ML14184B252
| ML14184B252 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/2014 |
| From: | Greg Werner NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E |
| To: | Jeremy G. Browning Entergy Operations |
| Young C | |
| References | |
| EA 14-008 | |
| Download: ML14184B252 (96) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E LAMAR BLVD ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511 July 3, 2014 EA 14-008 Jeremy Browning, Site Vice President Arkansas Nuclear One Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 SR 333 Russellville, AR 72802-0967
SUBJECT:
SUPPLEMENT TO THE ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE UNIT 1 DROPPED STATOR REGULATORY CONFERENCE MEETING
SUMMARY
Dear Mr. Browning:
On May 1, 2014, members of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff met with representatives of the Arkansas Nuclear One facility to discuss the apparent violation affecting both units related to the drop of the Unit 1 main generator stator as documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000313/2013012 and 05000368/2013012 (ML14083A409), issued on March 24, 2014. The focus of the regulatory conference was a discussion on the safety significance of the finding. The discussion included Unit 1 mitigating actions focusing on the use of temporary power to recover the electrical buses and Unit 2 procedural electrical power recovery actions.
In a meeting summary (ML14128A512) issued on May 9, 2014, it was noted that the regulatory conference was transcribed and that a copy of the transcription would be made available and placed into the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). A copy of this transcript is provided as an enclosure to this letter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs ADAMS.
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (The Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA Cale Young for Greg Werner/
Gregory E. Werner, Chief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-313, 50-368 License Nos.: DPR-51, NPF-6
Enclosure:
ANO Unit 1 Stator Drop Regulatory Conference Transcript
SUNSI Review By:
ADAMS Yes No Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Sensitive OFFICE RIV/DRP RIV/DRP NAME CYoung/dll GWerner SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA CYoung for/
DATE 7/3/14 7/3/14
Letter to Jeremy Browning from Gregory E. Werner dated July 3, 2014
SUBJECT:
SUPPLEMENT TO THE ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE UNIT 1 DROPPED STATOR REGULATORY CONFERENCE MEETING
SUMMARY
DISTRIBUTION:
Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov)
Deputy Regional Administrator (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)
Acting DRP Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)
Acting DRP Deputy Director (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)
DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)
DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)
Senior Resident Inspector (Brian.Tindell@nrc.gov)
Resident Inspector (Matt.Young@nrc.gov)
Resident Inspector (Abin.Fairbanks@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRP/E (Greg.Werner@nrc.gov)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (Cale.Young@nrc.gov)
Project Engineer, DRP/E (Jim.Melfi@nrc.gov)
ANO Administrative Assistant (Gloria.Hatfield@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)
Project Manager (Peter.Bamford@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Geoff.Miller@nrc.gov)
ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)
RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)
Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)
Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov)
Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)
RIV/ETA: OEDO (Yen-Ju.Chen@nrc.gov)
ROPreports
Cause No: (None)
Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
Transcript of Proceedings May 1, 2014 Job No. 18996 307 W. 7th Street, Suite 1350 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 817-336-3042
- depos@merittexas.com
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC 1 (Pages 1 to 4)
Page 1 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
TRANSCRIPT OF 8
9 NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONFERENCE 10 11 MAY 1, 2014 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 REPORTED BY:
24 25 KATHLEEN MCCURRY, CSR Page 2 1
IN ATTENDANCE:
2 Greg Werner - Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch E, 3
DRP 4
Kriss Kennedy - Director, Division of Reactor Projects 5
Marc Dapas - Regional Administrator, Region IV 6
Jeff Clark, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety 7
Jeff Circle - Team Leader, NRR/DRA 8
Jeff Mitman - Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst, 9
NRR/DRA 10 David Loveless - Senior Reactor Analyst, Division of 11 Reactor Projects 12 Leonard Willoughby - Senior Resident Inspector, Division 13 of Reactor Safety 14 Mike Bloodgood - Senior Program Engineer, Division of 15 Reactor Projects 16 Troy Pruett - Deputy Director, Division of Reactor 17 Projects 18 Brian Tindell - Senior Resident Inspector, Arkansas 19 Nuclear One 20 Peter Bamford - Project Manager, NRR 21 Vivian Campbell - Chief, Allegation Coordination and 22 Enforcement Staff 23 Rachel Browder - Senior Enforcement Specialist, 24 Allegation 25 Page 3 1
IN ATTENDANCE CONT'D 2
Jeremy Browning - Site Vice President ANO 3
Joseph Kowaleski - Senior Vice President, Entergy 4
David McKenney - Supervising Engineering 5
John Hathcoat - Assistant Operations Manager, ANO 6
Gary Sullins - Assistant Operations Manager, ANO 7
Richard Harris - Manager, Emergency Planning 8
Dale James - Director, Regulatory and Performance 9
Improvement Department, ANO 10 John McCann - Vice President, Regulatory Assurance, 11 Entergy 12 Bryan Ford - Senior Manager, Fleet Regulatory Assurance, 13 Entergy 14 Stephanie Pyle - Manager, Regulatory Assurance, ANO 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Page 4 1
INDEX 2
3 Page No.
4 Appearances.....................2 5
Proceedings.....................5 6
Reporter's Certificate........210 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC 2 (Pages 5 to 8)
Page 5 1
P R O C E E D I N G S 2
OPERATOR SYLVIA: Good afternoon 3
everyone. Welcome and thank you for standing by. At 4
this time participant lines are in listen only mode.
5 Following today's presentation we will have an 6
opportunity for question and answer session. At that 7
time please press star-one on your phone to ask a 8
question. Now I'll turn the call over to our host, 9
Mr. Greg Werner. You may begin.
10 MR. WERNER: Thank you Sylvia. Good 11 afternoon, I'm Gregory Werner with the Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission. I'm the Branch Chief, 13 responsibility for Arkansas Nuclear One and Waterford 14 Nuclear Power Plants.
15 Welcome to the regulatory conference 16 between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Entergy 17 Operations. Today we'll be discussing the event that 18 occurred on March 31st of last year involving a drop 19 Unit 1 stator at the Arkansas Nuclear One facility.
20 The event resulted in identification of 21 two preliminarily greater than green findings associated 22 the with violations of 10CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, 23 Criterion V for Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, 24 associated with the failure to insure that the overhead 25 temporary hoisting assembly was designed and tested in Page 6 1
accordance with approved standards.
2 A couple of administrative items; first, 3
the closest restrooms are located out the door to your 4
left past the guard station. In the event of an 5
emergency, listen to the announcement over the intercom, 6
if an evacuation of the building is necessary the 7
nearest exists are out the front. Go out the doors to 8
your left, or you can go out the doors to your right to 9
the side of the building, and then our assembly area 10 would be to the north towards the roads, we will proceed 11 out in that direction.
12 The agenda is what's up on the screen.
13 We also have an agenda that was printed and distributed.
14 If you'd like to get one, it's located over there on the 15 side counter, so feel free to get up and get an agenda.
16 This conference is being transcribed and will be 17 available publicly online.
18 As a reminder, when we speak, if we will 19 introduce ourselves so the transcription lady can go 20 ahead and get our names on the record. As a reminder to 21 both NRC and Entergy personnel, if you wish to make a 22 comment or question, please move to the microphone or 23 move the microphone in front of you or go to the podium 24 so the people on the phone bridge will be able to hear 25 your the question or comments.
Page 7 1
Feedback forms are also available on the 2
side table, and they will also be available online with 3
the public meeting notice for this meeting. We would 4
appreciate and request that you fill out the feedback 5
forms.
6 So quickly, if you look at the screen, 7
the agenda, we're going to do an introduction of 8
participants and I would just like to have the main 9
table introduce theirselves. We'll do some NRC opening 10 remarks, summary of the violation, additional NRC 11 opening remarks by Marc Dapas, Regional Administrator, 12 the licensee Entergy presentation, we'll have some 13 question and answers during that time from the NRC.
14 Once y'all's presentation is done, the 15 NRC will leave the room, we'll caucus and determine if 16 we have any other additional questions or need 17 additional information, we'll come back in at that time.
18 We'll ask those questions. Marc Dapas will then do a 19 closing remarks, we'll adjourn the conference, and then 20 we'll take questions and comments from members of the 21 public.
22 So just so start out with introductions, 23 again, as I said, I'm Gregory Werner, Branch Chief.
24 MR. KENNEDY: I'm Kriss Kennedy, Director 25 of Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region IV.
Page 8 1
MR. DAPAS: I'm Marc Dapas, Regional 2
Administrator of NRC Region IV office.
3 MR. CLARK: I'm Jeff Clark. I'm the 4
Acting Director for Division of Reactor Safety, Region 5
IV.
6 MR. CIRCLE: I'm Jeff Circle, a Team 7
Leader of the Division of Risk Assessment NRR 8
headquarters.
9 MR. MITMAN: Jeff Mitman, I'm a Risk 10 Analyst with NRR Risk Assessment and headquarters.
11 MR. LOVELESS: I'm David Loveless, I'm 12 the Senior Reactor Analyst for Region IV.
13 MR. WILLOUGHBY: I'm Leonard Willoughby, 14 Senior Reactor Inspector, Region IV.
15 MR. WERNER: Thank you. Entergy?
16 MR. BROWNING: Jeremy Browning, Site Vice 17 President, Arkansas Nuclear One.
18 MR. KOWALESKI: Joe Kowaleski, Chief 19 Operating Officer for the southern plants.
20 MR. MCKENNEY: My name's David McKenney 21 and I'm Engineering Supervisor at ANO.
22 MR. SULLINS: I'm Gary Sullins, I'm the 23 Manager of Shift Operations for ANO Unit 1.
24 MR. HATHCOAT: I'm John Hathcoat, Unit 2 25 Manager Shift Operations.
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC 3 (Pages 9 to 12)
Page 9 1
MR. HARRIS: Richard Harris, Emergency 2
Planning Manager, Arkansas Nuclear One.
