ML15020A701
| ML15020A701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/2015 |
| From: | David Silk Operations Branch I |
| To: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14174B408 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC U01894 | |
| Download: ML15020A701 (1) | |
Text
Question R0#61 Licensee Recommendation: The licensee proposed to delete this question based upon there is no correct answer. Although the 2R46 monitors were designed to provide continuous monitoring of high-level, post-accident releases of radioactive noble gases via the safety relief valves, the atmospheric dump valves, and the auxiliary feed pump turbine, they will exhibit a response to N-16 at levels corresponding to leak rates in the gallon per minute range according to DCP 80057587. Thus, these monitors can provide indication of a tube leak while the unit is at power.
NRC
Conclusion:
This question was initially acceptable for the examination based upon the (incorrect) premise that the 2R46 monitors would only provide indication during high levels of post-accident releases of radioactive noble gases. However, based upon documentation stating that these monitors can provide indication in response to N-16 during low steam generator tube leak rates, the NRC concluded that Choice b. is incorrect. The NRC will delete this question based upon the determination that there is no correct answer.
Question SR0#6 Licensee Recommendation: The licensee proposed that Choice c. be accepted as an additional correct response. According to the licensee, several applicants assumed that for the given conditions that condenser delta-T would increase rapidly, therefore the Continuous Action Summary of S1.0P-AB.CW-0001 would come into effect because condenser delta-T would exceed 27 °F. This would require the crew to initiate a load reduction in accordance with S1.0P-AB.LOAD-0001, thus making Choice c. to be a correct response. The applicants' assumption was substantiated by a simulator plant computer screen shot showing the rapid increase in condenser delta-T when the conditions provided in the question were run on the simulator and, within a short period of time, condenser delta-T reached 30°F.
NRC
Conclusion:
This question was initially acceptable for the examination based upon the (incorrect) premise that the Continuous Action Summary would not come into effect. However, based upon the simulator modeling of condenser delta-T for the given conditions, the NRC concluded that Choice c. is a correct response. The NRC will accept Choices c. and d. as correct responses to this question.
Question SR0#8 Licensee Recommendation: The licensee proposed to delete this question based upon there is no correct answer. For the given plant conditions (no emergency diesel generators running), the service water supply header isolation valves (SW3!~s) would already be closed. These valves are normally closed unless their respective EDG is running. Therefore, if a leak developed on the 28 EDG Lube Oil Cooler (Choice c.), it would not reduce SW header pressure because the oil cooler is already isolated. The proposal to delete this question is based up the SW flow path on Drawing 205342 Sheet 3 and the valve control logic on Drawing 246689.
NRC
Conclusion:
This question was initially acceptable for the examination based upon the (incorrect) premise that the service supply header isolation valves (SW39s) were in the open position. However, based upon the plant conditions provided in the question, and documentation supporting that these valves would have already been closed, the NRC concluded that Choice c. is incorrect. The NRC will delete this question based upon the determination that there is no correct answer.