ML14356A586
ML14356A586 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Salem ![]() |
Issue date: | 10/22/2014 |
From: | David Silk Operations Branch I |
To: | Gauding G Public Service Enterprise Group |
Shared Package | |
ML14174B408 | List: |
References | |
TAC U01894 | |
Download: ML14356A586 (284) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump TASK NUMBER: N0020080101 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC RO A1-1 ALTERNATE PATH: a.....l_ _,l KIA NUMBER: 2.1.25
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.2
- -3.9 ---
APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoCJ Ro[8] STAC] SROCJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0003, Overhead Annunciators Window C, Rev. 17 S2.0P-SO.RC-0004, Identifying and Measuring Leakage, Rev. 15 (Both Rev checked 9-26-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 15 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-26-14 Instructor Validated By: D Tait Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor
~~
Approved By: Date: tO-?..- 7--/ t; { £!/'- '~v'"-'{ Approved By: t\ 1\ /\_/\ (~.__\)~) Date: oke~at~ns-Re~ent~ ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From NJJr.IP:::Jr Tr::1ininn
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump TASK NUMBER: N00200801 01 SIMULATOR SETUP IC-241, 100% power MOL. RT-1 is MALF SW0218 Severity 1 Replace normal copy of S2.0P-SO.RC-0004, Identifying and Measuring Leakage, Attachment 1, Pump Data, located next to Aux Alarm Typewriter with Att. 1 from this JPM showing: Stop time 1510 yesterday, leak rate <.28, elapsed run time 13568 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 is operating at 100% power, steady state, BOL. INITIATING CUE: You are the RO. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained}.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Operator calculates leakage into Containment Sump of 0.3 gpm.
Page 2 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Soecific Permic::c::inn i=rnm 1\lr rf'lo-:>r Tr .... ;n;n~
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: --------------------- SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)* EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
Simulator Operator insert RT-1 on direction from Evaluator. Announces OHA C-2 CNTMT SUMP PMP START as unexpected. Refers to ARP for OHA C-2. ARP !E any indication of an RCS leak or Scans board parameters and OHA C-2 an interconnecting ECCS leak determines there are no indications of 3.1 affecting RCS inventory, THEN GO an RCS leak or an interconnecting TO S2.0P-AB.RC-0001(Q), Reactor ECCS leak affecting RCS inventory. Coolant System Leak. Page 3 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
ARP DETERMINE a leakrate lAW S2.0P- Determines containment sump leak rate OHA C-2 SO.RC-0004(0), Identifying and as follows: 3.1 Measuring Leakage. Note: Operator may perform section 5.1, Locating RCS leakage, but it is not directed because it is not known what the reason for the containment sump pump run is. Section 5.3 Measuring Leakage to Containment Sump should be performed. SO.RC-4 Each time a Containment Sump 5.3.1 Pump starts, RECORD the following on Attachment 1, Section 2.0:
- Operating Containment Sump Records "21 cont sump".
Pump Number
- Time of pump start Records time of pump start Cue: When determining pump start time from Aux Typewriter or OHA CRT, then state: 21 containment sump pump started at 0800.
Page 4 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
SO.RC-4 CALCULATE elapsed time in minutes Calculates elapsed time in minutes 5.3.2 between start time and previous between start time and previous Containment Sump Pump stop time Containment Sump Pump stop time AND RECORD on Attachment 1, and records on Attachment 1, Section
- Section 2.0. 2.0. by using previous stop time of 1510 yesterday, and with cue of 0800 today determines elapsed time is 1,000 minutes.
SO.RC-4 ENSURE no draining, sampling, or 5.3.3 liquid additions to Containment Sump Cue: No draining, sampling, or liquid have occurred during selected time additions to Containment Sump have frame. occurred during selected time frame. SO.RC-4 CALCULATE Containment Sump Calculates Containment Sump Leak 5.3.4 Leak Rate using Attachment 3. Rate using Attachment 3 by using page
- 1 of 2 of Att. 3, and determines the 1,000 minute line crosses the 0.3 gpm leak rate line.
SO.RC-4 RECORD calculated Containment Records calculated Containment Sump 5.3.5 Sump leak rate on Attachment 1, leak rate on Attachment 1, Section 2.0. i Section 2.0. as 0.3 gpm.
*------- I Page 5 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: -------------------- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
SO.RC-4 Direct a second Operator to Directs a second Operator to perform 5.3.6 PERFORM Independent Verification Independent Verification of the of the calculation(s) performed in calculation(s) performed in Attachment Attachment 1, Section 2.0. 1, Section 2.0 .. Cue: IV is complete SAT. SO.RC-4 RECORD Containment Sump Pump Records Containment Sump Pump stop 5.3.7 stop time and date on Attachment 1, time and date on Attachment 1, Section Section 2.0. 2.0. Records stop time. SO.RC-4 IF leakage to Containment Sump Determines leakage to Containment 5.3.8 exceeds 1.0 gpm AND Unit in Modes Sump does not exceed 1.0 gpm 1-4, THEN: A. INITIATE S2.0P-ST.RC-0008(Q), Reactor Coolant Water Inventory Balance. B. REFER to Technical Specification 3.4.7.2. SO.RC-4 !E leakage to Containment Sump Determines leakage to Containment 5.3.9 exceeds 0.85 gpm, THEN INITIATE Sump does not exceed 0.85 gpm. Section 5.6 of this procedure. Cue: JPM is comr:>lete. Page 6 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ~ 1. Task description -~n~ number, JPM description and number are identified. C)::::::::-_2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. 0 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____g__ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
V 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). _0___ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev.~ Date r D { r f { C'1 9 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.
~~£+-
SME/Instructor: ~ Date: SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ Page 7 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 is operating at 100% power, steady state, BOL. INITIATING CUE: You are the RO. Page 8 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK: Perform a QPTR TASK NUMBER: N0150020201 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC RO Admin A1-2 ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 2.1.43
--------~~------~
IMPORTANCEFACTOR: --~4~.1~-- APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD RO[ZJ STAD SROD EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002 Rev. 15 All rev checked 09/24/14 S1.RE-RA.. ZZ-0011 Rev. 383 Tech Spec 3.2.4 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 30 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 09-24-14 Instructor Validated By: E Bak Date: 10-14-14 SME or Instructor Date: Approved By: Training Department Date: Approved By: Operations Representative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK: Perform a QPTR TASK NUMBER: N0150020201 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when rod 204 dropped fully into the core. OHA E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR annunciated and remains locked in. Operators have not yet started reducing power to 74% to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d lAW S1.0P-AB.ROD-002, Dropped Rod. INITIATING CUE: The CRS has directed you to perform a QPTR using Manual Calculation lAW S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002. Nl currents are: Upper Detectors Lower Detectors N41 190 200 N42 200 215 N43 180 175 N44 200 205 Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Perform the QPTR and calculate the highest QPTR as SAT.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK* Perform a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation) Provide blank copy of S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002, Rev.15, Power Distribution- Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, a copy of S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Rev. I 383,Tables, and a copy of Tech Spec 3.2.4. 2.1 IDENTIFY sections of this procedure that are N/A's Section 5.2, Attachment 1 Section 3.0, and NOT to be performed with "N/A". Attachment 3. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS Reads and initials PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1-3.5 I 5.1.1 IF one PR channel is inoperable, AND RTP is Determines all PR channel are operable and step
>75%, THEN ... is NA.
5.1.2 RECORD the following data on Attachment 2
- Date Records current date, current time, 100% reactor
- Time power and checks OHA E-46 as reason for
- Reactor Power performance in Attachment 2.
- Reason for performing QPTR Calculation PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK: Perform a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
{*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL {Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation)
- 5.1.3 RECORD the following data on Attachment 1:
- Nl Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44 Records on Attachment 1: (From initial Upper Detector current readings conditions)
- Nl Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44
- Nl channels N41-44 Upper Detector Lower Detector current readings Current Readings
- Respective 100% Nl Current Values for
- Nl channels N41-44 Lower Detector Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44 Current Readings Detectors from S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Table
- 100% Nl Current Values from S1.RE-2 RA.ZZ-0011, TABLES NOTE: Attachment 1, Section 3 is NOT required to be performed to determine detector currents. It was added at Rev. 12 to use "when any NIS meter is suspect."
If asked, CUE that all Power Range Detectors are Operable. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK* Perform a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation)
- 5.1.4 COMPLETE Attachment 1 calculations. For Top and Bottom Detectors: (numbers as per key for evaluator)
- Calculates Detector Ratio for each top and bottom detector.
- Adds detector ratios to get Sum of detector ratios.
- Divides Sum by number of operable detectors (4) to get Average Detector Ratios.
- Places Average Detector Ratios in 41h I column of Att. 1
- Divides each detector ratio by the average ratio to get the power tilt for each I
detector. Cue: IV is complete when asked for IV of calculations I I
- 5.1.5 RECORD the following on Attachment 2 Records information on Attachment 2 (as per key
- 1. "Power Tilt" for each detector. for evaluator)
- 2. "Maximum Power Tilt" and applicable Maximum Power Tilt for Top and Bottom will be detector identification information. <1.02 and marked SAT
- 3. Test Results by initialing SAT or UNSAT column lAW stated Acceptance Criteria.
5.1.6 DIRECT a second Operator to perform Cue: IV is complete SAT. Independent Verification of calculations in Attachment 1, Sections 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 as applicable. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK* Perform a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation) 5.1.7 !E the Maximum Power Tilt for any detector Determines no tilt exceeds 1.02. exceeds 1.02, THEN REFER to TIS 3.2.4 for corrective actions. 5.3.1 This surveillance is satisfactory when Attachment 2 or 3 is completed with the Test Data meeting the Acceptance Criteria stated. Determines surveillance is SAT. 5.4.1 COMPLETE Attachment 4, Sections 1.0 and 2.0, AND FORWARD completed procedure to SM/CRS for review. JPM is terminated when candidate returns all JPM paperwork to evaluator. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ____ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. _ _ _ _ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) _ _ _ _ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. _ _ _ _ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. _ _ _ _ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. _ _ _ _ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). _ _ _ _ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _ _ Date _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _ _ _ _ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when rod 204 dropped fully into the core. OHA E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR annunciated and remains locked in. Operators have not yet started reducing power to 74% to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d lAW S1.0P-AB.ROD-002, Dropped Rod. INITIATING CUE: The CRS has directed you to perform a QPTR using Manual Calculation lAW S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002. Nl currents are: Upper Detectors Lower Detectors N41 190 200 N42 200 215 N43 180 175 N44 200 205 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout TASK NUMBER: N3130060301 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC RO Admin A2 ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 2.2.13
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: - - 4.1- - APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoCJ R0[8J STAC] SROCJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom OP-AA-1 09-115, Rev. 7, Safety Tagging Operations (rev checked 9-26-14)
REFERENCES:
Various drawings TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 30 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 09-26-14 Instructor Validated By: S Bickhart Date: 10-14-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: {0r~>""J Date: fD- 2-7 ...-/1( artment
* --~. /" Lf l 6 - '-' J Approved By: (~~(;) Date:
eseh.'t.ative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout TASK NUMBER: N3130060301 SIMULATOR SETUP INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. While performing a surveillance on 11 Safety Injection Pump, a leak was observed on the pump outlet flange discharge piping. The Work Clearance Module is not available due to an emergent power outage. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to perform the following:
- 1. Determine the correct blocking points which will allow repair of the 11 Sl pump.
- 2. Sequence those blocking points in the correct order.
- 3. Determine the correct tag type for each blocking point.
- 4. Determine the required positions necessary to allow repair on 11 Sl pump.
- 5. Enter all the above information on the provided OP-AA-1 09-115, Safety Tagging Operations Form 4.
Specific WCM identifiers are NOT required. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Identifies correct blocking points.
- 2. Sequence tagging in order by 1: Bezels, 2: Electrical, 3: Mechanical isolation, 4: Vents and drains.
- 3. Identifies correct tag types for components.
- 4. Identifies desired positions.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- NO. STANDARD S/U UN SAT Provide candidate with package Note: If requested, provide extra blank copies of containing several blank Form 4's, Form 4 Tagging/Untagging Work List (Tagging/Untagging Worklist), a copy of OP-AA-109-115, Safety Tagging Operations, drawings 205234 sheets 1-4, 203002, 207910-207912, and 207931-207933. Several of these drawings are not required.
- Determines Blocking Points as per key.
- Sequences Blocking Points in following order:
- 1. Bezels
- 2. Electrical Isolation
- 3. Mechanical Isolation
- 4. Vents and Drains
- Determines correct tag type for each Blocking Point as per key.
- Determines position required for each Blocking Point as per key.
Page 3 of 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires .Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- NO. STANDARD S/U UN SAT Notes for Evaluators:
Attachment 2, Component Tagging Rules, contains information which allows for the following:
- 1. "A minimum of 1 vent or drain is required to be RBT opened, there is no limit to how many can be used inside boundaries." (This is why all the vents and drains are sequenced #16)
- 2. MOV's are allowed to be used as Blocking Points. It would be acceptable procedurally if the 11 SJ113 AND 12SJ113 were used as Blocking Points instead of the single manual valve 1SJ 114. IF used as blocking points, the 11/12SJ 113 breakers (RBT-OFF), bezels (INFO), and valve handwheels (RBT-SHUT)would also be required to be tagged.
Note for Evaluators: The electrical power to a component must be cleared and tagged before that components manual operator is tagged, but may be sequenced within the tagout after other manual valves have been tagged.
'f ~
Note: Actual WCD 4278552 (CRTE) used as the l bases for the blocking points in JPM, with addition of vents and drains.
~ ~*~*.
Page 4 of 6 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training I I¥
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _____5_ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
~ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
__s~- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) __S=--- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ~ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ---'5"'----- 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ~ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev.__::]__ Date tOh4f )L/
___(_ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_______ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _______ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: ~
<~!f.J-- P;it kHu*r Date: /0/1 '-1 /1 t{
SME/Instructor: Date: ----------- SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: ___________ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. While performing a surveillance on 11 Safety Injection Pump, a leak was observed on the pump outlet flange discharge piping. The Work Clearance Module is not available due to an emergent power outage. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to perform the following:
- 1. Determine the correct blocking points which will allow repair of the 11 Sl pump.
- 2. Sequence those blocking points in the correct order.
- 3. Determine the correct tag type for each blocking point.
- 4. Determine the required positions necessary to allow repair on 11 Sl pump.
- 5. Enter all the above information on the provided OP-AA-1 09-115, Safety Tagging Operations Form 4.
Specific WCM identifiers are NOT required. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE TASK: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert TASK NUMBER: N1240100501 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC RO Admin A4 ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 2.4.39
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.9 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoC] Ro[D STAC] SROCJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator EP-SA-111-F8, Attachment 8 Secondary Communicator Log, Rev. 02 (checked 9-
REFERENCES:
26-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 8 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-26-14 Instructor Validated By: S Bickhart Date: 10-14-14 Approved By: Ml~uc6~~ Date: l0 .-'2- J-1 '1 Approved By: RJC~~m~G) Date: ro~ll*'i dp~rations~rese~ve ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert. TASK NUMBER: N1240100501 SIMULATOR OPERATOR CALL THE EROS HELP DESK ON LAND LINE 1-301-415-0467 OR CELL PHONE 1-240-731-2581 BEFORE STARTING JPMS TO INFORM THEM EROS WILL BE ACTIVATED DURING EXAM. PLACE FOLLOWUP CALL AFTER LAST RO HAS PERFORMED JPM. INITIAL CONDITIONS: An ALERT was declared at Salem due to the Unit 2 reactor failing to trip when a manual trip signal was initiated. The Rx tripped when the second trip handle was used. The unit is currently stable in MODE 3. The Emergency News Center (ENC) has not activated yet. INITIATING CUE: You are the Secondary Communicator. You are directed to perform EP-SA-111-F8, Attachment 8 Secondary Communicator Log Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Activate EROS.
- 2. Does NOT provide plant information to outside caller.
- 3. Terminate EROS.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _____________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _____________________ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
Provide a copy of ECG Attachment 8. Fills out ECG Attachment 8 by:
- 1. Printing name
- 2. Circles ALERT and circles CM2.
A.1 OBTAIN a copy of Attachment 6 and ASSIST Primary Communicator with Cue: Primary Communicator does not 15-minute notifications, as necessary. require assistance. A.2 DIRECT the Shift Rad Pro Tech (SRPT) (2644) to implement SC.EP- Cue: Shift Rad Pro Tech (Matt EP.ZZ-0301(Q) Shift Radiation Hassler) has been notified to Protection Technician Response. implement SC.EP-EP.ZZ-0301(0) (N/A for Common Site) Shift Radiation Protection Technician Response. A.3 !E_in an UNUSUAL EVENT Only, THEN, within approximately 30 Determines not in an Unusual Event. minutes, FAX a copy of the ICMF to the NEI Duty Manager at FAX# 9 202-785-4113 (backup Fax# 9 202-533-0180).
----~ ------ ---- - ~- - - --- - ----- ---- ~- --~ ~-- ~-
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 10
I OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (* Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) l A.4 For an ALERT or higher emergency; f
- a. !E an on-shift SRO is not available to fill the OSC Cue: The WCC Supervisor is the OSC Operations Supervisor Supervisor.
position, CALLOUT an additional SRO and have him/her report to the OSC. A.4 b. Within 60 minutes, ACTIVATE Cue if needed: The SM directs you to EROS from a LAN computer. activate EROS now. I A.4. PROCEED to a computer with its Proceeds to a computer with its i b.1 monitor labeled "EROS XXX" (XXX monitor labeled "EROS XXX" (XXX is is the computers asset tag number) the computers asset tag number) in in the Salem Control Room and the Salem Control Room and starts
- START the program by SELECTING the program by selecting the the ERDS_Salem desktop icon. ERDS_Salem desktop icon.
A.4. b.2 On the "Login For EROS Display" On the "Login For EROS Display" i
- popup window ENTER the popup window enters the PASSWORD PASSWORD and SELECT "Login" and selects"Login" to proceed. {The to proceed. (The Username will be Username will be displayed and the displayed and the password is the password is the same as the same as the Username) Username)
~-~-
PSEG Restricted -Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 10 i
~
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE i Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert I
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) I
~
A.4. b.3 SELECT the Action button labeled Selects the Action button labeled
- <CONNECT> on the appropriate <CONNECT> on the Salem 2 "EROS Salem 1 or Salem 2 "EROS Link Link Control and Status Display Control and Status Display Screen". Screen". f A.4.
b.4 SELECT the <YES> button in the Selects the <YES> button in the
- "Current Link Control State is "Current Link Control State is Disconnect. Do You Want To Disconnect. Do You Want To Connect?" box. Connect?" box.
A.4. b.5 OBSERVE that Status changes to Observes that Status changes to "Transmitting Data." "Transmitting Data." I A.4. b.6 VERIFY successful communications Verifies successful communications status by observing that the status by observing that the "Messages Sent" value is increasing "Messages Sent" value is increasing from zero "0" to some positive from zero "0" to some positive integer integer> "0". > "0".
~- ~ ~- -- - -- -- -~
I PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
A.4. b.7 INFORM the CRS of successful Informs the CRS of successful EROS EROS activation status. activation status. Cue: Steps A4 through A7 are complete. Steps A8 through A 10 are not required to be completed at this time. Section B is not required to be completed at this time. Simulator O~erator: After the previous step cue has been repeated back, call the desk phone and say the following:
- "This is Anderson Cooper calling Does NOT give plant information to from CNN headquarters in Atlanta. caller.
We have received a report that the Salem 2 reactor has experienced a Attachment 8, Section C, INCOMING Rx accident and the core is melting. CALLS, MEDIA, CAUTION, states, Can you give me an update on the "Communicators are NOT authorized current condition of Salem Unit 2?" to release any information to the News Media." May read either Attachment 8, section C, Incoming Calls, 3.C, OR tell them he cannot provide any information.
-----~--- --- ----- **----- ---- ------ --- **-- -- -- -
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS I NO. (* Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) I CUE: Once EROS is activated AND Media call action is complete, then state, "The Station Event has been terminated. The NRC Operations Center directs you to terminate EROS transmission." '
When directed by the NRC, I C.4.a TERMINATE Emergency Response Data System (EROS) transmission as follows: I C.4.b I RETURN to the computer labeled Returns to the computer labeled "EROS XXX" used to activate EROS "EROS XXX" used to activate EROS in in the Control Room. lE_the "EROS the Control Room. lE_the "EROS Link I Link Control and Status Display Control and Status Display Screen" Screen" was "MINIMIZED" THEN, was "MINIMIZED" THEN, maximizes it. MAXIMIZE it. I I C.4.c SELECT the appropriate (Salem Unit Selects the Salem Unit 2 Action
- 1 or Salem Unit 2) Action Button Button marked <DISCONNECT> on marked <DISCONNECT> on the the "EROS Link Control and Status "EROS Link Control and Status Display" Screen.
Display" Screen. I PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
C.4.d SELECT the <YES> button in the Selects the <YES> button in the
* "Current Link Control State is "Current Link Control State is Connect.
Connect. Do You Want To Do You Want To Disconnect?" box. Disconnect?" box. Terminate JPM. '- ~-- --- - - - --- --- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ~ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. --/"""'<)'--- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. __c;~~- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
<)' 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
'<;-;;---_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
__,.,_)-::r- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. (
/ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*).
____s__ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. - Date lq/r 4 / t I - - - - 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: ~ -J,"-" i/JICi Date: IV }1 '-1}1 V SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 9 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: An ALERT has been declared at Salem due to the Unit 2 reactor failing to trip when a manual trip signal was initiated. The Rx tripped when the second trip handle was used.
- The unit is currently stable in MODE 3.
The Emergency News Center (ENC) has not activated yet. INITIATING CUE: You are the Secondary Communicator. You are directed to perform EP-SA-111-F8, Secondary Communicator Log PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 10 of 10
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Chilled Water Loads TASK NUMBER: 0980020202 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC SRO Admin A1-1 ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 2.1.25
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.2 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD RoD STAD SR00 EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.CH-0001 Rev. 30 (checked 9-25-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 8 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-3-14 Instructor Validated By: N Salam Date: 10-16-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: 0~~~~~ Date: f6- 2 7 ,......;'-( ini~-D~ment l()'l,J - ( ~( Approved By: (tv\o\; ') Date: res~tive ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 'I of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Chilled Water TASK: Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Chilled Water Loads TASK NUMBER: 0980020202 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power during a summer heat wave.
- 2. At 1300, 22 Chiller trips on freeze protection followed shortly by 21 chiller, and neither can be reset.
- 3. Technical Specification LCO 3. 7.1 O.a Action b.1. is in effect and non-essential heat loads need to be removed from the chilled water system.
- 4. Inlet Water Temperature Readings from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(Q), Circulating I Service Water Log at 0800:
2TL3756 = 73.4°F 2TL3757 = 73.5°F
- 5. Outside air temperature has risen from 81 oF to 99°F during this watch.
INITIATING CUE: Identify non-essential heat loads to be removed from service in order to comply with TS 3.7.10. a Action b.1. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion: Identify combination of heat loads which will remove at least 999.1 kBTU/hr from chilled water svstem. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Chilled Water Name: Task: Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads Date: STEP STEP NO. (*=Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT Evaluation)
Provide blank copies ofTS 3.7.10, Chilled Water System- Auxiliary Building Subsystem and S2.0P-SO.CH-0001(0), Chilled Water System Operation. SO.CH-1 IF two Chillers are inoperable, THEN 5.6.2 SELECT components for isolation lAW Attachment 2. Att 2 RECORD the following data for use in 1.0 Table A:
- 1.1 Inlet Water Temperature from Enters temperatures from cue SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(0), Circulating I sheet onto Attachment 2 form.
Service Water Log: Adds 1.5 deg. to highest temp (73.5) and enters 75.0 deg. 2TL3756=- - °F 2TL3757= OF
- Lists 2 chillers out of service.
From the above indicated 2TL3756/2TL3757 temperatures, RECORD the highest temperature AND ADD 1.5°F to account for instrument uncertainty. Utilize this temperature I when referring to Table A OF+ 1.5°F = OF (highest temp) 1.2 Number of inoperable Chiller Units:_ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Chilled Water Name: Task: Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads Date: STEP STEP NO. (* = Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT Evaluation) I Att 2 Conservative decision making should NOTE be used when determining the Based on the rise in outside air appropriate non-essential heat loads to temperature between the 0800 be isolated. If inlet water temperature is inlet temperature reading and anticipated to exceed the selected inlet now (1300), and that the 75°F water temperature values, then heat temp used for calculation is right loads should be removed for the next at the limit to go up one category, higher inlet water temperature values. determines heat loads for inlet temp > 75°F should be used.
- 2.0 RECORD the TOTAL HEAT LOAD Enters 999.1 kBTU/hr.
ISOLATION from Table A: kBTU/hr 3.0 IDENTIFY the components to be isolated in Table B as follows: 3.1 RECORD the value from the HEAT Records values from HEAT LOAD
~
LOAD column into the Isolation column into Isolation column in Table B for the components selected for for following components: isolation. Any combination of components may be selected as long as the total heat load selected is > 999.1
~
kBTU/hr. I
- 4.0 ADD the values recorded in the Adds values in ISOLATION Isolation column AND RECORD the column. Verifies total is greater Total Isolation value in Table B that 999.1 kBTU/hr.
PSEG Restricted -Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8 I
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Chilled Water Name: Task: Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads Date: STEP STEP NO. (* =Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT Evaluation) 5.0 ENSURE that the Total Isolation value Verifies Total Isolation value I recorded in Table B is;::: the Total Heat recorded in Table B is;::: the Total Load Isolation recorded in Step 2.0 of Heat Load Isolation recorded in this attachment. Step 2.0 of this attachment. II Terminate JPM when procedure I SO.CH-0001(0), Chilled Water System Operation is returned to
'-- -~ evaluator. f PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
f>OJ<"' In.\" n +wn c> lJ
\0/"b\ ;, ~ ;J-
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _V'It\_*_ _ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. __Vi_~-- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. __Yvt __ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) __"(VA. __ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. _ _V'I-\_* __ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. W1 ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. __W_~_ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
--~-- 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM ma that procedure: Procedure Rev . .3Q__ Date -=5~,""+~..J:...L_-
jq
----'Y}A..L--1&1_ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate. @... 8 '.Mir'\
NIP.. 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _N_)-A __ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. ~tructor: ~ _ __ _ _ _ L!:._ _ _ __~
"5 __.~ Date: _lo_/_Jb--=-/_li4_ _
SME/Instructor: Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- 2. Control Room ventilation is aligned in the Maintenance Mode with Unit 1 EACS 0/S and unavailable.
- 3. 22 Chiller trips on freeze protection and cannot be reset.
- 4. Technical Specification LCO 3. 7.1 O.a Action a.1. is in effect and non-essential heat loads need to be removed from the chilled water system.
- 5. Inlet Water Temperature Readings from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(0), Circulating I Service Water Log:
2TL3756 = 73.4°F 2TL3757 = 74.0°F INITIATING CUE: Identify non-essential heat loads to be removed from service in order to comply with TS 3.7.1 0. a Action a.1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Administrative- Review Calculations that Determine Plant Status TASK: Review a QPTR TASK NUMBER: N1200170105 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC SRO Admin A1-2 ALTERNATE PATH: I I KIA NUMBER: 2.1.18
--------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.8 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO Eoc:J Roc:J STAD SRO[K] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002 Rev. 15 All rev checked 9-24-14 S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011 Rev. 383 Tech Spec 3.2.4 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 30 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-24-14 Instructor Validated By: N Salam Date: 10-16-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: Training Department Approved By: Date: Facility Representative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ------------------------ DATE: ------------------------ SYSTEM: Administrative- Review Calculations that Determine Plant Status TASK: Review a QPTR TASK NUMBER: N1200170105 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when rod 2D4 dropped fully into the core. OHA E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR annunciated and remains locked in. Operators have not yet started reducing power to 74% to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d lAW S1.0P-AB.ROD-002, Dropped Rod. INITIATING CUE: Review the completed S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002, Power Distribution- Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio for completeness and accuracy. Note any discrepancies, if any, and required actions, if any, on Attachment 4. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Review the QPTR and determine it has been performed correctly, with SAT results.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK" Review a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation) Provide Candidate with completed copy of S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002, Rev. 15, Power Distribution - Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, a copy of S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Rev. 383, Tables, and a copy of Tech Spec 3.2.4. 2.1 IDENTIFY sections of this procedure that are Verifies proper section of procedure used and NOT to be performed with "N/A". Section 5.2, Attachment 1 Section 3.0, and Attachment 3 are N/A. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS Verifies PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1-3.5 initialed. 5.1.1 IF one PR channel is inoperable, AND RTP is Verifies all PR channel are operable and step is
>75%, THEN ... marked NA.
5.1.2 RECORD the following data on Attachment 2
- Date Verifies current date, current time, 100% reactor
- Time power and that OHA E-46 as reason for
- Reactor Power performance in Attachment 2 is checked
- Reason for performing QPTR Calculation PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK* Review a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation) 5.1.3 RECORD the following data on Attachment 1:
- Nl Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44 Verifies data completed on Attachment 1:
Upper Detector current readings
- Nl channels N41-44 Upper Detector
- Nl Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44 Current Readings Lower Detector current readings
- Nl channels N41-44 Lower Detector
- Respective 100% Nl Current Values for Current Readings Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44
- 100% Nl Current Values from S1.RE-Detectors from S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Table RA.ZZ-0011, TABLES 2
Note: Attachment 1, Section 3 was NOT required to be performed to determine detector currents. It was added at Rev. 12 to use "when any NIS meter is suspect." If asked, Cue that all Power Range Detectors are/were Operable.
- 5.1.4 COMPLETE Attachment 1 calculations. Verifies calculations for Top and Bottom Detectors Verifies IV is complete.
- 5.1.7 lEthe Maximum Power Tilt for any detector Determines no power tilt exceeds 1.02.
exceeds 1.02, THEN REFER to T/S 3.2.4 for corrective actions.
- 5.3.1 This surveillance is satisfactory when Attachment 2 or 3 is completed with the Test Data meeting the Acceptance Criteria stated. Determines surveillance is SAT.
--* **- - - - - -~
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK* Review a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation)
- 5.4.1 COMPLETE Attachment 4, Sections 1.0 and Completes Attachment 4, Section 3.
2.0, AND FORWARD completed procedure to SM/CRS for review. JPM is terminated when candidate returns all JPM paperwork to evaluator. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of7
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 Revision 4 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ____ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ____ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _ _ Date _ _ _ _ __ ____ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: Date: _ _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of7
INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when rod 1D3 dropped fully into the core. OHA E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR annunciated and remains locked in. Operators have not yet started reducing power to 74% to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d lAW S1.0P-AB.ROD-002, Dropped Rod. INITIATING CUE: Review the completed S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002, Power Distribution- Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio for completeness and accuracy. Note any discrepancies, if any, and required actions, if any, on Attachment 4. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (TAGGING) TASK: Review a Tagging List for correct blocking points TASK NUMBER: 1220050302 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC SRO Admin A2 ALTERNATE PATH: I X I ~ANUMBER: ------~2=.2~.1~3------~ IMPORTANCE FACTOR: - - - - - - 4.3 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD RoD STAD SRO[KJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Perform (In-Plant or Classroom) OP-AA-109 Rev. 2, Safety Tagging Program
REFERENCES:
OP-AA-109-115 Rev. 7, Safety Tagging Operations P&IDs 205334-2 (Rev. 55), 203061-1 (Rev. 34), 205334-1 (Rev. 60) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 35 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-18-14 Instructor Validated By: N Salam Date: 10-16-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: f~r~inQo~ment
~ (J_,._,__, Gvrt~ i Date: JO-?.. 1-/~
{U~~)'l~ Approved By: V vvf\/ Operations Upa~t (V\.Ct) Date: ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (TAGGING) TASK: Review a Tagging List for correct blocking points TASK NUMBER: 1220050302 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- 2. A small leak has developed on an instrument connection for 21 Sl Pump. The leak location is just upstream of 21SJ92, Sl PUMP DISCH PRESS TAP.
- 3. No other ECCS-related technical specification action statements are in effect.
INITIATING CUE: You are an extra SRO on shift. A newly licensed NCO has asked you to review this Tagging List for your input. You are NOT the Approving Supervisor. If there is any enhancement or correction required to WCD, record it on your Tear-Off Sheet. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within valiaated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Identify improper blocking points of:
- a. 2SJ30 which should be 21 SJ33
- b. 21 SJ64 check valve as boundary, should be 21 SJ65
- c. 21 and 22SJ113 not included in WCD.
Page 2 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (TAGGING) TASK: Review a Tagging List for correct blocking points COMMENTS STEP STEP EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U evaluation}
Prove candidate with 'Tear-off Sheet" Tagging Request, and marked up drawings. START TIME: Provide a copy of OP-AA-109 Rev. 2, 1 Refers to OP-AA-109 Rev. 2, Safety Tagging Program and OP-AA-109-115 Safety Tagging Program and OP-AA-109-Rev. 7, Safety Tagging Operations, as 115 Rev. 7, Safety Tagging Operations if necessary. requested. 2 Reviews tagging request against P&ID Notes that: blocking points.
- 1. 2SJ30, RWST to Sl Pump Stop Valve, is listed as a blocking point.
Closing 2SJ30 would render both 21 and 22 Sl Pumps inoperable. The proper blocking point should be 21SJ33 instead of 2SJ30.
- 2 (cant) 2. 21 Sl pump Recirculation Line is not isolated from a potential energy source. Check valves are NOT relied upon for personnel protection.
Isolation valve 21SJ65 should be tagged in the closed position. l' l I Page 3 of 6 l
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (TAGGING) TASK: Review a Tagging List for correct blocking points COMMENTS STEP STEP EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- I 2 (cant) 3. ECCS cross-connect line going I I from pump suction to the 21 SJ113 and 22SJ113 is not tagged.
i NOTE: These valves are located on a different print that has NOT been provided to the candidate. The candidate may request drawing 205334 Sheet 1 to determine which valves need to be added OR the applicant may state the 21/22SJ113s from memory. I
- 2 (cant) 4. Returns Tagging Request to WCC, with changes requested.
NOTE: If candidate identifies vent or drain valves as required for maintenance, these valves could be tagged (not incorrect), but are not required for a full correct answer. Terminate JPM when tear off sheet, procedures, and drawings are returned. STOP TIME: L____
~- -
Terminating Cue: Page 4 of6
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _WI}.J....!..... __ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. __'tfv __ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
-~.!...* __ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) --~-- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. --~-- 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
__'M __ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. Y'v 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). DW6 2cf33i.{- \ 2o36bl
~
reVISIOn of
- 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM mqtcAhes 7 b ~
the1fb~st'current_AA-t6t1-/ I '1-j e> p
/l::"'
- /
that procedure: Procedure Rev. '2. Date St..U~e 27, z.or3 - OP-J.lA-1 t:>~ __'ltJ __ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
N\t:f' _ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
~'~
____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. 8nstructor: __ ~+--. __~______
--=!:;12 Date: _)_o.,_}t_t..._}l_'{_ _
SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - Page 5 of 6
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- 2. A small leak has developed on an instrument connection for 21 Sl Pump. The leak location is just upstream of 21SJ92, Sl PUMP DISCH PRESS TAP.
- 3. No other ECCS-related technical specification action statements are in effect.
INITIATING CUE: You are an extra SRO on shift. A newly licensed NCO has asked you to review this Tagging List for your input. You are NOT the Approving Supervisor. If there is any enhancement or correction required to WCD, record it on your Tear-Off Sheet. Page 6 of 6
OPERATORTRAniTNGPROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Waste Gas TASK: Authorize a Radioactive Gas Release Form TASK NUMBER: N1120650302 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC SRO Admin A3 ALTERNATE PATH: I X I ~ANUMBER: --------=2-~3~.6______~ IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.8 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD RoD STAD SRO [ ] ] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
S1.0P-SO.WG-0010 Rev. 31 (Rev checked 9/22/14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 20 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-22-14 Instructor Validated By: N Salam Date: 10-16-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: Training Departmenrt Approved By: Date: Operations Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Waste Gas TASK: Authorize a Radioactive Gas Release Form TASK NUMBER: N 1120650302 INITIAL CONDITIONS: 13 GOT is in holdup in preparation for performing a gas release. Chemistry has performed all required sampling and authorized the gas release. The release procedure, S1.0P-SO.WG-001 0, Discharge of 13 Gas Decay Tank to Plant Vent has just been handed to you by the Unit 1 PO, who informs you the release is ready for CRS approval. INITIATING CUE: Review the entire S1.0P-SO.WG-001 0 procedure for completeness, accuracy, and release approval. Approve the release or provide justification for NOT approving the release, and also note any discrepancies found in the procedure, in the comments section of the procedure. Note to Evaluator: A cue directing the performer to review the entire procedure is embedded several places in body of JPM, based on previous pefformance of this JPM where an operator will find the first flaw and discontinue reviewing the remainder of the procedure. If required, stress during initiating cue that the entire procedure is to be reviewed. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Review Gas Release and identify.that:
- a. Pre-release verification has not been performed at step 5.2.8
- b. Attachment 2, Step 4.1, second bullet, calculated Maximum Allowable Release rate from Section 3.4 has been entered as 32 SCFM instead of the correct value of 100 scfm.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Authorize a Radioactive Gas Release Form
- STEP NO. STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
(*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) Provide marked up S1.0P-SO.WG-0010 to operator. Operator reviews procedure. Possible Cue Required: On page 17, the Estimated Total Volume of Waste Gas to be released is entered by Chemistry during performance of Attachment 2, section 3.0, DOSE, VOLUME ESTIMATES AND APPROVAL. IF a candidate requests the Release Permit, or questions the estimated release volume or ANY aspect of Section 3.0, THEN provide the following cue: Cue: The data provided in Section 3 of Attachment 2 can be assumed to be correct.
- The first error in the procedure is that the performance of the pre-release valve position verification in Attachment 1, has not been performed at step 5.2.8., prior to the procedure being given to the CRS for release approval.
Possible Cue Required: If candidate identifies that Step 5.2.8 has not been performed and does not go any further to see if the rest of the procedure is correct, then a cue stating that the candidate needs to review the entire procedure will need to be given. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Authorize a Radioactive Gas Release Form
- STEP NO. STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
(*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
- The second error is that the release rate which was calculated as 100 scfm and entered on Att. 2 page 2 of 6, Step 3.4 second bullet, has been incorrectly entered as 32 scfm on Att. 2, page 4 of 6, step 4.1 1st bullet. (The release rate entered here must be
>32 scfm in order to sign off the next bullet).
Possible Cue Required: If candidate identifies that the release rate has been entered incorrectly and does not go any further to see if the rest of the procedure is correct, then a cue stating that the candidate needs to review the entire procedure will need to be given. Operator identifies and records When operator records discrepancies and has discrepancies. reviewed the entire procedure, then terminate JPM. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ____ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ____ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _ _ Date _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor:, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 6
INITIAL CONDITIONS: 13 GOT is in holdup in preparation for performing a gas release. Chemistry has performed all required sampling and authorized the gas release. The release procedure, S1.0P-SO.WG-0010, Discharge of 13 Gas Decay Tank to Plant Vent has just been handed to you by the Unit 1 PO, who informs you the release is ready for CRS approval. INITIATING CUE: Review the entire S1.0P-SO.WG-0010 procedure for completeness, accuracy, and release approval. Approve the release or provide justification for NOT approving the release, and also note any discrepancies found in the procedure, in the comments section of the procedure. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 6
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Classify Emergency/Non-Emergency Events - Make a General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation TASK NUMBER: N1240010502 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC SRO Admin A4 ALTERNATE PATH: IL...-___.1 KIA NUMBER: 2.4.44
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: - - - - - 4.4 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoCJ ROC] STACJ SRO[ZJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
Salem ECG TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: '10 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 15 minutes Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-19-14 Instructor Validated By: N Salam Date: 10-16-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: ~-~ Ctprnf17 Date:
~ningo;iartment Approved By: ~* (\v\D6J Date:
Operation~pre~tative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Classify Emergency/Non-Emergency Events - Make a General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation TASK NUMBER: N1240010502 INITIAL CONDITIONS: A severe accident has occurred at Salem Unit 2 You have declared a 13 point General Emergency in the Control Room at 1535 hrs for loss of all three fission product barriers under EAL's FB3.L, RB2.L, and CB.1.L The weather conditions are as follows:
- Wind direction is from 050 degrees at 15 mph.
- Overcast skies with rain showers.
- Ambient temp = 62°F
- 2R41 D is reading 2.5 E3 uCi/sec INITIATING CUE:
Continue performing the provided Salem ECG Attachment 4, General Emergency. I am the Primary Communicator. This is a time critical JPM. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Determine correct PAR.
- 2. Complete ICMF within 15 minutes.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Administrative Name: Task: Classify Emergency/Non-Emergency Events - Make a General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation STEP STEP NO. (* =Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT I Evaluation) i I '
Provide marked up EP-SA-111-F4, Attachment 4, General Emergency, and I a blank copy of EP-SA-111-102, Salem Emergency Classification Description Table. Att.4 CAUTION B A Protective Action Recommendation *i (PAR) SHALL be made on the Initial Contact Message Form (ICMF). I Att. 4 MAKE a PAR as follows: B.2
- a. REFER to Predetermined PAR Refers to Predetermined PAR Flowchart on Pg. 3 and Flowchart on Pg. 3 and determines DETERMINE the appropriate the appropriate PAR is to:
PAR. Evacuate All sectors 0-5 miles,
- Evacuate downwind sectors +/-
1 sector. SSW, SW, WSW 5-10 MILES (Shelter) All remaining sectors. Note: Wind is from 050 (NE), and the +/-1 sector is included in sectors for NE wind direction. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Administrative Name: Task: Classify Emergency/Non-Emergency Events - Make a General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation STEP STEP NO. (*=Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT Evaluation)
Att.4 b. lE_a Radiological Based PAR is Cue: A radiological PAR is not B.2 IMMEDIATELY available, THEN immediately available. COMPARE the two PARs and CHOOSE the most appropriate for I inclusion on the ICMF. Att. 4 COMPLETE/APPROVE the ICMF (last Completes the GE ICMF by filling B.3 page of this attachment). in:
- Name
- Checking "Control Room"
- Time/Date
- EALs FB3.L, RB2.L, and CB.1.L
- Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier, Loss of the Reactor Coolant System
- Barrier, Loss of the Containment Barrier
- NOT checking Box lib for PAR Upgrade.
- Checking no radiological release in progress based on 2R41 D reading
- Filling in Section V with conditions determined in 8.2 above.
- Initialing the ICMF PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8 t'
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Administrative Name: Task: Classify Emergency/Non-Emergency Events - Make a General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation STEP STEP NO. (* =Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT Evaluation)
Att. 4 IF time allows, OBTAIN an accuracy Cue: A peer check will not be 8.4 peer check of the completed ICMF. provided. Att. 4 PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Provides ICMF to evaluator. 8.5 Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement EGG Attachment 6. State JPM is complete, and mark Stop Time: I I ___ j_ ----- ---- ----*-- ---- --- -- ----*- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _W:...._1__ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. _ _,_f/1 __ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. _'tf\ ___ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
~
_~ ___ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
\V\
____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). __'M __ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matphe~ the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _I_ Date lD[LYjl1l \k ____ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. @Instructor: _ __,__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ '-I_ _ Date: _to{_._l__,'-/'--1 SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: A severe accident has occurred at Salem Unit 2 You have declared a 13 point General Emergency in the Control Room at 1535 hrs for loss of all three fission product barriers under EAL's FB3.L, RB2.L, and CB.1.L The weather conditions are as follows:
- Wind direction is from 050 degrees at 15 mph.
- Overcast skies with rain showers.
* =
Ambient temp 62°F
- 2R41 D is reading 2.5 E3 uCi!sec INITIATING CUE:
Continue performing the provided Salem ECG Attachment 4, General Emergency. I am the Primary Communicator This is a time critical JPM. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM 1 & 2 SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test TASK NUMBER: N0040430201 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim a ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: 004 A4.18
------~----~----~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.3 4.4 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOCJ RO[ZJ STACJ SRO[ZJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator- Perform
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-ST.CVC-0011, Rev. 7 (checked 10-7-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 8 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: D Tait Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor ia~epa~::7 0 ~ 2 7-11/ Approved By: Date: I Approved By: ~/ (~\\'JG\ Date: Operations DBartm~ ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test TASK NUMBER: N0040430201 SIMULATOR SETUP: IC-251 MODE3 ET-1 KB127PNB 2CV175 open pushbutton-OPEN ET-3 KB127TCB 2CV175 close PB(deletes B128) 1/0 OVAO B128 2FI-113A Rapid Borate Flow Initial 0 Final 33 Ramp 6 seconds Tied to ET-1 MALF: VL0095 2CV175 fails to 0% open ties to ET-3 with 11 sec TD. (This prevents reopening valve after it is shut after originaiiO is deleted when 2CV175 close PB is depressed. INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 is in MODE 3 @ NOP, NOT INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Perform S2.0P-ST.CVC-0011, Boration Flow Rate Test Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Complete S2.0P-ST.CVC-0011 and determine 2CV172 test is SAT and 2CV175 test is UNSAT.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ----------------- SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK* Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (Required for UNSAT (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
I' Provide marked up copy of S2.0P-ST.CVC-0011, Boration Flow Rate Test. i 2.1 IDENTIFY sections of this procedure that Determines all sections are to be performed. are not required to be performed with "N/A". 2.2 REVIEW Components "Off Normal and Determines from initial conditions that Off Normal Tagged" List(s) for system Components "Off Normal and Off-Normal and support system(s) associated with Tagged" List(s) review has been performed evolution to be performed in this SAT. procedure. 2.3 ENSURE one of the following:
- The Reactor is in Modes 3-6, or Determines the Reactor is in Mode 3.
Defueled. OR
- The procedure may be performed for Refueling Outages in Modes 1 and 2 provided the rapid boration is started immediately prior to the Reactor Trip.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK* Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) i 2.4 ENSURE the Charging System is in Determines Charging System is in service.
service lAW S2.0P-SO.CVC-0001(Q), Charging, Letdown, and Seal Injection. I 2.5 ENSURE calibration data for the Determines calibration data for the f instruments listed in Attachment 1, as instruments listed in Attachment 1 has been applicable, is obtained. obtained. 3.1 Steps identified with dollar signs ($) are Reads and initials step. those items required to meet Technical Specification acceptance criteria. Such steps, if not satisfactorily completed, may have reportability requirements and shall be brought to the immediate *attention of the SM/CRS. 3.2 Due to system limitations, boron addition Reads and initials step. rate is essentially the same whether one or both Boric Acid Transfer Pumps are operating. I 3.3 Allow 2CV175, RAPID BORATE STOP Reads and initials step. VALVE, to full stroke prior to reversing direction. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 10 J I
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) 3.4 The .:::_36 gpm Boric Acid Flow value Reads and initials step.
specified throughout this procedure satisfies the 33 gpm requirement of Technical Specification 4.1.2.2.d plus 3 gpm for instrument uncertainty associated with instrument loops 2FT11 0 and 2FT1131AW PR#971016106.
- 5.1.1 SELECT MAKEUP CONTROL MODE Selects MAKEUP CONTROL MODE SELECT, STOP. SELECT, STOP.
- 5.1.2 SELECT 2CV172, BA FLOW CONTROL Selects 2CV172, BA FLOW CONTROL TO TO BLENDER, MANUAL. BLENDER, MANUAL.
5.1.3 OPEN 2CV172. Determines 2CV172 is open. 5.1.4 On the in service Boric Acid Pump: On the in service Boric Acid Pump selects A. SELECT MANUAL. MANUAL, then FAST START.
- B. SELECT FAST START.
- 5.1.5 SELECT2CV185,MAKEUP Selects 2CV185, MAKEUP FLOWPATH, FLOWPATH, MANUAL. ---- -
MANUAL. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) i
- 5.1.6 OPEN 2CV185 Opens 2CV185.
5.1.7 CLOSE 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE. Closes 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE. 5.1.8 CLOSE 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE. Closes 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE.
- 5.1.9 RECORD test results in Attachment 1, Initials SAT after verifying 2FI11 OA indicates Section 2.0. ~ 36 gpm.
5.1.10 On the in service Boric Acid Pump, Selects SLOW START on in service Boric SELECT SLOW START. Acid Pump.
- 5.1.11 CLOSE 2CV185 Closes 2CV185. I 5.1.12 PRESS the following RECIRC VLV OPEN (INC FLOW) pushbuttons until the valves are sufficiently OPEN to support BAST level control: Throttles open:
A. 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE A. 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE B. 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE B. 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 10
~
f OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _________________ i JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ f SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control I~ TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation}
'I
- 5.1.13 PLACE the following valves in AUTO: Places 2CV185 and 2CV172 in AUTO.
- 2CV185
- 2CV172
- 5.2.1 On the in service Boric Acid Pump: On the in service Boric Acid Pump selects C. SELECT MANUAL. MANUAL, then FAST START.
D. SELECT FAST START.
- 5.2.2 OPEN 2CV175, RAPID BORATE STOP Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-1 is TRUE VALVE. when 2CV175 OPEN PB is depressed.
This inserts the 33 gpm rapid borate flow on 2FI113A. Opens 2CV175, RAPID BORATE STOP VALVE. 5.2.3 CLOSE 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE. Closes 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE. 5.2.4 CLOSE 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE. Closes 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE.
- 5.2.5 RECORD test results in Attaqhment 1, Initial UNSAT for 2FI113A flow.
Section 3.0. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- 5.2.6 On the in service Boric Acid Pump, Selects SLOW START on in service Boric SELECT SLOW START. Acid Pump.
- 5.2.7 CLOSE 2CV175, RAPID BORATE STOP Closes 2CV175, RAPID BORATE STOP VALVE. VALVE.
5.2.8 PRESS the following RECIRC VLV OPEN (INC FLOW) pushbuttons until the valves are sufficiently OPEN to support BAST level control: Throttles open: A. 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE A. 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE B. 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE B. 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE Terminate JPM when 21 and 22CV160 have been throttled open. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 10 I
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. __0__ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. _Q--=---_ _ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. --'Q""'"====-- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) _C-=d_-,_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. _Q......,___ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
- 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*).
__.9.__ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches t{le most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _:r_ Date f o ( r ("I ( '-1 (J,- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 9 of 10
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- Unit 2 is in MODE 3 @ NOP, NOT INITIATING CUE:
You are the Reactor Operator. Perform S2.0P-ST.CVC-0011, Boration Flow Rate Test PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 10 of 10
TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Perform Actions For A Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation TASK NUMBER: 1150030501 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim b ALTERNATE PATH: I X I ~ANUMBER: ----~E=0~1~1~E=A~1~.1~1----~ IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.2 4.2 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD Ro[D STAD SRO[D EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator
REFERENCES:
2-EOP-LOCA-3 Rev. 29 (Rev. checked 10-7-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: D Tait Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: Training Department Approved By: Date: Operations Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 1 of 9
TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emerqencv Operatinq Procedures TASK: Perform Actions For A Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation TASK NUMBER: 1150100501 SIMULATOR SETUP: IC- 252 MALF: VL0121 22SJ44 fails to 0% open REMOTES: SW27D 22 SW pump control power OFF SW43D 26 SW pump control power OFF 1/0: A908 OVDI 24 SW pump start PB OFF A909 OVDI 25 SW pump start PB OFF A403 OVDI 22 CS pump stop PB OFF A614 OVAO 22 CCHX Outlet Temperature 200
- Place Bezel Cover on 22 SW pump INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- A LBLOCA has occurred on 22 RC Loop.
- All Vital Buses are energized from off-site power.
- Operators are performing actions in 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant.
- 22 SW pump is CIT.
- 26 SW pump tripped 2 minutes ago.
- RWST lo level alarm has just annunciated.
INITIATING CUE: You are the RO. Perform 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, beginning with Step 1. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
~ 1. Transfer to CL recirc with single train operation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 2 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal TASK: Align RHR Suction to Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
START TIME: 1 Do not implement any FRPs until directed Reads step. by this EOP. 2 Is "Cont Sump Ch A( B) Level >62%" lit Checks Cont Sump Ch A( B) Level >62% lights and answers YES.
- 3 Depress "SUMP AUTO ARMED" Depresses "SUMP AUTO ARMED" pushbuttons on 21 and 22 SJ44 bezels pushbuttons on 21 and 22 SJ44 bezels.
- 4 Remove lockouts for the following: Rotates lockout switches on 2RP4 to the VALVE OPERABLE position for:
- 2SJ67 (SI Pumps Miniflow)
- 2SJ68 (SI Pumps Miniflow)
- 2SJ67 (SI Pumps Miniflow)
- 2SJ69 (Common Suction)
- 2SJ68 (SI Pumps Miniflow)
- 2SJ69 (Common Suction) 5 Are 21 and 22 SJ44 (Sump Valves) Determines Sump Valve 21 SJ44 is open open? and Sump Valve 22SJ44 is shut.
5.1 Reset Sl Determines Sl is reset. 5.1 Reset Emergency Loading for each SEC Determines Emergency Loading for each SEC is reset. 5.2 Is 21SJ44 open Determines 21 SJ44 is open.
- 5.2 Stop 22 RHR pump Depresses stop PB for 22 RHR pump.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 3 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal TASK: Align RHR Suction to Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- 5.2 Close 2SJ69 (Common Suction) Depresses close PB for Close 2SJ69 (Common Suction) and verifies green close light illuminates.
5.2 Start 21 RHR pump. Determines 21 RHR pump is running. 5.2 Initiate close on 22RH4 (Pump Suction) Depresses close PB for 22RH4 (Pump and continue. Suction) and continues. 5.2 Initiate open on 22SJ44 and continue. Depresses open PB for 22SJ44 and continues. 5.3 When 22SJ44 opens, Then start 22 RHR Does not start 22 RHR pump pump. Note: 22SJ44 will not open. 6 !E Blackout loading occurs on any vital Reads step. bus after Sl reset, then perform actions per Table A. 7 Reset Sl Determines Sl is reset on Trains A and B. Reset Emergency loading for each SEC. Determines Emergency Loading is Reset for each SEC. Are ill! SECs reset? Determines all SECs are reset. Reset 230V control centers. Determines all 230V control centers are reset. 8 Are both CS pumps running Determines both CS pumps are running. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 4 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal TASK: Align RHR Suction to Containment Sump I STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Stop 22 CS pump Depresses stop PB for 22 CS pump and determines pump does not stop. Note: May dispatch an operator to locally open or standby to open 22 CS pump breaker. Is 22 CS pump stopped Determines 22 CS pump is not stopped.
- Stop 21 CS pump Depresses stop PB for 21 CS pump and Determines pump has stopped.
- 9 Close 21 and 22RH19 (RHR HX Disch x- Depresses close PB for 21 and 22RH19 conn valves) (RHR HX Disch x-conn valves) and verifies shut lights illuminate.
Stop 23 charging pump Depresses stop PB for 23 charging pump and verifies it stops. 10 Select appropriate flowpath transition Selects flowpath transition step 11 with all step from Table B vital buses energized. Go to selected step Goes to Step 11. 11 Is Any 4KV vital bus energized by DG Determines no 4KV vital bus energized by DG. 11.1 Are at least three SW pumps running Determines only 2 SW pumps are running. Note: If operator attempts to start 24 or 25 SW pumps they will not start.
- Stop 2 CFCUs Depresses stop PBs for 2 running CFCUs and verifies they stop.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 5 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal TASK: Align RHR Suction to Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Go to Step 118 Goes to Step 118.