3 MR. JAMES: I'm Dale James, Director of 4
Regulatory and Performance Improvement, Arkansas Nuclear 5
One.
6 MR. WERNER: Thank you. Again this is 7
Gregory Werner. I'm going to have some opening remarks.
8 In accordance with the NRC's regulatory 9
process after potentially risk significant findings 10 identified and characterized by the significance 11 determination processes as greater than Green, we offer 12 licensees an opportunity for a regulatory conference.
13 In this case, Entergy has requested that 14 a conference be held to discuss the issues and their 15 significance. This conference is open to the public for 16 observation. Members of both the public -- both those 17 ins attendance here and via the phone bridge should be 18 aware that this is a meeting between the Nuclear 19 Regulatory Commission and Entergy.
20 During the meeting comments and questions 21 will not be taken from members of the public. Following 22 the conference, the NRC staff will be available to 23 answer questions and receive comments from members of 24 the public concerning matters discussed at this 25 conference.
Page 10 1
On March 31st 2013, during the movement 2
of the Unit 1 stator, the overhead temporary hoisting 3
assembly transporting the stator collapsed, causing the 4
525-ton stator to fall on and extensively damage 5
portions of the Unit 1 turbine deck and subsequently 6
fall over 30 feet into the train bay.
7 The stator drop resulted in a Unit 1 loss 8
of offsite power for approximately 6 days and a Unit 2 9
reactor trip. The drop stator ruptured a common fire 10 main header in the train bay which caused flooding in 11 Unit 1 and water damage to the electrical switchgear for 12 unit 2, a small explosion resulting in a loss of offsite 13 power to one vital bus.
14 As a result, one of the Unit 2 emergency 15 diesel generators started and restored power to the 16 associated safety-related vital bus. In response to 17 the small explosion inside the Unit 2 electrical 18 cabinet, the operators declared a notification of an 19 unusual event.
20 On April 5th 2013, an augmented 21 inspection team was chartered to assess the facts and 22 circumstances surrounding the temporary hoisting 23 assembly collapse.
24 The augmented inspection team completed 25 the fact-finding inspection on May 9th 2013, and Page 11 1
identified 10 unresolved items. Subsequently, a 2
follow-up team was conducted July 15th through February 3
10th, 2014, to review those unresolved items. During 4
the inspection the inspectors identified two findings of 5
potentially greater than Green significance that were a 6
violation of regulatory requirements.
7 The NRC assessed the risk significance of 8
this event and preliminarily determined that there was a 9
high safety significance, or the color Red, for Unit 1; 10 a substantial safety significance, or Yellow color, for 11 Unit 2. The NRC uses colors to classify the risk 12 significance of each event. Green finding; green, 13 white, yellow, red. With Green being the least risk 14 significance and Red being the most risk significance.
15 Following the inspection on site, the NRC 16 preliminarily determined that the finding constituted 17 apparent violation of 10CFR, Part 50, Appendix Bravo, 18 Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.
19 The violation was determined to be a failure of the 20 licensees to insure that the overhead temporary hoisting 21 assembly was adequately designed and tested.
22 Specifically, licensee failed to identify deficiencies 23 in the vendor calculation titled Heavy Lift Gantry 24 Calculation, and the incorrectly sized component in the 25 north tower structure of the temporary hoisting Page 12 1
assembly.
2 In addition, ANO personnel failed to 3
perform a load test of the temporary hoisting assembly.
4 These preliminary results along with an 5
option for regulatory conference were communicated to 6
you during an exit onsite that was conducted on 7
February 10th, 2014, and is documented in NRC Inspection 8
Report 2013 12, dated March 24, 2014.
9 This regulatory conference is the last 10 step of the inspection process before the NRC makes its 11 final determination on the significance of the 12 inspection findings.
13 This event led to a unique situation 14 where the NRC identified one performance deficiency and 15 one violation alleging different risk significance 16 determination for each unit. The differences in the 17 risk significance related to a couple of factors; 18 different operational modes, Unit 1 was shut down with 19 reactor head off, fuel in the vessel, ready to be 20 refueled as compared to Unit 2 there was 100 percent 21 power. The other differences are they are completely 22 different reactor designs. One is a Babcock & Wilcox 23 the other one is a combustion engineering design. They 24 have different systems and components that impact the 25 risk significance of the findings.
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC 4 (Pages 13 to 16)
Page 13 1
The purpose of this conference today is 2
to allow you to provide your position in part or all 3
with the facts and assumptions used by the NRC to make 4
our preliminary significance determination, and to allow 5
you to present new information that may assist us in 6
arriving at the most appropriate final significance 7
determination.
8 We also appreciate your views as to 9
whether there's any information that may be relevant to 10 the application of the significance determination in 11 this case, including your position on the content and 12 accuracy of the inspection report findings.
13 In particular, as discussed in the cover 14 letter of the augmented inspection team follow-up 15 report, please discuss actions that could be taken to 16 mitigate the severity of this event and what range of 17 credit should be applied and the basis for that.
18 If you have any additional information 19 that is under development and is not currently available 20 to be presented at this conference, please inform us of 21 the nature and the date when the NRC would expect to 22 receive that information. The NRC must receive that 23 information in a timely manner so that we can review it 24 and they can assess wit that information.
25 Please note that the primary purpose of Page 14 1
this meeting is to discuss issues related, again, to the 2
safety significance of the findings, which informs the 3
outcome of the apparent violation. It is important to 4
note that the decision to conduct this conference does 5
not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation 6
has occurred. The violation related to these findings 7
being discussed today will be assessed in accordance 8
with the commissions enforcement policy.
9 As a reminder, any statements, views, or 10 expressions of opinions made by NRC employees of this 11 conference do not represent final agency determinations 12 or beliefs relative to the matter before us today.
13 Following this conference, the regional 14 and NRC headquarter staff will reach significance 15 determination and enforcement decision. Our goal is to 16 issue the final significance determination letter by 17 June 10th of this year.
18 Just to kind of give you a little 19 background on our inspection activities, we determined 20 that ANO personnel conducted extensive reviews of the 21 event and the root cause evaluation and implemented 22 appropriate corrective actions that served the 23 subsequent lift of the drop stator and the Unit 1 24 replacement rotor of the stator were performed safely 25 considering the lessons learned from the root cause Page 15 1
evaluation.
2 Following the event and prior to 3
subsequent return to power, NRC inspectors observed 4
repair activities including the removal of the drop 5
stator, observed the subsequent Unit 1 replacement 6
stator lift, reviewed the corrective actions associated 7
with repairing the damaged Unit 1 turbine structure, the 8
fire main system, and both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 9
electrical systems, review the modifications and 10 procedures related to heavy load lifts and we also 11 observe training of your staff that they received on the 12 advised requirements for heavy load lifting 13 Now, I'd like to turn it over to Marc for 14 his opening remarks.
15 MR. DAPAS: Thank you, Greg. This is 16 Marc Depas, Regional Administrator. The stator drop was 17 certainly an unprecedented event that was significant 18 from both the reactor and personnel safety standpoint.
19 So it's in that context and is particularly important 20 that at the conclusion of this conference we at least 21 have a shared understanding of the facts and assumptions 22 regarding our preliminary significance determination, 23 and that we also have afforded you the full opportunity 24 to communicate any new information to ensure that our 25 final risk determination is as accurate as it can be.
Page 16 1
We communicated in the letter that I 2
signed that Greg referenced, the follow-up augmented 3
inspection team report dated March 24, we did clearly 4
communicate the basis for our preliminary risk 5
assessment. And as Greg indicated, there are different 6
designs between Unit 1 and Unit 2, and that results in 7
different systems and components that impact the risk 8
significance.
9 So in my view further underscores the 10 importance to ensure that we have the opportunity to 11 fully engage and the shared understanding of the facts 12 and assumptions. We ultimately may disagree with how 13 much significance should be accorded to the different 14 factors, but it's important that we have a shared 15 understanding, at least, from, you know, the premise 16 that we're operating from.
17 We acknowledge the corrective actions 18 that were performed to ensure the plant was properly 19 repaired and safe for restart. But I also wanted to 20 note, as I mentioned in the cover letter to the subject 21 inspection report that I just referenced, we had offered 22 the conclusion that your staff did not address Entergy's 23 oversight of the contractors involved with the stator 24 lift and we independently determined that you the 25 licensee did not ensure adequate supervisory and
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC 5 (Pages 17 to 20)
Page 17 1
management oversight of the contractors and other 2
supplemental personnel involved with the stator lift and 3
that this contributed to the event.
4 So I'd like to, as part of the conference 5
today, hear your thoughts regarding the actions you've 6
taken to provide for oversight of contractors, how you 7
evaluate that in going forward, what actions you've 8
taken to ensure that in going forward approach you have 9
adequately addressed that performance deficiency that 10 was apparent from our independent review.
11 That concludes my opening remarks. I 12 look toward to the discussion, and at this point, I'll 13 turn it over to you, Mr. Kowaleski, to provide any 14 opening remarks you may have 15 Thank you.
16 MR. KOWALESKI: Yeah, Jeremy Browning is 17 going to do the opening remarks. And our presentation 18 is going to address all the points that you made. It is 19 constructive to first look at the Unit 1 risk 20 significance and the Unit 2 risk significance, and 21 discuss the evolutions.
22 MR. BROWNING: All right. This is Jeremy 23 Browning, Site Vice President Arkansas Nuclear One, I do 24 appreciate the opportunity, thank you for your time, to 25 share additional insights and information that we Page 18 1
believe will help us achieve that objective of 2
determining the most accurate assessment of risk that 3
occurred following that event.
4 As we were preparing for this, I wanted 5
to make sure it's crystal clear that in no way, shape, 6
or form are we intending to challenge the significance 7
of the consequences of that event. We are simply trying 8
to establish the most accurate picture of the nuclear 9
safety risk following that event.
