000954 .000749 w'~' (lb/in} 0.05191 0.04033 0.03804 0.05218 0.04636
~ax= 0.1058wl"' 3.1634 2.4577 2.3180 3.1799 2.8253 (in. lb)
Total I (in") 0.001498 .00092 .000788 .001498 .001208 Sb = MC/I (psi) 441.4 494.2 523.6 443.7 463.1 (lG) Sb , 74G (psi) 32,664 36,571 38,746 32,834 34,269 Spress* --- Psi_1-'1 __ -- -- 7,338--- -6,.919-- - -12.,-4-50--- ----5-,-128- - - - , 8-4-2-- --- . S =Sb+ 40,002 43,490 51,196 37,962 39,111 S~*aaa (psi) (1} w= Assembly weight /(No. of fuel rods x Active length) (2) Fuel OD is taken same as the tube ID. (3) Spress. , axial stress = p x Davg. /4t , (4) Includes 0.004 in. reduction in cladding OD to account for water side cladding corrosion (Ref. 4). (5) Thickness is reduced by 0.002 in. to account for corrosion (Ref. 4). (6) Evaluation of the Westinghouse 17x17 bounds the B&W Mark BW fuel rod, which has the same outside diameter, thicker cladding, the same number of grids (spacers), and equal or lower pressurization (Table 6.2-1 and Section 7.2) Rev. 1 5/00
Table 6A-2 Tube Buckling Loads Due to End drop Impact Tube Arrays 15 x 15 17xl 7 1" 1 17 x 17 14 x 14 14 x 14 OFA OFA Tube length , 160 160 160 161.3 161.3 (in.)
.Tube active 144 144 144 144* 144 length, {in.)
Assembly 1,525 1,533 1,446 1,345 1,195 weight {lb) .. Length betw*een 24 24 24 24 24 spacers, {in.) .. Tube OD (in) 0.418 0.370 0.356 0~418 0.396 Tube thickness 0.0223 0.0205 0.0205 0.0223 0.0223 (in) Tube ID (in) 0.3734 *0.3290 0.3150 0.37:34 0.3514 No. of fuel 204 264 264 179 179 rods Wt. fuel rod . 7.475 5.807 5.477 7.514 6. 676 (lb) .. Tube area (in"') 0.0277 0.0225 0.0216 .0277 . 0262 Fuel pellet 0.1095 *0.0850 0.0779 0.1095 0.0970 area (in2 ) Tube weight 1. 0371 0.8424 .8087 1. 0455 0.9889 {lb) (11 Fuel weight 6.438 4.965 4.668 6. 468 5.688 (lb) ANSYS Plastic 140 120 120 140 125 Instability G load Buckling 98 84 84 98 87.5 G Load (70% } (1) Zircaloy Density = 0.234 lb/in. (2) Evaluation of the Westinghouse 17x17 bounds the B&W Mark BW fuel rod, which has the same outside diameter, thicker cladding, the same number of grids (spacers) ,* and equal or lower pressurization Rev. 1 5/00
Table 6A-3 TN-32 W17xl70FA Fuel Rod, Beam - Column Analysis G w p j L u SEC(U/2) A B y Load Deflection 10 5.477 54.77 13.5546 24 1.77061 1.57965 0.18776 0.76553 0.14374 15 5.477 82.155 11.0673 24 2.16855 2.13879 0.55.096 0.34023 0.18745 20 5.477 109.54 9:58456 24 2.50402 3.19070 1.40693 0.19138 0.26926 25 5.477 136.925 8.57269 24 2.79958 5.87646. 3.89675 0.12248 0.47729 26 5.477 142.402 8.40621 24 2.85503 7.00322 4.98432 . 0.11324 0.5~44 27 5.477 147.879 8.24907 24 2.90941 8.63353 6.57544 0.10501 0.69049 28 5.477 153.356 8.10043 24 2.96280 11.2013 9.10409 0.09764 0.88896 29 5.477 158.833 7.95954 24 3.01524 15.8402 13.7038 0.09102 1.24740 29.4 5.477 161.023 7.90521 24 3.03597 18.9444 16.7923 0.08856 1.48723 29.8 5.477 163.214 7.85197 24. 3.05655 23.5260 21.3582 0.08620 1.84117 30 5.477 164.31 . 7.82576 24 3.06679 26.7448 24.5692 0.08505 2.08983 30.2 5.477 165.405 7.79980 24 3.077 30.9687 28.7852 0.08393 2.41612 30.4 5.477 166.500 7.77410 24 3.08717 36.7553 34.5640 0.08283 2.86312 30.6 5.477 167.596 7.74865 24 3.09731 45.1687 42.9696 0.08175 3.51302 _3Q.8__ _5~4_17 16.8~69_1__ f--1.123.45_ - f-3rl01A-1-- -58.522$-- -56.3155- --0.08069- .-54453 31 5.477 169.787 7.69850 24 3.11748 82.9762 80.7614 0.07966 6.43344 31.2 5.477 170.882 7.67379 24 3.12752 142.212 139.989 0.07864 11.0090 Notes: W= Tube Weight (lb) L =Tube span (in) w=W/L (lbfm) P =Axial Force= G x W (lb) j = (EIJP)0*5 = (12.77x106 x .000788/P)°-5 U=L/j A= (secU/2-1-1/8U2) B=wj2/P y, deflection= Bx A (in) Rev. 1 5/00
. :6*1,**
*. . . . F.:1.~re. A- *.: .
~..:- -iube and* FUel' 'Pellets Finite* Element *Model *simula*tion .
.. . .of. . * ..
\
.~
- ..4' ** ..
.i .
ANSYS. PiPE 20 ELEMENT*
. .. ~ ANSYS PJ.:PE 16.
ELE~ENT F
- CNERTIA.LOAD (TUBE &: FUEL)
;f .~~~~:i~~p~:~P.
y
'l'UBE I o FUEL PELLETS z~
J NO'lE: THE 'l'UBE AND FUEL PELLETS NODES ARE COINCIDEN'J
* *"* BU'l' ARE~ SHOWN SEPARATELY FOR CLARITY. THESE NC
* **. ARE COUPLED IN X, Y, .&: *Z DIRECTIONS.
'\
*~~
*{.
~*.
""E..o~.::..---*-* ........ -.. -
. . Figure 6A-2
... . Lateral Displacement of Center Rod Limited by Rod-to-Rod
- . Contact and Assembly/Basket GeE . ..
Lal*ral DllplNl*menl DI Cen\er Rod Uml*d by RDCl-lo-ftod Ca.Ucl and Aa1embly/8aa~o\ Qapa
/Assemb1' Note: The type of fuel assembly shown in figure is for reference only. The purpose of this figure is to show the mode of fuel rod deflection.
REV'.
.- -*~/~O..
o.
CHAPTER. 7 CONFINEMENT 7.1 Confinement B011ndary The confinement boundary consis~s.of the .inner shell and* bottom plate, shell flange, lid outer plate, lid bolts, penetration cover plates and bolts and the inner metallic 0-rings of the lid seal and the two lid penetrations (vent arid drain)
- The confinement boundary is shown in Figure 1.2-1. The construction of the conf inernent boundary is shown on drawings 1049-70-l, 2 and 3 provided in Section 1.s. The confinement vessel prevents leakage of radioactive material from the cask cavity. It also maintains an inert atmosphere (helium) in the cask cavity. Helium assists in heat removal and provides a non-reactive environment to protect fuel assemblies against fuel cladding degradation which might otherwise lead to gross rupture.
7.1.l Confjnement Vessel The TN-32 confinement vessel consists of: an inner shell which is a welded, carbon steel cylinder with an integrally-welded, carbon steel bottom closure; a welded flange forging; a flanged and bolted carbon steel lid with bolts; and*vent and drain.covers.with bolts. The overall confinement vessel length is 175.25 in. with a* wall thickness of 1.5 in. The cylindrical cask cavity has a diameter of 68.?5 in. and a length of i63.25 in. The confinement shell and bottom closure materials are SA-203 Grade D and the shell flange is SA-3.50. Grade LF3. The confinement lid material .is SA-203 Grade D or '*sA:-350 Grade LF3. The cask design, fabrication and testing are covered by a Quality.Asrsurance-Prog~am-which_c~:mforms to the criteria in Subpart G of 10CFR72.
. The materials of construction of the confinement vessel are SA.203 Grade D and SA-350 LF3. The confinement ves~el is designed to the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB, Article 3200. SA-203 Gr. D is not a ASME Class 1 material, but .. is an accept~ble Class 2 (Subsection NC) material.
As stated in the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-1536<4 >, the NRC has accepted the use of either Subsection NB or Subsection NC of the code for*containment. SA-203 Grade D is identical to SA-203 Grade E which is a Class I material except for the foilowing: 7.1-l Rev. O 1/00
.- *7,"~-:=:;_7- * -.. :;..
-- Yield Strength Tensile Strength Elongation s/s.
Grade D 37 ksi 65 85 ksi 23% min 16.2 ksi Grade E 40 ksi 70 - 90 ksi 21% min 23.3 ksi The chemical content of the two grades are identic~l, except that Grade E .restricts the carbon to 0 .* 20 .ma_x.*, while Grade D further restricts* the carbon content to 0.17 max. Grade D is acceptable.as a Class 2 material up to 500° F. Grade D was selected because of its ductility, since the higher strength is not required.
- SA-203 Grade D has better .
elongation than due to its lower strength is more likely to have the good fracture toughness at low temperatures.
- In selecting materials f~r storage and transport casks, one of the major selection criteria is fracture toughness at low temperatures. Grade D was se~ected on this basis. There is no similar requirement for pressure vessels, as they are used at much higher temperatures.
For the SA-203 Grade D material, the allowable stress was based on s, the allowable stress for Class 2. components. This is conservative, since NB is based on s., which is 1/3 the tensile strength, while S is 1/4 the tensile strength. Thus there is additional*margin over and above the margin required by the code for Class I materials. The confinement vessel materials are impact tested in accordance with NB-2300. and meet the acceptance standards of NB-2330. The closure flange or other forgings comprising part of the containment boundary are examined by the ultrasonic method in accordance with paragraph NB-2542. The acceptance criteria of paragraph NB-2542.2 is applied. All external and accessible internal surf aces are examined by the ~iquid penetrant method or ______the__magnet.ic_p.ar.:t.icle_rnetilod__in__ac_cor.danc_et__wil_b_paragra:gh NB-2 54 6 or NB-2545 as applicable.
- The acceptance criteria of paragraph NB-2546.3 or NB-2545.3 is applied. The lid bolts, drain cover bolts and vent cover bolts are visually examined in accordance with NB-2582. The bolts are also dye penetrant .examined in accordance with Paragraph NB-2584. All holes for bolts are visually examined in accordance with Paragraph NB-2582. In accordance with NB-2520, low alloy materials are magnetic particle inspected after qu~nch and temper.
Welding materials used in containment welds or welds to containment components conform to the requirements of NB-2400 and to the material specification requirements of Section II, Part C of the ASME B&PV Code. Forgings are examined according to NB-2542, NB-2546, or NB~2545 as applicable.
- Temporary attachment welds to the containment boundary .meet the requirements of NB-
- 44*35. Paragraph NB-4300 is applied .for all confinement vessel 7.1-2 Rev. O 1/00
welds and examination and acceptance meets the requirements of NB-5210, NB-5220, NB-5320, NB-5330, NB-5340, or NB-5350 as appropriate. Stress relieving is also performed in accordance with Section I~I, Subsection NB. Even though the Code is not strictly.applicable to storage casks, it is the intent.to follow Section III, Subsection NB'of the Code as closely as possible for design and construction of the confinement vessel. The cask may, however, be fabricated by other than N-stamp holders and materials may be supplied by other than ASME Certificate Holders. Thus the requirements of NCA are not imposed. TN's quality assurance requirements, which are
- based*on.10CFR72 Subpart G and NQA-1 are imposed in lieu of t~e requirements of NCA-3850. This SAR is prepared in place of the AsME design and stress reports. Surveillances are performed by TN and utility personnel rather than by an Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) .
The weld of the bottom inner plate to the confinement shell is a Category C, Type 2 corner weld in accordance with Figure NB-4243-1 of the ASME Code. In accordance with NB-5231, Type 2 Category c full penetration corner welded joints require the fusion zone and the parent metal beneath the attachment surface to be ultrasonically examined after welding. If this weld is performed on the confinement vessel after assembly with the outer shell, the UT inspection cannot be performed. In lieu of the UT inspection, the joint will be examined by the radiographic method and either the liquid penetrant or magnetic particle methods in accordance with the ASME Code Subsection NB. A hydrotest is not required to be performed for this vessel. The method of manufacture precludes inspection of the confinement after the hydrotest, since it is enclosed in the gamma shielding during final machining and welding of the bottom plate. The ~~P~r~e~s~s~ure test of the completed vessel would need to be perf o:rmed after instaJ:'Tatron~in-the-gamma_shielding and would not provide meaningful results. In addition, the gamma shrei:"ding--suppor.ts:---:------- the confinement boundary under all conditions, so a pressure test of the confinement vessel separately will not simulate actual
*loading conditions. The TN-32 cask is not pressure.limited, as shown in Table 3A.2.3-S. All confinement welds are fully radiographed in accordance with Subsection NB requirements. The stresses due to pressure are insignificant compared to the loads due to drop or tipover events.
7.1.2 Cpnfjnement Penetrations There are two penetrations.through the confinement*vessel, both in the lid. One is the drain port and the other the vent port. A double o-ring seal mechanical closure is provided for
*each penetrati~n. Each penetration contains a quick connect coupling for ease of operation.
,- ,.
- 7.1-3 Rev. O 1/00
7.1.3 Seals and Welds The confinement boundary welds consist of the circumferential welds attaching the bottom closure and the top flange to the vessel shell. Also,. the longitudinal .weld*(s) on tb.e rolled plate, closing the cylinQ.rical vessel shell, and.t~e
- circumferential weld(s} attaching the rolled shells.together are confinement welds.
The confinement boundary welds, both circumferential and longitudinal, are full penetration welds examined volumetrical~y by radiograph. These welds are also liquid penetrant or magn~tic particle examined. The acceptance standards are in accordance **. with Article NB-5000.
/
Stainless steel ove'rlay welds are examined by the liquid penetrant method in accordance with Section V of the ASME Code. Electrodes, wire, and fluxes used for fabrication comply with the. applicable requirements of the ASME Code, Section II, Part C. The welding procedures, welders and weld operators must be qualified in accordance with Paragraph NB-4300 of Subsection NB. . Double metallic seals are utilized on the lid and the two lid penetrations. Helicoflex HND or equivalent seals may be used. The seals are shown in Figure 7.1-3. The internal *spring and lining maintain the necessary rigidity and sealing force, and provide some elastic recovery capability. The outer aluminum jacket provides a ductile material against the sealing surfaces. The jacket also provides a connecting sheet between the inner outer seals .. Holes in this sheet allow for attachment screws and for communication b.etween the overpressure system and the space between the seals. This sheet, which is about 0.020 inch thick, ~~~~~h~aHs,...........+/-n~uffic+/-ent stre~e-ransmit radial forces great enough to overcome the axial compressive forces on the seals, which are over 1000 lb/inch of seal length. Additional information on the seals is provided in* Section 2.3.2. The overpressure port seal is*a single metallic seal of the same design, Helicoflex HN200 or equivalent. All TN-32 surfaces which mate with the metallic seals are stainless steel. The use of a double seal system allows the TN-32 cask to have a pressure monitoring system of the interspace between the seals, (see Section 2.3.2). This combined cover-seal pressure monitoring system always meets or exceeds the requirement of.a double barrier closure which guara~tees tight, permanent containment. When the cask is placed in storage, a pressure greater than that of the cavity is set up in the gaps
,,,,,,.. 7.1-4 Rev. O 1/00
(interspace) between the double metallic seals of the lid and the lid penetrations. A decrease in the pressure of the monitoring system would be signalled by a pressure transducer/switch in the over pressure system. The lid and penetration seals described above are contained in grooves. Sealing is assured over. the storage period by utilizing seals.in a deformation-controlled design. The deformation of the seals is constant since bolt loads assure that the mating surfaces remain in contact. The seal deformation is set by its original diameter and the depth of the groove.
, The nominal diameter of the lid seal is 6.6 mm, and the nominal groove derth is 5.6 mm. At 1 mm compression, the sealing force is 245 N/mm (1399 lb/inch) <121
- The total force of the double seal is 631,600 lb. The total preload of the 48 lid bolts
*.is 2,851,000 lb, which is greater than the combined force of the s~als and internal pressure, 1,126,500 lb (Section 3A.3.1.1) .
.~. The nominal diameter of the port seals is 4.1 mm, and the no~inal groove depth is 3.2 mm. At 0.9 mm compression, the sealing force is 200 N/mm2 (1142 lb/inch) . The total force of the double seal is 37,900 lb. The total preload of the 8 cover bolts is greater than the combined force of the seals and internal pressure, 39,750 lb. The sealing force is maintained by the seal's internal spring. Due to creep, the sealing pressure decreases with increasing temperature as shown in the *following table '12 >. The long-term temperature limit is the point at which the sealing pressure becomes zero due to creep. The maximum normal temperature experienced by the seals in the TN-32 is 256 °F (Table 4.4-1}. Seal P124 c/P20 c P200 c/P20 c Temperature
-{-r-24-oe - ~F-t- ~~-~9~-F~ limit Lid, 6.6 mm (427 /670} = 60% (250/670} = 37% 340 oc (644 op)
Ports, 4 mm (352/600) = 60% (170/600) = 28% 280 °C (536 OF) Data from Reference 12; data at 124 °C by linear interpolation The maximum radial force on the seals is from the 5.5 atm abs overpressure system. Using the compressed seal height of 5.5 mm, this results in a force per unit seal length of about 4.5 atm gage*14.7 psi/atm*(S.6/25.4}inch = 15 lb/inch which is negligible compared to the compressive (axial) forces of over 1000 lb/inch. Because the maximum pressure is between the two seals, the direction of this force is such that the seals are supported by the walls of the seal groove. However, the seals are designed to retain pressure in either direction. Metallic seals are all capable of limiting leak rates to 7.1-5 Rev. 2 4/02
less than 1 x 10- 7 atm-cc/sec of helium. After loading, all lid and cover seals are leak tested in accordance with ANSI N14.5. The acceptable total cask leakage (both inner and outer seals combined} is 1 x 10-s std cc/sec. 7.1.4 Closure The confinement.vessel contains an integrally-welded bottom closure and a bolted and flanged top closure, (lid) . The flanged lid plate is attached to the cask body with 48 bolts. A bolt torque of 930 +/- SO ft-lbs (lubricated} is utilized to provide the required load for the metallic seals located in the lid. The Qlosure bolt analysis is presented in Appendix 3A.3. As previously mentioned, the lid contains two penetrations which are sealed by flanged covers fastened to the lid by 8
*bolts. The bolt torque required to seal the metallic seals in t~e penetration covers is 60 - 65 ft-lbs (lubricated) .
7 .1.5 Monitoring of System Confinement An overpressure monitoring system is part of the TN-32 design. The pressure in the monitoring system is greater than that of the cask cavity and the cask cavity pressure is greater than ambient. In this configuration, no in-leakage of air nor out-leakage of cavity gas is possible. If a leak existed in the seals, the design of the TN-32 overpressure system is such that the leak will either be to the atmosphere or to the cask cavity. Leakage from the cask cavity past the higher pressure of the overpressure system is physically impossible. The seals (~nd overpressure system)are collectively leak tested to 1 x 10-s std cc/sec. Using the methodology of ANSI
~N-i-11-r c21
.L ':I: * ;..> , an e*gu:i:va-.i:-ent-max-J;mUfil-c
* '.!.
- h- 0.i..-e-s~_ze--1.s-...es.1.....LI1i.cu..=i...L_J,J._as~e~~u=>P-.,._O=n=--------
"' . . +- ~ - - +- ~~ 1.,. d te st conditions of equivalent air leaking from 1 atm abs to 0.01 atm abs in ambient temperature conditions (77°F or 25°C) and the maximum acceptable leak of 1 x 10-s std cc/sec. The leakage hole length is assumed to be the same as the metal seal width, 0.5 cm.
The equivalent maximum hole size is calculated below. Other definitions:
= upstream volumetric leakage rate, cc/sec = 1 x 10- 5 std cc/sec (Test Leak Rate)
= coefficient of continuum flow conductance per unit pressure, cc/atm-sec
= coefficient of free molecular flow conductance per 7.1-6 Rev. 2 4/02
unit pressure,* cc/atm-sec Pu. = fluid upstream pressure, atm abs = 1.0 atrn abs l?4 = fluid downstream pressure, atm abs = 0.01 atm abs n* = leakage*hole diameter, cm . a =leakage hole length, cm= O.S*cm (assuming leak path length is on the order.of the metal seal width) *
µ =fluid viscosity, cP = 0.0185.cP (from ANSI Nl4.5, Table B.l)
- _-*
T = fluid absolute temperature, K = 298 K . M. = molecular weight, g/mol = 29.0 g/mol (from ANSI Nl4.5, Table B.l) Pa =average stream pressure=* (Pu.+ Pd), atm abs= a.sos atm abs
~ = (Fe + F 111 ) (Pu - P 4 ) (P./Pu.} cc/sec where:
Fe = (2. 49x10' x D") I Caµ) cc/atm-sec F111 = {3. 8lxl0, x D3 x (T/M) 0
- 5 } I {aP.) cc/atm-sec Substituting:
Fe= (2.49xlo' x D4 )/(0.S x 0.0185) = 2.69 x l.0 8 0 4 F*. = {3.SlxlO, xD3 x{29S/29.0) 0
- 5 }/{o.s x 0.505) = 4.84 x 10' D3
~ = (F + F 111 ) (Pu. - P 4 ) (P1JPu) cc/sec .
l x io*i = (Fe + F 111 ) (l.O - 0.01) (0.505 I l.O} Fe: + F 111 = 2 x 10- 5 Solving the equations, the equivalent hole diameter, D, is 4.83 x 10*4 cm. .
- During operations, the overpressure system is initially back
- f1Ilea---w+/-th-S.S-a~m--abs__l~6.2 psig) of Helium at s~~ndard*
temperature. The temperature of the helium in t~. tank_a~t~~~~~~~ equilibrium is assumed to be the average of the ambient temperature (lOOoF} and the seal temperature (256oF, from Table 4.~-1) or 178°F (8loC}. The pressure in the overpressure system at this temperature will be 6.53 atm abs (81.3 psig). Assuming the overpressure system is leaking to the atmosphere, the leak rate is defined using the equations of ANSI Nl4.5:
!J.i,He *= {Fe + F 111 } (Pu - Pd) (P./P".) cc./sec Fe= (2.49xlO' x D4 )/(aµ) cc/~t_m-sec Faa = {3.SlxlO~ x D, x (T/M) 0
- 5 } I {aP.} cc/atm-sec
" ,* 7 .1-7 Rev. O 1/00
-------~----
T.
"""u,Re = helium volumetric leakage rate Pu = 6 .53 atm abs Pd = 1.0 atm abs D = 4 . 83 x 10-* cm a =O.Scm .
= O. 0224 cP (for helium at 354 . K)
= 354 K '
= 4.0 g/mol
= * {Pu+ P4 ) = 3.77 atm abs Substituting:
Fe= {2.49E+06 x (4.825E-04) 4 }/(0.5 x 0.0224) = 1.21E-05 *. Fm= {3.81E+03x (4.825E-04) 3 x (354/4) 0 5
* } / (0.5 x 3.7668) =
2.14E-06 Lu,He = (Fe + Fm) (Pu - P4 ) (P./P11 ) Lu,He = (1. 21E-05 + 2 .14E-06) (6. 53 - l,. 0)-(3. 77 I 6. 53)
!J.i,He = 4.53E-05 cc/sec of Helium Over the first year, the maximum volume leaked from the overpressure system is:
V = 4.53E-OS cc/secx(365 days/yr)x(24 hrs/day)x(3600 sec/hr) V = 1428 cc of helium at T11 , P11
- The OP system tank basically consists of a 6" diameter schedule 80 pipe (27" long) and two 5i* diameter schedule 80 end caps. The volume of the tank is 835 in3
- The volume of the OP system is increased to 900 in3 (14750 cc) to include the OP system tubing and the space between the metallic seals in the lid and penetrations. Corresponding, the pressure is reduced by the following in the first year:
Pop released = Pop Sys, Initial X {Vreleued / Vop Sys} Pop released = 6. 53 atm (1428cc I 14750cc) = 0. 63 atm The overpressure system pressure is also corrected for the corresponding :'drop in temperature over the first year. At the end of the fi~st year, th~ overpressure system pressure is 5.88 atm abs (71.7 psig). These calculations are repeated every year for the 20 y~ar licensing period of the cask. Figure 7.1-1 illustrates the pressure drop from the overpressure system to the atmosphere.: Figure 7.1-1 also illustrates the pressure drop in the cask cavity due to fuel cooli~g. If a leak is to the c~sk cavity rather than the atmosphere, the pressure drop in the overpressure system is calculated using a downstream pr~ssure of 2.5 atm absj or 17.6 psig (see Section 7.2~2.l). Figure 7.1-1 also illustrates the results of this
/ 7.1-8 Rev. o 1/00
analysis. In this* scenario, the corresponding increase in the cask cavity pressure is negligible. ** As shown above, the monitoring system pressure is greater than the cask cavity or atmospheric pressure assuming a leak based on the conservative initial acceptance test leak rate of
- l. X 10.5 Std CC/SeC. Typically, metallic* Sjaals result in joints with much* lower leak rates than the acceptance criteria.
Therefore, no leakage will occur from the cask cavity during the storage period. The pressure in the overpressure system will be monitored over the lifetime of the cask. To allow time tp diagnose and. correct any problems, the overpressure monitoring system is set
- to alarm if ~he overpressure system drops below 3.2 atm abs (32.3psig). This alarm setpoint ensures that pressure decreases in the overpressure.monitoring- system are identified well before any potential out leakage from the cask cavity occurs.
7.1-9 Rev. *o 1/00
.,., - a * - * * * *
- 7.::::...:,_7 *- .. - -*
7.2 Requirements for Normal C:OndjtjoDs of Storage 7.2.1 Release of Radioactive Material The TN-32 dry storage ~a~k is designed to provide *storage of spent* fuel for at least 40 years*. The cask cavity_ pressure *is always above ambient during the storage period as a precaution against the in-leakage of air which might be harmful to ,the fuel. Since the confinement vessel consists of a steel cylinder with an integrally-welded bottom closure, the cavity gas can escape only through the lid closure system. In order to ensure cask leak tightness, two systems are employed. A double barrier system.for all potential lid leakage paths consisting of covers with multiple seals is utilized. Additionally, pressurization of monitored seal interspace provides a continuous positive inward and outward pressure gradient which guards against a release of the cavity gas to the environment and the admission of air to the cavity. The cask loadings for normal conditions of storage are given in Section 2.2.s. It is shown that the seals are not disturbed by any of the loadings and thus, the cask confinement is maintained. A gas sample may be taken utilizing the quick connect fitting in the vent port penetration to check the confinement vessel gas for radioactive material,. However, the over pressure monitoring system would have to be disabled in order to perform this test. 7.2.2 Pressurization of Confinement Vessel 7.2.2.1 Pressure under.JOO ~F Ambient Air Temperature. Maximum Tnsolation The pressure at completion of backfill is 2.2 atm abs. The average temperature of the helium when backfilling is completed is assumed to be at 313 op (773 oR), the same as the average cavity gas temperature under conditions of -20 oF.ambient air and no-solar load. The.average cavity gas temperature with 100 op ambient _air an4 maximum solar _load is 411 op (871 °R}. 2.2 atm abs (871 oR /773 oR) = 2.5 atm abs (22.1 psig) 7.2.2.2 Pressure Under JOO ~F Ambient Ajr Temperature, Maximum Insolatjon, 10% Fuel Rod Faj Jure, 1 0% BPRA Rod Failure Fuel clad failure would result in an increase in cavity .pressure due to free gas release of the fuel and BPRA rods. The Westinghouse 15x15 assembly contains the most free gas <3 >, ) 7.2-1 Rev. o 1/00
approximately 6.2 ml at STP (32 assemblies).
*B&W Mark BW fuel free gas, which is not evaluated in reference 3, is bounded by the Westinghouse 15x15 fuel as follows.