- 118 Stop the following pumps: Depresses stop PBs for:
- 22 Sl pump
- 22 Sl pump
- 21 Charging pump
- 21 Charging pump
- 22 AFW pump
- 22 AFW pump and verifies they stop.
Note: If SG lo lvl is present 22 AFW pp will not stop. Is 22 CCW HX in service Determines that 22 CCW HX is not available, nor being returned to service, based on high temperature on 2CC2. (Temp is -196°F) Open 21 CC16 (CC Supply to RHR HX Determines 21 CC16 (CC Supply to RHR Valve) HX Valve) is open. Start 21 RHR pump Determines 21 RHR pump is in service Stop 22 RHR pump Determines 22 RHR pump is stopped. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 6 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal TASK: Align RHR Suction to Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD evaluation)
S/U
- Close 22CC16 (CC Supply to RHR HX Depresses 22CC16 (CC Supply to RHR HX Valve) Valve) close PB and verifies it shuts.
Close 2SJ68 and 2SJ67(SI Pumps Depresses close PB for Close 2SJ68 and Miniflow Valves) 2SJ67(SI Pumps Miniflow Valves) and verifies they shut. Close 2RH1 AND 2RH2 (Common Determines 2RH1 AND 2RH2 (Common Suction Valves) Suction Valves) are shut. 119 Is 21 RHR pump running Determines 21 RHR pump is running. 120 Open 21 SJ45 (RHR Discharge to Sl Depresses open PB for 21 SJ45 (RHR pump valve) Discharge to Sl pump valve) and verifies it opens. Terminate JPM PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 7 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ____ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ____ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _ _ Date _ _ _ _ __ ____ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 8 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- A LBLOCA has occurred on 22 RC Loop.
- All Vital Buses are energized from off-site power.
- Operators are performing actions in 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant.
- 22 SW pump is CIT.
- 26 SW pump tripped 2 minutes ago.
- RWST lo level alarm has just annunciated.
INITIATING CUE: You are the RO. Perform 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, beginning with Step 1. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 9 of 9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) TASK NUMBER: N1140240401 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim c ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: APE 027 AA1.01
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.0 3.9 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EO C ) ROIT] STAC) SROITJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator- Perform S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Rev.11 Reactor Coolant System Leak(revchecked 10-7-14) S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001 ,Rev. 18 Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (rev checked 10-
REFERENCES:
7-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 4 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: NA Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: D Tait Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: M r~ {~HI/! Date: Approved By:
~~~-~p.artm~e-~~C\ 1 Date:
Operation .* epart t ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: TASK: N1140240401 TASK NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: The unit is operating in a steady state condition at 100% power with all systems in automatic. SIMULATOR SETUP: IC-253 The simulator setup is: RT-1 MALF: PR0018B 2PR2 Develops Leak Severity: 5000
- Ensure a centrifugal charging pump is in service.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Determine that 2PR2 PZR PORV is leaking and close 2PR7 Block Valve.
Page 2 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: --------------------- SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) Simulator Operator: Insert RT-1 Operator either: Identifies PORV tailpipe temperature has risen from normal to -22rF OR Identifies rising charging flow THEN enters S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant system Leak or S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary. Action Summary. AB.RC Note: CAS Item 3.0 directs entry into S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer 3.1 Pressure Malfunction. When PORV leakage is identified, operator initiates S2. OP-AB. PZR-000 1. Page 3 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _____________________ SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) STEP COMMENTS STEP NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) I 3.2 3.8 Is RCS temperature <350°F? (Mode 4, 5, or 6 LOCA) Is the Unit in Mode 3 after the accumulators are isolated? Answers NO an<;l goes to Step 3.8 (Mode 1, 2, or 3 LOCA) Answers NO and goes to Step 3.12 (Mode 1, 2 or 3 RCS LEAK) Il Is PZR level being maintained stable or Answers YES and goes to Step 3.18 rising? 3.12 Note: If operator is unsure if PZR level is lowering, then they may adjust charging flow to stabilize PZL level. PLACE CVC Makeup Control System in Operator determines Makeup Control 3.18 service as necessary to control VCT System is in automatic. level. INITIATE S2.0P-ST.RC-0008(Q), 3.19 Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Cue: A second operator will initiate the Balance. RCS Water Inventory Balance. IF recommended by Rad Pro OR desired Determines no recommendation by to reduce containment radiation levels Rad Pro has been made, and 3.20 containment pressure has remained THEN PLACE 2 CFCUs in slow speed AND 2 CFCUs in fast speed. stable. PERFORM the following to identify 3.21 location of leak: Page 4 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) INITIATE actions to locate and isolate the Initiates actions to locate and isolate 3.21.1 leak lAW Attachment 2, Guidelines for the leak lAW Attachment 2, Locating An RCS Leak. Guidelines for Locating An RCS Leak. MONITOR indicators on the left side of Monitors indicators on the left side of Att. 2 Table 1 for high or rising readings. Table 1 for high or rising readings, 1.0 and determines PORV tailpipe temperature is elevated. IF AT ANY TIME, the leak is determined Determines leak is from a PZR PORV, to be from a PORV, OR a Pressurizer and initiates S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001 (Q), CAS 3.0 Code Safety Valve, THEN INITIATE Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001(Q), Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. AB.PZR INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary. Action Summary. 3.1 3.2 Is POPS in service? Determines POPS is not in service. Is the controlling Pressurizer Pressure Determines the controlling Pressurizer 3.3 Control Channel (I or Ill) failed? Pressure Control Channel (I or Ill) has not failed, and goes to Step 3.11. Is the Master Pressure Controller failed? Determines the Master Pressure 3.11 (Refer to Attachment 2 for guidance) Controller has not failed, and goes to Step 3.17 Is a Spray Valve(s) failed? Determines a Spray Valve has not 3.17 (Refer to Attachment 2 for guidance) failed and goes to Step 3.39. Page 5 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: I DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) STEP COMMENTS STEP {*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL {Required for UNSAT ' NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 3.39 Is a PORV(s) failed? (Refer to Attachment 2 for guidance) Are PORV tailpipe temperatures Determines a PORV has not failed based on closed indication and goes to Step 3.46. Determines PORV tailpipe I 3.46 elevated? temperatures are elevated.
- CLOSE 2PR6 AND 2PR7, Pressurizer Closes 2PR6 AND 2PR7, Pressurizer 3.47 Relief Stop Valves. Relief Stop Valves.
IF PORV tailpipe temperature does_ NOT Determines PORV tailpipe lower sufficiently to allow a temperature temperatures are lowering sufficiently. 3.48 rise to be seen when the leaking PORV is unisolated, THEN: ...
- When pressure stabilizes, OPEN 2PR6, Determines pressure is stable, and 3.49 Pressurizer Relief Stop Valve. opens 2PR6, Pressurizer Relief Stop Valve.
Is tailpipe temperature rising? Determines tailpipe temp is not rising 3.50 and goes to Step 3.53.
- 3.53 OPEN 2PR7. Opens 2PR7.
Is tailpipe temperature rising? Determines tailpipe temperature 3.54 rising.
- 3.55 CLOSE 2PR7. Closes 2PR7.
Page 6 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) I STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) ! NOTIFY the SM/CRS to refer to Terminate JPM. Technical Specification 3.4.5 and the 3.56 Event Classification Guide for Primary Leakage. L___ _ _ - - - - - TERMINATING CUE: I Page 7 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training ~ l
~
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE TQ-AA-1 06-0303 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. Q 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. {) 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
~ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
-v-0
- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
- 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. Q 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). ~ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of Q ) that procedure: Procedure Rev. ~ ,, Date ,.. /t.r If tr ____ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor:~~ Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: Date: - - - - - - Page 8 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: The unit is operating in a steady state condition at 100% power with all systems in automatic. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Page 9 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM 1 & 2 SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink {Initiate Bleed and Feed with Sl pumps and Rx Head Vents) TASK NUMBER: N1150290501 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim d ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: EPE E05 EA 1.1
----~~~~~~--_,
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.1 4.0 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD Ro[K] STAD SRO[KJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator- Perform
REFERENCES:
2-EOP-FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev. 24 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 6 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: C Omlor Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: Training Department Approved By: Date: Operations Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: --------------------------- SYSTEM: Emerqencv Operatinq Procedures TASK: TCAF a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with Sl pumps and Rx Head Vents) TASK NUMBER: N1150290501 SIMULATOR SETUP: RX HEAD VENT KEYS ARE LOCATED IN SIM BOOTH IC-254 developed by: MSL rupture (10%)downstream of MSIVs. Fail all MSIVs open. All AFW pumps failed. Fail 2PR2 shut. 21 CVCS pp CIT. Performed TRIP-1 through Step 20. 22 CVCS pp tripped during TRIP-1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- Unit 2 initiated a Rx trip from 100% power in response to a Main Steam line break at the mixing bottle.
- An automatic Safety Injection initiated.
- The Main Turbine failed to trip automatically, and was manually tripped from the control console.
- MSLI failed, and all MSIV's remain open.
- All AFW flow has been lost.
- 21 charging pump is CIT.
- 22 charging pump tripped 3 minutes ago.
- EOP-TRIP-1 was performed and a transition to FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink was made at Step 20.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Perform FRHS-1 starting at Step 1. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Stop ALL RCPs.
- 2. Open 2PR1.
- 3. Open Rx Head Vent Valves 2RC40-2RC43.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: _________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with Sl pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Operator states he has the watch. 1 IS TOTAL AFW FLOW LESS THAN Determines it was not operator action which 22E04 LB/HR DUE TO OPERATOR caused total AFW flow to be less than 22E04 ACTIONS lb/hr. 2 IF AT LEAST ONE INTACT OR Recognizes ALL SGs are faulted. RUPTURED SG IS AVAILABLE, THEN DO NOT FEED A FAULTED SG 3 IS RCS PRESSURE GREATER THAN Checks RCS pressure on control console ANY INTACT OR RUPTURED SG and determines it is greater than all SG PRESSURE pressures checked on control console. 3.1 ARE RCS T-HOTS GREATER THAN Checks RCS Thot indication on control 350°F console and determines that RCS Thots are greater than 350°F. 4 IS 21 OR 22 CHARGING PUMP Determines neither 21 nor 22 charging pump AVAILABLE is available based on initial conditions and/or control console indications. GO TO STEP 23 Goes to Step 23. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with 51 pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD evaluation}
5/U 23 CAUTION TO ESTABLISH RCS HEAT REMOVAL Reads Step. BY RCS BLEED AND FEED, STEPS 24 THRU 29 MUST BE PERFORMED QUICKLY AND WITHOUT INTERRUPTION
- 23 STOP ALL RCPS Depresses STOP PB for 21-24 RCPs and '
verifies green stop light illuminates and red start light extinguishes. 24 INITIATE Sl Uses Safeguards key and initiates Sl on at least one train of Safeguards initiation. 25 ARE Sl VALVES IN SAFEGUARDS Checks 2RP4 and/or console indication to POSITION determine that all valves listed in Table B are in Safeguards position. Table B valves are: 2SJ4 OPEN BIT INLET 2SJ5 OPEN BIT INLET 2SJ12 OPEN BIT OUTLET 2SJ13 OPEN BIT OUTLET 2CV68 CLOSED CHARGING DISCHARGE 2CV69 CLOSED CHARGING DISCHARGE (continued next page) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with Sl pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Table B Valves (con't}: 21-24SJ54 OPEN ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 2SJ1 OPEN RWST TO CHARGING 2SJ2 OPEN RWST TO CHARGING - 2CV40 CLOSED DISCHARGE STOP 2CV41 CLOSED DISCHARGE STOP 25.1 IS 21 OR 22 CHARGING PUMP Checks control console and determines RUNNING neither 21 nor 22 charging pump is running. 25.2 IS ANY Sl PUMP RUNNING Checks control console and determines both 21 and 22 Sl pumps are running. 25.2 ARE VALVES IN TABLE COPEN FOR Checks control console indication for valves AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Sl PUMP listed in Table C and determines the valves are open for at least one running Sl pump. Table C valves are: 21/22 Sl PUMPS 2SJ30 (FROM RWST) 21/22SJ33 (SI PUMP SUCTION) 2SJ135 (COLD LEG DISCHARGE) 21/22SJ134 (COLD LEG DISCHARGE) 26 OPEN BOTH PZR PORV STOP VALVES Checks control console and determines BOTH 2PR6 and 2PR7 PORV STOP VALVES are open. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with 51 pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD evaluation)
S/U
- 26 OPEN BOTH PZR PORVS Depresses 2PR1 PZR PORV open PB and verifies green closed light extinguishes and red open light illuminates.
Depresses 2PR2 PZR PORV open PB and reports that 2PR2 will not open. 26.1 ARE BOTH PZR PORV STOP VALVES Checks control console and determines BOTH OPEN 2PR6 and 2PR7 PORV STOP VALVES are open. ARE BOTH PZR PORVS OPEN Determines 2PR2 PZR PORV is not open.
- 26.1 OPEN 2RC40 THRU 2RC43 (REACTOR Inserts key into each 2RC40 THRU 2RC43 HEAD VENTS) (REACTOR HEAD VENTS) switch on 2RP3, turns to open, and verifies each valve opens.
Terminate JPM when operator has opened 2RC40 thru 2RC43 Reactor Head Vents. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _ _ _ _ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ____ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. Date _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _ _ _ _ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - - S ME/1 nstructor: Date: _ _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- Unit 2 initiated a Rx trip from 100% power in response to a Main Steam line break at the mixing bottle.
- An automatic Safety Injection initiated.
- The Main Turbine failed to trip automatically, and was manually tripped from the control console.
- MSLI failed, and all MSIV's remain open.
- All AFW flow has been lost.
- 21 charging pump is CIT.
- 22 charging pump tripped 3 minutes ago.
- EOP-TRIP-1 was performed and a transition to FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink was made at Step 20.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Perform FRHS-1 starting at Step 1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM 1 & 2 SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Implement actions required for a Natural Circulation Cooldown TASK NUMBER: N 1150530502 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim e ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: EPE E09 EA1.1
----~~~~~~--~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.5 3.5 APPLICABILITY:
------RO SRO EOCJ Ro[K] STACJ SRO[KJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator- Perform
REFERENCES:
2-EOP-TRIP-4, Natural Circulation Cooldown, Rev. 23 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 30 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: C Omlor Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: JJ_/d~~ c~rrof{ Date: f6.--Z-1-Jif Approved By:
~~~Dot,;;partrt1m~~l Date:
It.- 1 '!- L~( dp:rations partr\\gp.t l .* ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Implement actions required for a Natural Circulation Cooldown TASK NUMBER: 1150050501 Simulator Setup: IC-255 MALF EL0134 Loss of Offsite Power MALF RP01 08 Failure of Automatic Sl Overrides 8106-8108 to override 2CV3,4,5 OPEN PB's OFF, and CLOSE PBs ON ties to Event-1 which is 2CV18 AUTO PB, which will isolate letdown and prevent is being put back in service. Overrides 8201-202 which prevents closing 2PR1, 2PR2, 2PR6, and 2PR7. INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 tripped from 100% power when a loss of all off-site power occurred. All vital buses loaded in MODE 2 SEC operation. Operators performed TRIP-1 and TRIP-2, then transitioned to TRIP-4 to perform a Natural Circulation Cooldown. Operators are performing Step 9 to establish a 20-25°F/hr cooldown rate using 21-24MS10s. Current RCS C/D rate is 5°F/hr. Thots - 561°F. Letdown was unable to be placed in service when directed in TRIP-2. Control Console bezels have been swapped out, and Letdown may be placed in service when directed by procedure. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to raise the C/D rate to 20-25°F/hr using 21-24MS10 as directed at step 9.1 ofTRIP-4, then continue with remainder of TRIP-4. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion
- 1. Raise C/D rate to 20-25°F per hour.
- 2. Depressurize the RCS by opening ONE PORV.
- 3. Initiate Safety Injection after PORV fails to close prior to the loss of RCS subcooling (- 3 minutes after PORV is opened, based on CT Book, Appendix B.2, page 2, italicized text)
Page 2 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Raise C/D rate and Lower RCS Pressure during a natural circulation cooldown lAW EOP-TRIP-4 STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) I Provide candidate with the "Tear Off Reviews the conditions and marked up Sheet" EOP START TIME:
9.1 CONTROL STEAM FLOW TO MINIMIZE SG DELTA-P
- DUMP STEAM USING INTACT SG Adjusts 21-24MS 1Os to raise cooldown rate MS10S (RELIEF VALVES) while minimizing SG Delta-P.
MAINTAIN SG NR LEVEL BETWEEN 9- Maintains SG NR level between 9-33% by 33% adjusting 21-24AF21 valves 10 WAIT UNTIL ALL RCS THOTS ARE Monitors RCS Thots while raising cooldown LESS THAN 543°F rate Cue when RCS Tavg is <543°F: "All RCS Thots are now <543°F. BLOCK HI STEAM LINE FLOW Sl Blocks HI STEAM LINE FLOW Sl on both 11 I trains I OPEN CV2 AND CV277 (LETDOWN Opens CV2 and CV277 (LETDOWN 12 CONTROL VALVES) AND PLACE IN CONTROL VALVES) and selects AUTO for "AUTO" OPEN CV7 (LETDOWN CONTROL VALVE) each valve Opens CV?(LETDOWN CONTROL VALVE) II t Page 3 of 6 I I i
~
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: STEP Raise C/D rate and Lower RCS Pressure during a natural circulation cooldown lAW EOP-TRIP-4 STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT II
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) I ADJUST CV55 (CHARGING FLOW Adjusts CV55 (CHARGING FLOW I
CONTROL VALVE) TO RAISE CONTROL VALVE) to obtain no less than J CHARGING FLOW TO AT LEAST 87 87 gpm on the charging flow indicator. I GPM PERFORM THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS Cue if required: If requested, direct the SIMULTANEOUSLY: operator to place a 75 gpm orifice in
- OPEN ONLY ONE ORIFICE service (CV4 or 5) .
ISOLATION VALVE
- ADJUST CV18 (LETDOWN Opens only one (Letdown Orifice Isolation PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE) Valves) and adjusts CV18 to control TO MAINTAIN LETDOWN letdown pressure such that the letdown line PRESSURE AT 300 PSIG relief valve does not lift (600 psig).
PLACE THE FOLLOWING IN AUTO: I
- CV18
- CV18 in AUTO*
- MASTER FLOW CONTROLLER
- Master Flow Controller in AUTO
- CV55
- CV55 in AUTO
- When the 2CV18 is placed in auto, it will shut, along with any open orifice valve, and all orifice valves will be prevented from opening.
13 IS LETDOWN IN SERVICE Answers NO Page 4 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Raise C/D rate and Lower RCS Pressure during a natural circulation cooldown lAW EOP-TRIP-4 STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluationl 13.1 CAUTION: Reads statement I
PZR PORV CYCLING SHOULD BE MINIMIZED
- USE ONLY ONE PZR PORV TO Opens only 2PR 1 OR 2PR2 LOWER RCS PRESSURE TO 1865 PSIG I
I WAIT UNTIL RCS PRESSURE LESS Monitors RCS pressure ! THAN 1865
- CLOSE BOTH PZR PORV's Attempts to shut the open PORV, and I determines it will not shut. I Attempts to shut associated PORV Block valve, and determines it will not shut. I Initiates Safety Injection based upon I
impending CAS action of loss of I subcooling or automatic safety injection nearing/reaching setpoint. (Auto Sl ! actuation is failed in sim setup.) I Terminate JPM when Sl has been initiated. STOP TIME: !
~-- ~-~ - ---
Page 5 of 6
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. (!) 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. 7~ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ---'<£)_£_____3. Perfonnance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) _ _,[)....._....'_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. t 5. Initiating and tenninating Cues are properly identified. _ _,{l)-.£__ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
~
- - - - 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
@) 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev~- Date I0 *j£
- I'{
~ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. - - - - 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor:
;0 ;s-IY Date: - - - - - -
SME/Instructor: Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - Page 6 of 6
INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 tripped from 100% power when a loss of all off-site power occurred. All vital buses loaded in MODE 2 SEC operation. Operators performed TRIP-1 and TRIP-2, then transitioned to TRIP-4 to perform a Natural Circulation Cooldown. Operators are performing Step 9 to establish a 20-25°F/hr cooldown rate using 21-24MS1 Os. Current RCS C/D rate is 5°F/hr. Thots - 561 °F. Letdown was unable to be placed in service when directed in TRIP-2. Control Console bezels have been swapped out, and Letdown may be placed in service when directed by procedure. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to raise the C/D rate to 20-25°F/hr using 21-24MS1 0 as directed at step 9.1 of TRIP-4, then continue with remainder of TRIP-4. Page 7 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification TASK NUMBER: 220130201 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim f ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KJA NUMBER: 022 A4.01
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.6 3.6 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD R0[8] STAD SR0[8] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003 Rev. 17 (Rev checked 9-6-14)
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.CBV-0001 Rev. 32 (Rev checked 9-6-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: D Tait Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: JJi~~. c,~ Date: (0 .-2,] -I "I c/~~artmen~, ~ '7- ( \,1 Approved By: olerations ~rt~ Date: l u-ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: ------------------------- DATE: SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification TASK NUMBER: 220130201 SIMULATOR SETUP: Reset Simulator to IC-256, 100% power, BOL. ET-1, KAD18PBR 25 CFCU low speed start PB, tied to 25 CFCU SW flow of 1675, ramped in over 10 seconds with 1 second delay INITIAL CONDITIONS: Rx power is 100% steady state, BOL. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to perform S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Systems-Cooling Systems surveillance for 25 CFCU for monthly run. 25 CFCU is filled and vented. Component Off Normal Report has been reviewed with no abnormalities noted. Calibration data for required instruments has been obtained and recorded in appropriate Attachments. The differential pressure gauge for 22 SW header has been installed. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion: Perform S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003 for 25 CFCU and evaluate minimum SW flow as SAT, and Minimum Cooling Water Flow for SW D/P as UNSAT. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
SYSTEM: Containment Cooling OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ___________________ DATE: ___________________ l I TASK* Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP COMMENTS STEP NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) I,I i START TIME: I Provide Operator with marked up copy of Prerequisites have been completed, but f S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Operator should review them before Systems-Cooling Systems. proceeding. Operator reviews and initials Precautions and Limitations. I NOTE: There is no requirement to either start additional SW pumps OR stop any running CFCUs. There is a system requirement NOT to run 5 CFCUs in HIGH speed, but that is N/A here. However, Operator MAY start another SW pump OR stop a CFCU, which is acceptable. I I PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training I
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
I 5.1.1 PERFORM test on each CFCU required to Operator retrieves S2.0P-SO.CBV-0001, be tested lAW the following instruction: Containment Ventilation Operation, and A. ENSURE the CFCU to be tested is reviews P&Ls, and Prerequisites. Operator in LOW SPEED lAW S2.0P- identifies the sections of the procedure SO.CBV-0001, Containment NOT to be performed (Sections 5.2-5.6) Ventilation Operation. with N/A. If needed, tell Operator Components Off Normal review is complete and SAT. Operator starts 25 CFCU in LOW speed lAW Step 5.1.3 by: SO.CBV A. ENSURE CFCU is filled and vented A. Ensuring 25 CFCU is filled and
-1 lAW S2.0P-SO.CBV-0003(Q), vented (Initiating Cue) 5.1.3 Filling and Venting Containment Fan Coil Units.
B. ENSURE Service Water is B. Ensuring SW is available by available. checking SW pumps in service and C. PRESS FAN LOW SPEED START adequate SW header pressure. bezel. D. ENSURE following dampers are in C. PRESS FAN LOW SPEED START indicated positions: bezel for 25 CFCU.
- ROUGH FLTR DAMPER D. ENSURES damper alignment is CLOSED correct for 25 CFCU:
- HEPA INLET DAMPER OPEN ROUGH FLTR DAMPER CLOSED
- HEPA OUTLET DAMPER OPEN HEPA INLET DAMPER OPEN HEPA OUTLET DAMPER OPEN
- ---- - ~ -- -- --------- - - **--- - - ~~-- -- -~ - ~-
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Containment Cooling. TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP STEP COMMENTS ii (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT ~
- NO. STANDARD I SO.CBV E. lE Service Water flow is <1465 Verifies SW flow >1465 gpm to 25 S/U evaluation)
Ii
-1 gpm, THEN: CFCU.
5.1.3 1. STOP the CFCU. (cant) 2. REFER to S2.0P-SO.SW-0005, Note: IF operator notices SW flow of 1675 Service Water System Operation, Service Water System Operability Guidelines. is not like the running CFCU's and states they would stop the performance of test, THEN Cue that the CRS directs you to l F. ENSURE Service Water flow.:::_ 1465 continue the test. gpm. ST.CBV- B. RECORD Start Time in the Operator records start time of 25 CFCU in 3 applicable Attachments( s ), Section Attachment 5. 5.1.1 3.0, for the CFCU being tested. l li t PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) i 5.1.1 C. When at least 15 minutes have Cue: 25 CFCU has been operating for 15 (cant) elapsed, RECORD the following in minutes.
the applicable Attachment(s), Section 3.0, for the CFCU being tested: Operator records 25 CFCU stop time, SW
*
- Stop Time flow rate, and 22 SW header .6-P.
- Cooling Water Flow Rate (gpm)
- IF testing 21 OR 22 CFCU, THEN 21 SW HDR .6-P is to be i recorded. Operator marks steps for 21-23 CFCU N/A. i
* !E testing 23 CFCU, THEN both I 21 SW HDR .6-P AND 22 SW HDR .6-P are to be recorded (Refer to Step 3.5)
Cue: WHEN asked, report 22 SW header
- IF testing 24 OR 25 CFCU,
.6-P is 91 psid.
THEN 22 SW HDR .6-P is to be recorded. Using Exhibit 1, determines minimum CFCU flowrate for 25 CFCU at 91 psid
- Test results by initialing the SAT (required to be rounded up to 95 psid lAW or UNSAT column lAW the Acceptance Criteria stated in P&L 3.4)
- the attachment. Operator initials >1465 gpm as SAT, and Cooling Water Flow Rate as UNSAT.
Terminate the JPM once the Att. 5 data in
-- -- ~-
Section 3.0 is marked SAT/UNSAT. _ _ _ _ c________ _ _ _ - - - --- PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE TQ-AA-1 06-0303 Revision 4 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. () V 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
_Q_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. U 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ~ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. J 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). Q 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _c)__ Date 1o { r 'S"" / ( '1 0 9. Pilot test the JPM: 3'Z..
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor:0~ Date: to (ts-/1'-'( SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Rx power is 100% steady state, SOL. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to perform S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Systems-Cooling Systems surveillance for 25 CFCU for monthly run. 25 CFCU is filled and vented. Component Off Normal Report has been reviewed with no abnormalities noted. Calibration data for required instruments 11as been obtained and recorded in appropriate Attachments. The differential pressure gauge for 22 SW header has been installed. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw control rods to criticality, and TCAF Failure of Source Range Hi Flux Trip to BLOCK . TASK NUMBER: N1120170101 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim g ALTERNATE PATH: [8J KIA NUMBER: 012 A4.03
----------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.6 3.6 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD Ro[KJ STAD SRO[KJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator I Perform
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Rev. 39 (Checked 10/7/14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 20 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 7/8/14 Instructor Validated By: C Omlor Date: 10/15/14 SME or Instructor Approved By: 12~~ _ C.vJopt Date: 10 -2]-ltf
~nTn~artment \ c .~ 'L) _.--\ L,(
Approved By: !\JVV\~art~ bperations
/- (f'\ \)\;) Date:
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw control rods to criticality, and TCAF Failure of Source Range Hi Flux Trip to BLOCK. SIMULATOR SETUP Fill out IOP-3 up to Step 5.3.18 for a non post refueling SU IC-256 Override 8410 OVDI (Block Source Range B PB will not block) Ensure AUDIO MULTIPLIER at Nl racks is set at 1k Ensure both SR channels are displayed on NR-45 and NR-45 alarms cleared. INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 2 performing a Rx startup by control rods lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003. The ICRR plot at the eight-fold position predicted criticality at 35 steps, which is the same as the Estimated Critical Rod Height. Rx Engineering predicts the Rx will go critical during the next rod pull of 25 steps. Control Bank D is at 25 steps. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Continue the startup at Step 5.3.18.0 by withdrawing Control Bank D 25 steps or until the Rx is critical, then continue with procedure to raise power and stabilize the Rx at 1x*10-8A in the Intermediate Range. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Identifies criticality during rod pull prior to withdrawing control bank D 25 additional steps.
- 2. Establishes an approximately 0.25 dpm SUR.
- 3. Inserts control rods to establish zero or negative SUR after determination that Source Range Channel B does not Block PRIOR to the Rx automatically tripping on High SR Flux.
PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK - Withdraw control rods to criticalit ... d TCAF Fail ..... - -*fS__ _...,.....,._ R
..... - Hi Flux Trio to BLOCK STEP COMMENTS STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Reviews procedure. Provide marked up copy of S2.0P-IO.ZZ~ 0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load. When ready to accept the watch, take the Simulator from FREEZE to RUN.
- 5.3.18.0 WITHDRAW Control Banks A, B and C Announces withdrawing Control Bank STOPPING at the following hold points to D 25 steps or until criticality is obtain ICRR data: achieved.
- CBA Fully Withdrawn
- RIL position Withdraws control rods while closely
- CBB Fully Withdrawn monitoring nuclear instrumentation,
- CBD at 50 Steps OR the 8-Fold Rod and stops withdrawing Control Bank I Position D when identification of Rx criticality t is observed. The Rx will be critical
- CBD withdrawal limited to #50 Step increments - OR before Control Bank D have been
- the 8-Fold Rod withdrawn 25 steps.
Position i Note: Step 5.3.18. F is the ICRR step, and has been completed. 5.3.18.E was N/A. 5.3.18.G has already occurred. I 5.3.18.H !E P-6 (Source Range Permissive) green Note: P-6 will not energize at this l~ light energizes .... point. I Ii I PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training II
. j OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw control rods to criticalibt, ~md TCAF Failure of Source Range Hi Flux Trip to BLOCK STEP COMMENTS STEP I (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- 5.3.19 When criticality is achieved: Announces the Rx is critical.
A. MAKE the following announcement Makes "Attention all plant personnel, l twice on the plant PA System: Unit 2 Reactor is critical."
"Attention all plant personnel, Unit 2 announcement two times on the Plant PA system. i Reactor is critical."
Cue: The Plant operator will annotate B. RECORD Criticality Date/Time data in the Control Room Log. Attachment 2, Section 3.0, and in the Control Room Narrative Log. Records date/time of criticality in C. RECORD Attachment 2, Section 3.0, Attachment 2, Section 3.0 at bottom Surveillance Results lAW the stated of page. Acceptance Criteria. Initials SAT column of section 3.0 in Attachment 2. Cue: "The CRS directs you to continue the power ascension at Step 5.3.20 by withdrawing Control Bank D to establish and maintain a 0.25 decade per minute start up rate."
- 5.3.20 CONTINUE with Reactor Power ascension, Withdraws Control Bank D to with positive stable SUR NOT to exceed 1.0 establish and maintain a stable li dpm, by adjusting Control Bank "D" as positive startup rate of approximately needed. 0.25 dpm SUR.
PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK Withdraw control rods to criticality, and_TCAF_Failure of Source Range_tli Fll1_X Trip to BLOCK STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluatiol'!}_
l 5.3.21 OBSERVE source range and intermediate Observes source range and I range levels on NIS for::: one decade overlap intermediate range and identifies during performance of next step. when at least 1 decade of overlap between them has occurred. 5.3.22 When P-6 (Source Range Permissive) green light is energized, as indicated on 2RP4% IR channels at 1o- 10 amps: A. SELECT one pen of NR-45 to an Selects one Intermediate Range Intermediate Range channel and the channel and one Power Range other pen to a Power Range channel. channel on recorder NR-45.
- B. BLOCK Source Range High Flux Trip Depresses BLOCK SOURCE I
by depressing both "BLOCK RANGE A" AND "BLOCK SOURCE SOURCE RANGE A" AND "BLOCK RANGE B" pushbuttons on console, SOURCE RANGE B" pushbuttons on and observes BLOCK SOURCE console. RANGE Blight does NOT illuminate. C. ENSURE Source Range Trains A&B TRIP BLOCKED blue light is Inserts control bank D to stop the illuminated on 2RP4 AND OHA E-5 power ascension and establishes a SR DET VOLT TRBL alarms. zero or negative SUR.
- 5.3.22.D
!E Source Range Detector fails to Block, Inserts control bank D to stop the THEN INSERT Control Rods to stabilize power ascension and establishes a Reactor Power: zero or negative SUR.
PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
. i OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw
-- control ---- rods to criticalit ---- ---- ...d TCAF Fail--*-- ........fS ....... ..... , __ .....
R - Hi Flux Trio to BLOCK STEP COMMENTS STEP 1 (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT I
- NO. STANDARD I
S/U evaluation) ! Terminate the JPM when a zero or negative SUR is established, or after I the Rx trips on High Source Range Flux at 1E5 cpm in the Source Range. I l PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. __,eJ. . _1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
-o£..__*
_{f)~-- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. -~@)""""-- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) (!) 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. -~----:::::::::=--- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
~ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ~ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matchesjhe m t current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. 35' Date ID ~ i~ 'I
-~--- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ /)~'0J/I-lA_'/_P1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
;of-s1Cf Date: _ _ _ _ __
SME/Instructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: Date: - - - - - - PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 2 performing a Rx startup by control rods lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003. The ICRR plot at the eight-fold position predicted criticality at 35 steps, which is the same as the Estimated Critical Rod Height. Rx Engineering predicts the Rx will go critical during the next rod pull of 25 steps. Control Bank Dis at 25 steps. INITIATING CUE You are the Reactor Operator. Continue the startup at Step 5.3.18.0 by withdrawing Control Bank D 25 steps or until the Rx is critical, then continue with procedure to raise power and stabilize the Rx at 1x10-8 A in the Intermediate Range. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration (23 CCW pump) TASK NUMBER: N 1150420501 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim h ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: 008 A4.01
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.3 3.1 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD R0[8] STAD SR0[8] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator
REFERENCES:
2-EOP-APPX-1 Rev. 24 (rev checked 9-6-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: C Omlor Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: Training Department Approved By: Date: Operations Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration TASK N 1150420501 NUMBER: SIMULATOR SETUP: IC-258, markup 2-EOP-TRIP-1 through Step 17 direction to start one CCW pump lAW APPX-1. 22 CCW pump start PB 0/R off. INITIAL CONDITIONS: The Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped and a Sl initiated based on indications of a large LOCA. 2-EOP-TRIP-1 is in effect. When the Main Generator breakers opened, all off site power was lost. All vital buses are being powered from their respective EDGs. NO CCW pumps are running. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to start ONE CCW pump lAW 2-EOP-APPX-1. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Start 21 CCW pump lAW APPX-1.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: --------------------- SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
I Operator obtains 2-EOP-APPX-1 1 CHECK 4 KV vital bus status: Checks 4KV vital busses and determines no vital bus is being
- a. CHECK AT LEAST ONE vital supplied from station power bus ENERGIZED by station transformer and goes to Step 2.
power transformers. 2 CHECK ECCS pump (CVC,SI, or RHR) and AFW pump status:
- a. CHECK all ECCS pumps AND Checks running pumps and motor driven AFW pumps determines that ALL ECCS and motor running on energized vital driven AFW pumps are running on buses. energized vital buses.
2.b. CHECK one CCW pump running. Checks CCW pump status and determines NO CCW pumps are running. Uses the RNO and goes to Step 3.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: --------------------- SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration STEP COMMENTS I STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step} EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 3 SELECT CCW pump start strategy:
- a. IF ALL 4 KV vital buses Determines ALL 4 KV vital buses energized, THEN GO TO Step 4. energized, and GOES TO Step 4.
4 Start 22 CCW pump as follows: 4.a CHECK 22 CCW pump AVAILABLE Determines 22 CCW pump is AVAILABLE.
- 4.b BLOCK 2B and 2C SECs. Blocks 2B and 2C SECs on 2RP1.
- 4.c RESET 2B and 2C SEC's Resets 2B and 2C SEC's on 2CC3.
4.d Perform the following at RP2:
- 4.d.1 STOP 22 Switchgear Room Supply Stops 22 Switchgear Room Supply Fan. Fan at RP2
- 4.d.2 START 23 Switchgear Room Supply Starts 23 Switchgear Room Supply Fan. Fan at RP2
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ---------------------- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ---------------------- SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation}
- 4.e STOP the following equipment at CC1: Stops equipment at CC1:
- 22 CFCU
- 22 CFCU
- 24 CFCU
- 24 CFCU
- 22 Aux Bldg Exhaust Fan
- 22 Aux Bldg Exhaust Fan
- 4.f START 22 CCW Pump. Depresses start PB for 22 CCW Pump and recognizes it did not start.
- 4.f 1)START 22 OR 24 CFCU Starts 22 or 24 CFCU RNO 2)GO TO Step 5 Goes to Step 5 5 START 21 CCW Pump as follows: I I
- 5.a BLOCK 2A AND 2B SECs. Blocks 2 A SEC and verifies 2B SEC previously blocked. I
- 5.b RESET 2A AND 2B SECs. Resets 2A SEC and verifies 2B SEC I previously reset.
5.c SEND an operator to 100 ft elev chiller Sends an operator to 100 ft elev I area to lock out 21 Chiller by placing chiller area to lock out 21 Chiller by the keyswitch in OFF (LOCKOUT) placing the keyswitch in OFF I _position. (LOCKOUT)_position.
- 5.d PERFORM the following at RP2: At RP2, Stops 21 Switchgear Room !
- 1) STOP 21 Switchgear Room Supply Fan and starts 22 Switchgear Supply Fan. Room Supply Fan.
I
- 2) START 22 Switchgear Room Supply Fan.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: --------------------- SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
- 5.e STOP the following equipment at CC1: At CC1, stops 21 CFCU and 21 Aux
- 21 CFCU Bldg Exhaust Fan
- 21 Aux Bldg Exhaust Fan
- 5.f START the following equipment at At CC1 starts 22 or 24 CFCU and CC1: starts 22 FHB Exhaust Fan
- 22 OR24 CFCU
- 22 FHB Exhaust Fan
- 5.g START 21 CCW Pump. Starts 21 CCW pump.
6 PLACE 21 AND 22 CCW Heat Exchangers in service as follows: 6.a CHECK AT LEAST THREE SW pumps Determines 3 SW pumps are running. running. 6.b SEND an operator to 84 ft elev Aux Sends an operator to 84 ft elev Aux Bldg to place 21 AND 22 CCW Heat Bldg to place 21 AND 22 CCW Heat Exchangers in service lAW S2.0P- Exchangers in service lAW S2.0P-SO.CC-0002(0), "21 & 22 Component SO.CC-0002(0), "21 & 22 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Operation." Cooling Heat Exchanger Operation." 6.c RETURN TO procedure in effect. Returns to procedure in effect. Terminating Cue: When operator announces returning to procedure in effect, state JPM is complete.
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE TQ-AA-106-0303 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ____ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ____ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _ _ Date _ _ _ _ __ - - - - 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: Date: - - - - - - - - SME/Instructor:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Date: - - - - - - - SME/Instructor:------------------- Date: - - - - - - -
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: The Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped and a Sl initiated based on indications of a large LOCA. 2-EOP-TRIP-1 is in effect. When the Main Generator breakers opened, all off site power was lost. All vital buses are being powered from their respective EDGs. NO CCW pumps are running. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to start ONE CCW pump lAW 2-EOP-APPX-1.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG TASK NUMBER: N0645060104 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC IP-i ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 064 A2.03
------------------~
IMPORTANCEFACTOR: ____ 3._1___ 3.1 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOCJ ROCK] STAC] SROCK] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: In Plant I Simulate
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, Rev. 41 (checked 10-15-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-24-14 Instructor Validated By: S Bickhart Date: 10-15-14 Approved By: Date: ;o.-'2--?~ILJ lJr'1)'(1 Approved By: Date: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG TASK N0645060104 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: 2C EDG is running loaded in parallel with 2C Vital bus for maintenance. It is loaded to 2550 KW, 1500 KVAR OUT. INITIATING CUE: Unload and shut down the 2C EDG lAW S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Operation, Sections 5.8 and 5.9 Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained}.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Lower DG real load incrementally to less than 200 KW.
- 2. Lower DG reactive load incrementally to 50-100 KVAR.
- 3. Open DG output breaker.
- 4. Stop DG and return Gen Loading SW to AUTO.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM I NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: TASK: Emergency Diesel Generator Unload and stop an EDG DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - II STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS !
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT i Evaluation)
Provide candidate with marked up Give operator marked up copy of procedure. S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Operation, Rev. 41 . f i NOTE The GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER Ensure that operator simulates tripping SWITCH should be placed in the TRIP the EDG breaker when cue is given position as soon as EDG Load is reduced later in JPM that load is <200KW. to 200 KW. I II I I I PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) 5.8.1 lE 2C EDG is paralleled on 2C 4KV Vital Bus, THEN concurrently PERFORM the following:
*
- ADJUST SPEED CONTROL Operator locates SPEED CONTROL SWITCH (GS) to gradually lower SWITCH (GS) and VOLTAGE load to 200 KW. CONTROL SWITCH , and simulates alternately goes to LOWER on the
*
- ADJUST VOLTAGE CONTROL switches while monitoring Generator SWITCH (VCS) to gradually lower KW and KVAR.
KVAR to between 50-1 00 KVAR OUT. CUE: Each time operator simulates going to lower on SPEED CONTROL SWITCH (GS), give operator reading which is 300KW less than previous. CUE: Each time operator simulates going to lower on VOLTAGE CONTROL SWITCH (VCS), give operator reading which is 200KVAR less than previous. NOTE: IF operator simulates going to RAISE on either switch, then CUE a reading that is HIGHER in the same amount as proper operation above. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) 5.8.3 OPEN 2C DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER by performing one of the Simulates opening 2C DIESEL following: GENERATOR BREAKER by placing
- OPEN 2CD1AX6D, 2C DIESEL 2C-DF-GCP-3 (BCS) to TRIP position.
GENERATOR BREAKER. (64' Swgr Rm, or CUE: Green indicating light above
- PRESS 2C BREAKER OPEN switch illuminates, red light pushbutton (2CC3), or extinguishes. Generator KW and
- PLACE 2C-DF-GCP-3 KVAR indicate 0. Generator Voltage GENERATOR CIRCUIT indicates 4160 VAC.
BREAKER SWITCH (BCS), to TRIP (2C DIG Control Panel). 5.8.4 ALLOW Diesel to run unloaded for.:::_ 3 CUE: 3 minutes has elapsed. minutes prior to stopping the EDG. 5.8.5 !E diesel unloading was directed by Step Marks step N/A 5.9.3F OR Step 5.1 0.4E, THEN RETURN to Step 5.9.4 OR Step 5.10.5. t 5.9.1 !E Diesel Generator was operated without Marks step N/A I electrical load for <15 minutes, THEN ALLOW Diesel to run unloaded until total runtime is .:::_15 minutes OR for a period of time specified by a pre-planned Maintenance activity, prior to stopping Diesel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training j
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) 5.9.2 !E Diesel Generator was operated without Marks step N/A electrical load for :::,2 hours, AND the diesel is capable of loading, THEN: [C0300]
A. Slowly LOAD Diesel, over 15 minutes, to 1500 KW at 1125 KVAR for minimum of 1 hour lAW Section 5.4 of this procedure. B. UNLOAD Diesel lAW Section 5.8 of this procedure. 5.9.3 !E Diesel Generator was operated without Marks step N/A electrical load for:::, 2 hours ....
~
[' I i I PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ------------------- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ I' SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT i i
Evaluation) 5.9.4 lE 2C-DF-GCP-1 2C DIESEL GEN LOADING SW is in MANUAL (DROOP), THEN: A. ADJUST Diesel Generator speed CUE: DG speed indicates 905 rpm. as necessary to achieve 900 rpm Operator simulates placing SPEED using SPEED CONTROL SWITCH CONTROL SWITCH (GS). to lower, (GS). then CUE: DG speed indicates 900 rpm. B. CHECK frequency indicated on Calls control room to check frequency.
. I 2CC3 bezel is 58.94-60.36 Hz. CUE: frequency is 60.03 HZ.
CUE: Generator voltage is 4140. C. ADJUST Generator terminal voltage as necessary to achieve Simulates raising VOLTAGE 4160 volts using VOLTAGE CONTROL SWITCH (VCS). CONTROL SWITCH (VCS) CUE: Generator voltage is 4160. D. CHECK voltage indicated on 2CC3 Operator calls control room to check II is 4.023-4.306 Kv. voltage on 2CC3 bezel. CUE: Voltage is 4200.
- 5.9.5 PLACE 2C-DF-SS, 2C DG STOP/START Simulates placing 2C-DF-SS 2C DG SWITCH in STOP. STOP/START SWITCH to STOP, and .~
verifies speed lowering. CUE: Diesel is stopping. 5.9.6 IF the Diesel Generator does not Marks NA. I shutdown ... PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training t
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ------------------- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT I i
Evaluation) I
- 5.9.7 IF 2C-DF-GCP-1, 2C DIESEL GEN Simulates placing 2C-DF-GCP-1 2C LOADING SW is in MANUAL (DROOP), DIESEL GEN LOADING SW in AUTO.
THEN PLACE 2C-DF-GCP-1 2C DIESEL CUE: AUTO light illuminates, GEN LOADING SW in AUTO (ISOCR). MANUAL light extinguishes, GENERATOR LOADING IN DROOP i MODE (B-9) alarm clears. TERMINATION: After placing switch in AUTO, state "JPM is complete." PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _ _...,..~_1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. -~-:r-- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
;.'r;.-- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant. control room, or simulator)
--,£-=--- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ---1--- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. - - - + - - 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). 7* 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of --?- that procedure: Procedure Rev.~ Date tO/ r:-J) 1 Y
.fJ:G 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.
~.
SME/Instructor~ ------*
~~dL~\
SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: 2C EDG is running loaded in parallel with 2C Vital bus for maintenance. It is loaded to 2550 KW, 1500 KVAR OUT. INITIATING CUE: Unload and shut down the 2C EDG lAW S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Operation, Sections 5.8 and 5.9 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Pressurizer/Pressure Relief TASK: Transfer Pressurizer 22 Backup Heaters to Emergency Power Supply TASK NUMBER: 115 043 05 01 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Annual IP-j ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 010 A4.02
----------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: -------- 3.6 3.4 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoCJ RO[RJ STAC] SRO[RJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: In Plant, Simulate
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.PZR-0010 Rev. 10 (Rev. checked 10-15-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 20 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9/2/2014 Instructor Validated By: S Bickhart Date: 10/15/14 SME~Instructor Approved By: {};:#I ' CA Vht'>J Date: /O ty
~~D artment tv- 'l Yll Olperati~~artm~l)
Approved By: Date: ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Pressurizer/Pressure Relief TASK: Transfer Pressurizer 22 Backup Heaters to Emergency Power Supply TASK 1150430501 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: Due to a loss of power to the group buses it is necessary to energize the PZR Backup Heaters from their emergency power supply. INITIATING CUE: The CRS directs you to perform S2.0P-SO.PZR-0010(Q), Section 5.3, Transferring Pzr Htr 22 BU Group To The Emergency Power Supply. All prerequisites and Precautions and Limitations have been reviewed and completed. 2A EDG is carrying 2A Vital Bus and is loaded to 2400 KW. You have a JAM key. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Simulate opening all but one PZR heater supply breakers.
- 2. Simulate aligning emergency power to PZR heater bus from 2A vital bus.
Page 2 of6
l OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ____________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer/Pressure Relief DATE: ____________________ TASK: Transfer 22 Backup Heaters to Emergency Power Supply STEP COMMENTS f
- STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT fj NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
Operator obtains procedure S2.0P- Provide marked up copy of S2.0P-SO.PZR-0010, Pressurizer Backup Heaters SO. PZR-00 10, Pressurizer Backup Power Supply Transfer. Heaters Power Supply Transfer
- 5.3.1 ENSURE 2AX1AX14X, 2EP Locates breaker 2AX1AX14X 2EP PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS FEED PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS FEED (EMERGENCY) is OPEN (84' Swgr Rm). (EMERGENCY) on 2A 460V Vital Bus, Elev. 84' Swgr Rm and determines current breaker position.
Cue: 2AX 1AX 14X Breaker indicates OPEN. i~
. -- I t 5.3.2 Request NCO to PERFORM the following: I i
A. PLACE 22 Backup Group in Locates nearest means of I MANUAL. communications and requests NCO to I B. PRESS the 22 BACKUP OFF place 22 B/U Htrs in MANUAL and I pushbutton press the 22 BACKUP OFF pushbutton. Cue: NCO reports 22 B/U Htrs are l I in MANUAL and 22 BACKUP OFF .I pushbutton has been depressed. I 5.3.3 ENSURE2EX1EP2EPX,2EP480V Locates 2EX1 EP2EPX, 2EP 480V PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS MAIN PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS MAIN BREAKER is OPEN (78' Electrical BREAKER on El. 78 Electrical Pen. Penetration). Cue: 2EX1EP2EPX, 2EP 480V PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS MAIN BREAKER is OPEN is open. II
\
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ____________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer/Pressure Relief DATE: ____________________ TASK: Transfer 22 Backup Heaters to Emergency Power Supply STEP COMMENTS
- STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
- 5.3.4 REMOVE interlock key from breaker Turns key and removes interlock key I 2EX1 EP2EPX. from breaker 2EX1 EP2EPX.
I i
- 5.3.5 PLACE any eleven of the following Operator locates individual heater disconnects in OFF (only three disconnects breakers, places all but three breakers I
are to remain ON) AND MARK the in OFF and notes breakers left ON as remaining disconnects as N/A: N/A in procedure.
- 5.3.6 PLACE, 2AX1AX14X-1, 2EP PZR HTR Operator locates 2AX 1AX 14X-1, 2EP BUS EMERGENCY FEED DISCONNECT PZR HTR BUS EMERGENCY FEED SWITCH, in the ON position (Eiev 78' DISCONNECT SWITCH, and places it Electrical Penetration). in the ON position (Eiev 78' Electrical Penetration).
- 5.3.7 INSERT interlock key, AND UNLOCK Locates Corry Key Interlock on '
breaker 2AX1AX14X. 2AX1AX14X breaker, inserts and turns key. 5.3.8 NOTIFY NCO that PZR Htr 22 B/U Group Candidate makes report to the Control has been transferred to the emergency Room. power supply (2A 460V Vital Bus). Repeat back notification and state: JPM is complete. I I I'
'j i,
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.
---S- 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ) 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
__2_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
~ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ) 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. -~..,...--- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. -~--?-- 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ------"'---- 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches _the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _jQ_ Date ro/t5fl c..f ---+/=;}~- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor:~ IGILI-kl4.:r:: Date: I oJ,s-j, 0 SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Due to a loss of power to the group buses it is necessary to energize the PZR Backup Heaters from their emergency power supply. INITIATING CUE: The CRS directs you to perform S2.0P-SO.PZR-0010(Q), Section 5.3, Transferring Pzr Htr 22 BU Group To The Emergency Power Supply. All prerequisites and Precautions and Limitations have been reviewed and completed. 2A EDG is carrying 2A Vital Bus and is loaded to 2400 KW. You have a JAM key.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Radioactive Liquid Waste TASK: Respond to High Radiation Alarm during an Authorized Release of Rad. Liquid Waste to the CIRC Water System From 21 CVCS Monitor Tank TASK NUMBER: N0685140104 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC IP-k ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: 2.3.11
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.3
- -3.8 --
APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD RO(LJ STAD SRO(LJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: In Plant/SIMULATE
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.WL-0001, Rev. 25, Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste from 21 CVCS Monitor Tank (checked 10-15-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 15 min. TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-24-14 Instructor Validated By: S Bickhart Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: A~- Gv"~ Date: l 0 ..... ~ 'J-I¥ Approved By: c:r~;:~tj I Date: f 0 - L '7 - (<(
~peratiof)S)Je'pirtment IJ ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:
ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Radioactive Liquid Waste TASK: Respond to High Radiation Alarm during an Authorized Release of Rad. Liquid Waste to the CIRC Water System From 21 CVCS Monitor Tank TASK N0685140104 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: Both Units are at 100% power. A discharge of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank to Unit 1 Circ Water via Unit 2 SW has been directed lAW S2.0P SO.WL-0001, Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste from 21 CVCS Monitor Tank. Recirculation and preparation for release of the Monitoring Tank have been completed. Chemistry has authorized a maximum allowable release rate of 150 gpm. ALL Circulators are in service. 2R18 and the Overboard Flow monitor are OPERABLE. SW Room Cooler Headers are NOT cross-tied. S2.0P-SO.WL-0001, Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 are complete. 21 eves tank initial level is 19,600 gallons. INITIATING CUE: Perform Section 5.5, Release of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank via SW system to CW system, of S2.0P-SO.WL-0001. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Perform normal Liquid Radwaste Release.
- 2. Terminate release upon receipt of high radiation alarm on release.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
*c No. S/U Provide operator with marked up copy of release Reviews marked up procedure procedure.
5.5.1 lE 2FR1064 is INOPERABLE .... NA's step since 2FR1064 is OPERABLE.
- 5.5.2 Direct Unit 2 NCO to OPEN 2WL51, LIQUID Locates plant page or phone to call control RELEASE STOP VALVE. room.
Cue: Unit 2 NCO reports 2WL51 has been opened. I 5.5.3 Direct a second operator to PERFORM an Independent Verification for 2WL51 position lAW I Attachment 2, Step 4.1.2 OR 4.2.2 as applicable Cue: IV has been performed. (ODCM) I
- 5.5.4 THROTTLE OPEN 2WR59, MT PMPS OB STOP Locates 2WR59 and simulates opening valve. I I
VALVE, NOT to exceed the Maximum Release Rate recorded in Attachment 2, Step 2.2.2 When operator checks flow indication on 104 I panel, Cue: With the valve fully open, flow I is 10 gpm. Note: Max Release Rate from Att. 2, Step I 2.2.2 is 150 gpm. I 5.5.5 Direct a second operator to PERFORM an I Independent Verification for 2WR59 position lAW Attachment 2, Step 4.1.3 OR 4.2.3 as Cue: IV has been performed. applicable (ODCM) _I
- 5.5.6 IF the Maximum Release Rate recorded in Locates 21WR53 and simulates throttling I Attachment 2, Step 2.2.2 can NOT be obtained, valve closed.