10 We take this commitment very seriously.
11 The seriousness of this event, the people that are 12 sitting on the Entergy panel were present on the day of 13 the event, myself included. The most impactful piece of 14 that is obviously the loss of one young man's life and 15 the injury of several other employees. That will have a 16 lasting impact on me personally, and the station, 17 personally we take it very seriously.
18 And as a result, we will share with you 19 the corrective actions that we took that were derived 20 out of a very thorough and rigorous causal analysis 21 which we broadened to extent of cause and condition. So 22 we will share that.
23 We do appreciate the insights you 24 provided to us in the augmented inspection team report 25 and your risk analysis. We use that as a basis for our Page 19 1
expanding further into possibly crediting some actions 2
that we believe could have mitigated the risk. We also 3
wanted to point out that following the event, the 4
operators at the station took appropriate actions to 5
place the plants in stable configurations, also 6
minimizing the risk to the health and safety of the 7
public.
8 We would also like to note that our 9
safety-related equipment performed as designed, further 10 reducing the risk to the health and safety of the 11 public.
12 If we could, if we could move onto the 13 agenda. As Joe spoke earlier, we're going to break the 14 presentation down into two separate areas, initially, 15 that's focusing on Unit 1 initially, and then we'll move 16 onto the discussion on Unit 2.
17 We've strategically put a break right 18 after the Unit 1 discussion, and again we'll take a 19 break whenever it's appropriate, but we thought that 20 would be a clean point to possibly allow ourselves to --
21 if there's additional follow-up questions because it is 22 a different set of the parameters that we will move into 23 when we talk about Unit 2. So we thought that might be 24 a good breaking point.
25 The agenda, we're going to kind of paint Page 20 1
the backdrop of the plant's immediate response, you 2
know, what happened immediately just so we have a clear 3
picture. It will be a very brief discussion, but I 4
think it's important for us to understand what actually 5
happened, the configuration of the plant, and the 6
actions that we actually took following the event.
7 Following that, we will discuss a couple 8
of areas on Unit 2, recovery of 4160 volt power and 9
inventory makeup, and some success paths that we were 10 developing as contingencies in the event the power 11 continued to degrade, that being our offsite power which 12 was always available to us and our safety buses that 13 were always available to us. The conduit between the 14 two has discussed earlier, had been severed.
15 So, really, that's the focus of our 16 recoveries. How do we connect the available offsite 17 power to the available safety, and we did have some 18 additional contingencies that we were working on.
19 After the break, we'll shift to Unit 2.
20 The discussion on Unit 2 is a little bit different in 21 that the recovery actions that we'll be talking about on 22 Unit 2 would be procedurally driven. The equipment was 23 available, we really aren't developing operator or 24 station-performed activities to implement those.
25 This is just simply walking you through
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC 6 (Pages 21 to 24)
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the available resources that we had and our analysis as 2
in some cases, there may not have been the appropriate 3
credit applied to those areas. And then we will, at the 4
end of presentation, talk about the site actions, the 5
common cause, including fleet actions that were taken 6
and, obviously, closing comments.
7 So if we can move on to the Unit 1 8
section. Already painted a little bit of an overview, 9
this is what you're about to listen to. We're going to 10 focus on the NRC event tree. When we're talking about 11 4160 volt AC power recovery, there's actually four 12 sections if this.
13 The first section of it is what we 14 actually did to recover power. Just so you understand 15 what we -- it took to actually connect that available 16 offsite power source to the onsite power source.
17 Then we're going to discuss three success 18 paths that were being developed as contingencies in the 19 event that we lost offsite power, or we lost one of our 20 diesels, what would we do then? That's part of the way 21 we do business. We're thinking about what could happen 22 next.
23 So those recovery actions were already 24 under development in that we would possibly lose one of 25 our emergency diesels and what would it take to get that Page 22 1
offsite power connected to our buses.
2 And the 4th item that we will talk about 3
is inventory. Making sure that we had available 4
inventory for our spent fuel pool which was flooded up, 5
had over 300,000 gallons of water on top of the fuel --
6 active fuel, but we did recognize the need to establish 7
inventory control.
8 As we go on through the Unit 1 9
discussion, we recognize that crediting those, there is 10 no approved process to credit actions that we were 11 proposing. So what we did is we used known tools that 12 are already out there for assessing risk, and we tried 13 to say how can we apply those known tools to the 14 methodologies that we would be implementing to give 15 credit to action and come up with a method for crediting 16 those.
17 I think that is all I had on the 18 overview, so I think we're ready to actually move into 19 the Unit 1 discussion.
20 MR. SULLINS: Mr. Browning, this is Gary 21 Sullins, you spoke to the spent fuel pool, I think you 22 meant the fuel transfer.
23 MR. BROWNING: Both. In our succession 24 on make up, our make up capability would have provided 25 make up both to the spent fuel pool and the reactor, but Page 23 1
thank you.
2 MR. KOWALESKI: Good afternoon. This is 3
Joe Kowaleski. Just add one other item to that as we're 4
talking about the actual installation of the power 5
supply from the offsite startup one transformer to the 6
safety buses. That was actually installed and available 7
for service in 4.4 days. Gary is going to discuss the 8
time to full recovery is 4.8 days, so in the actual 9
event we have we had offsite power established prior to 10 and within the timeframe of core recovery.
11 MR. SULLINS: Good afternoon, I'm Gary 12 Sullins, Manager Shift Operations on ANO Unit 1. I 13 supervise the shift managers for Unit 1 and then the 14 senior license holder to that unit. I also serve in the 15 role of TFC manager in our emergency response 16 organization. In that role I report directly to the 17 emergency plan manager and coordinate development of 18 repair and recovery actions in the TFC working with our 19 operations, maintenance, and engineering coordinators.
20 On the day of the stator drop event, I 21 provided oversight for control room activities 22 throughout the day, and in the days and weeks following, 23 I served in the role of supporting the engineering and 24 how to support organizations in defining strategies for 25 our recovery.
Page 24 1
MR. MCKENNEY: My name is David McKenney 2
and I'm the -- right now I'm currently the Engineering 3
Fix It Now Supervisor at ENTARK (unclear) 1. I've got 4
going on 27 -- a little more than 27 years experience, 5
all of it in engineering, and before that 6 years of 6
construction experience. I was the engineering 7
coordinator and the TSE the evening after the event.
8 We'll talk about what the engineering activities were 9
going on associated with that.
10 The engineering fix it now team is -- one of 11 our normal businesses is to provide temporary power 12 during outages and for other -- like bus outages and 13 some of those kind of things. So we're very familiar 14 with the ability to get power to where we need it.
15 MR. SULLINS: To remind you of the 16 structure of our presentation, the success paths for 17 4160 volt power recovery are built upon what we actually 18 did to substantiate their viability and also recognize 19 that those success paths were in our contingency plans 20 in the event that power degraded.
21 So what we'll start with, initial 22 conditions that applied both on the day of the event 23 with the plant responding as it did, and these initial 24 conditions would also apply for certain of the sequences 25 in the risk assessment had equipment failed such as our
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
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2 We were on day 7 of our refuelling outage 3
with our fuel transfer canal flooded. That provided for 4
us a time to boil of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and a time to core 5
uncovery of 115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br /> or 4.8 days 6
MR. MITMAN: If I could ask a question of 7
clarification on that? This is Jeff Mitman from 8
headquarters. The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and the 115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br /> are a 9
little bit longer than what I'd seen previously. Two 10 questions; first is, could you supply the basis for 11 those times? And the second question is, those are the 12 times that we currently understand were the conditions 13 that they were in. Also of extreme importance is what 14 the operators thought they had at the time of the event.
15 And so could you speak to how much time they thought 16 they had when the event happened?
17 MR. SULLINS: Yes I can, Jeff. We can 18 provide followup calculations from our insurance staff 19 for the times presented. I don't have with me, readily, 20 the times that we -- we calculate daily an estimate, a 21 bounding estimate for time to boil and time to core 22 uncovery, and those times were short and I'll have to 23 get back with you for the exact times that were posted 24 in the control room and available previously.
25 MR. BROWNING: Gary, are the estimates Page 26 1
that are done are any of those recoverable, are they 2
documented?
3 MR. SULLINS: Yes they are.
4 MR. BROWNING: So we can provide the --
5 from that day with the estimate?
6 MR. SULLINS: Yes we can.
7 MR. DAPAS: Just an over arching 8
question. Our preliminary risk determination we had a 9
different subsequent regarding time to boil and time to 10 core uncovery.
11 MR. MITMAN: The initial assessment's a 12 little bit shorter than those times, but not to the 13 point to -- the human reliability analysis isn't 14 sensitive enough to distinguish between what they have, 15 what's currently being estimated and what we used. So 16 it's not going to shift the results, but I'm not sure 17 where the numbers are coming from and I'd like to get a 18 look at those.
19 And likewise, what the operators thought 20 is probably more important then what the times actually 21 were because that's what everybody is going to be 22 working towards is what they think is the amount of time 23 that they have, not how much time they actually have.
24 MR. SULLINS: As a result of the stator 25 drop, we had a loss of availability of our three Page 27 1
non-vital sources to our vital switchgear. Those being 2
our startup one and startup two transformers and the 3
alternate AC diesel generator. Our vital switchgear 4
were unaffected and operated properly once re-powered 5
from the emergency diesel generators.
6 Also note is that we had available to us 7
480-volt power within our power block from local 8
distribution, we commonly refer to it as the London 9
Line. On the day of the stator drop event, that power 10 source was used for non-vital equipment. This supports 11 the spent fuel pool cooling function and in days that 12 followed, this power source was used to recover load 13 centers for our 480-volt distribution system. And 14 you'll see later in our presentation how this available 15 power provides options for us to respond.