The end of life pressure in the Mark BW fuel will be lower than that in the Westinghouse 17x17 fuel for the following reasons: * . (a) Westinghouse 17xl 7 .fuel is prepressurized up to 500 psi. Framatome Cogema Fuels has verified that Mark BW fuel prepressurization is less than 500 psi. * (b) The 002 mass in Westinghouse standard 17x17 fuel is* 0.364 lb/ft, and in Mark BW fuel, 0. 360 lb/ft. Therefore, for. a given mass-specific burnup, the Mark BW fuel will have slightly fewer fission products than the Westinghouse 17x17. The Mark BW fuel pellet density is 96%*, compar.ed to *95% for. the Westinghouse fuel. Therefore, there will be slightly less fission gas release in the Mark BW fuel.
- The diametral gap in the .two fuels is the same, so the plenum volume is nearly the same. Therefore, the* end of life
. moles of free gas in the Mark BW fuel will be the same or less than that in the Westinghouse '17x17 fuel. According to reference 3 the total free gas at 45 GWd/MTU is 939 cm3 for the 15xl5 and 648 cm3 for the 17x17. For the analysis of internal pressurization, the Westinghouse 15xl5 fuel bounds both the Westinghouse standard 17x17 fuel and the Mark BW fuel by a wide margin. The cavity pressure from 10% of the free gas in 32 assemblies is: Free fuel rod gas at STP (T = 492 °R, P = 1 atm abs)
= (0.1)32 assemblies(205 fuel rods/assy)939 cm3 = 0.616 m3 Free cavity volume = 190.4 ft 3 = 5.39 m3 Displacement volume of BPRA = 480 inl = 7. 866 x 10*3 ml Free cavity volume w/ BPRA = 5. 39 ml3 - (32) (7. 866x10* 3 ml)
= 5 .14 m Free fuel rod gas pressure at 411 op (871 oR), expanded to cavity volume:
P2 = pl CT2/Ti) (Vi/V2)
= 1(871/492) (0.616/5.14)
= 0.21 atm (3.12 psi) 7.2-2 Rev. 1 5/00
Total number of p-moles in BPRAs *(Ref 13)
= (0.1) (32 assemblies) (20 BPRA rods/assy) (6.59E-4 p-moles/rod) - ' *
= 0.0422 p-moles BPRA.rod gas pressure at 871 oR:
. . lbr-ft . :
* (0.0422 p- moles)(lS4S.32 )(871 R) ( )
p 2 = nRT _ p-moleR 0.3048m 3 V * " (~.14m 3 ) * . lft P2=2.2psi Total pressure = 22.1 + 3.12 + 2.17"= 27.4 psig The maximu~ normal operating pressure is conservatively set at 35 psig. 7.2-3 Rev. 1 5/00
I ,
*THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK 7.2-4 Rev. 1 5/00
*t.
. _7.3 Confinement Req_ldrements for Hypotbetjcal Accjdent Conditions 7.3.1 Fission Gas Products
*. Table 5. 2--5 lists* the activ.ity 'r~presentl.ng. the* fission gases, volatiles, and fines contributing more than 0.1% of the activity contained in the*32 fuel assemblies, plus iodine 129.
The releasable source term is first determined. The release fractions applied to the source term are provided below {developed from References 4, 5 and 11). Off-Normal
- Accident Yarjable Conditjons Condjtjons Fraction of crud that spalls off rods, 0.15 1.0 fc . .
Fraction of Rods that devel9p cladding 0.10 1.0 breaches, f 8 Fraction o( Gases that are released 0.3 0.3 due to a cladding breach, f G Fraction of Fines that are released 3 x 10-.5 3 x 10- 5 due to a cladding breach, fF Fraction of Released Fines that remain 0.10 0.10 airborne. following a cladding breach, ff,11
- Fraction of .Volatiles that are 2 x 10-4 2 x 10-4 released due to a cladding breach, fv
* .*o.003% of the fuel in a rod is released from the rod during a cladding failure in the form of fines. However, only 10%
of the fuel fines ejected from the rod during a cladding failure remain airborne (Reference 11) . The releasable source term also depends on the leak rate from the ---*--------TN-""-32_._Under_o.ff=normaLc_ondit_i.Qns_,_it_i_s_ae.s_ume_d_t.h_a...t_t.l:ML__________ overpressure system is not functioning properly. In this case, the cask cavity gas is free to leak out at a rate of 1 x 10-s std cc /sec. Assuming the cask cavity gas acts like helium
"(including the gases, volatiles, fines and crud), the leak rate is adjusted to a helium leak rate at cask cavity conditions using the equations of ANSI N14.S. This calculation is shown below.
Pu= 2.71 atm abs {off-normal cask cavity pressure, 10% fuel rod failure) Pd= 1.0 atm abs D = 4.83 x 10 4 cm a = 0.5 cm
µ = 0.0280 cP (for helium at 484 K)
T = fluid absolute temp = 4lloF = 484 K (cavity gas temperature, lOOoF ambient} M = 4.0 g/mol Pa=*~ (Pu+ Pd)= 1.9 atm abs 7.3-1 Rev. 1 5/00
Substituting; Fe = 9. 64E-06 F11* = 5. OSE-06
- Lu,ti.e = 1. 72.E-05 cc/sec of Helium for off-normal conditions Similarly, .*under .hypotheticai" ac~id~nt .conditio;ns,. it is assumed that the overpressure system has*stopped functioning and fire condit1ons exist.
L.i. he = helium volumetric leak rate Pu'= 5. O atm abs (cask cavity pressure following fire = 73 .*1 psia). P4 = l.O atm abs D = 4.83 x 10~ cm a = o.s cm
µ = 0.0283 cP (for helium at'531 K)
- T = fluid absolute temp ~ 531 K {average cavity gas temperature following fire, 497oF)
M = 4.0 P.. = ~ (Pu + Pd) = 3. 0 atm abs Substituting into the equations of ANSI Nl4.5: Fe = 9. 54E-06 F111 = 3.30E-06 . .
- Luhe = 3.0GE-05 cc/sec of Helium for hypothetical accident conditions
- The releasable contents from the TN-32 during off-normal and hypothetical accident conditions are provided in Tables 7.3-1 and 7.3-2, respectively.
7.3.2 Release of Contents Off-Normal Conditions - This condition exists over a one year period, seals are leaking at the test leak rate of l x io-s std cc/sec and the fraction of rods that have failed is 10%. Stability category D and 5 m/s wind speed is used for this analysis. This scenario assumes one cask is in off-normal condition at the ISFSI. ( Hypothetical Accident* Conditions . - This condition exist.a over a 30 day ~eriod,.seals are leaking at the test leak rate of 1 x io* 5 std/cc sec,* *the fraction of rods that have failed is 100%, and the temperature inside the cask is
. comparable to the fire accident conditions. Stability category F and 1 m/s wind speed is used for this analysis.
7.3-2 Rev. 0 1/00
~.*.*a--
.**;*-~
This scenario assumes one cask is in the hypothetical
~ccident condition at the ISFSI.
In the first scenario, the release is assumed to occur for more than a 20 minute period. The methodology of Reg Guide 1.145 1' 1 is applied. The atmospheric diffusion from a g.;-ound level point !SO~rce *at 100 me~ers is based on the fo.llowing
- parameters . ***
Wind speed = 5 meter/second '. cry = 8 meters from Ref 6, Figure l crz = 5 meters from Ref 6, Figure 2 M = l.l, from Ref 6, Figure 3 *. Ly = May = 8
- 8 meters A= is cross sectional area of the TN-32 = 12.6m2 Using the methodology of Reg Guide l .145 I h:/O} 100 meten during off-normal conditions is l.45E-03 sec/m3
- Similarly, the atmospheric diffusion for 500 meters during off- normal conditions is calculated using the following parameters.
Wind speed = 5 meter/second O'y = 40 meters crz = 20 meters M = 1.1
.Iy = Mery = 44 meters During off normal* conditions {x/Q} 500 meters is 7. 23E-05 sec/m3
- In* the second scenario the release is assumed to be a short term ground level release {occurring however over a 30 dar,
- period) assuming the methodo.logy of Regulatory Guide 1.25 71
- The atmospheric stability classification of F and a wind speed of 1 m/sec is used. The atmospheric diffusion from a ground level
____ p_oint-sour-ee-at--1.00-meters-is-calcui~t-etl-berow~.-~----------------- Wind speed = 1 meter/second cry = 4 meters {Ref 6, Figure l) crz *= 2 .3 met~rs_ (Ref 6, Figure 2) Substituting into* the equations of Ref~rence 7: x/Q =l I 1 c~ x 4 x 2.3) = 3.46E-02 sec/m3 for hypothetical accident conditions Similarly, the atmospheric diffusion for ~00 meters is: {x/0} 500 meter11 = 1. 90E-03 sec/m3 for hypothetical accident conditions . 7.3-3 Rev. o l/_!JO
7.3.2.l Dose Calculatjons Dose components are calculated following the method of Regulatory Guide l .10 9 <*> and utilizing dose conversion factors from EPA Federal Guidance Reper.ts Numbers 11 and i2<9
- 10>. *
- To determine the committed doses Cfi:-om air. inhalation) , the following equation is used:
Doseinhalation = R x*y/Q x Q x DCF1nba1ation Where: R = Inhalation Rate = 8,000 m1 /year = 2.54E-04 m3/sec . x/O = Short term average centerline value of3 atmospheric aiffusion for a ground level release (sec/rn ) Q = amount of material released (µCi/sec) DCF1Zlhalation = Exposure Dose Conversion Factor {rnrem/µCi), from reference 9. To determine the deep doses (from air immersion), the following*equation is used: Doseair illllllersion = x/0 x 0 x DCFa1r i1D1Der111on Where: x I Q = Short term average centerline value of atmospheric
.aiffusion for a ground level release {sec/m3 )
Q = amount of material released ~µCi/sec) DCF111111111rs:ton = Exposure Dose Conversion Factor (mrem/year per
µCi/cm 3 ) , from ref 10 For off-normal conditions, the estimated annual airborne doses {internal and external) at 100 meters from a single TN-32
- - -casleia:re-prov~ded-in_Table 7.3-3. The deep dose (external) and the committed dose (internal) on an organ-bas-i-s-and-t_ot_a=l~~~;;-;;;-~---- effective dose for distances of 100 and 500 meters are summarized below: ** Dose at J OQ Dose at 500 meters meters Cmz::em L~x:l 1mx:em l~:c:l Gonad 3.73E-01 l.B6E-02 Breast 2.83E-Ol 1.41E-02 Lung 4.56E+OO 2 .. 27E-01 Red Marrow 2.71E+OO 1.35E-Ol B. Surface 1.-91E+Ol 9.53E-Ol Thyroid 2.62E-Ol .1.30E-02 Remainder 1.lOE+OO 5.SOE-02 Effective l.92E.f.00 9.SBE-02 Skin 3.07E-02 1.53E-03 7.3-4 Rev. 0 1/00
---':"'~ -- *- :...
The values presented in bold print above demonstrate that the criteria of 7~.104(a) are met under off-normal conditions. For hypothetical accident conditions, the committed doses (internal) and deep doses (external} at 100 meters from a single
'l'N-32 cask for a 30 day exposure is provided in Table 7 .3-4. The.
total effective dose equivalent at 100 m and 500 m from a cask.is
.summarized below.
- Dose (mrem) 100 meters 500 meters Deep Dose (external) 1.53E-Ol 8.42E-03 Committed Dose Equivalent (internal)
- 5.87E+Ol 3.22E+OO Total Effective Dose Equivalent S.89E+01 3. 23E+OCl The committed dose equivalent to each organ plus the deep dose for a release over 30 days is presented below.
nose at 100 pose at SOD meters meters. (mreml {mrem) Effective Deep Dose 1.S3E-01 8.42E-03 Committed Dose Equivalent Gonad 1.21E+Ol 6.67E-Ol Breast 7.l2E+OO 3.91E-Ol Lung 1.l2E+02 6.l4E+OO R. Marrow 9.20E+Ol 5.0SE+OO B. Surface 6.64E+02 3.64E+01 Thyroid 6.69E+OO 3.67E-01 Remainder 3.33E+Ol 1.83E+OO TOTAL - Deep Dose plus Committed Dose 6.64E+02 3.65E+Ol Equivalent to Worst Organ (Bone Surface) The criteria of §72.l06(b) are met. In addition to the design basis fuel, _the burnup, initial enrichment and cooling time combinations of Table 2.1~3 were evaluated. The design basis fuel is representative of the airborne off-site doses. The most conservative case resulted in an 8% increase in the dose to the bone surface (worst organ) . The acceptance criteria of 10 CPR 72 are still met. . 7.3.2.2 Pressurizatjon of the Confinement Vessel The pressure assuming 100% fu~l failure, 100% BPRA rod failure, and 1000F ambient conditions is 75.0 psig. During the fire accident condition. (Section 11.2.5) the pressure increases to 83.8 psig, which is well below the 100 psi design pressure. Under the buried cask accident scenario, at seal failure (Section 4.5.2), the temp~rature inside the cask cavity increases to 644°F. and the pressur~ increases to 99.0 psig. 7.3-5 Rev. 0 llOO
t7.3.3 r.atent seaJ Fa j 1 ure By design the overpressure"monitoring system does ~ot immediately alarm if there is a leak in a seal or the overpressure system. The time period from when a leak begins to occu~ and when the overpressure system ~larm is activated is
~ependent on *the.si~e of the leak .. Two*conditions which could exist within the TN-32 confinement system are:
(1) The*outer seal (or the overpressure system) is ~eaking to. the atmosphere. In this case the inner seal is intact and there is no release of the contents of the cask cavity to the atmosphere. (2) The inner seal is leaking (or the overpressure system is leaking into the cask cavity). In this case the outer seal is still intact and there is no release of the cask cavity contents to the atmosphere.
- If a latent seal leak has occurred, the tables below provide some examples of the time to alarm based on assumed leakage rates (and based on the conditions presented in Section 7.1.5).
Case l - Leakage of Overpressure System to the Atmosphere Estimated Tjme to Estimated Tjme to Loss of op System Alarm (frqm Start Pressure (from Start r.eak Rate of r.atent SeaJ of I.atent SeaJ Cstd cclsecl Failure) Failnrel 3 1 x io* 16 days 34 days l X lQ*G 173 days 354 days s x io-5 (see Figure 7. l- 1 year 11 years 2) 1 x 10*5 (see Figure 7 .1- 9 years over 20 years -- -- * - - - - - - l J___ Case 2 ~ Leakage of Overpressure System to Cas~Cavity------~ Estimated Time to Estimated Xime* to EquaJize OP System Alarm Eressure wjth Cask {from Start* of cavjty Pressure I.eak Rate Latent Seal !from Start of (std cclsec} Fajlure) r.atent Seal Failure) 1 x io*3 19 days 24 days 1 x io-~ 201 days 254 days 5 x io-s (see Figure 7. l- i.*s* years 14 years 2) l x io-s (see Figure 7 ..1- 12 years over 20 years l} 7.3-6 Rev. O 1/00
.- As shown in the tables above, the alarm is set such that for any credible leak, there is time to evaluate the leaking condition and correct the condition provided that the . overpressure system remains pressurized. This period can be extended by repressurizing the overpressure tank. * *
. Aiiother condition which has.been considered is that a latent
- seal failure has occurred and the oveipre.ssure system is removed due to an accident . * * * ..
(1) If the outer seal has the latent failure and the OP system is removed then there is no release of cask.cavity contents. to the atmosphere. (2) If the inner seal has a latent failure and the OP system is removed then the table below provides the time before 10 CFR 72.106(b) limits will be exceeded (based on accident conditions presented in ~ection 7.2). Standard I.eak Rate T:fme to exceed (std cc /sec> 10 CFR 72. l 06 (bl I,jrnj ts i x io* 3 22 days 1 x io** 223 days 5 X 10" 5 446 days l x 10 5 2249 days
- The times above demonstrate that a latent failure up to 100 times greater than the test value could occur and recovery is possible.
The time to reach the accident release rates is dependent on the size of the leak. Due to the reliability of the metallic o-rings used in static applications, it is not considered credible that the inner seals could leak at a rate significantly higher than tb.e_t_es_t_l_eak_r_a_t.e_~he._probabilit...y_that_a_gr-0sS-..l.eak-oL.an inner seal in combination.with a gross leak in an outer seal or the overpressure system, such that the overpressure system could not hold pressure, is not considered a credible event. However, if the overpressure system is not functional, the overpressure system can be replaced with a blind flange. The replacement of the overpressure system with the blind flange is described under contingency actions in Chapter a, Section 8.4. The estimated operational dose due to this operation is provided in Chapter .10.
~-
7.3-7 Rev. O :J./00
7.4 References
- 1. A?Jlerican Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME Boiler And Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division l - Subsection NB, 1992. .
- 2. ANSI Nl.4.5-1997, "Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment,it February 1998.
- 3. Transnuclear, Inc., 11 Extended Fuel Burnup Demonstration Program Topical Report - Transport Considerations for Transnuclear Casks, 11 DOE/ET 34014-11, White Plains, New ..
York,, December 1983.
- 4. NUREG-1536, 11 Standard Review Plan for Dry Storage Casks, Final Report, 11 US Nuclear Regulatory. Commission, Jan 1997.
- 5. NUREG-1617, "Standard Review Plan for Transportation Packages for Spent Nuclear Fuel, Draft Report for Comment" US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 1998.
- 6. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.145, "Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequence Assessment at Nuclear Power Plants", Rev l. (1983).
- 7. USNRC ~egulatory Guide 1.25, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating Accident in the Fuel Handling Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors."
- 8. USNRC Regulatory 9¥ide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Men From Routine Releases of Reactor Effluent for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10CFRSO, Appendix 1 11 ,
Rev 1 (1977). ~~~~-~-US__E_nvironmental Protection Agency Federal Guidance Report No. 11, 11 Limiting Values of Rad:ionuc~ide-.t-ntak~rui_Mr Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalati~o=n-,~~~~~~~- Submersion and Ingestion, 11 EPA-520/1-88-020, Sept, 1988. 10 .. US Environmental Protection Agency Federal Guidance Report No. 12, _11 Exter!lal'Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil, 11 EPA-402-R-93-081, September;* 1993.
- 11. SAND90-2406, 11 A Method for Determining the Spent Fuel Contribution to Transport Cask Containment Requirements,"
Sandi~ National Laboratories, November, 1992.
- 12. Helicoflex Catalog ET 507 E5930.
- 13. Brookmire, et al, "Storage of Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies and Thimble Plug Devices in Dcy Storage Casks Surry ISFSI, 11
*NE-1162, Rev. o, May 1998.
, . 6'.
7.4-1 Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 7.3-3 O"*SITE AIRBORNE DOSES FROM OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS AT lOOM FROM THE 1N-32 CASK--COMMIITED DOSES (INTERNAL) Isotope Gonad Breast Lung R. Marrow B. Surface Thyroid Remainder Effective .... H3 4.70E-04 . 4.70E-04 4.70E-04 4.70E-04 4.70E-04 4.70E-04 4.70E-04 4.70E-04 co 60 S.S9E-02 2.16E-Ol 4.0SE+OO
- 2.02E-Ol l.58E-01 J.90E..01 4.23E-Ol 6.94E-Ol PU238 8.S?E-02 3.06E-06 S.63E-02 4.65E-01 S.81E+OO 2.94E-06 2.ISE-01 3.24E-01 PU239 7.0SE-03 2.04E-07 3.83E-03 3.74E..02 4.67E-01 2.00E-07 1.68E-02 2.S7E-02 PU240 1.09E-02 3.27E-07 S.9SE-03 S.82E-02 7.26E-Ol 3.12E-07 2.60E-02 3.99E-02 PU241 5.46E-02 2.45E-06 S.94E-04 2.69E-Ol 3.36E+OO 9.93E-07 1.0SE-01 l.79E-Ol AM241 3.7SE-02 3.0SE-06 2.13E-02 2.0IE-01 2.SIE+OO l.SSE-06 9.03E-02 l.39E-Ol CM244 4.82E-02 3.ISE-06 S.8SE-02 2.8SE-Ol . 3.SSE+oO 3.06E-06
- 1.4SE-01 2.03E-01 KR.SS O.OOE+OO O.OOE+oO O.OOE+oO O.OOE+DO O.OOE+DO O.OOE+oO O.OOE+-00 0.00E+OO SR90 8.91E-03 8.91E-03 1.26E-02 l.13E+OO 2.4SE+OO' 8.91E-03 l.13E-02 2.ISE-01 Y90 2.62E-08 2.62E-08 4.71E-04 7.70E-07 7.6SE-07 2.62E-08 1.96E-04 J.lSE-04 RU106 3.59E-04 4.91E..04 2.87E-01 4.86E-04 4.44E-04 4.75E-04 3.31E-03 3.S6E-02 RH106 O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+DO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+oO O.OOE+OO SB125 4.l lE-07 4.75E-07 2.48E-05 6.llE-07 l.12E-06 3.70E-07 1.66E-06 3.77E-06 TE12SM 2.22E-08 1.98E-o8 2.91E-06 3.22E-07 3.30E-06 l.OSE-08 1.89E..07 5.SlE-07 1129 2.32E-07 5.S1E-07 8.37E-07 3.73E-07 3.68E-07 4.16E-03 3.14E-07 l.2SE-04 CS134 l.28E-02 l.06E-02 l.16E-02 l.l6E-02 l.OSE-02
- 1.09E-02 1.37E-02 1.23E-02 CS137 4.44E-02 3.97E-02 4.47E-02 4.20E-02 4.02E-02 4.0lE-02 4.62E-02 4.37E-02 BA137M O.OOE+oO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+oO O.OOE+oO O.OOE+oO CEJ44 4.13E-07 6.0lE-07 1.37E-03 4.98E-06 8.lSE-06 5.04E-07 3.30E-OS l.74E-04 PR144 4.16E-12 1.SlE-11 1.62E-07 2.38E-11 2.S4E-ll 1.46E-11 2.42E-09 2.02E-08 PM147 1.48E-10 6.46E-10 1.39E-03 2.89E-OS 3.61E-04 3.SSE-10 2.80E-OS 1.90E-04 EU1S4 7.04E-OS 9.32E-OS 4.76E-04 6.37E-04 3.lSE-03 4.29£-0S 6.80E-o4 4.6SE-04 EU15S 9.39E-07 1.62E-06 3.14E-OS 3.77E-05 4.0lE-04 6.33E-07 2.93E-o5 2.9SE-05 Total 3.67E-01 2.76E-01 4.56E+o0 . 2.71E+OO l.91E+Ol 2.SSE-01 1.lOE+OO 1.92E+o0 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE7.3-3 (continued) OFF-SITE AIRBORNE. DOSES FROM OFF-NORMAL . CONDmONS AT lOOM FROM THE TN-32 CASK- DEEP pOSES (EXTE:t.rnAL). R. B. Isotope Gonad ~ Lung MaiTow Surface Thyroid Remainder Effective Skin H 3 O.OOE+oO O.OOE+oO 2.94E-07 O.OOE+oO O.OOE+oo O.OOE+oO O.OOE+oO 3.S4E-08 O.OOE+OO CO 60 S.69E-03 6.43E-03 S.74E-03 S.69E-03 8.23E-03 S.87E-03 S.SSE-03 5.83E-03 6.71E-03 PU238 7.91E-11 1.53E-08 1.28.E-Il 2.03:S-11 1.126-10 4.84E-11 2.40E-ll S.88E-ll 4.93E-10 . PU239 4.23£-12 6.S9E-12 2.31E-12 2.33E-12 8.27E-12 3.39E-12 2.SOE-12 3.70E-12 I.62£..11 . PU240 8.63£..12 I.67E-ll 1.48E-l2 2.24E-12 1.26£..11 5.32E-12 2.66E-12 6.44E-l2 S.32E-11 PU241 2.27E-11 2.74£-11 2.04£-11 1.78E-11 6.91£-11 2.20E-ll l.92E-11 2.29£-11 3.69E-11
- AM241 3.91E-09 4.87E-09 3.07E-08 2.37E-09 1.31E-08 3.56E-09 2.89&09 3.72E-09 S.83E-09 CM244 8.25£-11 1.S9E-10 8.46E-12 1.75E-ll 1.0SE-10 S.Ol.E-11 2.16E-ll S.87E-ll 4.67E-10
- KR8S 2.06E-04 2.36E*04 2.0lE-04 l.92E-04 3.88E-04 2.0SE-04 1.92£-04 2.lO:E-04 2.33E-02 SR90 l.04E-07 l.26E-07 8.S7E-08 7.24E-08 3.03£-07 9.7SE-08 8.13E-08 1.00E-07 1.22E-04 Y90 3.77E-08 4.39E-08 3.53E-08 3.23:E-08 8.86E-08 3.73E-08 3.35£.08 3.79E-08 l.2SE-05 RU106 O,OOE+oO O.OOE+oO O.OOE+oO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+oO O.OOE+oo O.OOE+oO O.OOE+OO RH106 1.65E-07 1.89E-07 l.6SE-07. l.S9E-07 2.SlE-07 1.68E-07 1.S7E-07 1.70E-07 l.78E-06 SB12S 8.91£.-08 1.02E-07 8.78E-08 8.42E-08 1.59E-07 9.0SE-08 8.37E-08 9.09E-08 J.19E-07 TE12SM 6.57E-10 9.34£-10 2.46E-10. 2.0SE-10 1.34E-09 5.1 lE-10 2.SS:E-10 4.99E-10 2.14E-09 1129 S.01.E-09 6.99E-09 2.25E-09 1.72E-09 1.lSE-08 4.0SE-09 2.41E-09 3.99E-09 l.lSE-08 CS134 2.87E-04 3.27E-04 2.86E-04 2.79E-04 4.66E..04 2.94E-04 2.74E-04 2.94E-04 3.67£-04 CS137 1.59E-07 l.93E-07 133E-07 1.14£-07 4.57E-07 1.SlE-07 1.27E-07 1.S4E-07 l.72E-04 BA137M 8.00E-06 9.lOE-06 7.92E-06 7.72E-06 I.3IE-OS 8.14E-06 7.58E-06 8.14E-06 1.0SE-05 CE144 5.SlE-09 6.88E-09 *. S.24E-O~ 4.SSB-09 1.70E-08 5.67E-09 4.92E-09 5.81E-09 1.99E-08
_ _ _ _PR144 l.29E-08 1.46.E-OS l.29E-08 1.27E-08 2.04E-08 1.33.E-08 1.25£-08 1.33E-08 5.74E-07 PMl.,..47.--.....,,,5""".29.E*li-6;-76E-1-1-3.85EJ.L3. -11 1.54.E-10 4.77E-11 3.72E-ll 4.90E-11 S.73E-08 EUJS4 1.42E-06 l.61E-06 1.42E-06 1.39.E-06 2.23E-06 1. C)'l.3DE;;()6--+.46E-06--1~96&06 EUISS 2.59E-08 3.07E-08 2.31E-08 1.92E-08 8.41E*OS 2.SlE-08 2.lSE-08' 2.59E-08 3.52E-.~0':"-8----- Total 6.19E-03 7.00E-03 6.23E-03 6.17E-03 9.lOE-03 6.39E-03 6.03E-03 6.34E-03 3.07E-02 Rev. O 1/00
.. TABLE 7.3-4 OFF-SITE AIRBORNE DOSES FROM HYPOTHETICAL'ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AT lOOM FROM ..