THEN THROTTLE CLOSED 21 WR53 MT I RECIRC V, NOT to exceed the Maximum When operator checks flow on 104 panel, Release Rate. Cue: Flow is 55 gpm. I c - -- ! D~J::~ D.aC>tril"'tnrl _ 0Ae>C"t':H'C"if"\n Dn.ru1iraC" Cnonifil"' Dormic-e-inn frnrn 1\1. lr>lo'"'llr Tr~ininn
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
- No. .. - S/U 5.5.7 !E 2FR1064 flow monitor is OPERABLE, Simulates annotating recorder with time, date and THEN RECORD time, date, and tank tank.
identification on recorder. 5.5.8 COMPLETE Attachment 2, Section 5.1 Records data. Cue: Chemistry paperwork indicates dilution water flowrate is 200,000 gpm. Cue: When operator reads 21 CVCS Monitor Tank Level, state, "2-LIS-180 indicates 90%". l Records 19,600 from either Att. 1 Section 2.0 or Att. 2 Section 1.0. If operator requests S2.0P-TM.ZZ-0002, Tank Capacity Data, tell them the procedure is not needed to determine the tank volume. Records Dilution Water Flowrate of 200,000 gpm. ) Initial conditions stated all circulators were in service . 5.5.9 .!f_any of the following occur during the releasE THEN direct the NCO to CLOSE 2WL51, Records 55 gpm for Discharge Flow Rate. I LIQUID RELEASE STOP VALVE. (Previous cue from Step 5.5.6 can be re-stated here if asked.) Loss of dilution water flow 2FR1064 becomes inoperable Cue: When operator reads 2R18 indication on 104 5 2R18 Monitor ALARMS panel, state, "2R18 reads 10 counts, the RED HI t
- MT pump pressure falls below the MOP RAD light is lit."
allowed lAW Attachment 4, as appliGable Calls control room to inform them of HI RADIATION condition and directs NCO to shut 2WL51. Cue: Once operator has called control room to have the 2WL51 shut, state: "JPM is complete." DCC~ D,..,l""fri ..... f,....rl o-~~r:t.C"'rirt.n Dc-.ru1irnc-- ~no"ifj,... Dormic-e-inn frnm 1\1,.,-.lo..-:l,.. Tr<":llininrt
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM
+
usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.
- 1. Task description and number. JPM description and number are identified.
----c- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. --4--3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ~ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
- 57. 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk('). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev.~ Date re1r5'"{*'i
- - - - 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _ _ _ _ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/1 nstructor:_-+~7---v-. __,*""'--**~* - '~!: :p:.=: .J.
.._._....__.__*n....,*u.l__,¢kd+"""""'.. L.I Date: --~-t.=:.."'pl'=S~~1y,______
SME/Instructor: Date: SME/Instructor: Date: _______ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Both Units are at 100% power. A discharge of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank to Unit 1 Circ Water via Unit 2 SW has been directed lAW S2.0P SO.WL-0001, Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste from 21 CVCS Monitor Tank. Recirculation and preparation for release of the Monitoring Tank have been completed. Chemistry has authorized a maximum allowable release rate of 150 gpm. ALL Circulators are in service. 2R18 and the Overboard Flow monitor are OPERABLE. SW Room Cooler Headers are NOT cross-tied. S2.0P-SO.WL-0001, Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 are complete. 21 eves tank initial level is 19,600 gallons. INITIATING CUE: Perform Section 5.5, Release of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank via SW system to CW system, of S2.0P-SO.WL-0001. PSEG Restricted -Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-3 Op-Test No.: 13-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL. Turnover: Maintain current power. Perform weekly Vacuum Pump swap lAW S2.0P-SO.AR-0001. Event Malf. No. Event Event Type* No. Description N 1 Swap condenser vacuum pumps PO 2 VL0336 c Loss of condenser vacuum (recoverable) VL0337 CRS/PO 3 EL0144 c Loss of 2A 4160 volt vital bus (TS) ALL I Turbine Inlet steam pressure transmitter (PT-505) failure 4 TU0055 ALL (TS) M 5 MS0302 Steam dump failure with single MSIV failing to shut ALL 6 RP0108 c Failure of automatic Safety Injection (steamline D/P) CRS/RO 7 AF0181 B c Loss of All AFW flow- FRHS condensate pump recovery AF0183 ALL CT's: #1 Initiate manual Safety Injection
#2 Establish Condensate flow in FRHS
- (N)ormal, (R)eactJVJty, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-1 Op-Test No.: 13-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 90% power, EOL. Turnover: Raise Rx power to 98.5% @ 10% per hour lAW IOP-4, Power Operation. Event Malf. No. Event Event Type* No. Description R CRS/RO 1 Raise power N PO c 2 AN0266 EDG Air Receiver low pressure (TS) CRS 3 CC0172C c CCW pump trip w I failure of standby pump to start (TS) CC0361 B CRS/PO 4 RC007D c RCP seal degradation CRS/RO M 5 MS0092H Steam leak in containment ALL 6 MS0092 c MSLI failure (Loss of Secondary Coolant) E-H ALL 7 RP318L 1 c Containment Spray pumps fail to start on SEC signal RP318L2 CRS/RO CT's: 1. Stop R~P with seal failure . 2 Start m1n1mum complement of contamment cooling.
- 2. Minimize AFW flow
- (N)ormal, (R)eact1v1ty, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 1 of 34 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: 13-01 NRC ESG-1 SCENARIO NUMBER: 13-01 NRC ESG-1 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates below EXPECTED DURATION: 80 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: '--------'1 L.O. REQUAL X I INITIAL LICENSE I STA
'--------'~ OTHER Revision Summary New Issue for 13-01 NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 08-7-14 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: (O...- ~'J -/4' Date APPROVED BY:
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 2 of 34 A. Given the unit at >20% reactor power with the generator synchronized to the grid, the crew will perform a power increase at 10%/hr, lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004(Q). B. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, the crew will perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, lAW approved station procedures. C. Given indication of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. D. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the safety related plant cooling water system in accordance with approved station procedures. E. Given a RCP with various seal failures, take corrective action for RCP seal failures lAW AB.RCP-0001 and the appropriate alarm response procedures F. Given a failure of an RCP, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction lAW approved station procedures. G. Given the failure of a RCP, DIRECT the response to the malfunction lAW approved station procedures. H. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. I. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. Given a safety injection, START equipment that has failed to automatically start in accordance with the approved station procedures. M. Given the order or indications of a multiple steam generator depressurization, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the generator depressurization in accordance with EOP-LOSC-2. N. Given indication of a multiple steam generator depressurization, DIRECT the response to the generator depressurization in accordance with EOP-LOSC-2
- 0. Given indication of excessive containment pressure DIRECT the response to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures.
R. Given the order or indications of excessive containment pressure perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures. S. Given the unit in the EOPs and an excessive containment pressure the crew will reduce containment pressure lAW approve station procedures. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 3 of 34 A. Power ascension B. 2C EDG air leak C. 23 CCW pump trip w/ failure of standby pump to auto start. D. 24 RCP seal degradation leading to failure. E. Steam rupture in containment w/ failure of MSIVs to shut. F. Containment Spray pump start failure. A. The crew will take the turnover at 90% power, MOL, with direction to raise power to 98.5%
@ 10% per hour. Rx Engineering is bringing updated reactivity plan to control room and crew should determine its own reactivity plan to establish ARO prior to reaching 98.5%
power. B. After the power ascension is commenced, the crew will receive an urgent trouble alarm for 2C EDG. The CRS will determine that 2C EDG is inoperable based on lower than required Air Start Tank pressure, and enter the appropriate Tech Spec. C. Once the EDG Tech Spec is identified, 23 Component Cooling Water pump will trip. The standby CCW pump will not auto start. The crew will manually start the standby CCW pump to restore system pressure and clear CCW and RCP system alarms. The CRS will enter the appropriate Tech Spec. D. 24 RCP #1 seal will exhibit signs of degrading performance. The crew will enter S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality, to address the rising sealleakoff flow. The crew will initiate a Rx trip when seal leakoff reaches the point where the RCP must be tripped. The crew will trip 24 RCP after the Rx is tripped. E. 3-5 minutes after the 24 RCP is tripped, the crew will isolate the sealleakoff return valve for 24 RCP, to prevent further damage and seal degradation of the 24 RCP. (CT #1 ). F. After performing Rx trip immediate actions in EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection, the crew will transition to EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response, when it is determined no condition exists which warrants a Safety Injection. CFST's will be active upon transition out of TRIP-1. During performance of RCS cooldown minimization steps, a steam leak will develop in containment. The crew will initiate a MSLI, then initiate a Safety Injection when all MSIVs remain open (MSLI fails). G. The crew will return to EOP-TRIP-1, then transition out to EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant. The crew will transition to EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization due to all MSIVs being open. H. The crew will transition to EOP-FRCE-1 when containment pressure rises to 15 psig. The crew will diagnose no Containment Spray pumps are running and start Containment Spray pumps. (CT #3). I. During performance of LOSC-2 or FRCE-1 Response to Excessive Containment Pressure, the crew will reduce AFW flow to minimize the RCS cooldown. (CT#2). J. A single MSIV will be closed in the field during performance of LOSC-2. The crew will recognize rising pressure in the associated SG, and transition to LOSC-1. K. The scenario will terminate after the return to LOSC-1. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 4 of 34 Pre-snapped IC-231 Initial IDescription 1 2VC1 and 2VC4 CIT _ 2 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 3 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 4 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 5 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 6 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 7 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 8 S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation, in progress and complete up to Step 5.1.26. 9 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 5 of 34 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group EVENT ACTION: ~~-----*---------------*-------1. kb528ttx //21 SG FEED PUMP TURB-TRIP 3 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed>
- ----- ~-------------*-------------*- - - - -
EVENT ACTION: kc201pb3 // 2C DIESEL GEN-START 5 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 6 of 34 SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK Time Value Time SER POINT AN0266 SER 266 FAILS- :J20 2C DIESEL 01 N/A N/A N/A RT-1 FAILS/OVRD GENERATOR URGENT TROUBLE TOON 02 RP318Q3 2C Diesel GEN Fails to Start on SEC N/A 1\J/A 1\J/A N/A 03 CC0172C 23 COMPONENT COOLING PUMP TRIP N/A N/A N/A RT-3 CC0361B 22 COMPONENT COOLING PUMP Fails to 04 N/A N/A N!A N!A Start on Low Pressure RC007D 24 RC PUMP- #1 SEAL FAILS - w/ 05 N!A 0.3 00:05:00 RT-3 0.75 DEGRADATION 06 MS0092E 21MS167 FAILS OPEN N/;\ N/A N/A N/A 07 MS0092F 22MS167 FAILS OPEN N/A NiA N/A N/A 08 MS0092G 23MS167 FAILS OPEN N/A NIA N/A N/A 09 MS0092H 24MS167 FAILS OPEN N/A N/A N/A N!A. MS0090Ar 21 Main Steam Line Leak Inside Con! 10 00:01:00 6 00:05:00 ET-3 10 AFTER orifice 11 RP318L1 21 CS Pum Fails to Start on SEC 1\JiA N/A N/A NiA 12 RP318L2 22 CS Pump Fails to Start on SEC N/A N!A NiA N!A 13 EL0163 2C EMERG DIESEL GENERATOR TRIP 00:00:10 N/A N!A RT-10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 7 of 34 SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK Time Value Time 01 DG27D 2C DIESEL ENGINE LOCAL START N/A N/A N/A RT-10 START SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition/ CHECK Time Value Time Severity 01 C201 F Dl 2C DIESEL GEN-STOP 00:00:05 N!A N/A ET-5 ON 02 C201 C1 LO 2C DIESEL GEN-READY TO LOAD N/A N/l\ 1\J/A N/A OFF 03 C203 LAO 2C DIESEL GENERATOR- VOLTS ~VA N/A N/A N/A 0 04 C203 R AO 2C DIESEL GENERATOR- FREQ ~~!A N/A N/,4. N/A 35 Description
- 1. None PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 8 of 34 A. State shift job assignments. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew 'The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 9 of 34
- 1. Power ascension CRS briefs crew on power ascension.
RO calculates dilution required to achieve ARO prior to 98.5% power. PO sets up Main Turbine for power ascension to 98.5% at 10% per hour. Note: CRS may direct rod movement only until rods are fully withdrawn. If this is the method chosen, then dilution will not be performed prior to initiating the up power. Note: Power defect change from 90% to 98.5% is 83.3 pcm. (Page 104/115 of S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0016 Curve Book, using 6,000 EFPH and 900 Cb RCS boron)) There is 52 pcm left in rods at 203 steps. (page 32/115). This means 31.3 pcm will have to be added via dilution. Note: Differential boron worth at 90% power for 6,000 EFPH is - -6.4846 pcm/ppm. 31.3 pcm I -6.4846 pcm/ppm =a boron concentration change of 4.8 ppm required. This can be calculated to PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 10 of 34
,f:'ii:JtCotnm~nt~:~i\ *-*~;t?1~
- ,~~~j;t:~~.~tc~,?:~!~i~'entF~i,~r~rr~~:~~\;~:.~~r'.~*.**r~a*)J,,: (~~~:/*~*
- be 353 gallons of dilution total would be required in addition to the rods. (Calc found on Figure 101 of S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012 Figures).
RO initiates dilution. (if required) Note: If dilution is used first, the turbine up power will not be initiated until after the RO reports the effect of the dilution is being observed in the RCS. PO initiates power ascension to 98.5% at 10% per hour. RO/PO monitor plant response to ensure power ascension is progressing as anticipated. RO either announces expected and actual auto rod movement, or withdraws rods in manual with CRS concurrence to maintain Tavg on _QrQgram. Note: Auto or manual rod control is at the discretion of the CRS. Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
- 2. 2C EDG Air start compressor leak/failure SimiJI~tor Operator: lnsE}rt RT*1
- I*: on directiorrfrdrn. Lead Evaluator; PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 11 of 34
. s:t ,;{'a ~~~-~rr:~~;~*~ct~~;~l,~~~~~~~~~~;~~*~?;~~t*~:"T . ***.~7?i~~~t~~1;2 ::~.
PO announces OHA J-20, 2C DG URGENT TRBL, as unexoected. i PO refers to ARP and re I Note: 2C EDG Air System is shown on drawing 205241 Sheet 6. Role Play: 2 minutes after being dispatched, report that when you arrived at 2C EDG control room, you could hear an air leak in the 2C t EDG room. You acknowledged 2C EDG local alarm panel alarms A-4 and A-5, Air Receiver #1 Low Pressure and Air Receiver #2 Low Pressure respectively. In 2C EDG room you identified both EDG air start compressors running, and a large air leak on the starting air supply line at the connection where the single supply line from the Moisture Separator splits to go to the two Air Receiver Tanks. Current Starting Air Tank pressures are both 176 psig and dropping. If asked, report the alarm setpoint for the low air pressure is 182 psig per PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 12 of 34 s~~ .tE:var tortlnstru ~f*t ~~~r]ci~~... >*~~.~.~~; .. the ARP.
.* ,&~g~~x;~~***
Note: If directed to isolate the air starting tanks inlet valves to isolate the leak, report back after 8 minutes that you have shut 21 DA5C and 22DA5C (or the valves directed by CRS if different) to isolate the 23A and 238 Air Receiver Tanks respectively, and that both Air Start tanks are at 155 psi g. Role Play: IF requested to inform CRS when air pressure reaches 160 psig, report back in 8 minutes that Air start pressure is 160 psig and lowering. Assuming a constant rate of pressure reduction, the Air Start tanks will reach their Tech Spec operability limit of 160 psig in 8 minutes from the initial field report. Note: CRS may direct starting 2C EDG to ensure it remains operable. This would preclude having to declare the EDG inoperable, and extend the amount of time until the EDG would be in a 72 hour shutdown LCO (to allow a trouble shooting plan to be developed, obtain repair parts, etc). However, running an EDG unloaded for an PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Paae 13 of 34 t.*.*. . j~~e:1 t~~fr'J~s1r~F~.i£t~~~irii'~t;i(~ ::fJ:,~{~.~~~~~?.~~~~&~~t~~~ttr*R~~:~~~8~ ** . .*
- .:~,:~~~:~~&J~: ~~*i extended period of time would require additional evaluation, and in any event the EDG will fail if it is attempted to be started.
IF CRS orders PO to start 2C EDG from control console it will not reach proper speed, and stop shortly after the start attempt. IF CRS directs 2C EDG to be started locally, state you will review S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Operation, ensure prerequisites are met, review the P&L's, do the pre-startup checks, and report back when you are ready to start 2C EDG. IF the CRS directs starting of 2C EDG without completing the step above, continue to next step. IF directed to locally start 2C EDG without performing normal start pre-req's, P&L's, etc., insert RT-10 to place the local start-stop switch to start, and report when 2C EDG trips 10 seconds later on over crank. (Local Alarm Panel window B-5 Failure to Start - Overcrank.) CRS enters TSAS 3.8.1.1.b action b and determines the remainina 2 EDGs must be PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 14 of 34
- :.>.x::e**.... ,. . *. . t* ** . r**zr*n# s"t'fUC""'t'o*J"~f:'\
.*,...c.'"t****.* Ct.e....
lVI*t*y**. '*'* ..* *; * ***v*<:. .*e* Xpe... 'd
. *p*Ja*0**t*/*s*t*u***d* en...t. . *R***""""' :"x:: :;;:;:;;;;:s*** ..,..qw****. * .*****'*"'.::. :.*.....*. *a*-r* . ;:;z >t~~~~~~~x~~~t:~.z;f~;:,:;*.**. "> ya.~:~ao. . <., , esponse,.,.,, &.*~r*
1*;*: verified operable by performing S2.0P-ST-500-1, ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES ALIGNMENT, within 1 hour. Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
- 3. 23 CCW pump w/failure of standby pump to start.
Simulator Operator: Insert RT-3 ..: on direction fron1 Lead*evaluatorr IVIALFS: '*.. ** ....*** . . *' ; . CC0172C 23 COMPONENT *. COOLING WATER PUMP.*TRIP
.~;&~~~~~~~~~~~~ .~EA!;*
i. lnl(iari.yarue:* oj J ** Severity:~o;7s. .
- Ramp: s'rninutes' RO reports trip of 23 CCW pump and standby i' umo did not auto start. I I
i RO manual! PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training I
~
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 15 of 34
;;,~,evaluator/fnstructor:ffActivitY;s:' ,*;!i:;SxfiectiltiRlanttstudirr.trijespons~ ,,, 5 .\ ~r;~::n;ofumehf,'~:: ,
h~~~~-f~~~~~;,,.,--, !;~ . o:-' ',: c..:: 'c;~,~ :~, *~~~xiJ~;~; ~'~~ .,~ *> '.~: c~1&tf~*;,~~:::~J~' <:,* *'*/*, .
'*.~~/*; '*,,*~,;~:t:: J:;.:".~*~.*.-~~1:~-v' ',< c clearing of all alarms associated with the CCW pumo tri~.
CRS directs RO/PO to validate alarms received with ARP auidance. Note: CCW system alarms will annunciate during initial crew response, but all alarms will clear upon restoration of system pressure. RO/PO report that alarms received were consistent with low CCW system pressure, and that the restoration of system pressure was exoected to clear all those alarms. RO verifies RCP CCW cooled parameters trendina to normal values. CRS may enter S2.0P-AS.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality, and S2.0P-AS.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality, to verify actions previously performed have corrected condition. Note: Entry into these 2 AS's is not required because the action taken to restore CCW system pressure corrected the entry conditions for the AS's. CRS dispatches operators to investigate 23 CCW oumo trio. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 16 of 34 E~afuator!J,Qstru,<:J<:lr ..<<ativitf> *'? *-~"' J:_::-:;~~rt/~B:r;:~Bj :*~"~~'i~;;t~m~nt~::?;*h~f* *, '*'{if?i\f;:,:,:: *
~ ~1~~~i;;~~:,~~-~*\;-~~;~~t-::~~<~- '~~J~'-<~}>~_:. \~ ' ,\~ ,;~,* ' -~~ *, " ~.:;L ' 'LOG* "
Role Play: 2 minutes after being dispatched to check 23 CCW pump breaker, report overcurrent trip is present on 23 CCW pump. If dispatched to check CCW pumps, report they look normal. CRS enters TSAS 3. 7.3 based on not having 2 operable CCW loops. Note: Post scenario question may need to be asked for this Tech Spec call if it is not addressed prior to RCP malfunction.
- 4. 24 RCP seal degradation w/
failure RO reports 24 RCP seal leakoff flow alarm current reading. Note: Seal inlet and outlet temps will lower, charging flow will rise, and RCDT level will rise (slightly), due to the seal leak. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality. CRS verifies entry condition of seal leakoff flow >5 _g()m is met. CRS directs initiation of CAS. RO uses P-250 computer to check 24 RCP ---- -***- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 1.7 of 34 .:;:,.:;:~;7~~\si~~:o~,~~*struc~~::.&tc~i~,~t:ri * * * * \,;,.;~Expircted P'hirWStudent ResporJse: .*.*
- 'c,'}i ' ':~~;:: )\~~ ~:;*':' 1c~, .:', :~,:,>, :1 ~i;;;;~;~; ~ >'~£:; :~1<~::~:*:'
. .*. . :~~6s~f~jL!~~z:1 conditions.
I CRS determines CCW water supply is not causing abnormal condition. RO reports all RCP temperatures are normal and stable. II RO reports seal injection has not been lost. RO reports seal leakoff is stable at 5.2 gpm. CRS determines a unit shutdown should be performed. Simulator Operator:: MODIFY ... . MALF RC0070 frOm Q,75Jo .f:d. with a 5 minute n3mp. on directioh from Lead/Evaluator * * ** '
' RO reports seal leak has begun to rise towards 6 gpm.
CRS determines 24 RCP seal leakoff flow rising towards >6 gpm and will soon exceed 6 gpm CAS value, and goes to Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps. CRS briefs Rx trip actions to be _p_erformed. CRS identifies the requirement to shut 24CV1 04 3-5 minutes after pumpshutdown. Note: When fully ramped in, the MALF will cause 24 RCP seal PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 18 of 34 1:.~:***e*** **dv" *t* .d *M.*.**. ***""***>"**'*'****-.. A . . c* ~1v1*t'y.~*:::.*;:::::s:tt1c'*
*t. '""***.c?:*:"'K'"'~'*" xpec .Et .,; . an . .\:'p**~.*~* *,* . .t/'S*:*t*,.*,d*
- u. *en * "t* R"wteS,t
,;*~:'~*~*,HS~~:-:~*, . :-c -* ,>::~~,~~::,,:<;<*,,:, -,-~ ,~~~- ;2.-~J,' ,'-:j;~i:~~ :~!::_;:,;:~;t{~;~~Y~1!~~~;:::::~Y~--;~ ~~::c >;~~:~~~, -~, , .. _
leakoff to be >6 gpm. This is indicated by a console reading of
"+OVER" on the hi range seal leakoff chart recorder.
RO trios the reactor. RO stops 24 RCP, and crew recognizes 24CV1 04 must be shut in 3-5 minutes. RO continues performing EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, immediate actions from memory:
- Reports the Rx is tripped - Confirms Rx trip - Backs up the Main Turbine trip - Reports at least one 4KV vital bus energized. - Reports Safety Injection not actuated. - Reports Safety injection not required based on board indications.
CRS reads immediate action steps to RO and RO verifies oerformance. PO receives CRS permission and throttles AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lb/hr. RO shuts 24CV1 04 3-5 minutes after 24 RCP is triooed.
- . CT#1:.Ciose 24CV~04 3~5 *
*minutesaftett,ripp'ir'lgJheiRCP *due to s~al*;t~ilkoff;;>i6.9pm.:**,.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 19 of 34
~ ~; ;ie.vat u I~:,."~~~::,,~\'<
1 lict~.~.*~ctivity~::,:* * .:~!*~~~~~~;*~,~:~!~~~~~*~~~~~~.~o.~~e* :'ftl';~~f,~:~g~i*l. . . *~:!;~~~1~~~t**~:r~:rt~f\¥~
- sAT> .....,* UNSAT *
- CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response.
Note: STA reports to the Control Room 10 minutes after being paged to report. RO makes page announcement "Unit 2 Rx trip." PO re_Q_orts total AFW flow is >22E4 Ibm/hr. PO stoj)_s 21 and 22 SGFPs. Silnulat<)r Operator: Ensure:,ET*3 iscTRUEwhe.n.2i .. SGFP is trippe.d:'. This *inserts thetsteam leak after'ci . . one minute delay..
- 5. Steam leak in containment PO lowers 23 AFW pump speed to minimum, and throttles 21-24AF21 's to maintain AFW flow - 22E4 Ibm/hr.
RO reports 3 RCPs running. RO reports RCS Tavg is stable at or trending to 54r F. RO reports unexpected OHAs for CFCU leak detection and Containment Sump pump start PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 20 of 34
- . "; ~v~~:~~9r~;r~~!g~!or 4c~1it2;~t:~~\~**:;~g;j,;~~~~~c~19~f:'~la,a~~~~CI~~~I~t:~~ns,e,0:~,#,:;, .~:';~,~rJf~~ * \commeill :':!~:,~~,;::::::,
,f* ,,
when they occur. RO reports no indication of RCS leak. Crew diagnoses steam leak in containment. CRS orders a MSLI using AB.STM-1 CAS justification.
- 6. MSLI failure RO reports MSLI has failed on both trains.
CRS orders a Safety Injection. RO initiates Safety Injection. CRS returns to TRIP-1 based on TRIP-2 CAS of Safety Injection actuation. CRS/RO verify immediate actions complete. CRS dispatches operators to locally shut MSIVs. f PO reports all available equipment started on SECs. i PO reports 21 and 22 AFW pumps running. PO reports Table B valve groups in safeguards position. RO reports 21/22CA330s are shut. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
"';ir~~~~re~~~'r1~~!~rrt~~:"~fiY'!:~Fi~:r ,,;'+> . , .*..:*:"'w1. *. ?:r~'.' ,, , ;:1,: ,, ** :r:, :"::i; y
,.:~~r:oG:::~;~;,
RO reports containment pressure is <15 psiq. Note: See actions on next page for when containment pressure rises above 15 psig. RO reports no high steam flow conditions on 2RP4. PO reports all 4KV vital buses enerqized. RO reports correct control room and switchqear room ventilation aliqnment. RO reports 2 CCW pumps in service. RO reports ECCS flow for current RCS pressure as expected. PO reports AFW flow >22E4 Ibm/hr. RO reports RCP status, and RCS temp not stable at or trending to 54r F due to steam leak, and MSLI has failed to shut anv MSIV. RO reports both RTBs open. RO reports both PZR PORVs shut and Block Valves open.
- 7. Containment Spray pumps fail to start.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 22 of 34
>~~~i:~~~~~,~~.t'~~~~r~~~1~~~f~St~~<~~h~:: *: .:,~"~,x~e~:~;~!*~j~st~t~'"I~~~,~~~~~
Note: Containment Spray is directed to be started in TRIP-1 and in FRCE-1 when containment pressure reaches 15 psig. TRIP-1 Spray initiation (FRCE-1 initiation is on page 24) CRS refers/returns to TRIP-1 Step 11 and:
- Ensures Containment Spray by initiating Phase Band Spray actuation. - RO inserts BOTH keys into CS actuation and turns at same time. - RO reports spray valve realignment. - Start 21 and 22 CS pumps If SECs are not reset, RO blocks and resets 2A and 2C SECs. '
RO inserts key and turns for 21 and 22 CS pumps and reports both CS pumps are running.
- Initiate MSLI I
RO reports MSLI failure.
- Stop 21-24 RCPs - RO depresses stop PB for all RCPs.
Ensure valve groups in Table 0 in safeguards position. PO reoorts Table 0 valves oosition. l
~
CT #2.(C.T~3) Ma,ndall~1 stat;t , * .* .... **. Containin.e.ntSpray:pump~* pri.or' .. to completion ofstep ~* ofFRCE: ** '.1. ' . * ' ,' < .... PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 23 of 34
~;::~~~~~f~,}~~i~(~~,~~~~"~:~t~':2~~,~~,t~r~~~::,~::,~: *~1~tf~g~:J*:*,:*rr***
RO reports RCP status, and spray valves shut if RCPs in service. PO reports all SG pressures dropping in an uncontrolled manner and MSLI has failed to shut anv MSIV CRS transitions to LOSC-1, Loss of Secondarv Coolant. Ii RO reports MSLI failed to shut any MSIV, and dispatches operators to shut MSIVs if not reviouslv oerformed. PO reports all SG pressures dropping in an uncontrolled manner. CRS transitions to LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization. PO ensures valves in Table A shut, and dispatches operator to shut any open valve if not oreviouslv oerformed. PO reports 23 AFW pump not needed for SG level control, then trips and stops 23 AFW RO reports RCS cooldown rate is > 100°F per I hour. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training t I
i TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Pag~ .24 of 34 }llijj~~.~~~t~~~~i~~~~~: *="~Ji~~:ted~~~~*"l{i:~~~*i~~~i~~~~~z . )'~~;,. '~;~~g~ : y .j >S0:<;;;;:;; Note: Step 5 asks for cooldown rate, not if RCS has cooled down l 100°F in last hour, which would be FRTS-1 (Thermal Shock) entry. i Note: RCS C/D rate is - 120°F/hr. .~ PO reduces AFW flow to each SG to no less than 1.0 E4 Ibm/hr. II CT#3 (CT-33) Reduce AFWJiow to.noless'than.1;0E4Jbmttlrfo.** I each: SG 'to'm'inimize~RCS,,>"< ... .* cooldowr1 'pfiortO exitingFRCE;. *.
- 1. **.* ..
STA reoorts valid RED oath on FRHS. I CRS transitions to FRHS-1, verifies it was operator action which caused the RED path, and returns to orocedure in effect. FRCE-1 actions here CRS directs closure of Phase A isolation valves not needed for recover *. t$ RO reports containment pressure >15 psi I RO reoorts LOCA-5 not in effect. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Pag~.~25 of 34
. *:E~~~~,~;~~{~f~~rt~gc~~~~~~!~* 'i .~~*.*:*,.,:&~~~~1e~?ttantf~to~e.~t.~~~$a~;g:r;~*~t;t*~* *~~fg~: .
RO starts or reports 21 and 22 CS in service. RO reports 21 and 22CS2C!r§l open. RO reports 2CS14,16 and 17 are open. RO stops RCPs if running. RO reports all CFCUs running in slow speed with adequate SW flow. RO reports MSLI valves all open, and dispatches operators to shut them if not previously performed. PO lowers AFW flow to no less than 1.0E4 lbm/hr to each SG. PO reports SG isolation valve status. CRS returns to procedure in effect. Simulatorpperator:O[)ce AFW flow has been Jowere'C! 'to* SGs; and
- A,ETE.R F~ff:~1has.bl3en . ***. .
REifformed( and BEFORE *reaching *** ste'p\ 8 of LOSC;2;,;:rHEN remove .::": 1 MALF from the MSIV theCRS
- direetedJo be closed first"that is3:;:.>
- NQT21"MSIV.
- PO reports rising pressure in affected SG.
CRS uses CAS action of LOSC-2 of rising pressure in any SG to return to LOSC-1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 26 of 34 ..**?~Yalu~t~~g~F~~ftor5fctivi~::t.*** t* :~:'\~*1,~~.~ec£e~. .~~a~~~~t,~a~~~~,.*R~.~~;~?s~. l::.~f1 f:01:l~:~~gfi~*~r*;. *).,f£ommenf ;.* ~*>w*
- Terminate scenario upon transition back to LOSC-1.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 27 of 34 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures E. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation F. S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, 2C EDG Operation G. S2.0P-AR.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Alarm Response H. Dwg 205241, Sheet 6, Diesel Engine Auxiliaries I. S2.0P-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling System Abnormality J. S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality K. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection L. 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response M. 2-EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant N. 2-EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization
- 0. 2-EOP-FRCE-1, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT1** UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS
. TODAY*
MODE: 1 POWER: 90 RCS BORON: 895 MWe 1080 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 6,000 EFPH Control Bank D is at 203 steps. Reactivity plan for power ascension to 98.5% is to perform dilution concurrent with rod withdrawal to establish ARO prior to reaching 98.5%. Calorimetric required prior to exceeding 90% power has been performed SAT. MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION: EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation, in progress and complete up to Step 5.1.26. Power was reduced 2 days ago to remove 21 and 22 Heater Drain Pumps from service due to possible damage from spraying water. Pumps have been inspected and returned to service. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: SECONDARY: Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
'------------------------------~---------
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST
- 1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter With Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct if applicable.
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
- 26. Verify EGC paperwork is marked "Training Use Only" and is current revision.
- 27. Ensure sufficient copies of ECG paperwork are available.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASKMETHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 13-01 NRC-ESG-1 REVIEWER: P Williams Initials Qualitative Attributes PW 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PW 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PW 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PW 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction( s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point PW 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
PW 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PW 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PW 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PW 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PW 10. The scenario has been validated. PW 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario. PW 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d) Initial Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d) GG 7 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GG 3 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GG 3 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GG Major Transients: 1-2 GG 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GG 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GG 3 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 13-01 NRC ESG-1 CT#1: (AB.RCP) Close 24CV104 3-5 minutes after tripping the RCP due to Seal Leakoff > 6 gpm. BASIS: Closing the Seal Leakoff Isolation Valve 24CV1 04 prevents unfiltered, high temperature RCS into the #2 RCP seal, which raises the probability of #2 seal failure. The 3 minute time frame is based on expected coastdown time of the RCP since a static condition is more favorable for the #2 seal to perform its backup function to the #1 seal. The 5 minute limitation minimizes RCS leakage from the damaged seal to maintain RCS inventory. Failure to isolate within 5 minutes raises the possibility of a #2 seal failure and subsequent LOCA. CT#2 (CT-3) Manually start Containment Spray pumps prior to completion of step 3 of FRCE-1. BASIS: Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to "recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component." CT#3 (CT-33) Reduce AFW flow to no less than 1.0E4 lbm/hr to each SG to minimize RCS cooldown prior to exiting FRCE-1. BASIS: Failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality and the containment CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 33 of 34 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN Event YIN Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture y Loss ofCCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area y Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 1 of 29 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: 13-01 NRC ESG-3 SCENARIO NUMBER: 13-01 NRC ESG-3 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates below EXPECTED DURATION: 75 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: '-------- L.O. REQUAL X !INITIAL LICENSE
'--------'1 STA '-------- OTHER Revision Summary New Issue for 13-01 NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 09-14-14 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: /0 J -!If Date APPROVED BY:
Date PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 2 of 29 A. Given the order or indications of a loss of vacuum, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction, in accordance with S2.0P-AB.COND-0001. B. Given the order or indications of a loss of vacuum, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with S2.0P-AB.COND-0001 C. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. D. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction in accordance with S2.0P-AB.4KV-0001. E. Given indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with S2.0P-AB.4KV-0001. F. Given indication of unwarranted continuous rod motion perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with S1/S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003. G. Given indication of unwarranted continuous rod motion DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003. H. Given the indication of excessive steam flow, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to excessive flow in accordance with S1/S2.0P-AB.STM-0001 I. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. Given a safety injection has occurred and equipment has failed to START equipment that has failed to automatically start in accordance with the approved station procedures. M. Given indication of excessive containment pressure DIRECT the response to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures. R. Given the order or indications of excessive containment pressure perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures. S. Given the unit in the EOPs and an excessive containment pressure the crew will reduce containment pressure lAW approve station procedures. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 3 of 29 A. Swap Condenser Vacuum pumps B. Loss of Condenser Vacuum (recoverable) C. Loss of 2A 4KV vital bus on Bus Differential D. Turbine Steamline Inlet Pressure Transmitter PT-505 failure E. Steam Dump failure F. Loss of all AFW I FRHS I Cond pump recovery A. The crew will take the turnover at 100% power, MOL, with direction to swap operating condenser vacuum pumps per Control Room logs weekly pump swap using S2.0P-SO.AR-0001, Condenser Air Removal System Operation. B. During the vacuum pump swap, the pump being secured will have its air injection suction isolation valve AR25 fail open, causing condenser vacuum to degrade if not addressed immediately. The crew will attempt to re-start the affected pump (it will not start), direct field personnel to immediately shut the affected AR25, and start the remaining vacuum pump, which will restore vacuum. C. Once vacuum has been restored, the 2A 4KV vital bus will lock out on bus differential. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.4KV-0001, Loss of 2A 4160 Volt Vital Bus. The CRS will identify Tech Specs. D. The Main Turbine Steamline Inlet Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) will fail low. If control rods are in auto (they may have been placed in manual due to non-urgent failure alarm present) they will insert at maximum rate. The RO will verify no load reject in progress, and place control rods in manual. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. If control rods are in manual, the crew will diagnose the failure based on alarms received and RP4 hi steam flow bistable status. E. The crew will swap Main Steam Dumps if in S2.0P-AB.ROD-003, or lAW SO.RPS-0006 based on TSAS 3.3.2.1 requiring placing PT -505 in the tripped condition. If the crew did not require AB.ROD-3 entry and do not swap steam dumps toMS Pressure control (the TSAS gives them 6 hours to place channel in tripped condition) the steam dump failure will be entered by the Simulator Operator. The steam dump failure will cause 21-23TB20 steam dumps to open. The steam dumps will be unable to be shut or turned off. The CRS will direct a Rx trip and MSLI. F. The MSLI will only shut 3 of 4 MSIV's, and the CRS will direct a Safety Injection be initiated. An auto Sl signal will be generated on Steamline Delta Pressure as 23 SG blows down. Auto Sl initiation is failed. G. 22 AFW pump will trip shortly after AFW flow reduction is performed following TRIP-1 immediate actions. 23 AFW pump will trip 5 minutes later. The crew will isolate feedwater to 23 SG. The CRS will transition to FRHS-1 when directed in TRIP-1. H. The crew will perform a Condensate pump recovery in FRHS-1 due to SGFPs not being available, and all AFW pumps failed. I. The scenario will terminate when SG WR levels are rising in FRHS-1, or when RCS Bleed and Feed is initiated. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 4 of 29 Pre-snapped IC-233 Initial I Description 1 2VC1 and 2CV4 CIT _ 2 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 3 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 4 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 5 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 6 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 7 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 8 Provide copy of S2.0P-SO.AR-0001 with prereq 2.2 (off normal check) signed off. 9 Provide blank copy of S2.0P-DL.ZZ-0003, Control Room logs Modes 1-4. 10 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 5 of 29 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group EVENT ACTION: kcf08dv1 // STM DUMP CONTROL MODE-MAIN STM P 3 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kb515tcp // 22AF21 CLOSE 5 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kck05anz // 25AR25 25 VACUUM PUMP-CONDENSER 7 COMMAND: DMF VL0440 PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kck04tpz // 24 VACUUM PUMP-STOP 9 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kck02pbz //22 VACUUM PUMP-START 11 COMMAND: DMF CN0086B PURPOSE: <update as needed> SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK Time Value Time 01 N!A N/A N/A N/A 100 02 EL0144 LOSS OF 2A 4160V VITAL BUS N!A N/A N/A RT-1 03 TU0055 TURBINE INLET PRESS XMTR 505 FAILS H/ N/A N/A N/A RT-3 0 04 08 FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC Sl N/A N/A N/A N/A 05 1B 22 AUX FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP 00:00:15 N/A N/A ET-5 06 AF0183 23 AUX FW PMP OVERSPEED TRIP 00:01:00 N/A N/A ET-5 07 NiA N/A N!A N/A 0 08 CN0086B Loss of 22 main condenser vacuum f\J/A N/A N/A ET-9 4 09 MS0092G 23MS167 FAILS OPEN N/A N/A N/A N!A 10 VL0463 21TB20 Fails to Position N/A N/A ~JiA ET-3 100 11 VL0464 22TB20 Fails to Position N/A N/A N/A 12 VL0465 23TB20 Fails to Position N/A N/A N/A PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 6 of 29 SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK Time Value Time SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition/ CHECK Time Value Time Severity 01 CF06 F Dl STM DUMP INTLK TRAIN 'A'-OFF N/A NiA N/A N/A OFF 02 CF07 F Dl STM DUMP r-.J!A N/A N/A OFF 03 N/A N/A N/A OFF 04 CK04 E Dl 24 VACUUM PUMP-START N/A N!A N/A N/A OFF
- 1. None PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 7 of 29 A. State shift job assignments. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 8 of 29 EY:aiuatbHI nstrucfc
- ~{t::~~:\!~:':*j~: )~>;;~'~ ' ', *, ~-.:~~~' ****~~~~:i~~~~~~~u~f~~.~~~P~~f:~~;*f~~ ',.,'-,
- 1. Swap Condenser Vacuum Pumps CRS directs PO to start the next sequential Condenser Vacuum pump (25), and secure the previous pump (24) lAW S2.0P-SO.AR-0001, Condenser Air Removal System Ooeration.
PO refers to section 5.5, Swapping Condenser Vacuum Pumos. PO contacts Chemistry to inform them of When contacted, report Chemistry is ready for swapping vacuum pumps. PO determines section 5.5.4 for starting 25 vacuum pump and stopping 22 or 24 vacuum pumps is proper orocedure section. PO contacts NEO to check 25 vacuum pump seal tank level, Seal Water Circulator discharge pressure is 10-25 psig as indicated by 2PL3226, and 24 Vacuum Pump suction pressure is at least 3" Hg. Above Main Condenser vacuum. Role play: When contacted, report PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 9 of 29
, "Sva:iJt.atorllnstro,ct9~~~tivltJ *** :tl~~"';;,,rexp'~tfecf':ptan1ZStud9:nfR>>espon *;~.**;z>C~m~~~~;t~~~]}?if!P;;<:;:;;; .
- ,_ -~. *,Ii:iil .:_~i;f:f:z:,: :~~%\\'1~:~tf:~rv~~*,~* ,. *:~,\7!~.~~:** :*~:t .* ,. '.;:f~' **:~: -~; \,~.;{~*. *.t.~;~t)f~i ~~-:~~~~:~*~~:;** h~ii~,:~~:{:*.* ' ~ )*::?~~. *:/:<1,'
you will check conditions and get back to them. One minute later, report 24 vacuum pump seal tank level is normal112 way between high and low marks, Seal Water Circulator discharge pressure is 18 psig, and 25 vacuum pump suction pressure is 28" Hg. PO ooens 25AR25. PO stoos 24 vacuum Simulator Operator:.Ensure; ET-9
- is*truewhen 24\/acuum;pumpstop f=>B Ts aepr~ised. Jhis insE3rts.th¢J
*lass of v<idiJum. :< . * ..*. * . .....**..
PO reoorts 24AR25 did not shut.
- 2. Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum CRS directs start of 24 vacuum oum~.
PO reoorts 24 vacuum oumo will not start. PO contacts NEO to isolate 24AR25 by closina 24AR23 . PO reports slowly degrading condenser backoressure. Note: If CRS directs starting the remaining vacuum pump here, then PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 10 of 29
.eiJ~I uarorll n$trtlctP:r!~cfiv~~9\!f f ~ :~~' ,**li?,?~:t:~ff;:~;:;*;~:-;c:' Jg~: :*,' ' "* il~~ ~\'~: .:t~~~' '*:~ ::*~:~~;~<' ~' < ,', \ <
vacuum will improve, and S2.0P-AB.COND-0001 may not be entered. I!' Simuiatdr:~dperatorn::nsure >, *
- .* ET~J*1*** is~tf\Je:when~22vacuum. I pump :start PB:'is d~pl"es~ed~ T't)ls
**deletes the \/acuum malfunction; * >Simulator Oper:ator::J 5 seconds -~
after 22 vacuum pum'p' is started, delete MALFVL0337,.andif . previously direCted to .. locallyshut .. 24AR23, reportas NEQ that>
- 24AR23 is shut. *,;,.;,: *.**
- I CRS enters S2.0P-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1 CAS. i CRS ensures local operators are addressing i vacuum problem. PO starts all available vacuum pumps if not previously performed. PO reports condenser backpressure is improving. t CRS goes to Section 4.0, Completion and Review to exit procedure. Continue to next event on direction PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 11 of 29 from Lead Evaluator.
- 3. Loss of 2A 4160 volt bus diret'tic>n;tf-ofri *L:ead~evaluatdr.,i.:* ;*h.**
- MALF: *Ei:o144~J:loss:of*2tf4.16dv*
.VitillBus.> * * :>* :*"'"":*< if ~:" .. RO/PO announce multitude of unexpected alarms, and diagnose the loss of 2A 4KV vital bus. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.4KV-0001, Loss of 2A 4KV Vital Bus. PO reports 2A EDG running, and dispatches an ooerator to 2A EDG. RO reports 23 charging pump was in service, closes 2CV55. and starts 21 ch re PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 12 of 29
- i~~~~~f~~a~if'!£ltr~t~r~~~:~ry'&'?~!i'~, ,, . ,' ' 7 \ ' .*. . vw, RO reports 21 RHR pump was not in service and 2A vital bus is deeneraized.
PO reoorts no AFW oumos in service. RO reports all SW and CCW low pressure alarms clear. RO restores letdown by verifying 2CV2 and 2CV277 open and in auto, ensuring charging flow -80 gpm, opening one 75 letdown orifice, and adjusting 2CV18 to maintain letdown pressure -300 psig, then placing 2CV18 in automatic. CRS dispatches operator and Maintenance to investiaate loss of 2A bus. CRS determines Tech Specs applicable to loss of 2A bus. CRS directs initiation of S2.0P-AB.460-0001, Loss of 2A 460/230V Vital buses. Applicable tech Specs are: 3.9.12 for FHV- immediate 3.4.5 for 2PR6 loss of power- 1 hour 3.6.1.1 for 21 SW20 being open w/no power-1 hour 3.8.2.1 action a for 2A 4KV bus deenergized - 8 hours 3.8.2.3 and 3.8.2.5 for battery chargers - 2 hours 3.6.3 for CIV inoperable - 4 hours 3.7.1.2.a and b, action b for 2 AFW pumps-PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 13 of 29
,,)}!'{,"
geyaluaiorllrlstruetO'rJ>!ctivifY',;, ,
,u**u~<<-"-o'>
.:_".~ ~l~i '.:?~~ :/::~:~,.~;~1~~ ;~~t~~.f:'<_;j;i;Jf,?%f;!~~-::~ft~;~\ <-_:-:* >~~:~ >~' i' \~~l~; 6 hours 3.7.6.a.1 CREACS fans- 4 hours 3.3.3.1 act. b Rad monitors - AB.460-0001 steps start here- I some action in this AB are i redundant to actions taken in AB.4KV-1. PO verifies centrifugal charging pp and I letdown in service. PO dispatches operators to swap to alternate battery chargers for 2A 125 and 28 VDC batteries. i PO starts 22 chilled water PO ensures alternate ventilation system components placed in service, and dispatches an operator to realign DFO to 22 DFO xfer pump to reaular. Note: The rod control Non-urgent failure alarm will be in. The ARP states to place rod control in manual. This may or may not be identified when it is determined to proceed to next event based on the amount of alarms requiring verification. Continue to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 14 of 29 ICientiRe.spoosE
*-~~*~:~t;*~.~~:~~,-.,~t~*,ft.;~~::::B~{~; ,?.~ -c:>'~:', .,"M'<.. ;.~-~.,~'A*, ",.,*
- 4. Failure of Turbine Steamline Inlet Pressure Transmitter PT-505.
~imu lator ,Operator: *lm3erfRT-3 .*.
on directionfrom:Lead:Evaluator;' ** MAilF~;tfUo"oss Tl.lrbine:Jnlet *:~ Pfess xmtr Jails~*! ow/ +<* *v ., *
- .. severitvr;o<:;:g~ :*;'
If rods are in auto, RO report insertion at 72 spm, no load reject, and places control rods in manual. If rods are in manual, RO reports OHA's and RP4 bistable indications. Crew diaanoses PT-505 failed low. AB.ROD-3 steps here. If rods moved, CRS enters S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. RO reports rods in manual and rod motion stoooed , and rod motion was inward. I' RO reports PT-505 failed low and rods above ~ RIL. PO aligns steam dumps by:
- Ensuring steam pressure setpoint is 1005 psig. - Ensuring steam dumps in auto. - Deoressina MS Pressure Control PB.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
~
i
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 15 of 29
, ,'~t'i:::r ,,,,,,,t,"R' ,,,~,w<~>,'"~'--"'~'"', "'KY,, "-,,"ttlfg':*_,'B'"t->*f,
- ~~;~~2{ty~t¥,
- ,'-,:,~,,,--, .u.~.~en , e$ponser" '*'"z _ >:!:# _ . *"' ~*>cdmme~~;~~" -*/,_
}>f;~~ ~,**~- :~,:r: *~'.~:~ ~~~- ~*.:-!~~; ~, ~~i- :~_,, :Y?fir;tt(:)*G:~~> *;simutator:ot:>erator:.Ensl.ite ET~'3* *.* 'istro~:I\Vh~li ,ste.am:#qmps placed.-**
,.*~p~tJ~Wi~~g.~~C~ ~~,~~l:',,,. v~lves. ,,,* > 8 AB-ROD-3 NOT entered steps start here. Note: There is no alarm response or abnormal procedure direction to swap steam dumps to MS Pressure control mode. The CRS can use S2.0P-SO.MS-0002, Steam Dump System Operation to swap steam dumps once it is identified that the steam dumps have a 100%Tavg demand. >IF th~:,cr~w does *nc:>,tid.entifyJhat steam'.dump<cor:Hrol modesno,uld _
,be,~wapp'ed,* th'en ~ea~;Eya1Liat6r *direct Sim.ulator,dpera'tor .to force,;
ET,;3'TRL:IEfbinltia~e;{he steam. . dumoJailure .. ;. '"' * ;,, Note: All 3 TB20's failing open will result in total steam flow rising from 100% to 107%. An auto MSLI will not reach its initiation setpoint. PO reoorts 21-23TB20's have ooened. CRS directs the PO to turn off steam dumos or PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 16 of 29
;;;::~:,J!omm~nt~*~'fM~ ~;,f1:' ',.: ,' 0 ),
attempt closing dump valves in manual, and PO reoorts valves remain ooen. CRS directs RO to trip the Rx and initiate a MSLI lAW CAS of S2.0P-AB.STM-0001. RO trios the Rx. RO initiates MSLI and reports 23MS167 remains ooen. RO initiates MSLI on other SSPS train and reoorts 23MSIV remains ooen. RO attempts to FAST close 23MS167 and reoorts it remains ooen. Note: Once the MSLI is initiated, 23 SG pressure will rapidly drop to more than 100 psig below the remaining SGs. RO reports an automatic Sl signal is present on SG 0/P between 23 SG and the remaining SG's, and reoorts Sl has not actuated. RO initiates Sl and completes immediate actions by backing up main turbine trip and verifying at least one 4KV vital bus is eneraized. ct#1. <cr:2fiVIanuailyactUate~l******'* . prior to cbrnpl~tionof TRIP-1:;. , step 5. }; ** *
- t:;:~ ,*:,:.
1 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 17 of 29 ~~ii:r~~~~~~~~~~! :;~ ::~i~~~~d~{~~~~~~~'£!;~etFonr~~4~~~~r: **~****~*~g~"i!f~r~' RO and CRS verify immediate actions complete. PO isolates AFW flow to 23 SG. CRS dispatches operator to locally close 23MS167 or isolate 21-23TB20's or both.
- 'Sirnu.lator operator: -Er-isure ET"s islrue wherf22AF2t.isthrottled. .
This .!rips 22'.AFW:ptrrl1p} Men trips 23Af\N pump aftetca5.minute * *
- delav. * * **. * > ** . .
While throttling AFW flow, PO reports 22 AFW pump has tripped. PO adjusts 21, 22, and 24AF11 's (from TDAFW pump) to control AFW flow to intact SGs. PO reports no available equipment failed to start on SEC initiation. PO reports 21 AFW pump has no power, 22 AFW pump has tripped, and 23 AFW pump is in service. PO reports when 23 AFW pump trips. PO reports 21SW20 and 21SW223 have no indication on 2RP4. (no power) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
RO reports 21/22CA330's shut, and containment pressure normal. RO reports no indications of high steam flow. PO re_g_orts 2A 4KV vital bus deenergized. RO reports control room ventilation status, and ensures proper swgr ventilation. RO reports 2 CCW pumps in service. RO reports ECCS injection flow status for current RCS pressure. PO reports AFW flow and SG NR level status. Note: If the CRS arrives at step 20 with any SG NR level > 9%, then even with no AFW flow, will NOT go to FRHS-1. CRS should continue in TRIP-1 until a transition to LOSC-1 is made, at which time CFSTs would become active and the CRS could transition to FRHS-1 on RED path when it occurs. IF a transition to LOCS-1 is made, steam flow will be initiated when MS1 O's are adjusted to stabilize RCS temp. CRS transitions to FRHS-1 <22E4 lbm/hr AFW flow and all SG NR levels <9%. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 19 of 29
- reval~~.~~rt~11 ~tt~~~%*~*AcfirJ~rE;
- "~:~~[com~t~~:f;;;,,;7i,**'l,:: ....
f~'\~~~*. * ~1+~9l; J\~{ )\ ~f~E ; ; ;4ti;~f ~~~~~;i.~*r~;.';:;d ~~z~;\ff; .:,:~QG;!J\ .. . PO reports it was not operator action which required FRHS-1 entry. RO reports RCS pressure > intact SGs and RCS Thots >350°F. RO reports 21 and 22 charging pumps available. CRS reads Bleed and Feed transition Continuous Action Steps. PO ensures 21-24GB4 and 21-24SS94 are shut. PO reports no AFW pumps running or can be started . If not previously performed, crew sends operators to investigate cause of AFW pump trips. RO stops all RCPs. PO reports condensate system in operation, and SGFPs not available. RO reports Sl has occurred. PO verifies Sl valve aliqnment. RO resets Sl and Phase A isolation, and reports Phase B reset. RO opens 21/22CA330s. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Paae 20 of 29 .* ,:~evafi.iatorJiristruefSF;;"J *;;~~~rri~:~:i
~:~ ,;;~ ::~1 \; t1 -~:~~~!~*:;:~:;t--:~~.'~ :-*.*:'~~>-,::;:~:, :,~~'fkPS Crew selects 22 or 24 SG for depressurization, whichever has a lower SG level.
Note: Crew should not select a SG for depressurization which will require initiation of RCS Bleed and Feed sooner than would otherwise be required. CRS dispatches operator to open selected SG BF40 valve. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 21 of 29 !,.~ ~~~~J~~~~~~£~t~~!~~~i~~,7it!~t"* . ., ., , , . :;*.~:f~~/ , '""'*'*L?* PO ooens 21 and 22CN48s. PO shuts 21/22CN32s. CRS waits at step 20.5 as selected SG deoressurizes. PO reoorts selected SG WR level is risin CT#2 (CT-45) Establish feeCff'low .* into anycSG before RCS Bleed~: cmd Fe'ed'is required . . * .
. 'uNSAT:;.*...;...;...,--""---: ' *>:>">::):,:~ '
PO reports no SG NR level is >9%, and that selected SG WR level is risina. PO maintains selected SG pressure <575 RO reports Bleed and Feed have not been initiated. CRS returns to procedure in effect, either TRIP-1 or LOSC-1. Lead Evaluator terminate scenario upon transition back to procedure in effect, or after Bleed and Feed has been initiated. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 22 of 29 A Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures E. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation F. S2.0P-DL.ZZ-0003, Control Room Logs Modes 1-4 (page 13) G. S2.0P-SO.AR-0001, Condenser Air Removal System Operation H. S2.0P-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum I. S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion J. S2.0P-SO.MS-0002, Steam Dump System Operation K. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection L. 2-EOP-FRHS-1, Loss of Heat Sink PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204
- ATTACHMENT1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS
*TODAY MODE: 1 POWER: 100 RCS BORON: 853 MWe 1220 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):
NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 5,000 EFPH MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION: EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: Swap to next sequential Condenser Vacuum pump after turnover lAW S2.0P-SO.AR-0001, Condenser Air Removal System Operation, as directed by Control Room Logs, S2.0P-DL.ZZ-0003, page 13. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: SECONDARY: Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST
- 1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter With Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct if applicable.