16 On the day of the event we chose to staff 17 our emergency response organization, and for the 18 dominant cut set and the risk assessment we would 19 likewise be in an alert condition and have available to 20 us that support structure provided by our ERO.
21 We were in day seven of a fueling outage 22 and that provided for us substantial support of human 23 resources. We had 295 craft available, 45 electricians, 24 this is around the clock support, approximately 40 25 engineering personnel, and 60 operations personnel. And Page 28 1
those are the operations personnel available to support 2
Unit 1. It does not include those that were involved in 3
Unit 2.
4 To ground our discussion, we've reviewed 5
your risk assessment and have focussed on key nodes in 6
sequence 19 which is called out in your report, which 7
involves the loss of both emergency diesel generators 8
and then other sequences where loss of one emergency 9
diesel generator can influence the probability of core 10 damage.
11 We'll be talking about, as Mr. Browning 12 mentioned, recovery paths that were available to us for 13 4160-volt power as well as inventory control recovery.
14 Our objective, just to summarize, is to 15 provide a technical basis for success paths for that 16 dominant cut set where both diesel generators or one 17 diesel generator is lost. Three of these involve 18 recovering 4160-volt AC power and the three success 19 paths were those contingency plans that were developed 20 in response to the event.
21 We also will talk about a 4th success 22 path involving use of 480-volt power to provide force 23 flow makeup to the reactor coolant system.
24 MR. KOWALESKI: This is Joe Kowaleski, 25 just wanted to point that out that of the three
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4160-volt success paths were on the board and being 2
evaluated in scope in response to this event as 3
contingencies in the event that something happened. So 4
in terms of determining what we could do, these were 5
already on the table.
6 MR. DAPAS: I think that's an important 7
distinction there. It's not that these alternative 8
success paths could have been pursued, you are 9
communicating to us that they actually were being 10 pursued or at least you were going through the thought 11 process and what would be involved to establish power 12 via those alternate routes. Is that correct?
13 MR. KOWALESKI: Yeah, that's correct. So 14 given the picture, we've got two diesel generators, a 15 very stable condition, and so evaluating how to restore 16 offsite power, the way we chose to do it, from start up 17 one to the safety buses was done in a way to provide 18 flexibility for the ultimate recovery. Lay down areas, 19 travel paths so it was well away from what we needed for 20 construction activities. And it provided operational 21 flexibility for future testing and activities to restore 22 the electrical part.
23 So it's more complex then these options.
24 These options were on the board, being evaluated by the 25 TSC as contingencies in the event that we had a problem Page 30 1
with the diesel or some kind of a problem with 2
completing the offsite source that we ultimately did.
3 MR. BROWNING: And hopefully through our 4
presentation we're going to demonstrate to you that the 5
scope of what we actually did was very similar to the 6
scope that was in these contingency plans, so the 7
materials, the resources, and the people that we would 8
have needed to do this activity, we could have shifted 9
the plan from what we were actually doing, which was 10 based on actual planning not the ones proposed in risk 11 analysis, but they are so similar in nature that that 12 change in course could have happened pretty quickly.
13 MR. CIRCLE: This is Jeff Circle from 14 headquarters. Did these contingencies exist in any way, 15 shape, or form prior to the stator drop as standard 16 contingencies that you normally take? That would 17 require, you know, putting equipment in the warehouse, 18 getting it prepared, procedures or anything like that?
19 MR. BROWNING: The actual specific 20 contingency that we're talking about today would not 21 have been fully developed; however, the processes that 22 we would have used for temporary power for a normal 23 refueling, we do these kind of things to prepare 24 ourselves for a refueling outage. So the scope would 25 have been the same. We're going to take power through Page 31 1
here and we're going to run a capable to there and all 2
the relaying and the metering that you might need to do 3
to do that would be on the table. The change would be 4
where is the source of power and where do I need it?
5 MR. CIRCLE: Was the equipment staged?
6 MR. BROWNING: Yes, sir. We will discuss 7
that as far as we were going to do some circ water pump 8
cables and some other work on some site where we had the 9
craft there, the resources there, the materials there 10 for similar work with similar components, we just 11 changed where those components would be connected.
12 MR. KOWALESKI: This is Joe Kowaleski, 13 just to be clear, so all the materials needed to execute 14 these options were on site? They were not staged for 15 this job, but they were immediately available on site?
16 MR. BROWNING: That includes the human 17 resource and the skills and the training to implement 18 them.
19 MR. CIRCLE: But no procedures?
20 MR. BROWNING: No procedures were 21 developed at that time. They were developed in order to 22 implement.
23 MR. DAPAS: I think it would probably be 24 appropriate that you were planning to go through and 25 explain to --
Page 32 1
MR. BROWNING: Yes, sir.
2 MR. DAPAS: I understand your question.
3 I think it's a valid question. I think we'll -- you 4
were going to give us the opportunity to engage, right?
5 MR. BROWNING: Yes, sir, if we don't hit 6
your expectations when we flip past the slide, ask a 7
question.
8 MR. CIRCLE: Well, we're not wallflowers.
9 MR. SULLINS: Thank you for the question.
10 Both for our actual response and for postulated 11 equipment failures, our priorities would be dictated by 12 the circumstances. And what we mean by that is we're 13 looking at our defense in depth for our five key safety 14 functions. What's our status of the plant? If the TSC 15 is activated as it was that day and in the event of 16 blackout condition, we're assessing those and 17 establishing priorities. On the day of the event the 18 plant was stabilized quickly and we had two trains of 19 decay heat removal on this support equipment in 20 operation.
21 The priorities align with those key 22 safety functions, protecting the electric power, 23 protecting decay heat removal, protecting the spent fuel 24 pool cooling. With the conditions that existed in our 25 plant it was also very important to us to protect our
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personnel with changing plant conditions, electrical 2
safety, structural safety were very important to us.
3 And as Mr. Kowaleski had mentioned, we 4
were factoring in -- given that we were stable with two 5
trains in operation, we're looking at taking a longer 6
term view of risk and how we recover and what we 7
ultimately chose to do with our recovery of offsite 8
power.
9 On the day of the event we recovered 10 promptly our decay heat removal function, our spent fuel 11 pool cooling. In the week that followed, we reliably 12 operated emergency diesel generators with no challenges, 13 and beyond that, we reliably operated our two trains of 14 decay heat removal.
15 As we've already discussed, we chose --
16 we developed and chose a recovery path for 4160-volt 17 power. In light of the stable conditions and the time 18 margin that was available for us with the condition, 19 too, of our shut down operations protection plan flooded 20 up to implement an optimum electrical recovery.
21 That recovery that was implemented was 22 made available to my staff and operations in 4.4 days.
23 And to be clear on what we mean by available, it was 24 tested energized up to the last breaker on which no 25 modifications were made and operating instructions and Page 34 1
briefings have been provided to our operators in the 2
form of night orders. So in the event that we needed to 3
use this source on a emergency basis, it was available 4
to us at that time 5
MR. MITMAN: Could you speak to why you 6
waited, what the thinking was behind waiting another day 7
and a half, approximately, before you re-energized --
8 MR. KOWALESKI: -- refer to the process 9
diagram.
10 MR. SULLINS: I'll answer briefly. It 11 was to complete the review process to formally approve 12 the temporary modifications design reviews.
13 MR. MITMAN: Did you have to do any 14 further testing on the buses to see that they were okay 15 to take the power?
16 MR. SULLINS: No sir, we did not.
17 MR. BROWNING: If you look back at the 18 slide that talked about priorities. We were making 19 decisions based on actual plant conditions. One of our 20 priorities is we were not going to challenge one of 21 those emergency diesel generators. We were not going to 22 challenge a bus.
23 A different mindset would have come into 24 play if one of those diesel generators would have shut 25 down. That would now take that priority off the table.
Page 35 1
We don't have to protect that diesel anymore and that 2
breaker would have been closed by the operators just as 3
Gary's stating it. The subsequent days we've discovered 4
nothing that would have changed our approach and that 5
breaker would have powered that bus up without 6
challenge.
7 MR. SULLINS: The process -- I was 8
involved in that decision. That process that applies is 9
our temporary modification process, and I had 10 discussions with the lead for the recovery team, our 11 design engineering manager, about whether we met the 12 criteria for an emergency team mod and actually placing 13 it into service, and my position was that we did not.
14 So we waited for the formal approval to be completed to 15 place it into service.
16 MR. BROWNING: Again going back to the 17 other -- again, this is Jeremy Browning, Site Vice 18 President ANO -- we would have met the criteria for 19 emergency temp mod had one of those diesel generators 20 failed in some way because the safety function would not 21 have been met and that would allowed that process to 22 continue forward.
23 MR. CIRCLE: Right. And this is Jeff 24 Circle. The thing is that if the diesel had failed, one 25 of the reasons why it failed is the fault with the Page 36 1
switchgear. So it wouldn't have been a 4.4-day 2
recovery, it would have been a little bit longer.
3 Because you would have to have measured the switchgear 4
to ensure that the fault, the condition had cleared.
5 MR. KOWALESKI: I would clarify that 6
slightly. The timeframe for the 4.8 days available to, 7
quote, uncover the start at the point that you lost both 8
diesels, not on the day that stator, but that point in 9
time that both diesels failed, you would have had 4.8 10 days to put that in service.
11 MR. CIRCLE: Right, but you would still 12 have a lot longer time then you had on that particular 13 event. So that event, the diesels were running, so you 14 had the temp mod right up to the last breaker. What 15 we're talking about -- we're skipping ahead a little bit 16 because this is part of the risk analysis, that you 17 failed two diesels, you're in the station blackout 18 condition and now the only power that you have is 19 through the temp mod, but you don't know what caused the 20 diesel's to fail.