. THE TN-32 CASK
- COMMI.TTED . DOSES (INTERNAL).*. - . mrem/3 O days Isotope Gonad Breast Lung R.Marrow B. Surface Thyroid Remainder Effective H3 1.64E-02 1.64E-02 1.64E-02 1.64E-02 I.64E-02 1.64E-02 l.64E-02 l.64E~02 Co60 1.30E+o0 5.02E+oo 9.41E+Ol 4.69E+o0 3.68E+o0 4.42E+o0 9.82E+o0 I.61E+ol Pu238 2.99E+o0 1.07E-04 l.96E+OO l.62E+ol 2.03E+o2 1.0JE-04 7.49E+o0 1.13E+ol Pu239 2.46E-Ol 7.12E-06 l.34E-Ol l.31E+oO 1.63E+ol 6.97E-06 S.84E-01 8.96E-01 Pu240 3.82E-01 1.14E-OS 2.0BE-01 2.03E+o0 2.S3E+ol l.09E-OS 9.07E-01 t.39E+oo Pu241 l.90E+OO 8.S4E-OS 2.07E-02 9.38E+o0 1.I7E+o2 3.46E-OS 3.66E+o0 6.22E+OO Am241 1.31E+OO 1.0SE-04 7.4l:E;-01 7.0lEt-00 8.74E+ol 6.44E-05 3.lSE+oO 4.83E+o0 Cm244 1.68E+o0 1.lOE-04 2.04Et-OO 9.92E+OO l.24Et-02 1.07E-04 S.OSE+oO 7.0SE+OO Kr85 O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOEt-00 O.OOE+oO O.OOEt-00 O.OOE+oO O.OOE+oO Sr90 3.llE-01 3.llE-01 4.39E-Ol 3.95E+ol 8.56E+ol 3.llE-01 3.95E-01 7.61E+o0 Y90 9.13E-01 9.13E-07 1.64E-oi 2.68E-05 2.67E-05 9.13E-07 6.83E-03 4.02E-03 Ru 106 l.25E-02 l.71E-02 l.OOE+Ol I.69E-02 l.SSE-02 J.66E-02 t.lSE-01 l.24E+oO Rh 106 O.OOE+oO O.OOEt-00 *o.ooE+oo O.OOE+oO O.OOEt-00 O.OOEt-00 O.OOE+oO O.OOE+OO Sb 125 1.43E-05 l.66E-OS 8.64E-04 2.13E-05 3.89E-OS l.29E-OS 5.11E-05 l.31E-04 Te 125m 7.73E-07 6.90E-07 l.OlE-04 1.12E-05 1.ISE-04 3.77E-07 6.SSE-06 1.92E-05 1129 8.07E-06 1.94E-OS 2.92E-OS 1.30.E-05 J.28E-OS l.4SE-Ol LIOE-05 436E-03 Cs134 4.46E-01 3.71E-01 4.0SE-01 4.0SE-01 3.78E-OI 3.SlE-01 4.77~1 4.29E-01 Csl37 1.SSE+OO 1.38E+o0 l.56E+OO l.47E+o0 1.40E+o0 I.40E+o0 l.61E+o0 l.S2E+o0 Ba 137m O.OOE+oO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+oO O.OOE+oO O.OOEt-00 O.OOE+OO O.OOE+oO Cc 144 l.44E-05 2.lOE-OS 4.76E-02 l.73E-04 2.84E-04 l.76E-05 1.ISE-03 6.0SE-03 Pr144 t.45E-10 6.32E-IO 5.66E-06 8.3 lE-10 8.85E-10 5.lOE-10 8.43E-08 7.0SE-07 Pm 147 S.16E-09 2.25E-08 4.84E-02 l.OtE-03 1.26E-02 I.24E-08 9.75E-t>4 6.63E-03 Eu 154 2.4SE-03 3.25E-03 1.66E-02 2.22E-02 1.lOE-01 l.SOE-03 2.37E-02 1.62E-02 EtrlSS 3:27~s-s~"6s1:.os---1:09E-1l3 l.31&03 I.40E:Or-z-.2m;O~r.02E:or-IJ>3~03 Total l.21E+o1 7.12E+OO l.12E+02 9.20E+ol 6.64E+o2 6.69E+o0 .3,33E+ol S.87E+ot Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 7.3-4 (c.ontinued) OFF-SITE AIRBORNE DOSES FROM HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AT lOOM FROM THE*'l'N-32 CASK DEEP DOSES. (EXTERNAL) - mrem/30 days R. B. Isotope ~ Breast Marrow SuxTac:e Thyroid Rwinder Effective ~ H 3 O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO l.OJE-05 O.OOE+OD O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO 1.24E-06 0.00E+OO Co 60 l.32E~Ol 1.4SE-01 1.33£-01 1.32£-01 1.9lE-Ol 1.37£-0~ 1.29E-01 1.3SE-01 1.S6E-Ol Pu 238 2.76E-09 5.34£-0'7 4.46B-10 7.06E-10 l.91E-09 1.69E-09 8.36E-10 2.0SE-0*9 1*.72£-08 P'Ll 239 1.47E-10 2.30£-10 8.07E-11 8.13E-l1 2.88E-10 1.lSE-10 8.70E-l1 l.29E-10 S.66E-10 Pu 240 3.0lE-10 S.82£-10 5.lSE-11 7.SOE-11 4.38E-10 l.BSE-10 9.27E-11 2.2SE-10 1.SSE-09 Pu 241 7.SlE-10 9.53E-10 ?.13E-l0 6.19E-l0 2.41E-09 7.68£-10 6.70E-l0 7.97E-l0 l.29E-09 1'm 241 1.36E-07 l.70E-07 l.07E-07"8*.27E-08 4.SSE-07 l.24E-07 l.OlE-07 1.30E-0~ 2.03E-07 cm 244 2.SSE-09 S.54E-09 2.9SE-10 6.0SE-10 3.68£-09 l.?SE-09 7.54~-lO 2.0SE-09 1.63E-08
- Kr 8S 7.19E*03 8.23E-03 7.00E-03 6.69E-03 1.3SE-02 7.25E~03 6.69£-03 7.llE-03 8.llE*Ol Sr 90 3.61E-06 4.40E-06 2.99£-06 2.52E-06 1.06£-05 3.40E-06 2.83E-06 3.49E-06 4.27E-03 y.90 1.31E-06 l.53E-06 1.23E-06 l.lJE-06 3.09E-06 l.30E-06 l.17E-06 1.32E-06 4.34E-04 Jlu 106 O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO Jlh 106 S.7SE-06 6.60E-06 5.7SE-06 S.SSE-06 9.78E-06 5.86E-06 S.4BE-06 ~.92E-06 6.20£-05 Sb 125 3.11£-06 3.SGE-06 3.06E-06 2.93£-06 S.54E-06 3.lSE-06 2.92£-06 3.17E*06 4.16E-06 Te 125m 2.29E-DS 3.26£-08 8.S6E-09 7.14E-09 4.69£-08 1.78E-08 9.95E-09 l.74E-08 7.4SE-08 I .129 l.77E*07 2.44E-07 7.S3E-08 6.00E-08 4.03£-07 l.41E-07 B.42E-08 l.39E-07 4.03E-07 Cs 134 l.OOE-02 l.l4E-02 9.97£-03 9.73E-03 1.62£-02 l.02E-02 9.SSE-03 1.02£-02 l.2BE-02 Cs 137 S.S4E-06 6.7JE-06 4.65E-06 3.97E-06 l.59E-OS S.2SE-06 4.4~E-06 5.38E-06 6.00E-03 Ba 137m 2.79E-04 3.17E-04 2.76E-04 2.69E-04 4.56E-04 ~.84E-04 2.64E-04 2.84E-04 3.68E-04 Ce 144 2.02E-07 2.40E-07 1.83£-07 1.S9E-07 S.91E-07 l.9BE-07 l.72E-Oi 2.02E-07 6.SSE-07 Pr 144 4.SlE-07 5.lOE-07 4.SlE-07 4.44E-07 7.lOE-07 4.63E-07 4.37E-07 4.63E*07 2.00E-05 Pm 147 l.84E-09 2.36E-09 l.3~E-09 l.10E-09 S.37E-09 1.66E-09 l.JOE-09 l.71E-09 2.00E-06
_ _ _ __::E:.::u:.__:154 4.96E-OS 5.63E-OS 4.9SE-05 4.SSE-OS 7.79E..-05 s.08Eo005 ~.75E-OS 5.07E-05 6.SSE-05 Eu 1-S-s-g:-o~-07-h0'7E00.0.6- B.04'.r;-07 6.70E*07 2 *.93E-06 8.?3E-07 7.SOE-07 9.02!:-07 l.23E-06 Total l.SOE-01 1.69E-Ol l.51E-01 1.49E-Ol 2.22£-01-i:-5""4-E-Ol--l~-4.liE~j l.53E-Ol 9.91E-Ol
,,. REV. D 1/00
- ~ ~::* ~*:*~: -. .
... FIGORE~*1::.1.:.1:*
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REV. 0 l/00
__ ,F.IGURE 7 .l-2 OVERPRESSURE MONITORING "SYSTEM PRESSURE DROP WITH TIME (Assuming a Latent Seal Leak Rate of S x 10*' std cc/sec)
'1.IJ 6.5 I
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'4 REV. 0 l./00
~ .. -...
-*:::::-.!:!.-7-.
Figure 7.1-3 Lid, Vent Port, &: Drain* Port Metal Seals
- I
.1 A I
-----~----t l HOLES, AS REQ'D. FOR .
ATTACHMENT SC*REWS &: OVERPRESSURE PORT COMMUNICATION. JACKET: ALUMINUM LINING: STAINLESS STEEL SPRING:HIGH STRENGTH ALLOY OR NICKEL ALLOY (NIMONIC 90 OR EQUAL) 4mm (PORT) 6.6mm (LID) t SECTION A-A
,;l TN-32 SAR Rev. 0 1/00
CHAPTER 8 OPERATING PROCEDURES This chapter outlines a representative sequence of operations to be incorporated into operating procedures for preparing, loading, testing, storing, unloading, and maintaining the TN-32 cask. Maintenance activities to be perfoJ:111ed during the storage period are described in Chapter 9.
- All procedures described herein are subject to the limitations imposed by the Technical Specifications, SAR Chapter 12.
8.1 Loadjng the Cask 8.1.1 General Description This section provides a general description of the cask loading operations. More detailed steps are provided in Table 8.1-1. The empty cask is inspected upon receipt and off loading from the delivery vehicle. The protective cover, overpressure system, top neutron shield, and lid are removed. The cask is lowered into the spent fuel pool. As.it is lowered or before, the cask is filled with water having a minimum dissolved boron content of 2300 ppm. Fuel assemblies are loaded into the cask using the refueling platform main hoist fuel grapple or equivalent methods (may vary depending on plant design) . After the cask is loaded with spent fuel and the, lid is placed on the cask, the cask is lifted to the pool surface, the cavity water in the cask is drained and the lid bolts are ~~~~i~~n~s~t~a~Iled. The cask is set down, decontaminated, and dried by using a vacuum system. The smooth surfaces of the cask are designed to facilitate decontamination. The lid bolts are torqued to their final required value. The cavity is filled with helium to above atmospheric pressure and the cask lid seal is leak tested. The top neutron shield is installed on the lid. The overpressure monitoring system is installed and leak tested, and the interspace between the double metallic o~rings pressurized. The external radiation levels are measured. The protective cover is then installed and the cask is transferred to its storage location at the ISFSI. (The protective cover can be installed at the ISFSI.) 8.1-1 Rev. O 1/00
-- - .r.. -*-* ....
vehicle which limits the height of the cask above the . . ground to 18 inches. The cask is set in its storage position. The cask over pressure system is connected to the site storage cask monitoring system and a functional check of the monitoring system is performed. 8.1.2 Flow Sheets The suggested sequence of operations to be performed in loading fuel into the TN-32 storage cask and placing the cask into storage at the ISFSI is outlined in Table 8.1-1. Some variations in this sequence may be expected as site specific procedures are developed by TN-32 owners. Details of the number of personnel and the time required' for the various operations are given in Tables 10.3-1 and -2 as part of the radiation exposure determinations discussed in Chapter 10. The data are based on Transnuclear's experience with transport and storage cask operations and will vary for ari individual licensee. Temporary shielding, measures to facilitate surface decontamination, an'd minimization of operation time will maintain operational doses ALAR.A as discussed in the flow sheets. 8.1.3 Vacuum Drying System A vacuum drying system is utilized to remove residual moisture from the cask cavity, after the cask has been drained. This method is successfully used by Transnuclear on both its transport casks and storage casks. After a loaded cask is removed from a pool and drained, it is placed under a vacuum. After bolting the lid, residual water is removed by the following, or*equivalent method: a} Using a wand attached to the vacuum system, remove excess water from the seal areas through the passageways at the overpressure, drain, and vent ports: , b} Install the drain port cover.
- The quick disconnect fitting may be left in place or removed. If it is left in place, purge the space between the cover and quick disconnect fitting with helium before lowering and bolting the cover.
c} With the quick_ disconnect removed to improve evacuation, install a flanged vacuum connector over the vent port, purge or ev~cuate the helium supply lines, and evacuate the cask to 4 millibar (4xl0- 4 MPa} or less. Make provision to prevent or correct icing of the evacuation lines. d) Isolate the vacuum pump.* If, in a period of 30 minutes, -the. pressure does not exceed 4 millibar {4xl0" 4 *MPa), the cask is adequately dried. Otherwise, repeat vacuum pumping until this criterion is met. 8.1-2 Rev. O 1/00
~)Backfill the evacuated cask cavity with helium (minamum 99.99% purity)to slightly above atmospheric pressure, remove the vacuum connector, and immediately install the quick disconnect fitting. f) Attach the vacuum/backfill manifold to the fitting, purge or evacuate the helium supply lines, and re-evacuate the cask to below 100 mbar. g) Isolate*the vacuum pump, backfill the cask cavity to above atmospheric pressure with helium (minimum 99.99% purity).
- h) Install the vent port cover after purging with helium between the cover and the quick disconnect. Leak.test. (see Section 8.1.4).
I The evacuation and backfill process is repeated if the cask cavity is exposed to the atmosphere. 8.1.4 Leak Detectjon After backfill, the cask' is leak tested by helium mass spectrometry by pressurizing the annular space and measuring the total leak rate of all seals, both inner and outer, including the overpressure system. This conservative leak rate must be less than the limit stated in Section 8.3. Leak test procedures make provision for cases where a quick disconnect fitting may prevent communication between the cask cavity and the inside of a port inner seal. Failure to meet the leak test acceptance criterion requires evaluation of the leak location, for example by use of the helium mass spectrometer irt the ~sniffer mode, examination of sealing surfaces, replacement of the leaking seal(s), and re-performance of the leak test. Replacement of the main lid seal requires reflooding of the cask and removal of the lid, similar to the steps described under Section 8.2. 8.1.S Major Tools and Equjpment The following tools and equipmen~ormal--l-y--;r;equ_i~r~e-d._..f.~o~r,__~~--~~ loading and unloading the TN-32 casks:
- A transport frame which is used to transport the empty cask from the manufacturer's facility to the utility. The transport frame is not important to safety, since it is only used in conjunction with an empty cask.
- A spreader lift beam to connect the cask to the crane hook.
The lift beam is used to.remove the cask from the transport frame, to move the cask into the pool, into the processing stations such as the decontamination area and eventually to a . location where the cask can be lifted by the cask transporter. This lift beam is designed and fabricated in accordance with 8.1-3 Rev. O 1/00
. location where the cask can be lifted by the cask transporter.
This lift beam is designed and fabricated in accordance with
- ANSI N14. 6. <1 > The load bearing components of the lift beam will be evaluated by the user under its heavy lifting program in accordance with NUREG 0612 <3 > *
- A vertical cask transporter. The cask transporter is generally set to limit the lift height of the cask to less than 18 inches above the transport surface. The cask transporter is used to move the cask from the cask loading bay to the storage pad. The cask transporter may be self-propelled or be pulled by a tow vehicle to the ISFSI. The cask transporter is not important to safety, since the cask is analyzed to withstand a postulated 18 inch drop onto a concrete pad which is bounding for the transfer path. The cask transporter is designed to lift the cask by means of the top trunni~ns.
- A lid lifting system. This consists of a set of slings threaded into the top of the lid or a lifting pintle. The load bearing components of the lid lifting system will be evaluated by the user under its heavy lifting program in accordance with NUREG 0612.
- Helium mass spectrometer leak detection system including port connectors. The leak detector is designated as not important to safety, but is calibrated.
- Vacuum drying system including hose$ and connectors. The vacuum drying system is not important to safety, but all gages are calibrated. The pump has adequate displacement, water vapor pumping speed, and base pressure. A two stage rotary vane pump with 75 cfrn or greater displacement has been used successfully. Filters and pumping oil are periodically replaced according to manufacturer's recommendations and ALARA considerations.
- Pumps for removing water from.the cask. The pumps are not important to safety. .
.-----.ca-libratea-t-orqire-wrenche-s-rorn-tting-specif ied torque for cask bolts, s~rews and plugs (Not important to safety) . See drawing 1049-70-1, Chapter 1, for torque requirements.
- Sockets and hex keys for removal and replacement of bolts, screws, coupling and connectors .. These items are not important to safety.
- Helium cylind~rs and manifold with calibrated pressure gage for backfill of cask and overpressure system. These items are not important to safety.
** Alignment pins that are temporarily installed in two or more lid bolt holes during lid installati"on. These alignment pins .
are designated as not important *to safety, and are removed after the lid is installed. *
*
- Temporary blind flange which can be used to replace the 8.1-4 Rev. 0 1/00
overpressure port cover for transfer of the cask to the spent fuel pool. Rev. O 1/00 B.1-5
--"":"-.~.* - - ...
8.2 Unloading the Cask This section describes the steps required to unload a TN-32 cask. Additional measures may need to be taken if damage to the cask has occurred due to accidents.* If the TN-32 cask needs to be unloaded for any reason, the sequence of operations described in Section 8.1 and listed in Table B.1-1 will be essentially performed in reverse. The unloading steps are provided in Table 8.2-1. The dry cask ref lood process during unloading of PWR fuel is unlikely to disperse crud into the fuel transfer pool and the
- pool area atmosphere, because of the tightly bound nature of PWR crud. Nonetheless, radiation monitoring is recommended during ref looding operations to minimize airborne exposure and personnel contamination hazards.
If the overpressure system is known to be leaking and no longer above cavity pressure, the cask*overpressure monitoring system is disconnected and a blind flange and seal are installed at the overpressure system port before moving the cask. The cask is* moved from the ISFSI site back into the spent fuel pool building using the cask transport vehicle. The protective cover is unbolted and removed. The overpressure system is then depressurized and removed. The vent port is removed and a cavity gas sample is collected. The gas sample is analyzed and any precautions necessary are added based on the gas cavity sample results.
- If degraded fuel is suspected, additional measures, appropriate for the specific conditions, are to be planned, reviewed and approved by the appropriate plant personnel, and
- -----imp-lement:ed-to--rninim+/-ze-exposures-to-w6rkers-and-radiclogica-l---------
releases to the environment. These additional measures may includ~ provision of filters, respiratory protection and other methods to control releases and exposures*ALARA. The helium in the cavity is depressurized to atmospheric pressure. The drain port cover is removed. The lid lifting equipment is attached, and the lid bolts are untorgued. Some of the lid bolts may be removed, but at least 6 equally spaced lid bolts should remain installed. Fill and drain lines* are connected to the lid drain -and vent ports. The quick disconnect fittings may be used or they may be removed. The cask is lowered into the spent fuel pool. Water with a minimum dissolved boron content of 2300 ppm is added to 8.2-1 Rev. o 1/00
fill the cask and to gradually cool the fuel in the c~sk. The pressure is monitored at the cask outlet, and the flow rate of the water is controlled to limit the internal pressure to below the design limit of 100 psi. A check valve (set at 75.3 psig or below) will be installed at the inlet to the cask to prevent the cask pressure from exceeding 90 psia. The initial flow rate is 1.0 gallon per minute. Once the pressure falls below 50 psig and is maintained for a period of forty five minutes, the flow rate can be gradually increased while monitoring the pressure at the outlet. If the pressure gage reading exceeds 70 psig, close the inlet valve until the pressure falls below 50 psig. Reflooding can then be resumed. {See Chapter 4 for the supporting calculation} . The water/steam mixture from the vent port discharge may contain some radioactive material. Gases are closely monitored to determine if .there is a radiological hazard and appropriately processed. A typical set up for flooding the cask is shown in Figure 8.2-1. The check valve and the monitoring of the exit pressure will ensure that the water vapor pressure generated .during unloading does not exceed the cask design pressure. When the cask is full, the fill and drain lines are removed. The cask is then lowered to the pool bottom where the lid is removed making the fuel accessible for transfer. Provided that the TN-32 cask is within its design life, the cask can be reused after unloading. Inspection procedures will be implemented to ensure that the cask is still in its design configuration after unloading. The TN-32 cask is designed so that it will not need to be opened after initial loading operations are completed until it is time to unload the fuel. 8.2-2 Rev. O 1/00
- 8. 3 Surveillance and Maintenance *'
Chapters 9 and 12 discuss required surveillance *and maintenance of the TN-32. Most required activities are very simple and do not require additional detail here. The most complex surveillance and maintenance operation is overpressure system maintenance, which is discus*sed below. The term switches" in the following refers to switches or transducers, either of which are used to monitor the pressure in the overpressure tank. Redundant overpressure system switches are mounted on the side of the cask, and communicate with the overpressure tank via stainless steel tubing which penetrates the weather protective cover. Each switch has an isolation valve and an access valve provided for the calibration and maintenance procedure. The access valve outside port may have a capped fitting or a quick connect fitting. To verify the functioning and calibration of the switches, a Channel Operation Test (COT) shall be performed. A helium cylinder and the appropriate manifold with a calibrated pressure gauge and a bleed down valve are required. A typical procedure outline is provided below. a) Close the isolation valve~ b) Remove the cap from the access valve, and connect the test manifold while maintaining a slow helium purge. c) Pressurize test manifold to about 75 psig from the helium cylinder, then isolate the helium cylinder and open the access valve. d) Open the bleed down valve~ and redu~e the pressure slowly (the
*volume-:Ls vezy-srrra--i-1-,-bu~--mintm1z-e--any cnance o radioactive emissions, the helium may be bled into an empty cylinder). For transducers, verify the pressure reading on the transducers against the reference gauge at a number of points. For both switches and transducers, verify that the alarm is actuated at the correct pressure.
e)°Adjust the set point or calibration as required and repeat the immediately preceding step.
*f) Repressurize the manifold with helium to the original system pressure (66.2 psig), close the access valve, disconnect the
*manifold, cap the access valve, and open the isolation valve.*
8.3-1 Rev. O 1/00
g) Repeat the procedure for the second switch. h} If replacement of a switch is required, the switch must be leak tested after installation lf there has been some reduction in system pressure, the entire overpressure system may also be re-pressurized to the original pressure (66. 2 psig) by opening . . the isolation valve at the beginning of step f) rather than at*the end.
- 8.3-2 Rev. O 1/00
8.4 Contingency Actions Routine surveillance activities may trigger contingency actions as identified in the Technical Specifications. Many of these actions, such as removal of storm debris, are simple and require no further detail here. This section provides guidance in the event of a low pressure alarm from the overpressure monitoring system. The margin between the set point and the confinement pressure provides ample time as provided in the Technical Specifications to assess and correct the condition. First determine if there is a false indication. This could. be due to alarm panel malfunction or a switch failure. . Exceptionally cold weather may also cause a reduction in pressure and a consequent false alarm. This may be corrected by re-pressurizing the . system as discussed at the end of Section 8.3. . If the alarm appears to.pe due to an actual leak, first determine if there is a leak in the overpressure system. This may be done by first checking the exterior plumbing, and then, if no leak is found, by removing the weather cover, and testing the tank and the op port cover. A helium mass spectrometer system in either vacuum or sniffer mode may be used. If a leak is found, the overpressure system should be vented to atmospheric pressure. Capture the helium in an evacuated cylinder to minimize the chance of radioactive effluents, and to provide a sample for testing. The overpressure system can then be repaired, reassembled, leak tested, and repressurized. A failure of the overpressure system for a period of 30 days has been evaluated as an off normal event. This should provide sufficient time to perform any repairs and testing. A temporary blind flange may be installed on the overpressure port during the repair. If the alarm is not false, and there is no leak in the overpressure system, there may be a leak at the lid seal or the
twG>-p0r,.t-- sea-1-s-.-Reyl-a-eement.-ef-E-hese- '.sea-ls-wi-11-requ+/-r*,,..____________
returning the cask to a decontamination building, the spent fuel pool area, or equivalent. After transfer, remove the weather cover, neutron shield, and the vent port. Vent the cavity to atmospheric pressure via the quick-connect coupling in the vent port. Capture a portion of the vented gas in a sample cylinder for analysis and vent the remainder to a gaseous radwaste system. Remove the drain port cover. Inspect the sealing surfaces and replace the seals and if necessary the covers. Repressurize the cask, assemble the port 8.4-1 Rev. 0 1/00
covers and leak test as in the normal sequence of loading operations {Table 8.1-1, step C-6 onward). If after these steps, the cask still does not meet the leak tightness criterion, the lid gasket may be replaced. Proceed as for cask unloading, section 8.2, up* to the point of removing the lid. After the lid is removed, inspect the sealing surfaces, replace the seal, and reassemble the cask; proceeding in the* normal sequence of loading operations (Table a.1-1, step B-4 onward) . ' 8.4-2 Rev. o 1/00
B.S Preparatjon of the Cask *. The operations required for preparing the cask for transfer are provided in Table 8.1-1, Section C and D. The following procedural steps shall be verified before moving the cask to the storage pad:
- a) The lid and penetration covers have been installed and torqued to their specified values.
b) The cask has been vacuum dried and successfully dryness tested. per Section 8.1.3. c) The cask has been leak tested to ensure that the total leakage rate of both inner and outer seals is less than l x 10*5 std-cm3 /sec (l.O x 10~ 5 mbar-1/sec). d) The cask cavity has been backfilled to approximately 2.2 atm abs (17. 5 psig) with helium .. The overpressure system has been backfilled to achieve an equilibrium pressure of about 5.5 atm abs (66.2 psig) with helium. {Note: The overpressure system may be installed at the storage site.) e) The cask outside surfaces have been decontaminated. The surface contamination levels have been measured and do not exceed 20 dpm/100 cm2 (alpha) or 1000 dpm/1oocm2 {beta + gamma) . f) The surface dose rates have been measured and do not exceed the technical specification limits provided in.Chapter 12. 8.5-1 Rev. o 1/00
8.6 :References
- 1. ANSI Nl4. 6, "American National Standard for Radioactive Materials Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More, 11 New York, 1986.
- 2. ANSI Nl4.S, Final Draft, 11 Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment of Radioactive Materials," 1997.
- 3. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission "Control of Heavy Loads at Power Plants", NUREG-0612, July, 1980.
8.6-1 Rev. O 1/00
..-.....-_::o;.-......._.
; ~
TABLE 8.1-1 SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS A- Receiving
- 1. Unload empty cask and seals at plant site.
- 2. . Inspect for shipping damage. Check for shipment
**completeness and cleanliness. Also verify that records for cask are complete and accurate.
- 3. Remove protective cover, overpressure system and top neutron shield.
- 4. Remove neutron shield pressure relief valve and install plug in neutron shield vent hole.
- s. Remove lid bolts and licL
- 6. Install lid alignment pins.
- 7. Steps 8 through 12 may be performed in any order.
- a. Replace lid seal. Inspect the lid sealing surface. Check for defects in the seal contact areas that may prevent a proper seal. (This step may be performed at any time prior to installing lid on loaded cask) .
- 9. Replace seals in vent, drain and overpressure port covers.
Inspect the sealing surfaces. Check for defects in the seal contact areas that may prevent a proper seal. (This step may be performed at any time prior to installing covers on the loaded cask.) _______ 10. __ Visually__ ins_pe.c_t_~the-1.i.d__ bol.ts __ and--bolt:--ho-l.e--t-hreads-toQ------- - - ensure they do not have any laps, seams, cracks or damaged threads.
- 11. yerify installation of a threaded plug in the vent hole of the neutron shield.
- 12. To minimize contaminants introduced into the spent fuel pool, rinse the interior and exterior of the cask with water if necessary ..
- 13. Move cask to cask loading pool area.
Rev. O 1/00
B Cask Loadjng Pool Note: When the cask is full of water and loaded with fuel, pressure can build up within the cask due to the generation of steam. To prevent this, the cask should be vented at all times.
- 1. Lower cask into cask loading pool, filling the interior with borated water or pool water meeting the Technical Specification requirement for minimum boron content. The exterior of the cask and the lift beam may be rinsed with clean water immediately prior to submersion in order to .
facilitate decontamination.
- 2. Load preselected spent fuel.assemblies into the basket compartments. Procedures shall be developed to ensure that the fuel loaded into the* cask meets the fuel specifications.
- 3. Verify identity of the fuel assemblies loaded into the cask.
- 4. At least one lid penetration must be completely open (both cover and quick disconnect fitting removed) prior to installation of the lid. Lower lid and place on cask body flange over the alignment pins.
- 5. Lift cask so that the top of the cask is above the water surface and install six or more of the lid bolts hand tight.
Note: Throughout this procedure, all bolt threads are to be coated with Nuclear Grade Neolube or equival~nt.
- 6. Using the drain port in the lid, pump water from the cask.
This may be done either before or after lifting the cask out ~~~--~~~o_f_the pool. While lifting the cask out of the pool, the caslt may oe rinsed w:ttri-cie-an-borated-water--t-o-f--ae-ilitat.=--------- decontamination.
- 7. Disconnect drain line.
B.
- Move cask to the decontamination area.
Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 8.1-1 (continued) SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS C Decontamination Area
- Note: The maximum potential for worker exposure occurs during decontamination and for operations near the lid from the time that the water in the cask is pumped out until the time the neutron shield is in place, steps Cl through C7. Exposure can be minimized by use of temporary shielding (lead "bean bags",
plastic neutron shielding), by measures to facilitate decontamination, and by minimizing time and maximizing distance.
- 1. Decontaminate cask until acceptable surface levels are obtained.
- 2. Install remaining lid bolts and torque lid bolts to the value specified on Drawing 1049-70-1. This should be accomplished in multiple passes in accordance with an appropriate torquing pattern. Perform a final pass to ensure proper torque; this may be in a circular pattern.
- 3. Remove plug from neutron shield vent and reinstall pressure relief valve. *
- 4. Connect the Vacuum Drying System (VDS) to the vent port and establish a vacuum to evaporate residual cavity water.
Limit the rate of evacuation or provide a heat* source such as heat tape on the evacuation line as*necessary to prevent blockage of the line by ice.
- s. Evacuate cavity to remove remaining moisture and verify dryness in accordance with Section 8.1.3.
*~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~
- 6. Backfill cask with helium and pressurize to 2230 mbar absolute C+/- 100 mbar) .
- 7. Connect the evacuation line of a helium mass spectrometer system to the overpressure port, and helium leak test all lid and port cover seals. The acceptable total cask seal -
leakage (both inner and outer seals and the overpressure system) is 1 x io-s std-cm3 /sec (1. O x io-s mbar-1/sec) . The leak test shall be performed in accordance with ANSI N14. 5 <2 >
- For ports containing quick disconnects, purge the cavity below the cover with helium at a minimum flow rate of 80 cubic feet per hour for at least 20 seconds. Install the port ~over. (A partial pressure of at least 50% helium will Rev. O 1/00
be obtained under the cover.) The vent and drain covers should be torqued to the values specified on drawing 1049-70-l prior to leak testing. 7A. If cask does not pass the leak test, determine source of leak. If the leak is in a vent or drain cover, remove the cover and replace the seals. Also examine the sealing surf ace for any obvious indication of scratches or defects. Repeat leak test. 7B. If the cask still does not pass leak test, evaluate test method or return cask to pool and replace seals.
- 8. Install top neutron shield.
Note: Installation of the overpressure system and protective cover could be done at a different location if restricted overhead clearances require transfer without these components in place. A temporary blind flange and metal seal will be installed on the overpressure port prior to transferring the cas~ without the overpressure system in place. Temporary weather protection will be provided as necessary.
- 9. Install overpressure system.
- 10. Helium leak test the.overpressure system. The leak rate of the overpressure system must be combined with the inner and outer seal leak rates and not exceed 1 x 10-s std-cm3 /sec (1. O x10* 5 mbar-1/sec) . If the acceptance criterion is not met, locate the overpressure system leak, correct it, and re-test.
Rev. 0 1/00
TABLE 8.1-1 (continued) SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS
- 11. Pressurize the overpressure system with helium to a pressure
.of about s.s atm abs (66.2 psig).
- 12. Install the protective cover.
Note: steps 13 and 14 may be done at the storage pad.
- 13. Install pressure transducer tubing on exterior of cask, and helium leak test to point of the valve at the protective cover. The total overpressure system leak rate combined with the inner and outer seal leak rates must be 1 x 10-5 std-cm3 /sec* (1.0 xio-s mbar-1/sec) or less. If the .acceptance criterion is not met, locate the overpressure system leak, correct it, and re-test.
- 14. Backfill the external tubing with helium to a pressure of about 5.5 atm abs (66.2 psig), and open the valve at the protective cover.
- 15. Verify that surface dose rates and surface contamination levels are within the limits set by the Technical Specifications.
- 16. Load cask on transporter.
- 17. Move cask to Storage Area.
D. Storage Area ~1~---Lower cask- aown onEO-scorag*e-pad-+/-n-se-lected-1-oca-Eion-.-The,-------- casks should be positioned at least 16 feet apart between centerlines.
- 2. Disconnect cask transporter.
- 3. Connect over pressure system to monitoring panel.
- 4. Perform a Channel Operation Test (COT) to verify proer function of pressure switch/transducer, as described in Section 8.3 Rev. o 1/00
TABLE 8.2-1* SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS - UNLOADING A. Storage Area
- 1. Disconnect over pressure system from monitoring panel.
- 2. Position cask transporter over cask.
- 3. Engage lifting arms and lift cask to designated lift height.
- 4. Move cask to spent fuel pool building.
B. I.oadj ng Area
- 1. Lower cask, disconnect cask transporter and remove transporter from loading*area.
- 2. Lift cask to decontamination area using lift beam and crane.
- 3. Remove neutron shield pressure relief valve and install plug in neutron shield vent hole.
- 4. Depressurize overpressure tank using the diaphragm valve, disconnect tubing at protective cover.
- 5. Remove protective cover.
- 6. Remove overpressure tank, overpressure port flange and top neutron shield.
- 7. Remove vent cover.
- 8. Collect a cavity gas sample through the vent port quick
~~~~-=d=i~connect coupling_*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
- 9. Analyze the gas sample for radioactive material and add necessary precautions based on cavity gas sample results.
Note: If degraded fuel is suspected, additional measures, appropriate for the specific conditions, are to be planned, reviewed and approved by the designated approval authority, and implemented to minimize exposures to workers and radiological releases to the environment. These additional measures may include provision of filters, respiratory protection and other methods to control releases and exposures .ALARA. Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 8.2-1 SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS - UNLOADING (Continued)
- 10. Vent cavity gas through the vent port quick connect fitting until atmospheric.pressure is reaqhed. Venting to a gaseous radwaste system is recommended.
- 11. Remove vent port quick disconnect fitting and install the vent port adapter, which may be a flanged adapter or a inch male pipe thread. Remove the drain port cover. If it was installed during storage, the drain port quick*
disconnect fitting and nipple may also be removed. Install the drain port adapter to the drain port. The drain port adapter may be a fitting which mates to the drain port quick disconnect, or a 1 inch male pipe thread. Note: The quick disconnect fittings and the pipe threads at the vent and drain ports are different sizes, and are not interchangeable. .'
- 12. Loosen lid bolts and remove all but 6 approximately equally spaced lid bolts.
- 13. Attach cask to crane using lift beam. Attach lid lifting equipment.
- 14. Attach water supply line to drain port adapter, and the vent line to the vent port adapter. (See Figure 8.2-1)
- 15. Ensure appropriate measures are in place to ensure proper handling of steam. Both fill and drain lines should be designed for steam at 100 psig minimum to prevent steam burns and radiation exposures due to line failure.
- 16. Lower cask into spent fuel pool/cask pit. The cask may be rinsed with clean water immediately prior to submersion to facilitate decontamination.
C Cask I.pading Pool Note:In PWR spent fuel pools, significant amounts of loose fuel crud are unlikely. Evaluations should be made to determine if precautions are necessary to ensure that this particulate does not become airborne or become a radiation concern due to material floating on the surface of the water. Precautions may include enhanced filtering of the pool water during loading and unloading operations, increased ventilation and monitoring airborne contamination during all spent fuel pool activities.
- Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 8.2-1 SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS - UNLOADING (Continued}
- 1. Begin pumping borated water or pool water meeting the
- T.echnical Specification requirement for minimum boron content into the cask through the drain port at a rate of l gpm while continuously monitoring exit pressure (See setup shown in Figure 8.2-1). Continue pumping at a rate of l. gpm for at least 45 minutes. By this time, the water level in the cask will have reached the active fuel length.
- 2. The flow rate can then be gradually increased while monitoring the pressure .at ~he outlet. If th~ pressure gage reading exceeds 70 psig, close the inlet valve until the pressure falls below 50 psig. Reflooding can then be resumed.
- 3. After verifying that a steady stream of water is coming from the vent line.by checking .for bubbles or carefully lifting the hose out of the water, take a sample for chemistry analysis.
- 4. When the-cask is full of water, remove the hose from the drain port and the hose and vent port adapter from the vent port. Remove the remaining six lid bolts.
- 5. Lower the cask and place it on the bottom of the pool/pit.
The lift beam may be rinsed with clean water immediately prior *to submersion to facilitate decontamination.
- 6. Raise the lift beam from the cask removing the cask lid.
- 7. Unload spent fuel assemblies in accordance with site procedures .
Rev. 0 1/00
- FIGURE 8:2-1
- TY.PICAL *SET-UP *FOR* Fll:LING GAS!{ WITH WATER*
GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM * * [OPTIONAL) t PRESSURE GAGE 0-200 PSIG. DRAIN LINE WATER I
. OUT 'f l;
REV *. _o 1/00
*- CHA~TER 9 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 9.l Acceptance Crjterja 9.1.1 Vim1aJ Inspection Visual inspections are performed at the Fabricator 1 s facility to ensure that the casks conform to the drawings and specifications. The visual inspection includes verifying that all specified coatings are applied and the cask is clean and free of defects.
Upon arrival at the loading facility, the casks are again inspected to e~sure that the casks have not been damaged during shipment. Visual inspections which indicate conditions which are not in conformance with the drawings and specifications will be repaired or evaluated for the effect of the condition oµ the safety function of the components in accordance with 10CFR72.48 by the user. 9 .1 . 2 Stp1ctin:a J The* structural analyses *performed on the cask are presented in Chapter 3. To ensure that the cask can perform its design function, all structural materials are chemically and physically* tested to ensure that the required properties are met. All welding is performed using qualified processes and qualified personnel according to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code< 11
- Base materials and welds are examined in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements. NDE requirements for welds are specified on the drawings provided in
. .Chapter 1. Weld-related NDE is performed in accordance with
--- ------- wr.i-tten-and __a:gp_];"oved procedures. NDE personnel are qualified in accordance with sNir=--tc~1~< 2 >. - - --*------------
------- -- --- ---~--
The confinement welds are designed, fabricated, tested and in~pected in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Subsection NB. Exceptions to the Code taken regarding the containment vessel are described in Chapter 7. Noncontainment welds are inspected to the NDE acceptance criteria of ASME B&PV Code Subsection NF. In addition the following supplementary weld inspections will be performed on the welds of the gamma shield shell to bottom shield and the lid to shield lid:
- 9.1-1 Rev. O l/00
- PT or MT at weld preparation surfaces (base metal)
- PT or MT at root pass
- PT or MT for each 0.38 inches of weld
- PT or MT at final surface Basket welding procedures are qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. The fusion spot welds which attach the stainless steel tubes or adjacent*structural shapes shall be performed using a GTAW fusion welding process based on ANSI/AWS Dl. 3 cs>. The welding process shall produce a nugget of weld metal with a minimum 0.5 in. diameter weld shear area at the interf~ce of the tubes and plug. A 100% visual inspection is performed to verify the normality of the weld zone. Welds located up to 24" from the openings of the basket assemblies and directly visible shall be examined by direct visual inspection. All other fusion plug welds shall be examined by a remote visual inspection using mirrors and auxiliary lighting. This inspection will verify the location, configuration and uniformity of*the welds. In addition, a mechanical test of one test coupon from each welding machine is used to verify proper machine settings and operation prior to the start of each working shift. The acceptance criteria is failure of the base metal prior to failure of the weld area and a visual verification of a ~ inch diameter fused weld. zone.
In addition, a bubble leak test is performed at 3 psig or greater on the resin enclosure. The purpose of this test is to identify any potential leak passages in the enclosure welds. For the standard TN-32 and TN-32A, a load test of 1.5 times the des'ign lift load is ap~lied to the top trunnions ih accordance with ANSI N14.6 31 for a period of ten minutes to ________ensure that the trunnion,~cg.n_p_e..:i::.f.orm__ s:atisfactorily_. _.Ear-the-TN.,,, _____ ------* 32B, the upper trunnions are designed for nonredundant (single failure proof) lifting, and a load test of 3 times the design lift load is applied. The load is maintained for a period of ten minutes. After the load test, the trunnion welds and the bearing surfaces are examined by liquid penetrant or magnetic particle examination. Acceptance standards are in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Articles NF-5340 and NF-5350. 9.1.3 Leak Tests Leakage tests are performed on the confinement system and overpressure system at the Fabricator's facility. These tests are usually performed using the helium mass spectrometer method. Alternative methods are acceptable, provided that the required sensitivity is achieved. The leakage tests are performed in 9 .1-2 . Rev. o 1/00
-- accordance with ANSI Nl4. s t 4 >. Personnel performing the leakage tests are qualified in accordanoe with SNT-TC-1A 12>.
The confinement boundary permissible leakage rate is less than or equal to l x 10*5 std cm3 /sec. In order to assure the leakage rate of the confinement boundary is less than lx io-s std cm3/sec the total leak.rate (of the inner seals and the outer* seals) at standard conditions is less than lxlo-s std cm3 /sec.* The sensitivity of the leakage test procedure is at least 5 x 10*' std cm11I sec . Although the overpressure system is not important to* safety, it is also leak tested in accordance with ANSI Nl4.5. The permissible leakage rate for the overpressure system shall be* less than l x 10-5 std cm3 /sec. The sensitivity of the leakage test procedure. shall be no less than 5 x io*' std cm3 /sec. 9.1.4 Components 9.l.4.1 Yalyes There are no valves performing a function important to safety. The TN-32 design incorporates quick-connect couplings for ease of draining and venting. However, these couplings do not form part of the confinement boundary. They are covered by bolted closures with metallic o-ring seals. 9.l.4.2 Gaskets The lid and all confinement penetrations are sealed using double metallic o-ring seals. The inside o-ring forms part of the confinement boundary. Metallic o-rings are not temperature sensitive, and are theref9re tested at room temperature. Metallic a-rings of the same type as those to be used for storage
- -~~are installed for the fabrication leakage test described in Section 9--:-1-:-3-.--The-t-ested--0~ring.sJre replaced before loading the cask. Upon completion of cask loading~Enesea--i-s-are---test-ed.------
as described in Section 12 .1. 2. 5.
- 9.1~5 Shielding Integrity The analyses performed to ensure shielding integrity are presented in Chapter s.
. The radial neutron. shield is protected from damage or loss*
by the aluminum and steel enclosure. The material is a proprietary borated reinforced polymer. Additional information or the resin is provided in Appendix 9A. The resin's primary function is neutron shielding, which is 9.1-3 Rev. o 1/00
...:::::;::_7-*-
~
~rovided primarily by its hydrogen content.* The resin includes boron to reduce secondary gamma radiation which occurs when neutrons are captured by hydrogen. Variation in the boron content is not significant because the capture gammas are a small component of the external dose rate. The resin also pr9vides some gamma shielding; which.is a function of the overall resin density; but is not sensitive to composition. ,*, .
The shielding performance of the material can be adequately verified by chemical analysis and verification of density. Uniformity is assured by installation process control. The following are acceptance values for density and chemical composition for the resin. The nominal values .are those used in the shielding calculations of Chapter s, except that oxygen is 41.73% and zinc is not included in Chapter 5. Element nominal wt % acceptance range (wt %) H 5.05 -10 I + 20* B 1.05 + 20 c 35.13 of- 20 Al 14.93 + 20 O+Zn (balance) 43.84 + 20 The nominal resin density used in Chapter 5 calculations is 1.58 g/cm3
- However, because zinc is not included, the-sum of the individual elements is only 97.89% Therefore, the minimum resin density in acceptance testing is l.58*0.9789 = 1.547 g/cm3
- Density testing will be performed on every mixed batch of resin. Chemical analysis will be made on the first batch mixed with a given set of components, and thereafter whenever a new lot of one of the major components is introduced. Major components are aluminum oxide, zinc borate and the polyester resin, which
~~~~-c=o=ftlb="=~i=n~e""":>ldmalte up 92% or-tlie resin by weight. 9.1-4 Rev. O 1/00
Qualification tests of the personnel and procedure* used for mixing and pouring the polyester resin used for neutron shielding
- are performed. Qualification testing includes verification that *.
the chemical composition and density is achieved, and the process is performed in such a manner as to prevent large voids which would affect the shielding ~apabil~ty of the resin. External dose rate surveys are performed at loading to* ensure that the Technical Specification's radiation*dose limits are not.exceeded for each cask. 9.1.6 Thermal Acceptance To test the method of manufacture for .the radial thermal performance through the cask body, a thermal test is performed on* one cask (without basket). Testing is performed to verify the radial heat transfer from the cask cavi~y to the ambient through the cask consisting.of the inner shell, gamma shield shell, aluminum resin boxes, radial neutron shielding,* and outer shell. A heat source placed witnin the cask cavity distributes the heat load evenly over the corresponding inner surface of the cask body. Temperature readings are taken on the inner surface of the cask and in the ambient. The appropriate cask surfaces will be insulated to minimize axial heat losses. The calculated thermal conductance is then compared to an analytically determined result. If the method of manufacture is modified for future casks, the impact of the change will be evaluated. Similar testing of a subsequent cask will be performed if the change is deemed thermally significant. 9.l.-5 Rev. O 1/00
Neutron Absorber Tests Material Description The neutron absorber consists of borated aluminum containing*. 4.5 wt% boron which is isot9pically enriched to 95 wt% BlO. Because of the negligibly low solubility of boron in solid aluminum, the boron appears entirely as discrete second phase particles of AlB2 in the aluminum matrix. The matrix is limited to any 1000 serie_s aluminum, aluminum alloy 6063, or aluminum alloy 6351 so that no boron-containing phases other than AlB2 are formed. Titanium may also be added to form TiB2 particles,.which are finer. The 4.5 wt % converts to a nominal areal density of boron 10
- as follows: (2.69 g BA1/cm3 ) (4.5 wt% B) {95 wt%Bl0) (0.040.
- inch) (2.54 cm/inch) = 0.012 g Bl0/cm2 , which is intentionally slightly above the design minimum.of O.GlO.
The boron-containing phase is introduced into the system during the reaction of a proprietary boron-containing salt with molten aluminum. The individual AlB2 particles range in size from 5 to 10 microns. If titanium* salt is added as well, the *
- resulting TiB2 particles range in size from 1 to 5 microns. Both AlB2 and TiB2 are thermally stable at all temperatures below the melting point of the aluminum matrix. As such, the effect on the properties of the matrix aluminum alloy.are those typically associated with a uniform fine dispersion of *an inert equiaxed second phase.
Flmcti opaJ Reqi1i rements The neutron absorber sheets serve no other function than neutron absorption; the cask safety analysis does not rely upon .their thermal conductivity or mechanical strength. The basket structural components surrouriff-tlie slieets on~ail-siaes .-* -The radiation and tempera.ture environment in the cask is not sufficiently severe to damage the aluminum matrix that retains the boron-containing particles. To assure performance of the sheets' safety-related function, the only critical variable that needs to be verified is the boron 10 areal density. Because the criticality analysis takes 90% credit for the boron content, the test method used evaluates both the boron content and its uniformity. Each neutron absorber sheet. location in the basket is 8.25 inches wide by 144 inches long. ~h~ 144 inch length may be made up of more than one piece. For example, two pieces 8.25 x 72 inches may be used. Coupons the full width of the sheet (a.2s* inches) will be removed between each finished sheet and at the 9.1-6 Rev. O 1/00
-- e"'nds of the "stock sheet" as shown in Figure 9.l-1. The second dimension of the coupon shall be as required for neutron transmission measurements; l to 2 inches is adequate for the typical 1 cm diameter neutron beam.
Acceptance Testjn~, Neptronic Effective boron 10 content is verified by neutron transmission testing of these coupons. The transmissipn through the coupons is compared with transmission through calibrated standards composed of a homogeneous boron compound without other significant neutron absorbers, for example zirconium diboride or titanium diboride. These standards are paired with aluminum shims sized to match the scattering by aluminum in the neutron absorber sheets. The transmission measurement shall be made about 1/4 to 1/3 of the distance from the end of the coupon. Thus, the random placement of the coupons in the test fixture results in testing at two locations across the sheet width as shown in Figure 9.1-1. The effective boron 10 content of each coupon, minus 3a based on the ne~tron counting statistics for that coupon, must be~ 10 mg Bl0/crn2
- In the event that a coupon fails the single neutron transmission measurement, four additional measurements may be made on the coupon, and th~_average of the 5 measurements, less 30 base~ on the count_ing statistics, must pe ~ 10 mg Bl_O/cm2 *
- Macroscopic uniformity of boron-10 distribution is verified by neutron radioscopy or radiography of the coupons. The acceptance criterion is that there be uniform luminance a~ross the coupon. This inspection shall cover the entire coupon.
Normal sampling of coupons for neutron transmission measurements and radiography/radioscopy shall be 100%. Rejection ~~~o*f-a-g~-ven-coupon_sha_ll result iri"rej~ction of the contiguous sheet(s). Reduced sampling (50% - every o~ner-couponJ-may-b,__-=-:--~~~~-c--~ introduced based upon acceptance of all coupons in the first 25% of the lot. A rejection during reduced inspection will require a return to 100% inspection of the lot. A lot is defined as all the sheets rolled from a single casting*. Acceptance Testing. Vjsual The finished sheets shall be visually examined to verify that they are free of cracks, porosity, blisters, or foreign inclusions. Removal of such defects, .where possible, is permitted if the removal does not result in a dimensional non-conformance. 9.1-7 Rev. 0 1/00
- .:rust:i f j cat j on for 90!1; BJ 0 Credit According to NUREG/CR-5661 <5 >
"Limiting added neutron absorber material credit to 75%
without comprehensive tests is based on concerns fQr potential 'streaming' of neutrons due to nonuniformities. It has been shown *that* boron carb_ide granules embedded in aluminum permit channeling of a beam of neutrons between the grains and reduce the effect~veness for neutron absorption." Furthermore
*"A percentage of neutron absorber material greater than 75~
may be considered in the analysis only if comprehensive tests, capable of verifying the presence and uniformity*of the neutron absorber, are implemented." [emphasis added] The calculations in Chapter 6 take credit for 90% of the boron 10 in the borated alum~num. This is justified by the following considerations.
- a) The coupons for neutronic inspection are removed between each finished sheet, and are the full width of the sheet. As such, they are taken from locations that are truly representative of the finished product. Coupons are also removed at the ends of the "stock sheet", where underthickness of the sheets or defects propagated from the pre-roll ingot would be most likely. The use of representative coupons for inspection is
*analogous to the removal of specimens.from structural materials for mechanical testing.
b) Neutron radiography/radioscopy of coupons across the full
*width of the sheet will detect macroscopic non-uniformities iri the boron 10 distribution such as could be introduced by the fabrication process. .Such defects usually originate from the pre-roll ingot and propagate in the direction of rolling. For exampl-e-,---an--i-ng-ot.--wi-th---a-sk-i-n-hi-gh in bororr-and--a-cent*er---------
depleted in boron will exhibit alternating bands of high and low boron concentration, which can be detected with radiography or radioscopy, parallel to the rolling .direction. c) Neutron transmission measures effective boron 10 content directly. The term "effective" is used here because if there - are any of the effects noted in NUREG/CR-5661, the neutron transmission technique will measure not the physical boron 10 areal density, but a lower value. Thus, this technique by its nature screens out the microscopic non-uniformities which have been the source of the recommended 75% credit for boron 10 in criticality evaluations. 9 .1-8 . Rev. o 1/00
d) The use of neutron transmission and radiography/radioscopy satisfies the "and uniformity requirement emphasized in NUREG/CR-5661 on both the microscopic and macroscopic scales. e) Th~ normal inspection for neutronic tests is 100%. The prQvisions for transition to reduced in~pection and for return to noriµal *inspection require t.hat e~ch new. lot begin *\ilith normal inspection. This is more restrictive than the
- guidelines of ANSI/ASQC Zl. 4 <7 >, which allows reduced inspection to continue from lot to lot.
- f) The recommendations of NUREG/CR-5661 are based upon testing of a neutron absorber with boron carbide particles averaging SS microns. The boride particles in the borated aluminum are*
much finer {s-10* microns), and therefore much less subject to the neutron streaming phenomena discussed in the NUREG
- g) Visual inspection of the sheets verifies that there are no gross mechanical defects that could compromise the neutron absorber's ability to remain intact and in position in the basket.
9.1-9 Rev. o 1/00
-:.~~-
9.2 Maintenance Program Because of their passive nature, the storage casks will require little, if any, maintenance over the lifetime of the ISFSI. Typical maintenance tasks would involve verifying t~e pressure switch function and set point, verifying the pressure in the overpressure tank and repainting of some casks with corrosion-inhibiting coatings. No special maintenance tecliniques are necessary. Two identical pressure tranducers/switches are used to assure a functional system through redundancy. The pressure transducers/switches are not replaced unless they are malfunctioning. All the gaskets used for.the confinement boundary are metallic o-rings. They are designed to maintain their sealing capability until the cask is reopened. If a leak is detected by a drop in pressure in the overpressure system, repairs can be
- made by replacing faulty components. For a drop in pressure that is consistent with the maximum allowable leak rate (see Figure 7.1-1), the overpressure system can be re-pressurized at the time of transducer/switch maintenance.
- 9. 2-1
- Rev. O 1/00
- 9. 3 .. References*
l.ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, 1992 Edition. *
- 2.-*SNT-TC-lA,. **.American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Personnel QUalification and Certification in*Nondestructive Testing," 1984. * *
- 3. ANSI Nl4. 6, *.American National St"anda~d for Special Lifting
- Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds or More for Nuclear Materials, a New York, 1986..
- 4.ANSI Nl4.5-1997, *American National Standard for Leakage Tests on Paqkages for Shipment of Radioactive Materials", February 1998
. 5.ANSI/AWS Dl.3 Structural Welding Code - Sheet Steel. 6.NOREG/CR-5661, Recommendations for Preparing the Criticality Safety Eyaluation of Transportation Packages, 1997
- 7. ANSI/ASQC Zl. 4-1993*, Sanmling Procedures and Tabl§ls for Inspection by*Attributes.
REV. o 1/00 9.3-1
'I Figure 9.1-1 * .. * ,.:.
!N-32 .Neutro~ ~bsorber Prate Coupons, Borot_ed'.Afuminum**~
- I * * ' I I ; I ..... I ,*
.' .. **I 1
* *
- r
.* .,*_~,
. I
\*
\~.
. .,. .~' o I I*
. ~
Edge 0.2*- 0.4*w, * -l~termedio.te coupon (note 2) Cev.ery sheef )' I
' '. ~
w* 8.25 .. I ** *, F~n-ish~d sh~e~ .
* :i
." . . :ffi.in.* .~~d~h ~*(r~q~ir~~.' :
" *for o~~epto~~.~*~, te~!*~g
*.: . -*'. . .......*.t~*., I',. I * * ~ ...
I* sheet* * !
** i , ... f I
I
. ! ~*. .~
. : . . ~*: .. :
I
- a * "*". l ** * ;'" .,*
Notes: ! ' ' : : * ** . **. ** .: * .- ...
- J. Neutron. rddiography/ *radiosc*opy of eritir~* ~~up~n:*... ~
* . I , . , * * ** . .
'*~ *, .. . 2. Neut~on trJo~smission m_eo'surem'enfs*. at '_:th.is 1.~~o!io~. '. i. *. :* .
- , h I
token randomly I rrom olterno1.e e.dge,s.. *-:.
. . .. . . . =* . . . .
"*.* .. : . *~*..