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
- 26. Verify EGC paperwork is marked "Training Use Only" and is current revision.
- 27. Ensure sufficient copies of ECG paperwork are available.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 13-01 NRC-ESG-3 REVIEWER: P Williams Initials Qualitative Attributes PW 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PW 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PW 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PW 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction( s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point PW 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
PW 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PW 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PW 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PW 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PW 10. The scenario has been validated. PW 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario. PW 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d) Initial Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d) GG 8 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GG 3 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GG 3 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 GG 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GG 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GG 2 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 13-01 NRC ESG-3 CT#1 (CT-2) Manually actuate 51 prior to completion of TRIP-1 step 5. Basis: Failure to manually actuate Sl under the postulated conditions constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) ... capacity." In this case, Sl can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate Sl also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the following abilities:
- Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) ... capacity)
- Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component"
- Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety" CT#2 (CT-45) Establish feed flow into any SG before RCS Bleed and Feed is required.
Basis: Failure to establish the minimum required feedwater flow rate, under the postulated plant conditions, results in "adverse consequences or significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant." In this case, the minimum required feedwater flow rate can be established by performing the appropriate manual action. Therefore, failure to manually establish the minimum required feedwater flow rate also represents a failure of the crew to demonstrate the ability to:
- Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls (assuming
- AFW) that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably
- introduced by the scenario
- Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component
* (assuming AFW)
- Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety" Finally, failure to manually establish feedwater flow rate under the postulated conditio~s is a "violation of the facility license condition."
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N Event Y/N Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss of CCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area y Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg y Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-4 Op-Test No.: 13-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 4% power, SOL. Unit is returning from forced outage to repair all 4 RCP diffuser vanes bolting issue. 24 SW pump is CIT for strainer repair. Turnover: Raise power to 18% @1 0% per hour. Event Malf. No. Event Event Type* No. Description R 1 Raise power ALL 2 SW0216A c #2 SW bay leak (TS) ALL 3 RC0002 c RCS leak (TS) ALL 4 CV0208A c Centrifugal charging pump fails during swap from PDP while CV02088 CRS/RO responding to RCS leak. M 5 RC0002 SBLOCA CRS/RO 6 EL0134 c LOOP coincident with Sl initiation ALL 7 0/R A701 8 c 2C SEC fails to initiate Dl CRS/PO 8 RP318S1 c High head ECCS fails to inject (one pump failed from Event RP318S2 CRS/RO 4 above, other pump doesn't start) CT's: #1 Establish High Head ECCS
#2 Start minimum SW pumps
- (N)ormal, (R)eact!VIty, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 1 of 29 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: 13-01 NRC ESG-4 SCENARIO NUMBER: 13-01 NRC ESG-4 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates below EXPECTED DURATION: 65 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: '-------'1 L.O. REQUAL X !INITIAL LICENSE
'-------'1 STA '-------'1 OTHER Revision Summary New Issue for 13-01 NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 09-14-14 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: [0-2-"J.-;o/
Date APPROVED BY: \ o~1 ~ -~lr Date PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 2 of 29 A. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the safety related plant cooling water system in accordance with S1/S2.0P-AB.SW-0001. B. Given indication of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. C. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with S1/S2.0P-AB.RC-0001. D. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with S1/S2.0P-AB.RC-0001 E. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. F. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. G. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. H. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. I. Given a safety injection has occurred and equipment has failed to START equipment that has failed to automatically start in accordance with the approved station procedures. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 3 of 29 A. Raise power B. #2 SW Bay leak C. RCS leak (25 gpm) D. Centrifugal charging pump failure E. SBLOCA F. LOOP coincident with Sl initiation G. 2C SEC fails to initiate H. High Head ECCS fails to inject A. The crew will take the turnover at 4% power, BOL, with direction to raise power to 18% @ 30% per hour. 24 SW pp is CIT for strainer repair. 21 SGFP is in service, 22 SGFP is latched at idle speed. B. After power ascension is in progress, a leak in #2 SW Bay occurs. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay leak, cross connect nuclear headers and isolate the affected SW bay. The CRS will identify Tech Spec 3.0.3 is applicable based on SW pump operability. C. After the SW Bay leak has been addressed, a 25 gpm RCS leak will occur. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak. When swapping to a centrifugal charging pump, the pump selected will trip after starting, and the other centrifugal charging pump will be placed in service. The crew will quantify the RCS leakrate, and the CRS will identify Tech Specs. D. Once the RCS leak has been addressed, the leak will worsen into a SBLOCA. The CRS will direct a Rx trip and safety injection. If attempted first, Train B Sl initiation will not work, and Train A will be used to initiate Sl. E. When Sl is initiated, a loss of off-site power occurs. 2A and 2B SECs will load in MODE Ill (SI plus Blackout). 2C SEC fails to initiate. Operators will manually shut 2C EDG output breaker to energize 2C vital bus. The crew will start at least 1 SW pump on 2C bus. The crew will start one charging pump to establish high head ECCS injection. F. The crew will perform Rx trip stabilization actions in TRIP-1, then transition to LOCA-1 to reset Sl and re-establish control of plant equipment. The scenario will terminate when the TRIP-3 transition point is reached. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 4 of 29 Pre-snapped IC-234
.*. . %lg~;~~~"riiA!~~~~i;<i;i~i:<ioi'~u~S;~l~~~tl~ ~rR~~!$/bez~~~t~c:ta99~ ==~-'-'---'-
Initial 1 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 2 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 3 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 4 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 5 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 6 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) _ 7 24 SW pump C/T __ 8 S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, filled out up to step 5.4.16. __ 9 S2.0P-SO.MS-0002, Steam Dump System Operation, with P&L 2.2 signed off. 10 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 5 of 29 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group Description EVENT ACTION: kb417pbj // 21 CHG PUMP-START 3 COMMAND: DMF CV0208B PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kb419pbj //22 CHG PUMP-START 5 COMMAND: DMF CV0208A PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: ka501doa //TRAIN 'A'- Sl OPERATE KEYSWITCH 7 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 6 of 29 SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK Time Value Time RC0002 RCS LEAK INTO CONTAINMENT ( equiv to 0-01 N/A N/A N/A RT-3 25 4inches 02 CV0208A 21 CHARGING PUMP TRIP 03 CV0208B 22 CHARGING PUMP TRIP 04 EL0134 LOSS OF ALL 500KV OFF-SITE 05 RP318S1 21 CHRG PMP FAILS TO STRT 06 07 IN SW STRUCTURE N!A SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK Time Value Time 01 SW35D 24 SW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER N/A N/A N/A N/A OFF 02 SW36D 24 SW PUMP RACK OUT N/A N!A N/A N/A TAGGED 03 SW23D 21 SW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER N/A N/A N/A RT-10 OFF 04 SW27D 22 SW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER 00:00:10 N/A N/A RT-10 OFF 05 SW32D 23 SW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER 00:00:20 N/A N/A RT-10 OFF SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition/ CHECK Time Value Time Severity 01 A701 B Dl TRAIN 'B'- N/A N/A N/A N/A OFF C206 A Dl 2C SFGD EMER OPR-EMERG LOADING 02 N/A N/A N/A N/A ON RESET 1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 7 of 29 A. State shift job assignments. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 8 of 29
- t';s. EvaiU~tor/fnstructor
< !!,~:*.~;. _*:_- <- :~ ~~:~;~~;:-: :nk~t~}:~:'. :1r~
5
- 1. Power ascension CRS briefs crew on _Q_ower ascension.
Note: There is no limit on power ascension rate when < 50% power. PO slowly adjusts Main Steam dumps to raise reactor power using Attachment 3, by either adjusting the auto setpoint, or by placing steam dumps in manual and adjusting valve position. Note: S2.0P-SO.MS-0002 allows steam dumps to be placed in Manual for adjustment. Manual allows for finer control. RO slowly withdraws control rods. Crew announces when Rx power is 5% and notes Mode 1 entry. CRS contacts work control to update WCM to Mode 1. PO ensures 21-24MS1 O's in auto set at 1015-1020_Q§ig. CRS continues _Q_ower ascension. Continue to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 9 of29
,Ev~h~~~~r:l~s~~~f~~~:~ctiyity ;.* '> .* ; .:.,:L~~~,~~~~~$!~~/S~fdent '.~~i~~~~s:~~*:z;::.~:~t;;~ x:*Bg~t~:.;*:~fl"t~XX;!r .
- 2. #2 SW Bay leak 1 S~~u~a~pr*Operator: .1iiseriRT:1.
*: ~A~~~~~w6~~~~L~i.~~~6~dr. . LEAKi't~ sw STRUC'J:URE . Severi~y;rs;*Q.oo .. * . *~; **
- Ramp; :3inirlutes Note: The first OHA will annunciate 1 minute after the leak is inserted.
RO announces unexpected SW system alarms. CRS directs power ascension put on hold. PO places Main Steam dumps in auto at current steam pressure if in manual. RO monitors reactor. PO either starts a SW pump based on lowering SW header pressure, or announces the auto start of 25 SW pump when it occurs, and the clearing of the low SW header _Qfessures alarms. PO reports indications of SW leak in #2 SW Bay. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.SW-0003 SW Bay Leak _Q_er ARP direction or enters S2.0P-PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 10 of 29 r.n,mrnilri"+:~~~Ut~;0"111J?~' AB.SW-001, Loss of SW Header Pressure, then transitions to S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, and initiates CAS. RO reports both SW Bays are in service and dispatches NEO to investigate 2 Bay alarms. PO monitors Main Turbine I SGFP temps on SPDS and Plant Computer. (CAS Item 2.0) Role Play: 3 minutes after being contacted, report as NEO that there is a large leak in 2 bay, you can't identify where it is coming from due to the spray, and approx. 2.5 ft of water is in the bay now, and rising slowly. (Bay is considered disabled at 2ft. I Crew splits SW Bays by opening nuclear header cross over MOVs 21 SW23 and II 22SW23, and shutting SW bay cross connect I valves 21SW17 and 22SW17, and reports the leak is in 2 Bay. PO reports 25 and 26 SW pumps running, and I stops 21-23 SW pumps. Crew sends NEO to open control power bkrs for 21-23 SW pumps. Simulator Operator: 2 minutes BJterbeing dil"eeted)o de-energize'
- control'power tb21.:.23SWpl.lmps,:
call asNEO and state: "Tbis is . PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 11 of 29 d.;tal~nt/stuaentR~$J>on$
- t~ *H)~*~ "'},'*.<*>~~-,
-* :x""~~::~'~*'*~*.::-...-~:~~~~5*~\r,~-- ,";*~***:*.*t;'.*i[:*~~;~~.;~~f:~~~},. .*."p.'(.; .;~~~'<'* *1?. -~ -..,-._,. ,~,
(I>JE()spamt}) *calliqg;.for a;J=,icst
.check. >J:am*Jn.unie:2:645' . . .* ; .,;h ~:<'1:**: .. . switchgear.tdorn;andJfuewalls ~re . .
- J~6'~:~b~~~;s!s~~~~~~~~~~~~~,~.:.**.
~RT~tOt. REMQJES: SW23D,: . . .* .***.SW27D ,.SW32b forQ1":::22.;.al1d 23 < rfWi~~$~~~f~~~Jl~i~ 1 Call co*ntrol room afte(lasfremote is1 active.*artd'report~Bcsntrol pow~r >** breakeri' have oeen 'opened fof'21 I 22 and 23SW PUlnPS. . . . Crew isolates 2 SW Bay by closing 21 SW22 and 21SW20. PO reoorts the leak is isolated. Role Play: Once 2 SW Bay is isolated, NEO (if contacted) reports that the leak appears to have stopped, and level is slowly lowering in bay. PO reoorts SW remains available to the EDGs. PO reports SW is being supplied to the Turbine Buildina throuah 23SW20. PO monitors Main Turbine parameters on SPDS and the Plant Comouter. (CAS item 2.0 PO initiates action to remove one CCHX from PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 12 of 29 va'r'ua '"i4i !'I " 't','??~'A"'/t'* Y'" '. '"' xee\:id~u, .an . u ent'R,esponsQw:<4t1t:~:
- '*t ;~:;&If> ,CC,'>",j'~'( ','E f; ~:,:g.:,.IP,,, ,t!'s't':;/i(d,/ ' ''0Nf':, ~';:%7/~;&' ,,:,,,,;;,,'S'. B""' "~'::::n::ilR,',',
dmmefftY"" ,. ,,", .-, , ,.. , , ,_""
- 1 E'?' ...or nstruc or: c tvt ,;,J$>,~Y+,, . ':,.;
.~ lf,J. *'rl0:~!:tr . *, '-. 'tt~~~:: ~~p, ~;L;,: ,,f ~::~,~£~~r?dd{i£~j~;t1!5;t~~*~"~~~ ;;~£;: .; i'~t~ 1::_ ' **,,. ,**,;t;t;x&#i:Yt\f(i ~7~<1>::;:;"", : :~~~tco,~?\r; ',:i~%~~7: 'i*~J!5 1 service. (CAS item 4.0)
PO initiates action to isolate SW to two CFCU's lAW CAS item 5.0. Note: CRS should contact work control to find status 24 SW pump, and when pump could be restored to service to avoid a unit shutdown due to Tech Spec 3.0.3. If asked, respond that the release for 24 SW pump is in the field. CRS enters TSAS 3.0.3 due to having NO C2.2_erable SW loops. Proceed to next event after Tech Spec has been identified at Lead Evaluators direction. Note: Entry conditions are also met for S2.0P-AB.ZZ-002, Flooding, due to flooding in 2 Bay. Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
- 3. RCS leak Simula,to/Qpf3ratot,:: Insert RT*3
- ori dire~tron.frOrnJ-~.ao Evalt)ator.
- MALt=: RCOQ,q2 RCS leal< into, . ' :
,'~~~l;~r;~s~.:' :" ,~', , ,., J,};&!
- PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 13 of 29
;;,f:~: ; Ev2lltiatCfrlrll'stru6ta~!ABHv'itl;;:< * : : *'ii:r't:>:E:xpectf!Jd Rlahttstirctenf ReS'pSilse '?:'t . .i1:w:;:: ; .: . .:;;:i~:;i;~ +'t~:: ~.t,t .:,*:i;~t;~;:);}: ' . ~ ; ;,~ : a~t:.~~;\.;s:*:;p1<: t: ;:fi1E~~ f: ~~~ ~>
- ',t~ ~*. t~lf~ <l~i~~~i\r <
RO reports that charging flow is rising and PZR level is lowering slowly. Crew reports reading on 2R11A containment radiation monitor is risinq. RO reports unexpected OHA C-2 CNTMT SUMP PMP START. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak. CRS directs implementation of Att. 1 CAS. RO reports RCS temperature >350°F. I l RO reports unit is in MODE 1. RO reports PZR level is lowering with maximum PDP flow. RO transfers to a centrifugal charging pump by performing step 3.14 as follows: II RO ensures charging master flow controller in auto. I RO shuts 2CV55. I l SiJ11ulator Openitor:*Ensure ET-3 ' OR ET~5 is tru'ewheH"'21bor'.22" : i I ch~rgJngpo(npis*starte*a:*:'fl}is.will trip' tHe chargjl)g**pqn]p which was . f started(: and delete 'tt1e*tripof the
- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training II
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 14 of 29 m"a,r~~f;:w~'.,>~~~,:
- 4. Centrifugal charging pump trip RO starts 21 or 22 charging pump, and reoorts it has tri CRS directs RO to start remaining charging Simulator Operator: After. the.
- .$1pob<:lchargif)9 p~mp is ~t~r;tedL.::~.*
reiqsert the charging pum~Jrip fa(:, th~ cgargiQQ' puln!llWhidl:l tr!Rped:,;*,;.: lt2lf:ha~glnQ):iumlr.is trip8,~t:!. *. ';~*f i~se~t*.IVI~Et:;~yo~.o~~- .::;:~;:: }, Jf 22:*chargJp'g!pym p:1r~~tripPE:)d, ~
. .rt:'MAL:F=~GV0208B:' ; .L .>*.**' ' .
must* t>~'dohe *pd~cib:the*Si
' ** * ,* *** < '" .~*; ,**-:'<>'**** . .~;, ';j RO places 23 charging pump speed controller in manual.
While lowering 23 Charging Pump speed to minimum, RO adjusts 2CV55 to maintain desired flow. RO stops 23 Charging Pump when at minimum flow PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 15 of 29 RO adjusts 2CV55 to control Pressurizer ' level. RO places 2CV55 in AUTO OR leaves in MANUAL until directed bythe SM/CRS. RO adjusts RCP Seal Injection flows to maintain 6-12 gpm per pump/ Note: Letdown will isolate if PZR level is allowed to lower to 17%. PO swaps to the 4~m letdown orifice. RO estimates leak rate, and reports PZR level can be maintained stable or rising. CRS initiates S2.0P-ST.RC-0008, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance. CRS evaluates containment conditions and determines CFCU status. CRS initiates actions to locate and isolate the leak lAW Attachment 2. CRS enters TSAS 3.4. 7 .2.b. action b for the unidentified RCS leak, and 3.5.2.a action a for ECCS Note: Although the leak is within the makeup capacity of the eves system, a containment entry to locate and isolate should be ruled out due to the magnitude of the PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 16 of 29
.:;expectea' Plant7sludeot Respon~e~:~,
~lli~J~~it}~~:J1 .* 1 j c,, ,c ' . *.:
~~~~\~Si~::tt};. ~:~;~t~' \ .;. ,,,< *.~* '*j, c.'}:-;:*~ ~~t ~~~i}; :- L~:~;~:~<: ;~&fff " :.~;~~~:~~~~~;;:~i,*;;,;~r:;~**.:;~;r:
leakage. Continue to next event on direction
~
from Lead evaluator.
- 5. SBLOCA i
i i Sinl'ulator Operat()r::on aireqtiO!l from Lead* E:valt.iatt>;r;mVIOoiF:Y(, IVIAI.::F'Rcooot.frotri25to 2 'o*oo. *
'wittfno~ramp:or delav~* ,:i****
i f I RO trios the reactor, and confirms the Rx tri Note to Evaluators: Train B SSPS is closest to the Rx trip handles on RO initiates Sl on Train B and reports Sl has not initiated. I I the Control Console, and typically Sl is initiated from Train B. This was not considered an event on Form ES-D-1 since it may not be performed by all operators, but may be counted as another component ~ failure if performed. i RO initiates Sl on Train A and reports Sl has I initiated on both trains. f PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 17 of 29
}()mffi~Ht~~:~;; ,,,~, *
- 6. LOOP coincident with Safety Injection Crew diagnoses loss of all off-site power when control room normal liahtina aoes out.
RO continues immediate actions:
- Reports Main Turbine is tripped. - Reports 2A and 28 EDGs have started and are supplying respective vital buses. - Reoorts Sl has been manuallv initiated.
CRS and RO verify immediate actions comolete.
- 7. 2C SEC fails to initiate PO reports no conditions present that should keeo 2C EDG from startina.
CRS directs PO to start 2C EDG and shut 2C EDG outout breaker. PO starts 2C EDG, selects bezel mimic for 2C EDG outout breaker. PO shuts 2C EDG outout breaker. Note: With the 2C SEC not initiating, whatever equipment was PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204
... "/* .,,,,.<~~JJ~ 18 of 29 4*/
- Comment <"a' *
.~r. **.;*>*: ....... :.:.i.;;,x~;
- running on 2C bus before the LOOP will restart since no trip signals were sent to their breakers.
Crew should open breakers for C bus equipment prior to closing EDG output breaker to prevent possibly stalling 2C EDG.
- CT#1 ((;T~25) stait. at.lea~t .o'ne s':e~a;o,,t ~ a~~:~T .. '
sw p\.lmp *prior to er)d ot; .
,: ~
PO throttles AFW flow, and reports all SG NR levels are >9%. i I' i
- 8. High Head ECCS fails to inject f
PO reports SEC loading status for energized vital buses. If 22 charging pump was running before LOOP, then it will have restarted from C bus if the EDG breaker was shut. ! I If 21 charging pump was running prior to the LOOP, the PO will block and reset 28 SEC, then start 21 charging pump.
- c"(#2*(CI;.7).Estabiisfi;~low.trom I
'at.H~ast ov~:;Hig~~l:leati~pha'rging
'Purrip:pdc>r'to transition out of.*.* *:
~i~fP~~&~f,~t~~~~,;' ,~,,,,
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 I Page 19 of 29
,;,~~~~:~!~~{~? .
I
- ._;:/~ '.;* ..,
If 2C EDG breaker is shut, then crew will also need to evaluate SEC loading on 2C bus, since SEC will not have started any i equipment, and only equipment which was previously running will be running now. i [ I PO reports 21 and 22 AFW pumps running. I Crew recognizes when containment pressure iI reaches 4 psig and uses adverse containment values. I RO shuts charging pump mini flow valve 2CV139 and reports 2CV140 has no power when RCS pressure lowers below 1500 psig with BIT flow established. (CAS) PO reports safeguards valve alignments. RO reports 21/22CA330's shut and containment pressure has remained below 15 psig. PO reports no high steam flow conditions. PO reports 4KV vital bus status. If 2C EDG l output breaker has not been shut, CRS directs power restored to 2C vital bus. i RO reports correct ventilation lineups. RO reports CCW pump status. 21 and 22 should not be running since they were stripped PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 20 of 29
,,f r~~~~~lJ~}r~;~~9;~~~t~i~~lJi:,*. ~g;*~~i~,~~1!'.!~1t~111!*~~@!;:{,
6
.* ~;r :'teor:nm~n*
of 2A and 28 vital buses on SEC Mode Ill initiation. 23 CCW pump status will hinge on whether 2C EDG outout breaker is shut. RO reports ECCS injection status for current RCS oressure. PO reports all SG NR levels are >9%. (15% adverse RO reports RCPs stopped, and RCS temperature beina controlled. Note: ECCS injection flow will be causing RCS temperature to lower. A MSLI is not required. RO reoorts reactor trio breakers are ooen RO reports PZR PORVs are shut and Block Valves ooen. RO reoorts RCPs are not in service. PO reports no indication of faulted steam enerators. PO reports no indication of ruptured steam enerators. RO reports at least 2 channels in Table F in warnina, alarm, or risin~. CRS transitions to LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 21 of 29
- .:, } EvalilatorJJristrucf&r:~cfi';**\.'t*f
- 1&~:~~1it;¢t~~:"~~~~~!~~~~~ll;~~~z~~;~:~~~*.~~i~g~ ,£,,
it:.~i~~~~: .:(;;~':'"~s-{;:%'f'~~'fi"~ ,)~'0fb?Z'
- ~fi1~~ii;r~ ,;j~r.-. \-, ,;,~;r~ ~~;~~:.; :'.:.~r:~~ };~~,l~~:~k Terminate scenario after transition to LOCA-1 is made.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 22 of 29 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures E. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load F. NF-AP-440, PWR Fuel Conditioning G. S2.0P-AB.SW-0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure H. S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay Leak I. S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak J. 2-EOP-TRI P-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS
.TODAY*
MODE: 1 POWER: 4.1% RCS BORON: 1740 ppm MWe 0 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 500 EFPH Control Bank D is at 157 steps. Reactivity plan for power ascension to 18.0% is to use S2.0P-SO.MS-0002, Steam Dump Operation, Section 5.4. MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION: EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, in progress and complete up to Step 5.4.16. All requirements for Mode 1 entry are satisfied. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: SECONDARY: Main Steam Dumps are in MS Pressure Control-Auto set at 986 psig. All MSIVs are open. 21 SGFP in service, 22 SGFP latched at idle speed. AFW secured. Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: 24 SW pump C/T for strainer repair. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING .CHECKLIST
- 1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter With Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct if applicable.
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
- 26. Verify EGC paperwork is marked "Training Use Only" and is current revision.
- 27. Ensure sufficient copies of ECG paperwork are available.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT3 . CRITIGALTASK METHODOLOGY *. In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 13-01 NRC-ESG-4 REVIEWER: P Williams Initials Qualitative Attributes PW 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PW 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PW 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PW 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point PW 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
PW 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PW 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PW 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PW 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PW 10. The scenario has been validated. PW 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario. PW 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d) Initial Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d) GG 7 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GG 3 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GG 2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 GG 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GG 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GG 2 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 13-01 NRC ESG-4 CT#1 (CT-25) Start at least one SW pump prior to end of scenario. Bases: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG's are running without SW cooling. Running the EDGs without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, all running EDGs are affected by the loss of all SW cooling. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded ... emergency power capacity." CT#2 (CT-7) Establish Flow from At Least One High-head 51 Pump prior to transition out of TRIP-1. Bases: Failure to manually start at least one high-head Sl pump under the postulated conditions constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) ... capacity." In this case, at least one high-head Sl pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head Sl pump also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the following abilities: Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component" PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N Event Y/N Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss ofCCW y Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out y LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbirie Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-5(Spare) Op-Test No.: 13-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 75% power MOL. Power was reduced 30 minutes ago due to 21 SGFP Governor problems. PZR PORV 2PR1 was declared inoperable 3 hours ago due to intermittent control circuit anomalies, and the PORV Block valve 2PR6 was shut and deenergized to comply with TSAS 3.4.5 action b. Turnover: Maintain current power Event Malf. No. Event Event Type* No. Description 1 CV0035 c Charging Master Flow Controller fails low CRS/RO 2 PR0017C Non-controlling PZR level Channell! I fails (TS) 3 SG0078C c 90 gpd SGTL (TS) ALL R CRS/RO 4 Down power N PO 5 M SG0078C SGTR ALL 6 AF0182B c 22 AFW pp pressure override failure CRS/PO 7 EL0134 c LOOP during RCS cooldown ALL 8 VL0298 c PZR PORV fails shut!SGTR depress unavail --+SGTR-5 CRS/RO CT's: #1 Isolate AFW
#2 C/0 to, and maintain, RCS temp
- (N)ormal, (R)eactJVIty, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 1 of 32 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: 13-01 NRC ESG-5 SCENARIO NUMBER: 13-01 NRC ESG-5 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates below EXPECTED DURATION: 90 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: .___ __.I L.O. REQUAL X I INITIAL LICENSE
.___ __.I STA .___ __.I OTHER Revision Summary New issue for 13-01 NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 09-14-14 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: ~ {,..,;!. J0-2--1 -1 '1 Operati()iaining Maager Date APPROVED BY:
Date PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 2 of 32 A. Given a steam generator tube leak, take corrective action, lAW S2.0P-AB.SG-0001. B. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube leak (SGTL), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube leak in accordance with the approved station procedures. C. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube leak (SGTL), DIRECT the response to the tube leak, in accordance with the approved station procedures. D. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. E. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. F. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. G. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. H. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube rupture in accordance with the approved station procedures. I. Given indication of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), DIRECT the response to the SGTR in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) without pressurizer pressure control, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the SGTR in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given the indication of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) without pressurizer pressure control, DIRECT the response to the SGTR in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. During performance of emergency operating procedures, monitor the critical safety function status trees in accordance the EOP in effect. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 3 of 32 A. Charging Master Flow Controller Fails B. Non-controlling PZR level channel fails low. C. 90 gpd SGTL D. SGTR E. 22 AFW pp Pressure Overide Failure F. LOOP during RCS cool down G. PORV fails shut/SGTR depressurization unavailable ---*SGTR-5 A. The crew will take the watch at 76% power, MOL. Power was reduced 30 minutes ago due to 21 SGFP governor problems, which have not been investigated yet. PZR PORV 2PR1 was declared inoperable 3 hours ago due to intermittent control circuit anomalies, and the PORV Block valve 2PR6 was shut and deenergized to comply with TSAS 3.4.5 action b. B. Shortly after taking the watch, the Master Charging Flow Controller auto setpoint will fail from its current position to 0% demand over a 5 minute period, and PZR level channel Ill will fail low. The crew will respond lAW S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, to ensure level channels are selected for control and alarm functions, place 23 charging pump speed controller in manual, and restore normal charging flow. If the MFC is taken to manual, the controller output will stabilize, but will be unable to be adjusted upwards. The level channel failure is silent. The CRS will identify Tech Specs. C. After the PZR level channel Tech Spec has been identified, a small (90 gpd) SGTL will ramp in on 23 SG. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.SG-001, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and take actions to quantify the leak and minimize the spread of contamination in the secondary plant. The crew identifies that the SGTL meets the criteria for Action Level 3 in AB.SG, requiring the unit to be <50% power within one hour, and that Tech Spec 3.4.7.2 applies once the leak is >150 gpd. D. Once the power reduction is underway, the affected SG tube will rupture. Operators will identify the rising leak rate, and initiate a Rx trip and Safety Injection lAW CAS when conditions warrant. E. The crew will perform diagnostics in TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. 22 AFW pump pressure override protection fails and cannot be defeated. Operators will isolate AFW to 23 SG and identify that a radioactive release from 23 SG through 23 AFW pp turbine discharge is occurring until the 23MS45, steam supply to TDAFW pump, is shut or the AFW pump is secured. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 4 of 32 F. The crew will transition to SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. With the 23MS45 still open, the CRS will secure 23 AFW pump if not performed previously, leaving 24 SG as the only generator receiving AFW flow. Once secured and with 23MS45 shut, the crew will reset 23MS52, 23 AFW pump trip valve, and start 23 AFW pump. G. During the RCS cooldown to target temperature in SGTR-1, a loss of off-site power will occur when the hottest CET reaches 510 degrees. The crew will perform the actions of Table C to restart safeguards loads, and re-establish the cooldown using the MS1 Os. 21 Sl pump will not start if the crew attempts to start it, and 22 Sl pump will trip if started. H. Once the target temperature has been reached, the crew will attempt to perform the RCS depressurization with the only available PORV since RCPs are stopped and the other PZR PORV 2PR1 is unavailable. 2PR2 will not open. With no Sl pumps running, the CRS will transition to SGTR-5. I. The scenario will terminate after the transition to SGTR-5 has been made. Pre-snapped IC-235
. .eRE fl. ~OR TR~I:~I'Nt*t*.~,. computer setpoirit~,'i prOGedures.;p~zef'cove:;~:;iagg~~*~~quip~~nt) <,:;*.r *(:* ._ .**~:*:\?~ _ . :.;-~:;:*.~:.:j~JT: -*~*;_"'"*** .<* ; ;</,* _ ._,_.*::,-*,~::.'Y:-:_:. ~-~-:.;/~_~?** :-,:;~ ../l~:<"',>"'. _:<'>::;:..;>Y/<,** * -**_>*!-,;.//;~;~: }':* <.. :-.j<;;;:::;,<<**-:-J~t(~?t1~z::*::*-~~~:>*:~>~~*
Initial \ Description ... ,. , . _ 1 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 2 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 3 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 4 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 5 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 6 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 7 2PR6 CIT 8 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 5 of 32 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group EVENT ACTION: monp187 < 510 //HOTTEST INCORE TIC TEMP.O 3 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK Time Value Time 01 SG0078C 23 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE WA 0 00:05:00 RT-1 0.3 02 CV0035 CHRG MASTER FLO CNTRLR FAILS H/L N/A 39.2 00:05:00 RT-4 0.01 03 EL0134 LOSS OF ALL 500KV OFF-SITE POWE N/A N/A WA ET-3 04 I'J/A N/A N!A RT-3 0.01 05 SJ0062B 22 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP TRIP NIA N!A N!A RT-5 06 AF0182B 22 AFP PRESS OVRD PROT FAILS N/A N/A N/A N/A AAS POINT 07 AN3735 AAS 735 FAILS - :21 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:03:00 N/A N!A RT-2 FAILS/OVRD TOON AAS POINT 08 AN3736 AAS 736 FAILS- :22 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:03:10 N/A N/A RT-2 FAILS/OVRD TOON AAS POINT 09 AN3737 AAS 737 FAILS- :23 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:03:20 N th N/A RT-2 FAILS/OVRD TOON AAS POINT 10 AN3738 AAS 738 FAILS- :24 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:03:30 N/A N!A RT-2 FAILS/OVRD TOON AAS POINT 11 AN3739 AAS 739 FAILS - :25 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:03:42 N/A N/A RT-2 FAILS/OVRD TOON 12 PR0017C PZR LEVEL CHIll LT461)FAILS H/L 00:00:01 NiA N/A RT-4 0 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 6 of 32 SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK Time Value Time 01 PR34D PORV STOP VALVE 2PR6 TAGGED NiA N/A N/A N/A TAGGED 02 MS06A 23MS45 23 STM GEN STM SUP-23 AFP N!A N/A N/A RT-7 0 03 AF01 D 23 AUX FP TRIP RESET 00:10:00 N/A N/A RT-8 RESET SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition/ CHECK Time Value Time Severity 01 AH01 F Dl 21 Sl PUMP STOP 00:00:05 N!A N/A ET-3 ON B511 A Dl 22 AUX FEED PUMP-PRESS OVERRIDE 02 N/A NIA N/A N!A OFF DEFEAT Description 1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 7 of 32 A. State shift job assignments. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 8 of 32 Exilo/e'Sted~*~~j*ntt$tu*aa..,+'~.,. .. ""'"1
>>'*<,<:~/<~:,*iti~~~~~-;: --*:.,,:fri;t~~~~> * , ,' ~i~
Note: RCS temperature will be lowering -0.1 oF I minute from Xe. The crew determines how much RCS dilution is reauired to maintain Tava on oroaram. RO initiates a dilution for RCS temperature control.
- 1. Charging Master Flow Controller fails low Simulator Operator: Insert RT.;4 on directionfrom:t:ead Ev~Iuator .
.M~LF: C)/,0035 CH~G MASTER
.*.. FLO.*CNTRLR*FAILS*H/L*
!!~~%1#lr~~r~~;~
Mft.cf:r;Fiko'o17c PZR tievi:1JcH.
- III(LJ461)FAILS:Hfl:.;~,c:' ';:*:. . ;.,
- seveHty::o, * . *' **
Note: There is no audible indication or letdown isolation from the PZR level Ch Ill failure as the high lvl/lo level alarms come off the LC460D and LC459F (channels selected for control and alarm.) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 9 of32
,,s, .Evaltinto'rtrn~tr:uctof7Ativityf1
~~~~-~.*;~~I~:;:.:'*;~>--~:/* *;~~~*:~I~::~t1~.:p~,:_;-i~:~;:;:::- 7: *':i~t,, ~c! ' ' : "> RCP seal injection flow. RO diagnoses Master Flow Controller (MFC) output lowering with PZR level on (or below) pro!=) ram. CRS directs RO to place Master Flow Controller in manual and restore char!=)ing flow. RO places MFC in manual, and reports MFC demand has stabilized, but cannot be raised. CRS directs RO to place 23 charging pump speed controller in manual and restore charging flow. RO reports positive control over 23 charging pump speed in manual, and raises charging flow to restore PZR level to program. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, based on the reduction of charging flow. CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1 CAS. RO reports 23 charging pump in service with no indication of cavitation. * -
- 2. Non-controlling PZR Level Channel Ill fails low.
Note: This is at least where the level channel failure should be identified. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 10 of 32
'!¥ ~ E IU: '"t' /1 t f q.A f *t xi\ " *)'"*~ .
- E'******r d';pt**+*$t/Sf d' *itR ,...... . **sY$P: . ' ' PSBli' :rx~z* .
,;g:,;,; ~a .:~~:~~~ .rue or; /. ~;~,;~t~:~;~~*;* :f~4~~;~;1.*~~'~** . 0:~~;~'1.:~r :;&Y,1~l~;f~;~?.,'; . .~.~.~~J;~~$'?;':*].:.3.:.~{*~icod~;t~~::~:t:~~:. RO reports PZR lvl channel Ill failed low. Note: AB.CVC actions for a failed PZR level channel are written for a channel which is selected for control or alarm. If CRS bases procedure flowpath on this fact, then MFC failure is addressed at Step 105. If not done previously, RO takes manual control of charging to maintain PZR level on program. RO reports operable channels are selected for control, alarm, and recorder. j CRS determines MFC will not be returned to f auto. CRS directs removal of PZR level channel Ill from service. CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 action 6. Note: The following steps are the actions in AB.CVC for getting to the failed MFC step 105 after first reaching the step (54) for a failed PZR level channel. RO reports VCT lvl channel has not failed. RO reports no indication of charging header PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training l
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 11 of 32
* ~d'mm&nr'f *
- leak.
RO reports charging MFC failed. RO reports manual control of 23 charging pump has been established, and reports PZR level can be maintained stable or rising. CRS assigns responsibility and band for manual PZR level control. Proceed to next event after AB.CVC-1 has been addressed and PZR level channel failure TS has been identified at Lead Evaluators direction.
- 2. SGTL Simulator Ope~atqr:'lns~rtRT-1*.
oil.dir~¢tfonfrom*a~ead . . Evaluator:*:,. M1\U~:,~d.oo7s~*~-~~-*~team 1 9~fleratorJub'e Rupture :.
**"*1*v*
F*~*1na .... a.*1*ue,
** **.***o* 3***:::.*, -Ramp:.15minutes: .::
- f.**
RO announces OHA A-6 RMS HI RAD OR TRBL as unexpected. RO reports CRT shows 2R53C in alarm. RO reports 2R53C reading and slowly rising. CRS contacts Radiation Protection to perform PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 12 of 32 ,,i ~;~~'~5~t,t2!t~~~~W~~~1r~ctiv!!i,~il. SC.RP-TI.RM-0607(0), Primary To Secondary
. ~.,i~~~s ~.3~'fi.~~~1~j;.,~;L" .
11 Leak Rate Resoonse lAW ARP. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.SG-001 Steam Generator Tube Leak directly or enters S2.0P-AB.RAD-001, Abnormal Radiation CRS directs performance of S2.0P-AB.SG-001 CAS. Go to page 14 when Action Level 3 is identified. CRS dispatches an operator to deenergize TGA sumos. idee
~*. This~RT rncJuaesa*~ 'i* .,~~ ,minute,d~!~>;::~b'etofeopening;suri)*p' breakers:,.;*B~po~J?JTpo~JfroJ;r;oor;n:'
rr lastof'th' o?sump.:breake'rs
~AL~~~;¥fe~~~~~~:g*l1i'~!fl '. . 'AN37~5.221 TGASurnpl.J:everHL:.
c:AN3736221"GA Sump,L~vetHi
*AN37'37:23f6A *'* '* . . . .*:.- sum.p*LeXie I Hr*..
AN~138 24,TGA15ump; Level Hi
- Af:.'~Z39 25 TG,A.~:Sump!(evel Hi Delays:
3:'57 *. a:oo; 3~Jo,'3:25i\3:37', . .
. **. 1~ 1' .* *. '
RO reports PZR level is stable. IF RO reports PZR level is lowerina. RO will swao to a PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 13 of 32
~v~!~atoHin~tifu~4lor!Activi~J** ~SfUde0:fR~~*ti9 ..... ~Iff: ;;i:> ~~:l;.~,~tt> :S?~ :~, ,;. *,/_s~,l. ,,~t~f-<:-~ ~~-~~ f::{,, .; ;, ~~, :*v,_jy.: , .~-' '* z; ;:'> ~, ,:;~~- -i,l- <z1%-:"'t,0G*** ********
18
**w*' ';:.'~Y}\'
RO reoorts unit is in Mode 1. Crew identifies 2R53C, 2R 19C and 2R 15 risina. PO reoorts affected SG is 23. PO raises 23MS1 0 setooint to 1045 osi PO closes or checks closed 23GB4, 23MS7, and 23MS18. CRS dispatches an operator to shut 23MS45, and enters TSAS 3.7.1.3 for 23 AFW pump when required. I. Simulator Operator: Do NOT shut 23MS45 until directed later in scenario. CRS dispatches an operator to re-align SGBD and MS samolina to Waste Svstem . . ,Simulatc:)ro'perator:"to minOte~:> . aftert.,chernistry;h(first cor~tacte~,,:. repOrtthaf23*SG hasd~vel6peda 300 gpa leak; from o priJ-nary to'*i secondafy'previously:~ .
'Ii i ~
CAS Action Level 3 required actions start here. CRS determines that the CAS indicates that PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 14 of 32
- Y" -~:~~~~'~,!1~g~srtn~fir::~Bflvity:~~;~J'~[~~rk:?~~~~~,, ;~~~~~;~~~¥4'?1*'
7 Action Level 3 is present lAW Step 6.2.A based on:
- Leak rate is ;::: 75 gpd AND - The rate of change of the leakrate is ;::: 30 d/hr.
CRS determines a power reduction to ~50% must be performed within 1 hour. CRS enters TSAS 3.4.7.2.c Note: If time does not permit Tech Spec identification, post scenario follow up question will be required.
- 4. Downpower RO calculates boron addition required for ower reduction to 50%.
CRS orders a power reduction at a rate which will ensure oower is <50% within one hour. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction to perform the power reduction. RO initiates RCS boration at rate directed by CRS. RO announces expected and actual rod movement when it occurs. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 15 of 32
- c
- ;;~~tfi~l~~~y~~!~~~\1~f,f~j:~;~~
Proceed to next event on direction from Lead evaluator.
- 5. 23 SGTR
.siroulato~~operator::~MooiF-v , ,~ , .; . MP:L!.F SG0078Cito'650:Witn'no s**sti~~ .*ramp:or.a~:lay'aft~tr:p~\IJ'er;.~~ducfi9r1':*
** t1as.,com niehced)3~;at'a ire8tion~qf; ;:
- J~eaCIEvai, bt.Jf:A.f:ii'ER' s6'tube*,,;(;:.
- leak exceeds 150gpd;* (TS *. **
threshOld * * * *
- RO reports indications of worsening tube leak on 23 SG.
CRS determines CAS actions for rising SG NR level lAW CAS 1.0 are true. CRS directs the RO to trip the Rx, confirm the trio, and initiate a Safetv lniection. RO trips the Rx, confirms the trip, and initiates a Safetv lniection. RO performs immediate actions of TRIP-1: Verifies Rx tripped. Verifies Rx trip is confirmed. Backs up Main Turbine trip. Verifies off site power available to at least one vital buss. Verifies Sl initiation. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 16 of 32 r.. ': .* a~a'iuator/ ~~~n.r~~~~tilG
- ~.
- i;it~t: ~ ~~*i~:~:~i~y ~
CRS reads immediate action steps to RO who confirms their performance. Crew commences monitorina TRIP-1 CAS. RO reports SEC loading is not complete for all i vital busses, but all available equipment 1 started. I
- 6. 22 AFW pump Pressure f Override circuit malfunction t
i PO reports all AFW pumps are running, but 22 I AFW pump is not supplying flow even though its discharae pressure is hiah enouah. PO requests, and receives, permission to II
~
depress Pressure Override Defeat for 22 AFW umo, which has no effect on AFW flow. PO reports 23 AFW pump is running, and that an unmonitored release is occurring from the TDAFW pump steam discharge with 23MS45 not shut vet. AFW flow control is complicated by the fact that a SGTR is present on 23 SG, but the 23MS45 has not been shut yet. Additionally, 22 AFW pump is not supplying flow to 21 and 22 SGs because its Pressure Override circuit has failed. Shortly after the Rx is tripped, SG level will recover in at least one SG so that AFW flow can PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 17 of 32
' ,' .' ~
be lowered< 22E4. TRIP-1 does not direct tripping 23 AFW pump unless 2 MDAFW pps are running, which in this case is not true, since a running pump would be supplying flow. Detailed observation of the crew during AFW flow decisions should be made by the evaluators.
,cr# J;>(CT~1.8Lisdl~t~.AFW:~o ** ;thenlpturedSGWjthin:10~: .* *.. *:*.
min Lites of ent,.Y)nto :TRIP~t:and
- subsequently~clos~ 23MS167; .
23MS18;23MS7 and 23GB4 .....
- before a'trimsition'to'SGTR-3 is:
re~dired ..>; .*;l~/ *. *~'~?:~:( ... J.
- SAT UNSAT0**.*.
PO requests to throttle AFW flow, and isolates AFW flow to 23 SG by closing 23AF11 and 23AF21. CRS directs PO to maintain total AFW flow
>22E4 lbm/hr while throttlina AFW flow.
RO reoorts normal containment oressure. CRS determines no MSLI is reauired. CRS directs SM to refer to the ECG. PO reports all 4KV vital busses energized from off site oower. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Paae 18 of 32 i::,i~}"~~~~~~~~:ir~rt" RO reports control room ventilation in accident ressurized mode. RO reoorts 2 CCW s are runnin RO reports ECCS is injecting as expected for current RCS oressure. PO reoorts AFW flow and SG NR level status. RO reoorts all RCPs are in ooeration. f RO reoorts MSLI is not reauired. RO reports RTBs are open, PORVs shut, PORV block valve 2PR7 open, 2PR6 shut and CIT, and PZR spray valves operating as expected for current RCS oressure. RO maintains seal iniection flow to all RCPs. PO reoorts no faulted SGs. PO reports 23 SG is ruptured based on NR level. !I CRS transitions to SGTR-1. RO maintains seal iniection flow to all RCPs. PO reoorts 23 SG is ruotured, and 23MS10 is PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 19 of 32
- zv~1,;EvafuatorlU1strul ed1i'Ja'ntf
- stttaeot'Res*f1Qns"ij)i ... ,":cP'mYrlenf:,::,:;,~i . ...
~--~J: *;.,~ <, *;;,~~y-i~-~~~~~L;:*~~~::l?~;~~~. **< */ ., : ":\~;,(:,'~ ~~ _,,;},.}:.~;, ~~~~~iitf~:~\t~~~!,};:,~;t::fi:: 'i PO reports 23MS1 0 operating as expected for current oressure. PO ensures 23MS167, 23MS7, 23MS18, and 23GB4 are shut. PO reoorts 23 SG is ruotured. PO reports 23 AFW pump is NOT only source of AFW. l <.Simulator operator:J:when23 * ** * .
*~:r'~fsr~~~~p'~J&C~y~~i~o:;:¥:tt:*' .
dispatched.* *insert Rn7tO.close .. 23MS45.~nd'catl.control t06m.lo:: int6~1J1th'e.rn ifi~"snut.;; *** * ** **
**~$~~~~:~;~*~~1~~~p23' CRS sends an operator to reset 2MS52 when all SG NR levels are > 15%. *Simu rator*.Operator:.:; Insert RT~s .
fo reset2Mss2: .Rf.'Iiicludesa to'**~**
.**rPinutE{delay,prior.toresettlrig MS52,, : .. * .. . *'"* .
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 20 of 32
REMOTE: AF01 D 2'!ol,.:~u.n.
.** T~l~; ~E~,!§T '::ff,t?' " ~ ... FmaiNalt.fe: RESET. CRS checks on status of MS sampling valves which were directed to be shut in AB.SG. When contacted by crew report 2SS333 is shut. PO reports 23 SG is isolated from intact SGs, 23 SG NR level is >9%, and feed flow is isolated to 23 SG. RO reports power is C/T to 2PR6, and CRS either leaves it CIT, or orders power restored. Note: Do NOT restore power to 2PR6 during scenario. If asked later in scenario, state you are having problems with WCM getting the release authorized. RO reports 2PR2 is operating correctly in response to PZR pressure. PO reports no faulted SGs. RO resets Sl and Phase A isolations, and opens CA330's. PO resets all SECs. RO stops both RHR PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 21 of 32
*:~t~~~~~~rt~~~i~~:~~~~~~I:~~;~~1{.~!ti~~r~*; *r~~~~~j~~YJ~7:t~~~0t;~~~Pl~~~ =>mm*Emt*/*
CRS dispatches an operator to shift Gland Sealina steam to Unit 1. CRS determines target temperature for RCS cooldown is 503 dearees. PO commences RCS cooldown by using Steam Dumps in MS Pressure Control-Manual at 25% demand. PO Bvpasses Tav
- 7. Loss of Off-site power Simulator operatOr.:, E:hsure:E:t~3 is TR.UEwheri'the:hottest**CET J **...
- re'aches i510'degre~s:'This. insert~
ttile'Jos~:6!'~ff~site R9wer." ':¥ ..* * * -~-~~ :, ,,_~:-*, . *. ~~}J\.\.<1;:-~tiL ."~~- *~ ,*.~ .::;4,::~<< ;,~~~.,~:~*: .* i;;~ ": "*~,:;~{:,,'"'~~ . . MALF:rEL013'4,1;;oss**ot All<~::~<';', . off$'1te ~.~oK\tJ,ow~r.r ** .*' .: : ;; ~i*:~;:
'~~t:O~ ,()Vor~fi,~~~~~P yf CRS recognized loss of off-site power and returns to Step 10 CAS to perform actions of Table C.
PO verifies all available equipment started for each SEC. PO resets all SECs. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 22 of 32
*:;.. :l~vatuatortlnstr.uctor Activif~t~v ~ :~;;~' ~f:ExpeoteaV*PiantJsfuCietit;Rd§pci ~~,T~nly<<v:;:;;~~~i*~i~,.**l~~ ;;;, \' :~:~~\: *,~&~t *?1'fltif{~:;,;::}?~illl~f;~f1:': *. ::;~!?:~\$~ *.* .:~:;} * , . . * * * ~*: . ;~.:~ :.;:: ');:;~. t'l~*~;?. /
- ~iijl~~tatq.r .()PEi.l"atol"
- . wnerWcR~~f I
t l ~'drre&ts .. siart'o'fsrpumps,.~rnsert* . RT~5 after 22 sl* pump has oeen
- i Staii"ed. *. * * *'* ** * * .
~:~,- ~ ~' ~~/', .: "<t **. ~
- ~~~\~~~;/;i: ":~:-~ '" I MAL~: *s~oo*a~Ef22"'Safet}l:.
- Jnjection*~P;ump trip::
l/~~l~: ;1"~*;*p~~p ~i;l not st~~;h>****. CRS directs the cooldown to oe re-estaolished usina 21, 22 and 24MS10's fullv open. RO shuts charging pump mini flows when i RCS pressure lowers to 1500 psi~. I PO staoilizes hottest CET temperature less than 503 dearees. I
*9T#2JCJ::-19): **Estahlish/maiotaio} *;~~~~~~%~~~b~~\0 iihri~{.;'1~*1':.r'{~ . . .
- r~q uif'e8'*,eith~r b~~ause'rr'l[llmuni
- reqylr~d 'subcq91J.Qg*6af'lnd~.Re*
- r:naif)t~\~ed,,or.o,ec~yse f{c.~*!ow". f temperature calises'a.RE!iYor:.f*; ...
I
- ~~~r~~~~~Hft~1B~~~}f~~~~
--~';-
f PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 "> <<, ~>>,"' ~(W,;w... "=""*'d*~- ,,,,.,. ~* ".'1'." ,/,,,,~ .,, ~ '<'.v~~"'.' ** /..::<"<>:::'~"'<~<<ii ,, '${ Page 23 of 32
<:; Eva<ltf!:i~or:/IQ'sttuetor~~~nvity,!:l;~<Z' ,.,;*; :'ommen,J< * -~;~, ~~~.,-1 , ;~~,, _,,<:;~~\. ,:'* ~:;* :~s;,;*.*;~~, *~~,~~~Jft~,;~~ .- -~ ,. ~{J~~~~ :+~~*f; {;i: ~t :':fg;.; ,
PO reports 23 SG pressure is stable or rising or at least 250 osia above intact SG oressure. RO reports adeauate subcoolin~. RO reports RCPs are stopped and normal PZR sorav is not available.
- SimulatorOperato6Y*JnseH RT-3 ......**
when st~p .18 ~ORY.~tatus. iscread *
.* PRIOFNQ"Crew*attempfing to open . .:2.~.f{2~\;;. ,'.:':. * *... * ; **.\~ ::.i4tir~{< i* r**** ~.,. . **MALF,:~;'{L0298.'2F>>,Rg::fails*to ** pOSI't'IOfl . '(0'* 100°' 10 )' ;6*. £:.{;. * .
Final Value:;0.01* t:*~**:~,.:. RO reoorts 2PR2 PZR PORV is available.
- 8. PZR PORV fails shut RO reoorts 2PR2 will not ooen CRS returns to step 18 and answers NO to if a PORV is available.
SimulatC>rOperator:.. lf CRS cjjq>
*. notstart' Sl. pumps ~ub~e;lquenfto '
- theBiackout;:and.* starts;fhembere ..*
.* JI;IEN inseJi*RT;o5 a,fter '22SJp.url1p:. ~a~.PE;'l~n s~~rt~d:...; * . > *.. ,;.;., .* ~*~:*~...:* * *. MALF:*.$J0062J~*l~2 Safety,., . ".: *1 njEfction,Ponip trip.,::,, * :'~~;.:; * *,\ ~**
- ..Note:?a:1sf rium.p'fwnEnot,,start. ,
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 24 of 32 '~~~)~~~Jg~t~~{l?!~t~~gf~~~ . .
<='"'>" oo/N~-0-~J f~y<;' ,'-. ',,*;;r~,i;t}~~'n,'
RO reports no Sl pumps running if start attemot is made. CRS transitions to SGTR-5. Terminate scenario after transition to SGTR-5 in announced. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 25 of 32 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures E. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation F. S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging G. S2.0P-AB.SG-0001, Steam Generator Tube Leak H. S2.0P-AB.LOAD-0001 Rapid Load Reduction I. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection J. 2-EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture K. 2-EOP-SGTR-5, SGTR without Pressurizer Pressure Control PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS . . TODAY MODE: 1 POWER: 76 RCS BORON: 885 MWe 920 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core burnup is 5,000 EFPH Control Bank D rods are at 148 steps Power was reduced to 76% 30 minutes ago due to slight oscillations on 21 SGFP governor. Xe is building in at 60 pcm I hr. MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION: 3.4.5. Action b- 2PR1 expires 69 hours from now EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: 2PR6 shut and power CIT. CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: PZR PORV 2PR1 was declared inoperable 3 hours ago due to intermittent control circuit anomalies. SECONDARY: 21 SGFP remains in service. Governor problem has not been identified. Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: None PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST
- 1. Verify simulator is in 'TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter With Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct if applicable.
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
- 26. Verify EGC paperwork is marked "Training Use Only" and is current revision.
- 27. Ensure sufficient copies of ECG paperwork are available.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 3 . CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 13-01 NRC-ESG-5 REVIEWER: P Williams Initials Qualitative Attributes PW 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PW 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PW 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PW 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction( s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point PW 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
PW 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PW 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PW 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PW 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PW 10. The scenario has been validated. PW 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario. PW 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.S.d) Initial Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.S.d) GG 7 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GG 3 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GG 2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 GG 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GG 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GG 2 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 13-01 NRC ESG-5 CT# 1: {CT-18) Isolate AFW to the ruptured SG within 10 minutes of entry into TRIP-1 and subsequently close 23MS167, 23MS18, 23MS7 and 23GB4 before a transition to SGTR-3 is required. Basis: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the crew allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency ERG constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy.... " CT#2{CT-19) Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either of the following conditions: Too high to maintain minimum required subcooling OR Below [the RCS temperature that causes an RED path or a PURPLE challenge to the subcriticality and/or the integrity CSF. Basis: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency ERG. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy .... " PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N Event Y/N Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water y Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss ofCCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg y Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Y Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Y Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump TASK NUMBER: N0020080101 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC RO A1-1 ALTERNATE PATH: a.....l_ _,l KIA NUMBER: 2.1.25
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.2
- -3.9 ---
APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoCJ Ro[8] STAC] SROCJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0003, Overhead Annunciators Window C, Rev. 17 S2.0P-SO.RC-0004, Identifying and Measuring Leakage, Rev. 15 (Both Rev checked 9-26-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 15 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-26-14 Instructor Validated By: D Tait Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor
~~
Approved By: Date: tO-?..- 7--/ t; { £!/'- '~v'"-'{ Approved By: t\ 1\ /\_/\ (~.__\)~) Date: oke~at~ns-Re~ent~ ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From NJJr.IP:::Jr Tr::1ininn
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump TASK NUMBER: N00200801 01 SIMULATOR SETUP IC-241, 100% power MOL. RT-1 is MALF SW0218 Severity 1 Replace normal copy of S2.0P-SO.RC-0004, Identifying and Measuring Leakage, Attachment 1, Pump Data, located next to Aux Alarm Typewriter with Att. 1 from this JPM showing: Stop time 1510 yesterday, leak rate <.28, elapsed run time 13568 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 is operating at 100% power, steady state, BOL. INITIATING CUE: You are the RO. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained}.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Operator calculates leakage into Containment Sump of 0.3 gpm.