21 So there would be some additional work 22 that you would have to do prior to restoring power.
23 That's all -- that's why we're asking that question.
24 MR. DAPAS: I think the importance of 25 discussion here is to try as realistically as we can to
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reconstruct, if you will, what conditions would have 2
existed had you needed to exercise these alternative 3
recovery paths here, since a lot are looking at those as 4
being available here to address the risk significance, 5
that we describes following an assumption of the failure 6
of the diesel.
7 So in my view that's why it's important 8
on timelines here, we need to be careful here when we're 9
saying on saying an extensive period of time, you know, 10 those are all subjective terms. Just try and refine, 11 you know, what is the actual time estimate if there 12 needed to be an understanding of the root cause -- the 13 cause for the diesel failure here, does that impact the 14 bus and would you have to do some degree of testing, 15 right, before you connected your alternative power 16 source to the affected bus.
17 Understanding that, just what would be a 18 realistic estimate of that time?
19 MR. BROWNING: And hopefully, through our 20 presentations we've discussed the contingencies, we will 21 show the margin that we would have had in the event that 22 we would have lost one of those diesels and decided to 23 implement one of our contingencies, as opposed to what 24 we actually did.
25 The only real discussion around actual is Page 38 1
to paint the picture of scope and what it took to do it 2
and compare that to what we would have done in the event 3
that we had a failure. And, again, if we get to the 4
point where we're talking about the timelines and we 5
haven't met your expectations, we will clearly provide 6
the information that we need to meet those expectations.
7 MR. SULLINS: Regarding the question on 8
assessing the condition of the bus, we would well confer 9
the dialog on the indications available to the operator 10 and how we would access that if that's useful.
11 Okay. The next phase of our section is 12 David McKenney will describe what we actually did to 13 recover power from Startup No. One.
14 MR. MCKENNEY: First thing I wanted to do 15 was kind of go through our electrical distribution 16 system. So everybody has a baseline knowledge on this 17 before we start talking about options that we take. So 18 I'm going to point to the screen up here, so if you 19 follow along with me, it will help us with that.
20 We have, there's basically five sources 21 of power to our vital AC. There's a Startup 1 22 transformer, which is fed from offsite. There's a 23 Startup 2 transformer, which is shared with Unit 2.
24 There's the alternate AC diesel generator, which is --
25 it also shared with Unit 2, can provide power to either Page 39 1
the non-vital on Unit 1 or the vital on Unit 1, the 2
non-vital on Unit 2 and the vital on Unit 2. So it has 3
lots of capabilities to go to different places.
4 And, of course, we have the emergency 5
diesel generators that feed the safety buses. So the 6
way the normal power comes into the plant, is it comes 7
in from one of the Start transformers to the non-vital.
8 You can see this line right here shows the difference 9
between the non-vital above this line and vital below 10 this line. And so, anyway, there's -- and then from 11 there it goes from --
12 (Noise from the bridge phone line) 13 MR. WERNER: This is Greg Werner, 14 somebody with the NRC doesn't have their phone muted.
15 Could you please mute your phone? Thank you.
16 MR. MCKENNEY: I think we got it. All 17 right, so this is the non-vital, which we call A1 and A2 18 and then from there it feeds through to vitals. This is 19 the red train, and the green train, 4160, and then it 20 cascades down through the 480-volt systems to provide 21 the power.
22 So this is the situation we were in 23 before the event and the lines that are colored red is 24 the lines that were energized. Any questions on that?
25 Okay.
Page 40 1
So what this figure is designed to show 2
you is what was actually damaged by the stator drop.
3 And that's inside this shaded box here. The little 4
figure on the thing doesn't have shaded, but it has a 5
red dotted line around it. And what you can see is, is 6
when the stator fell, it made unavailable the non-vital 7
link between offsite and the vital. So what we're faced 8
with was how to get power from the top, above the box, 9
down to the bottom, to get power back if the diesels 10 were to fail.
11 MR. MITMAN: At the time of the event did 12 you know the status of 2A9 and whether the 2A9 bus was 13 functional or not?
14 MR. MCKENNEY: There was no indication to 15 the operators it was nonfunctional. We -- so the damage 16 to the 2A9 bus is actually in the back where the 17 termination points to Unit 1. So the bus --
18 MR. MITMAN: Jeff Mitman again. Let me 19 rephrase it a different way. Did the operators think 20 that they could use 2A9 immediately after the stator 21 drop?
22 MR. HATHCOAT: This is John Hathcoat, the 23 Unit 2 Shift AO1, we had -- the report came from the 24 field about 1:30 in the afternoon that there was 25 potential damage to the back of 2A9. The feeds from the
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Page 41 1
A1, A3 vital and non-vital Unit 1 back of 2A9 was 2
damaged, but at that point Unit 2 believed that we 3
needed to assess what we had.
4 Up to that point and even after that 5
point on the Unit 2 side it was fully available and the 6
operators would have used it if need be. It is a shared 7
load between Unit 1 and Unit 2, so the functionality is 8
really dependent on if there's anything damaged, 9
challenging the functionality, we would call it 10 unavailable or nonfunctional, but it was available.
11 MR. MITMAN: But there's visible damage 12 to the 2A9 bus, and so far you haven't talked about 13 testing the 2A9 bus to see whether it's capable of 14 performing its design function, and I'm surprised that 15 you would contemplate energizing a 4,000-volt bus 16 without doing at least a little bit of testing on it 17 unless you were at a point where it was your last 18 resource.
19 MR. HATHCOAT: Absolutely. And from a 20 Unit 2 perspective, you know, H B Robinson was mentioned 21 in the control room four or five times, I was in there.
22 And that question came up, and it was isolated -- what 23 we knew -- the report from the field was it was isolated 24 to the Unit 1 side.
25 And from the Unit 2 perspective, you Page 42 1
know, I interviewed the controlling supervisor, the SDA, 2
I was there, and if we were in a blackout condition, and 3
I'll talk more about that in the Unit 2 section, but, 4
yes, it would have been pursued.
5 The question came up, you know, locally 6
going down there and looking at it. From a relay tech 7
standpoint we would have gone down, more than likely, 8
and opened up the back and inspected and make sure it 9
was just isolated to the Unit 1 side before we pursued 10 on Unit 2.
11 MR. KOWALESKI: To be clear, though, the 12 damage was on the connection points on the output of the 13 Unit 1 breakers, very visible and easily accessed and 14 assessed. So there was no damage to the actual bus, the 15 bus work supply from the alternate AC diesel, no damage 16 to any of the Unit 2 breakers or the feeder breaker to 17 the bus.
18 The damage was at the termination points 19 on the output side of the Unit 1 breakers, and the 20 breakers themselves were not damaged.
21 MR. MITMAN: You know that today, but the 22 people in the control room at the time of the event did 23 not know that, so it's not a question of what the bus 24 was capable of doing, it's a question of what the 25 operators in the control room thought they could do.
Page 43 1
And not only is there damage to the 2A9 bus, but there's 2
water on the floor in a room with 4,000 volts of 3
energized equipment.
4 It's a -- plant personnel have to be very 5
careful about what they're doing that the equipment that 6
is functioning and themselves, and I just want to draw 7
the distinction between what we know today and what was 8
known at the time of the event. And what we knew they 9
could have done at the time of the event today is not 10 what the control room knew at the time.
11 MR. BROWNING: So John has the direct 12 knowledge of what the control room would have known at 13 the time.
14 MR. HATHCOAT: I was in the control room 15 at the time. We were stable on the Unit 2 side, so we 16 did not have to pursue energizing 2A9, but, you know, 17 our procedures, station blackout procedures, loss of 18 offsite power procedures, standard tasks, we're trained 19 on that.
20 That's one of our major recovery 21 strategies, and I'll talk more about that, is to look at 22 your blackout condition for safety function. We're 23 going to follow our procedure and energize 2A9 using the 24 station blackout diesel.
25 Now is it a proven action, knowing that Page 44 1
there's potential damage to the back side of the 2A9 2
bus? Absolutely. We don't have time, we would have had 3
time to engage the technicians, I sent them down there 4
looking at the back up 2A9, make sure that it was 5
isolated just to the back feed on the Unit 1 side, and 6
it shouldn't have been any issue at all moving forward 7
with energizing one of our vital buses.
8 MR. DAPAS: I think the key here is --
9 this is Marc Dapas -- I think the key there is what in 10 your view do you think the operators and staff would 11 have been able to assess and I understand now that your 12 view there was that the damage was isolated to what the 13 Unit 1 breaker output determination?
14 MR. HATHCOAT: There's two breakers --
15 MR. DAPAS: The question in my mind is, 16 is that readily apparent to the operators by going down 17 and looking at that and making that determination, or is 18 that a function of what you've been able to determine, 19 you know, after the fact there? What information was 20 available to the operators and what input was there for 21 their decision making, trying to understand that here 22 and looking back.
23 MR. HATHCOAT: You can easily discern 24 that the queues are kind of split out, that it was 25 isolated to the A1 and A3 feeds to Unit 1. With that in
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mind, you know, the operators would have, knowing what 2
they did that the cable was pulled across the train bay, 3
and at the time they had known that, hey, as isolated 4
Unit 1 we could have moved forward with Unit 2.
5 Now the information came from back from 6
the field about 1:30 in the afternoon. Now talking to 7
the shift manager at that point later he said, you know, 8
it might have been a good idea in a blackout condition 9
to send the relay techs down just to look in the back 10 just to confirm that it is, you know, isolated to A1-A3 11 before we pursued on it because we would have had time 12 in a blackout condition.
13 So, yes, they definitely would have 14 pursued it for our procedural direction to restore power 15 if needed.
16 MR. CIRCLE: This is Jeff Circle. How 17 was the accessibility at that time if they had to do a 18 detailed examination of the switchgear?