* *
- I * . ;..... *** *. -~ .~.. :. .* * ** : ** . * : .* r!j I . .. . *.** ... , .:,;
. . TN-32 SAR*: "REV. 0 1100
- i
.' ** t'
' I
APPENDIX 9A Transnuclear TN-32 Radial Neutron Shield Material The material is an unsaturated polyester crosslinked with styrene, with about 50 weight % mineral and fiberglass reinforcement. The components are polyester resin, styrene monomer, alpha methyl styrene, aluminum oxide, zinc borate, and chopped fiberglass. Thermal Stability Thermal aging tests on a material with the same components in slight*ly different proportions have been perf orrned by Transnucleaire, Paris (TNP). The tests by TNP evaluate weight loss and of fgassing at 125 °C (260 °F) and 155 °C (311 °F),. The maximum normal temperature in the TN-32 radial neutron shield is 280 °F (138 °C) at the beginning of storage per Chapter 4 of the TN-32 SAR. A curve is interpolated at this temperature on the figure. That curve indicates an exponential weight loss that rapidly approaches a maximum value. After 106 hours, the weight loss is about 1.0%, and extrapolation of the results indicates maximum weight *1oss of ~bout 1.3%. This effect diminishes rapidly with decreasing temperature,* as can be seen by comparing the results at 125 and 155 °C in Figure 9A-1. An analysis of the gas released from a sample heated from 25 to 125 °C over one hour shows it to be 99.9% styrene. The results are included in the attached Table 2-2-1. These *results obtained wi-ur-small sa:mp-:r-e-s-c-s-o nun thi-ck-x-5-9------- mm dia) are conservative with respect to the material in a larger enclosed form such as the TN-32 radial neutron shield, where volatile constituents must diffuse through a much greater distance to be released. Radiation Stability The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) has published a compilation of its own testing and of prior published data on the radiation resistance of various materials. Volume Two 1 presents the results of testing, and Volume Three 2 summarizes the results and provides recommendations in Appendices 5. 9 and 6. The.se show that while unfilled polyester has poor radiation resistance, Rev. O 1/00 9A-l
both mineral- and glass-filled polyester, such as used in the TN-32 radial neutron shield, are among the most radiation-resistant of thermosetting resins. Rev. O 1/00 9A-2
References
- 1. Schonbacher, et. al. , CERN 79-08, Compilation of Radiation Damage Test Data, Part II, Thermosetting and thermoplastic resins, 15 Aug 1979
- 2. Beynel, et. al., CERN 82-10, Compilation of Radiation Damage Test Data, Part III, Materials used around high-energy accelerators, 4 Nov 1982 Rev. O l/00 9A-3
Table 9A-1 Quantitative Analysis of Gases Released from Neutron Shield Test Resin Upon Heating from 21 to 125 °C for One Hour Gas Quantity (µg/g of analyzed resin) Styrene 610 02 0.030 N2 0.21 H2 Q.005 co 0.03 C02 0.24 CH4 <0.0005 C2H4 <0.001 C2H6 <0.001 C3H6 <0.003 C3Ha <0.003 iso-C4H10 <0.006 n-C4H10 <0.006 iso-CsH10 <0.02 n-CsH10 <0.02
-~- - ------- ------------ ------
Rev. 0 1/00
Figure 9A-1". . Weight Loss Due to ~-Thermal Aging of* Neutron Shield T.est~.
- Resin 0,(.J _ W "la
*en '*
Perle de masse l 1.5 2,0 50 100
- t en JOUrs d~
CHAPTER 10 RADIATION PROTECTION 10.1 ENSURING THAT OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURES ARE AS LOW AS IS REASONABLY ACHIEVABLE (ALARA) 10.l~l Policy Considerations A radiological protection program will be implemented at th~ ISFSI in accordance with requirements of 10CFR72.126. ISFSI personnel are given training in the proper operation of the cask. This training covers operations, inspections, repair and maintenance of the cask. *Proper training of the operation personnel helps to minimize exposure to radiation such that the total indiv.idual and collective exposure to personnel in all phases of operation and maintenance are kept As Low As Reasonably Achievable.
- 10.l.2 Design Considerations The TN-32 dry storage cask design takes into account*
radiation protection considerations, which ensure that occupational radiation exposures are ALARA. The fuel will be stored dry, inside the sealed, heavily-shielded cask. The most significant radiation protection design consideration provides for heavy shielding to minimize pe_rsonnel exposures.. To avoid personnel exposure, the casks will not be opened nor fuel removed from the casks while at the ISFSI unless the ISFSI is specifically designed and licensed for these purposes. Storage of the fuel in the dry sealed cask eliminates the possibility of leakage of contaminated liquids. The cask is designed to prevent the leakage of any radioactive gases. The exterior of the casks
. will be decontaminated prior to transfer to the ISFSI, thereby
minimizi_ng exposure of personnel to surface contamination. The TN-32 cask-*coffcatns*-no -act-i-v-e-eomp.on.e_ritfL which require periodic maintenance or surveillance. This method of spent--fuei-s-t-o~aq_.e_ _ - - - * - * -
minimizes direct radiation exposures and eliminates the potential for personnel contamination. Regulatory Position 2 of Regulatory Guide 8.8' 1>, is incorporated into the design considerations, as described below: ALARA objective 2a on access control will be met by use of a fence with a locked gate that surrounds the ISFSI and prevents unauthorized access. Regulatory Position 2b on radiation shielding is met by the heavy shielding of the cask which minimizes personnel exposures. Regulatory Position 2c on process instrumentation and* 10.l-l Rev. o 1/00
....... ._. - ........ ~
controls is met by designing the instrumentation for a long service life and locating readouts in a low dose rate location. Regulatory Position 2d on control of airborne contaminants does not apply because no gaseous releases are expected. No significant surface contamination-is expected because the exterior of.the cask will.be decontaminated prior to transfer to the ISFSI. Regulatory Position 2e on crud control is not applicable to the ISFSI because there are no systems at the ISFSI that could transport crud. Regulatory Position 2f on decontamination is met because the exterior of the cask is designed for decontamination. The cask is decontaminated prior to transfer to the ISFS.I. Regulatory Position 2g on radiation monitoring does not apply because the casks are sealed. There is no need for airborne radioactivity monitoring since no airborne radioactivity is anticipated. Area radiation monitors are not required because the ISFSI will not normally be occupied. Regulatory Position 2h on resin treatment systems is not applicable to the ISFSI because there will be no radioactive systems containing resins. Regulatory Position 2i concerning other miscellaneous ALARA items is not applicable because these items refer to radioactive systems not present at _the ISFSI. ---1-0-.--1--.-3-0perati-onar-Con-si-c:te-rations Operational requirements for surveillance are incorporated into the design considerations in Section 10.1.2 in that the casks are stored with adequate spacing to allow ease of on site surveillance. In addition, remote annunciation is available outside the ISFSI protected area to minimize surveillance time. The operational requirements are incorporated into the radiation protection design features described in Section 10.2 since the casks are heavily shielded to minimize occupational exposure. The TN-32 cask is designed to be essentially maintenance free. It is a passive system without any moving parts. The double metallic.O-ring design with continuous surveillance of the over pressure system guarantees that in the unlikely event of a 10.1-2 Rev. 0 1/00
.***** failure of one of the seals, adequate time is available to restore the cask leak tightness. The only cask repair procedure that could be envisioned is replacement of a confinement seal. For this, the cask would be returned to the spent fuel pool area in order to minimize ra~iation exposure to personnel. The only anticipated maintenance procedures are visual inspection, possible paint touch-up, and pressure transducer/switch maintenance. The TN-32 cask/ISFSI contains no systems that process liquids or gases or contain, collect, store, or transport . radioactive liquids or solids other than the stored spent fuel. Therefore, the ISFSI meets ALARA requirements since there are no such systems to be maintained, be repaired, or be a source of leaks. *
. 10 .1-3 Rev. o 1/00
-* 7.-:.:.:..-:--. :- =-
10.2 Radiation Protection Design Features 10.2.1 Cask Design Features The TN-32 dry storage cask has a number of design features which ensure a high degree. of integrity for the confinement of radioactive materials and reduction of direct radiation *exposures
.to levels that are as low as practical: .*: . *
- The casks are loaded, sealed, and decontaminated prior to transfer to the ISFSI.
The fuel will not be unloaded nor will the casks be opened at the ISFSI unless the ISFSI is specifically designed and
- licensed for these purposes.
The fuel will be stored dry inside the casks, so that no radioactive liquid is ava.~lable for leakage. The casks will be sealed airtight with a helium atmosphere to preclude oxidation of the fuel. The seals are double metallic 0-rings to assure leak-tightness. The casks will be heavily shielded to reduce external dose rates. The shielding design features are discussed below. No radioactive material will be discharged during storage. \ Shielding tor the TN-32 cask is provided mainly by the thick-walled cask body. For neutron shielding, a borated polyester resin compound surrounds the cask body and a polypropylene disk covers the lid for storage. Additional shielding is provided by the steel shell surrounding the resin layer and by the stainless steel and aluminum structure of the basket. Details of the cask shielding and radioactive sources are provided in Section 5.2. Geometric attenuation, enhanced by air and ground attenuation, provides additional "shielding" for distant locations at restricted area and site boundaries. However, the contribution of the sky shine dose must be considered for distant locations. The sky shine dose estimation is provided in the following section. 10.2.2 Radiation Dose Rates Calculated dose rates in the ~mmediate vicinity of the TN-32 cask are presented in Table 5.1-2 and Figure 5.4-1 and -2. Comparison of calculated and measured dose rates is presented in Appendix SA. Direct dose rates at longer distances are presented in Table 5.1-3. 10.2-1 Rev. o 1/00 .
The skyshine dose fr~m a single cask containing the design
*oasis fuel source (without2 inserts, defined in Chapter 5) was calculated using the MCNP code. The models for the MCNP .
skyshine analysis were basically the same as those utilized for the dose rates at long distances, described in section 5.3.1.3. For the skyshine analyses, an earthen berm was added to the basic long distance models. The berm was modeled as 4.2 meters high and was located 20 meters from the* cask centerline. As before, three separate models "were utilized, neutron, fuel gamma, and fuel hardware gamma. The tallies and dose conversion factors were the same as previously described. The MCNP calculations were performed on a Pentium PC computer under Windows NT. Skyshine dose rates were estimated from 100 to 500 meters. from a single TN-32 cask (without inserts) . The results of the single cask skyshine analyses are presented in Table 10.2-1. Single cask (without inserts)~ skyshine plus direct The total (direct + skyshine} dose rates for a single cask are shown in Figure 10.2-1. This figure shows that for a single cask containing design basis fuel a minimum distance of approximately 250 meters is necessary to meet the 25 mrem/year limit (10 CFR 72.104). Single cask (without inserts), skyshine only If a berm is placed around the TN-32 cask, essentially reducing the direct dose to insignificant levels, 1 cask containing design basis fuel would need to be placed at an approximate distance of 150 meters from the site boundary to meet the 25 mrem/year limit. ISFSI array, skyshine only ~-:.-~~T~h~e~dose rates from a typical ISFSI are evaluated based on the sky slfine--resurts-f-.t'e>m-a-singl.e cask (without inserts) and assuming the presence of a berm. These resurts sl'row*-*that-a minimum distance of approximately 450 meters is necessary from the* ISFSI to the site boundary to meet the 25 mrern/yr limit. This value is based on the ISFSI layout of Figure 1.4-1 and the assumption that eight casks are placed at the ISFSI in the first year and two casks every year there after. Therefore, an ISFSI of 48 casks would be filled in 21 years. Figure 10.2-2 presents these results. Dose rates at the site boundary will depended on specific ISFSI parameters such as storage array configuration, number of stored casks, characteristics of stored fuel, fuel loading patterns, site geography, etc. Each ISFSI license applicant may calculate the off-site dose rates based on site characteristics
*rather than the .limiting design basis characteristics analyzed above. Berms, walls, or preferential loading of "cooler" fuel in the outer compartments of the cask may be used as necessary to keep the site boundary dose rate within the 25 mrem/year limit.
10.2-2 Rev. O 1/00
;:--~
.. .. ~.
10.3 Estimated Onsite Collective Dose Assessment Cask Loading Operations Table 10.3-1 shows the estimated occupational exposures to ISFSI personnel during the loading, transport, and_ emplacement of* the storage casks (time and manpower may vary depending on individual ISFSI practices). The task "times, number of personnel required and the average distance from the cask are.listed in this table.
- This estimate of operational doses assumes that there is no temporary shielding used. .Lead bean bags and temporary plastic neutron shielding can be used to maintain doses ALARA. Actual.
operations loading TN-32 casks with fuel near 40 GWD/MTO burnup and 7 year cooling has resulted in operational doses less than 15% of the dose calculated in Table 10.3-1. The average distance for a given operation takes into account the fact that the operator may be momentarily in contact with the cask, but this time will be limited. For example, during bolting, the placement of the bolts in the holes will bring the operator in contact with the cask. While torquing the operator will be further away due to the typical length of a torque wrench handle. Similarly, for draining, vacuum drying, and leak testing, the attachment of fittings will take place closer to the cask than the operation of the pump and vacuum drying system. For decontamination, although operators will be close to the cask to take swipes, other parts of the operation will be done by hosing the cask down from further away. For this reason, 0.5 or 1.0 meter is an appropriate average distance for these hands-on operations. The operator's hands may be in a high dose rate location momentarily, for example when connecting couplings or vacuum _____f7 t=-t=i='l'\g_aLthe_por.ts..----'l'.hi.s-d.oes-net-t-r-a-ns-iate into a wh-oi-e-=ooay 1""-* dose, and therefore, these localized streaming effects are not considered here. *
.. For the operations near the lid, typically most of the operation will take place a-round the perimeter (corner) and a smaller portion will take place directly over the lid. A 33/67 weighted_ average of axial centerline and above neutron shield radial dose rates is used for these operations as described below.
10.3-1 Rev. 0 1/00
Dose rates used for the operations dose estimate Dose rates for the TN~32A are higher than for the TN-32 and TN-32B where indicated due to the 1.12 inch thinner lid; radial dose rates, and dose rates after installation of the top neutron shield are the same as for the TN-32 and TN-32B. All of the following dose rates are in mrem/hr. They include the . contribution from burna~le poison rod .ass_embli.es.
- Water/lid: Dose rates at the cask top while the.cask is still filled with water are low due to the water shielding; they are estimated at TN-32, TN-32B TN-32A 0.5 meter 7v I 3n l7y I 3n 2 meter 2.., I ln 5v I ln After the cask is drained., and before the neutron shield is installed, dose rates at the cask lid centerline are equivalent to the accident '"top dose rates in Table 5 .1-2 and Figure 5. 4-5.
TN-32, TN-32B TN-32A Contact 271v I 230n 817..., I 2Bln 0.5 meter 2llv I l52n 622y I 186n 1.meter 15lv I 74n 427v I 90n 2 meter 87v I 31n 233v I 38n The surface radial dose rate above the neutron shield is calculated in Table 5.1-2. Extrapolation to the points away from the surface is based upon ratios derived from measurements of loaded casks. TN-32, TN-328 TN-32A Contact 279y I 13ln 279v I 131n 0.5 met:er: ---,-5 8y-/-J-4n--- § Sy--/-1.A.n 1 meter 68v I 32n 68v I 32n 2 meter 43v I 20n 43v I 20n Lid/Corner: (prior to placement of top neutron shield) 33% axial dose rates at the cask lid centerline and 67% radial dose rate above the neutron shield: TN-32, TN-328 TN-32A
0.5 meter
179v I lOOn 3llv I llln 1 meter 95y I 46n 186v I Sln 2 meter 58v I 24n 106., I 26n 10.3-2 Rev. o 1/00
-............ ~. :.*. *.... . __
***~~=-
-* Top/Corner (after installation of top neutron shield) : use the radial dose rate above the neutron shield (table above)
- TN-32, TN-32B TN-32A
0.5 meter
15Bv /.74n 158v I 74n 1 meter 68v I* 32n 68.., I 32n 2 meter 43y I 20n 43..,* I 20n Radial (midplane dose rates from Figure 5.4-1) TN-32, TN-32B TN-32A 0.5 meter 117v I 12n 117v I 12ri 1 meter: 67v I Sn 67v I Sn 2 meter 40v I 5n 40v I Sn 3 meter 27v I 3n 27v I 3n Maintenance Operations Table i0.3-2 shows the estimated design basis annual person-rem for surveillance and maintenance activities. These estimates take no credit for reduced does rates due to decay time at the ISFSI. The background dose rate at the ISFSI is estimated at 15y/2n mrem/hr based on a distance of more than 4 meters from the nearest cask, except as noted. Dose rates are based upon the radial midplane dose rates (including the contribution from BPRAs) calculated in Chapter 5 except where noted. Visual surveillance is based on a walk down among the casks a distance no closer than 2 meters to a single cask; background is based upon a distance of 3 meters from the neighboring cask. For operability tests and calibration, and for unanticipated instrument repair, the worker was assumed to be located at the
Pl-umbing--ma-ni-f-e-ld.-loca-ted-on-the-cas-k-exte-rror-aoout 4 feet f-r-om---~----
the ground, an average of 1 meter from the cask.
- Repressurization of the overpressure system may be done at the sam~ time as calibration with little or no additional exposure.
For paint touch up, an average distance is 0.5 meter. For major repairs to the overpressure system that would require removal of the weather protective cover, the 0.5 meter radial dose rate from the area above the radial neutron shield is used (top/corner dose rate). This dose rate is the same for the TN-32, TN-32B and TN-32A. The TN:32A has higher dose rates only after the top neutron shield is removed. 10.3-3 Rev. 0
- 1/00
~ For replacement of port or lid seals, or for fuel unloading, the loading procedure dose estimate may be used for guidance, taking into account any additional decay time. The ISFSI license applicant will evaluate the additional dose to station personnel from ISFSI operations, based on the particular storag~ configuration and sit~ personnel.requirements. 10.3-4 Rev. 0 1/00
-* -~-- .
10.4
- References
- 1. U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ...Regulatory .Guide 8. 8, Information Relevant to Ensuring That Occupational Exposures *.
at Nuclear Power Stations will be As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable, Revision 3, June 1978.
- 2. MCNP4B2, "Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System." *Los Alamos National Laboratory, CCC-660, RSIC.
10.4-1 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 10.2-1 SKY SHINE DOSE RATES AT POSTULATED SITE BOUNDARY FROM ONE CASK Distance from Neutron {mrem/yr} Gamma {mrem/yr} Tota1 1(mrem/yr}
. Source*
lOOmeters 51.9 42.2 94.1 150meters 20.1 19.9 39.9 200meters 9.0 9.8 18.8 300meters 2.1 2.8 4.9 500meters 0.2 0.3 o.s
- Distance from center of cask 1.- without fuel inserts Rev. O 1/00
-*-.-~
TABLE 10.3-1 DESIGN BASIS OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES FOR CASK LOADING, .. TRANSPORT, AND EMPLACEMENT (ONE TIME EXPOSURE) GAMMA TN-32 and 3lB TN-32A Noor Time Avg location Dose rate person-*, Dose rate person- *. Penons (br) Dist mrem/hr rem mremlbr rem (m) A. Cask Receipt 1- Unloading, inspection, NO EXPOSURE OTHER THAN BACKGROUND *. 12 etc. B. Cask Loading Pool 1 Lower cask into cask NO EXPOSURE OTHER THAN BACKGROUND (POOL). loading pool 2 Load NO EXPOSURE OTHER THAN BACKGROUND (POOL) 3 Verify NO EXPOSURE OTHER THAN BACKGROUND (POOL) 4 Lower lid NO EXPOSURE OTHER THAN BACKGROUND (POOL) S Lift cask and install 1o.25 0.5 water/ 7 o. 0018 17 0.0043 some of the lid bolts lid hand tight 1 0.5 2 water/ 2 0.0010 5 o. 0025 lid 6 Drain (pump) water 1 0.5 0.5 water/ 7 0.0035 17 0.0085 lid 1 1 2 water/ 2 o. 0020 5 0.0050 lid 7 Disconnect drain line 1 0.25 0.5 lid/ 179 0.044~ 311 o. 0778 corner -a Move t-o 2 1 -2 radial 40 0.0800 40 0.0800 decontamination area
- c. Decontamination Area 1 Decontaminate 2 1 1 radial 67 0.1340 67 0.1340 1 0.5 l lid/ 95 0.0475 186 0.0930
- corner 2 Install remaining lid 2 1 o.s lid/ 179 0.3580 311 0.6220 bolts and torque corner 3 Remove plug from 1 0.25 0 *. 5 lid/ 179 0.0448 311 0.011*0 neutron shield vent, corner install pressure
- relief valve. )
Rev. O 1/00
- ..
- 4 Connect the Vacuum 10.25 0.5 lid/ 179 0.0448 311 0.0778
- Drying System corner 1 o.s 2 radial 40 0.0200 - 40 0.0200 5 Continue vacuum clrvinQ 1 1 1 radial 67 0.0670 67 0.0670 6 Backfill cask with *1 0.25 0.5 lid/ 179 0. 0448 311 0. ()778 helium and pressurize corner 2 l 2 radial 40 0.0800 40 0.0800 7 Helium leak test all 1 1 o.s lid/ 179 0.1190 311 0.3110 lid and port cover corner seals 2 2 2 radial 40 0.1600 40 0.1600 8 Install top neutron 2 0.25 o.s top/ 158 0.0790 158 0~0790 shield. corner 9 Install overpressure 2 o.s 0.5 top/ 158 0.1580 158 0.1580 system tank
.. corner 10 Leak test OP system 2 0.5 1 top/ 68 0.0680 68 0.0680 corner 11 Pressurize OP system 1 0.5 1 top/ 68 0.0340 68 0.0340 corner
- - 12 Install protective 2 1 o.s top/ 158 0.3160 158 0.3160 cover corner 13 Install exterior l o.s 0.5 top/ 158 0.0790 158 0.0790 tubing, leak test corner 1 l l radial 67 0.0670 67 0.0670 14 Backfill exterior l 0.5 1 radial 67 0.0335 67 0.0335 tubing 15 Check surface dose 2 o.s 1 radial 67 0.0670 67 0.0670 rate ana eontaminat-ie~
levels 16 Load cask on 2 l 2 radial 40 0.0800 40 0.0800 transporter 17 Move cask to storage 2 3 3 radial 27 0.1620 27 0.1620 area Rev. O 1/00
--~-*----
ts. Storaae Area l Lower cask onto 2 0.5 2 radial 40 0.0400 40 0.0400 storaqe pad 2 Disconnect cask 2 o.s 2 radial 40 0.0400 40 0.0400 transporter 3 Connect over pressure 2 1 1 radial 67 0.1340 67 0.1340 system to monitoring Danel 4 Check OP system l o.s 1 radial 67 0.0335 67 0.0335 function. Total 2.70 3.29 Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 10.3-1, Continued DESIGN BASIS OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES NEUTRON & TOTAL NEUTRON + GAMMA TN-32 and 32B TN-32A Noor Time Avg* locatJon Dose rate person- Dose rate penon-I Persons (hrj Dist (m) mrem/br rem m~m/hr re* . A. Cask Receipt l-12 Unloading, NO EXPOSURE OTHER THAN BACKGROUND inspection, etc. B. Cask Loading Pool 1 Lower cask into cask NO EXPOSURE OTHER THAN BACKGROUND (POOL) loadinq pool 2 Load NO EXPOSURE OTHER THAN BACKGROUND (POOL) 3 Verify NO.EXPOSURE OTHER THAN BACKGROUND (POOL) 4 Lower lid NO EXPOSURE OTHER THAN BACKGROUND (POOL) 5 Lift cask and l 0.25 0.5 water/ 3 0.0008 3 0.0008 install some of the lid lid bolts hand tiqht 1 o.s 2 water/ 1 0.0005 l 0.0005 lid 6 Drain (pump) water 1 o.s 0.5 water/ 3 0.0015 3 0.0015 lid 1 l *2 water/ 1 0.0010 l 0.0010 lid 7 Disconnect drain 1 0.25 0.5 lid/ 100 0.0250 111 0.0279 line corner 8 Move to 2 1 2 radial 5 0.0100 5 0.0100 aecont-amination--ar-ea- ~-
- c. Decontamination Area l Decontaminate 2 1 l radial 8 0.0160 8 0.0160 l o.s 1 lid/ 46 0.0230 51 0.0255 corner 2 Install remainin9 2 1 0.5 lid/ 100 0.2000 111 0.2220 lid bolts and toraue corner 3 Remove plug from 10.25 0.5 lid/ 100 0.0250 111 0.0278 neutron shield vent, corner install pressure relief valve.
,- ,- Rev. O 1/00
4 Connect the Vacuum 1 0.25 o.s lid/ 100 0.0250 111 0.0278 - Drying System corner 1 0.5 2 radial 5 o. 0025 5 0.0025 5 Continue vacuum 1 1 1 radial 8 0.0080 8 0.0080 dryinCJ 6 Backfill cask with 1 0.25 *o. 5 lid/ 100 0.0250 lli 0.0278 helium and corner pressurize 2 1 2 radial 5 o. 0100 5 0 .0100 7 Helium leak test all 1 1 0.5 lid/ 100 0.1000 111 Q.1110 lid and port cover corner seals 2 2 2 radial 5 0.0200 5 0.0200 8 Install top neutron 2 0.25 o.s top/ 74 0.0370 74 0.0370 shield. .. corner 9 Install overpressure 2 0.5 0.5 top/ 74 0.0740 74 0.0740 system tank corner 10 Leak test OP system 2 0.5 l top/ 32 0.0320 32 0.0320 corner 11 Pressurize OP system 1 o.s 1 top/ 32 0.0160 32 0.0160 corner 12 Install protective 2 1 0.5 top/ 74 0.1480 74 0.1480 cover corner 13 Install exterior 1 o.s 0.5 top/ 74 0.0370 74 0.0370 corner tubing, leak test 1 1 1 radial 8 0 .0080 8 o. 0080 14 Backfill exterior l o.s l radial 8 0.0040 8 0.0040 tubing 15 Check surface dose 2 0.5 1 radial -- 8 0.0080 e o.ooao
rate and contamination levels t6 Load cask on 2 l 2 radial 5 0. 0100 5 0.0100 transporter 17 Move cask to storage 2 3 3 radial 3 o. 0180 3 0.0180 area D. Storage Area l Lower cask onto 2 0.5 2 radial 5 0.0050 5 o. 0050 storage pad 2 Disconnect cask 2 o.s 2 radial 5 0.0050 5 0.0050 transporter Rev. o 1/00
' ": 3 Connect over pressure 2 1 1 radial 8 0.0160 9 0. 0160 system to monitoring iPanel 4 Check OP system 1 0.5 1 radial 8 0.0040 8 0.0040 function. Total 0.92 0.96 n+cram *3.62 4.25
,. ,; Rev. O 1/00
TABLE 10.3-2
,. DESIGN BASIS ISFSI MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS ANNUAL EXPOSURES GAMMA Task Time No of Dist Dose Rate Backgmd ~ration <;>peration Annual ..
Req'd Person {m) {mremlhr) (mremlhr) Dose(rem) Frequency Dose (hr) {/year) {rem) Visual Surveillance of Casks 0.25 1 2 40 27 0.0167S 12 0.2Ql Instrumentation
- a. Operability & Calibration 2 2 I 67 15 0.328 1 0.328
- b. Unanticipated Repairs 2 2 1 67 IS 0.328 0.25 0.082 Surface Defect Repair 1 2 o.s 117 15 0264 1 0.264 Repair under Protective Cover 8 2 o.s 158 15 2.768 0.05 0.138 NEUTRON AND TOTAL Task Time No of Dist Dose Rate Backgmd Operation Operation Annual Total Req'd Person {m) (mremlhr) (mremlhr) Dose(rem) Frequency( Dose gamma +
(hr) /year) . (rem) n (rem) Visual Surveillance of Casks 0.25 1 2 s 3 0.002 12 0.024 0.225 Instrumentation
- a. Operability & Calibration 2 2 1 8 2 0.04 1 0.040 0.368
- b. Unanticipated Repairs 2 2 1 8 2 0.04 025 0.010 0.092 Surface Defect Repair 1 2 o.s 12 2 0.028 I 0.028 0.292 Repair under Protective Cover 8 2 o.s 74 2 1.216 0.05 0.061 0.199 1.All dose rates assume that the TN-32 cask contains design.
basis fuel. No reduction of dose rate is assumed for decay time.
- 2. Doses are on a per cask basis.
Rev. O 1/00
F~gure 10.2-1 Annual Dose From One Cask . ' 10000 1000 ... 100 ~ :.......-Total E ! 10 : -+-Skyshine E 1 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 Distance (meters) (no. fuel inserts} Rev. O l/00
FIGURE 10.2-2 OFF-SITE SKY SHINE DOSE RATES AT POSTULATED SITE BOUNDARY FROM A TYPICAL ISFSI
~
E 10000
! 1000 -sE 100 ~ 10 G) en 1 0
c 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Distance from ISFSI (meters) (Distance from center of nearest cask) (no fuel inserts) Rev. O l/00
CHAPTER 11 ACCIDENT ANALYSES This Chapter describes the postulated off-normal and accident events that might occur during storage of the TN-32 cask at an ISFSI, the potential causes of these events, their detection and consequences and the corrective course of action to be taken by ISFSI personnel. 11.1 Off-Normal Operatjons
. Off-normal operations are design events of the second type (Design Event II) as defined in ANSI/ANS 57_9. Design Event II conditions consist of that set of events that, although not occurring regularly, can be expected to occur with moderate frequency or on the order of once during a calendar year of ISFSI operation.