Page 2 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Soecific Permic::c::inn i=rnm 1\lr rf'lo-:>r Tr .... ;n;n~
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: --------------------- SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)* EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
Simulator Operator insert RT-1 on direction from Evaluator. Announces OHA C-2 CNTMT SUMP PMP START as unexpected. Refers to ARP for OHA C-2. ARP !E any indication of an RCS leak or Scans board parameters and OHA C-2 an interconnecting ECCS leak determines there are no indications of 3.1 affecting RCS inventory, THEN GO an RCS leak or an interconnecting TO S2.0P-AB.RC-0001(Q), Reactor ECCS leak affecting RCS inventory. Coolant System Leak. Page 3 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
ARP DETERMINE a leakrate lAW S2.0P- Determines containment sump leak rate OHA C-2 SO.RC-0004(0), Identifying and as follows: 3.1 Measuring Leakage. Note: Operator may perform section 5.1, Locating RCS leakage, but it is not directed because it is not known what the reason for the containment sump pump run is. Section 5.3 Measuring Leakage to Containment Sump should be performed. SO.RC-4 Each time a Containment Sump 5.3.1 Pump starts, RECORD the following on Attachment 1, Section 2.0:
- Operating Containment Sump Records "21 cont sump".
Pump Number
- Time of pump start Records time of pump start Cue: When determining pump start time from Aux Typewriter or OHA CRT, then state: 21 containment sump pump started at 0800.
Page 4 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
SO.RC-4 CALCULATE elapsed time in minutes Calculates elapsed time in minutes 5.3.2 between start time and previous between start time and previous Containment Sump Pump stop time Containment Sump Pump stop time AND RECORD on Attachment 1, and records on Attachment 1, Section
- Section 2.0. 2.0. by using previous stop time of 1510 yesterday, and with cue of 0800 today determines elapsed time is 1,000 minutes.
SO.RC-4 ENSURE no draining, sampling, or 5.3.3 liquid additions to Containment Sump Cue: No draining, sampling, or liquid have occurred during selected time additions to Containment Sump have frame. occurred during selected time frame. SO.RC-4 CALCULATE Containment Sump Calculates Containment Sump Leak 5.3.4 Leak Rate using Attachment 3. Rate using Attachment 3 by using page
- 1 of 2 of Att. 3, and determines the 1,000 minute line crosses the 0.3 gpm leak rate line.
SO.RC-4 RECORD calculated Containment Records calculated Containment Sump 5.3.5 Sump leak rate on Attachment 1, leak rate on Attachment 1, Section 2.0. i Section 2.0. as 0.3 gpm.
*------- I Page 5 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: -------------------- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Measure Leakage to the Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
SO.RC-4 Direct a second Operator to Directs a second Operator to perform 5.3.6 PERFORM Independent Verification Independent Verification of the of the calculation(s) performed in calculation(s) performed in Attachment Attachment 1, Section 2.0. 1, Section 2.0 .. Cue: IV is complete SAT. SO.RC-4 RECORD Containment Sump Pump Records Containment Sump Pump stop 5.3.7 stop time and date on Attachment 1, time and date on Attachment 1, Section Section 2.0. 2.0. Records stop time. SO.RC-4 IF leakage to Containment Sump Determines leakage to Containment 5.3.8 exceeds 1.0 gpm AND Unit in Modes Sump does not exceed 1.0 gpm 1-4, THEN: A. INITIATE S2.0P-ST.RC-0008(Q), Reactor Coolant Water Inventory Balance. B. REFER to Technical Specification 3.4.7.2. SO.RC-4 !E leakage to Containment Sump Determines leakage to Containment 5.3.9 exceeds 0.85 gpm, THEN INITIATE Sump does not exceed 0.85 gpm. Section 5.6 of this procedure. Cue: JPM is comr:>lete. Page 6 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ~ 1. Task description -~n~ number, JPM description and number are identified. C)::::::::-_2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. 0 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____g__ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
V 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). _0___ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev.~ Date r D { r f { C'1 9 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.
~~£+-
SME/Instructor: ~ Date: SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ Page 7 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 is operating at 100% power, steady state, BOL. INITIATING CUE: You are the RO. Page 8 of 8 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK: Perform a QPTR TASK NUMBER: N0150020201 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC RO Admin A1-2 ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 2.1.43
--------~~------~
IMPORTANCEFACTOR: --~4~.1~-- APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD RO[ZJ STAD SROD EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002 Rev. 15 All rev checked 09/24/14 S1.RE-RA.. ZZ-0011 Rev. 383 Tech Spec 3.2.4 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 30 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 09-24-14 Instructor Validated By: E Bak Date: 10-14-14 SME or Instructor Date: Approved By: Training Department Date: Approved By: Operations Representative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK: Perform a QPTR TASK NUMBER: N0150020201 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when rod 204 dropped fully into the core. OHA E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR annunciated and remains locked in. Operators have not yet started reducing power to 74% to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d lAW S1.0P-AB.ROD-002, Dropped Rod. INITIATING CUE: The CRS has directed you to perform a QPTR using Manual Calculation lAW S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002. Nl currents are: Upper Detectors Lower Detectors N41 190 200 N42 200 215 N43 180 175 N44 200 205 Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Perform the QPTR and calculate the highest QPTR as SAT.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK* Perform a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation) Provide blank copy of S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002, Rev.15, Power Distribution- Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, a copy of S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Rev. I 383,Tables, and a copy of Tech Spec 3.2.4. 2.1 IDENTIFY sections of this procedure that are N/A's Section 5.2, Attachment 1 Section 3.0, and NOT to be performed with "N/A". Attachment 3. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS Reads and initials PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1-3.5 I 5.1.1 IF one PR channel is inoperable, AND RTP is Determines all PR channel are operable and step
>75%, THEN ... is NA.
5.1.2 RECORD the following data on Attachment 2
- Date Records current date, current time, 100% reactor
- Time power and checks OHA E-46 as reason for
- Reactor Power performance in Attachment 2.
- Reason for performing QPTR Calculation PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK: Perform a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
{*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL {Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation)
- 5.1.3 RECORD the following data on Attachment 1:
- Nl Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44 Records on Attachment 1: (From initial Upper Detector current readings conditions)
- Nl Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44
- Nl channels N41-44 Upper Detector Lower Detector current readings Current Readings
- Respective 100% Nl Current Values for
- Nl channels N41-44 Lower Detector Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44 Current Readings Detectors from S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Table
- 100% Nl Current Values from S1.RE-2 RA.ZZ-0011, TABLES NOTE: Attachment 1, Section 3 is NOT required to be performed to determine detector currents. It was added at Rev. 12 to use "when any NIS meter is suspect."
If asked, CUE that all Power Range Detectors are Operable. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK* Perform a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation)
- 5.1.4 COMPLETE Attachment 1 calculations. For Top and Bottom Detectors: (numbers as per key for evaluator)
- Calculates Detector Ratio for each top and bottom detector.
- Adds detector ratios to get Sum of detector ratios.
- Divides Sum by number of operable detectors (4) to get Average Detector Ratios.
- Places Average Detector Ratios in 41h I column of Att. 1
- Divides each detector ratio by the average ratio to get the power tilt for each I
detector. Cue: IV is complete when asked for IV of calculations I I
- 5.1.5 RECORD the following on Attachment 2 Records information on Attachment 2 (as per key
- 1. "Power Tilt" for each detector. for evaluator)
- 2. "Maximum Power Tilt" and applicable Maximum Power Tilt for Top and Bottom will be detector identification information. <1.02 and marked SAT
- 3. Test Results by initialing SAT or UNSAT column lAW stated Acceptance Criteria.
5.1.6 DIRECT a second Operator to perform Cue: IV is complete SAT. Independent Verification of calculations in Attachment 1, Sections 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 as applicable. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK* Perform a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation) 5.1.7 !E the Maximum Power Tilt for any detector Determines no tilt exceeds 1.02. exceeds 1.02, THEN REFER to TIS 3.2.4 for corrective actions. 5.3.1 This surveillance is satisfactory when Attachment 2 or 3 is completed with the Test Data meeting the Acceptance Criteria stated. Determines surveillance is SAT. 5.4.1 COMPLETE Attachment 4, Sections 1.0 and 2.0, AND FORWARD completed procedure to SM/CRS for review. JPM is terminated when candidate returns all JPM paperwork to evaluator. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ____ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. _ _ _ _ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) _ _ _ _ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. _ _ _ _ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. _ _ _ _ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. _ _ _ _ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). _ _ _ _ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _ _ Date _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _ _ _ _ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when rod 204 dropped fully into the core. OHA E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR annunciated and remains locked in. Operators have not yet started reducing power to 74% to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d lAW S1.0P-AB.ROD-002, Dropped Rod. INITIATING CUE: The CRS has directed you to perform a QPTR using Manual Calculation lAW S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002. Nl currents are: Upper Detectors Lower Detectors N41 190 200 N42 200 215 N43 180 175 N44 200 205 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout TASK NUMBER: N3130060301 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC RO Admin A2 ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 2.2.13
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: - - 4.1- - APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoCJ R0[8J STAC] SROCJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom OP-AA-1 09-115, Rev. 7, Safety Tagging Operations (rev checked 9-26-14)
REFERENCES:
Various drawings TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 30 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 09-26-14 Instructor Validated By: S Bickhart Date: 10-14-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: {0r~>""J Date: fD- 2-7 ...-/1( artment
* --~. /" Lf l 6 - '-' J Approved By: (~~(;) Date:
eseh.'t.ative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout TASK NUMBER: N3130060301 SIMULATOR SETUP INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. While performing a surveillance on 11 Safety Injection Pump, a leak was observed on the pump outlet flange discharge piping. The Work Clearance Module is not available due to an emergent power outage. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to perform the following:
- 1. Determine the correct blocking points which will allow repair of the 11 Sl pump.
- 2. Sequence those blocking points in the correct order.
- 3. Determine the correct tag type for each blocking point.
- 4. Determine the required positions necessary to allow repair on 11 Sl pump.
- 5. Enter all the above information on the provided OP-AA-1 09-115, Safety Tagging Operations Form 4.
Specific WCM identifiers are NOT required. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Identifies correct blocking points.
- 2. Sequence tagging in order by 1: Bezels, 2: Electrical, 3: Mechanical isolation, 4: Vents and drains.
- 3. Identifies correct tag types for components.
- 4. Identifies desired positions.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- NO. STANDARD S/U UN SAT Provide candidate with package Note: If requested, provide extra blank copies of containing several blank Form 4's, Form 4 Tagging/Untagging Work List (Tagging/Untagging Worklist), a copy of OP-AA-109-115, Safety Tagging Operations, drawings 205234 sheets 1-4, 203002, 207910-207912, and 207931-207933. Several of these drawings are not required.
- Determines Blocking Points as per key.
- Sequences Blocking Points in following order:
- 1. Bezels
- 2. Electrical Isolation
- 3. Mechanical Isolation
- 4. Vents and Drains
- Determines correct tag type for each Blocking Point as per key.
- Determines position required for each Blocking Point as per key.
Page 3 of 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires .Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- NO. STANDARD S/U UN SAT Notes for Evaluators:
Attachment 2, Component Tagging Rules, contains information which allows for the following:
- 1. "A minimum of 1 vent or drain is required to be RBT opened, there is no limit to how many can be used inside boundaries." (This is why all the vents and drains are sequenced #16)
- 2. MOV's are allowed to be used as Blocking Points. It would be acceptable procedurally if the 11 SJ113 AND 12SJ113 were used as Blocking Points instead of the single manual valve 1SJ 114. IF used as blocking points, the 11/12SJ 113 breakers (RBT-OFF), bezels (INFO), and valve handwheels (RBT-SHUT)would also be required to be tagged.
Note for Evaluators: The electrical power to a component must be cleared and tagged before that components manual operator is tagged, but may be sequenced within the tagout after other manual valves have been tagged.
'f ~
Note: Actual WCD 4278552 (CRTE) used as the l bases for the blocking points in JPM, with addition of vents and drains.
~ ~*~*.
Page 4 of 6 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training I I¥
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _____5_ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
~ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
__s~- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) __S=--- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ~ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ---'5"'----- 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ~ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev.__::]__ Date tOh4f )L/
___(_ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_______ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _______ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: ~
<~!f.J-- P;it kHu*r Date: /0/1 '-1 /1 t{
SME/Instructor: Date: ----------- SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: ___________ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. While performing a surveillance on 11 Safety Injection Pump, a leak was observed on the pump outlet flange discharge piping. The Work Clearance Module is not available due to an emergent power outage. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to perform the following:
- 1. Determine the correct blocking points which will allow repair of the 11 Sl pump.
- 2. Sequence those blocking points in the correct order.
- 3. Determine the correct tag type for each blocking point.
- 4. Determine the required positions necessary to allow repair on 11 Sl pump.
- 5. Enter all the above information on the provided OP-AA-1 09-115, Safety Tagging Operations Form 4.
Specific WCM identifiers are NOT required. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE TASK: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert TASK NUMBER: N1240100501 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC RO Admin A4 ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 2.4.39
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.9 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoC] Ro[D STAC] SROCJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator EP-SA-111-F8, Attachment 8 Secondary Communicator Log, Rev. 02 (checked 9-
REFERENCES:
26-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 8 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-26-14 Instructor Validated By: S Bickhart Date: 10-14-14 Approved By: Ml~uc6~~ Date: l0 .-'2- J-1 '1 Approved By: RJC~~m~G) Date: ro~ll*'i dp~rations~rese~ve ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert. TASK NUMBER: N1240100501 SIMULATOR OPERATOR CALL THE EROS HELP DESK ON LAND LINE 1-301-415-0467 OR CELL PHONE 1-240-731-2581 BEFORE STARTING JPMS TO INFORM THEM EROS WILL BE ACTIVATED DURING EXAM. PLACE FOLLOWUP CALL AFTER LAST RO HAS PERFORMED JPM. INITIAL CONDITIONS: An ALERT was declared at Salem due to the Unit 2 reactor failing to trip when a manual trip signal was initiated. The Rx tripped when the second trip handle was used. The unit is currently stable in MODE 3. The Emergency News Center (ENC) has not activated yet. INITIATING CUE: You are the Secondary Communicator. You are directed to perform EP-SA-111-F8, Attachment 8 Secondary Communicator Log Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Activate EROS.
- 2. Does NOT provide plant information to outside caller.
- 3. Terminate EROS.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _____________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _____________________ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
Provide a copy of ECG Attachment 8. Fills out ECG Attachment 8 by:
- 1. Printing name
- 2. Circles ALERT and circles CM2.
A.1 OBTAIN a copy of Attachment 6 and ASSIST Primary Communicator with Cue: Primary Communicator does not 15-minute notifications, as necessary. require assistance. A.2 DIRECT the Shift Rad Pro Tech (SRPT) (2644) to implement SC.EP- Cue: Shift Rad Pro Tech (Matt EP.ZZ-0301(Q) Shift Radiation Hassler) has been notified to Protection Technician Response. implement SC.EP-EP.ZZ-0301(0) (N/A for Common Site) Shift Radiation Protection Technician Response. A.3 !E_in an UNUSUAL EVENT Only, THEN, within approximately 30 Determines not in an Unusual Event. minutes, FAX a copy of the ICMF to the NEI Duty Manager at FAX# 9 202-785-4113 (backup Fax# 9 202-533-0180).
----~ ------ ---- - ~- - - --- - ----- ---- ~- --~ ~-- ~-
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 10
I OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (* Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) l A.4 For an ALERT or higher emergency; f
- a. !E an on-shift SRO is not available to fill the OSC Cue: The WCC Supervisor is the OSC Operations Supervisor Supervisor.
position, CALLOUT an additional SRO and have him/her report to the OSC. A.4 b. Within 60 minutes, ACTIVATE Cue if needed: The SM directs you to EROS from a LAN computer. activate EROS now. I A.4. PROCEED to a computer with its Proceeds to a computer with its i b.1 monitor labeled "EROS XXX" (XXX monitor labeled "EROS XXX" (XXX is is the computers asset tag number) the computers asset tag number) in in the Salem Control Room and the Salem Control Room and starts
- START the program by SELECTING the program by selecting the the ERDS_Salem desktop icon. ERDS_Salem desktop icon.
A.4. b.2 On the "Login For EROS Display" On the "Login For EROS Display" i
- popup window ENTER the popup window enters the PASSWORD PASSWORD and SELECT "Login" and selects"Login" to proceed. {The to proceed. (The Username will be Username will be displayed and the displayed and the password is the password is the same as the same as the Username) Username)
~-~-
PSEG Restricted -Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 10 i
~
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE i Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert I
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) I
~
A.4. b.3 SELECT the Action button labeled Selects the Action button labeled
- <CONNECT> on the appropriate <CONNECT> on the Salem 2 "EROS Salem 1 or Salem 2 "EROS Link Link Control and Status Display Control and Status Display Screen". Screen". f A.4.
b.4 SELECT the <YES> button in the Selects the <YES> button in the
- "Current Link Control State is "Current Link Control State is Disconnect. Do You Want To Disconnect. Do You Want To Connect?" box. Connect?" box.
A.4. b.5 OBSERVE that Status changes to Observes that Status changes to "Transmitting Data." "Transmitting Data." I A.4. b.6 VERIFY successful communications Verifies successful communications status by observing that the status by observing that the "Messages Sent" value is increasing "Messages Sent" value is increasing from zero "0" to some positive from zero "0" to some positive integer integer> "0". > "0".
~- ~ ~- -- - -- -- -~
I PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
A.4. b.7 INFORM the CRS of successful Informs the CRS of successful EROS EROS activation status. activation status. Cue: Steps A4 through A7 are complete. Steps A8 through A 10 are not required to be completed at this time. Section B is not required to be completed at this time. Simulator O~erator: After the previous step cue has been repeated back, call the desk phone and say the following:
- "This is Anderson Cooper calling Does NOT give plant information to from CNN headquarters in Atlanta. caller.
We have received a report that the Salem 2 reactor has experienced a Attachment 8, Section C, INCOMING Rx accident and the core is melting. CALLS, MEDIA, CAUTION, states, Can you give me an update on the "Communicators are NOT authorized current condition of Salem Unit 2?" to release any information to the News Media." May read either Attachment 8, section C, Incoming Calls, 3.C, OR tell them he cannot provide any information.
-----~--- --- ----- **----- ---- ------ --- **-- -- -- -
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS I NO. (* Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) I CUE: Once EROS is activated AND Media call action is complete, then state, "The Station Event has been terminated. The NRC Operations Center directs you to terminate EROS transmission." '
When directed by the NRC, I C.4.a TERMINATE Emergency Response Data System (EROS) transmission as follows: I C.4.b I RETURN to the computer labeled Returns to the computer labeled "EROS XXX" used to activate EROS "EROS XXX" used to activate EROS in in the Control Room. lE_the "EROS the Control Room. lE_the "EROS Link I Link Control and Status Display Control and Status Display Screen" Screen" was "MINIMIZED" THEN, was "MINIMIZED" THEN, maximizes it. MAXIMIZE it. I I C.4.c SELECT the appropriate (Salem Unit Selects the Salem Unit 2 Action
- 1 or Salem Unit 2) Action Button Button marked <DISCONNECT> on marked <DISCONNECT> on the the "EROS Link Control and Status "EROS Link Control and Status Display" Screen.
Display" Screen. I PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
C.4.d SELECT the <YES> button in the Selects the <YES> button in the
* "Current Link Control State is "Current Link Control State is Connect.
Connect. Do You Want To Do You Want To Disconnect?" box. Disconnect?" box. Terminate JPM. '- ~-- --- - - - --- --- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ~ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. --/"""'<)'--- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. __c;~~- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
<)' 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
'<;-;;---_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
__,.,_)-::r- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. (
/ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*).
____s__ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. - Date lq/r 4 / t I - - - - 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: ~ -J,"-" i/JICi Date: IV }1 '-1}1 V SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 9 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: An ALERT has been declared at Salem due to the Unit 2 reactor failing to trip when a manual trip signal was initiated. The Rx tripped when the second trip handle was used.
- The unit is currently stable in MODE 3.
The Emergency News Center (ENC) has not activated yet. INITIATING CUE: You are the Secondary Communicator. You are directed to perform EP-SA-111-F8, Secondary Communicator Log PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 10 of 10
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Chilled Water Loads TASK NUMBER: 0980020202 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC SRO Admin A1-1 ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 2.1.25
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.2 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD RoD STAD SR00 EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.CH-0001 Rev. 30 (checked 9-25-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 8 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-3-14 Instructor Validated By: N Salam Date: 10-16-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: 0~~~~~ Date: f6- 2 7 ,......;'-( ini~-D~ment l()'l,J - ( ~( Approved By: (tv\o\; ') Date: res~tive ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 'I of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Chilled Water TASK: Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Chilled Water Loads TASK NUMBER: 0980020202 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power during a summer heat wave.
- 2. At 1300, 22 Chiller trips on freeze protection followed shortly by 21 chiller, and neither can be reset.
- 3. Technical Specification LCO 3. 7.1 O.a Action b.1. is in effect and non-essential heat loads need to be removed from the chilled water system.
- 4. Inlet Water Temperature Readings from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(Q), Circulating I Service Water Log at 0800:
2TL3756 = 73.4°F 2TL3757 = 73.5°F
- 5. Outside air temperature has risen from 81 oF to 99°F during this watch.
INITIATING CUE: Identify non-essential heat loads to be removed from service in order to comply with TS 3.7.10. a Action b.1. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion: Identify combination of heat loads which will remove at least 999.1 kBTU/hr from chilled water svstem. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Chilled Water Name: Task: Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads Date: STEP STEP NO. (*=Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT Evaluation)
Provide blank copies ofTS 3.7.10, Chilled Water System- Auxiliary Building Subsystem and S2.0P-SO.CH-0001(0), Chilled Water System Operation. SO.CH-1 IF two Chillers are inoperable, THEN 5.6.2 SELECT components for isolation lAW Attachment 2. Att 2 RECORD the following data for use in 1.0 Table A:
- 1.1 Inlet Water Temperature from Enters temperatures from cue SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(0), Circulating I sheet onto Attachment 2 form.
Service Water Log: Adds 1.5 deg. to highest temp (73.5) and enters 75.0 deg. 2TL3756=- - °F 2TL3757= OF
- Lists 2 chillers out of service.
From the above indicated 2TL3756/2TL3757 temperatures, RECORD the highest temperature AND ADD 1.5°F to account for instrument uncertainty. Utilize this temperature I when referring to Table A OF+ 1.5°F = OF (highest temp) 1.2 Number of inoperable Chiller Units:_ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Chilled Water Name: Task: Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads Date: STEP STEP NO. (* = Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT Evaluation) I Att 2 Conservative decision making should NOTE be used when determining the Based on the rise in outside air appropriate non-essential heat loads to temperature between the 0800 be isolated. If inlet water temperature is inlet temperature reading and anticipated to exceed the selected inlet now (1300), and that the 75°F water temperature values, then heat temp used for calculation is right loads should be removed for the next at the limit to go up one category, higher inlet water temperature values. determines heat loads for inlet temp > 75°F should be used.
- 2.0 RECORD the TOTAL HEAT LOAD Enters 999.1 kBTU/hr.
ISOLATION from Table A: kBTU/hr 3.0 IDENTIFY the components to be isolated in Table B as follows: 3.1 RECORD the value from the HEAT Records values from HEAT LOAD
~
LOAD column into the Isolation column into Isolation column in Table B for the components selected for for following components: isolation. Any combination of components may be selected as long as the total heat load selected is > 999.1
~
kBTU/hr. I
- 4.0 ADD the values recorded in the Adds values in ISOLATION Isolation column AND RECORD the column. Verifies total is greater Total Isolation value in Table B that 999.1 kBTU/hr.
PSEG Restricted -Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8 I
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Chilled Water Name: Task: Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads Date: STEP STEP NO. (* =Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT Evaluation) 5.0 ENSURE that the Total Isolation value Verifies Total Isolation value I recorded in Table B is;::: the Total Heat recorded in Table B is;::: the Total Load Isolation recorded in Step 2.0 of Heat Load Isolation recorded in this attachment. Step 2.0 of this attachment. II Terminate JPM when procedure I SO.CH-0001(0), Chilled Water System Operation is returned to
'-- -~ evaluator. f PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
f>OJ<"' In.\" n +wn c> lJ
\0/"b\ ;, ~ ;J-
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _V'It\_*_ _ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. __Vi_~-- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. __Yvt __ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) __"(VA. __ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. _ _V'I-\_* __ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. W1 ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. __W_~_ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
--~-- 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM ma that procedure: Procedure Rev . .3Q__ Date -=5~,""+~..J:...L_-
jq
----'Y}A..L--1&1_ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate. @... 8 '.Mir'\
NIP.. 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _N_)-A __ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. ~tructor: ~ _ __ _ _ _ L!:._ _ _ __~
"5 __.~ Date: _lo_/_Jb--=-/_li4_ _
SME/Instructor: Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- 2. Control Room ventilation is aligned in the Maintenance Mode with Unit 1 EACS 0/S and unavailable.
- 3. 22 Chiller trips on freeze protection and cannot be reset.
- 4. Technical Specification LCO 3. 7.1 O.a Action a.1. is in effect and non-essential heat loads need to be removed from the chilled water system.
- 5. Inlet Water Temperature Readings from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(0), Circulating I Service Water Log:
2TL3756 = 73.4°F 2TL3757 = 74.0°F INITIATING CUE: Identify non-essential heat loads to be removed from service in order to comply with TS 3.7.1 0. a Action a.1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Administrative- Review Calculations that Determine Plant Status TASK: Review a QPTR TASK NUMBER: N1200170105 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC SRO Admin A1-2 ALTERNATE PATH: I I KIA NUMBER: 2.1.18
--------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.8 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO Eoc:J Roc:J STAD SRO[K] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002 Rev. 15 All rev checked 9-24-14 S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011 Rev. 383 Tech Spec 3.2.4 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 30 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-24-14 Instructor Validated By: N Salam Date: 10-16-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: Training Department Approved By: Date: Facility Representative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ------------------------ DATE: ------------------------ SYSTEM: Administrative- Review Calculations that Determine Plant Status TASK: Review a QPTR TASK NUMBER: N1200170105 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when rod 2D4 dropped fully into the core. OHA E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR annunciated and remains locked in. Operators have not yet started reducing power to 74% to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d lAW S1.0P-AB.ROD-002, Dropped Rod. INITIATING CUE: Review the completed S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002, Power Distribution- Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio for completeness and accuracy. Note any discrepancies, if any, and required actions, if any, on Attachment 4. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Review the QPTR and determine it has been performed correctly, with SAT results.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK" Review a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation) Provide Candidate with completed copy of S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002, Rev. 15, Power Distribution - Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, a copy of S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Rev. 383, Tables, and a copy of Tech Spec 3.2.4. 2.1 IDENTIFY sections of this procedure that are Verifies proper section of procedure used and NOT to be performed with "N/A". Section 5.2, Attachment 1 Section 3.0, and Attachment 3 are N/A. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS Verifies PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1-3.5 initialed. 5.1.1 IF one PR channel is inoperable, AND RTP is Verifies all PR channel are operable and step is
>75%, THEN ... marked NA.
5.1.2 RECORD the following data on Attachment 2
- Date Verifies current date, current time, 100% reactor
- Time power and that OHA E-46 as reason for
- Reactor Power performance in Attachment 2 is checked
- Reason for performing QPTR Calculation PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK* Review a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation) 5.1.3 RECORD the following data on Attachment 1:
- Nl Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44 Verifies data completed on Attachment 1:
Upper Detector current readings
- Nl channels N41-44 Upper Detector
- Nl Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44 Current Readings Lower Detector current readings
- Nl channels N41-44 Lower Detector
- Respective 100% Nl Current Values for Current Readings Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44
- 100% Nl Current Values from S1.RE-Detectors from S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Table RA.ZZ-0011, TABLES 2
Note: Attachment 1, Section 3 was NOT required to be performed to determine detector currents. It was added at Rev. 12 to use "when any NIS meter is suspect." If asked, Cue that all Power Range Detectors are/were Operable.
- 5.1.4 COMPLETE Attachment 1 calculations. Verifies calculations for Top and Bottom Detectors Verifies IV is complete.
- 5.1.7 lEthe Maximum Power Tilt for any detector Determines no power tilt exceeds 1.02.
exceeds 1.02, THEN REFER to T/S 3.2.4 for corrective actions.
- 5.3.1 This surveillance is satisfactory when Attachment 2 or 3 is completed with the Test Data meeting the Acceptance Criteria stated. Determines surveillance is SAT.
--* **- - - - - -~
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK* Review a QPTR STEP COMMENTS
- STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT evaluation)
- 5.4.1 COMPLETE Attachment 4, Sections 1.0 and Completes Attachment 4, Section 3.
2.0, AND FORWARD completed procedure to SM/CRS for review. JPM is terminated when candidate returns all JPM paperwork to evaluator. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of7
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 Revision 4 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ____ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ____ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _ _ Date _ _ _ _ __ ____ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: Date: _ _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of7
INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when rod 1D3 dropped fully into the core. OHA E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR annunciated and remains locked in. Operators have not yet started reducing power to 74% to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d lAW S1.0P-AB.ROD-002, Dropped Rod. INITIATING CUE: Review the completed S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002, Power Distribution- Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio for completeness and accuracy. Note any discrepancies, if any, and required actions, if any, on Attachment 4. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (TAGGING) TASK: Review a Tagging List for correct blocking points TASK NUMBER: 1220050302 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC SRO Admin A2 ALTERNATE PATH: I X I ~ANUMBER: ------~2=.2~.1~3------~ IMPORTANCE FACTOR: - - - - - - 4.3 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD RoD STAD SRO[KJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Perform (In-Plant or Classroom) OP-AA-109 Rev. 2, Safety Tagging Program
REFERENCES:
OP-AA-109-115 Rev. 7, Safety Tagging Operations P&IDs 205334-2 (Rev. 55), 203061-1 (Rev. 34), 205334-1 (Rev. 60) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 35 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-18-14 Instructor Validated By: N Salam Date: 10-16-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: f~r~inQo~ment
~ (J_,._,__, Gvrt~ i Date: JO-?.. 1-/~
{U~~)'l~ Approved By: V vvf\/ Operations Upa~t (V\.Ct) Date: ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (TAGGING) TASK: Review a Tagging List for correct blocking points TASK NUMBER: 1220050302 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- 2. A small leak has developed on an instrument connection for 21 Sl Pump. The leak location is just upstream of 21SJ92, Sl PUMP DISCH PRESS TAP.
- 3. No other ECCS-related technical specification action statements are in effect.
INITIATING CUE: You are an extra SRO on shift. A newly licensed NCO has asked you to review this Tagging List for your input. You are NOT the Approving Supervisor. If there is any enhancement or correction required to WCD, record it on your Tear-Off Sheet. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within valiaated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Identify improper blocking points of:
- a. 2SJ30 which should be 21 SJ33
- b. 21 SJ64 check valve as boundary, should be 21 SJ65
- c. 21 and 22SJ113 not included in WCD.
Page 2 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (TAGGING) TASK: Review a Tagging List for correct blocking points COMMENTS STEP STEP EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U evaluation}
Prove candidate with 'Tear-off Sheet" Tagging Request, and marked up drawings. START TIME: Provide a copy of OP-AA-109 Rev. 2, 1 Refers to OP-AA-109 Rev. 2, Safety Tagging Program and OP-AA-109-115 Safety Tagging Program and OP-AA-109-Rev. 7, Safety Tagging Operations, as 115 Rev. 7, Safety Tagging Operations if necessary. requested. 2 Reviews tagging request against P&ID Notes that: blocking points.
- 1. 2SJ30, RWST to Sl Pump Stop Valve, is listed as a blocking point.
Closing 2SJ30 would render both 21 and 22 Sl Pumps inoperable. The proper blocking point should be 21SJ33 instead of 2SJ30.
- 2 (cant) 2. 21 Sl pump Recirculation Line is not isolated from a potential energy source. Check valves are NOT relied upon for personnel protection.
Isolation valve 21SJ65 should be tagged in the closed position. l' l I Page 3 of 6 l
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (TAGGING) TASK: Review a Tagging List for correct blocking points COMMENTS STEP STEP EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- I 2 (cant) 3. ECCS cross-connect line going I I from pump suction to the 21 SJ113 and 22SJ113 is not tagged.
i NOTE: These valves are located on a different print that has NOT been provided to the candidate. The candidate may request drawing 205334 Sheet 1 to determine which valves need to be added OR the applicant may state the 21/22SJ113s from memory. I
- 2 (cant) 4. Returns Tagging Request to WCC, with changes requested.
NOTE: If candidate identifies vent or drain valves as required for maintenance, these valves could be tagged (not incorrect), but are not required for a full correct answer. Terminate JPM when tear off sheet, procedures, and drawings are returned. STOP TIME: L____
~- -
Terminating Cue: Page 4 of6
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _WI}.J....!..... __ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. __'tfv __ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
-~.!...* __ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) --~-- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. --~-- 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
__'M __ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. Y'v 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). DW6 2cf33i.{- \ 2o36bl
~
reVISIOn of
- 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM mqtcAhes 7 b ~
the1fb~st'current_AA-t6t1-/ I '1-j e> p
/l::"'
- /
that procedure: Procedure Rev. '2. Date St..U~e 27, z.or3 - OP-J.lA-1 t:>~ __'ltJ __ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
N\t:f' _ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
~'~
____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. 8nstructor: __ ~+--. __~______
--=!:;12 Date: _)_o.,_}t_t..._}l_'{_ _
SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - Page 5 of 6
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- 2. A small leak has developed on an instrument connection for 21 Sl Pump. The leak location is just upstream of 21SJ92, Sl PUMP DISCH PRESS TAP.
- 3. No other ECCS-related technical specification action statements are in effect.
INITIATING CUE: You are an extra SRO on shift. A newly licensed NCO has asked you to review this Tagging List for your input. You are NOT the Approving Supervisor. If there is any enhancement or correction required to WCD, record it on your Tear-Off Sheet. Page 6 of 6
OPERATORTRAniTNGPROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Waste Gas TASK: Authorize a Radioactive Gas Release Form TASK NUMBER: N1120650302 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC SRO Admin A3 ALTERNATE PATH: I X I ~ANUMBER: --------=2-~3~.6______~ IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.8 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD RoD STAD SRO [ ] ] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
S1.0P-SO.WG-0010 Rev. 31 (Rev checked 9/22/14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 20 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-22-14 Instructor Validated By: N Salam Date: 10-16-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: Training Departmenrt Approved By: Date: Operations Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Waste Gas TASK: Authorize a Radioactive Gas Release Form TASK NUMBER: N 1120650302 INITIAL CONDITIONS: 13 GOT is in holdup in preparation for performing a gas release. Chemistry has performed all required sampling and authorized the gas release. The release procedure, S1.0P-SO.WG-001 0, Discharge of 13 Gas Decay Tank to Plant Vent has just been handed to you by the Unit 1 PO, who informs you the release is ready for CRS approval. INITIATING CUE: Review the entire S1.0P-SO.WG-001 0 procedure for completeness, accuracy, and release approval. Approve the release or provide justification for NOT approving the release, and also note any discrepancies found in the procedure, in the comments section of the procedure. Note to Evaluator: A cue directing the performer to review the entire procedure is embedded several places in body of JPM, based on previous pefformance of this JPM where an operator will find the first flaw and discontinue reviewing the remainder of the procedure. If required, stress during initiating cue that the entire procedure is to be reviewed. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Review Gas Release and identify.that:
- a. Pre-release verification has not been performed at step 5.2.8
- b. Attachment 2, Step 4.1, second bullet, calculated Maximum Allowable Release rate from Section 3.4 has been entered as 32 SCFM instead of the correct value of 100 scfm.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Authorize a Radioactive Gas Release Form
- STEP NO. STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
(*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) Provide marked up S1.0P-SO.WG-0010 to operator. Operator reviews procedure. Possible Cue Required: On page 17, the Estimated Total Volume of Waste Gas to be released is entered by Chemistry during performance of Attachment 2, section 3.0, DOSE, VOLUME ESTIMATES AND APPROVAL. IF a candidate requests the Release Permit, or questions the estimated release volume or ANY aspect of Section 3.0, THEN provide the following cue: Cue: The data provided in Section 3 of Attachment 2 can be assumed to be correct.
- The first error in the procedure is that the performance of the pre-release valve position verification in Attachment 1, has not been performed at step 5.2.8., prior to the procedure being given to the CRS for release approval.
Possible Cue Required: If candidate identifies that Step 5.2.8 has not been performed and does not go any further to see if the rest of the procedure is correct, then a cue stating that the candidate needs to review the entire procedure will need to be given. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Authorize a Radioactive Gas Release Form
- STEP NO. STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
(*Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
- The second error is that the release rate which was calculated as 100 scfm and entered on Att. 2 page 2 of 6, Step 3.4 second bullet, has been incorrectly entered as 32 scfm on Att. 2, page 4 of 6, step 4.1 1st bullet. (The release rate entered here must be
>32 scfm in order to sign off the next bullet).
Possible Cue Required: If candidate identifies that the release rate has been entered incorrectly and does not go any further to see if the rest of the procedure is correct, then a cue stating that the candidate needs to review the entire procedure will need to be given. Operator identifies and records When operator records discrepancies and has discrepancies. reviewed the entire procedure, then terminate JPM. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ____ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ____ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _ _ Date _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor:, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 6
INITIAL CONDITIONS: 13 GOT is in holdup in preparation for performing a gas release. Chemistry has performed all required sampling and authorized the gas release. The release procedure, S1.0P-SO.WG-0010, Discharge of 13 Gas Decay Tank to Plant Vent has just been handed to you by the Unit 1 PO, who informs you the release is ready for CRS approval. INITIATING CUE: Review the entire S1.0P-SO.WG-0010 procedure for completeness, accuracy, and release approval. Approve the release or provide justification for NOT approving the release, and also note any discrepancies found in the procedure, in the comments section of the procedure. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 6
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Classify Emergency/Non-Emergency Events - Make a General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation TASK NUMBER: N1240010502 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC SRO Admin A4 ALTERNATE PATH: IL...-___.1 KIA NUMBER: 2.4.44
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: - - - - - 4.4 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoCJ ROC] STACJ SRO[ZJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
Salem ECG TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: '10 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 15 minutes Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-19-14 Instructor Validated By: N Salam Date: 10-16-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: ~-~ Ctprnf17 Date:
~ningo;iartment Approved By: ~* (\v\D6J Date:
Operation~pre~tative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Classify Emergency/Non-Emergency Events - Make a General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation TASK NUMBER: N1240010502 INITIAL CONDITIONS: A severe accident has occurred at Salem Unit 2 You have declared a 13 point General Emergency in the Control Room at 1535 hrs for loss of all three fission product barriers under EAL's FB3.L, RB2.L, and CB.1.L The weather conditions are as follows:
- Wind direction is from 050 degrees at 15 mph.
- Overcast skies with rain showers.
- Ambient temp = 62°F
- 2R41 D is reading 2.5 E3 uCi/sec INITIATING CUE:
Continue performing the provided Salem ECG Attachment 4, General Emergency. I am the Primary Communicator. This is a time critical JPM. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Determine correct PAR.
- 2. Complete ICMF within 15 minutes.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Administrative Name: Task: Classify Emergency/Non-Emergency Events - Make a General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation STEP STEP NO. (* =Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT I Evaluation) i I '
Provide marked up EP-SA-111-F4, Attachment 4, General Emergency, and I a blank copy of EP-SA-111-102, Salem Emergency Classification Description Table. Att.4 CAUTION B A Protective Action Recommendation *i (PAR) SHALL be made on the Initial Contact Message Form (ICMF). I Att. 4 MAKE a PAR as follows: B.2
- a. REFER to Predetermined PAR Refers to Predetermined PAR Flowchart on Pg. 3 and Flowchart on Pg. 3 and determines DETERMINE the appropriate the appropriate PAR is to:
PAR. Evacuate All sectors 0-5 miles,
- Evacuate downwind sectors +/-
1 sector. SSW, SW, WSW 5-10 MILES (Shelter) All remaining sectors. Note: Wind is from 050 (NE), and the +/-1 sector is included in sectors for NE wind direction. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Administrative Name: Task: Classify Emergency/Non-Emergency Events - Make a General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation STEP STEP NO. (*=Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT Evaluation)
Att.4 b. lE_a Radiological Based PAR is Cue: A radiological PAR is not B.2 IMMEDIATELY available, THEN immediately available. COMPARE the two PARs and CHOOSE the most appropriate for I inclusion on the ICMF. Att. 4 COMPLETE/APPROVE the ICMF (last Completes the GE ICMF by filling B.3 page of this attachment). in:
- Name
- Checking "Control Room"
- Time/Date
- EALs FB3.L, RB2.L, and CB.1.L
- Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier, Loss of the Reactor Coolant System
- Barrier, Loss of the Containment Barrier
- NOT checking Box lib for PAR Upgrade.
- Checking no radiological release in progress based on 2R41 D reading
- Filling in Section V with conditions determined in 8.2 above.
- Initialing the ICMF PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8 t'
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: Administrative Name: Task: Classify Emergency/Non-Emergency Events - Make a General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation STEP STEP NO. (* =Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS
- STANDARD S/U (Req'd for UNSAT Evaluation)
Att. 4 IF time allows, OBTAIN an accuracy Cue: A peer check will not be 8.4 peer check of the completed ICMF. provided. Att. 4 PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Provides ICMF to evaluator. 8.5 Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement EGG Attachment 6. State JPM is complete, and mark Stop Time: I I ___ j_ ----- ---- ----*-- ---- --- -- ----*- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _W:...._1__ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. _ _,_f/1 __ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. _'tf\ ___ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
~
_~ ___ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
\V\
____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). __'M __ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matphe~ the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _I_ Date lD[LYjl1l \k ____ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. @Instructor: _ __,__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ '-I_ _ Date: _to{_._l__,'-/'--1 SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: A severe accident has occurred at Salem Unit 2 You have declared a 13 point General Emergency in the Control Room at 1535 hrs for loss of all three fission product barriers under EAL's FB3.L, RB2.L, and CB.1.L The weather conditions are as follows:
- Wind direction is from 050 degrees at 15 mph.
- Overcast skies with rain showers.
* =
Ambient temp 62°F
- 2R41 D is reading 2.5 E3 uCi!sec INITIATING CUE:
Continue performing the provided Salem ECG Attachment 4, General Emergency. I am the Primary Communicator This is a time critical JPM. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM 1 & 2 SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test TASK NUMBER: N0040430201 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim a ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: 004 A4.18
------~----~----~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.3 4.4 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOCJ RO[ZJ STACJ SRO[ZJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator- Perform
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-ST.CVC-0011, Rev. 7 (checked 10-7-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 8 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: D Tait Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor ia~epa~::7 0 ~ 2 7-11/ Approved By: Date: I Approved By: ~/ (~\\'JG\ Date: Operations DBartm~ ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test TASK NUMBER: N0040430201 SIMULATOR SETUP: IC-251 MODE3 ET-1 KB127PNB 2CV175 open pushbutton-OPEN ET-3 KB127TCB 2CV175 close PB(deletes B128) 1/0 OVAO B128 2FI-113A Rapid Borate Flow Initial 0 Final 33 Ramp 6 seconds Tied to ET-1 MALF: VL0095 2CV175 fails to 0% open ties to ET-3 with 11 sec TD. (This prevents reopening valve after it is shut after originaiiO is deleted when 2CV175 close PB is depressed. INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 is in MODE 3 @ NOP, NOT INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Perform S2.0P-ST.CVC-0011, Boration Flow Rate Test Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Complete S2.0P-ST.CVC-0011 and determine 2CV172 test is SAT and 2CV175 test is UNSAT.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ----------------- SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK* Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (Required for UNSAT (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
I' Provide marked up copy of S2.0P-ST.CVC-0011, Boration Flow Rate Test. i 2.1 IDENTIFY sections of this procedure that Determines all sections are to be performed. are not required to be performed with "N/A". 2.2 REVIEW Components "Off Normal and Determines from initial conditions that Off Normal Tagged" List(s) for system Components "Off Normal and Off-Normal and support system(s) associated with Tagged" List(s) review has been performed evolution to be performed in this SAT. procedure. 2.3 ENSURE one of the following:
- The Reactor is in Modes 3-6, or Determines the Reactor is in Mode 3.
Defueled. OR
- The procedure may be performed for Refueling Outages in Modes 1 and 2 provided the rapid boration is started immediately prior to the Reactor Trip.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK* Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) i 2.4 ENSURE the Charging System is in Determines Charging System is in service.
service lAW S2.0P-SO.CVC-0001(Q), Charging, Letdown, and Seal Injection. I 2.5 ENSURE calibration data for the Determines calibration data for the f instruments listed in Attachment 1, as instruments listed in Attachment 1 has been applicable, is obtained. obtained. 3.1 Steps identified with dollar signs ($) are Reads and initials step. those items required to meet Technical Specification acceptance criteria. Such steps, if not satisfactorily completed, may have reportability requirements and shall be brought to the immediate *attention of the SM/CRS. 3.2 Due to system limitations, boron addition Reads and initials step. rate is essentially the same whether one or both Boric Acid Transfer Pumps are operating. I 3.3 Allow 2CV175, RAPID BORATE STOP Reads and initials step. VALVE, to full stroke prior to reversing direction. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 10 J I
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) 3.4 The .:::_36 gpm Boric Acid Flow value Reads and initials step.
specified throughout this procedure satisfies the 33 gpm requirement of Technical Specification 4.1.2.2.d plus 3 gpm for instrument uncertainty associated with instrument loops 2FT11 0 and 2FT1131AW PR#971016106.
- 5.1.1 SELECT MAKEUP CONTROL MODE Selects MAKEUP CONTROL MODE SELECT, STOP. SELECT, STOP.
- 5.1.2 SELECT 2CV172, BA FLOW CONTROL Selects 2CV172, BA FLOW CONTROL TO TO BLENDER, MANUAL. BLENDER, MANUAL.
5.1.3 OPEN 2CV172. Determines 2CV172 is open. 5.1.4 On the in service Boric Acid Pump: On the in service Boric Acid Pump selects A. SELECT MANUAL. MANUAL, then FAST START.
- B. SELECT FAST START.
- 5.1.5 SELECT2CV185,MAKEUP Selects 2CV185, MAKEUP FLOWPATH, FLOWPATH, MANUAL. ---- -
MANUAL. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) i
- 5.1.6 OPEN 2CV185 Opens 2CV185.
5.1.7 CLOSE 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE. Closes 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE. 5.1.8 CLOSE 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE. Closes 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE.
- 5.1.9 RECORD test results in Attachment 1, Initials SAT after verifying 2FI11 OA indicates Section 2.0. ~ 36 gpm.
5.1.10 On the in service Boric Acid Pump, Selects SLOW START on in service Boric SELECT SLOW START. Acid Pump.
- 5.1.11 CLOSE 2CV185 Closes 2CV185. I 5.1.12 PRESS the following RECIRC VLV OPEN (INC FLOW) pushbuttons until the valves are sufficiently OPEN to support BAST level control: Throttles open:
A. 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE A. 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE B. 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE B. 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 10
~
f OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _________________ i JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ f SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control I~ TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation}
'I
- 5.1.13 PLACE the following valves in AUTO: Places 2CV185 and 2CV172 in AUTO.
- 2CV185
- 2CV172
- 5.2.1 On the in service Boric Acid Pump: On the in service Boric Acid Pump selects C. SELECT MANUAL. MANUAL, then FAST START.
D. SELECT FAST START.
- 5.2.2 OPEN 2CV175, RAPID BORATE STOP Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-1 is TRUE VALVE. when 2CV175 OPEN PB is depressed.
This inserts the 33 gpm rapid borate flow on 2FI113A. Opens 2CV175, RAPID BORATE STOP VALVE. 5.2.3 CLOSE 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE. Closes 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE. 5.2.4 CLOSE 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE. Closes 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE.
- 5.2.5 RECORD test results in Attaqhment 1, Initial UNSAT for 2FI113A flow.
Section 3.0. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 10
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control TASK: Perform a Boration Flow Capability to the RCS Surveillance Test STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- 5.2.6 On the in service Boric Acid Pump, Selects SLOW START on in service Boric SELECT SLOW START. Acid Pump.
- 5.2.7 CLOSE 2CV175, RAPID BORATE STOP Closes 2CV175, RAPID BORATE STOP VALVE. VALVE.
5.2.8 PRESS the following RECIRC VLV OPEN (INC FLOW) pushbuttons until the valves are sufficiently OPEN to support BAST level control: Throttles open: A. 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE A. 21CV160, RECIRC VALVE B. 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE B. 22CV160, RECIRC VALVE Terminate JPM when 21 and 22CV160 have been throttled open. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 10 I
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. __0__ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. _Q--=---_ _ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. --'Q""'"====-- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) _C-=d_-,_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. _Q......,___ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
- 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*).
__.9.__ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches t{le most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _:r_ Date f o ( r ("I ( '-1 (J,- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 9 of 10
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- Unit 2 is in MODE 3 @ NOP, NOT INITIATING CUE:
You are the Reactor Operator. Perform S2.0P-ST.CVC-0011, Boration Flow Rate Test PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 10 of 10
TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Perform Actions For A Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation TASK NUMBER: 1150030501 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim b ALTERNATE PATH: I X I ~ANUMBER: ----~E=0~1~1~E=A~1~.1~1----~ IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.2 4.2 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD Ro[D STAD SRO[D EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator
REFERENCES:
2-EOP-LOCA-3 Rev. 29 (Rev. checked 10-7-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: D Tait Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: Training Department Approved By: Date: Operations Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 1 of 9
TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emerqencv Operatinq Procedures TASK: Perform Actions For A Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation TASK NUMBER: 1150100501 SIMULATOR SETUP: IC- 252 MALF: VL0121 22SJ44 fails to 0% open REMOTES: SW27D 22 SW pump control power OFF SW43D 26 SW pump control power OFF 1/0: A908 OVDI 24 SW pump start PB OFF A909 OVDI 25 SW pump start PB OFF A403 OVDI 22 CS pump stop PB OFF A614 OVAO 22 CCHX Outlet Temperature 200
- Place Bezel Cover on 22 SW pump INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- A LBLOCA has occurred on 22 RC Loop.
- All Vital Buses are energized from off-site power.
- Operators are performing actions in 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant.
- 22 SW pump is CIT.
- 26 SW pump tripped 2 minutes ago.
- RWST lo level alarm has just annunciated.
INITIATING CUE: You are the RO. Perform 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, beginning with Step 1. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
~ 1. Transfer to CL recirc with single train operation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 2 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal TASK: Align RHR Suction to Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
START TIME: 1 Do not implement any FRPs until directed Reads step. by this EOP. 2 Is "Cont Sump Ch A( B) Level >62%" lit Checks Cont Sump Ch A( B) Level >62% lights and answers YES.
- 3 Depress "SUMP AUTO ARMED" Depresses "SUMP AUTO ARMED" pushbuttons on 21 and 22 SJ44 bezels pushbuttons on 21 and 22 SJ44 bezels.
- 4 Remove lockouts for the following: Rotates lockout switches on 2RP4 to the VALVE OPERABLE position for:
- 2SJ67 (SI Pumps Miniflow)
- 2SJ68 (SI Pumps Miniflow)
- 2SJ67 (SI Pumps Miniflow)
- 2SJ69 (Common Suction)
- 2SJ68 (SI Pumps Miniflow)
- 2SJ69 (Common Suction) 5 Are 21 and 22 SJ44 (Sump Valves) Determines Sump Valve 21 SJ44 is open open? and Sump Valve 22SJ44 is shut.
5.1 Reset Sl Determines Sl is reset. 5.1 Reset Emergency Loading for each SEC Determines Emergency Loading for each SEC is reset. 5.2 Is 21SJ44 open Determines 21 SJ44 is open.
- 5.2 Stop 22 RHR pump Depresses stop PB for 22 RHR pump.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 3 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal TASK: Align RHR Suction to Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- 5.2 Close 2SJ69 (Common Suction) Depresses close PB for Close 2SJ69 (Common Suction) and verifies green close light illuminates.
5.2 Start 21 RHR pump. Determines 21 RHR pump is running. 5.2 Initiate close on 22RH4 (Pump Suction) Depresses close PB for 22RH4 (Pump and continue. Suction) and continues. 5.2 Initiate open on 22SJ44 and continue. Depresses open PB for 22SJ44 and continues. 5.3 When 22SJ44 opens, Then start 22 RHR Does not start 22 RHR pump pump. Note: 22SJ44 will not open. 6 !E Blackout loading occurs on any vital Reads step. bus after Sl reset, then perform actions per Table A. 7 Reset Sl Determines Sl is reset on Trains A and B. Reset Emergency loading for each SEC. Determines Emergency Loading is Reset for each SEC. Are ill! SECs reset? Determines all SECs are reset. Reset 230V control centers. Determines all 230V control centers are reset. 8 Are both CS pumps running Determines both CS pumps are running. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 4 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal TASK: Align RHR Suction to Containment Sump I STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Stop 22 CS pump Depresses stop PB for 22 CS pump and determines pump does not stop. Note: May dispatch an operator to locally open or standby to open 22 CS pump breaker. Is 22 CS pump stopped Determines 22 CS pump is not stopped.
- Stop 21 CS pump Depresses stop PB for 21 CS pump and Determines pump has stopped.
- 9 Close 21 and 22RH19 (RHR HX Disch x- Depresses close PB for 21 and 22RH19 conn valves) (RHR HX Disch x-conn valves) and verifies shut lights illuminate.
Stop 23 charging pump Depresses stop PB for 23 charging pump and verifies it stops. 10 Select appropriate flowpath transition Selects flowpath transition step 11 with all step from Table B vital buses energized. Go to selected step Goes to Step 11. 11 Is Any 4KV vital bus energized by DG Determines no 4KV vital bus energized by DG. 11.1 Are at least three SW pumps running Determines only 2 SW pumps are running. Note: If operator attempts to start 24 or 25 SW pumps they will not start.
- Stop 2 CFCUs Depresses stop PBs for 2 running CFCUs and verifies they stop.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 5 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal TASK: Align RHR Suction to Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Go to Step 118 Goes to Step 118.
- 118 Stop the following pumps: Depresses stop PBs for:
- 22 Sl pump
- 22 Sl pump
- 21 Charging pump
- 21 Charging pump
- 22 AFW pump
- 22 AFW pump and verifies they stop.