19 MR. HATHCOAT: Well, we couldn't get down 20 to it 'til around noon or after this, but at that time, 21 you know, we didn't know -- there was no knowledge that 22 the blackout diesel on 2A9 was damaged. It wasn't until 23 we got down there, until about 1 o'clock is when we 24 actually noticed.
25 MR. TINDELL: This is Brian Tindell the Page 46 1
Senior Resident at Arkansas Nuclear One, I think we're 2
getting confused between availability for Unit 1 and 3
Unit 2. I think most of what you're talking about is 4
availability for Unit 2, but we're talking about the 5
Unit 1.
6 MR. HATHCOAT: Absolutely. And I'll talk 7
a lot more about the Unit 2 and hopefully clarify that.
8 MR. DAPAS: Just one overarching comment.
9 I think it's important here that we're understanding the 10 basis for your assumptions, so if our questions are 11 leaving you with the impression that we've already 12 reached a determination, it's really to understand the 13 basis here and how you considered the various factors 14 here, you know, IE: If the bus needs to be tested, did 15 you consider that? How did you factor that into your 16 timeline?
17 MR. FORD: I think we might answer those 18 questions better when we get into the strategies.
19 MR. MCKENNEY: First thing we're going to 20 talk about is what we actually installed, post event, 21 and that's just to show you the basic electrical layout 22 of that and a physical overhead view of that.
23 And so what we're going to do is go 24 through -- this is a picture of the Startup 1 25 transformer that was on the previous slide. And what we Page 47 1
did there is we hooked a cable between the Startup 1 2
transformer and a temporary 4160-volt breaker that was 3
located in our transformer yard. Ran another capable 4
around the south side of the Unit 1 turbine building, 5
away from the damaged area and tied it to the A310-410, 6
which is the cross connect between the two vital buses.
7 We were actually able to install this in 8
4.4 days and had it energized to this point 9
here(indicating). All tested and energized up to that 10 point.
11 And where we spliced this cable, and this 12 portion of the circuit was not impacted by any damage or 13 any of those kind of things, so that portion of the 14 circuit was still intact.
15 MR. LOVELESS: Temporary breaker was 16 onsite for it, or was it brought in?
17 MR. MCKENNEY: No, we brought that in, 18 ENTARK, Entergy Arkansas had that, and it was here the 19 next morning, after the event.
20 MR. SULLINS: Very good question. We're 21 talking about what we actually did when we talk about 22 the success paths that are modeled in our risk 23 assessment the breaker is not a part of that strategy.
24 MR. MCKENNEY: This is just an overhead 25 view showing the layout of -- here's the Startup 1 Page 48 1
Transformer as it exists, it's normal location. We put 2
the temporary breaker about approximately 50 feet away, 3
then we ran the cable around the south side of the plant 4
and to our vital switchgear area.
5 This area here that's designated the 6
train bay, that is where the stator fell. And these two 7
boxes here, I know it's hard to see, that's our 8
non-vital A2 and A1 switchgear.
9 MR. WERNER: As a reminder, if you 10 wouldn't mind just saying what page number you're on, we 11 do have folks from headquarters listening in.
12 MR. MCKENNEY: I'm on slide 17. This is 13 slide 18, and this is a photograph of the temporary 14 breaker. You can see the general location right here 15 that we put in transformer yard. This is Startup 16 Transformer No. 1. And this is the stator where it 17 landed after the event. So you can see we have 18 temporary cables here you can see coming in and out of 19 the breaker from the transformer and then going down the 20 opposite end of plant, back around to the vital 21 switchgear.
22 This is slide 19. This is showing the 23 general scope of the actual installation that we 24 installed. And you can see that it might be a little 25 confusing. It's seven -- since we had to run parallel
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conductors per phase, there's seven cables and one 2
neutral, so the actual length was 50 feet and 500 feet, 3
so it's lot of, there's some parallel runs on that.
4 MR. CIRCLE: We did have that question.
5 MR. MCKENNEY: Yeah. There's 28 splices 6
or terminations, some of them were splices, some were 7
terminations, 4160-volt that we installed for that.
8 MR. MITMAN: So, this will come up a 9
little bit later, but you used about 4,000 foot of 10 cable as I understand it, right? How much additional 11 cable did you have on site?
12 MR. MCKENNEY: We had scheduled to 13 replace our circulating water pump cables, which is in 14 our intake structure, so we had quite a bit of cable on 15 site to do that particular job. We had not started that 16 job yet. So we had a lot of cable and the termination 17 kits associated with replacing that cable, this 18 4160-volt cable, so.
19 MR. KOWALESKI: We had more, but you 20 don't know an exact length?
21 MR. MCKENNEY: We had enough to do the 22 alternate, we did bring in cable to finish this 23 particular option, but the subsequent options, the 24 capable length is a lot shorter and if we'd gone into 25 that situation, we'd have done that.
Page 50 1
MR. MITMAN: So, again, I'm getting a 2
little bit ahead, but the concern is how many of these 3
options you could do? You obviously had enough to do 4
this one, but if you had to do one or two additional 5
ones, you might have run out of cable.
6 SPEAKER: This is headquarters. We're 7
having a hard time hearing you, Jeff, could you please 8
speak up a little?
9 MR. MITMAN: Okay.
10 MR. BROWNING: How much cable did we 11 actually have on site, how much did we use for this?
12 MR. MCKENNEY: I can get you those 13 numbers at break. I've got them in a book back here.
14 MR. DAPAS: I think the intent of the 15 question was to understand if you had to pursue more 16 than one contingency option there did you have 17 sufficient cable for that?
18 MR. MCKENNEY: One thing is, and it's not 19 listed in our presentation, if we really had to do this 20 we could have run this cable a lot shorter than what we 21 did. And that's what we're going to talk about in a 22 moment.
23 MR. CIRCLE: Jeff Circle, just to 24 clarify, and then I'll finish, had it not been for the 25 fact that you had already scheduled the circ water pump Page 51 1
you would not have this much capable on site?
2 MR. MCKENNEY: That's correct.
3 MR. BROWNING: But to that point, we not 4
be lifting the stator if we weren't in a refueling 5
outage performing this work.
6 MR. CIRCLE: Right, but this particular 7
outage, it was fortuitous that you had cable on site 8
available.
9 MR. MCKENNEY: Cable is not terribly 10 difficult to come by in the timeframe we're talking 11 about. We were able to actually get the cable here in 12 the timeframe we're talking about. But we did have 13 enough cable to do multiple of these options on site.
14 I want to talk a little bit about the 15 implementation process because that's going to be 16 important as far as how do we get to the point that we 17 identified the need for one of these temporary 18 installations, to actual implementation of those 19 installations.
20 And so, we had -- I was in the TSC and we 21 were working on multiple options because of the 22 condition we were in with just running on diesel 23 generators from the engineering and a station 24 perspective that's not a very comfortable position to 25 be, so we were continuously looking at additional Page 52 1
options, contingency plans because if we lose a diesel 2
generator, then we'd want to be able to respond in a 3
reasonable fashion.
4 And so the implementation would be under 5
our temporary modification process and our work 6
management process. I'll go through this flowchart a 7
little bit with you. This kind of describes our 8
processes.
9 So if you'll look at the top here you'll 10 see where they have the TSC or OCC or OPS where 11 engineering identifies a need. Engineering would define 12 the concept and scope and then at that point, once we 13 define the initial concept and scope, depending on the 14 urgency, we would provide those directions to planning, 15 in which case they would start the planning process and 16 get instructions to the field for the start of 17 installation.
18 A lot of the stuff that we actually 19 install, like pulling capable, it's pretty straight 20 forward, so you don't need a lot of detailed 21 instructions for that, but they were working under our 22 processes.
23 So as they're installing and testing the 24 configuration, they're providing feedback to engineering 25 as we are refining the scope. And then if there's any
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changes to what engineering needs we provide that back 2
to planning, which kind of completes the circle on -- to 3
make sure that we're linked up.
4 Because what we're doing here is we're 5
running in parallel paths, right? One is the 6
installation, one is the documentation and approvals 7
associated with the temporary modification.
8 So this right here, the available for 9
use, that's when the testing's done, the installation's 10 done, oftentimes the engineering will lag a little bit 11 behind that if you're in a parallel path environment.
12 And for the installation we actual installed, that 13 available for use, that's the 4.4 days we're talking 14 about. It was installed, it was tested, and it was 15 energized up to the point that all OPS had to do was 16 close the breaker to provide power to either of the 17 vital buses.
18 So if there was an immediate need or if 19 we were to lose a diesel generator or something, we 20 could have invoked an emergency team on and placed it in 21 service. But the path we used, since there was no 22 immediate need, we were stable with both diesel 23 generators, is it came through this way and we waited 24 the additional day and a half to get our paper completed 25 before we put it in service.
Page 54 1
Any questions on that?
2 MR. LOVELESS: This is David Loveless.
3 How would you authorize an emergency temporary 4
modification?
5 MR. MCKENNEY: Our process that is 6
involved in that involves -- it's considered an 7
immediate threat to the safety or reliability of the 8
plant or involves authorization from the shift manager 9
and the engineering director. So that's within our 10 existing processes.
11 MR. BROWNING: This is Jeremy Browning.
12 What we're trying to communicate in the prior slide and 13 this slide is the modeling that we did, is assuming that 14 this process that we actually used would be applied to 15 the process, or applied to the applications that we 16 would be talking to you.
17 So it's what we actually did and it's 18 what we would have done had we had to implement one of 19 those contingencies. That's what we're trying to 20 communicate in these two slides. Which means the 21 installation in the field would have been controlled to 22 the four quarters. There would have been engineering 23 support paperwork unless we declared that we had a 24 safety function that was challenged, which would be the 25 only gate to an emergency. We would invoke paths where Page 55 1
it says available for use until the process was 2
complete.