Two off-normal conditions have been considered with regard to the TN-32 cask: a loss of electric power or leakage in any one of the seals or the overpressure system. 11.1.l Loss of Electric POwer A total loss of electric power is postulated. The failure could be either an open or a short to ground circuit, or any other mechanism capable of producing an interruption of power. ll.1.1.1 Postulated Cause of the Event A loss of power to the ISFSI may occur as a result of - -naturaLphenom~na,_ s'l!_ch as lightning or extreme wind, or as a result of undefined distur15ances-+/-n-the-nonsaf-et-y-relat ed__P-ortion of the electric power system. If electric power is lost, the following systems would be de~energized and rendered nonfunctional: Area lighting Cask pressure monitoring instrumentation 11.1.1.2 Detectjon of Events A loss of power at the ISFSI site would be detected during periodic surveillance by noting that area lighting is not operational. 11.1.l.3 Analysjs Qf Effects and Consequences This eveot has no safety or radiological consequences 11.1-1 Rev. O l/00
---*-*-**-~ -
because a loss of.power will not affect the integrity of the storage casks, jeopardize the safe storage of the fuel, or result in radiological releases. None of the systems whose failure could be caused by this event are necessary for the accomplishment of the important to safety function of the cask. The lighting syst~m provides no important to safety* function to the cask. lt does however, provide for the visual monitoring for intrusion detection as required by the ISFSI security plan. The instrumentation monitors the long-term performance of the storage casks with respect to the cask seals. None of these parameters are expected to change rapidly and their status is not dependent* upon electric power. A loss of power has no effect on the subcritical condition of the cask, cask confinement or retrievability of the fuel. 11.1.1.4 Correctjye Actions Following a loss of electric power to the ISFSI, facility maintenance personnel will be informed and will isolate the fault and restore service by conventional means. Such an operation is straightforward and routine for maintenance personnel. 11.1.1.5 Radjolo~ical Impact from Off-Normal Operations No radiological impact from off-normal operations is postulated. 11.1 . .2 Cask Seal I.eakage or I.eakage of the Overpressure Monitoring System The storage casks feature redundant seals in conjunction with an extremely rugged body design. Additional barriers to the release of radioactivity are presented by the sintered fuel pellet matrix and the zircaloy cladding which surrounds the*fuel
....pei-l-ets-.-Furt-hermore-,the-interseal-gaps-are--p~essur.i-z-ea--4-n----
excess of the cask cavity. The overpressure monitoring system is designated as not important to safety. Therefore a leak of the ov~rpressure system is the most likely cause of leakage. i1*.1. 2 .1 pastnJ ated Cause of the Event A combined event of failure of one of the seals or the overpressure system pressure boundary in addition to a failure of
.the pressure monitoring alarm system is assessed.
11.1.2.2 Detectjon of Event Detection of a seal leak in addition to the loss of the pressure monitoring system would be by means of periodic calibration or .testing. 11.1-2 Rev. o 1/00
11.1.2.3 Analysjs of Effects and Consequences Leaks could occur in three locations:
- In any of the inner confinement seals (Jjd seal. jnner vent seal or inner drajn seal).
The lid and lid penetration cover* bolts and seals are designed to prevent leakage during all normal,'off-normal and postulated accident events. Therefore this is a very unlikely event. In this case the overpressure system, which has a higher pressure than the cask cavity, would leak helium into the cask cavity. Since the pressure is higher in the overpressure tank, it would prevent leakage of radioactive materials out of the cask cavity until the pressure between the overpressure tank and the cask cavity equalized. This would take several years, depending on the size of the leak. At the test leak rate, the overpressure system pressure would always exceed the cask cavity pressure, as shown in Chapter 7. Therefore no leakage of radioactive material can occur, even if the alarm were to fail. Chapter 7 also demonstrates that even if the inner seal has experienced a latent seal failure there is ample time for identifying the leak through routine surveillances.
- In any of the outer sea]s CJjd, oyex:pressure port coyer, yent cpyer gr drain coyer)
The lid and lid penetration cover bolts and seals are designed to prevent leakage during all normal, off-normal and postulated accident events. Therefore this is a very ~~~~~---u=n=l~ikely event. In this case, leakage out of the interspace to the atmosphere would occur. This would not result in release
*of radioactive material from the cask cavity since the inner seal is intact. Again, as demonstrated.in Chapter 7, a latent seal failure of the outer seals would not result in a release of any radioactive material to the environment .. There is also ample time for identifying the leak through routine surveillances.
- A leak jn the overpressure system This is the most likely cause of a leak, since it is a non safety related component and not designed to withstand accident loadings.
In this case two scenarios could exist: 11.1-3 Rev. O 1/00
- The overpressure system is not functioning and the inner seal is intact. In this case there is no release of radioactive material to the environment; .or The overpressure system is not functioning and the inner seal is leaking at *some rate.
In this latter case, leakage out*of the interspace to the atmosphere and the cask cavity would occur. This would not result in release of radioactive material from the cask cavity until the pressure fell to the cask cavity pressure. At the test leak rate of 1 x io-s std cc/sec, this would not occur during the 20 year storage period.. However, a leak of this magnitude in combination with a loss of the over pressure system has been evaluated as both an off-normal and accident condition in Section 7.3. The results of these calculations assuming off-normal conditions indicate that an individual located at the site boundary (100 m from the cask) for an entire year would receive an effective dose equivalent of 1.92 mrem, a thyroid dose of 0.262 mrem, and a bone surface dose of 19.1 mrem. These doses are below the regulatory limits of 10 CFR 72 .104 (a) of 2. s x io* 1 msv (25 mrem) to the whole body, 7. s x io- 1 msv (75 mrem) to the thyroid and 2. 5 x io-1 msv (25 mrem) to any other critical organ. The results of these calculations assuming accident conditions indicated that at the site boundary (lOOm from the cask), for a 30 day release, the total effective dose equivalent is 58.9 mrem. The sum of the deep dose equivalent and the committed dose equivalent to any individual organ (the critical organ in this case is the bone surface) is 664 rnrern for a 30 day release. These
v-a-'lues are we11-~l-mvthe-l-irnit-ing-of-f-s-i~e--Ooses-def.ined._______
in 10 CFR 72.106(b}. Another accident condition under consideration is that the overpressure system is not functioning and the inner seal has experienced a latent seal failure. This analysis is presented in 7.3.3.- This accident analysis demonstrates that a latent failu~e up to 100 times greater that the test value could occur and there is ample time for recovery before the limiting off site doses in 10 CFR 72.106(b) are met. The probability that a gross leak of an inner seal in combination with a gross leak in the outer seal is.not considered a credible event. 11.1.2.4 Correctjye Actions The overpressure system leak would be repaired at the ISFSI 11.1-4 Rev. O 1/00
depending on the complexity of the repair, or the cask would be returned to the spent fuel pool for seal replacement. Repairs which could be performed at the ISFSI are tightening of fittings, replacement of valves or switches, localized weld repairs or replacement of *components. 11.1.2.s Radiologjcal Impact For the worst case, which includes loss of alarm, complete loss of the pressure differential between the cask and the overpressure system, and complete loss of the overpressure system pressure boundary, the dose rates at the site boundary would
- increase as stated above, but are below the regulatory limits.of 10 CFR 72.l04{a).
11.1-5 Rev. O 1/00
- -,-----~--------
11.2 Accjdents Accidents are design events of the third and fourth type {Design Events III and IV) as defined in ANSI/ANS 57.9. Design Event III consists of that set of infrequent events that could
.reasonably be expected to occur during the lifetime of the ISFSI.
Design Event IV.consists of the events *that are postulated because their consequences may result in... the maximum potential impact on the immediate environs. Their consideration establishes a conservative design basis for certain systems with important confinement features. The following accidents are considered:
- An Earthquake
- Extreme Wind and Tornado Missiles
- Floods
- Explosions
- Fire
- Inadvertent Loading of a Newly Discharged Fuel Assembly
- Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly with a Higher Initial Enrichment than the Design Basis Fuel
- Hypothetical Cask Drop or Tipover
- Nonmechanistic Loss of the Confinement Barrier
- Cask Burial 11.2.1 Earthquake 11.2.1.1 Cause of Accjdent The design earthquake (DE) is postulated to occur as a design basis extreme natural phenomenon.
-- lr.-2~1~2----1\CC-;-dent -ima-lysj-s------- Seismic response characteristics of the storage casks are prQvided in Section* 2.2.3 and Appendix 3A. Results 9f these analyses show that the cask does not tip over or slide due to the design basis seismic event, the leak-tight integrity of the cask is not compromised and that no damage will be sustained. The basket stresses are also low and do not result in deformation that would prevent fuel from being unloaded from the cask. 11.2.1.3 Accjdept Pose Calculations The DE is not capable of damaging the cask. Hence, no radioactivity is released and there is no associated dose increase due to this event. 11.2.1.4 Corrective Actions 11.2-1 Rev. o 1/00
After a design basis seismic event, the cask would be inspected for damage. Any debris would be removed. An evaluation would be performed to determine if the cask were still within the licensed design basis. The functioning of the pressure monitoring system would be confirmed and repaired if necessary. If necessary, the cask would be returned to the spent fuel pool for unloading. 11.2.2 Extreme Wjnd and Tornado Mjssjles 11.2.2.l Cause of Accident The extreme winds due to passage of the design tornado as defined in Section 2.2.1 are postulated to occur as an extreme natural phenomenon. 11.2.2.2 Accident Analysis The effects and consequences of extreme winds on the casks are presented in Section 2.2.l and Appendix 3A. Extreme winds do not result in a cask tip over or sliding of the cask. The pressure due to high winds on the surf ace of the cask is bounded by the assumed external pressure of 25 psi. The stresses in the cask resulting from this external pressure are presented in Appendix 3A. High winds have no effect on the leak tight integrity of the cask, and do not result in damage to the cask itself. High winds do not affect the basket o~ the ability to retrieve the spent fuel from the cask. The effect of tornado missiles hitting the cask has been evaluated in Section 2.2.1. These analyses show that the stresses in the cask as a result of missile impact are well below the allowable stresses for Accident(Level D) conditions. It is also shown in Section 2.2.1 that the tornado missile impact will not result in cask tipover. Local damage to the neutron shield may result from the tornado missile impact. The overpressure system could be damaged, - - -part-icui-ariy-the-compenents-outside_o_f *the protective cover. 11.2.2.3 Accjdent Dose Calculations Extreme winds are not capable of overturning these casks nor of* damaging their seals. The overpressure system and the neutron shielding may be damaged. To determine the bounding dose, loss of neutron shielding (Section 11.2.5.3) is combined with the TEDE from the loss of one confinement barrier and 100% fuel cladding failure (Section 11.2.9.3). The resulting site boundary accident dose, 714 mrem, is below the 5 rem limit to the w~ole body or any organ as specified in 10 CFR 72 .1_06 (b) . 11.2.2.4 Carrectjye Actjpns
. After excessive high winds or a tornado, the cask will be inspected for damage. Any debris would be removed. Any damage resulting frol'IJ. impact with a missile would be evaluated to ll. 2-2 Rev. O 1/00
determine if the cask were still within the licensed design basis. The functioning of the pressure monitoring system would be confirmed, and repaired if necessary. If necessary, the cask would be returned to the spent fuel pool for unloading. 11.2.3 Flood 11.2.3.1 Cause pf Accident Natural event. 11.2.3.2 Accident Analysis The postulated floods and high water levels are discussed in Section 2.2.2. The analysis presented shows that the cask will withstand the external pressure due to the flood and the velocity of the flowing water will not tip or cause the cask to slide. Minor floods have no impact on the cask performance. Major floods could result in debris buildup around the casks or result in damage to the exterior of the cask or the overpressure monitoring system outside of the protective cover. 11.2.3.3 Accident Pose caJcuJatjons The probable maximum flood is not capable of overturning the casks or of damaging their seals.. Therefore, no radioactivity is released and there is no .associated do~e increase due to this event.
- 11.2.3.4 Corrective Actions After a major flood of the ISFSI site, the cask will be inspected for damage. 'Any debris will be removed. Any *damage resulting from the flood would be evaluated to determine if the casks were still within the licensed design basis. The
funct-ioning-of-t-he-pressure-meni-to-r--i-ng-system-wou.l-d-be-conf-i-rmed-.-,- - - - - -
and repaired if necessary. 11.2.4 ExpJosjop 11.*2 .4 .1 Cause of Accident Explosion in the general vicinity. 11.2.4.2 Aqcjdent Analysis The cask is designed to withstand 25 psi external pressure as shown in Chapter 3. The pressure generated by a credible explosion in the general vicinity of the cask is expected to be only on the order of a few psi. This would not collapse the h~avy steel wall consisting of the confinement system and the gamma shield, the o.s inch thick steel shell surrounding the neutron resin 9r provide enough lateral load to tip the cask. 11.2-3 Rev. o 1/00
11.2.4.3 Accident Dose Calculations The cask will not tip as a result of the postulated pressure wave. Accordingly, no cask damage or release of radioactivity is postulated. Since no radioactivity is released, no resultant dose increase is associated with this event. 11.2.4.4 Corrective Actions After an explosion in the vicinity of the ISFSI site, the casks would be inspected for damage. The surfaces of the cask would potentially need to be cleaned and repainted in local . areas. Any debris would be removed. If there were any damage, an evaluation would be performed to determine if the cask were still within the licensed design basis. The functioning of the pressure monitoring system would be confirmed, and repaired if necessary.
- 11. 2
- 5 .Eire.
11.2.5.l Cause of Accident Combustible materials will not normally be stored at an ISFSI. Therefore, a credible fire would be very small and of short duration such as that due to a fire or explosion from a vehicle or portable crane. However a hypothetical fire accident is evaluated for the TN-32 cask based on a fuel fire, the source of fuel being that from a ruptured fuel tank of the cask transporter tow vehicle. The bounding capacity of the fuel ta~k is 200 gallons and the bounding hypothetical fire is an engulfing fire around the cask. 11.2.S.2 Accident Analysis The evaluation of the hypothetical fire event is presented in Section 4.5.1 of the SAR. The fire thermal evaluation is performed primarily to demonstrate the confinement integrity of the*TN-32. This is assured as long as the metallic lid seals remain below 536oF and the cavity pressure is less than 100 psig. Based on the thermal analyses for the fire accident conditions, the TN-32 can withstand the hypothetical fire accident event without compromising its confinement integrity. No melting of the metallic cask components occurs. Peak cask component temperatures are summar~zed in Tabl~ 4.5-1. The maximum seal temperature is calculated to be 380oF which is well below the temperature limit of the metallic seals. The average c~vity gas temperature peaks at 497oF and the pressure increases to 83.8 psig. See Section 7.3.2.2. The pressure inside the cask cavity is well ,,.below the design pressure of 100 psig. 11.2-4 Rev. O 1/00
The neutron shield will off-gas during the hypothetical accident. A pressure relief valve is provided on the outer shell to prevent the pressurization of the outer shell. Shielding analyses have been performed showing acceptable consequences even if all the resin disappears.
- 11. 2. 5 .3 Accj dent Dose Calcn1 ati pns Local damage to the neutron shielding may result from the fire. This is bounded by removal of all the neutron shielding which is evaluated in Chapter 5. Even with this conservative assumption, the site boundary accident dose rates are below 5 rem to the whole body or any organ as specified in 10CFR72.106(b).
The offsite dose is evaluted for two accident conditions:
- 1) loss of radial neutron shielding
- 2) loss of the protective cover and top neutron shield.
A comparison of Figures 5.4-4 and 5.4-6 demonstrates that the radial case with burnable poison rod assemblies is bounding. For accident conditions, the following assumptions are made: a) the nearest postulated site boundary is 100 meters distant from the cask . b) the accident involves.a single cask c) the accident duration is 30 days d) a person remains at the postulated site boundary 24 hours per day for the entire duration e) skyshine doses are negligible compared to direct doses. The normal condition direct dose rates {without inserts) at 100 meters are scaled by the ratio of accident to normal surface dose rates as shown in the following table. All units are ~~~~~mremfhr. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- normal dose rate accident, nomal . . accldent, 100 m direct. surface surface JOO m direct Table 5 1-3 Table s.1-2 Table s.1-2 mrem/br gamma 2.96E-02 541 138 1.16E-Ol neutron l.06E-02 1150 15.3 7.97E-Ol total 9.lE-01 The direct dose over 30 days would be 655 mrem. The background from the rest of the ISFSI would be 1/12 of the 25 mrem/year.limit (10 CFR 72.104), or 2 mrem. The combined total accident dose would be 657 mrem. 11.2.5.4 Corrective Actions
. After a fire, the cask would be inspected for damage. The neutron shielding material may have been damaged during the fire. )
A radiological,.- survey of the cask would be performed prior to 11.2-5 Rev. O 1/00
physical inspection. The surfaces of the cask would potentially need to be cleaned and repainted in local areas. If there is any damage, an evaluation would be performed to determine if the cask were still within the licensed design basis. If the cask is no longer within the design basis, the cask will be returned to the spent fuel pool and unloaded. The top neutron shield may need to be replaced prior to putting the cask ~ack into service. If the cask is still within the design basis, the functioning of the overpressure monitoring system would be confirmed, and repaired if necessary.
- 11. 2. 6 Inadvertent I,oad:i ng of a Newly pj scbarged Fuel Assembly 11.2.6.l Cause of Accjdent The possibility of a spent fuel assembly, with a heat generation rate greater than 1.021 kW, being erroneously selected for storage in a cask has been considered. The cause of this accident is postulated to be an error during the loading operations, e.g., wrong assembly picked by the fuel handling crane, or a failure in the administ~ative controls governing the fuel handling operations.
11.2.6.2 Accident Analysis The fuel assemblies require sev.eral years of storage in the spent fuel pool before the heat generation decays to a rate below l.021 kW. This accident scenario postulate~ the inadvertent loading of an assembly not intended for storage in the storage canister, with a heat generation rate in excess of the design basis specified in Section 2.1. In order to preclude this accident from going undetected, and to ensure that appropriate corrective actions can take place prior to the sealing of the casks, a final verification of the ---a-s-semblies-1-eaeled--i-nto-the casks and a.comparison with fuel management records is required to assure that tne corre*ct----------~ assemblies are loaded.
- These administrative controls and the records a~sociated with them will be included in the procedures described in Chapter
- 8. .
Appropriate and sufficient actions will be taken to ensure that an erroneously loaded fuel assembly does not remain undetected. In particular, the storage of a*fuel assembly with a heat generation in excess of 1.021 kW is not considered credible in view of the multiple administrative controls. There is no thermal or shielding analysis impact since the improperly loaded cask will not get out of the water due to independent review. The
~oading of a higher enriched fuel assembly is evaluated as a separate accident in Section 11.2.7.
11.2-6 Rev. O 1/00
11.2.6.3 Accident Dose Calculatjops The inadvertent loading of a fuel assembly not intended for storage in a storage cask is not considered to be a credible occurrence. Therefore, no resultant doses would occur. 11.2.6.4 corrective Actions If it has been determined that a fuel assembly which is outside the bounds of the design basis has been loaded, it shall be removed from the cask prior to removing the cask from the water.
- 11. 2. 7 Inadvertent r.oadj ng nf a Fuel Assembly with a higher jnitjaJ enrichment than the Desig:n Basis Fuel 11.2.7.1 Cause Of Accident The possibility of a spent fuel assembly with an initial enrichment greater than 4.05 w/o U235 has been considered. The cause of this accident is postulated to be an error during the loading operations, e.g., wrong assembly picked by the fuel handling crane, or a failure in the administrative controls governing the fuel handling operations.
11.2.7.2 Accjdept Analysis An evaluation is performed in chapter 6 with one fuel assembly in one of the 4 center compartments with an enrichment of 5.0 w/o U235. This analysis is performed with 17x17 fuel assemblies and all of the fuel assemblies are shifted toward the cask centerline. The analysis results are presented in Table 6.4-2 and the relevant information is reproduced here. r ;as_e_____u_e_s_c_xip_c_im:i. _g*ff- --er- -k~-2-CJ Baseline, TN-32 design basis 17x17 fuel shifted toward cask axis, 4.05% 0.9167 0.0008 0.9183 enrichment Center assembly enriched to 5% remaining fuel 4.05% enrichment 87.5% 0.9315 0.0009 0.9333 borated water density, worst case normal conditions. As shown above, in the event of one fuel *assembly with higher initial enrichment than the design basis fuel being loaded into the cask, the cask remains subcritical. In order to preclude this accident from going undetected,' and to ensure that appropriate corrective actions can take place prior to the sealing of the casks, a final verification of the assemblies loaded into the*casks and a comparison with fuel management records is required to assure that the correct assemblies are loaded. "" 11.2-7 Rev. o l/00
These administrative contr.ols and the records associated with them will be included in the procedures described in Chapter 8. Appropriate and sufficient actions will be taken to ensure that -an erroneously loaded fuel assembly does not remain undetected. In the event that a fuel ass*embly with higher initial enrichment is loaded, the fuel rem~ins subcritical. 11.2.7.3 Accident pose Calculatjons The inadvertent loading of a fuel assembly with higher initial enrichment than the design basis is prevented by administrative control. There is no resultant dose rate increase due to this condition. 11.2.7.4 Corrective Action If it is determined that a fuel assembly has been loaded which is outside the bounds of the design basis, it shall be removed from the cask. 11.2.B Hypothetical Cask Drop and Tipping Accidents 11.2.8.1 Cause of Accident The stability of the TN-32 storage cask in the upright position on the ISFSI concrete storage pad is demonstrated in Section 2.2 of this SAR. The effects of tornado wind and missiles, flood water and earthquakes are described in Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, respectively. It is shown in those sections that the cask will not tip over under the most severe natural phenomena specified in this Safety Analysis Report. The cask drop is postulaEed-~o-o~cur-du-r-i-ng--hand~-i-ng-W~h~i~l~e~~~~~~~~ the cask is moved onto or off of a transport vehicle. The trunnions are designed and load tested to the requirements of ANSI N14. 6 <2 > for lifting devices. The cask will generally be handled by a specifically designed transport vehicle in a vertical orientation and not lifted higher than 18 inches. Therefore it is extremely unlikely that the cask could be dropped. Other drop events which may be postulated at a specific ISFSI site will be evaluated in accordance with 10CFR 72.212. Therefore the cask is examined for both dropping and tipping accidents, which are hypothetical impact events that are extremely unlikely to occur.
- 11.2.8.2 Accjdent Analyses The cask is evaluated under bottom end impact on the' ISFSI storage pad after a drop from a height of 18 inches in Section 11.2-8 Rev. o 1/00
3A.2.3.2. The storage pad is generally the hardest concrete surface outside of the spent fuel storage building~ The cask is oriented vertically and is not lifted higher than 18 inches once it leaves the containment building. Therefore this case is an upper bound drop event since impact onto a softer surf ace would result in lower cask deceleration and a lower impact force. The cask is also evaluated under *a tipover event on the storage .pad in Section 3A.2.3.2 even though (as demonstrated in ,Section 2.2) the cask can not tip over.
- The analysis presented in Appendix 3A indicates that the maximum deceleration due to an 18 inch bottom end drop is 36 g's*.
The maximum deceleration due to a tipover accident is 23 g's .. The cask is analyzed conservatively for a so g vertical load simulating the end drop, and a SO g side drop conservatively simulating the tipover. The cask stresses reported in Tables 3A.2.5-13 through -24 are less than the 2.4 Sm containment membrane stress allowable at all locations. No additional processing is needed since this is the lowest allowable. An additional analysis of a cask tipping over and impacting a trunnion is evaluated in 3A.2.4.3. This analysis shows that the local stresses around the trunnion are acceptable, and the g loadings are less severe than the side drop analyzed in 3A.2.3.2.
- The stresses in the lid bolts due to the two -postulated drop accidents are presented in Section 3A.3.2. This analysis shows that the stresses in the bolts due to the accident loads are well below the allowable limit of 3Sm and the bolt yield strength.
Therefore, confinement will not be compromised. The stresses in the basket due to the two postulated drop accidents are presented in Appendix 3B. and 3C. These analyses
show-t.ha*t----t.he-ba-sket;-is-s-E-ruet-u-r-a~~y-saa-s.£.aet.eey--una~he-8-8-g-------
side and SO G end loads. For the tipover event, the top of the basket was evaluated for an .88G side load and evaluated at a temperature of 400oF (Section 3C.3-1). The center of.the basket is evaluated for a 52G side load at a temperature of 531oF (Section 3C.3-2). An assessment of the fuel after a drop or tipover accident is performed in Appendix 6A. That analysis concludes that the fuel pins will remain intact. The fuel assemblies may be retrieved from the cask by returning the cask to the spent fuel pool. The Chapter 6 criticality analysis evaluates reduction of the fuel pin pitch due to grid damage in the tipover, and axial sliding of the fuel pins in the end drop. That analysis verifies that 2300 ppm borated water is adequate to maintain criticality safety during unloading after a drop or tipover accident . 11.2-9 Rev. o 1/0.0
11.2.B.3 Accident Dose CaJcnlatjpns A cask tipover will not breach the cask confinement barrier. The bolts that retain the protective cover, the top neutron shield and the overpressure tank are not analyzed for the tipover accident, and therefore, this dose calculation will assume that they these components are removed. To de.termine the* bounding dose, loss of neutron shielding {Section 11.2.5.3) is .combined. with the TEDE from the loss of one confinement barrier and 100% cladding failure (Section 11.2.9.3). The resulting site boundary accident dose, 714 mrem, is below the 5 rem limit to the whole body or any organ as specified in 10 .CFR 72 .106 (b) . 11.2.8.4 Corrective Actions After a tipover or cask handling drop, a radiological survey would be performed. The cask*would be uprighted and inspected for damage. The neutron shielding material may have been damaged due to impact .. If there is any damage, an evaluation would be performed to determine if the cask were still within the licensed design basis. If the cask is no longer within the design basis, the cask will be returned to the spent fuel pool and unloaded. The neutron shield may need to be replaced prior to putting the cask back into service. If the cask is still within the design basis, the functioning of the pressure monitoring system would be confirmed, and repaired if necessary..
- 11. 2. 9 I,oss of Confipement Barrier 11.2.9.1 Cause of Accjdent This is a nonmechanistic type event. It is assumed that the overpressure system has stopped functioning and fire conditions exist. One set of seals is functioning. All fuel rods have
~~~f~a~ilea~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 11.2.9.2 Accident Analysis Radioactive material can be released at a rate equal to the test leak rate of 1 x io-s std cc/sec. It is also assumed that all of the fuel rods have failed, and the temperature inside the cask is comparable to the fire accident conditions. The cask is assumed to leak at this rate for 30 days. In this accident, the confinement function of the fuel rod cladding and one set of seals is eliminated. Heat removal and radiation shielding functions operate in the normal passive manner.
. This is equivalent to breaking one cask seal barrier, removing the pressure monitoring system, failing all the cladding in all the loaded fuel assemblies (gap activity release), and 11.2-10 Rev. O 1./00
finally, failing the fuel pellets themselves. The analysis is presented in Section 7.3.2. 11.2.9.3 Accjdent Dose Calculatjons The dose evaluation due to this postulated accident is given in Section.7.3.2.-l. The total effective_ dose equivalent at.100 m is 58.9 mrem/30 days. The sum of the deep dose equivalent and the committed dose equivalent to any individual organ (the bone surface is the critical organ) is 664 mrem/30 days. The shallow dose equivalent to the skin is 0.99 mrem/30 .days. These values are well below the limiting off site doses defined in 10 CFR 72.106. 11.2.9.4 Corrective Actions In the event of cask leakage, the cask would be returned to the spent fuel pool and the seals would be replaced. In addition, the overpressure system would be checked to determine the cause of failure and corrective measures to prevent future recurrence would be taken. The overpressure system and pressure monitoring equipment would be repaired or replaced as necessary prior to returning the loaded cask to the ISFSI for storage.
- 11. 2 .10 Bud ed crisk
.11.2.10.l Cause of Accident Earthquake or other natural phenomenon resulting in collapse of building, other structure or other manmade or earthen material onto a cask.
11.2.10.2 Accident Analysis An evaluation was made to determine the increase in cask
~t-emper*u-r-e-wi-t-h--t.ime-as-sumi-B~-he-eask-was--c:ompl-et-e.J.-y-bu.r-i..ed-l.,u-. - - - - - - - -
a medium which will not provide the equivalent cooling of nat~ral convection and unrestricted radiation to the environment. The det.ails of this analysis are provided in Section 4. s . ~ . The results of this analysis show that if the cask is not uncovered within 3 hours, the neutron shield temperature will exceed the allowable long term temperature limit of 300oF (l49oC)
- The cask seal temperature will reach its 536oF (280oC) limit about 38 hours after burial. The cavity pressure, including the contribution due to 100% fuel and BPRA failure, will not exceed 100 psig at 38 hours. The-fuel temperature off-normal limit of 10580 F (S?OoC) is reached about 93 hours after burial occurs.