Note: If SG lo lvl is present 22 AFW pp will not stop. Is 22 CCW HX in service Determines that 22 CCW HX is not available, nor being returned to service, based on high temperature on 2CC2. (Temp is -196°F) Open 21 CC16 (CC Supply to RHR HX Determines 21 CC16 (CC Supply to RHR Valve) HX Valve) is open. Start 21 RHR pump Determines 21 RHR pump is in service Stop 22 RHR pump Determines 22 RHR pump is stopped. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 6 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal TASK: Align RHR Suction to Containment Sump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD evaluation)
S/U
- Close 22CC16 (CC Supply to RHR HX Depresses 22CC16 (CC Supply to RHR HX Valve) Valve) close PB and verifies it shuts.
Close 2SJ68 and 2SJ67(SI Pumps Depresses close PB for Close 2SJ68 and Miniflow Valves) 2SJ67(SI Pumps Miniflow Valves) and verifies they shut. Close 2RH1 AND 2RH2 (Common Determines 2RH1 AND 2RH2 (Common Suction Valves) Suction Valves) are shut. 119 Is 21 RHR pump running Determines 21 RHR pump is running. 120 Open 21 SJ45 (RHR Discharge to Sl Depresses open PB for 21 SJ45 (RHR pump valve) Discharge to Sl pump valve) and verifies it opens. Terminate JPM PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 7 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ____ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ____ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _ _ Date _ _ _ _ __ ____ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 8 of 9
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- A LBLOCA has occurred on 22 RC Loop.
- All Vital Buses are energized from off-site power.
- Operators are performing actions in 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant.
- 22 SW pump is CIT.
- 26 SW pump tripped 2 minutes ago.
- RWST lo level alarm has just annunciated.
INITIATING CUE: You are the RO. Perform 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, beginning with Step 1. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training 9 of 9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) TASK NUMBER: N1140240401 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim c ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: APE 027 AA1.01
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.0 3.9 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EO C ) ROIT] STAC) SROITJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator- Perform S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Rev.11 Reactor Coolant System Leak(revchecked 10-7-14) S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001 ,Rev. 18 Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (rev checked 10-
REFERENCES:
7-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 4 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: NA Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: D Tait Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: M r~ {~HI/! Date: Approved By:
~~~-~p.artm~e-~~C\ 1 Date:
Operation .* epart t ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: TASK: N1140240401 TASK NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: The unit is operating in a steady state condition at 100% power with all systems in automatic. SIMULATOR SETUP: IC-253 The simulator setup is: RT-1 MALF: PR0018B 2PR2 Develops Leak Severity: 5000
- Ensure a centrifugal charging pump is in service.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Determine that 2PR2 PZR PORV is leaking and close 2PR7 Block Valve.
Page 2 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: --------------------- SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) Simulator Operator: Insert RT-1 Operator either: Identifies PORV tailpipe temperature has risen from normal to -22rF OR Identifies rising charging flow THEN enters S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant system Leak or S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary. Action Summary. AB.RC Note: CAS Item 3.0 directs entry into S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer 3.1 Pressure Malfunction. When PORV leakage is identified, operator initiates S2. OP-AB. PZR-000 1. Page 3 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _____________________ SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) STEP COMMENTS STEP NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) I 3.2 3.8 Is RCS temperature <350°F? (Mode 4, 5, or 6 LOCA) Is the Unit in Mode 3 after the accumulators are isolated? Answers NO an<;l goes to Step 3.8 (Mode 1, 2, or 3 LOCA) Answers NO and goes to Step 3.12 (Mode 1, 2 or 3 RCS LEAK) Il Is PZR level being maintained stable or Answers YES and goes to Step 3.18 rising? 3.12 Note: If operator is unsure if PZR level is lowering, then they may adjust charging flow to stabilize PZL level. PLACE CVC Makeup Control System in Operator determines Makeup Control 3.18 service as necessary to control VCT System is in automatic. level. INITIATE S2.0P-ST.RC-0008(Q), 3.19 Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Cue: A second operator will initiate the Balance. RCS Water Inventory Balance. IF recommended by Rad Pro OR desired Determines no recommendation by to reduce containment radiation levels Rad Pro has been made, and 3.20 containment pressure has remained THEN PLACE 2 CFCUs in slow speed AND 2 CFCUs in fast speed. stable. PERFORM the following to identify 3.21 location of leak: Page 4 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) INITIATE actions to locate and isolate the Initiates actions to locate and isolate 3.21.1 leak lAW Attachment 2, Guidelines for the leak lAW Attachment 2, Locating An RCS Leak. Guidelines for Locating An RCS Leak. MONITOR indicators on the left side of Monitors indicators on the left side of Att. 2 Table 1 for high or rising readings. Table 1 for high or rising readings, 1.0 and determines PORV tailpipe temperature is elevated. IF AT ANY TIME, the leak is determined Determines leak is from a PZR PORV, to be from a PORV, OR a Pressurizer and initiates S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001 (Q), CAS 3.0 Code Safety Valve, THEN INITIATE Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001(Q), Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. AB.PZR INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary. Action Summary. 3.1 3.2 Is POPS in service? Determines POPS is not in service. Is the controlling Pressurizer Pressure Determines the controlling Pressurizer 3.3 Control Channel (I or Ill) failed? Pressure Control Channel (I or Ill) has not failed, and goes to Step 3.11. Is the Master Pressure Controller failed? Determines the Master Pressure 3.11 (Refer to Attachment 2 for guidance) Controller has not failed, and goes to Step 3.17 Is a Spray Valve(s) failed? Determines a Spray Valve has not 3.17 (Refer to Attachment 2 for guidance) failed and goes to Step 3.39. Page 5 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: I DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) STEP COMMENTS STEP {*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL {Required for UNSAT ' NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 3.39 Is a PORV(s) failed? (Refer to Attachment 2 for guidance) Are PORV tailpipe temperatures Determines a PORV has not failed based on closed indication and goes to Step 3.46. Determines PORV tailpipe I 3.46 elevated? temperatures are elevated.
- CLOSE 2PR6 AND 2PR7, Pressurizer Closes 2PR6 AND 2PR7, Pressurizer 3.47 Relief Stop Valves. Relief Stop Valves.
IF PORV tailpipe temperature does_ NOT Determines PORV tailpipe lower sufficiently to allow a temperature temperatures are lowering sufficiently. 3.48 rise to be seen when the leaking PORV is unisolated, THEN: ...
- When pressure stabilizes, OPEN 2PR6, Determines pressure is stable, and 3.49 Pressurizer Relief Stop Valve. opens 2PR6, Pressurizer Relief Stop Valve.
Is tailpipe temperature rising? Determines tailpipe temp is not rising 3.50 and goes to Step 3.53.
- 3.53 OPEN 2PR7. Opens 2PR7.
Is tailpipe temperature rising? Determines tailpipe temperature 3.54 rising.
- 3.55 CLOSE 2PR7. Closes 2PR7.
Page 6 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Abnormal Operating Procedures TASK: TCAF PZR Pressure Malfunction (Isolate leaking PZR PORV) I STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) ! NOTIFY the SM/CRS to refer to Terminate JPM. Technical Specification 3.4.5 and the 3.56 Event Classification Guide for Primary Leakage. L___ _ _ - - - - - TERMINATING CUE: I Page 7 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training ~ l
~
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE TQ-AA-1 06-0303 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. Q 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. {) 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
~ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
-v-0
- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
- 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. Q 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). ~ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of Q ) that procedure: Procedure Rev. ~ ,, Date ,.. /t.r If tr ____ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor:~~ Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: Date: - - - - - - Page 8 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: The unit is operating in a steady state condition at 100% power with all systems in automatic. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Page 9 of 9 PSEG Restricted- Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM 1 & 2 SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink {Initiate Bleed and Feed with Sl pumps and Rx Head Vents) TASK NUMBER: N1150290501 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim d ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: EPE E05 EA 1.1
----~~~~~~--_,
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.1 4.0 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD Ro[K] STAD SRO[KJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator- Perform
REFERENCES:
2-EOP-FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev. 24 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 6 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: C Omlor Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: Training Department Approved By: Date: Operations Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: --------------------------- SYSTEM: Emerqencv Operatinq Procedures TASK: TCAF a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with Sl pumps and Rx Head Vents) TASK NUMBER: N1150290501 SIMULATOR SETUP: RX HEAD VENT KEYS ARE LOCATED IN SIM BOOTH IC-254 developed by: MSL rupture (10%)downstream of MSIVs. Fail all MSIVs open. All AFW pumps failed. Fail 2PR2 shut. 21 CVCS pp CIT. Performed TRIP-1 through Step 20. 22 CVCS pp tripped during TRIP-1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- Unit 2 initiated a Rx trip from 100% power in response to a Main Steam line break at the mixing bottle.
- An automatic Safety Injection initiated.
- The Main Turbine failed to trip automatically, and was manually tripped from the control console.
- MSLI failed, and all MSIV's remain open.
- All AFW flow has been lost.
- 21 charging pump is CIT.
- 22 charging pump tripped 3 minutes ago.
- EOP-TRIP-1 was performed and a transition to FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink was made at Step 20.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Perform FRHS-1 starting at Step 1. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Stop ALL RCPs.
- 2. Open 2PR1.
- 3. Open Rx Head Vent Valves 2RC40-2RC43.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: _________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with Sl pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Operator states he has the watch. 1 IS TOTAL AFW FLOW LESS THAN Determines it was not operator action which 22E04 LB/HR DUE TO OPERATOR caused total AFW flow to be less than 22E04 ACTIONS lb/hr. 2 IF AT LEAST ONE INTACT OR Recognizes ALL SGs are faulted. RUPTURED SG IS AVAILABLE, THEN DO NOT FEED A FAULTED SG 3 IS RCS PRESSURE GREATER THAN Checks RCS pressure on control console ANY INTACT OR RUPTURED SG and determines it is greater than all SG PRESSURE pressures checked on control console. 3.1 ARE RCS T-HOTS GREATER THAN Checks RCS Thot indication on control 350°F console and determines that RCS Thots are greater than 350°F. 4 IS 21 OR 22 CHARGING PUMP Determines neither 21 nor 22 charging pump AVAILABLE is available based on initial conditions and/or control console indications. GO TO STEP 23 Goes to Step 23. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with 51 pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD evaluation}
5/U 23 CAUTION TO ESTABLISH RCS HEAT REMOVAL Reads Step. BY RCS BLEED AND FEED, STEPS 24 THRU 29 MUST BE PERFORMED QUICKLY AND WITHOUT INTERRUPTION
- 23 STOP ALL RCPS Depresses STOP PB for 21-24 RCPs and '
verifies green stop light illuminates and red start light extinguishes. 24 INITIATE Sl Uses Safeguards key and initiates Sl on at least one train of Safeguards initiation. 25 ARE Sl VALVES IN SAFEGUARDS Checks 2RP4 and/or console indication to POSITION determine that all valves listed in Table B are in Safeguards position. Table B valves are: 2SJ4 OPEN BIT INLET 2SJ5 OPEN BIT INLET 2SJ12 OPEN BIT OUTLET 2SJ13 OPEN BIT OUTLET 2CV68 CLOSED CHARGING DISCHARGE 2CV69 CLOSED CHARGING DISCHARGE (continued next page) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with Sl pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Table B Valves (con't}: 21-24SJ54 OPEN ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 2SJ1 OPEN RWST TO CHARGING 2SJ2 OPEN RWST TO CHARGING - 2CV40 CLOSED DISCHARGE STOP 2CV41 CLOSED DISCHARGE STOP 25.1 IS 21 OR 22 CHARGING PUMP Checks control console and determines RUNNING neither 21 nor 22 charging pump is running. 25.2 IS ANY Sl PUMP RUNNING Checks control console and determines both 21 and 22 Sl pumps are running. 25.2 ARE VALVES IN TABLE COPEN FOR Checks control console indication for valves AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Sl PUMP listed in Table C and determines the valves are open for at least one running Sl pump. Table C valves are: 21/22 Sl PUMPS 2SJ30 (FROM RWST) 21/22SJ33 (SI PUMP SUCTION) 2SJ135 (COLD LEG DISCHARGE) 21/22SJ134 (COLD LEG DISCHARGE) 26 OPEN BOTH PZR PORV STOP VALVES Checks control console and determines BOTH 2PR6 and 2PR7 PORV STOP VALVES are open. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with 51 pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD evaluation)
S/U
- 26 OPEN BOTH PZR PORVS Depresses 2PR1 PZR PORV open PB and verifies green closed light extinguishes and red open light illuminates.
Depresses 2PR2 PZR PORV open PB and reports that 2PR2 will not open. 26.1 ARE BOTH PZR PORV STOP VALVES Checks control console and determines BOTH OPEN 2PR6 and 2PR7 PORV STOP VALVES are open. ARE BOTH PZR PORVS OPEN Determines 2PR2 PZR PORV is not open.
- 26.1 OPEN 2RC40 THRU 2RC43 (REACTOR Inserts key into each 2RC40 THRU 2RC43 HEAD VENTS) (REACTOR HEAD VENTS) switch on 2RP3, turns to open, and verifies each valve opens.
Terminate JPM when operator has opened 2RC40 thru 2RC43 Reactor Head Vents. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _ _ _ _ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ____ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. Date _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _ _ _ _ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - - S ME/1 nstructor: Date: _ _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- Unit 2 initiated a Rx trip from 100% power in response to a Main Steam line break at the mixing bottle.
- An automatic Safety Injection initiated.
- The Main Turbine failed to trip automatically, and was manually tripped from the control console.
- MSLI failed, and all MSIV's remain open.
- All AFW flow has been lost.
- 21 charging pump is CIT.
- 22 charging pump tripped 3 minutes ago.
- EOP-TRIP-1 was performed and a transition to FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink was made at Step 20.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Perform FRHS-1 starting at Step 1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM 1 & 2 SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Implement actions required for a Natural Circulation Cooldown TASK NUMBER: N 1150530502 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim e ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: EPE E09 EA1.1
----~~~~~~--~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.5 3.5 APPLICABILITY:
------RO SRO EOCJ Ro[K] STACJ SRO[KJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator- Perform
REFERENCES:
2-EOP-TRIP-4, Natural Circulation Cooldown, Rev. 23 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 30 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: C Omlor Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: JJ_/d~~ c~rrof{ Date: f6.--Z-1-Jif Approved By:
~~~Dot,;;partrt1m~~l Date:
It.- 1 '!- L~( dp:rations partr\\gp.t l .* ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Implement actions required for a Natural Circulation Cooldown TASK NUMBER: 1150050501 Simulator Setup: IC-255 MALF EL0134 Loss of Offsite Power MALF RP01 08 Failure of Automatic Sl Overrides 8106-8108 to override 2CV3,4,5 OPEN PB's OFF, and CLOSE PBs ON ties to Event-1 which is 2CV18 AUTO PB, which will isolate letdown and prevent is being put back in service. Overrides 8201-202 which prevents closing 2PR1, 2PR2, 2PR6, and 2PR7. INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 tripped from 100% power when a loss of all off-site power occurred. All vital buses loaded in MODE 2 SEC operation. Operators performed TRIP-1 and TRIP-2, then transitioned to TRIP-4 to perform a Natural Circulation Cooldown. Operators are performing Step 9 to establish a 20-25°F/hr cooldown rate using 21-24MS10s. Current RCS C/D rate is 5°F/hr. Thots - 561°F. Letdown was unable to be placed in service when directed in TRIP-2. Control Console bezels have been swapped out, and Letdown may be placed in service when directed by procedure. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to raise the C/D rate to 20-25°F/hr using 21-24MS10 as directed at step 9.1 ofTRIP-4, then continue with remainder of TRIP-4. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion
- 1. Raise C/D rate to 20-25°F per hour.
- 2. Depressurize the RCS by opening ONE PORV.
- 3. Initiate Safety Injection after PORV fails to close prior to the loss of RCS subcooling (- 3 minutes after PORV is opened, based on CT Book, Appendix B.2, page 2, italicized text)
Page 2 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Raise C/D rate and Lower RCS Pressure during a natural circulation cooldown lAW EOP-TRIP-4 STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) I Provide candidate with the "Tear Off Reviews the conditions and marked up Sheet" EOP START TIME:
9.1 CONTROL STEAM FLOW TO MINIMIZE SG DELTA-P
- DUMP STEAM USING INTACT SG Adjusts 21-24MS 1Os to raise cooldown rate MS10S (RELIEF VALVES) while minimizing SG Delta-P.
MAINTAIN SG NR LEVEL BETWEEN 9- Maintains SG NR level between 9-33% by 33% adjusting 21-24AF21 valves 10 WAIT UNTIL ALL RCS THOTS ARE Monitors RCS Thots while raising cooldown LESS THAN 543°F rate Cue when RCS Tavg is <543°F: "All RCS Thots are now <543°F. BLOCK HI STEAM LINE FLOW Sl Blocks HI STEAM LINE FLOW Sl on both 11 I trains I OPEN CV2 AND CV277 (LETDOWN Opens CV2 and CV277 (LETDOWN 12 CONTROL VALVES) AND PLACE IN CONTROL VALVES) and selects AUTO for "AUTO" OPEN CV7 (LETDOWN CONTROL VALVE) each valve Opens CV?(LETDOWN CONTROL VALVE) II t Page 3 of 6 I I i
~
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: STEP Raise C/D rate and Lower RCS Pressure during a natural circulation cooldown lAW EOP-TRIP-4 STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT II
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) I ADJUST CV55 (CHARGING FLOW Adjusts CV55 (CHARGING FLOW I
CONTROL VALVE) TO RAISE CONTROL VALVE) to obtain no less than J CHARGING FLOW TO AT LEAST 87 87 gpm on the charging flow indicator. I GPM PERFORM THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS Cue if required: If requested, direct the SIMULTANEOUSLY: operator to place a 75 gpm orifice in
- OPEN ONLY ONE ORIFICE service (CV4 or 5) .
ISOLATION VALVE
- ADJUST CV18 (LETDOWN Opens only one (Letdown Orifice Isolation PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE) Valves) and adjusts CV18 to control TO MAINTAIN LETDOWN letdown pressure such that the letdown line PRESSURE AT 300 PSIG relief valve does not lift (600 psig).
PLACE THE FOLLOWING IN AUTO: I
- CV18
- CV18 in AUTO*
- MASTER FLOW CONTROLLER
- Master Flow Controller in AUTO
- CV55
- CV55 in AUTO
- When the 2CV18 is placed in auto, it will shut, along with any open orifice valve, and all orifice valves will be prevented from opening.
13 IS LETDOWN IN SERVICE Answers NO Page 4 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Raise C/D rate and Lower RCS Pressure during a natural circulation cooldown lAW EOP-TRIP-4 STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluationl 13.1 CAUTION: Reads statement I
PZR PORV CYCLING SHOULD BE MINIMIZED
- USE ONLY ONE PZR PORV TO Opens only 2PR 1 OR 2PR2 LOWER RCS PRESSURE TO 1865 PSIG I
I WAIT UNTIL RCS PRESSURE LESS Monitors RCS pressure ! THAN 1865
- CLOSE BOTH PZR PORV's Attempts to shut the open PORV, and I determines it will not shut. I Attempts to shut associated PORV Block valve, and determines it will not shut. I Initiates Safety Injection based upon I
impending CAS action of loss of I subcooling or automatic safety injection nearing/reaching setpoint. (Auto Sl ! actuation is failed in sim setup.) I Terminate JPM when Sl has been initiated. STOP TIME: !
~-- ~-~ - ---
Page 5 of 6
TQ-AA-1 06-0303 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. (!) 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. 7~ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ---'<£)_£_____3. Perfonnance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) _ _,[)....._....'_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. t 5. Initiating and tenninating Cues are properly identified. _ _,{l)-.£__ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
~
- - - - 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
@) 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev~- Date I0 *j£
- I'{
~ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. - - - - 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor:
;0 ;s-IY Date: - - - - - -
SME/Instructor: Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - Page 6 of 6
INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 tripped from 100% power when a loss of all off-site power occurred. All vital buses loaded in MODE 2 SEC operation. Operators performed TRIP-1 and TRIP-2, then transitioned to TRIP-4 to perform a Natural Circulation Cooldown. Operators are performing Step 9 to establish a 20-25°F/hr cooldown rate using 21-24MS1 Os. Current RCS C/D rate is 5°F/hr. Thots - 561 °F. Letdown was unable to be placed in service when directed in TRIP-2. Control Console bezels have been swapped out, and Letdown may be placed in service when directed by procedure. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to raise the C/D rate to 20-25°F/hr using 21-24MS1 0 as directed at step 9.1 of TRIP-4, then continue with remainder of TRIP-4. Page 7 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification TASK NUMBER: 220130201 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim f ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KJA NUMBER: 022 A4.01
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.6 3.6 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD R0[8] STAD SR0[8] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003 Rev. 17 (Rev checked 9-6-14)
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.CBV-0001 Rev. 32 (Rev checked 9-6-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: D Tait Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: JJi~~. c,~ Date: (0 .-2,] -I "I c/~~artmen~, ~ '7- ( \,1 Approved By: olerations ~rt~ Date: l u-ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: ------------------------- DATE: SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification TASK NUMBER: 220130201 SIMULATOR SETUP: Reset Simulator to IC-256, 100% power, BOL. ET-1, KAD18PBR 25 CFCU low speed start PB, tied to 25 CFCU SW flow of 1675, ramped in over 10 seconds with 1 second delay INITIAL CONDITIONS: Rx power is 100% steady state, BOL. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to perform S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Systems-Cooling Systems surveillance for 25 CFCU for monthly run. 25 CFCU is filled and vented. Component Off Normal Report has been reviewed with no abnormalities noted. Calibration data for required instruments has been obtained and recorded in appropriate Attachments. The differential pressure gauge for 22 SW header has been installed. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion: Perform S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003 for 25 CFCU and evaluate minimum SW flow as SAT, and Minimum Cooling Water Flow for SW D/P as UNSAT. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
SYSTEM: Containment Cooling OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ___________________ DATE: ___________________ l I TASK* Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP COMMENTS STEP NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) I,I i START TIME: I Provide Operator with marked up copy of Prerequisites have been completed, but f S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Operator should review them before Systems-Cooling Systems. proceeding. Operator reviews and initials Precautions and Limitations. I NOTE: There is no requirement to either start additional SW pumps OR stop any running CFCUs. There is a system requirement NOT to run 5 CFCUs in HIGH speed, but that is N/A here. However, Operator MAY start another SW pump OR stop a CFCU, which is acceptable. I I PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training I
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
I 5.1.1 PERFORM test on each CFCU required to Operator retrieves S2.0P-SO.CBV-0001, be tested lAW the following instruction: Containment Ventilation Operation, and A. ENSURE the CFCU to be tested is reviews P&Ls, and Prerequisites. Operator in LOW SPEED lAW S2.0P- identifies the sections of the procedure SO.CBV-0001, Containment NOT to be performed (Sections 5.2-5.6) Ventilation Operation. with N/A. If needed, tell Operator Components Off Normal review is complete and SAT. Operator starts 25 CFCU in LOW speed lAW Step 5.1.3 by: SO.CBV A. ENSURE CFCU is filled and vented A. Ensuring 25 CFCU is filled and
-1 lAW S2.0P-SO.CBV-0003(Q), vented (Initiating Cue) 5.1.3 Filling and Venting Containment Fan Coil Units.
B. ENSURE Service Water is B. Ensuring SW is available by available. checking SW pumps in service and C. PRESS FAN LOW SPEED START adequate SW header pressure. bezel. D. ENSURE following dampers are in C. PRESS FAN LOW SPEED START indicated positions: bezel for 25 CFCU.
- ROUGH FLTR DAMPER D. ENSURES damper alignment is CLOSED correct for 25 CFCU:
- HEPA INLET DAMPER OPEN ROUGH FLTR DAMPER CLOSED
- HEPA OUTLET DAMPER OPEN HEPA INLET DAMPER OPEN HEPA OUTLET DAMPER OPEN
- ---- - ~ -- -- --------- - - **--- - - ~~-- -- -~ - ~-
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Containment Cooling. TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP STEP COMMENTS ii (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT ~
- NO. STANDARD I SO.CBV E. lE Service Water flow is <1465 Verifies SW flow >1465 gpm to 25 S/U evaluation)
Ii
-1 gpm, THEN: CFCU.
5.1.3 1. STOP the CFCU. (cant) 2. REFER to S2.0P-SO.SW-0005, Note: IF operator notices SW flow of 1675 Service Water System Operation, Service Water System Operability Guidelines. is not like the running CFCU's and states they would stop the performance of test, THEN Cue that the CRS directs you to l F. ENSURE Service Water flow.:::_ 1465 continue the test. gpm. ST.CBV- B. RECORD Start Time in the Operator records start time of 25 CFCU in 3 applicable Attachments( s ), Section Attachment 5. 5.1.1 3.0, for the CFCU being tested. l li t PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) i 5.1.1 C. When at least 15 minutes have Cue: 25 CFCU has been operating for 15 (cant) elapsed, RECORD the following in minutes.
the applicable Attachment(s), Section 3.0, for the CFCU being tested: Operator records 25 CFCU stop time, SW
*
- Stop Time flow rate, and 22 SW header .6-P.
- Cooling Water Flow Rate (gpm)
- IF testing 21 OR 22 CFCU, THEN 21 SW HDR .6-P is to be i recorded. Operator marks steps for 21-23 CFCU N/A. i
* !E testing 23 CFCU, THEN both I 21 SW HDR .6-P AND 22 SW HDR .6-P are to be recorded (Refer to Step 3.5)
Cue: WHEN asked, report 22 SW header
- IF testing 24 OR 25 CFCU,
.6-P is 91 psid.
THEN 22 SW HDR .6-P is to be recorded. Using Exhibit 1, determines minimum CFCU flowrate for 25 CFCU at 91 psid
- Test results by initialing the SAT (required to be rounded up to 95 psid lAW or UNSAT column lAW the Acceptance Criteria stated in P&L 3.4)
- the attachment. Operator initials >1465 gpm as SAT, and Cooling Water Flow Rate as UNSAT.
Terminate the JPM once the Att. 5 data in
-- -- ~-
Section 3.0 is marked SAT/UNSAT. _ _ _ _ c________ _ _ _ - - - --- PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE TQ-AA-1 06-0303 Revision 4 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. () V 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
_Q_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. U 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ~ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. J 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). Q 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _c)__ Date 1o { r 'S"" / ( '1 0 9. Pilot test the JPM: 3'Z..
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor:0~ Date: to (ts-/1'-'( SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Rx power is 100% steady state, SOL. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to perform S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Systems-Cooling Systems surveillance for 25 CFCU for monthly run. 25 CFCU is filled and vented. Component Off Normal Report has been reviewed with no abnormalities noted. Calibration data for required instruments 11as been obtained and recorded in appropriate Attachments. The differential pressure gauge for 22 SW header has been installed. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw control rods to criticality, and TCAF Failure of Source Range Hi Flux Trip to BLOCK . TASK NUMBER: N1120170101 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim g ALTERNATE PATH: [8J KIA NUMBER: 012 A4.03
----------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.6 3.6 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD Ro[KJ STAD SRO[KJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator I Perform
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Rev. 39 (Checked 10/7/14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 20 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 7/8/14 Instructor Validated By: C Omlor Date: 10/15/14 SME or Instructor Approved By: 12~~ _ C.vJopt Date: 10 -2]-ltf
~nTn~artment \ c .~ 'L) _.--\ L,(
Approved By: !\JVV\~art~ bperations
/- (f'\ \)\;) Date:
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw control rods to criticality, and TCAF Failure of Source Range Hi Flux Trip to BLOCK. SIMULATOR SETUP Fill out IOP-3 up to Step 5.3.18 for a non post refueling SU IC-256 Override 8410 OVDI (Block Source Range B PB will not block) Ensure AUDIO MULTIPLIER at Nl racks is set at 1k Ensure both SR channels are displayed on NR-45 and NR-45 alarms cleared. INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 2 performing a Rx startup by control rods lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003. The ICRR plot at the eight-fold position predicted criticality at 35 steps, which is the same as the Estimated Critical Rod Height. Rx Engineering predicts the Rx will go critical during the next rod pull of 25 steps. Control Bank D is at 25 steps. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Continue the startup at Step 5.3.18.0 by withdrawing Control Bank D 25 steps or until the Rx is critical, then continue with procedure to raise power and stabilize the Rx at 1x*10-8A in the Intermediate Range. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Identifies criticality during rod pull prior to withdrawing control bank D 25 additional steps.
- 2. Establishes an approximately 0.25 dpm SUR.
- 3. Inserts control rods to establish zero or negative SUR after determination that Source Range Channel B does not Block PRIOR to the Rx automatically tripping on High SR Flux.
PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK - Withdraw control rods to criticalit ... d TCAF Fail ..... - -*fS__ _...,.....,._ R
..... - Hi Flux Trio to BLOCK STEP COMMENTS STEP
(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Reviews procedure. Provide marked up copy of S2.0P-IO.ZZ~ 0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load. When ready to accept the watch, take the Simulator from FREEZE to RUN.
- 5.3.18.0 WITHDRAW Control Banks A, B and C Announces withdrawing Control Bank STOPPING at the following hold points to D 25 steps or until criticality is obtain ICRR data: achieved.
- CBA Fully Withdrawn
- RIL position Withdraws control rods while closely
- CBB Fully Withdrawn monitoring nuclear instrumentation,
- CBD at 50 Steps OR the 8-Fold Rod and stops withdrawing Control Bank I Position D when identification of Rx criticality t is observed. The Rx will be critical
- CBD withdrawal limited to #50 Step increments - OR before Control Bank D have been
- the 8-Fold Rod withdrawn 25 steps.
Position i Note: Step 5.3.18. F is the ICRR step, and has been completed. 5.3.18.E was N/A. 5.3.18.G has already occurred. I 5.3.18.H !E P-6 (Source Range Permissive) green Note: P-6 will not energize at this l~ light energizes .... point. I Ii I PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training II
. j OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw control rods to criticalibt, ~md TCAF Failure of Source Range Hi Flux Trip to BLOCK STEP COMMENTS STEP I (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- 5.3.19 When criticality is achieved: Announces the Rx is critical.
A. MAKE the following announcement Makes "Attention all plant personnel, l twice on the plant PA System: Unit 2 Reactor is critical."
"Attention all plant personnel, Unit 2 announcement two times on the Plant PA system. i Reactor is critical."
Cue: The Plant operator will annotate B. RECORD Criticality Date/Time data in the Control Room Log. Attachment 2, Section 3.0, and in the Control Room Narrative Log. Records date/time of criticality in C. RECORD Attachment 2, Section 3.0, Attachment 2, Section 3.0 at bottom Surveillance Results lAW the stated of page. Acceptance Criteria. Initials SAT column of section 3.0 in Attachment 2. Cue: "The CRS directs you to continue the power ascension at Step 5.3.20 by withdrawing Control Bank D to establish and maintain a 0.25 decade per minute start up rate."
- 5.3.20 CONTINUE with Reactor Power ascension, Withdraws Control Bank D to with positive stable SUR NOT to exceed 1.0 establish and maintain a stable li dpm, by adjusting Control Bank "D" as positive startup rate of approximately needed. 0.25 dpm SUR.
PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK Withdraw control rods to criticality, and_TCAF_Failure of Source Range_tli Fll1_X Trip to BLOCK STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluatiol'!}_
l 5.3.21 OBSERVE source range and intermediate Observes source range and I range levels on NIS for::: one decade overlap intermediate range and identifies during performance of next step. when at least 1 decade of overlap between them has occurred. 5.3.22 When P-6 (Source Range Permissive) green light is energized, as indicated on 2RP4% IR channels at 1o- 10 amps: A. SELECT one pen of NR-45 to an Selects one Intermediate Range Intermediate Range channel and the channel and one Power Range other pen to a Power Range channel. channel on recorder NR-45.
- B. BLOCK Source Range High Flux Trip Depresses BLOCK SOURCE I
by depressing both "BLOCK RANGE A" AND "BLOCK SOURCE SOURCE RANGE A" AND "BLOCK RANGE B" pushbuttons on console, SOURCE RANGE B" pushbuttons on and observes BLOCK SOURCE console. RANGE Blight does NOT illuminate. C. ENSURE Source Range Trains A&B TRIP BLOCKED blue light is Inserts control bank D to stop the illuminated on 2RP4 AND OHA E-5 power ascension and establishes a SR DET VOLT TRBL alarms. zero or negative SUR.
- 5.3.22.D
!E Source Range Detector fails to Block, Inserts control bank D to stop the THEN INSERT Control Rods to stabilize power ascension and establishes a Reactor Power: zero or negative SUR.
PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
. i OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw
-- control ---- rods to criticalit ---- ---- ...d TCAF Fail--*-- ........fS ....... ..... , __ .....
R - Hi Flux Trio to BLOCK STEP COMMENTS STEP 1 (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT I
- NO. STANDARD I
S/U evaluation) ! Terminate the JPM when a zero or negative SUR is established, or after I the Rx trips on High Source Range Flux at 1E5 cpm in the Source Range. I l PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. __,eJ. . _1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
-o£..__*
_{f)~-- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. -~@)""""-- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) (!) 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. -~----:::::::::=--- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
~ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ~ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matchesjhe m t current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. 35' Date ID ~ i~ 'I
-~--- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: _ _ /)~'0J/I-lA_'/_P1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
;of-s1Cf Date: _ _ _ _ __
SME/Instructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: Date: - - - - - - PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 2 performing a Rx startup by control rods lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003. The ICRR plot at the eight-fold position predicted criticality at 35 steps, which is the same as the Estimated Critical Rod Height. Rx Engineering predicts the Rx will go critical during the next rod pull of 25 steps. Control Bank Dis at 25 steps. INITIATING CUE You are the Reactor Operator. Continue the startup at Step 5.3.18.0 by withdrawing Control Bank D 25 steps or until the Rx is critical, then continue with procedure to raise power and stabilize the Rx at 1x10-8 A in the Intermediate Range. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration (23 CCW pump) TASK NUMBER: N 1150420501 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Sim h ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: 008 A4.01
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.3 3.1 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD R0[8] STAD SR0[8] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator
REFERENCES:
2-EOP-APPX-1 Rev. 24 (rev checked 9-6-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-6-14 Instructor Validated By: C Omlor Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: Training Department Approved By: Date: Operations Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration TASK N 1150420501 NUMBER: SIMULATOR SETUP: IC-258, markup 2-EOP-TRIP-1 through Step 17 direction to start one CCW pump lAW APPX-1. 22 CCW pump start PB 0/R off. INITIAL CONDITIONS: The Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped and a Sl initiated based on indications of a large LOCA. 2-EOP-TRIP-1 is in effect. When the Main Generator breakers opened, all off site power was lost. All vital buses are being powered from their respective EDGs. NO CCW pumps are running. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to start ONE CCW pump lAW 2-EOP-APPX-1. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Start 21 CCW pump lAW APPX-1.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: --------------------- SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
I Operator obtains 2-EOP-APPX-1 1 CHECK 4 KV vital bus status: Checks 4KV vital busses and determines no vital bus is being
- a. CHECK AT LEAST ONE vital supplied from station power bus ENERGIZED by station transformer and goes to Step 2.
power transformers. 2 CHECK ECCS pump (CVC,SI, or RHR) and AFW pump status:
- a. CHECK all ECCS pumps AND Checks running pumps and motor driven AFW pumps determines that ALL ECCS and motor running on energized vital driven AFW pumps are running on buses. energized vital buses.
2.b. CHECK one CCW pump running. Checks CCW pump status and determines NO CCW pumps are running. Uses the RNO and goes to Step 3.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: --------------------- SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration STEP COMMENTS I STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step} EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 3 SELECT CCW pump start strategy:
- a. IF ALL 4 KV vital buses Determines ALL 4 KV vital buses energized, THEN GO TO Step 4. energized, and GOES TO Step 4.
4 Start 22 CCW pump as follows: 4.a CHECK 22 CCW pump AVAILABLE Determines 22 CCW pump is AVAILABLE.
- 4.b BLOCK 2B and 2C SECs. Blocks 2B and 2C SECs on 2RP1.
- 4.c RESET 2B and 2C SEC's Resets 2B and 2C SEC's on 2CC3.
4.d Perform the following at RP2:
- 4.d.1 STOP 22 Switchgear Room Supply Stops 22 Switchgear Room Supply Fan. Fan at RP2
- 4.d.2 START 23 Switchgear Room Supply Starts 23 Switchgear Room Supply Fan. Fan at RP2
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ---------------------- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ---------------------- SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation}
- 4.e STOP the following equipment at CC1: Stops equipment at CC1:
- 22 CFCU
- 22 CFCU
- 24 CFCU
- 24 CFCU
- 22 Aux Bldg Exhaust Fan
- 22 Aux Bldg Exhaust Fan
- 4.f START 22 CCW Pump. Depresses start PB for 22 CCW Pump and recognizes it did not start.
- 4.f 1)START 22 OR 24 CFCU Starts 22 or 24 CFCU RNO 2)GO TO Step 5 Goes to Step 5 5 START 21 CCW Pump as follows: I I
- 5.a BLOCK 2A AND 2B SECs. Blocks 2 A SEC and verifies 2B SEC previously blocked. I
- 5.b RESET 2A AND 2B SECs. Resets 2A SEC and verifies 2B SEC I previously reset.
5.c SEND an operator to 100 ft elev chiller Sends an operator to 100 ft elev I area to lock out 21 Chiller by placing chiller area to lock out 21 Chiller by the keyswitch in OFF (LOCKOUT) placing the keyswitch in OFF I _position. (LOCKOUT)_position.
- 5.d PERFORM the following at RP2: At RP2, Stops 21 Switchgear Room !
- 1) STOP 21 Switchgear Room Supply Fan and starts 22 Switchgear Supply Fan. Room Supply Fan.
I
- 2) START 22 Switchgear Room Supply Fan.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: --------------------- SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water (CCW) TASK: Perform Actions for CCW Restoration STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
- 5.e STOP the following equipment at CC1: At CC1, stops 21 CFCU and 21 Aux
- 21 CFCU Bldg Exhaust Fan
- 21 Aux Bldg Exhaust Fan
- 5.f START the following equipment at At CC1 starts 22 or 24 CFCU and CC1: starts 22 FHB Exhaust Fan
- 22 OR24 CFCU
- 22 FHB Exhaust Fan
- 5.g START 21 CCW Pump. Starts 21 CCW pump.
6 PLACE 21 AND 22 CCW Heat Exchangers in service as follows: 6.a CHECK AT LEAST THREE SW pumps Determines 3 SW pumps are running. running. 6.b SEND an operator to 84 ft elev Aux Sends an operator to 84 ft elev Aux Bldg to place 21 AND 22 CCW Heat Bldg to place 21 AND 22 CCW Heat Exchangers in service lAW S2.0P- Exchangers in service lAW S2.0P-SO.CC-0002(0), "21 & 22 Component SO.CC-0002(0), "21 & 22 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Operation." Cooling Heat Exchanger Operation." 6.c RETURN TO procedure in effect. Returns to procedure in effect. Terminating Cue: When operator announces returning to procedure in effect, state JPM is complete.
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE TQ-AA-106-0303 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ____ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ____ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ____ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ____ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ____ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _ _ Date _ _ _ _ __ - - - - 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor: Date: - - - - - - - - SME/Instructor:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Date: - - - - - - - SME/Instructor:------------------- Date: - - - - - - -
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: The Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped and a Sl initiated based on indications of a large LOCA. 2-EOP-TRIP-1 is in effect. When the Main Generator breakers opened, all off site power was lost. All vital buses are being powered from their respective EDGs. NO CCW pumps are running. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to start ONE CCW pump lAW 2-EOP-APPX-1.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG TASK NUMBER: N0645060104 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC IP-i ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 064 A2.03
------------------~
IMPORTANCEFACTOR: ____ 3._1___ 3.1 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOCJ ROCK] STAC] SROCK] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: In Plant I Simulate
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, Rev. 41 (checked 10-15-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-24-14 Instructor Validated By: S Bickhart Date: 10-15-14 Approved By: Date: ;o.-'2--?~ILJ lJr'1)'(1 Approved By: Date: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG TASK N0645060104 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: 2C EDG is running loaded in parallel with 2C Vital bus for maintenance. It is loaded to 2550 KW, 1500 KVAR OUT. INITIATING CUE: Unload and shut down the 2C EDG lAW S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Operation, Sections 5.8 and 5.9 Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained}.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Lower DG real load incrementally to less than 200 KW.
- 2. Lower DG reactive load incrementally to 50-100 KVAR.
- 3. Open DG output breaker.
- 4. Stop DG and return Gen Loading SW to AUTO.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM I NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: TASK: Emergency Diesel Generator Unload and stop an EDG DATE: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - II STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS !
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT i Evaluation)
Provide candidate with marked up Give operator marked up copy of procedure. S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Operation, Rev. 41 . f i NOTE The GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER Ensure that operator simulates tripping SWITCH should be placed in the TRIP the EDG breaker when cue is given position as soon as EDG Load is reduced later in JPM that load is <200KW. to 200 KW. I II I I I PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) 5.8.1 lE 2C EDG is paralleled on 2C 4KV Vital Bus, THEN concurrently PERFORM the following:
*
- ADJUST SPEED CONTROL Operator locates SPEED CONTROL SWITCH (GS) to gradually lower SWITCH (GS) and VOLTAGE load to 200 KW. CONTROL SWITCH , and simulates alternately goes to LOWER on the
*
- ADJUST VOLTAGE CONTROL switches while monitoring Generator SWITCH (VCS) to gradually lower KW and KVAR.
KVAR to between 50-1 00 KVAR OUT. CUE: Each time operator simulates going to lower on SPEED CONTROL SWITCH (GS), give operator reading which is 300KW less than previous. CUE: Each time operator simulates going to lower on VOLTAGE CONTROL SWITCH (VCS), give operator reading which is 200KVAR less than previous. NOTE: IF operator simulates going to RAISE on either switch, then CUE a reading that is HIGHER in the same amount as proper operation above. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) 5.8.3 OPEN 2C DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER by performing one of the Simulates opening 2C DIESEL following: GENERATOR BREAKER by placing
- OPEN 2CD1AX6D, 2C DIESEL 2C-DF-GCP-3 (BCS) to TRIP position.
GENERATOR BREAKER. (64' Swgr Rm, or CUE: Green indicating light above
- PRESS 2C BREAKER OPEN switch illuminates, red light pushbutton (2CC3), or extinguishes. Generator KW and
- PLACE 2C-DF-GCP-3 KVAR indicate 0. Generator Voltage GENERATOR CIRCUIT indicates 4160 VAC.
BREAKER SWITCH (BCS), to TRIP (2C DIG Control Panel). 5.8.4 ALLOW Diesel to run unloaded for.:::_ 3 CUE: 3 minutes has elapsed. minutes prior to stopping the EDG. 5.8.5 !E diesel unloading was directed by Step Marks step N/A 5.9.3F OR Step 5.1 0.4E, THEN RETURN to Step 5.9.4 OR Step 5.10.5. t 5.9.1 !E Diesel Generator was operated without Marks step N/A I electrical load for <15 minutes, THEN ALLOW Diesel to run unloaded until total runtime is .:::_15 minutes OR for a period of time specified by a pre-planned Maintenance activity, prior to stopping Diesel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training j
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) 5.9.2 !E Diesel Generator was operated without Marks step N/A electrical load for :::,2 hours, AND the diesel is capable of loading, THEN: [C0300]
A. Slowly LOAD Diesel, over 15 minutes, to 1500 KW at 1125 KVAR for minimum of 1 hour lAW Section 5.4 of this procedure. B. UNLOAD Diesel lAW Section 5.8 of this procedure. 5.9.3 !E Diesel Generator was operated without Marks step N/A electrical load for:::, 2 hours ....
~
[' I i I PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ------------------- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ I' SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT i i
Evaluation) 5.9.4 lE 2C-DF-GCP-1 2C DIESEL GEN LOADING SW is in MANUAL (DROOP), THEN: A. ADJUST Diesel Generator speed CUE: DG speed indicates 905 rpm. as necessary to achieve 900 rpm Operator simulates placing SPEED using SPEED CONTROL SWITCH CONTROL SWITCH (GS). to lower, (GS). then CUE: DG speed indicates 900 rpm. B. CHECK frequency indicated on Calls control room to check frequency.
. I 2CC3 bezel is 58.94-60.36 Hz. CUE: frequency is 60.03 HZ.
CUE: Generator voltage is 4140. C. ADJUST Generator terminal voltage as necessary to achieve Simulates raising VOLTAGE 4160 volts using VOLTAGE CONTROL SWITCH (VCS). CONTROL SWITCH (VCS) CUE: Generator voltage is 4160. D. CHECK voltage indicated on 2CC3 Operator calls control room to check II is 4.023-4.306 Kv. voltage on 2CC3 bezel. CUE: Voltage is 4200.
- 5.9.5 PLACE 2C-DF-SS, 2C DG STOP/START Simulates placing 2C-DF-SS 2C DG SWITCH in STOP. STOP/START SWITCH to STOP, and .~
verifies speed lowering. CUE: Diesel is stopping. 5.9.6 IF the Diesel Generator does not Marks NA. I shutdown ... PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training t
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ------------------- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------- SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator TASK: Unload and stop an EDG STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT I i
Evaluation) I
- 5.9.7 IF 2C-DF-GCP-1, 2C DIESEL GEN Simulates placing 2C-DF-GCP-1 2C LOADING SW is in MANUAL (DROOP), DIESEL GEN LOADING SW in AUTO.
THEN PLACE 2C-DF-GCP-1 2C DIESEL CUE: AUTO light illuminates, GEN LOADING SW in AUTO (ISOCR). MANUAL light extinguishes, GENERATOR LOADING IN DROOP i MODE (B-9) alarm clears. TERMINATION: After placing switch in AUTO, state "JPM is complete." PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _ _...,..~_1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. -~-:r-- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
;.'r;.-- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant. control room, or simulator)
--,£-=--- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ---1--- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. - - - + - - 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). 7* 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of --?- that procedure: Procedure Rev.~ Date tO/ r:-J) 1 Y
.fJ:G 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.
~.
SME/Instructor~ ------*
~~dL~\
SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: 2C EDG is running loaded in parallel with 2C Vital bus for maintenance. It is loaded to 2550 KW, 1500 KVAR OUT. INITIATING CUE: Unload and shut down the 2C EDG lAW S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Operation, Sections 5.8 and 5.9 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Pressurizer/Pressure Relief TASK: Transfer Pressurizer 22 Backup Heaters to Emergency Power Supply TASK NUMBER: 115 043 05 01 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC Annual IP-j ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 010 A4.02
----------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: -------- 3.6 3.4 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoCJ RO[RJ STAC] SRO[RJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: In Plant, Simulate
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.PZR-0010 Rev. 10 (Rev. checked 10-15-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 20 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9/2/2014 Instructor Validated By: S Bickhart Date: 10/15/14 SME~Instructor Approved By: {};:#I ' CA Vht'>J Date: /O ty
~~D artment tv- 'l Yll Olperati~~artm~l)
Approved By: Date: ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Pressurizer/Pressure Relief TASK: Transfer Pressurizer 22 Backup Heaters to Emergency Power Supply TASK 1150430501 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: Due to a loss of power to the group buses it is necessary to energize the PZR Backup Heaters from their emergency power supply. INITIATING CUE: The CRS directs you to perform S2.0P-SO.PZR-0010(Q), Section 5.3, Transferring Pzr Htr 22 BU Group To The Emergency Power Supply. All prerequisites and Precautions and Limitations have been reviewed and completed. 2A EDG is carrying 2A Vital Bus and is loaded to 2400 KW. You have a JAM key. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Simulate opening all but one PZR heater supply breakers.
- 2. Simulate aligning emergency power to PZR heater bus from 2A vital bus.
Page 2 of6
l OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ____________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer/Pressure Relief DATE: ____________________ TASK: Transfer 22 Backup Heaters to Emergency Power Supply STEP COMMENTS f
- STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT fj NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
Operator obtains procedure S2.0P- Provide marked up copy of S2.0P-SO.PZR-0010, Pressurizer Backup Heaters SO. PZR-00 10, Pressurizer Backup Power Supply Transfer. Heaters Power Supply Transfer
- 5.3.1 ENSURE 2AX1AX14X, 2EP Locates breaker 2AX1AX14X 2EP PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS FEED PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS FEED (EMERGENCY) is OPEN (84' Swgr Rm). (EMERGENCY) on 2A 460V Vital Bus, Elev. 84' Swgr Rm and determines current breaker position.
Cue: 2AX 1AX 14X Breaker indicates OPEN. i~
. -- I t 5.3.2 Request NCO to PERFORM the following: I i
A. PLACE 22 Backup Group in Locates nearest means of I MANUAL. communications and requests NCO to I B. PRESS the 22 BACKUP OFF place 22 B/U Htrs in MANUAL and I pushbutton press the 22 BACKUP OFF pushbutton. Cue: NCO reports 22 B/U Htrs are l I in MANUAL and 22 BACKUP OFF .I pushbutton has been depressed. I 5.3.3 ENSURE2EX1EP2EPX,2EP480V Locates 2EX1 EP2EPX, 2EP 480V PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS MAIN PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS MAIN BREAKER is OPEN (78' Electrical BREAKER on El. 78 Electrical Pen. Penetration). Cue: 2EX1EP2EPX, 2EP 480V PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS MAIN BREAKER is OPEN is open. II
\
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ____________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer/Pressure Relief DATE: ____________________ TASK: Transfer 22 Backup Heaters to Emergency Power Supply STEP COMMENTS
- STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
- 5.3.4 REMOVE interlock key from breaker Turns key and removes interlock key I 2EX1 EP2EPX. from breaker 2EX1 EP2EPX.
I i
- 5.3.5 PLACE any eleven of the following Operator locates individual heater disconnects in OFF (only three disconnects breakers, places all but three breakers I
are to remain ON) AND MARK the in OFF and notes breakers left ON as remaining disconnects as N/A: N/A in procedure.
- 5.3.6 PLACE, 2AX1AX14X-1, 2EP PZR HTR Operator locates 2AX 1AX 14X-1, 2EP BUS EMERGENCY FEED DISCONNECT PZR HTR BUS EMERGENCY FEED SWITCH, in the ON position (Eiev 78' DISCONNECT SWITCH, and places it Electrical Penetration). in the ON position (Eiev 78' Electrical Penetration).
- 5.3.7 INSERT interlock key, AND UNLOCK Locates Corry Key Interlock on '
breaker 2AX1AX14X. 2AX1AX14X breaker, inserts and turns key. 5.3.8 NOTIFY NCO that PZR Htr 22 B/U Group Candidate makes report to the Control has been transferred to the emergency Room. power supply (2A 460V Vital Bus). Repeat back notification and state: JPM is complete. I I I'
'j i,
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.
---S- 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. ) 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
__2_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
~ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ) 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. -~..,...--- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. -~--?-- 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk(*). ------"'---- 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches _the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. _jQ_ Date ro/t5fl c..f ---+/=;}~- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/Instructor:~ IGILI-kl4.:r:: Date: I oJ,s-j, 0 SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: - - - - - - SME/Instructor: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Due to a loss of power to the group buses it is necessary to energize the PZR Backup Heaters from their emergency power supply. INITIATING CUE: The CRS directs you to perform S2.0P-SO.PZR-0010(Q), Section 5.3, Transferring Pzr Htr 22 BU Group To The Emergency Power Supply. All prerequisites and Precautions and Limitations have been reviewed and completed. 2A EDG is carrying 2A Vital Bus and is loaded to 2400 KW. You have a JAM key.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Radioactive Liquid Waste TASK: Respond to High Radiation Alarm during an Authorized Release of Rad. Liquid Waste to the CIRC Water System From 21 CVCS Monitor Tank TASK NUMBER: N0685140104 JPM NUMBER: 13-01 NRC IP-k ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: 2.3.11
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.3
- -3.8 --
APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD RO(LJ STAD SRO(LJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: In Plant/SIMULATE
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.WL-0001, Rev. 25, Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste from 21 CVCS Monitor Tank (checked 10-15-14) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 15 min. TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 9-24-14 Instructor Validated By: S Bickhart Date: 10-15-14 SME or Instructor Approved By: A~- Gv"~ Date: l 0 ..... ~ 'J-I¥ Approved By: c:r~;:~tj I Date: f 0 - L '7 - (<(
~peratiof)S)Je'pirtment IJ ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:
ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Radioactive Liquid Waste TASK: Respond to High Radiation Alarm during an Authorized Release of Rad. Liquid Waste to the CIRC Water System From 21 CVCS Monitor Tank TASK N0685140104 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: Both Units are at 100% power. A discharge of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank to Unit 1 Circ Water via Unit 2 SW has been directed lAW S2.0P SO.WL-0001, Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste from 21 CVCS Monitor Tank. Recirculation and preparation for release of the Monitoring Tank have been completed. Chemistry has authorized a maximum allowable release rate of 150 gpm. ALL Circulators are in service. 2R18 and the Overboard Flow monitor are OPERABLE. SW Room Cooler Headers are NOT cross-tied. S2.0P-SO.WL-0001, Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 are complete. 21 eves tank initial level is 19,600 gallons. INITIATING CUE: Perform Section 5.5, Release of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank via SW system to CW system, of S2.0P-SO.WL-0001. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Perform normal Liquid Radwaste Release.
- 2. Terminate release upon receipt of high radiation alarm on release.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
*c No. S/U Provide operator with marked up copy of release Reviews marked up procedure procedure.
5.5.1 lE 2FR1064 is INOPERABLE .... NA's step since 2FR1064 is OPERABLE.
- 5.5.2 Direct Unit 2 NCO to OPEN 2WL51, LIQUID Locates plant page or phone to call control RELEASE STOP VALVE. room.
Cue: Unit 2 NCO reports 2WL51 has been opened. I 5.5.3 Direct a second operator to PERFORM an Independent Verification for 2WL51 position lAW I Attachment 2, Step 4.1.2 OR 4.2.2 as applicable Cue: IV has been performed. (ODCM) I
- 5.5.4 THROTTLE OPEN 2WR59, MT PMPS OB STOP Locates 2WR59 and simulates opening valve. I I
VALVE, NOT to exceed the Maximum Release Rate recorded in Attachment 2, Step 2.2.2 When operator checks flow indication on 104 I panel, Cue: With the valve fully open, flow I is 10 gpm. Note: Max Release Rate from Att. 2, Step I 2.2.2 is 150 gpm. I 5.5.5 Direct a second operator to PERFORM an I Independent Verification for 2WR59 position lAW Attachment 2, Step 4.1.3 OR 4.2.3 as Cue: IV has been performed. applicable (ODCM) _I
- 5.5.6 IF the Maximum Release Rate recorded in Locates 21WR53 and simulates throttling I Attachment 2, Step 2.2.2 can NOT be obtained, valve closed.