3 MR. KENNEDY: How many other options did 4
you actually start down this path, this implementation 5
process path other options in parallel?
6 MR. BROWNING: Not in any great detail.
7 MR. MCKENNEY: We were in this step 8
block, right here, according to that and we had done 9
some of this (indicating).
10 MR. BROWNING: But what you're going to 11 hopefully see is the work order instructions for 12 installing a Raychem splice, for example. That Raychem 13 splice per order instructions can be translated over 14 into this option. The installation of this component 15 you just changed the nomenclature of where it's going, 16 and the fieldwork could have been done. If we were 17 halfway through option, the one we were doing, it's a 18 matter of cutting cable and redirecting that cable. The 19 work order instructions can come out in our process and 20 use by the craft just in a different locations.
21 MR. DAPAS: Marc Dapas, the salient point 22 here is that you actually implemented this process and 23 the manner in which it was provided to restored 24 4160-volt power. You would have used the same process 25 and you're assuming other three contingency success Page 56 1
paths that you indicated that you could have received --
2 MR. BROWNING: When we get into the risk 3
-- that's correct.
4 MR. DAPAS: So I understand where you're 5
going next. I just wanted to make sure I understood 6
that part.
7 MR. CIRCLE: Just one last question.
8 This is Jeff Circle, again, did you retain those records 9
from the last, from the implementation process 10 considering the restoring power if you needed --
11 contingencies?
12 MR. KOWALESKI: Do we have any written 13 records of what we did?
14 MR. CIRCLE: TLC logs.
15 MR. MCKENNEY: I do not have that. I 16 have some personal documents for, basically, how we 17 transitioned off from one to the other because part of 18 this is, you know, we have to figure out how we're going 19 to transition from these different options back and 20 forth.
21 MR. KOWALESKI: The answer is, there's 22 some personal notes that people have, but we don't have 23 any formal --
24 MR. CIRCLE: Nothing formal.
25 MR. MCKENNEY: No formal. I'm going to
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circle back around, finish up the -- what we actually 2
installed, which is a demonstrated -- we're calling it a 3
demonstrated success was the Startup 1 source.
4 So restored power to vital switchgear, 5
the craft was qualified and to do the activities that 6
we're talking about it provided the option tied to 7
either of the vital buses and allowed the diesel 8
generators to be available to feed their respective 9
train while we're installing it.
10 And it was actually available -- if you 11 look at that block that we talked about in 4.4 days. It 12 was actually energized up to the last breaker. And that 13 was documented in station log for that was when it was 14 available.
15 The next thing I want to get into is the 16 3 4160 alternate success paths. And these are things 17 that we talked about were being scoped in parallel while 18 we're installing the demonstrated success.
19 And the estimated times, if we're going 20 to compare back to what we actually installed on how 21 long it would take to do it. We're going to show you 22 that these are considerably more simple and less 23 involved.
24 So this first success path would be a 25 simplification or an alternate to the actually installed Page 58 1
success path. So what we've done here is eliminated the 2
temporary breaker. The temporary breaker provided some 3
additional flexibility, but if we were in a station 4
blackout or loss of an additional diesel -- and we're on 5
page - slide 24 -- it would, so it was basically, run 6
the cable from Startup 1 transformer to the cross tie 7
between the safety buses or the vital buses.
8 And what that looks like on slide 25 is 9
we have the Startup 1 transformer and we still would 10 have routed it around the area where the damage was, but 11 we would have taken a more direct route.
12 And so we would have used quite a bit 13 less cable, and we would have tied it to the exact same 14 spot that we used in the actual installed installation.
15 If you look at this table, this is a 16 comparison between the expedited or success path one and 17 the actual installed and you can see that it's half as 18 much cable, half as many terminations, and we do not 19 have to install temporary breaker, we do not have to do 20 the testing on temporary breaker, the DC supply for the 21 temporary breaker, so there's quite a bit of scope that 22 would have been eliminated by that particular option.
23 MR. KOWALESKI: This is Joe Kowaleski, to 24 that previous question on cable availability, if you 25 look at that total length of capable plus the next Page 59 1
option, that total length for both of these two options 2
is 2500 feet cable, 2450 feet of cable. The actually 3
installed one was 3,500 feet of cable. So what we 4
actually did is a thousand feet more cable than if we 5
were doing this option and the next option in parallel.
6 MR. CLARK: This is Jeff Clark. I just 7
have a question. On the first demonstrated option we 8
had the breaker in here and I'm assuming that provided 9
some safety feature to the bus as well. So did you have 10 protective devices other than the (can't hear) 11 transformer to the bus?
12 MR. MCKENNEY: The expedited option, or 13 success path one we're calling it here, did not, but it 14 had the upstream protection on the transformer itself.
15 MR. CLARK: From the transformer --
16 MR. MCKENNEY: Yeah, on the high side.
17 MR. CLARK: I understand.
18 MR. MCKENNEY: The other reason why we 19 installed the breaker was to -- operating the breaker on 20 the high side of the transformer is an Entergy Arkansas 21 function. So by putting the breaker inside we were able 22 to allow operations to have control over that within 23 their own station. So that was one of the key functions 24 of that breaker.
25 MR. BROWNING: And what we actually did Page 60 1
was positioning ourselves for a long-term recovery, 2
giving us the maximum operational flexibility. Had we 3
lost a piece of generator, that priority would have 4
completely shifted. We're no longer looking at 5
long-term recovery and operational flexibility, we're 6
looking at how do I connect to that bus in a safe, 7
efficient manner.
8 MR. DAPAS: This is Marc Dapas. Just a 9
question to make sure I understand. The difference, 10 then, between your success path one and what you 11 actually did to restore is connecting a cable directly 12 to the winding versus via temporary breaker --
13 MR. MCKENNEY: That's correct.
14 MR. DAPAS: -- Startup point transformer?
15 MR. BROWNING: And shorting the path.
16 MR. DAPAS: And the reason why it's a 17 shorter path, why would you have not exercised the same 18 path you did in the actual restoration? I may have 19 missed the --
20 MR. BROWNING: The real basis there was 21 that operational flexibility, the time we had and lay 22 down areas for recovery. Where we would have laid that 23 cable for a direct path, would not have afforded us the 24 opportunity to finish the recovery efforts that we knew 25 we needed to do. It would be outside of the area that
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was impacted, but because of where we needed to move 2
material inside our turbine building, we wanted that 3
outside the turbine building altogether for maximum 4
flexibility inside there.
5 But that's a different decision than I 6
don't have power on one of my safety buses. I'm not 7
thinking about long-term recovery. I'm thinking about 8
power to my safety-related bus.
9 MR. MITMAN: So, before we leave that 10 one, can we go back two slides, back to slide 24, 11 please. This is Jeff Mitman. The scenario where you'd 12 need immediately the offsite power would be some failure 13 of the vital AC power. Now the largest contributor to 14 that would be a failure of the diesel generators.
15 MR. MCKENNEY: Right.
16 MR. MITMAN: It seems like that's what 17 you're built your contingencies on, your success paths 18 on, is failures to the diesels. But we're in a 19 condition where the stator has been dropped, there's 20 extensive damage on 1A1 and 1A2 and I can easily 21 envision a situation where there's damage to the A3 22 and/or the A4. Not directly from the stator drop 23 itself, but because of problems in the electrical system 24 that has caused failures in the associated electrical 25 distribution system.
Page 62 1
Did you consider any contingencies to 2
reenergize loads that didn't rely on the A3 or the A4?
3 MR. KOWALESKI: Yeah. The third option, 4
or the fourth option that we'll talk about is one 5
directly, it's a 480-volt power directly, bypassing all 6
4160-volt switchgear.
7 MR. MITMAN: So that's the contingency if 8
the failure is other than on the diesel generator?
9 MR. KOWALESKI: In the event, although 10 the aux building is completely separate building, in 11 relaying protecting the safety buses from damage on the 12 non safety buses. If all that had failed, both diesel 13 generators had failed, and the safety buses were 14 completely unavailable on the 4160-volt, there is a 15 direct path to 480-volt power to the necessary makeup 16 pumps with multiple options that completely bypass the 17 4160-volt system.
18 MR. BROWNING: David, let's get you back 19 on track. Let's move to success path two if there's no 20 more questions on success path one.
21 MR. MCKENNEY: I want to give a little 22 overhead view on page 2, slide 27. This gives you a 23 physical layout and the general area of the train bay 24 where the stator fail. Here is the 2A9 switchgear, 25 which is located on the Unit 2 side. This is a wall Page 63 1
between the train bay and Unit 2.
2 These were the route of the cables that 3
went to A1 and also to the vital switchgear. So when --
4 and also from -- A2 was actually de-energized at that 5
point in the outage. So there's a cable that runs from 6
A2 switchgear and that's what feeds to the A4 vital 7
switchgear.
8 And I'm going to show where we're going 9
to use this green cable here in a moment.
10 MR. KOWALESKI: And that end of the 11 switchgear was undamaged?
12 MR. MCKENNEY: Yeah, this end of the 13 switchgear was undamaged, which is the west side, or to 14 the left. And on the right this side right is where the 15 stator, the main impact was to the switchgear. This 16 side here was not damaged.
17 MR. MITMAN: Before we leave this slide, 18 what's the source of control power for the 2A9 bus?
19 MR. HATHCOAT: The source of control 20 power is DC, it's all from the Unit 2 control room. The 21 Unit 2 control room basically has the controls to start 22 the alternate diesel generator and tie it on the.
23 Unit 2 side.
24 MR. MITMAN: So the source of control 25 power is --
Page 64 1
MR. MCKENNEY: From Unit 2.
2 MR. MITMAN: -- from Unit 2 and on the DC 3
system?