11.2 .10. 3 Accident Dose Cal CJJl at ions Provided that the cask is unburied within 3 hours, there
- 11. 2-11 Rev. O l/00
will be no increase in dose rate due to cask burial. After that period, slow degradation of the neutron shielding would begin to occur resulting in higher surface dose rates. At about 38 hours, the seals could reach their long term maximum temperature of 536oF (28QoC) . It is reasonable to assume that the cask can be unburied before temperatures ar~ reached which would result in seal failure.*
- To determine the bounding dose, los~ of neutron ~hielding.
(Section 11.2.5.3) is combined with the TEDE from the loss of one confinement barrier and 100% fuel cladding failure (Section il.2.9.3). The resulting site boundary accident dose, 714 mrem, is *below the 5 rem limit to the whole body or any organ as specified in 10 CFR 72.106{b). 11.2.10.4 Correctjye Actjons The cask should be unburied as soon as possible to prevent release of radioactive material. The cask will be inspected for damage. The neutron shielding material may have been damaged during the burial. If there is any damage, an evaluation would be performed to determine if the cask were still within the licensed design basis. If the cask is no longer within the design basis, the cask will be returned to the spent fuel pool and unloaded. The neutron shield and all seals would need to be replaced prior to putting the cask back into service. 11.2-12 Rev. O 1/00
11.3 REFERENCES
- 1. American Nuclear Society, ANSI/ANS-57.9, Design Criteria for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation {Dry Storage Type), 1984. *
- 2. American National Standards Institute, .ANSI Nl4. 6, Special Lifting*Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 pounds or More, 1986.
- 3. Deleted.
- 4. Deleted.
11.3-1 Rev. O 1/00
TN-32 GENERIC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TN-32 Technical Specifications
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION ........................................................................................................... 1.1-1 1.1 DEFINITIONS .........................*........................................................................................... 1.1-1 1.2 LOGICAL CONNECTORS .................................................................................................. 1.2-1 1.3 COMPLETION TIMES .....................................................:..............................~ ................... 1.3-1 1.4 FREQUENCY...................................................................................................................... 1.4-1 2.0 FUNCTIONAL AND OPERATING LIMITS ..........................................................'.......................* 2.0-1 2.1 FUEL TO BE STORED IN THE TN-32 CASK .................................................................... 2.0-1 2.2 FUNCTIONAL AND OPERATING LIMITS VIOLATIONS ................................................... 2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY .......................................... 3.0-1 3.0 . SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY ......................................................... 3.0-2 3.1 CASK INTEGRITY .............................................................................................................. 3.1-1 3.1.1 Cask Cavity Vacuum Drying ...................................................................................... 3.1.~1 3.1.2 Cask Helium Backfill Pressure .................................................................................. 3.1-3 3.1.3 Cask Helium Leak Rate ............................................................................................. 3.1-4 3.1.4 Combined Helium Leak Rate .................................................................................... 3.1-5 3.1. 5 Cask lnterseal Pressure ............................................................................................ 3.1-6 3.1.6 Cask Minimum Lifting Temperature ..........................................:............................... 3.1-7 3.2 CASK RADIATION PROTECTION ..................................................................................... 3.2-1 3.2.1 cask Surface Contamination ..................................................................................... 3.2-1 3.3 CASK CRITICALITY CONTROL ......................................................................................... 3.3-1 3.3.1 Dissolved Boron Concentration ................................................................................. 3.3-1 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES .................................................................................................................. 4.0-1 4.1 STORAGE CASK ................................................................................................................ 4.0-1 4.1.1 Criticality .................................................................................................................... 4.0-1 4.1.2 Structural Performance ............................................................................................. 4.0-1 4.1.3 Codes and Standards ................................................................................................ 4.0-1 4.1.4 Helium Purity ............................................................................................................. 4.0-2 4~2----ST0RAGE-PAD .....-.........-...-.-.-....-.-..*.. *****-***-*****~*********~***-*-*-.,_V,_,_,_,_~~******* ....................... :...... 4.0-2 4.2.1 Storage Locations for Casks ..................................................................................... 4 . 0 : 2 - - - - - - - 4.2.2 Pad Properties to Limit Cask Gravitational Loadings Due to Postulated Drops ......................................................................................................................... 4.0-2 4.3 SITE SPECIFIC PARAMETERS AND ANALYSES ............................................................ 4.0-2 5.0- ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ................................................................................................. 5.0-1 5.1 TRAINING MODULE ........................................................................................................... 5.0-1 5.2 PROGRAMS ....................................................................................................................... 5.0-1 5.2.1 Cask Sliding Evaluation ............................................................................................. 5.0-2 5.2.2 Cask Transport Evaluation Program ......................................................................... 5.0-2 5.2.3 Cask Surface Dose Rate Evaluation Program .......................................................... 5.0-2 TN-32 Technical Specifications
Definitions 1.1 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.1 Definitions
~~~~~~~--------~~~~-NOTE~--------~--~------~----~
The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications and Bases. Term Definition ACTIONS ACTIONS shall be that part of a Specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under designated Conditions within specified Completion Times. CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST econ A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) shall be the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify the operability of required alarm functions. The COT shall include adjustments, as necessary, of the required alarm setpoint so that the setpoint is within the required range and accuracy. INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLY Spent Nuclear Fuel Assemblies without known* or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks and which can be handled by normal means. Partial fuel assemblies, that is fuel assemblies from which fuel rods are missing, shall not be classified as INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLIES unless dummy fuel rods are used to displace an amount of water equal to or greater than that displaced by the original fuel rod(s). LOADING OPERATIONS LOADING OPERATIONS include all licensed activities on a cask while it is being loaded with fuel assemblies. LOADING OPERATIONS begin when the first fuel assembly is placed in the cask and end when the cask is supported by the transporter. STORAGE OPERATIONS STORAGE OPERATIONS include all licensed activities that are - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - performed-aUheJndependenlSpentEueLS_tor.agtlostallation (ISE§!)_ while a cask containing spent fuel is sitting on a storage pad within the - ------- - - - lSFSI. TRANSPORT OPERATIONS TRANSPORT OPERATIONS include all licensed activities performed on a cask loaded with one or more fuel assemblies when it is being moved to and from ~he ISFSI. TRANSPORT OPERATIONS begin when the cask is first suspended from the transporter and end when the cask is at its destination and no longer supported by the transporter. UNLOADING OPERATIONS UNLOADING OPERATIONS include all licensed activities on a cask while fuel assemblies are being unloaded. UNLOADING OPERATIONS begin when the cask is no longer supported by the transporter and end when the last fuel assembly is removed from the cask. TN-32 Technical Specifications 1.1-1
Logical Connectors 1.2 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.2 Logical Connectors PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to explain the meaning of logical connectors. Logical connectors are used in Technical Specifications (TS) to discriminate
- between, and yet connect, discrete Conditions, Required Actions, Completion Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies. The only logical connectors that appear in TS are AND and OR. The physical arrangement of these eonnectors constitutes logical conventions with specific meanings.
BACKGROUND Several levels of logic may be used to state Required Actions. These levels are Identified by the placement (or nesting) of the logical connectors and by the
- number assigned to each Required Action. The first level of logic is identified by the first digit of the number assigned to a Required Action and the placement of the logical connector in the first level of nesting (i.e., left justified with the number of the Required Action). The successive levels of logic are identified by additional digits of the Required Action number and by successive indentions of the logical connectors.
When logical connectors are used to state a Condition, Completion Time, Surveillance, or Frequency, only the first level of logic is used, and the logical connector is left justified with the statement of the Condition, Completion Time, Surveillance, or Frequency. EXAMPLES The follo~ng examples illustrate the use of logical connectors: EXAMPLE 1.2-1: ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
,A
. bGO-not-met-.- -A.1--Yerlfy~
AND A.2 Restore ... In this example the logical connector AND Is used to indicate that when in Condition A,,both Required Actions A.1 and A.2 must be completed. TN-32 Technical Specifications 1.2-1
Logical Connectors 1.2 1.2 Logical Connectors EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.2-2: (continued) ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LCO not met. A.1 Stop ...
-OR A.2.1 Verify ...
AND A.2.2.1 Reduce ...
-OR A.2.2.2 Perform ...
OR A.3 Remove ... This example represents a more complicated use of logical connectors. Required Actions A.1, A.2, and A.3 are alternative choices, only one of which must be performed as indicated by the use of the logical connector OR and the left justified placement Any one of these three Actions may be chosen. If A.2 is chosen, then both A.2.1 and A.2.2 must be performed as indicated by the logical connector AND. Required Action A2.2 is met by performing A.2.2.1 or A.2.2.2. The-indented-position-of-the-logical-eonnector-ORindicateslhatA.2.2..1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ and A.2.2.2 are alternative choices, only one of which must be performed. TN-32 Technical Specifications 1.2-2
Completion Times 1.3 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.3 Completion Times PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to establish the Completion Time convention and to provide guidance for its use. BACKGROUND Limiting Conditions fo~ Operation (LCOs} specify minimum requirements for ensuring safe operation of the cask. The ACTIONS associated with an LCO state Conditions that typically describe the ways in which the requirements of the LCO can fail to be met. Specified with each stated Condition are Required Action(s} and Completion Times(s). DESCRIPTION The Completion Time is the amount of time allowed for completing a Required Action. It is referenced to the time of discovery of a situation (e.g., equipment or variable not within limits) that requires entering an ACTIONS Condition unless otherwise specified, providing the cask is In a specified condition stated in the Applicability of the LCO. Required Actions must be completed prior to the expiration of the specified Completion Time. An ACTIONS Condition remains in effect and the Required Actions apply until the Condition no longer exists or the cask is not within the LCO Applicability. Once a Condition has been entered, subsequent subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition unless specifically stated. The - Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply to each additional failure,
*with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.
TN-32 Technical Specifications 1.3-1
Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES The following examples illustrate the use of Completion Times with different types of Conditions and changing Conditions: EXAMPLE 1.3-1: ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action B.1 Perform Action 8.1. 12 hours and associated Completion Time AND not met. -- B.2 Perform Action B.2 36 hours Condition B has two Required Actions. Each Required Action has its own separate Completion Time. Each Completion Time is referenced to the time that Condition Bis entered. The Required Actions of Condition Bare to complete action B.1 within 12 hours AND to complete action B.2 within 36 hours. A total of 12 hours is allowed for completing action B.1 and a total of 36 hours (not 48 hours) is allowed for completing action B.2 from the time that Condition B was entered. If action B.1 is completed within 6 hours, the time allowed for completing action B.2 is the next 30 hours because the total time allowed for completing action 8.2 is 36 hours. TN-32 Technical Specifications 1.3-2
Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-2: (continued) ACTION$ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A One system not A.1 Restore system to within idays within limit Iimil B. Required Action B.1 Perform Action 8.1. 12 hours and associated Completion Time AND not met B.2 Perform Action B.2. 36 hours When a system is determined to not meet the LCO, Condition A Is entered. If the system is not restored within 7 days, Condition B is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start If the system is restored after Condition B is entered, Condition A and B are exited, and therefore, the Required Actions of Condition B may be terminated. TN-32 Technical Specifications 1.3-3
Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-3: (continued) ACTIONS
~~~~~~NOTE:~~~~~~~-
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each component. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LCO not met. A.1 Restore compliance 4 hours with LCO. B. Required Action 8.1 Perform Action B.1. 12 hours and associated Completion Time AND not met. B.2 Perform Action B.2. 36 hours The Note above the ACTIONS Table is a method of modifying how the Completion Time is tracked. If this method of modifying how the Completion Time is tracked was applicable only to a specific Condition, the Note would appear in that Condition rather than at the top of the ACTIONS Table.
- The Note allows Condition A to be entered separately for each component, and Completion Times tracked on a per component basis. When a component does not meet the LCO, Condition A is entered and its Completion Time starts. If subsequent components are determined Not to meet the LCD, Condition A is entered for each component and separate Completion Times start and are tracked for each component.
:~=:-:-=-:=-----~,-:;---~~-~~*
IMMEDIATE When "Immediately" is used as a CompletioifTlme;-tne COMPtETION-rtMf: Required Action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. TN-32 Technical Specifications 1.3-4
Frequency 1.4 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.4 Frequency PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to define the proper use and application of Frequency requirements. DESCRIPTION Each Surveillance Requirement (SR) has a specified Frequency in which th~ Surveillance must be met in order to meet the associated Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). An understanding of the correct application of the specified Frequency Is necessary fqr compliance with the SR. The "specified Frequency" is referred to throughout this section and each of the Specifications of Section 3.0, Surveillance Requirement (SR) Applicability. The "specified Frequency" consists of the requirements of the Frequency column of each SR, as well as certain Notes in the Surveillance column that modify performance requirements. Situations where a Surveillance could be required (i.e., its Frequency could expire), but where it is not possible or not desired that it be performed until sometime after the associated LCO is within its Applicability, represent potential SR 3.0.4 conflicts. To avoid these conflicts, the SR (i.e., ~he Surveillance or the Frequency) is stated such that it is only "required" when It can be and should be performed. With an SR satisfied, SR 3.0.4 imposes no restriction. The use of "met" or "performed" in these instances conveys specific meanings. A Surveillance is "mer* only when the acceptance criteria are saiisfied. Known failure of the requirements of a Surveillance, even without a Surveillance specifically being performed," constitutes a Surveillance not "met" TN-32 Technical Specifications 1.4-1
Frequency 1.4 1.4 Frequency EXAMPLES The following examples illustrate the various ways that Frequencies are specified: EXAMPLE 1.4-1: SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE *FREQUENCY Verify Pressure within limil 12 hours Example 1.4-1 contains the type of SR most often encountered in the Technical Specifications (TS). The Frequency specifies an interval (12 hours) during which the associated Surveill~nce must be performed at least one time.. Performance of the Surveillance initiates the subsequent Interval. Although the Frequency is stated as 12 hours, an extension of the time interval to 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency is allowed by SR 3.0.2 for operational flexibility. The measurement of this interval continues at all times, even when the SR is not required to be met per SR 3.0.1 (such as when the equipment is determined to not meet the LCO, a variable is outside specified limits, or the unit is outside the Applicability of the LCO). If the interval specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the cask is in a condition specified in the Applicability of the LCO, the LCO is not met in accordance with SR 3.0.1. If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a condition specified in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR is required, the Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2 prior to entry into the specified condition. Failure to do so would result in a violation of SR 3.0.4. TN*32 Technical Specifications 1.4-2
Frequency 1.4 1.4 Frequency EXAMPLES. EXAMPLE 1.4-2: (continued)
- . - *- *'SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .. *.*.,;.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Verify flow is within limits. . Once within 12 hours prior to starting
.. .. activity AND 24 hours thereafter
,,*j I
- Example 1.4-2 has two Frequencies. The first is a one time performance Frequency, and the second is of the type shown in Example 1.4-1. The logical connector "AND" indicates that both Frequency requirements must be met. Each time the example activity Is to be performed, the Surveillance must be performed prior to starting the activity.
The use of "once" indicates a single performance will satisfy the specified Frequency (assuming no other Frequencies are connected by "AND"). This type of Frequency does not qualify for the 25% extension allowed by SR 3.0.2.
**"Thereafter" Indicates future pei'formances must be established per SR 3.0.2, but
* ,
- only after a specified condition is first met (i.e., the "once" performance in this
_ example). If the specified activity is canceled or not performed, the
* "
- measurement of both Intervals stops. New intervals start upon preparing to
. re~tart the sp~cified activity. *
** ,. { :;', '*"" r ,* ,:
. ';: *.* ~ . ,*;
. *~
.. .-.. ~ :* .; ..
;,*I
- TN-32 Technical Specifications 1.4-3
Functional and Operating Limits 2.0 2.0 Functional and Operating Limits 2.1 Fuel To Be Stored In The TN-32 Cask .. The spent nuclear fuel to be stored in the TN-32 cask shall meet the following requirements: *
. . * ~ ! ..
- a. Fuel shall be unconsolidated INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLIES .
. b. *.Fuel shall be limited to fuel with zircaioy cladding .
- c. Fuel types shall be limited to the fuel types below with maximum uranium content as follows:
Westinghouse 14x14 Std ZCA and ZCB: 0.4144 MTU/assy. Westinghouse 15x15: 0.4671 MTU/assy. Westinghouse 17x17 Std: 0.4671 MTU/assy. Westinghouse 14x14 OFA: 0.3611 MTU/assy. Westinghouse 17x17 OFA: 0.4282 MTU/assy. B&W/FCF 17x17 Mark BW: 0.4632 MTU/assy.
- d. Fuel may include burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRA's) having the acceptable
. combination of burnup and cooling time described by Figure 2.1.1-1.
- e. Fuel may include thimble plug assemblies (TPA's) having the acceptable combination of bumup and cooling time described by Figure 2.1.1-2.
f.. Fuel assemblies shall have the following bounding characteristics:
- i. The maximum initial enrichment shall not exceed 4.05 weight percent.
('* ..:: ': The determination of fuel enrichment shall not be based on average
.. values that include low enrichment axial reflector blankets.
**,... n .. The maximum assembly average burnup shall not exceed 45,000 MWD/MTU iii. The minimum cooling time prior to loading shall be as specified in Table 2.1.1-1.
. w. . ~~:~~~~sh~~~p~~:er_a_ss_e~~-~ha~-1n_o~xce_ed_1_.0_2_k~_w_ith_o_r__ J____________ .
----v.---The fuel assembly weight with hardware shall not exceed 1533 lbs.
2.2 Functional and Operating Limits Violations If any Functional and Operating Limit of 2.1 is violated, the following actions shall be completed: 2.2.1 The affected fuel assemblies shall be removed from the cask and placed in a safe condition. 2.2.2 Within 24 hours, notify the NRC Operations Center. 2.2.3 Within 30 days, submit a special report which describes the cause of the violation and the actions taken to restore compliance and prevent recurrence. TN*32 Technical Specifications 2.0-1 ,* ....
Functional and Operating Limits 2.0 Table 2.1.1-1 Minimum Acceptable Cooling Time as a Function of Burnup and Initial Enrichment Min. lnit. Enrichment (%wt)(1) 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 7 1.6 7 1.7 7 7 7 1.8 7 7 7 7 7 1.9 7 7 7 7 7 7 2.0 7 7 7 7 7 7 2.1 7 7 7 7 7 7 2.2 7 7 7 7 7 10 10 2.3 7 7 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 10 10 2.4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 9 10 10 2.5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 10 2.6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 10 2.7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 B 9 9 9 2.8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 B 8 8 8 9 9 9 2.9 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 3.0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 3.1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 3.2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 3.3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 3.4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 --- 3.5 3.6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7-7 7 7
-r --r -r 7 7
-T I ,-
7 7 7 7 7 7 I -; -r-3.7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3.8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3.9 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 4.05 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
* - not evaluated (1) Round actual value down to next lower tenth.
(2) Round actual value up to next higher GWd/MTU. TN-32 Technical Specifications 2.0-2
Functional and Operating Limits 2.0 2200 2100 2000 .d 1900 / 1800 /
'ii' 1700 ,/
~
1600 / ll 1500 ACCEPTABLE /
'C fl 1400 /
c
*in 1300 /
f::
~ 1000 JV
/
/
tlD
.e 900 /
~ 800 / -
E 700 / UNACCEPTABLE -
=
.§ 600 /
.e
- E 500 v 400 /
300 / 200 / 100 / 0 v 30000 35000 40000 45000 50000 55000 60000 Burnup (MWd/MTU) Figure 2.1.1-1 Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs) Minimum Acceptable Cooling Time as a Function of Bumup TN-32 Technical Specifications 2.0-3
Functional and Operating Limits 2.0 7500 7000
~ -------
f.11 JIu 6500 ~ACCEPTABLE ~
~
8 6000
=
/
.i"' 5500
/
,/
II E i= 5000 I J
! 4500 I UNACCEPTABLE E
i
*a 4000 I i
3500 I. 3000 I 45,000 95,000 145,000 195,000 Burnup (MWd/MTU) Figure 2.1.1-2 Thimble Plug Assemblies (TPAs)
1v1inimum.Acceptable-Cooling_Time_as.aEunctioJLof BumuP-TN-32 Technical Specifications 2.0-4
LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCOs shall be met during specified conditions in the Applicability. except as provided in LCO 3.0.2. LCO 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions ofthe associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO ,. 3.0.5. If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required, unless otherwise stated. LCO 3.0.3 Not applicable to a cask. LCO 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry Into a specified condition In the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. This Specification shall not prevent changes in specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply .with ACTIONS, or that are related to the unloading of a cask. Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications. These exceptions allow entry into specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered allow operation in the specified condition in the Applicability only for a Umited period of time. Leo a.o.s Equipment removed from service or not in service in compliance with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate it meets the LCO or that other equipment meets the LCO. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate that the LCO
;*,s-met.
LCO 3.0.6 Not applicable to a cask. LC03.0.7 No~ applicable to a cask. TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.0-1
LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILllY SR 3.0.1 SRs shall be met during the specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR. Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LCO except as provided in SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on equipment or variables outside specified limits. SR 3.0.2 The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met. For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply. If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per ... " basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individu~I Specifications. SR 3.0.3 If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, *whichever is less. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance.
- If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.
When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance
is-net-met,the-1..CO-must-immediately-be-declared_notmet,_andJbe_aQR~lica~b~le_ _ _ _ _ _ __
Condition{s) must be entered. SR 3.0.4 Entry into a specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency. This provision shall not prevent entry into specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are related to the unloading of a cask. TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.0-2
Cask Integrity LCOs 3.1 3.1 CASK INTEGRITY 3.1.1 Cask Cavity Vacuum Drying LCO 3.1.1 The cask cavity vacuum drying pressure shall be sustained at or below 4 mbar absolute for a period of at least 30 minutes after isolation from the pumping system. APPLICABILITY: During LOADING OPERATIONS ACTIONS Separate Condition entry is allowed for each cask. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE
- NOTE Not applicable until SR 3.1.1.1 is -
performed. Action A.1 applies until helium is removed for subsequent A. Cask cavity vacuum drying operations. pressure limit not met. 12 hours A. 1 Achieve or maintain a nominal helium environment in the cask 96 hours AND A2 Establish cask cavity drying pressure within limits. B. Required Action A.1 and B.1 Remove all fuel assemblies 7 days associated Completion Time not from the cask. met TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.1-1
Cask Integrity LCOs 3.1
- c. Required Action A.2 and C.1 Remove all fuel assemblies 30days associated Completion Time not from the cask.
met SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.1.1 Verify that the equilibrium cask cavity vacuum drying pressure Once, within 24 hours of is brought to s 4 mbar absolute for at least 30 minutes. completion of cask dr~lning. TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.1-2
Cask Integrity LCOs 3.1 3.1 CASK INTEGRITY 3.1.2 Cask Helium Backfill Pressure LCO 3.1.2 The cask cavity shall be filled with helium to a pressure of 2230 mbar absolute(+/- 100 mbar). APPLICABILITY: During LOADING OPERATIONS ACTIONS ~~~~~~~~~NOTE~~~~~~~~- Separate Condition entry is allowed for each cask. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE NOTE Not applicable until SR 3.1.2.1 is Action. A. 1 applies until helium is removed for subsequent performed. operations A. Cask initial helium backfill pressure A.1 Achieve or maintain a 6 hours limit not met. nominal helium environment in the cask AND 48 hours A.2 Establish cask cavity backfill pressure within limits.
- 8. Required Action A.1 and B.1 Remove all fuel assemblies 7 days associated Completion Time not from the cask.
met. C. Required Action A.2 and associated C.1 Remove all fuel assemblies _30days Completion-1:ime not.met JroroJb.e cask. - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.2.1 Verify that the cask cavity helium pressure is 2230 mbar Once, within 30 hours of absolute (+/- 100 mbar). completion of cask draining. TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.1-3
Cask Integrity LCOs 3.1 3.1 CASK INTEGRITY 3.1.3 Cask Helium Leak Rate LCO 3.1.3 The combined helium leak rate for all closure seals shall not exceed 1.0 E-5 std cc/sec. . APPLICABILITY: During LOADING OPERATIONS. ACTIONS
~--------~~----~-NOTE--~--------~~-----------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each cask. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE A.1 Establish cask helium leak 48 hours Not applicable until SR 3.1.3.1 is rate within limit performed. A. Cask helium leak rate not mel B. Required Action A.1 and 8.1 Remove all fUel assemblies 30 days associated Completion Time are from cask. not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.3.1 Verify the cask helium leak rate is within the limit. Once, prior to TRANSPORT OPERATIONS. TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.1-4
Cask Integrity LCOs 3.1 3.1 CASK INTEGRITY 3.1.4 Combined Helium Leak Rate LCO 3.1.4 The combined helium leak rate for all closure seals and the overpressure system shall not exceed 1.0 E-5 std cc/sec. APPLICABILITY: During STORAGE. ACTIONS
NOTE----------------------------~-----------------
Separate Condition entry' is allowed for each cask. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE A.1 Establish combined helium 48 hours Not applicable until SR 3.1.4.1 is leak rate within limit performed. A. Combined helium leak rate not met. B. Required Action A. 1 and associated 8.1 Remove all fuel assemblies 30days Completion Time are not met. from cask. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY NOTE This surveillance may be combined with SR 3.1.3.1. Once prior to TRANSPORT SR 3.1.4.1 Verify the combined helium leak rate is within the limit OPERATIONS _()_R Once within 48 hours of commencing STORAGE OPERATIONS. TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.1-5
Cask Integrity LCOs 3.1 3.1 CASK INTEGRITY 3.1.5 Cask lntersear Pressure LCO 3.1.5 Cask interseal pressure shall be maintained at a pressure of at least 3.2 atm abs APPLICABILITY: During STORAGE OPERATIONS. ACTIONS ~~~~~~~~~NOTE~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~ Separate Condition entry is allowed for each cask. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Cask interseal pressure below A.1 Reestablish cask interseal 7 days limit. pressure above limit.
- 8. Required Action A.1 and B.1 Remove all fuel assemblies 30.days associated Completion Time not from cask.
met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.5.1 Verify cask interseal helium pressure above limit. 7 days SR 3.1.5.2 Perform a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COD to verify Once, within 7 days of proper functioning of pressure switch I transducer on cask commencing STORAGE overpressure system. OPERATIONS and every 36 months thereafter TN*32 Technical Specifications 3.1.S
Cask Integrity LCOs 3.1 3.1 CASK INTEGRITY 3.1.6 Cask Minimum Lifting Temperature LCO 3.1.6 The loaded cask shall not be lifted if the outer surface of the. cask is below
-20°F.
APPLICABILITY: During TRANSPORT OPERATIONS ACTIONS
NOTE----------------------------------------------------~-----------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each cask. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Cask surface temperature below A.1 lower cask to safe position Immediately limit. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.6.1 Verify outer surface temperature is above limit Once, immediately prior to lifting cask and prior to cask transfer to or from ISFSI.
TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.1-7
Cask Radiation Protection LCOs 3.2 3.2 CASK RADIATION PROTECTION 3.2.1 Cask Surface Contamination LCO 3.2.1 Removable contamination on the cask exterior surfaces shall not exceed:
- a. 1000dpm/100 cm2 (0.2 Bq I cm2) from beta and gamma sources, and
- b. 20 dpm I 100 crTIJ (0.003 Bq I cm2) from alpha sources.