THEN THROTTLE CLOSED 21 WR53 MT I RECIRC V, NOT to exceed the Maximum When operator checks flow on 104 panel, Release Rate. Cue: Flow is 55 gpm. I c - -- ! D~J::~ D.aC>tril"'tnrl _ 0Ae>C"t':H'C"if"\n Dn.ru1iraC" Cnonifil"' Dormic-e-inn frnrn 1\1. lr>lo'"'llr Tr~ininn
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
- No. .. - S/U 5.5.7 !E 2FR1064 flow monitor is OPERABLE, Simulates annotating recorder with time, date and THEN RECORD time, date, and tank tank.
identification on recorder. 5.5.8 COMPLETE Attachment 2, Section 5.1 Records data. Cue: Chemistry paperwork indicates dilution water flowrate is 200,000 gpm. Cue: When operator reads 21 CVCS Monitor Tank Level, state, "2-LIS-180 indicates 90%". l Records 19,600 from either Att. 1 Section 2.0 or Att. 2 Section 1.0. If operator requests S2.0P-TM.ZZ-0002, Tank Capacity Data, tell them the procedure is not needed to determine the tank volume. Records Dilution Water Flowrate of 200,000 gpm. ) Initial conditions stated all circulators were in service . 5.5.9 .!f_any of the following occur during the releasE THEN direct the NCO to CLOSE 2WL51, Records 55 gpm for Discharge Flow Rate. I LIQUID RELEASE STOP VALVE. (Previous cue from Step 5.5.6 can be re-stated here if asked.) Loss of dilution water flow 2FR1064 becomes inoperable Cue: When operator reads 2R18 indication on 104 5 2R18 Monitor ALARMS panel, state, "2R18 reads 10 counts, the RED HI t
- MT pump pressure falls below the MOP RAD light is lit."
allowed lAW Attachment 4, as appliGable Calls control room to inform them of HI RADIATION condition and directs NCO to shut 2WL51. Cue: Once operator has called control room to have the 2WL51 shut, state: "JPM is complete." DCC~ D,..,l""fri ..... f,....rl o-~~r:t.C"'rirt.n Dc-.ru1irnc-- ~no"ifj,... Dormic-e-inn frnm 1\1,.,-.lo..-:l,.. Tr<":llininrt
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM
+
usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.
- 1. Task description and number. JPM description and number are identified.
----c- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. --4--3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ~ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
- 57. 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk('). ____ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev.~ Date re1r5'"{*'i
- - - - 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _ _ _ _ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/1 nstructor:_-+~7---v-. __,*""'--**~* - '~!: :p:.=: .J.
.._._....__.__*n....,*u.l__,¢kd+"""""'.. L.I Date: --~-t.=:.."'pl'=S~~1y,______
SME/Instructor: Date: SME/Instructor: Date: _______ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Both Units are at 100% power. A discharge of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank to Unit 1 Circ Water via Unit 2 SW has been directed lAW S2.0P SO.WL-0001, Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste from 21 CVCS Monitor Tank. Recirculation and preparation for release of the Monitoring Tank have been completed. Chemistry has authorized a maximum allowable release rate of 150 gpm. ALL Circulators are in service. 2R18 and the Overboard Flow monitor are OPERABLE. SW Room Cooler Headers are NOT cross-tied. S2.0P-SO.WL-0001, Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 are complete. 21 eves tank initial level is 19,600 gallons. INITIATING CUE: Perform Section 5.5, Release of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank via SW system to CW system, of S2.0P-SO.WL-0001. PSEG Restricted -Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-3 Op-Test No.: 13-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL. Turnover: Maintain current power. Perform weekly Vacuum Pump swap lAW S2.0P-SO.AR-0001. Event Malf. No. Event Event Type* No. Description N 1 Swap condenser vacuum pumps PO 2 VL0336 c Loss of condenser vacuum (recoverable) VL0337 CRS/PO 3 EL0144 c Loss of 2A 4160 volt vital bus (TS) ALL I Turbine Inlet steam pressure transmitter (PT-505) failure 4 TU0055 ALL (TS) M 5 MS0302 Steam dump failure with single MSIV failing to shut ALL 6 RP0108 c Failure of automatic Safety Injection (steamline D/P) CRS/RO 7 AF0181 B c Loss of All AFW flow- FRHS condensate pump recovery AF0183 ALL CT's: #1 Initiate manual Safety Injection
#2 Establish Condensate flow in FRHS
- (N)ormal, (R)eactJVJty, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-1 Op-Test No.: 13-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 90% power, EOL. Turnover: Raise Rx power to 98.5% @ 10% per hour lAW IOP-4, Power Operation. Event Malf. No. Event Event Type* No. Description R CRS/RO 1 Raise power N PO c 2 AN0266 EDG Air Receiver low pressure (TS) CRS 3 CC0172C c CCW pump trip w I failure of standby pump to start (TS) CC0361 B CRS/PO 4 RC007D c RCP seal degradation CRS/RO M 5 MS0092H Steam leak in containment ALL 6 MS0092 c MSLI failure (Loss of Secondary Coolant) E-H ALL 7 RP318L 1 c Containment Spray pumps fail to start on SEC signal RP318L2 CRS/RO CT's: 1. Stop R~P with seal failure . 2 Start m1n1mum complement of contamment cooling.
- 2. Minimize AFW flow
- (N)ormal, (R)eact1v1ty, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 1 of 34 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: 13-01 NRC ESG-1 SCENARIO NUMBER: 13-01 NRC ESG-1 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates below EXPECTED DURATION: 80 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: '--------'1 L.O. REQUAL X I INITIAL LICENSE I STA
'--------'~ OTHER Revision Summary New Issue for 13-01 NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 08-7-14 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: (O...- ~'J -/4' Date APPROVED BY:
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 2 of 34 A. Given the unit at >20% reactor power with the generator synchronized to the grid, the crew will perform a power increase at 10%/hr, lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004(Q). B. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, the crew will perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, lAW approved station procedures. C. Given indication of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. D. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the safety related plant cooling water system in accordance with approved station procedures. E. Given a RCP with various seal failures, take corrective action for RCP seal failures lAW AB.RCP-0001 and the appropriate alarm response procedures F. Given a failure of an RCP, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction lAW approved station procedures. G. Given the failure of a RCP, DIRECT the response to the malfunction lAW approved station procedures. H. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. I. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. Given a safety injection, START equipment that has failed to automatically start in accordance with the approved station procedures. M. Given the order or indications of a multiple steam generator depressurization, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the generator depressurization in accordance with EOP-LOSC-2. N. Given indication of a multiple steam generator depressurization, DIRECT the response to the generator depressurization in accordance with EOP-LOSC-2
- 0. Given indication of excessive containment pressure DIRECT the response to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures.
R. Given the order or indications of excessive containment pressure perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures. S. Given the unit in the EOPs and an excessive containment pressure the crew will reduce containment pressure lAW approve station procedures. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 3 of 34 A. Power ascension B. 2C EDG air leak C. 23 CCW pump trip w/ failure of standby pump to auto start. D. 24 RCP seal degradation leading to failure. E. Steam rupture in containment w/ failure of MSIVs to shut. F. Containment Spray pump start failure. A. The crew will take the turnover at 90% power, MOL, with direction to raise power to 98.5%
@ 10% per hour. Rx Engineering is bringing updated reactivity plan to control room and crew should determine its own reactivity plan to establish ARO prior to reaching 98.5%
power. B. After the power ascension is commenced, the crew will receive an urgent trouble alarm for 2C EDG. The CRS will determine that 2C EDG is inoperable based on lower than required Air Start Tank pressure, and enter the appropriate Tech Spec. C. Once the EDG Tech Spec is identified, 23 Component Cooling Water pump will trip. The standby CCW pump will not auto start. The crew will manually start the standby CCW pump to restore system pressure and clear CCW and RCP system alarms. The CRS will enter the appropriate Tech Spec. D. 24 RCP #1 seal will exhibit signs of degrading performance. The crew will enter S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality, to address the rising sealleakoff flow. The crew will initiate a Rx trip when seal leakoff reaches the point where the RCP must be tripped. The crew will trip 24 RCP after the Rx is tripped. E. 3-5 minutes after the 24 RCP is tripped, the crew will isolate the sealleakoff return valve for 24 RCP, to prevent further damage and seal degradation of the 24 RCP. (CT #1 ). F. After performing Rx trip immediate actions in EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection, the crew will transition to EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response, when it is determined no condition exists which warrants a Safety Injection. CFST's will be active upon transition out of TRIP-1. During performance of RCS cooldown minimization steps, a steam leak will develop in containment. The crew will initiate a MSLI, then initiate a Safety Injection when all MSIVs remain open (MSLI fails). G. The crew will return to EOP-TRIP-1, then transition out to EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant. The crew will transition to EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization due to all MSIVs being open. H. The crew will transition to EOP-FRCE-1 when containment pressure rises to 15 psig. The crew will diagnose no Containment Spray pumps are running and start Containment Spray pumps. (CT #3). I. During performance of LOSC-2 or FRCE-1 Response to Excessive Containment Pressure, the crew will reduce AFW flow to minimize the RCS cooldown. (CT#2). J. A single MSIV will be closed in the field during performance of LOSC-2. The crew will recognize rising pressure in the associated SG, and transition to LOSC-1. K. The scenario will terminate after the return to LOSC-1. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 4 of 34 Pre-snapped IC-231 Initial IDescription 1 2VC1 and 2VC4 CIT _ 2 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 3 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 4 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 5 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 6 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 7 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 8 S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation, in progress and complete up to Step 5.1.26. 9 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 5 of 34 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group EVENT ACTION: ~~-----*---------------*-------1. kb528ttx //21 SG FEED PUMP TURB-TRIP 3 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed>
- ----- ~-------------*-------------*- - - - -
EVENT ACTION: kc201pb3 // 2C DIESEL GEN-START 5 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 6 of 34 SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK Time Value Time SER POINT AN0266 SER 266 FAILS- :J20 2C DIESEL 01 N/A N/A N/A RT-1 FAILS/OVRD GENERATOR URGENT TROUBLE TOON 02 RP318Q3 2C Diesel GEN Fails to Start on SEC N/A 1\J/A 1\J/A N/A 03 CC0172C 23 COMPONENT COOLING PUMP TRIP N/A N/A N/A RT-3 CC0361B 22 COMPONENT COOLING PUMP Fails to 04 N/A N/A N!A N!A Start on Low Pressure RC007D 24 RC PUMP- #1 SEAL FAILS - w/ 05 N!A 0.3 00:05:00 RT-3 0.75 DEGRADATION 06 MS0092E 21MS167 FAILS OPEN N/;\ N/A N/A N/A 07 MS0092F 22MS167 FAILS OPEN N/A NiA N/A N/A 08 MS0092G 23MS167 FAILS OPEN N/A NIA N/A N/A 09 MS0092H 24MS167 FAILS OPEN N/A N/A N/A N!A. MS0090Ar 21 Main Steam Line Leak Inside Con! 10 00:01:00 6 00:05:00 ET-3 10 AFTER orifice 11 RP318L1 21 CS Pum Fails to Start on SEC 1\JiA N/A N/A NiA 12 RP318L2 22 CS Pump Fails to Start on SEC N/A N!A NiA N!A 13 EL0163 2C EMERG DIESEL GENERATOR TRIP 00:00:10 N/A N!A RT-10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 7 of 34 SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK Time Value Time 01 DG27D 2C DIESEL ENGINE LOCAL START N/A N/A N/A RT-10 START SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition/ CHECK Time Value Time Severity 01 C201 F Dl 2C DIESEL GEN-STOP 00:00:05 N!A N/A ET-5 ON 02 C201 C1 LO 2C DIESEL GEN-READY TO LOAD N/A N/l\ 1\J/A N/A OFF 03 C203 LAO 2C DIESEL GENERATOR- VOLTS ~VA N/A N/A N/A 0 04 C203 R AO 2C DIESEL GENERATOR- FREQ ~~!A N/A N/,4. N/A 35 Description
- 1. None PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 8 of 34 A. State shift job assignments. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew 'The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 9 of 34
- 1. Power ascension CRS briefs crew on power ascension.
RO calculates dilution required to achieve ARO prior to 98.5% power. PO sets up Main Turbine for power ascension to 98.5% at 10% per hour. Note: CRS may direct rod movement only until rods are fully withdrawn. If this is the method chosen, then dilution will not be performed prior to initiating the up power. Note: Power defect change from 90% to 98.5% is 83.3 pcm. (Page 104/115 of S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0016 Curve Book, using 6,000 EFPH and 900 Cb RCS boron)) There is 52 pcm left in rods at 203 steps. (page 32/115). This means 31.3 pcm will have to be added via dilution. Note: Differential boron worth at 90% power for 6,000 EFPH is - -6.4846 pcm/ppm. 31.3 pcm I -6.4846 pcm/ppm =a boron concentration change of 4.8 ppm required. This can be calculated to PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 10 of 34
,f:'ii:JtCotnm~nt~:~i\ *-*~;t?1~
- ,~~~j;t:~~.~tc~,?:~!~i~'entF~i,~r~rr~~:~~\;~:.~~r'.~*.**r~a*)J,,: (~~~:/*~*
- be 353 gallons of dilution total would be required in addition to the rods. (Calc found on Figure 101 of S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012 Figures).
RO initiates dilution. (if required) Note: If dilution is used first, the turbine up power will not be initiated until after the RO reports the effect of the dilution is being observed in the RCS. PO initiates power ascension to 98.5% at 10% per hour. RO/PO monitor plant response to ensure power ascension is progressing as anticipated. RO either announces expected and actual auto rod movement, or withdraws rods in manual with CRS concurrence to maintain Tavg on _QrQgram. Note: Auto or manual rod control is at the discretion of the CRS. Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
- 2. 2C EDG Air start compressor leak/failure SimiJI~tor Operator: lnsE}rt RT*1
- I*: on directiorrfrdrn. Lead Evaluator; PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 11 of 34
. s:t ,;{'a ~~~-~rr:~~;~*~ct~~;~l,~~~~~~~~~~;~~*~?;~~t*~:"T . ***.~7?i~~~t~~1;2 ::~.
PO announces OHA J-20, 2C DG URGENT TRBL, as unexoected. i PO refers to ARP and re I Note: 2C EDG Air System is shown on drawing 205241 Sheet 6. Role Play: 2 minutes after being dispatched, report that when you arrived at 2C EDG control room, you could hear an air leak in the 2C t EDG room. You acknowledged 2C EDG local alarm panel alarms A-4 and A-5, Air Receiver #1 Low Pressure and Air Receiver #2 Low Pressure respectively. In 2C EDG room you identified both EDG air start compressors running, and a large air leak on the starting air supply line at the connection where the single supply line from the Moisture Separator splits to go to the two Air Receiver Tanks. Current Starting Air Tank pressures are both 176 psig and dropping. If asked, report the alarm setpoint for the low air pressure is 182 psig per PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 12 of 34 s~~ .tE:var tortlnstru ~f*t ~~~r]ci~~... >*~~.~.~~; .. the ARP.
.* ,&~g~~x;~~***
Note: If directed to isolate the air starting tanks inlet valves to isolate the leak, report back after 8 minutes that you have shut 21 DA5C and 22DA5C (or the valves directed by CRS if different) to isolate the 23A and 238 Air Receiver Tanks respectively, and that both Air Start tanks are at 155 psi g. Role Play: IF requested to inform CRS when air pressure reaches 160 psig, report back in 8 minutes that Air start pressure is 160 psig and lowering. Assuming a constant rate of pressure reduction, the Air Start tanks will reach their Tech Spec operability limit of 160 psig in 8 minutes from the initial field report. Note: CRS may direct starting 2C EDG to ensure it remains operable. This would preclude having to declare the EDG inoperable, and extend the amount of time until the EDG would be in a 72 hour shutdown LCO (to allow a trouble shooting plan to be developed, obtain repair parts, etc). However, running an EDG unloaded for an PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Paae 13 of 34 t.*.*. . j~~e:1 t~~fr'J~s1r~F~.i£t~~~irii'~t;i(~ ::fJ:,~{~.~~~~~?.~~~~&~~t~~~ttr*R~~:~~~8~ ** . .*
- .:~,:~~~:~~&J~: ~~*i extended period of time would require additional evaluation, and in any event the EDG will fail if it is attempted to be started.
IF CRS orders PO to start 2C EDG from control console it will not reach proper speed, and stop shortly after the start attempt. IF CRS directs 2C EDG to be started locally, state you will review S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Operation, ensure prerequisites are met, review the P&L's, do the pre-startup checks, and report back when you are ready to start 2C EDG. IF the CRS directs starting of 2C EDG without completing the step above, continue to next step. IF directed to locally start 2C EDG without performing normal start pre-req's, P&L's, etc., insert RT-10 to place the local start-stop switch to start, and report when 2C EDG trips 10 seconds later on over crank. (Local Alarm Panel window B-5 Failure to Start - Overcrank.) CRS enters TSAS 3.8.1.1.b action b and determines the remainina 2 EDGs must be PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 14 of 34
- :.>.x::e**.... ,. . *. . t* ** . r**zr*n# s"t'fUC""'t'o*J"~f:'\
.*,...c.'"t****.* Ct.e....
lVI*t*y**. '*'* ..* *; * ***v*<:. .*e* Xpe... 'd
. *p*Ja*0**t*/*s*t*u***d* en...t. . *R***""""' :"x:: :;;:;:;;;;:s*** ..,..qw****. * .*****'*"'.::. :.*.....*. *a*-r* . ;:;z >t~~~~~~~x~~~t:~.z;f~;:,:;*.**. "> ya.~:~ao. . <., , esponse,.,.,, &.*~r*
1*;*: verified operable by performing S2.0P-ST-500-1, ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES ALIGNMENT, within 1 hour. Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
- 3. 23 CCW pump w/failure of standby pump to start.
Simulator Operator: Insert RT-3 ..: on direction fron1 Lead*evaluatorr IVIALFS: '*.. ** ....*** . . *' ; . CC0172C 23 COMPONENT *. COOLING WATER PUMP.*TRIP
.~;&~~~~~~~~~~~~ .~EA!;*
i. lnl(iari.yarue:* oj J ** Severity:~o;7s. .
- Ramp: s'rninutes' RO reports trip of 23 CCW pump and standby i' umo did not auto start. I I
i RO manual! PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training I
~
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 15 of 34
;;,~,evaluator/fnstructor:ffActivitY;s:' ,*;!i:;SxfiectiltiRlanttstudirr.trijespons~ ,,, 5 .\ ~r;~::n;ofumehf,'~:: ,
h~~~~-f~~~~~;,,.,--, !;~ . o:-' ',: c..:: 'c;~,~ :~, *~~~xiJ~;~; ~'~~ .,~ *> '.~: c~1&tf~*;,~~:::~J~' <:,* *'*/*, .
'*.~~/*; '*,,*~,;~:t:: J:;.:".~*~.*.-~~1:~-v' ',< c clearing of all alarms associated with the CCW pumo tri~.
CRS directs RO/PO to validate alarms received with ARP auidance. Note: CCW system alarms will annunciate during initial crew response, but all alarms will clear upon restoration of system pressure. RO/PO report that alarms received were consistent with low CCW system pressure, and that the restoration of system pressure was exoected to clear all those alarms. RO verifies RCP CCW cooled parameters trendina to normal values. CRS may enter S2.0P-AS.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality, and S2.0P-AS.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality, to verify actions previously performed have corrected condition. Note: Entry into these 2 AS's is not required because the action taken to restore CCW system pressure corrected the entry conditions for the AS's. CRS dispatches operators to investigate 23 CCW oumo trio. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 16 of 34 E~afuator!J,Qstru,<:J<:lr ..<<ativitf> *'? *-~"' J:_::-:;~~rt/~B:r;:~Bj :*~"~~'i~;;t~m~nt~::?;*h~f* *, '*'{if?i\f;:,:,:: *
~ ~1~~~i;;~~:,~~-~*\;-~~;~~t-::~~<~- '~~J~'-<~}>~_:. \~ ' ,\~ ,;~,* ' -~~ *, " ~.:;L ' 'LOG* "
Role Play: 2 minutes after being dispatched to check 23 CCW pump breaker, report overcurrent trip is present on 23 CCW pump. If dispatched to check CCW pumps, report they look normal. CRS enters TSAS 3. 7.3 based on not having 2 operable CCW loops. Note: Post scenario question may need to be asked for this Tech Spec call if it is not addressed prior to RCP malfunction.
- 4. 24 RCP seal degradation w/
failure RO reports 24 RCP seal leakoff flow alarm current reading. Note: Seal inlet and outlet temps will lower, charging flow will rise, and RCDT level will rise (slightly), due to the seal leak. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality. CRS verifies entry condition of seal leakoff flow >5 _g()m is met. CRS directs initiation of CAS. RO uses P-250 computer to check 24 RCP ---- -***- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 1.7 of 34 .:;:,.:;:~;7~~\si~~:o~,~~*struc~~::.&tc~i~,~t:ri * * * * \,;,.;~Expircted P'hirWStudent ResporJse: .*.*
- 'c,'}i ' ':~~;:: )\~~ ~:;*':' 1c~, .:', :~,:,>, :1 ~i;;;;~;~; ~ >'~£:; :~1<~::~:*:'
. .*. . :~~6s~f~jL!~~z:1 conditions.
I CRS determines CCW water supply is not causing abnormal condition. RO reports all RCP temperatures are normal and stable. II RO reports seal injection has not been lost. RO reports seal leakoff is stable at 5.2 gpm. CRS determines a unit shutdown should be performed. Simulator Operator:: MODIFY ... . MALF RC0070 frOm Q,75Jo .f:d. with a 5 minute n3mp. on directioh from Lead/Evaluator * * ** '
' RO reports seal leak has begun to rise towards 6 gpm.
CRS determines 24 RCP seal leakoff flow rising towards >6 gpm and will soon exceed 6 gpm CAS value, and goes to Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps. CRS briefs Rx trip actions to be _p_erformed. CRS identifies the requirement to shut 24CV1 04 3-5 minutes after pumpshutdown. Note: When fully ramped in, the MALF will cause 24 RCP seal PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 18 of 34 1:.~:***e*** **dv" *t* .d *M.*.**. ***""***>"**'*'****-.. A . . c* ~1v1*t'y.~*:::.*;:::::s:tt1c'*
*t. '""***.c?:*:"'K'"'~'*" xpec .Et .,; . an . .\:'p**~.*~* *,* . .t/'S*:*t*,.*,d*
- u. *en * "t* R"wteS,t
,;*~:'~*~*,HS~~:-:~*, . :-c -* ,>::~~,~~::,,:<;<*,,:, -,-~ ,~~~- ;2.-~J,' ,'-:j;~i:~~ :~!::_;:,;:~;t{~;~~Y~1!~~~;:::::~Y~--;~ ~~::c >;~~:~~~, -~, , .. _
leakoff to be >6 gpm. This is indicated by a console reading of
"+OVER" on the hi range seal leakoff chart recorder.
RO trios the reactor. RO stops 24 RCP, and crew recognizes 24CV1 04 must be shut in 3-5 minutes. RO continues performing EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, immediate actions from memory:
- Reports the Rx is tripped - Confirms Rx trip - Backs up the Main Turbine trip - Reports at least one 4KV vital bus energized. - Reports Safety Injection not actuated. - Reports Safety injection not required based on board indications.
CRS reads immediate action steps to RO and RO verifies oerformance. PO receives CRS permission and throttles AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lb/hr. RO shuts 24CV1 04 3-5 minutes after 24 RCP is triooed.
- . CT#1:.Ciose 24CV~04 3~5 *
*minutesaftett,ripp'ir'lgJheiRCP *due to s~al*;t~ilkoff;;>i6.9pm.:**,.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 19 of 34
~ ~; ;ie.vat u I~:,."~~~::,,~\'<
1 lict~.~.*~ctivity~::,:* * .:~!*~~~~~~;*~,~:~!~~~~~*~~~~~~.~o.~~e* :'ftl';~~f,~:~g~i*l. . . *~:!;~~~1~~~t**~:r~:rt~f\¥~
- sAT> .....,* UNSAT *
- CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response.
Note: STA reports to the Control Room 10 minutes after being paged to report. RO makes page announcement "Unit 2 Rx trip." PO re_Q_orts total AFW flow is >22E4 Ibm/hr. PO stoj)_s 21 and 22 SGFPs. Silnulat<)r Operator: Ensure:,ET*3 iscTRUEwhe.n.2i .. SGFP is trippe.d:'. This *inserts thetsteam leak after'ci . . one minute delay..
- 5. Steam leak in containment PO lowers 23 AFW pump speed to minimum, and throttles 21-24AF21 's to maintain AFW flow - 22E4 Ibm/hr.
RO reports 3 RCPs running. RO reports RCS Tavg is stable at or trending to 54r F. RO reports unexpected OHAs for CFCU leak detection and Containment Sump pump start PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 20 of 34
- . "; ~v~~:~~9r~;r~~!g~!or 4c~1it2;~t:~~\~**:;~g;j,;~~~~~c~19~f:'~la,a~~~~CI~~~I~t:~~ns,e,0:~,#,:;, .~:';~,~rJf~~ * \commeill :':!~:,~~,;::::::,
,f* ,,
when they occur. RO reports no indication of RCS leak. Crew diagnoses steam leak in containment. CRS orders a MSLI using AB.STM-1 CAS justification.
- 6. MSLI failure RO reports MSLI has failed on both trains.
CRS orders a Safety Injection. RO initiates Safety Injection. CRS returns to TRIP-1 based on TRIP-2 CAS of Safety Injection actuation. CRS/RO verify immediate actions complete. CRS dispatches operators to locally shut MSIVs. f PO reports all available equipment started on SECs. i PO reports 21 and 22 AFW pumps running. PO reports Table B valve groups in safeguards position. RO reports 21/22CA330s are shut. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
"';ir~~~~re~~~'r1~~!~rrt~~:"~fiY'!:~Fi~:r ,,;'+> . , .*..:*:"'w1. *. ?:r~'.' ,, , ;:1,: ,, ** :r:, :"::i; y
,.:~~r:oG:::~;~;,
RO reports containment pressure is <15 psiq. Note: See actions on next page for when containment pressure rises above 15 psig. RO reports no high steam flow conditions on 2RP4. PO reports all 4KV vital buses enerqized. RO reports correct control room and switchqear room ventilation aliqnment. RO reports 2 CCW pumps in service. RO reports ECCS flow for current RCS pressure as expected. PO reports AFW flow >22E4 Ibm/hr. RO reports RCP status, and RCS temp not stable at or trending to 54r F due to steam leak, and MSLI has failed to shut anv MSIV. RO reports both RTBs open. RO reports both PZR PORVs shut and Block Valves open.
- 7. Containment Spray pumps fail to start.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 22 of 34
>~~~i:~~~~~,~~.t'~~~~r~~~1~~~f~St~~<~~h~:: *: .:,~"~,x~e~:~;~!*~j~st~t~'"I~~~,~~~~~
Note: Containment Spray is directed to be started in TRIP-1 and in FRCE-1 when containment pressure reaches 15 psig. TRIP-1 Spray initiation (FRCE-1 initiation is on page 24) CRS refers/returns to TRIP-1 Step 11 and:
- Ensures Containment Spray by initiating Phase Band Spray actuation. - RO inserts BOTH keys into CS actuation and turns at same time. - RO reports spray valve realignment. - Start 21 and 22 CS pumps If SECs are not reset, RO blocks and resets 2A and 2C SECs. '
RO inserts key and turns for 21 and 22 CS pumps and reports both CS pumps are running.
- Initiate MSLI I
RO reports MSLI failure.
- Stop 21-24 RCPs - RO depresses stop PB for all RCPs.
Ensure valve groups in Table 0 in safeguards position. PO reoorts Table 0 valves oosition. l
~
CT #2.(C.T~3) Ma,ndall~1 stat;t , * .* .... **. Containin.e.ntSpray:pump~* pri.or' .. to completion ofstep ~* ofFRCE: ** '.1. ' . * ' ,' < .... PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 23 of 34
~;::~~~~~f~,}~~i~(~~,~~~~"~:~t~':2~~,~~,t~r~~~::,~::,~: *~1~tf~g~:J*:*,:*rr***
RO reports RCP status, and spray valves shut if RCPs in service. PO reports all SG pressures dropping in an uncontrolled manner and MSLI has failed to shut anv MSIV CRS transitions to LOSC-1, Loss of Secondarv Coolant. Ii RO reports MSLI failed to shut any MSIV, and dispatches operators to shut MSIVs if not reviouslv oerformed. PO reports all SG pressures dropping in an uncontrolled manner. CRS transitions to LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization. PO ensures valves in Table A shut, and dispatches operator to shut any open valve if not oreviouslv oerformed. PO reports 23 AFW pump not needed for SG level control, then trips and stops 23 AFW RO reports RCS cooldown rate is > 100°F per I hour. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training t I
i TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Pag~ .24 of 34 }llijj~~.~~~t~~~~i~~~~~: *="~Ji~~:ted~~~~*"l{i:~~~*i~~~i~~~~~z . )'~~;,. '~;~~g~ : y .j >S0:<;;;;:;; Note: Step 5 asks for cooldown rate, not if RCS has cooled down l 100°F in last hour, which would be FRTS-1 (Thermal Shock) entry. i Note: RCS C/D rate is - 120°F/hr. .~ PO reduces AFW flow to each SG to no less than 1.0 E4 Ibm/hr. II CT#3 (CT-33) Reduce AFWJiow to.noless'than.1;0E4Jbmttlrfo.** I each: SG 'to'm'inimize~RCS,,>"< ... .* cooldowr1 'pfiortO exitingFRCE;. *.
- 1. **.* ..
STA reoorts valid RED oath on FRHS. I CRS transitions to FRHS-1, verifies it was operator action which caused the RED path, and returns to orocedure in effect. FRCE-1 actions here CRS directs closure of Phase A isolation valves not needed for recover *. t$ RO reports containment pressure >15 psi I RO reoorts LOCA-5 not in effect. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Pag~.~25 of 34
. *:E~~~~,~;~~{~f~~rt~gc~~~~~~!~* 'i .~~*.*:*,.,:&~~~~1e~?ttantf~to~e.~t.~~~$a~;g:r;~*~t;t*~* *~~fg~: .
RO starts or reports 21 and 22 CS in service. RO reports 21 and 22CS2C!r§l open. RO reports 2CS14,16 and 17 are open. RO stops RCPs if running. RO reports all CFCUs running in slow speed with adequate SW flow. RO reports MSLI valves all open, and dispatches operators to shut them if not previously performed. PO lowers AFW flow to no less than 1.0E4 lbm/hr to each SG. PO reports SG isolation valve status. CRS returns to procedure in effect. Simulatorpperator:O[)ce AFW flow has been Jowere'C! 'to* SGs; and
- A,ETE.R F~ff:~1has.bl3en . ***. .
REifformed( and BEFORE *reaching *** ste'p\ 8 of LOSC;2;,;:rHEN remove .::": 1 MALF from the MSIV theCRS
- direetedJo be closed first"that is3:;:.>
- NQT21"MSIV.
- PO reports rising pressure in affected SG.
CRS uses CAS action of LOSC-2 of rising pressure in any SG to return to LOSC-1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 26 of 34 ..**?~Yalu~t~~g~F~~ftor5fctivi~::t.*** t* :~:'\~*1,~~.~ec£e~. .~~a~~~~t,~a~~~~,.*R~.~~;~?s~. l::.~f1 f:01:l~:~~gfi~*~r*;. *).,f£ommenf ;.* ~*>w*
- Terminate scenario upon transition back to LOSC-1.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 27 of 34 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures E. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation F. S2.0P-SO.DG-0003, 2C EDG Operation G. S2.0P-AR.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Alarm Response H. Dwg 205241, Sheet 6, Diesel Engine Auxiliaries I. S2.0P-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling System Abnormality J. S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality K. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection L. 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response M. 2-EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant N. 2-EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization
- 0. 2-EOP-FRCE-1, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT1** UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS
. TODAY*
MODE: 1 POWER: 90 RCS BORON: 895 MWe 1080 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 6,000 EFPH Control Bank D is at 203 steps. Reactivity plan for power ascension to 98.5% is to perform dilution concurrent with rod withdrawal to establish ARO prior to reaching 98.5%. Calorimetric required prior to exceeding 90% power has been performed SAT. MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION: EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation, in progress and complete up to Step 5.1.26. Power was reduced 2 days ago to remove 21 and 22 Heater Drain Pumps from service due to possible damage from spraying water. Pumps have been inspected and returned to service. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: SECONDARY: Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
'------------------------------~---------
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST
- 1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter With Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct if applicable.
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
- 26. Verify EGC paperwork is marked "Training Use Only" and is current revision.
- 27. Ensure sufficient copies of ECG paperwork are available.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASKMETHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 13-01 NRC-ESG-1 REVIEWER: P Williams Initials Qualitative Attributes PW 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PW 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PW 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PW 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction( s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point PW 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
PW 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PW 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PW 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PW 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PW 10. The scenario has been validated. PW 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario. PW 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d) Initial Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d) GG 7 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GG 3 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GG 3 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GG Major Transients: 1-2 GG 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GG 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GG 3 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 13-01 NRC ESG-1 CT#1: (AB.RCP) Close 24CV104 3-5 minutes after tripping the RCP due to Seal Leakoff > 6 gpm. BASIS: Closing the Seal Leakoff Isolation Valve 24CV1 04 prevents unfiltered, high temperature RCS into the #2 RCP seal, which raises the probability of #2 seal failure. The 3 minute time frame is based on expected coastdown time of the RCP since a static condition is more favorable for the #2 seal to perform its backup function to the #1 seal. The 5 minute limitation minimizes RCS leakage from the damaged seal to maintain RCS inventory. Failure to isolate within 5 minutes raises the possibility of a #2 seal failure and subsequent LOCA. CT#2 (CT-3) Manually start Containment Spray pumps prior to completion of step 3 of FRCE-1. BASIS: Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to "recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component." CT#3 (CT-33) Reduce AFW flow to no less than 1.0E4 lbm/hr to each SG to minimize RCS cooldown prior to exiting FRCE-1. BASIS: Failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality and the containment CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 33 of 34 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN Event YIN Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture y Loss ofCCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area y Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 1 of 29 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: 13-01 NRC ESG-3 SCENARIO NUMBER: 13-01 NRC ESG-3 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates below EXPECTED DURATION: 75 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: '-------- L.O. REQUAL X !INITIAL LICENSE
'--------'1 STA '-------- OTHER Revision Summary New Issue for 13-01 NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 09-14-14 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: /0 J -!If Date APPROVED BY:
Date PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 2 of 29 A. Given the order or indications of a loss of vacuum, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction, in accordance with S2.0P-AB.COND-0001. B. Given the order or indications of a loss of vacuum, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with S2.0P-AB.COND-0001 C. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. D. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction in accordance with S2.0P-AB.4KV-0001. E. Given indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with S2.0P-AB.4KV-0001. F. Given indication of unwarranted continuous rod motion perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with S1/S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003. G. Given indication of unwarranted continuous rod motion DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003. H. Given the indication of excessive steam flow, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to excessive flow in accordance with S1/S2.0P-AB.STM-0001 I. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. Given a safety injection has occurred and equipment has failed to START equipment that has failed to automatically start in accordance with the approved station procedures. M. Given indication of excessive containment pressure DIRECT the response to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures. R. Given the order or indications of excessive containment pressure perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures. S. Given the unit in the EOPs and an excessive containment pressure the crew will reduce containment pressure lAW approve station procedures. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 3 of 29 A. Swap Condenser Vacuum pumps B. Loss of Condenser Vacuum (recoverable) C. Loss of 2A 4KV vital bus on Bus Differential D. Turbine Steamline Inlet Pressure Transmitter PT-505 failure E. Steam Dump failure F. Loss of all AFW I FRHS I Cond pump recovery A. The crew will take the turnover at 100% power, MOL, with direction to swap operating condenser vacuum pumps per Control Room logs weekly pump swap using S2.0P-SO.AR-0001, Condenser Air Removal System Operation. B. During the vacuum pump swap, the pump being secured will have its air injection suction isolation valve AR25 fail open, causing condenser vacuum to degrade if not addressed immediately. The crew will attempt to re-start the affected pump (it will not start), direct field personnel to immediately shut the affected AR25, and start the remaining vacuum pump, which will restore vacuum. C. Once vacuum has been restored, the 2A 4KV vital bus will lock out on bus differential. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.4KV-0001, Loss of 2A 4160 Volt Vital Bus. The CRS will identify Tech Specs. D. The Main Turbine Steamline Inlet Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) will fail low. If control rods are in auto (they may have been placed in manual due to non-urgent failure alarm present) they will insert at maximum rate. The RO will verify no load reject in progress, and place control rods in manual. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. If control rods are in manual, the crew will diagnose the failure based on alarms received and RP4 hi steam flow bistable status. E. The crew will swap Main Steam Dumps if in S2.0P-AB.ROD-003, or lAW SO.RPS-0006 based on TSAS 3.3.2.1 requiring placing PT -505 in the tripped condition. If the crew did not require AB.ROD-3 entry and do not swap steam dumps toMS Pressure control (the TSAS gives them 6 hours to place channel in tripped condition) the steam dump failure will be entered by the Simulator Operator. The steam dump failure will cause 21-23TB20 steam dumps to open. The steam dumps will be unable to be shut or turned off. The CRS will direct a Rx trip and MSLI. F. The MSLI will only shut 3 of 4 MSIV's, and the CRS will direct a Safety Injection be initiated. An auto Sl signal will be generated on Steamline Delta Pressure as 23 SG blows down. Auto Sl initiation is failed. G. 22 AFW pump will trip shortly after AFW flow reduction is performed following TRIP-1 immediate actions. 23 AFW pump will trip 5 minutes later. The crew will isolate feedwater to 23 SG. The CRS will transition to FRHS-1 when directed in TRIP-1. H. The crew will perform a Condensate pump recovery in FRHS-1 due to SGFPs not being available, and all AFW pumps failed. I. The scenario will terminate when SG WR levels are rising in FRHS-1, or when RCS Bleed and Feed is initiated. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 4 of 29 Pre-snapped IC-233 Initial I Description 1 2VC1 and 2CV4 CIT _ 2 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 3 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 4 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 5 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 6 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 7 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 8 Provide copy of S2.0P-SO.AR-0001 with prereq 2.2 (off normal check) signed off. 9 Provide blank copy of S2.0P-DL.ZZ-0003, Control Room logs Modes 1-4. 10 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 5 of 29 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group EVENT ACTION: kcf08dv1 // STM DUMP CONTROL MODE-MAIN STM P 3 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kb515tcp // 22AF21 CLOSE 5 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kck05anz // 25AR25 25 VACUUM PUMP-CONDENSER 7 COMMAND: DMF VL0440 PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kck04tpz // 24 VACUUM PUMP-STOP 9 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kck02pbz //22 VACUUM PUMP-START 11 COMMAND: DMF CN0086B PURPOSE: <update as needed> SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK Time Value Time 01 N!A N/A N/A N/A 100 02 EL0144 LOSS OF 2A 4160V VITAL BUS N!A N/A N/A RT-1 03 TU0055 TURBINE INLET PRESS XMTR 505 FAILS H/ N/A N/A N/A RT-3 0 04 08 FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC Sl N/A N/A N/A N/A 05 1B 22 AUX FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP 00:00:15 N/A N/A ET-5 06 AF0183 23 AUX FW PMP OVERSPEED TRIP 00:01:00 N/A N/A ET-5 07 NiA N/A N!A N/A 0 08 CN0086B Loss of 22 main condenser vacuum f\J/A N/A N/A ET-9 4 09 MS0092G 23MS167 FAILS OPEN N/A N/A N/A N!A 10 VL0463 21TB20 Fails to Position N/A N/A ~JiA ET-3 100 11 VL0464 22TB20 Fails to Position N/A N/A N/A 12 VL0465 23TB20 Fails to Position N/A N/A N/A PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 6 of 29 SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK Time Value Time SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition/ CHECK Time Value Time Severity 01 CF06 F Dl STM DUMP INTLK TRAIN 'A'-OFF N/A NiA N/A N/A OFF 02 CF07 F Dl STM DUMP r-.J!A N/A N/A OFF 03 N/A N/A N/A OFF 04 CK04 E Dl 24 VACUUM PUMP-START N/A N!A N/A N/A OFF
- 1. None PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 7 of 29 A. State shift job assignments. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 8 of 29 EY:aiuatbHI nstrucfc
- ~{t::~~:\!~:':*j~: )~>;;~'~ ' ', *, ~-.:~~~' ****~~~~:i~~~~~~~u~f~~.~~~P~~f:~~;*f~~ ',.,'-,
- 1. Swap Condenser Vacuum Pumps CRS directs PO to start the next sequential Condenser Vacuum pump (25), and secure the previous pump (24) lAW S2.0P-SO.AR-0001, Condenser Air Removal System Ooeration.
PO refers to section 5.5, Swapping Condenser Vacuum Pumos. PO contacts Chemistry to inform them of When contacted, report Chemistry is ready for swapping vacuum pumps. PO determines section 5.5.4 for starting 25 vacuum pump and stopping 22 or 24 vacuum pumps is proper orocedure section. PO contacts NEO to check 25 vacuum pump seal tank level, Seal Water Circulator discharge pressure is 10-25 psig as indicated by 2PL3226, and 24 Vacuum Pump suction pressure is at least 3" Hg. Above Main Condenser vacuum. Role play: When contacted, report PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 9 of 29
, "Sva:iJt.atorllnstro,ct9~~~tivltJ *** :tl~~"';;,,rexp'~tfecf':ptan1ZStud9:nfR>>espon *;~.**;z>C~m~~~~;t~~~]}?if!P;;<:;:;;; .
- ,_ -~. *,Ii:iil .:_~i;f:f:z:,: :~~%\\'1~:~tf:~rv~~*,~* ,. *:~,\7!~.~~:** :*~:t .* ,. '.;:f~' **:~: -~; \,~.;{~*. *.t.~;~t)f~i ~~-:~~~~:~*~~:;** h~ii~,:~~:{:*.* ' ~ )*::?~~. *:/:<1,'
you will check conditions and get back to them. One minute later, report 24 vacuum pump seal tank level is normal112 way between high and low marks, Seal Water Circulator discharge pressure is 18 psig, and 25 vacuum pump suction pressure is 28" Hg. PO ooens 25AR25. PO stoos 24 vacuum Simulator Operator:.Ensure; ET-9
- is*truewhen 24\/acuum;pumpstop f=>B Ts aepr~ised. Jhis insE3rts.th¢J
*lass of v<idiJum. :< . * ..*. * . .....**..
PO reoorts 24AR25 did not shut.
- 2. Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum CRS directs start of 24 vacuum oum~.
PO reoorts 24 vacuum oumo will not start. PO contacts NEO to isolate 24AR25 by closina 24AR23 . PO reports slowly degrading condenser backoressure. Note: If CRS directs starting the remaining vacuum pump here, then PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 10 of 29
.eiJ~I uarorll n$trtlctP:r!~cfiv~~9\!f f ~ :~~' ,**li?,?~:t:~ff;:~;:;*;~:-;c:' Jg~: :*,' ' "* il~~ ~\'~: .:t~~~' '*:~ ::*~:~~;~<' ~' < ,', \ <
vacuum will improve, and S2.0P-AB.COND-0001 may not be entered. I!' Simuiatdr:~dperatorn::nsure >, *
- .* ET~J*1*** is~tf\Je:when~22vacuum. I pump :start PB:'is d~pl"es~ed~ T't)ls
**deletes the \/acuum malfunction; * >Simulator Oper:ator::J 5 seconds -~
after 22 vacuum pum'p' is started, delete MALFVL0337,.andif . previously direCted to .. locallyshut .. 24AR23, reportas NEQ that>
- 24AR23 is shut. *,;,.;,: *.**
- I CRS enters S2.0P-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1 CAS. i CRS ensures local operators are addressing i vacuum problem. PO starts all available vacuum pumps if not previously performed. PO reports condenser backpressure is improving. t CRS goes to Section 4.0, Completion and Review to exit procedure. Continue to next event on direction PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 11 of 29 from Lead Evaluator.
- 3. Loss of 2A 4160 volt bus diret'tic>n;tf-ofri *L:ead~evaluatdr.,i.:* ;*h.**
- MALF: *Ei:o144~J:loss:of*2tf4.16dv*
.VitillBus.> * * :>* :*"'"":*< if ~:" .. RO/PO announce multitude of unexpected alarms, and diagnose the loss of 2A 4KV vital bus. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.4KV-0001, Loss of 2A 4KV Vital Bus. PO reports 2A EDG running, and dispatches an ooerator to 2A EDG. RO reports 23 charging pump was in service, closes 2CV55. and starts 21 ch re PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 12 of 29
- i~~~~~f~~a~if'!£ltr~t~r~~~:~ry'&'?~!i'~, ,, . ,' ' 7 \ ' .*. . vw, RO reports 21 RHR pump was not in service and 2A vital bus is deeneraized.
PO reoorts no AFW oumos in service. RO reports all SW and CCW low pressure alarms clear. RO restores letdown by verifying 2CV2 and 2CV277 open and in auto, ensuring charging flow -80 gpm, opening one 75 letdown orifice, and adjusting 2CV18 to maintain letdown pressure -300 psig, then placing 2CV18 in automatic. CRS dispatches operator and Maintenance to investiaate loss of 2A bus. CRS determines Tech Specs applicable to loss of 2A bus. CRS directs initiation of S2.0P-AB.460-0001, Loss of 2A 460/230V Vital buses. Applicable tech Specs are: 3.9.12 for FHV- immediate 3.4.5 for 2PR6 loss of power- 1 hour 3.6.1.1 for 21 SW20 being open w/no power-1 hour 3.8.2.1 action a for 2A 4KV bus deenergized - 8 hours 3.8.2.3 and 3.8.2.5 for battery chargers - 2 hours 3.6.3 for CIV inoperable - 4 hours 3.7.1.2.a and b, action b for 2 AFW pumps-PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 13 of 29
,,)}!'{,"
geyaluaiorllrlstruetO'rJ>!ctivifY',;, ,
,u**u~<<-"-o'>
.:_".~ ~l~i '.:?~~ :/::~:~,.~;~1~~ ;~~t~~.f:'<_;j;i;Jf,?%f;!~~-::~ft~;~\ <-_:-:* >~~:~ >~' i' \~~l~; 6 hours 3.7.6.a.1 CREACS fans- 4 hours 3.3.3.1 act. b Rad monitors - AB.460-0001 steps start here- I some action in this AB are i redundant to actions taken in AB.4KV-1. PO verifies centrifugal charging pp and I letdown in service. PO dispatches operators to swap to alternate battery chargers for 2A 125 and 28 VDC batteries. i PO starts 22 chilled water PO ensures alternate ventilation system components placed in service, and dispatches an operator to realign DFO to 22 DFO xfer pump to reaular. Note: The rod control Non-urgent failure alarm will be in. The ARP states to place rod control in manual. This may or may not be identified when it is determined to proceed to next event based on the amount of alarms requiring verification. Continue to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 14 of 29 ICientiRe.spoosE
*-~~*~:~t;*~.~~:~~,-.,~t~*,ft.;~~::::B~{~; ,?.~ -c:>'~:', .,"M'<.. ;.~-~.,~'A*, ",.,*
- 4. Failure of Turbine Steamline Inlet Pressure Transmitter PT-505.
~imu lator ,Operator: *lm3erfRT-3 .*.
on directionfrom:Lead:Evaluator;' ** MAilF~;tfUo"oss Tl.lrbine:Jnlet *:~ Pfess xmtr Jails~*! ow/ +<* *v ., *
- .. severitvr;o<:;:g~ :*;'
If rods are in auto, RO report insertion at 72 spm, no load reject, and places control rods in manual. If rods are in manual, RO reports OHA's and RP4 bistable indications. Crew diaanoses PT-505 failed low. AB.ROD-3 steps here. If rods moved, CRS enters S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. RO reports rods in manual and rod motion stoooed , and rod motion was inward. I' RO reports PT-505 failed low and rods above ~ RIL. PO aligns steam dumps by:
- Ensuring steam pressure setpoint is 1005 psig. - Ensuring steam dumps in auto. - Deoressina MS Pressure Control PB.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
~
i
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 15 of 29
, ,'~t'i:::r ,,,,,,,t,"R' ,,,~,w<~>,'"~'--"'~'"', "'KY,, "-,,"ttlfg':*_,'B'"t->*f,
- ~~;~~2{ty~t¥,
- ,'-,:,~,,,--, .u.~.~en , e$ponser" '*'"z _ >:!:# _ . *"' ~*>cdmme~~;~~" -*/,_
}>f;~~ ~,**~- :~,:r: *~'.~:~ ~~~- ~*.:-!~~; ~, ~~i- :~_,, :Y?fir;tt(:)*G:~~> *;simutator:ot:>erator:.Ensl.ite ET~'3* *.* 'istro~:I\Vh~li ,ste.am:#qmps placed.-**
,.*~p~tJ~Wi~~g.~~C~ ~~,~~l:',,,. v~lves. ,,,* > 8 AB-ROD-3 NOT entered steps start here. Note: There is no alarm response or abnormal procedure direction to swap steam dumps to MS Pressure control mode. The CRS can use S2.0P-SO.MS-0002, Steam Dump System Operation to swap steam dumps once it is identified that the steam dumps have a 100%Tavg demand. >IF th~:,cr~w does *nc:>,tid.entifyJhat steam'.dump<cor:Hrol modesno,uld _
,be,~wapp'ed,* th'en ~ea~;Eya1Liat6r *direct Sim.ulator,dpera'tor .to force,;
ET,;3'TRL:IEfbinltia~e;{he steam. . dumoJailure .. ;. '"' * ;,, Note: All 3 TB20's failing open will result in total steam flow rising from 100% to 107%. An auto MSLI will not reach its initiation setpoint. PO reoorts 21-23TB20's have ooened. CRS directs the PO to turn off steam dumos or PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 16 of 29
;;;::~:,J!omm~nt~*~'fM~ ~;,f1:' ',.: ,' 0 ),
attempt closing dump valves in manual, and PO reoorts valves remain ooen. CRS directs RO to trip the Rx and initiate a MSLI lAW CAS of S2.0P-AB.STM-0001. RO trios the Rx. RO initiates MSLI and reports 23MS167 remains ooen. RO initiates MSLI on other SSPS train and reoorts 23MSIV remains ooen. RO attempts to FAST close 23MS167 and reoorts it remains ooen. Note: Once the MSLI is initiated, 23 SG pressure will rapidly drop to more than 100 psig below the remaining SGs. RO reports an automatic Sl signal is present on SG 0/P between 23 SG and the remaining SG's, and reoorts Sl has not actuated. RO initiates Sl and completes immediate actions by backing up main turbine trip and verifying at least one 4KV vital bus is eneraized. ct#1. <cr:2fiVIanuailyactUate~l******'* . prior to cbrnpl~tionof TRIP-1:;. , step 5. }; ** *
- t:;:~ ,*:,:.
1 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 17 of 29 ~~ii:r~~~~~~~~~~! :;~ ::~i~~~~d~{~~~~~~~'£!;~etFonr~~4~~~~r: **~****~*~g~"i!f~r~' RO and CRS verify immediate actions complete. PO isolates AFW flow to 23 SG. CRS dispatches operator to locally close 23MS167 or isolate 21-23TB20's or both.
- 'Sirnu.lator operator: -Er-isure ET"s islrue wherf22AF2t.isthrottled. .
This .!rips 22'.AFW:ptrrl1p} Men trips 23Af\N pump aftetca5.minute * *
- delav. * * **. * > ** . .
While throttling AFW flow, PO reports 22 AFW pump has tripped. PO adjusts 21, 22, and 24AF11 's (from TDAFW pump) to control AFW flow to intact SGs. PO reports no available equipment failed to start on SEC initiation. PO reports 21 AFW pump has no power, 22 AFW pump has tripped, and 23 AFW pump is in service. PO reports when 23 AFW pump trips. PO reports 21SW20 and 21SW223 have no indication on 2RP4. (no power) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
RO reports 21/22CA330's shut, and containment pressure normal. RO reports no indications of high steam flow. PO re_g_orts 2A 4KV vital bus deenergized. RO reports control room ventilation status, and ensures proper swgr ventilation. RO reports 2 CCW pumps in service. RO reports ECCS injection flow status for current RCS pressure. PO reports AFW flow and SG NR level status. Note: If the CRS arrives at step 20 with any SG NR level > 9%, then even with no AFW flow, will NOT go to FRHS-1. CRS should continue in TRIP-1 until a transition to LOSC-1 is made, at which time CFSTs would become active and the CRS could transition to FRHS-1 on RED path when it occurs. IF a transition to LOCS-1 is made, steam flow will be initiated when MS1 O's are adjusted to stabilize RCS temp. CRS transitions to FRHS-1 <22E4 lbm/hr AFW flow and all SG NR levels <9%. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 19 of 29
- reval~~.~~rt~11 ~tt~~~%*~*AcfirJ~rE;
- "~:~~[com~t~~:f;;;,,;7i,**'l,:: ....
f~'\~~~*. * ~1+~9l; J\~{ )\ ~f~E ; ; ;4ti;~f ~~~~~;i.~*r~;.';:;d ~~z~;\ff; .:,:~QG;!J\ .. . PO reports it was not operator action which required FRHS-1 entry. RO reports RCS pressure > intact SGs and RCS Thots >350°F. RO reports 21 and 22 charging pumps available. CRS reads Bleed and Feed transition Continuous Action Steps. PO ensures 21-24GB4 and 21-24SS94 are shut. PO reports no AFW pumps running or can be started . If not previously performed, crew sends operators to investigate cause of AFW pump trips. RO stops all RCPs. PO reports condensate system in operation, and SGFPs not available. RO reports Sl has occurred. PO verifies Sl valve aliqnment. RO resets Sl and Phase A isolation, and reports Phase B reset. RO opens 21/22CA330s. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Paae 20 of 29 .* ,:~evafi.iatorJiristruefSF;;"J *;;~~~rri~:~:i
~:~ ,;;~ ::~1 \; t1 -~:~~~!~*:;:~:;t--:~~.'~ :-*.*:'~~>-,::;:~:, :,~~'fkPS Crew selects 22 or 24 SG for depressurization, whichever has a lower SG level.
Note: Crew should not select a SG for depressurization which will require initiation of RCS Bleed and Feed sooner than would otherwise be required. CRS dispatches operator to open selected SG BF40 valve. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 21 of 29 !,.~ ~~~~J~~~~~~£~t~~!~~~i~~,7it!~t"* . ., ., , , . :;*.~:f~~/ , '""'*'*L?* PO ooens 21 and 22CN48s. PO shuts 21/22CN32s. CRS waits at step 20.5 as selected SG deoressurizes. PO reoorts selected SG WR level is risin CT#2 (CT-45) Establish feeCff'low .* into anycSG before RCS Bleed~: cmd Fe'ed'is required . . * .
. 'uNSAT:;.*...;...;...,--""---: ' *>:>">::):,:~ '
PO reports no SG NR level is >9%, and that selected SG WR level is risina. PO maintains selected SG pressure <575 RO reports Bleed and Feed have not been initiated. CRS returns to procedure in effect, either TRIP-1 or LOSC-1. Lead Evaluator terminate scenario upon transition back to procedure in effect, or after Bleed and Feed has been initiated. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 22 of 29 A Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures E. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation F. S2.0P-DL.ZZ-0003, Control Room Logs Modes 1-4 (page 13) G. S2.0P-SO.AR-0001, Condenser Air Removal System Operation H. S2.0P-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum I. S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion J. S2.0P-SO.MS-0002, Steam Dump System Operation K. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection L. 2-EOP-FRHS-1, Loss of Heat Sink PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204
- ATTACHMENT1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS
*TODAY MODE: 1 POWER: 100 RCS BORON: 853 MWe 1220 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):
NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 5,000 EFPH MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION: EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: Swap to next sequential Condenser Vacuum pump after turnover lAW S2.0P-SO.AR-0001, Condenser Air Removal System Operation, as directed by Control Room Logs, S2.0P-DL.ZZ-0003, page 13. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: SECONDARY: Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST
- 1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter With Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct if applicable.