APPLICABILITY: During LOADING OPERATIONS ACTIONS
~~~~~~~~~NOTE~~~~~~~~~
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each cask. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A Removable contamination on the A.1 Decontaminate cask Prior to cask exterior surface exceeds either surfaces to below required TRANSPORT limit levels. OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.1.1 Verify that the removable contamination on the exterior surface Once, prior to of the cask does not exceed the specified limits. TRANSPORT OPERATIONS. TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.2-1
Cask Criticality Control LCOs 3.3 3.3 CASK CRITICALITY CONTROL 3.3.1 Dissolved Boron Concentration LCO 3.3.1 The dissolved boron concentration of the water in the spent fUel pool and the water added to the cavity of a loaded cask shall be at least 2300 ppm. APPLICABILITY: During LOADING and UNLOADING OPERATIONS ACTIONS NOTE~~~~~~~~~ Separate Condition entry is allowed for each cask. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Dissolved boron concentration limit A.1 Suspend loading of fUel Immediately notmel assemblies into cask. AND A.2 Remove all fuel assemblies 24 hours from cask. TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.3-1
Cask Criticality Control LCOs 3.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1 Verify dissolved boron concentration limit In spent fuel pool Within 4 hours prior to water and water to be added to the cask cavity is met using commencing LOADING two independent measurements. OPERATIONS AND 48 hours thereafter while the cask Is in the spent fuel pool or while water is In cask. SR3.3.1.2 Verify dissolved boron concentration limit in spent fuel pool Once, within 4 hours prjor water and water to be added to the* cask cavity is met using to flooding cask during two independent measurements. UNLOADING OPERATIONS AND 48 hours thereafter while the cask is in the spent fuel pool or while water is in cask. TN-32 Technical Specifications 3.3-2
Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES The specifications in this section include the design characteristics of special importance to each of the physical barriers and to maintenance of safety margins in the cask design. The principal objective of this category is to describe the design envelope which might constrain any physical changes to essential equipment. Included in this category are the site environmental parameters which provide the bases for design, but are not inherenUy suited for description as LCOs. 4.1 Storage Cask 4.1. 1 Criticality The design of the storage cask, including spatial constraints on adjacent assemblies (minimum basket cell opening of 8.64 in. sq.) and the boron content of the basket material (minimum areal density equal to 10 mg B10/cm2) shall ensure that fuel assemblies are maintained in a subcritical condition with a k..trof less than 0.95 under all conditions of operation. 4.1.2 Structural Performance The cask has been evaluated for a cask tipover (equivalent to a side drop of 67 g's) and a bottom end drop resulting in an axial gravitational (g) loading of 50 g's. 4.1.3 Codes and Standards The TN-32 cask confinement boundary is designed and fabricated in accordance with Subsection NB of the ASME Code. Exceptions to the code are listed in Table 4.1-1. The cask gamma shielding has been evaluated in accordance with Subsection NB of the ASME code with the exceptions listed in Table 4.1-1. The basket is designed in accordance with Subsection NF of the ASME Code. The basket is inspected as shown in Table 4.1-1. Proposed alternatives to ASME Code Section Ill, 1992 Edition including exceptions allowed by Table 4.1-1 may be used when authorized by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards or Designee. The applicant should demonstrate that:
- 1. The Proposed alternatives would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety, or
- 2. Compliance with the specified requirements of ASME Code, Section 111, 1992 Edition would result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase In the level of quality and safety.
Requests for exceptions in accordance with this section should be submitted in accordance with 10CFR 72.4. 4.1.4 Helium Purity The cask shall be filled with helium with a purity of at least 99.99%. This level of purity will ensure that the residual impurities in the cask cavity will be less than 1 mole. TN-32 Technical Specifications 4.0-1
Design Features 4.0 4.2 Storage Pad 4.2.1 Storage Locations for Casks Casks shall be spaced a minimum of 16 feet apart, center-to-center. This minimum spacing will ensure the proper dissipation of radiant heat energy from an array of casks as assumed in the TN-32 Safety Analysis Report*
- 4.2.2 Pad Properties to Limit Cask Gravitational Loadings Due to Postulated Drops The TN-32 cask has been evaluated for cask drops onfo a reinforced concrete pad. The evaluations are based on the following parameters:
Concrete thickness 36 inches*(max) Nominal concrete compressive strength 6000 psi (max) Reinforcement Yield Strength 60,000 psi (min) Sail Effective Modulus of Elasticity 32,600 psi (max)
- Maximum drop height 18 inches
- This set of limits will ensure that the g loading imposed on the cask is no more than 50 g's (cask bottom end drop).
4.3 Site Specific Parameters and Analyses Site specific parameters and analyses that shall need verification by the system user are, as a minimum, as follows:
- 1. Tornado maximum wind speeds: 290 mph rotational 70 mph translational
- 2. Flood levels up to 57 ft. and drag forces up to 57, 160 lbs.
- 3. Seismic loads of up to 0.26g horizontal and 0.17g vertical , or Analyses to provide verification that loads associated with a design basis seismic event do not cause the cask to slide or to tip over, as follows.
(~ For sliding an~sis, a coefficient-of-friction of 0.35 is assumed and a factor-of-safety 1: of 1 ls used-(as- recommencfecf6y A~STfANS-o7~9-;-8eetion-~17~~1 )-:-Tfie following relationship of horizontal seismic acceleration to corresponding vertical seismic acceleration shall be met at any time: 0.35~-g,,)
----~1.1 gh Where:
g h = Horizontal seismic acceleration. gv =Corresponding vertical seismic acceleration. (b) For tipover analysis, a .factor-of-safety of 1.1 ls used {as recommended by ANSI I ANS-57 .9, Section 6.17.4.1 ). The following relationship of horizontal seismic acceleration to corresponding vertical seismic acceleration shall be met at any time: TN-32 Technical Specifications 4.0-2
Design Features 4.0 ghL +g L 1 v v r <- Lr* -1.1 Where: gh = Horizontal seismic acceleration.-. g v =* Corre~p~>nding yertlcal seisn:il~ acceleration. .
*Lv = Vertical distance from cask base to cask C. G.
Lr = Radial distance frorr:i cask base perimeter to cask C. G.
- 4. Average daily ambient temperatures: ~ -20°F minimum s 100°F maximum *
- 5. The potential for fires and explosions shall be addressed, based on site-specific considerations. Fires and explosions should be bounded by the cask design bases parameters of 200 gallons of fuel (in the tank of the transporter vehicle) and an external
- pressure of 25 psig.
- 6. Supplemental Shielding: In cases where engineered features (i.e. berms, shield walls) are used to ensure that the requirements of 10CFR 72.104(a) are met, such features are to be considered important to safety and must ~e evaluated to determine the applicable Quality Assurance Category.
*'i *.*.. :.
* :~ * ' I~ ~,: ... I~ *
- TN-32 Technical Specifications 4.0-3
Design Features 4.0 THIS PAGE.INTENTIONALLY BLANK TN-32 Technical Specifications 4.0-4
Table 4.1-1
~N-32 ASME Code Exceptions List of ASME Code Exceptions for TN-32 Dry Storage Cask Confmement Boundary/Gamma Shielding/Basket I
The cask confinement boundary is designed Iin accordance with the ASME Code Subsection NB. The basket was also designed in accordance with ASME Code Subsection NF. The Gamma shielding, which is primarily for shielding, but also provides structural support to the confinement boundary duringidrop accidents, was not designed in accordance with the code. The analysis of the gamma shielding is in accordance with Subslection NB. Inspections of the gamma shielding are performed in accordance with the ASME Code as detailed in the SAR. . Reference ode Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures Component ASME Req~irement Code/Section II TN-32 NB-1100 Stamp~gand The TN-32 cask is not N stamped, nor is there a code design specification Cask preparation of generated. A design criteria document was generated in accordance with reports by the TN's QA Program, and the design and analysis is provided in the SAR. Certific~te Holder TN-32 Cask. NCA-3800 Quality tsurance The Quality assurance requirements ofNQA-1 or 10 CFR 72 Subpart Gare Require, ents imposed in lieu ofNCA-3800 requirements. Lid Bolts NB-3232.3 Fatigue ianalysis of A fatigue analysis of the bolts is not performed for storage, since the bolts bolts are not subject to significant cyclical loads. Gamma NB-1132.2 Non-ptt1ssure The pri:rp.ary function of the gamma shield is shielding, although Shielding retaining structural credit is taken for the gamma shielding in the structural analysis. attacmnents shall The welds are examined in accordance with NF acceptance criteria. A
- confomtto I fracture toughness evaluation is presented in Appendix 3E of the SAR.
Subsectjon NF Pressure test NB-6110 All pressure The TN-32 cask is n~t pressure limited. All confinement welds are fully of the retainin~ radiographed. In addition, the gamma shielding supports the confinement confinement compontts shall boundary under all conditions, so a pressure test of the confinement vessel boundary be press e tested. separately will not simulate actual loading conditions. If the pressure test is performed with the confinement vessel inside the gamma shield, the I confmement boundary welds cannot be examined. I . TN-32 Technical Specifications . (*'
Table 4 .l-l TN-32 AL.. . .~ Code Exceptions 1 Component Reference C?de Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures ASME Requrement Code/Section I Confinement NB-2120 Require*1ent Standard Review Plan, NUREG-1536 has accepted the use of either Vessel materialsI to be Subsection NB (Class l) or NC (Class 2 or 3) of the Code for the Material ASME~lass 1 confinement. SA-203 Gr. D is similar to SA-203 Gr. E which is a Class 1 material material. The chemical content of the two grades are identical, except that Gr.. E restricts the carbon to 0.20 max., while Gr. D further restricts the carbon content to 0.17 max. Gr. D is acceptable as a Class 2 material up to 500° F. Gr. D was selected because of its ductility, since the higher strength is not required. SA-203 Gr. D has better elongation than Grade E and due to its lower strength is more likely to have the good fracture toughness at low temperatures. In selecting materials for storage and transport casks, one of the major selection criteria is fracture toughness at low temperatures. Grade D was selected on this basis: There is no similar requirement for pressure vessels, as they are used at much higher temperatures. For the SA-203 Grade D material, the allowable stress was based on S, the allowable stress for Class 2 components. This is conservative, since NB is based on Sm. which is I /3 the tensile strength, while S is 1/4 the tensile strength. Thus there is additional margin over and above the margin required by the code for Class I materials. Weld of Lid NB-4335 Impact festing of If two different materials are joined, the fracture toughness requirements of Shield Plate to weld~d heat either may be used for the weld metal. There are no fracture toughness Lid affecte zone of requirements on the shield plate, and therefore none are performed on the lid to s ield plate base metal or the heat affected zones. This weld is not subject to low temperatures, as it is inside the cask cavity. An evaluation of this weld at low temperatures is presented in Appendix 3E of the SAR. TN-32 Technical Specifications.
Table ~.1-1 TN-32 ASME Code Exceptions Component Reference ~ode Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures ASME R, lremenl Code/Section Gamma NB-2190 Materifl in the The gamma shielding materials were procured to ASTM or ASME Shielding component support material specifications. Materials testing is perfonned in accordance with load p~th and not the appli~able specification. Impact testing is not performed on the gamma press £ perfo;:feng a retaining functio welded to. shielding materials (including welding materials). An evaluation of the gamma shielding due to impact at low temperatures is provided in Appendix 3E of the SAR. pressu f. retaining material shall meet the reqbirements ofNF-2000 Confinement NB-7000 Vessels are No overpressure protection is provided. Function of confinement vessel is Vessel require~ to have to contain radioactive contents* under nonnal, off nonnal, and accident overpr ssure conditions of storage. Confinement vessel is designed to withstand protect on maximum internal pressure considering 100% fuel rod failure and maximum accident temperatures. Confinement NB-8000 States TN-32 cask to be marked and identified in accordance with 10CFR72 Vessel require ments for requirements. Code stamping is not required. QA data package to be in namep ates, accordance with Transnuclear approved QA program. stampi 1gand reports perNCA-8000 Confinement NB-2000 Requi1s materials Material will be supplied by Transnuclear approved suppliers with Vessel to be supplied by Certified Material Test reports (CMTR) in accordance ~ith NB-2000 material ASMEI approved requirements. The cask is not code stamped. The quality assurance materit supplier; requirements ofNQA-1or10 CFR 72 Subpart Gare imposed in lieu of the Qualit assurance requirements ofNCA-3800.
- tomee NCA require ments TN-32 Technical Specifications
I Table 4.1-1 rn.. 32 .1. ... dME Code Exceptions I Component Reference ICode Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures ASME Requirement Code/Section I Comer weld NB-5231 Full wnetration In lieu of the UT inspection, the joint will be examined by RT and either between cometi welded PT or MT methods in accordance with ASME Subsection NB bottom inner joints ~uire the requirements. plate to inner fusion zone and shell the patent metal benea~h the attachinent surface to be UT after weldi~g Boundary of NB-1131 Thed~sign A code design specification was not prepared for the TN-32 cask. A TN Jurisdiction specification shall design criteria was prepared in accordance with TN's QA program. The defin~the containment boundary is specified in Chapter 1 of the SAR. boun ary ofa comp0nent to whicH another I . comp~nent 1s attach~d. Aluminum NF-2120 Mateqals to be The aluminum plate strength is not used for structural analysis under basket plate ASMEClass j 1 normal operating loads nor the 50g accident end drop load. The aluminum and rail, mater al plate strength is only assumed to be effective for the short duration neutron dynamic loading from a tipover accident and for secondary thermal stress absorber calculations. 6061-T6 is ASME code material (Class 2 or 3). The strength plates of the neutron absorber plates are not considered in any analysis. TN-32 Technical Specifications
Tablet-I TN*32 ASME Code Exceptions Component Reference Code Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures ASME ReqJirement Code/Section Basket NF-4000/NF- Weldin1VNDE Basket welding procedures are qualified in accordance with ASME Section 5000 inspections IX. Due to the unique nature of these welds, special inspections and tests I were developed for these welds. These are described in Section 9.1.2 of the SAR. Components Subsection NB The code does not apply to components other than the containment other than the boundary and basket. The gamma shielding has been analyzed and containment inspected in accordance with Subsection NB as defined at the beginning of boundary and this table. basket Basket NF-3000 Allowa1)}e Stresses The ASME Code gives stress values up to 400°F. Stress values above 400°F are taken from "Aluminum Standards and Data", 1990. The allowable stresses used for the* aluminum basket plate and rail are based on S, the allowable stress for a Class 2 or 3 component. This is conservative, since the analyses of the basket and rail are performed in accordance with the rules of Subsection NF. Subsection NF allowables are based on Sm which is 1/3 the ultimate strength, while S is Y4 the ultimate strength. Thus there is additional margin built into the analysis of the basket and rail over and above the margin required by Subsection NF for class 1 materials. TN-32 Technical Specifications
Administrative Controls 5.0 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1 Training Module Training modules shall be developed under the general licensee's training program as required by 10 CFR 72.212(b)(6). Training modules shall require a comprehensive program for the operation and maintenance of the TN-32 spent fuel storage cask and the independent spent fuel storage installation {lSFSI). The training modules shall include the following elements, at a minimum:
- TN-32 cask design (overview)
- ISFSI Facility design (overview)
- Systems, Structures, and Components lmpo~nt to Safety (overview)
- TN-32 Dry Storage Cask Safety Analysis Report (overview)
- NRC Safety Evaluation Report (overview)
- Certificate of Compliance conditions
- TN-32 Technical Specifications
- Applicable Regulatory Requirements (e.g.,10 CFR72, Subpart K, 10 CFR 20, 10 CFR Part 73)
- Required Instrumentation and Use
- Operating Experience Reviews
- TN-32 Cask Operating and Maintenance procedures, including:
Fuel qualification and loading Rigging and handling Loading Operations as described in Chapter 8 of the SAR
~U~n~loading-Operations including reflooaing asdes-cribed-in-ChapterS-ofthe-SAR-----------
Auxiliary equipment operations and maintenance (i.e. vacuum drying, helium backfilling and leak testing, reflooding) Transfer operations including loading and unloading of the Transport Vehicle ISFSI Surveillance operations Radiation Protection Maintenance Security Off-normal and accident conditions, responses and corrective actions. 5.2 Programs The following programs shall be established, implemented, and maintained: TN-32 Technical Specifications 5.0-1
Administrative Controls 5.0 5.2.1 Cask Sliding Evaluation The TN-32 cask has been evaluated for sliding in the unlikely events of a seismic event. A static coefficient of friction of 0.35 is used in these analyses. This program provides a means for evaluating the coefficient of friction to ensure that the cask will not slide during the seismic event.
- a. Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.212, this program shall evaluate the site-specific ISFSI pad configurations/conditions to ensure that the cask would not slide during the postulated design basis earthquake. The program shall conclude that the surface static friction coefficient of friction is greater than or equal to 0.35.
- b. Alternatively, for site-specific ISFSI pad configurations/conditions with a lower coefficient of friction than 0.35, the program shall evaluate the site specific conditions to ensure that the TN-32 cask will not slide during the postulated design basis earthquake. The program shall also evaluate storm winds, missile impacts and flood forces to ensure that the cask will not slide such that it could result in impact with other casks or structures at the ISFSI. The program shall ensure that these alternative analyses are documented and controlled.
5.2.2 Cask Transport Evaluation Program This program provides a means for evaluating various transport configurations and transport route conditions to ensure that the design basis drop limits are met.
- a. Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.212, this program shall evaluate the site-specific transport conditions. To demonstrate compliance with Technical Specification 4.2.2, the program shall conclude that the expected lift height above the transport surface shall be less than or equal to that described by Technical Specification 4.2.2. Also, the program shall conclude that the transport route conditions (e.g., surface hardness and pad thickness) are equivalent to or less limiting than those prescribed for the typical pad surface which forms the basis for Technical Specification 4.2.2.
- b. Alternatively, for site-specific transport conditions which are not encompassed by those of Technical Specification 4.2.2, the program shall evaluate the site-specific conditions to ensure that the end-drop loading does not exceed 50 g. This alternative analysis shall be commensurate with the analysi$ which forms the basis of Technical Specification 4.2.2
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _(ReJ.erence TN-32 SAR Arwendix 3A). The program shall ensure that these alternative analyses are documented and controlled.
- c. This program shall establish administrative controls and procedures to ensure that cask TRANSPORT OPERATIONS are conducted within the limits imposed by the Technical Specifications or the alternative analysis described above.
5.2.3 Cask Surface Dose Rate Evaluation Program This program provides a means for ensuring that ISFSl's using TN-32 casks do not violate the requirements of 10 CFR 72 and Part 20 regarding radiation doses and dose rates.
- 1. As part of its evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 72.212, the licensee shall perform an analysis to confirm that the limits of 10CFR Part 20 and 10CFR Part 72.104 will be satisfied under the actual site conditions and configurations considering the planned number of casks to be used and the planned fuel loading conditions.
TN-32 Technical Specifications 5.0-2
Administrative Controls 5.0 5.2.3 Continued
- 2. On the basis of the analysis in TS 5.2.3.1, the licensee shall establish a set of cask surface dose rate limits which are to be applied to TN-32 casks used at the site. Limits shall establish average gamma-ray and neutron dose rates for:
A. The top of the TN-32 cask (protective cover) B. The sides of the radial neutron shield, . C. The side of the cask above the radial neutron shield, and D. The side of the cask below the radial neutron shield.
- 3. Not withstanding the limits established in TS 5.2.3.2, the dose rate limits may not exceed the values calculated in the SAR for a content of design basis fuel as follows:
A. 60 mr/hr gamma and 10 mrlhr neutron on the top (protective cover) B. 170 mr/hr gamma and 20 mr/hr neutron on the sides of the radial neutron shield C. 280 mr/hr gamma and 140 mr/hr neutron on the side surfaces of the cask above* the radial neutron shield region. D. 11 O mr/hr gamma and 200 mr/hr neutron on the side surfaces of the cask below the radial neutron shield region.
- 4. Prior to transport of a TN-32 containing spent fuel to the ISFSI, tne licensee shall measure the cask surface dose rates and calculate average values as described in 5.2.3.7 and 5.2.3.8.
The measured average dose rates shall be compared to the limits established in TS 5.2.3.2 or the limits in TS 5.2.3.3, whichever are lower.
- 5. If the measured average surface dose rates do not meet the limits of TS 5.2.3.2 or TS 5.2.3.3, whichever are lower, the licensee shall take the following actions:
A. Notify the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission {Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards) within 30 days. B. Administratively verify that the correct fuel was loaded, and C. Perform an analysis to determine that placement of the as-loaded cask at the ISFSI will not cause ffielSFST to exceeo1M-radiatiorrexposareiimits-oMe-GFl't--------- Parts 20 and 72.
- 6. If the analysis in 5.2.3.5.C shows that placement of the as-loaded cask at the ISFSI will cause the ISFSI to exceed the radiation exposure limits of 10CFR Parts 20 and 72, the licensee shall remove all fuel assemblies from the cask within 30 days of the time of cask loading.
- 7. The surface dose rates shall be measured at approximately the following points (see also Figure 5.2.3-1).
A. Above the Radial Neutron Shield (A): Midway between the top of the cask body flange and the top of the radial neutron shield. At least six measurements equally spaced circumferentially. TN-32 Technical Specifications 5.0-3
Administrative Controls 5.0 5.2.3 Continued B. Sides of Radial Neutron Shield (8, C and D): one sixth, one half and five sixths of the distance from the top of the radial neutron shield. At least six measurements equally spaced circumferentially at each elevation, two of which shall be at the circumferential location of the cask trunnions. However, no measurement shall be taken directly over the trunnion:. C. Below Radial Neutron Shield {E): Midway between the bottom of the radial neutron shield and the bottom of the cask. At least six measurements equally spaced circumferentially. D. Top of Cask (F, G and H): At the center of the protective cover, one measurement (F). Halfway between the center and the knuckle at.least four measurements equally spaced circumferentially (G). At the knuckle at least four measurements equally spaced circumferentially (H).
- a. The average dose rates shall be determined as follows.
In each of the four measurement zones in TS 5.2.3. 7, the sum of the dose rate measurements is divided by the number of measurements to determine the average for that zone. The neutron and gamma-ray dose rates are averaged-separately. Uniformly spaced dose rate measurement locations are chosen such that each point in a given zone represents approximately the same surface area. TN-32 Technical Specifications 5.0-4
F G__..---c*P.-....-...:. CASK BOTTOM
- NOTE: DOSE MEASUREMENTS ARB AT FIGURE 5.2.3-1
'CONTACT.*
-CONTACT DOSE RATE MEASUREMENTS LOCATIONS
'l'N-32 'l'echnical Specifications 5.0-5
THIS PAGE INTENTIALLY BLANK Rev. 0 1/00
TN-32 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.0 FUNCTIONAL AND OPERATING LIMITS ............................................................................... B 2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY ....................................... B 3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY ...................................................... B 3.0-4 3.1 CASK INTEGRITY .......................................................................................:................... 8 3.1.1-1 3.1.1 Cask Cavity Vacuum Drying ...................................................................................... 8 3.1.1-1 3.1.2 Cask Helium Backfill Pressure ................................................................................... B 3.1.2-1 3.1.3 Cask Helium Leak Rate ............................................................................................. B 3.1.3-1 3.1.4 Combined Helium Leak Rate ..................................................................................... 8.3.1.4-1 3.1.5 Cask lnterseal Pressure ............................................................................................. B 3.1.5-1 3.1.6 Cask Minimum Lifting Temperature .......................................................................... B 3.1-6-1 3.2 CASK RADIATION PROTECTION .................................................................................. B 3.2.1-1 3.2.1 Cask Surface Contamination ...................................................................................... B 3.2.1-1 3.3 CASK CRITICALITY CONTROL ...................................................................................... B 3.3.1-1 3.3.1 Dissolved Boron Concentration ................................................................................. B 3.3.1-1 TN-32 Technical Specifications B-i
Functional and Operating Limits Bases 82.0 B 2.0 FUNCTIONAL AND OPERATING LIMITS B 2.1 / B 2.2 Fuel To Be Stored In The TN-32 Cask BASES BACKGROUND The cask design requires certain limits on spent fuel parameters, including fuel type, maximum allowable enrichment prior to irradiation, maximum bumup, minimum acceptable cooling time prior to storage in the cask, and physical condition of the spent fuel (i:e., intact fuel assemblies). Other Important limitations are the radiological source terms from the Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs) and Thimble Plug Assemblies (TPAs). These limitations are included in the thermal, structural, radiological, and criticality evaluations performed for the cask. APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS Various analyses have been performed that use these fuel parameters as assumptions. These assumptions are included in the thermal, criticality, structural, shielding and confinement analyses. The fuel geometry is determined by the fuel type designation (i.e. 14x14 std, 14x140FA, etc}. The maximum uranium content is not generally specified for each fuel type. However, the fuel manufacturer is required to provide the uranium content for each assembly. The maximum uranium content per assembly is taken from the criticality calculations presented in Chapter 6 of the SAR. The shielding analysis is based on nominal uranium content, which is slightly less than the values specified. However, minor variations In the uranium content will have an insignificant effect on the shielding results. Technical Specification Table 2.1.1-1 *provides the minimum cooling times based on a fuel minimum initial enrichment and maximum bumup. To use the table, the minimum enrichments are rounded down and bumups are rounded up. For example, fuel with a 2.68% enrichment and a bumup of 34.2 GWd/MTU would use the 2.6% enrichment row and the 35 GWd/MTU column. FUNCTIONAL AND OPERATING LIMITS VIOLATIONS 2.2.1 If Functional and Operating Limit 2.1 is violated, the limitations on the fuel assemblies in the cask have not been met. Actions must be taken to place the affected fuel
- assemblies in a safe condition. This safe condition may be established by returning the affected fuel assemblies to the spent fuel pool. However, it is acceptable for the affected fuel assemblies to remain in the cask if that is determined to be a safe condition. -
2.2.2 and 2.2.3 Notification of the violation of a Functional and Operating Limit to the NRC is required within 24 hours. Written reporting of the violation must be accomplished within 30 days. This notification and written report are independent of any reports and notification that may be required by 10CFR 72. 75.
.I TN-32 Technical Specifications B 2.0-1
LCO I SR Applicability Bases 83.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY BASES LCOs LCO 3.0.1, 3.0.2, 3.0.4, and 3.0.5 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated. LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met (i.e., when the cask is in the specified conditions of the Applicability statement of each Specification). LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated ACTIONS shall be met The Completion Time of each Required Action for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point in time that an
- ACTIONS Condition is entered. The Required Actions establish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when the requirements of an LCO are not met This Specification establishes that
- a. Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification; and
- b. Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met within the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified.
There are two basic types of Required Actions. The first type of Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limit is
.the Completion Time to restore a system or component or to restore variables .
to within specified limits. If this type of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, the cask may have to be placed in the spent fuel pool and unloaded. (Whether stated as a Required Action or not, correction of the entered Condition is an action that may always be considered upon entering ACTIONS.) The second type of Required Action specifies the remedial measures that permit continued operation of the unit that ls not further restricted by the Completion Time. In this case, compliance with the Required Actions provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. - ---*- -- - -- ------ --- __ Completing the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met or is no longer applicable, unless otherwise stated in the individual Specifications. The Completion Times of the Required Actions are also applicable wtien a system or component is removed from service intentionally. The reasons for intentionally relying on the ACTIONS include, but are not limited to, perfonnance of Surveillances, preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, or investigation of operational problems. Entering ACTIONS for these reasons must be done in a manner that does not compromise safety. Intentional entry into ACTIONS should not be made for operational convenience. TN;.32 Technical Specifications B 3.0--1
LCO J SR Applicability Bases B3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.2 (continued) Individual Specifications may specify a time limit for performing an SR when *- equipment is removed from service or bypassed for testing. In this case, the Completion Times of the Required Actions are applicable when this time limit expires, if the equipment remains removed from service or bypassed. When a change In specified condition is required to comply with Required Actions, the cask may enter a specified condition in which anottter Specification becomes applicable. In this case, the Completion Times of the associated Required Actions would apply from the point in time that the new Specification becomes applicable and the ACTIONS Condition(s) are entered. LCO 3.0.3 This specification is not applicable to a cask. The placeholder is retained for consistency with the power reactor technical specifications. LCO 3.0.4 LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. It precludes placing the cask in a specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., Applicability desired to be entered) when the following exist:
- a. Conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met in the Applicability desired to be entered; and
- b. Continued noncompliance with the LCO requirements, if the Applicability were entered, would result in the cask being required to exit the Applicability desired to be entered to comply with the Required Actions.
Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the cask for an unlimited period of time in specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. Therefore, in such cases, entry into a specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions. The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components before entering an associated specified condition in the Applicability.
- The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in specified conditions in the Applicability that are related to the unloading ofa cask.
Exceptions to LCO 3.0.4 are stated in the individual Specifications. Exceptions may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification. TN-32 Technical Specifications B 3.0-2
LCO I SR Applicability Bases B 3.0 BASES LC03.0.4 Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated equipment out (continued) of service (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, changing specified conditions while in an ACTIONS Condition, either in compliance with LCO 3.0.4 or where an exception to LCO 3.0.4 Is stated, is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for those Surveillances that do not have to be performed due to the associated out of service equipment LCO 3.0.5 LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or not in service in compliance with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of required testing to demonstrate:
- a. The equipment being returned to service meets the LCO; or
- b. Other equipment meets the applicable LCOs.
The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS 'is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the allowed required testing. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance. LCO 3.0.6 this specification is not applicable to a cask. The placeholder is retained for consistency with the power reactor technical specifications. LCO 3.0.7 This specification is not applicable to a cask. The placeholder is retained for consistency wit}}