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
- 26. Verify EGC paperwork is marked "Training Use Only" and is current revision.
- 27. Ensure sufficient copies of ECG paperwork are available.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 13-01 NRC-ESG-3 REVIEWER: P Williams Initials Qualitative Attributes PW 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PW 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PW 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PW 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction( s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point PW 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
PW 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PW 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PW 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PW 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PW 10. The scenario has been validated. PW 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario. PW 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d) Initial Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d) GG 8 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GG 3 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GG 3 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 GG 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GG 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GG 2 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 13-01 NRC ESG-3 CT#1 (CT-2) Manually actuate 51 prior to completion of TRIP-1 step 5. Basis: Failure to manually actuate Sl under the postulated conditions constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) ... capacity." In this case, Sl can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate Sl also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the following abilities:
- Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) ... capacity)
- Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component"
- Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety" CT#2 (CT-45) Establish feed flow into any SG before RCS Bleed and Feed is required.
Basis: Failure to establish the minimum required feedwater flow rate, under the postulated plant conditions, results in "adverse consequences or significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant." In this case, the minimum required feedwater flow rate can be established by performing the appropriate manual action. Therefore, failure to manually establish the minimum required feedwater flow rate also represents a failure of the crew to demonstrate the ability to:
- Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls (assuming
- AFW) that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably
- introduced by the scenario
- Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component
* (assuming AFW)
- Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety" Finally, failure to manually establish feedwater flow rate under the postulated conditio~s is a "violation of the facility license condition."
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N Event Y/N Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss of CCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area y Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg y Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-4 Op-Test No.: 13-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 4% power, SOL. Unit is returning from forced outage to repair all 4 RCP diffuser vanes bolting issue. 24 SW pump is CIT for strainer repair. Turnover: Raise power to 18% @1 0% per hour. Event Malf. No. Event Event Type* No. Description R 1 Raise power ALL 2 SW0216A c #2 SW bay leak (TS) ALL 3 RC0002 c RCS leak (TS) ALL 4 CV0208A c Centrifugal charging pump fails during swap from PDP while CV02088 CRS/RO responding to RCS leak. M 5 RC0002 SBLOCA CRS/RO 6 EL0134 c LOOP coincident with Sl initiation ALL 7 0/R A701 8 c 2C SEC fails to initiate Dl CRS/PO 8 RP318S1 c High head ECCS fails to inject (one pump failed from Event RP318S2 CRS/RO 4 above, other pump doesn't start) CT's: #1 Establish High Head ECCS
#2 Start minimum SW pumps
- (N)ormal, (R)eact!VIty, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 1 of 29 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: 13-01 NRC ESG-4 SCENARIO NUMBER: 13-01 NRC ESG-4 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates below EXPECTED DURATION: 65 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: '-------'1 L.O. REQUAL X !INITIAL LICENSE
'-------'1 STA '-------'1 OTHER Revision Summary New Issue for 13-01 NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 09-14-14 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: [0-2-"J.-;o/
Date APPROVED BY: \ o~1 ~ -~lr Date PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 2 of 29 A. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the safety related plant cooling water system in accordance with S1/S2.0P-AB.SW-0001. B. Given indication of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. C. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with S1/S2.0P-AB.RC-0001. D. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with S1/S2.0P-AB.RC-0001 E. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. F. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. G. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. H. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. I. Given a safety injection has occurred and equipment has failed to START equipment that has failed to automatically start in accordance with the approved station procedures. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 3 of 29 A. Raise power B. #2 SW Bay leak C. RCS leak (25 gpm) D. Centrifugal charging pump failure E. SBLOCA F. LOOP coincident with Sl initiation G. 2C SEC fails to initiate H. High Head ECCS fails to inject A. The crew will take the turnover at 4% power, BOL, with direction to raise power to 18% @ 30% per hour. 24 SW pp is CIT for strainer repair. 21 SGFP is in service, 22 SGFP is latched at idle speed. B. After power ascension is in progress, a leak in #2 SW Bay occurs. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay leak, cross connect nuclear headers and isolate the affected SW bay. The CRS will identify Tech Spec 3.0.3 is applicable based on SW pump operability. C. After the SW Bay leak has been addressed, a 25 gpm RCS leak will occur. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak. When swapping to a centrifugal charging pump, the pump selected will trip after starting, and the other centrifugal charging pump will be placed in service. The crew will quantify the RCS leakrate, and the CRS will identify Tech Specs. D. Once the RCS leak has been addressed, the leak will worsen into a SBLOCA. The CRS will direct a Rx trip and safety injection. If attempted first, Train B Sl initiation will not work, and Train A will be used to initiate Sl. E. When Sl is initiated, a loss of off-site power occurs. 2A and 2B SECs will load in MODE Ill (SI plus Blackout). 2C SEC fails to initiate. Operators will manually shut 2C EDG output breaker to energize 2C vital bus. The crew will start at least 1 SW pump on 2C bus. The crew will start one charging pump to establish high head ECCS injection. F. The crew will perform Rx trip stabilization actions in TRIP-1, then transition to LOCA-1 to reset Sl and re-establish control of plant equipment. The scenario will terminate when the TRIP-3 transition point is reached. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 4 of 29 Pre-snapped IC-234
.*. . %lg~;~~~"riiA!~~~~i;<i;i~i:<ioi'~u~S;~l~~~tl~ ~rR~~!$/bez~~~t~c:ta99~ ==~-'-'---'-
Initial 1 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 2 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 3 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 4 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 5 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 6 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) _ 7 24 SW pump C/T __ 8 S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, filled out up to step 5.4.16. __ 9 S2.0P-SO.MS-0002, Steam Dump System Operation, with P&L 2.2 signed off. 10 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 5 of 29 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group Description EVENT ACTION: kb417pbj // 21 CHG PUMP-START 3 COMMAND: DMF CV0208B PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kb419pbj //22 CHG PUMP-START 5 COMMAND: DMF CV0208A PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: ka501doa //TRAIN 'A'- Sl OPERATE KEYSWITCH 7 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 6 of 29 SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK Time Value Time RC0002 RCS LEAK INTO CONTAINMENT ( equiv to 0-01 N/A N/A N/A RT-3 25 4inches 02 CV0208A 21 CHARGING PUMP TRIP 03 CV0208B 22 CHARGING PUMP TRIP 04 EL0134 LOSS OF ALL 500KV OFF-SITE 05 RP318S1 21 CHRG PMP FAILS TO STRT 06 07 IN SW STRUCTURE N!A SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK Time Value Time 01 SW35D 24 SW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER N/A N/A N/A N/A OFF 02 SW36D 24 SW PUMP RACK OUT N/A N!A N/A N/A TAGGED 03 SW23D 21 SW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER N/A N/A N/A RT-10 OFF 04 SW27D 22 SW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER 00:00:10 N/A N/A RT-10 OFF 05 SW32D 23 SW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER 00:00:20 N/A N/A RT-10 OFF SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition/ CHECK Time Value Time Severity 01 A701 B Dl TRAIN 'B'- N/A N/A N/A N/A OFF C206 A Dl 2C SFGD EMER OPR-EMERG LOADING 02 N/A N/A N/A N/A ON RESET 1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 7 of 29 A. State shift job assignments. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 8 of 29
- t';s. EvaiU~tor/fnstructor
< !!,~:*.~;. _*:_- <- :~ ~~:~;~~;:-: :nk~t~}:~:'. :1r~
5
- 1. Power ascension CRS briefs crew on _Q_ower ascension.
Note: There is no limit on power ascension rate when < 50% power. PO slowly adjusts Main Steam dumps to raise reactor power using Attachment 3, by either adjusting the auto setpoint, or by placing steam dumps in manual and adjusting valve position. Note: S2.0P-SO.MS-0002 allows steam dumps to be placed in Manual for adjustment. Manual allows for finer control. RO slowly withdraws control rods. Crew announces when Rx power is 5% and notes Mode 1 entry. CRS contacts work control to update WCM to Mode 1. PO ensures 21-24MS1 O's in auto set at 1015-1020_Q§ig. CRS continues _Q_ower ascension. Continue to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 9 of29
,Ev~h~~~~r:l~s~~~f~~~:~ctiyity ;.* '> .* ; .:.,:L~~~,~~~~~$!~~/S~fdent '.~~i~~~~s:~~*:z;::.~:~t;;~ x:*Bg~t~:.;*:~fl"t~XX;!r .
- 2. #2 SW Bay leak 1 S~~u~a~pr*Operator: .1iiseriRT:1.
*: ~A~~~~~w6~~~~L~i.~~~6~dr. . LEAKi't~ sw STRUC'J:URE . Severi~y;rs;*Q.oo .. * . *~; **
- Ramp; :3inirlutes Note: The first OHA will annunciate 1 minute after the leak is inserted.
RO announces unexpected SW system alarms. CRS directs power ascension put on hold. PO places Main Steam dumps in auto at current steam pressure if in manual. RO monitors reactor. PO either starts a SW pump based on lowering SW header pressure, or announces the auto start of 25 SW pump when it occurs, and the clearing of the low SW header _Qfessures alarms. PO reports indications of SW leak in #2 SW Bay. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.SW-0003 SW Bay Leak _Q_er ARP direction or enters S2.0P-PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 10 of 29 r.n,mrnilri"+:~~~Ut~;0"111J?~' AB.SW-001, Loss of SW Header Pressure, then transitions to S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, and initiates CAS. RO reports both SW Bays are in service and dispatches NEO to investigate 2 Bay alarms. PO monitors Main Turbine I SGFP temps on SPDS and Plant Computer. (CAS Item 2.0) Role Play: 3 minutes after being contacted, report as NEO that there is a large leak in 2 bay, you can't identify where it is coming from due to the spray, and approx. 2.5 ft of water is in the bay now, and rising slowly. (Bay is considered disabled at 2ft. I Crew splits SW Bays by opening nuclear header cross over MOVs 21 SW23 and II 22SW23, and shutting SW bay cross connect I valves 21SW17 and 22SW17, and reports the leak is in 2 Bay. PO reports 25 and 26 SW pumps running, and I stops 21-23 SW pumps. Crew sends NEO to open control power bkrs for 21-23 SW pumps. Simulator Operator: 2 minutes BJterbeing dil"eeted)o de-energize'
- control'power tb21.:.23SWpl.lmps,:
call asNEO and state: "Tbis is . PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 11 of 29 d.;tal~nt/stuaentR~$J>on$
- t~ *H)~*~ "'},'*.<*>~~-,
-* :x""~~::~'~*'*~*.::-...-~:~~~~5*~\r,~-- ,";*~***:*.*t;'.*i[:*~~;~~.;~~f:~~~},. .*."p.'(.; .;~~~'<'* *1?. -~ -..,-._,. ,~,
(I>JE()spamt}) *calliqg;.for a;J=,icst
.check. >J:am*Jn.unie:2:645' . . .* ; .,;h ~:<'1:**: .. . switchgear.tdorn;andJfuewalls ~re . .
- J~6'~:~b~~~;s!s~~~~~~~~~~~~~,~.:.**.
~RT~tOt. REMQJES: SW23D,: . . .* .***.SW27D ,.SW32b forQ1":::22.;.al1d 23 < rfWi~~$~~~f~~~Jl~i~ 1 Call co*ntrol room afte(lasfremote is1 active.*artd'report~Bcsntrol pow~r >** breakeri' have oeen 'opened fof'21 I 22 and 23SW PUlnPS. . . . Crew isolates 2 SW Bay by closing 21 SW22 and 21SW20. PO reoorts the leak is isolated. Role Play: Once 2 SW Bay is isolated, NEO (if contacted) reports that the leak appears to have stopped, and level is slowly lowering in bay. PO reoorts SW remains available to the EDGs. PO reports SW is being supplied to the Turbine Buildina throuah 23SW20. PO monitors Main Turbine parameters on SPDS and the Plant Comouter. (CAS item 2.0 PO initiates action to remove one CCHX from PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 12 of 29 va'r'ua '"i4i !'I " 't','??~'A"'/t'* Y'" '. '"' xee\:id~u, .an . u ent'R,esponsQw:<4t1t:~:
- '*t ;~:;&If> ,CC,'>",j'~'( ','E f; ~:,:g.:,.IP,,, ,t!'s't':;/i(d,/ ' ''0Nf':, ~';:%7/~;&' ,,:,,,,;;,,'S'. B""' "~'::::n::ilR,',',
dmmefftY"" ,. ,,", .-, , ,.. , , ,_""
- 1 E'?' ...or nstruc or: c tvt ,;,J$>,~Y+,, . ':,.;
.~ lf,J. *'rl0:~!:tr . *, '-. 'tt~~~:: ~~p, ~;L;,: ,,f ~::~,~£~~r?dd{i£~j~;t1!5;t~~*~"~~~ ;;~£;: .; i'~t~ 1::_ ' **,,. ,**,;t;t;x&#i:Yt\f(i ~7~<1>::;:;"", : :~~~tco,~?\r; ',:i~%~~7: 'i*~J!5 1 service. (CAS item 4.0)
PO initiates action to isolate SW to two CFCU's lAW CAS item 5.0. Note: CRS should contact work control to find status 24 SW pump, and when pump could be restored to service to avoid a unit shutdown due to Tech Spec 3.0.3. If asked, respond that the release for 24 SW pump is in the field. CRS enters TSAS 3.0.3 due to having NO C2.2_erable SW loops. Proceed to next event after Tech Spec has been identified at Lead Evaluators direction. Note: Entry conditions are also met for S2.0P-AB.ZZ-002, Flooding, due to flooding in 2 Bay. Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
- 3. RCS leak Simula,to/Qpf3ratot,:: Insert RT*3
- ori dire~tron.frOrnJ-~.ao Evalt)ator.
- MALt=: RCOQ,q2 RCS leal< into, . ' :
,'~~~l;~r;~s~.:' :" ,~', , ,., J,};&!
- PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 13 of 29
;;,f:~: ; Ev2lltiatCfrlrll'stru6ta~!ABHv'itl;;:< * : : *'ii:r't:>:E:xpectf!Jd Rlahttstirctenf ReS'pSilse '?:'t . .i1:w:;:: ; .: . .:;;:i~:;i;~ +'t~:: ~.t,t .:,*:i;~t;~;:);}: ' . ~ ; ;,~ : a~t:.~~;\.;s:*:;p1<: t: ;:fi1E~~ f: ~~~ ~>
- ',t~ ~*. t~lf~ <l~i~~~i\r <
RO reports that charging flow is rising and PZR level is lowering slowly. Crew reports reading on 2R11A containment radiation monitor is risinq. RO reports unexpected OHA C-2 CNTMT SUMP PMP START. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak. CRS directs implementation of Att. 1 CAS. RO reports RCS temperature >350°F. I l RO reports unit is in MODE 1. RO reports PZR level is lowering with maximum PDP flow. RO transfers to a centrifugal charging pump by performing step 3.14 as follows: II RO ensures charging master flow controller in auto. I RO shuts 2CV55. I l SiJ11ulator Openitor:*Ensure ET-3 ' OR ET~5 is tru'ewheH"'21bor'.22" : i I ch~rgJngpo(npis*starte*a:*:'fl}is.will trip' tHe chargjl)g**pqn]p which was . f started(: and delete 'tt1e*tripof the
- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training II
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 14 of 29 m"a,r~~f;:w~'.,>~~~,:
- 4. Centrifugal charging pump trip RO starts 21 or 22 charging pump, and reoorts it has tri CRS directs RO to start remaining charging Simulator Operator: After. the.
- .$1pob<:lchargif)9 p~mp is ~t~r;tedL.::~.*
reiqsert the charging pum~Jrip fa(:, th~ cgargiQQ' puln!llWhidl:l tr!Rped:,;*,;.: lt2lf:ha~glnQ):iumlr.is trip8,~t:!. *. ';~*f i~se~t*.IVI~Et:;~yo~.o~~- .::;:~;:: }, Jf 22:*chargJp'g!pym p:1r~~tripPE:)d, ~
. .rt:'MAL:F=~GV0208B:' ; .L .>*.**' ' .
must* t>~'dohe *pd~cib:the*Si
' ** * ,* *** < '" .~*; ,**-:'<>'**** . .~;, ';j RO places 23 charging pump speed controller in manual.
While lowering 23 Charging Pump speed to minimum, RO adjusts 2CV55 to maintain desired flow. RO stops 23 Charging Pump when at minimum flow PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 15 of 29 RO adjusts 2CV55 to control Pressurizer ' level. RO places 2CV55 in AUTO OR leaves in MANUAL until directed bythe SM/CRS. RO adjusts RCP Seal Injection flows to maintain 6-12 gpm per pump/ Note: Letdown will isolate if PZR level is allowed to lower to 17%. PO swaps to the 4~m letdown orifice. RO estimates leak rate, and reports PZR level can be maintained stable or rising. CRS initiates S2.0P-ST.RC-0008, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance. CRS evaluates containment conditions and determines CFCU status. CRS initiates actions to locate and isolate the leak lAW Attachment 2. CRS enters TSAS 3.4. 7 .2.b. action b for the unidentified RCS leak, and 3.5.2.a action a for ECCS Note: Although the leak is within the makeup capacity of the eves system, a containment entry to locate and isolate should be ruled out due to the magnitude of the PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 16 of 29
.:;expectea' Plant7sludeot Respon~e~:~,
~lli~J~~it}~~:J1 .* 1 j c,, ,c ' . *.:
~~~~\~Si~::tt};. ~:~;~t~' \ .;. ,,,< *.~* '*j, c.'}:-;:*~ ~~t ~~~i}; :- L~:~;~:~<: ;~&fff " :.~;~~~:~~~~~;;:~i,*;;,;~r:;~**.:;~;r:
leakage. Continue to next event on direction
~
from Lead evaluator.
- 5. SBLOCA i
i i Sinl'ulator Operat()r::on aireqtiO!l from Lead* E:valt.iatt>;r;mVIOoiF:Y(, IVIAI.::F'Rcooot.frotri25to 2 'o*oo. *
'wittfno~ramp:or delav~* ,:i****
i f I RO trios the reactor, and confirms the Rx tri Note to Evaluators: Train B SSPS is closest to the Rx trip handles on RO initiates Sl on Train B and reports Sl has not initiated. I I the Control Console, and typically Sl is initiated from Train B. This was not considered an event on Form ES-D-1 since it may not be performed by all operators, but may be counted as another component ~ failure if performed. i RO initiates Sl on Train A and reports Sl has I initiated on both trains. f PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 17 of 29
}()mffi~Ht~~:~;; ,,,~, *
- 6. LOOP coincident with Safety Injection Crew diagnoses loss of all off-site power when control room normal liahtina aoes out.
RO continues immediate actions:
- Reports Main Turbine is tripped. - Reports 2A and 28 EDGs have started and are supplying respective vital buses. - Reoorts Sl has been manuallv initiated.
CRS and RO verify immediate actions comolete.
- 7. 2C SEC fails to initiate PO reports no conditions present that should keeo 2C EDG from startina.
CRS directs PO to start 2C EDG and shut 2C EDG outout breaker. PO starts 2C EDG, selects bezel mimic for 2C EDG outout breaker. PO shuts 2C EDG outout breaker. Note: With the 2C SEC not initiating, whatever equipment was PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204
... "/* .,,,,.<~~JJ~ 18 of 29 4*/
- Comment <"a' *
.~r. **.;*>*: ....... :.:.i.;;,x~;
- running on 2C bus before the LOOP will restart since no trip signals were sent to their breakers.
Crew should open breakers for C bus equipment prior to closing EDG output breaker to prevent possibly stalling 2C EDG.
- CT#1 ((;T~25) stait. at.lea~t .o'ne s':e~a;o,,t ~ a~~:~T .. '
sw p\.lmp *prior to er)d ot; .
,: ~
PO throttles AFW flow, and reports all SG NR levels are >9%. i I' i
- 8. High Head ECCS fails to inject f
PO reports SEC loading status for energized vital buses. If 22 charging pump was running before LOOP, then it will have restarted from C bus if the EDG breaker was shut. ! I If 21 charging pump was running prior to the LOOP, the PO will block and reset 28 SEC, then start 21 charging pump.
- c"(#2*(CI;.7).Estabiisfi;~low.trom I
'at.H~ast ov~:;Hig~~l:leati~pha'rging
'Purrip:pdc>r'to transition out of.*.* *:
~i~fP~~&~f,~t~~~~,;' ,~,,,,
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 I Page 19 of 29
,;,~~~~:~!~~{~? .
I
- ._;:/~ '.;* ..,
If 2C EDG breaker is shut, then crew will also need to evaluate SEC loading on 2C bus, since SEC will not have started any i equipment, and only equipment which was previously running will be running now. i [ I PO reports 21 and 22 AFW pumps running. I Crew recognizes when containment pressure iI reaches 4 psig and uses adverse containment values. I RO shuts charging pump mini flow valve 2CV139 and reports 2CV140 has no power when RCS pressure lowers below 1500 psig with BIT flow established. (CAS) PO reports safeguards valve alignments. RO reports 21/22CA330's shut and containment pressure has remained below 15 psig. PO reports no high steam flow conditions. PO reports 4KV vital bus status. If 2C EDG l output breaker has not been shut, CRS directs power restored to 2C vital bus. i RO reports correct ventilation lineups. RO reports CCW pump status. 21 and 22 should not be running since they were stripped PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 20 of 29
,,f r~~~~~lJ~}r~;~~9;~~~t~i~~lJi:,*. ~g;*~~i~,~~1!'.!~1t~111!*~~@!;:{,
6
.* ~;r :'teor:nm~n*
of 2A and 28 vital buses on SEC Mode Ill initiation. 23 CCW pump status will hinge on whether 2C EDG outout breaker is shut. RO reports ECCS injection status for current RCS oressure. PO reports all SG NR levels are >9%. (15% adverse RO reports RCPs stopped, and RCS temperature beina controlled. Note: ECCS injection flow will be causing RCS temperature to lower. A MSLI is not required. RO reoorts reactor trio breakers are ooen RO reports PZR PORVs are shut and Block Valves ooen. RO reoorts RCPs are not in service. PO reports no indication of faulted steam enerators. PO reports no indication of ruptured steam enerators. RO reports at least 2 channels in Table F in warnina, alarm, or risin~. CRS transitions to LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 21 of 29
- .:, } EvalilatorJJristrucf&r:~cfi';**\.'t*f
- 1&~:~~1it;¢t~~:"~~~~~!~~~~~ll;~~~z~~;~:~~~*.~~i~g~ ,£,,
it:.~i~~~~: .:(;;~':'"~s-{;:%'f'~~'fi"~ ,)~'0fb?Z'
- ~fi1~~ii;r~ ,;j~r.-. \-, ,;,~;r~ ~~;~~:.; :'.:.~r:~~ };~~,l~~:~k Terminate scenario after transition to LOCA-1 is made.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 22 of 29 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures E. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load F. NF-AP-440, PWR Fuel Conditioning G. S2.0P-AB.SW-0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure H. S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay Leak I. S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak J. 2-EOP-TRI P-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS
.TODAY*
MODE: 1 POWER: 4.1% RCS BORON: 1740 ppm MWe 0 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 500 EFPH Control Bank D is at 157 steps. Reactivity plan for power ascension to 18.0% is to use S2.0P-SO.MS-0002, Steam Dump Operation, Section 5.4. MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION: EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, in progress and complete up to Step 5.4.16. All requirements for Mode 1 entry are satisfied. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: SECONDARY: Main Steam Dumps are in MS Pressure Control-Auto set at 986 psig. All MSIVs are open. 21 SGFP in service, 22 SGFP latched at idle speed. AFW secured. Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: 24 SW pump C/T for strainer repair. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING .CHECKLIST
- 1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter With Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct if applicable.
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
- 26. Verify EGC paperwork is marked "Training Use Only" and is current revision.
- 27. Ensure sufficient copies of ECG paperwork are available.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT3 . CRITIGALTASK METHODOLOGY *. In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 13-01 NRC-ESG-4 REVIEWER: P Williams Initials Qualitative Attributes PW 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PW 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PW 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PW 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point PW 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
PW 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PW 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PW 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PW 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PW 10. The scenario has been validated. PW 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario. PW 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d) Initial Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d) GG 7 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GG 3 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GG 2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 GG 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GG 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GG 2 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 13-01 NRC ESG-4 CT#1 (CT-25) Start at least one SW pump prior to end of scenario. Bases: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG's are running without SW cooling. Running the EDGs without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, all running EDGs are affected by the loss of all SW cooling. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded ... emergency power capacity." CT#2 (CT-7) Establish Flow from At Least One High-head 51 Pump prior to transition out of TRIP-1. Bases: Failure to manually start at least one high-head Sl pump under the postulated conditions constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) ... capacity." In this case, at least one high-head Sl pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head Sl pump also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the following abilities: Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component" PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N Event Y/N Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss ofCCW y Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out y LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbirie Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-5(Spare) Op-Test No.: 13-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 75% power MOL. Power was reduced 30 minutes ago due to 21 SGFP Governor problems. PZR PORV 2PR1 was declared inoperable 3 hours ago due to intermittent control circuit anomalies, and the PORV Block valve 2PR6 was shut and deenergized to comply with TSAS 3.4.5 action b. Turnover: Maintain current power Event Malf. No. Event Event Type* No. Description 1 CV0035 c Charging Master Flow Controller fails low CRS/RO 2 PR0017C Non-controlling PZR level Channell! I fails (TS) 3 SG0078C c 90 gpd SGTL (TS) ALL R CRS/RO 4 Down power N PO 5 M SG0078C SGTR ALL 6 AF0182B c 22 AFW pp pressure override failure CRS/PO 7 EL0134 c LOOP during RCS cooldown ALL 8 VL0298 c PZR PORV fails shut!SGTR depress unavail --+SGTR-5 CRS/RO CT's: #1 Isolate AFW
#2 C/0 to, and maintain, RCS temp
- (N)ormal, (R)eactJVIty, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 1 of 32 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: 13-01 NRC ESG-5 SCENARIO NUMBER: 13-01 NRC ESG-5 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates below EXPECTED DURATION: 90 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: .___ __.I L.O. REQUAL X I INITIAL LICENSE
.___ __.I STA .___ __.I OTHER Revision Summary New issue for 13-01 NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 09-14-14 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: ~ {,..,;!. J0-2--1 -1 '1 Operati()iaining Maager Date APPROVED BY:
Date PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 2 of 32 A. Given a steam generator tube leak, take corrective action, lAW S2.0P-AB.SG-0001. B. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube leak (SGTL), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube leak in accordance with the approved station procedures. C. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube leak (SGTL), DIRECT the response to the tube leak, in accordance with the approved station procedures. D. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. E. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. F. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. G. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. H. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube rupture in accordance with the approved station procedures. I. Given indication of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), DIRECT the response to the SGTR in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) without pressurizer pressure control, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the SGTR in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given the indication of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) without pressurizer pressure control, DIRECT the response to the SGTR in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. During performance of emergency operating procedures, monitor the critical safety function status trees in accordance the EOP in effect. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 3 of 32 A. Charging Master Flow Controller Fails B. Non-controlling PZR level channel fails low. C. 90 gpd SGTL D. SGTR E. 22 AFW pp Pressure Overide Failure F. LOOP during RCS cool down G. PORV fails shut/SGTR depressurization unavailable ---*SGTR-5 A. The crew will take the watch at 76% power, MOL. Power was reduced 30 minutes ago due to 21 SGFP governor problems, which have not been investigated yet. PZR PORV 2PR1 was declared inoperable 3 hours ago due to intermittent control circuit anomalies, and the PORV Block valve 2PR6 was shut and deenergized to comply with TSAS 3.4.5 action b. B. Shortly after taking the watch, the Master Charging Flow Controller auto setpoint will fail from its current position to 0% demand over a 5 minute period, and PZR level channel Ill will fail low. The crew will respond lAW S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, to ensure level channels are selected for control and alarm functions, place 23 charging pump speed controller in manual, and restore normal charging flow. If the MFC is taken to manual, the controller output will stabilize, but will be unable to be adjusted upwards. The level channel failure is silent. The CRS will identify Tech Specs. C. After the PZR level channel Tech Spec has been identified, a small (90 gpd) SGTL will ramp in on 23 SG. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.SG-001, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and take actions to quantify the leak and minimize the spread of contamination in the secondary plant. The crew identifies that the SGTL meets the criteria for Action Level 3 in AB.SG, requiring the unit to be <50% power within one hour, and that Tech Spec 3.4.7.2 applies once the leak is >150 gpd. D. Once the power reduction is underway, the affected SG tube will rupture. Operators will identify the rising leak rate, and initiate a Rx trip and Safety Injection lAW CAS when conditions warrant. E. The crew will perform diagnostics in TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. 22 AFW pump pressure override protection fails and cannot be defeated. Operators will isolate AFW to 23 SG and identify that a radioactive release from 23 SG through 23 AFW pp turbine discharge is occurring until the 23MS45, steam supply to TDAFW pump, is shut or the AFW pump is secured. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 4 of 32 F. The crew will transition to SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. With the 23MS45 still open, the CRS will secure 23 AFW pump if not performed previously, leaving 24 SG as the only generator receiving AFW flow. Once secured and with 23MS45 shut, the crew will reset 23MS52, 23 AFW pump trip valve, and start 23 AFW pump. G. During the RCS cooldown to target temperature in SGTR-1, a loss of off-site power will occur when the hottest CET reaches 510 degrees. The crew will perform the actions of Table C to restart safeguards loads, and re-establish the cooldown using the MS1 Os. 21 Sl pump will not start if the crew attempts to start it, and 22 Sl pump will trip if started. H. Once the target temperature has been reached, the crew will attempt to perform the RCS depressurization with the only available PORV since RCPs are stopped and the other PZR PORV 2PR1 is unavailable. 2PR2 will not open. With no Sl pumps running, the CRS will transition to SGTR-5. I. The scenario will terminate after the transition to SGTR-5 has been made. Pre-snapped IC-235
. .eRE fl. ~OR TR~I:~I'Nt*t*.~,. computer setpoirit~,'i prOGedures.;p~zef'cove:;~:;iagg~~*~~quip~~nt) <,:;*.r *(:* ._ .**~:*:\?~ _ . :.;-~:;:*.~:.:j~JT: -*~*;_"'"*** .<* ; ;</,* _ ._,_.*::,-*,~::.'Y:-:_:. ~-~-:.;/~_~?** :-,:;~ ../l~:<"',>"'. _:<'>::;:..;>Y/<,** * -**_>*!-,;.//;~;~: }':* <.. :-.j<;;;:::;,<<**-:-J~t(~?t1~z::*::*-~~~:>*:~>~~*
Initial \ Description ... ,. , . _ 1 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 2 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 3 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 4 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 5 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 6 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 7 2PR6 CIT 8 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 5 of 32 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group EVENT ACTION: monp187 < 510 //HOTTEST INCORE TIC TEMP.O 3 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK Time Value Time 01 SG0078C 23 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE WA 0 00:05:00 RT-1 0.3 02 CV0035 CHRG MASTER FLO CNTRLR FAILS H/L N/A 39.2 00:05:00 RT-4 0.01 03 EL0134 LOSS OF ALL 500KV OFF-SITE POWE N/A N/A WA ET-3 04 I'J/A N/A N!A RT-3 0.01 05 SJ0062B 22 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP TRIP NIA N!A N!A RT-5 06 AF0182B 22 AFP PRESS OVRD PROT FAILS N/A N/A N/A N/A AAS POINT 07 AN3735 AAS 735 FAILS - :21 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:03:00 N/A N!A RT-2 FAILS/OVRD TOON AAS POINT 08 AN3736 AAS 736 FAILS- :22 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:03:10 N/A N/A RT-2 FAILS/OVRD TOON AAS POINT 09 AN3737 AAS 737 FAILS- :23 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:03:20 N th N/A RT-2 FAILS/OVRD TOON AAS POINT 10 AN3738 AAS 738 FAILS- :24 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:03:30 N/A N!A RT-2 FAILS/OVRD TOON AAS POINT 11 AN3739 AAS 739 FAILS - :25 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:03:42 N/A N/A RT-2 FAILS/OVRD TOON 12 PR0017C PZR LEVEL CHIll LT461)FAILS H/L 00:00:01 NiA N/A RT-4 0 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 6 of 32 SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK Time Value Time 01 PR34D PORV STOP VALVE 2PR6 TAGGED NiA N/A N/A N/A TAGGED 02 MS06A 23MS45 23 STM GEN STM SUP-23 AFP N!A N/A N/A RT-7 0 03 AF01 D 23 AUX FP TRIP RESET 00:10:00 N/A N/A RT-8 RESET SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition/ CHECK Time Value Time Severity 01 AH01 F Dl 21 Sl PUMP STOP 00:00:05 N!A N/A ET-3 ON B511 A Dl 22 AUX FEED PUMP-PRESS OVERRIDE 02 N/A NIA N/A N!A OFF DEFEAT Description 1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 7 of 32 A. State shift job assignments. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 8 of 32 Exilo/e'Sted~*~~j*ntt$tu*aa..,+'~.,. .. ""'"1
>>'*<,<:~/<~:,*iti~~~~~-;: --*:.,,:fri;t~~~~> * , ,' ~i~
Note: RCS temperature will be lowering -0.1 oF I minute from Xe. The crew determines how much RCS dilution is reauired to maintain Tava on oroaram. RO initiates a dilution for RCS temperature control.
- 1. Charging Master Flow Controller fails low Simulator Operator: Insert RT.;4 on directionfrom:t:ead Ev~Iuator .
.M~LF: C)/,0035 CH~G MASTER
.*.. FLO.*CNTRLR*FAILS*H/L*
!!~~%1#lr~~r~~;~
Mft.cf:r;Fiko'o17c PZR tievi:1JcH.
- III(LJ461)FAILS:Hfl:.;~,c:' ';:*:. . ;.,
- seveHty::o, * . *' **
Note: There is no audible indication or letdown isolation from the PZR level Ch Ill failure as the high lvl/lo level alarms come off the LC460D and LC459F (channels selected for control and alarm.) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 9 of32
,,s, .Evaltinto'rtrn~tr:uctof7Ativityf1
~~~~-~.*;~~I~:;:.:'*;~>--~:/* *;~~~*:~I~::~t1~.:p~,:_;-i~:~;:;:::- 7: *':i~t,, ~c! ' ' : "> RCP seal injection flow. RO diagnoses Master Flow Controller (MFC) output lowering with PZR level on (or below) pro!=) ram. CRS directs RO to place Master Flow Controller in manual and restore char!=)ing flow. RO places MFC in manual, and reports MFC demand has stabilized, but cannot be raised. CRS directs RO to place 23 charging pump speed controller in manual and restore charging flow. RO reports positive control over 23 charging pump speed in manual, and raises charging flow to restore PZR level to program. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, based on the reduction of charging flow. CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1 CAS. RO reports 23 charging pump in service with no indication of cavitation. * -
- 2. Non-controlling PZR Level Channel Ill fails low.
Note: This is at least where the level channel failure should be identified. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 10 of 32
'!¥ ~ E IU: '"t' /1 t f q.A f *t xi\ " *)'"*~ .
- E'******r d';pt**+*$t/Sf d' *itR ,...... . **sY$P: . ' ' PSBli' :rx~z* .
,;g:,;,; ~a .:~~:~~~ .rue or; /. ~;~,;~t~:~;~~*;* :f~4~~;~;1.*~~'~** . 0:~~;~'1.:~r :;&Y,1~l~;f~;~?.,'; . .~.~.~~J;~~$'?;':*].:.3.:.~{*~icod~;t~~::~:t:~~:. RO reports PZR lvl channel Ill failed low. Note: AB.CVC actions for a failed PZR level channel are written for a channel which is selected for control or alarm. If CRS bases procedure flowpath on this fact, then MFC failure is addressed at Step 105. If not done previously, RO takes manual control of charging to maintain PZR level on program. RO reports operable channels are selected for control, alarm, and recorder. j CRS determines MFC will not be returned to f auto. CRS directs removal of PZR level channel Ill from service. CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 action 6. Note: The following steps are the actions in AB.CVC for getting to the failed MFC step 105 after first reaching the step (54) for a failed PZR level channel. RO reports VCT lvl channel has not failed. RO reports no indication of charging header PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training l
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 11 of 32
* ~d'mm&nr'f *
- leak.
RO reports charging MFC failed. RO reports manual control of 23 charging pump has been established, and reports PZR level can be maintained stable or rising. CRS assigns responsibility and band for manual PZR level control. Proceed to next event after AB.CVC-1 has been addressed and PZR level channel failure TS has been identified at Lead Evaluators direction.
- 2. SGTL Simulator Ope~atqr:'lns~rtRT-1*.
oil.dir~¢tfonfrom*a~ead . . Evaluator:*:,. M1\U~:,~d.oo7s~*~-~~-*~team 1 9~fleratorJub'e Rupture :.
**"*1*v*
F*~*1na .... a.*1*ue,
** **.***o* 3***:::.*, -Ramp:.15minutes: .::
- f.**
RO announces OHA A-6 RMS HI RAD OR TRBL as unexpected. RO reports CRT shows 2R53C in alarm. RO reports 2R53C reading and slowly rising. CRS contacts Radiation Protection to perform PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 12 of 32 ,,i ~;~~'~5~t,t2!t~~~~W~~~1r~ctiv!!i,~il. SC.RP-TI.RM-0607(0), Primary To Secondary
. ~.,i~~~s ~.3~'fi.~~~1~j;.,~;L" .
11 Leak Rate Resoonse lAW ARP. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.SG-001 Steam Generator Tube Leak directly or enters S2.0P-AB.RAD-001, Abnormal Radiation CRS directs performance of S2.0P-AB.SG-001 CAS. Go to page 14 when Action Level 3 is identified. CRS dispatches an operator to deenergize TGA sumos. idee
~*. This~RT rncJuaesa*~ 'i* .,~~ ,minute,d~!~>;::~b'etofeopening;suri)*p' breakers:,.;*B~po~J?JTpo~JfroJ;r;oor;n:'
rr lastof'th' o?sump.:breake'rs
~AL~~~;¥fe~~~~~~:g*l1i'~!fl '. . 'AN37~5.221 TGASurnpl.J:everHL:.
c:AN3736221"GA Sump,L~vetHi
*AN37'37:23f6A *'* '* . . . .*:.- sum.p*LeXie I Hr*..
AN~138 24,TGA15ump; Level Hi
- Af:.'~Z39 25 TG,A.~:Sump!(evel Hi Delays:
3:'57 *. a:oo; 3~Jo,'3:25i\3:37', . .
. **. 1~ 1' .* *. '
RO reports PZR level is stable. IF RO reports PZR level is lowerina. RO will swao to a PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 13 of 32
~v~!~atoHin~tifu~4lor!Activi~J** ~SfUde0:fR~~*ti9 ..... ~Iff: ;;i:> ~~:l;.~,~tt> :S?~ :~, ,;. *,/_s~,l. ,,~t~f-<:-~ ~~-~~ f::{,, .; ;, ~~, :*v,_jy.: , .~-' '* z; ;:'> ~, ,:;~~- -i,l- <z1%-:"'t,0G*** ********
18
**w*' ';:.'~Y}\'
RO reoorts unit is in Mode 1. Crew identifies 2R53C, 2R 19C and 2R 15 risina. PO reoorts affected SG is 23. PO raises 23MS1 0 setooint to 1045 osi PO closes or checks closed 23GB4, 23MS7, and 23MS18. CRS dispatches an operator to shut 23MS45, and enters TSAS 3.7.1.3 for 23 AFW pump when required. I. Simulator Operator: Do NOT shut 23MS45 until directed later in scenario. CRS dispatches an operator to re-align SGBD and MS samolina to Waste Svstem . . ,Simulatc:)ro'perator:"to minOte~:> . aftert.,chernistry;h(first cor~tacte~,,:. repOrtthaf23*SG hasd~vel6peda 300 gpa leak; from o priJ-nary to'*i secondafy'previously:~ .
'Ii i ~
CAS Action Level 3 required actions start here. CRS determines that the CAS indicates that PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 14 of 32
- Y" -~:~~~~'~,!1~g~srtn~fir::~Bflvity:~~;~J'~[~~rk:?~~~~~,, ;~~~~~;~~~¥4'?1*'
7 Action Level 3 is present lAW Step 6.2.A based on:
- Leak rate is ;::: 75 gpd AND - The rate of change of the leakrate is ;::: 30 d/hr.
CRS determines a power reduction to ~50% must be performed within 1 hour. CRS enters TSAS 3.4.7.2.c Note: If time does not permit Tech Spec identification, post scenario follow up question will be required.
- 4. Downpower RO calculates boron addition required for ower reduction to 50%.
CRS orders a power reduction at a rate which will ensure oower is <50% within one hour. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction to perform the power reduction. RO initiates RCS boration at rate directed by CRS. RO announces expected and actual rod movement when it occurs. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 15 of 32
- c
- ;;~~tfi~l~~~y~~!~~~\1~f,f~j:~;~~
Proceed to next event on direction from Lead evaluator.
- 5. 23 SGTR
.siroulato~~operator::~MooiF-v , ,~ , .; . MP:L!.F SG0078Cito'650:Witn'no s**sti~~ .*ramp:or.a~:lay'aft~tr:p~\IJ'er;.~~ducfi9r1':*
** t1as.,com niehced)3~;at'a ire8tion~qf; ;:
- J~eaCIEvai, bt.Jf:A.f:ii'ER' s6'tube*,,;(;:.
- leak exceeds 150gpd;* (TS *. **
threshOld * * * *
- RO reports indications of worsening tube leak on 23 SG.
CRS determines CAS actions for rising SG NR level lAW CAS 1.0 are true. CRS directs the RO to trip the Rx, confirm the trio, and initiate a Safetv lniection. RO trips the Rx, confirms the trip, and initiates a Safetv lniection. RO performs immediate actions of TRIP-1: Verifies Rx tripped. Verifies Rx trip is confirmed. Backs up Main Turbine trip. Verifies off site power available to at least one vital buss. Verifies Sl initiation. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 16 of 32 r.. ': .* a~a'iuator/ ~~~n.r~~~~tilG
- ~.
- i;it~t: ~ ~~*i~:~:~i~y ~
CRS reads immediate action steps to RO who confirms their performance. Crew commences monitorina TRIP-1 CAS. RO reports SEC loading is not complete for all i vital busses, but all available equipment 1 started. I
- 6. 22 AFW pump Pressure f Override circuit malfunction t
i PO reports all AFW pumps are running, but 22 I AFW pump is not supplying flow even though its discharae pressure is hiah enouah. PO requests, and receives, permission to II
~
depress Pressure Override Defeat for 22 AFW umo, which has no effect on AFW flow. PO reports 23 AFW pump is running, and that an unmonitored release is occurring from the TDAFW pump steam discharge with 23MS45 not shut vet. AFW flow control is complicated by the fact that a SGTR is present on 23 SG, but the 23MS45 has not been shut yet. Additionally, 22 AFW pump is not supplying flow to 21 and 22 SGs because its Pressure Override circuit has failed. Shortly after the Rx is tripped, SG level will recover in at least one SG so that AFW flow can PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 17 of 32
' ,' .' ~
be lowered< 22E4. TRIP-1 does not direct tripping 23 AFW pump unless 2 MDAFW pps are running, which in this case is not true, since a running pump would be supplying flow. Detailed observation of the crew during AFW flow decisions should be made by the evaluators.
,cr# J;>(CT~1.8Lisdl~t~.AFW:~o ** ;thenlpturedSGWjthin:10~: .* *.. *:*.
min Lites of ent,.Y)nto :TRIP~t:and
- subsequently~clos~ 23MS167; .
23MS18;23MS7 and 23GB4 .....
- before a'trimsition'to'SGTR-3 is:
re~dired ..>; .*;l~/ *. *~'~?:~:( ... J.
- SAT UNSAT0**.*.
PO requests to throttle AFW flow, and isolates AFW flow to 23 SG by closing 23AF11 and 23AF21. CRS directs PO to maintain total AFW flow
>22E4 lbm/hr while throttlina AFW flow.
RO reoorts normal containment oressure. CRS determines no MSLI is reauired. CRS directs SM to refer to the ECG. PO reports all 4KV vital busses energized from off site oower. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Paae 18 of 32 i::,i~}"~~~~~~~~:ir~rt" RO reports control room ventilation in accident ressurized mode. RO reoorts 2 CCW s are runnin RO reports ECCS is injecting as expected for current RCS oressure. PO reoorts AFW flow and SG NR level status. RO reoorts all RCPs are in ooeration. f RO reoorts MSLI is not reauired. RO reports RTBs are open, PORVs shut, PORV block valve 2PR7 open, 2PR6 shut and CIT, and PZR spray valves operating as expected for current RCS oressure. RO maintains seal iniection flow to all RCPs. PO reoorts no faulted SGs. PO reports 23 SG is ruptured based on NR level. !I CRS transitions to SGTR-1. RO maintains seal iniection flow to all RCPs. PO reoorts 23 SG is ruotured, and 23MS10 is PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 19 of 32
- zv~1,;EvafuatorlU1strul ed1i'Ja'ntf
- stttaeot'Res*f1Qns"ij)i ... ,":cP'mYrlenf:,::,:;,~i . ...
~--~J: *;.,~ <, *;;,~~y-i~-~~~~~L;:*~~~::l?~;~~~. **< */ ., : ":\~;,(:,'~ ~~ _,,;},.}:.~;, ~~~~~iitf~:~\t~~~!,};:,~;t::fi:: 'i PO reports 23MS1 0 operating as expected for current oressure. PO ensures 23MS167, 23MS7, 23MS18, and 23GB4 are shut. PO reoorts 23 SG is ruotured. PO reports 23 AFW pump is NOT only source of AFW. l <.Simulator operator:J:when23 * ** * .
*~:r'~fsr~~~~p'~J&C~y~~i~o:;:¥:tt:*' .
dispatched.* *insert Rn7tO.close .. 23MS45.~nd'catl.control t06m.lo:: int6~1J1th'e.rn ifi~"snut.;; *** * ** **
**~$~~~~:~;~*~~1~~~p23' CRS sends an operator to reset 2MS52 when all SG NR levels are > 15%. *Simu rator*.Operator:.:; Insert RT~s .
fo reset2Mss2: .Rf.'Iiicludesa to'**~**
.**rPinutE{delay,prior.toresettlrig MS52,, : .. * .. . *'"* .
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 20 of 32
REMOTE: AF01 D 2'!ol,.:~u.n.
.** T~l~; ~E~,!§T '::ff,t?' " ~ ... FmaiNalt.fe: RESET. CRS checks on status of MS sampling valves which were directed to be shut in AB.SG. When contacted by crew report 2SS333 is shut. PO reports 23 SG is isolated from intact SGs, 23 SG NR level is >9%, and feed flow is isolated to 23 SG. RO reports power is C/T to 2PR6, and CRS either leaves it CIT, or orders power restored. Note: Do NOT restore power to 2PR6 during scenario. If asked later in scenario, state you are having problems with WCM getting the release authorized. RO reports 2PR2 is operating correctly in response to PZR pressure. PO reports no faulted SGs. RO resets Sl and Phase A isolations, and opens CA330's. PO resets all SECs. RO stops both RHR PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 21 of 32
*:~t~~~~~~rt~~~i~~:~~~~~~I:~~;~~1{.~!ti~~r~*; *r~~~~~j~~YJ~7:t~~~0t;~~~Pl~~~ =>mm*Emt*/*
CRS dispatches an operator to shift Gland Sealina steam to Unit 1. CRS determines target temperature for RCS cooldown is 503 dearees. PO commences RCS cooldown by using Steam Dumps in MS Pressure Control-Manual at 25% demand. PO Bvpasses Tav
- 7. Loss of Off-site power Simulator operatOr.:, E:hsure:E:t~3 is TR.UEwheri'the:hottest**CET J **...
- re'aches i510'degre~s:'This. insert~
ttile'Jos~:6!'~ff~site R9wer." ':¥ ..* * * -~-~~ :, ,,_~:-*, . *. ~~}J\.\.<1;:-~tiL ."~~- *~ ,*.~ .::;4,::~<< ;,~~~.,~:~*: .* i;;~ ": "*~,:;~{:,,'"'~~ . . MALF:rEL013'4,1;;oss**ot All<~::~<';', . off$'1te ~.~oK\tJ,ow~r.r ** .*' .: : ;; ~i*:~;:
'~~t:O~ ,()Vor~fi,~~~~~P yf CRS recognized loss of off-site power and returns to Step 10 CAS to perform actions of Table C.
PO verifies all available equipment started for each SEC. PO resets all SECs. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 22 of 32
*:;.. :l~vatuatortlnstr.uctor Activif~t~v ~ :~;;~' ~f:ExpeoteaV*PiantJsfuCietit;Rd§pci ~~,T~nly<<v:;:;;~~~i*~i~,.**l~~ ;;;, \' :~:~~\: *,~&~t *?1'fltif{~:;,;::}?~illl~f;~f1:': *. ::;~!?:~\$~ *.* .:~:;} * , . . * * * ~*: . ;~.:~ :.;:: ');:;~. t'l~*~;?. /
- ~iijl~~tatq.r .()PEi.l"atol"
- . wnerWcR~~f I
t l ~'drre&ts .. siart'o'fsrpumps,.~rnsert* . RT~5 after 22 sl* pump has oeen
- i Staii"ed. *. * * *'* ** * * .
~:~,- ~ ~' ~~/', .: "<t **. ~
- ~~~\~~~;/;i: ":~:-~ '" I MAL~: *s~oo*a~Ef22"'Safet}l:.
- Jnjection*~P;ump trip::
l/~~l~: ;1"~*;*p~~p ~i;l not st~~;h>****. CRS directs the cooldown to oe re-estaolished usina 21, 22 and 24MS10's fullv open. RO shuts charging pump mini flows when i RCS pressure lowers to 1500 psi~. I PO staoilizes hottest CET temperature less than 503 dearees. I
*9T#2JCJ::-19): **Estahlish/maiotaio} *;~~~~~~%~~~b~~\0 iihri~{.;'1~*1':.r'{~ . . .
- r~q uif'e8'*,eith~r b~~ause'rr'l[llmuni
- reqylr~d 'subcq91J.Qg*6af'lnd~.Re*
- r:naif)t~\~ed,,or.o,ec~yse f{c.~*!ow". f temperature calises'a.RE!iYor:.f*; ...
I
- ~~~r~~~~~Hft~1B~~~}f~~~~
--~';-
f PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 "> <<, ~>>,"' ~(W,;w... "=""*'d*~- ,,,,.,. ~* ".'1'." ,/,,,,~ .,, ~ '<'.v~~"'.' ** /..::<"<>:::'~"'<~<<ii ,, '${ Page 23 of 32
<:; Eva<ltf!:i~or:/IQ'sttuetor~~~nvity,!:l;~<Z' ,.,;*; :'ommen,J< * -~;~, ~~~.,-1 , ;~~,, _,,<:;~~\. ,:'* ~:;* :~s;,;*.*;~~, *~~,~~~Jft~,;~~ .- -~ ,. ~{J~~~~ :+~~*f; {;i: ~t :':fg;.; ,
PO reports 23 SG pressure is stable or rising or at least 250 osia above intact SG oressure. RO reports adeauate subcoolin~. RO reports RCPs are stopped and normal PZR sorav is not available.
- SimulatorOperato6Y*JnseH RT-3 ......**
when st~p .18 ~ORY.~tatus. iscread *
.* PRIOFNQ"Crew*attempfing to open . .:2.~.f{2~\;;. ,'.:':. * *... * ; **.\~ ::.i4tir~{< i* r**** ~.,. . **MALF,:~;'{L0298.'2F>>,Rg::fails*to ** pOSI't'IOfl . '(0'* 100°' 10 )' ;6*. £:.{;. * .
Final Value:;0.01* t:*~**:~,.:. RO reoorts 2PR2 PZR PORV is available.
- 8. PZR PORV fails shut RO reoorts 2PR2 will not ooen CRS returns to step 18 and answers NO to if a PORV is available.
SimulatC>rOperator:.. lf CRS cjjq>
*. notstart' Sl. pumps ~ub~e;lquenfto '
- theBiackout;:and.* starts;fhembere ..*
.* JI;IEN inseJi*RT;o5 a,fter '22SJp.url1p:. ~a~.PE;'l~n s~~rt~d:...; * . > *.. ,;.;., .* ~*~:*~...:* * *. MALF:*.$J0062J~*l~2 Safety,., . ".: *1 njEfction,Ponip trip.,::,, * :'~~;.:; * *,\ ~**
- ..Note:?a:1sf rium.p'fwnEnot,,start. ,
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 24 of 32 '~~~)~~~Jg~t~~{l?!~t~~gf~~~ . .
<='"'>" oo/N~-0-~J f~y<;' ,'-. ',,*;;r~,i;t}~~'n,'
RO reports no Sl pumps running if start attemot is made. CRS transitions to SGTR-5. Terminate scenario after transition to SGTR-5 in announced. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Page 25 of 32 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures E. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation F. S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging G. S2.0P-AB.SG-0001, Steam Generator Tube Leak H. S2.0P-AB.LOAD-0001 Rapid Load Reduction I. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection J. 2-EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture K. 2-EOP-SGTR-5, SGTR without Pressurizer Pressure Control PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS . . TODAY MODE: 1 POWER: 76 RCS BORON: 885 MWe 920 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core burnup is 5,000 EFPH Control Bank D rods are at 148 steps Power was reduced to 76% 30 minutes ago due to slight oscillations on 21 SGFP governor. Xe is building in at 60 pcm I hr. MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION: 3.4.5. Action b- 2PR1 expires 69 hours from now EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: 2PR6 shut and power CIT. CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: PZR PORV 2PR1 was declared inoperable 3 hours ago due to intermittent control circuit anomalies. SECONDARY: 21 SGFP remains in service. Governor problem has not been identified. Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: None PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST
- 1. Verify simulator is in 'TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter With Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct if applicable.
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
- 26. Verify EGC paperwork is marked "Training Use Only" and is current revision.
- 27. Ensure sufficient copies of ECG paperwork are available.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 ATTACHMENT 3 . CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 13-01 NRC-ESG-5 REVIEWER: P Williams Initials Qualitative Attributes PW 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PW 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PW 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PW 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction( s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point PW 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
PW 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PW 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PW 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PW 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PW 10. The scenario has been validated. PW 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario. PW 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.S.d) Initial Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.S.d) GG 7 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GG 3 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GG 2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 GG 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GG 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GG 2 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 13-01 NRC ESG-5 CT# 1: {CT-18) Isolate AFW to the ruptured SG within 10 minutes of entry into TRIP-1 and subsequently close 23MS167, 23MS18, 23MS7 and 23GB4 before a transition to SGTR-3 is required. Basis: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the crew allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency ERG constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy.... " CT#2{CT-19) Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either of the following conditions: Too high to maintain minimum required subcooling OR Below [the RCS temperature that causes an RED path or a PURPLE challenge to the subcriticality and/or the integrity CSF. Basis: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency ERG. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy .... " PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 06-0204 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N Event Y/N Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water y Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss ofCCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg y Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Y Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Y Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.}}