4 MR. MCKENNEY: So I'm on slide 28, and 5
what this does is we would -- we're going to hook a 6
cable from -- disconnect a cable from A2 which right 7
here, from A2 and run it through the door into Unit 2 8
because these are on the same elevation and there's a 9
door, I'll show you an overhead view here in a moment, 10 and splice in approximately a hundred feet of cable and 11 tie it back into 2A901.
12 So we had to make some very minor -- the 13 termination points were damaged in 2A901. And when we 14 actually, physically repaired them, it took six hours.
15 So it was, the breakers were fine, it's just where the 16 cables terminated.
17 Also important on this is, you can see 18 that this success path No. 2 is completely independent 19 of success path 1 or what we installed. They use 20 different tie points. The physical location is 21 different. The sources are different.
22 And this is an overhead view on page --
23 slide 29. You can see where we disconnected the green 24 cable from A201's cubicle and ran it through the door 25 and it'd make it about this far, so we just had to run
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about a hundred feet of cable.
2 Of course, that's a hundred feet times 3
seven because we have seven conductors or three parallel 4
paths times three, plus one. And we would have tied it 5
in to the alternate AC switchgear in the back.
6 MR. DAPAS: Just to make sure I'm 7
following this, can you show me why given our discussion 8
earlier about the ultimate AC, 4160-volt bus the damage 9
associated with that bus did not impact this success 10 path, too? I just wanted to make sure I fully 11 understand.
12 MR. MCKENNEY: We would have to make some 13 minor repairs in the back of 2A9. I have some 14 photographs here I can show you, but we would have had 15 to make some minor repairs and as I stated, it took six 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> to make those for the permanent repairs when we 17 actually did do that.
18 MR. DAPAS: So what's the timeframe there 19 to assess, if you will, the extent and condition 20 associated with the damage to determine minor repairs 21 and all that's necessary and then the time to implement 22 those repairs were all factored into your timeline for 23 how long it would take you to complete these success 24 paths?
25 MR. MCKENNEY: Yes. Let me get to the Page 66 1
next couple slides down and we'll discuss that.
2 MR. SULLINS: I just wanted to add that 3
while identified early, the tie point on the normal feed 4
to the A4 vital switchgear, we actually used this tie 5
point for a second offsite power feed later in our 6
recovery and the splices were very near where 7
illustrated on this picture.
8 MR. MCKENNEY: So this is slides 30 and 9
this is talking about the differences between what we 10 actually installed, we're always tying back to that 11 because it demonstrates that we were able to complete 12 these splices and terminations and pulling this cable.
13 So on the right is what we actually 14 installed. On the left is what would be required to 15 hook up success path No. 2. You can see it's about 16 700 feet of cable, half as many terminations or splices, 17 14, and we'd have to make some minor termination point 18 repairs in 2A901. So we can be pulling cable, we could 19 be making up the stress cones or the termination kits 20 while we're repairing the 2A9 switchgear. That could be 21 running in parallel and whatever electrical testing that 22 we felt we needed to do.
23 MR. KOWALESKI: So the only damage to 24 that switchgear was the connection points on the outside 25
-- output of that breaker. That's all that had to be Page 67 1
repaired were those connections.
2 MR. DAPAS: And this is Marc Dapas again.
3 Understand, you're looking at success path 1 or success 4
path 2, right? Not both success paths, correct? You 5
would have had to make a decision to use one or two or 6
both --
7 MR. KOWALESKI: These could have, and in 8
the event of diesel failure, would have been pursued in 9
parallel.
10 MR. DAPAS: So getting back to Jeff's 11 question here, factoring that into your timelines, 12 ensuring sufficient cable availability, using the 13 processes that you've described, you're going to be 14 doing that with both of these contingency plans, would 15 that have resulted --
16 I wanted to understand with the time you 17 assumed to implement each contingency plan does that 18 reflect the recognition that you're pursuing both of 19 these in parallel and did you the right number of staff, 20 you know, that were focused on each one individually, or 21 are you relying on the same staff to make decisions and 22 how did you factor the fact that you would potentially 23 be pursuing two paths at the same time?
24 MR. KOWALESKI: If you recall back on 25 page 9, there were 45 electricians per shift, so 45 Page 68 1
electricians per shift could easily pursue both of these 2
options. There were 40 engineers per shift to provide 3
support, and 60 operation staff per shift. So there was 4
sufficient resources to be able to pursue both of these 5
paths in parallel.
6 MR. BROWNING: If you looked at the scope 7
of work that we were planning on implementing on a given 8
day during the outage, it would be comparable work.
9 Actually, it would be significantly less. To implement 10 what we're talking about would be significantly less 11 than what we were already planning on doing during any 12 incident.
13 MR. DAPAS: The context of the questions 14 I'd offer here, at least I'm not aware of risk 15 assessment's allowed for credit for cable routing here 16 and alternate power supplies, installed equipment and 17 when that equipment failed what redundancy do you have, 18 etc.? So, it's important that we understand clearly the 19 timeline assumptions here when you pointed out in one of 20 your earlier slides that you would have been able to 21 implement one of these contingency plans before you 22 would have seen that a core uncovered.
23 MR. BROWNING: Yes, sir.
24 MR. KOWALESKI: And we do have a timeline 25 picture that may help clarify that.
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MR. LOVELESS: Before you leave the --
2 this is David Loveless. In this particular success path 3
you're talking about accessing two areas that were 4
significantly restricted, at least early on in the 5
event. My understanding from the AIT that the entire 6
switchgear area in Unit 1 was closed off. At some point 7
no one was allowed in there, but then it was very 8
limited when it was. And then on the Unit 2 side --
9 SPEAKER: This is headquarters we're 10 having trouble hearing you guys. Could you speak close 11 to the mic, please?
12 Thank you.
13 MR. LOVELESS: On the Unit 2 side, we're 14 talking with th followup team about some of the work --
15 or on some of the -- that plus 2 Alpha 1 where they 16 couldn't get in there. They said, no, we've got 17 energized equipment in there, we've got water all over 18 the floor, nobody's going in there. So I would expect 19 to see both of those restrictions somehow.
20 When did we know that this green cable 21 was accessible and it was undamaged? When did we have 22 Unit 2 side cleared up enough that someone could 23 actually access it?
24 MR. MCKENNEY: If you look back on slide 25 29 -- actually, let's go back to this one, slide 27, Page 70 1
okay? This cable, we actually had access up to this 2
point. The major damage, structural damage, was in this 3
area. So they did put a fence right across here, but 4
this was visibly - was not damaged. So we could get to 5
this area easily. And we actually did do assessments 6
the first day in all this area.
7 MR. HARRIS: And David, let me see if I 8
can address your question. I believe what you're 9
referring to is at the onset -- immediately after the 10 stator drop event occurred, there were limitations 11 allowing operator access into the Unit 2 area because of 12 the water intrusion and certainly associated with that 13 area.
14 That was immediately after, and we dealt 15 with that in relation to, you know, recognition of what 16 the condition was for emergency classifications and the 17 danger.
18 What David is talking about is - would be 19
- would come in a much later in relation to developing a 20 recovery strategy and getting access in this area. So I 21 don't think there's any - these are not mutually 22 exclusive, or these issues are not contradicting each 23 other, but -- because immediately after the accident we 24 did try to restrict operator access to that area, but 25 later on during the recovery phase, we would have been Page 71 1
able to go in and do these actions.
2 MR. LOVELESS: I guess my point is that 3
most of risk we're looking at is, at time zero we go 4
into station blackout, and the times for recover that 5
you're talking about aren't from somewhere a couple days 6
later after you stabilize and have been thinking about 7
it while. It's now. You need power now, and you're 8
telling me I'm going to be going into an area that we 9
haven't assessed to determine if it's structurally sound 10 yet and I've got other electricians I'm sending into the 11 area full of water with energized equipment.
12 So I do see them as overlapping.
13 MR. HATHCOAT: This is John Hathcoat. At 14 least on the Unit 2 side with emergency class 15 declaration around the 2A1-2A9 bus was a little bit 16 delayed from when the actual explosion occurred. That 17 was due to water on the floor, but after a couple hours, 18 and then about 13:30 is when we actually had the log 19 entry that we were able to assess the back of 2A9 20 safely.
21 So it was roughly six hours of being 22 delayed, and we were able to access that back -- and 23 we'd been back there for awhile being able to access the 24 area. So that's just a point of reference.
25 MR. MCKENNEY: Are there any more Page 72 1
questions on success path No. 2? And I'd like to move 2
onto success path No. 3 which is on slide 31. This has 3
to do with -- it's a variation of the station blackout 4
connection that we just talked about in success path No.
5 2.
6 What that involves there is we connect to 7
the same green cable that we showed on some of those 8
other ones there and we would, instead of connecting to 9
the 2A9 switchgear cubicle, for some we couldn't repair 10 that, and we had this particular option; we could have 11 disconnected a condensate pump, which is non-vital.
12 This is Unit 2, 2A1, Unit 2 switchgear, not the Unit 1.
13 And we would disconnect a condensate pump and connect a 14 temporary cable to it's output breaker.
15 And, so we'd have to do some minor 16 reconfiguration of the control scheme for the breaker, 17 but we have -- it'd be the same as our load center 18 breakers. So we'd have the scheme well defined, could 19 easily have made the transition over to that.
20 If you can see from slide 32 here, the 21 route is basically the same, cable splice would be in 22 the same spot, instead of hooking to 2A9 over here, we'd 23 just loop back the cable and hook into this spot, so.
24 We would run success path 1 and success 25 path 2 or 3 in parallel. We wouldn't do both of these
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because they're -- this tie point on the opposite end 2
here, 409, is a snake. But it does provide us an option 3
if for some reason we couldn't get the 2A9 switchgear 4
repaired or if -- so we could have another place to tie 5
to get power.
6 It does provide some nice options also 7
that -- 2A9 also -- and this cable from 2A2 to the -- is 8
always energized. So this cable, which is shown in red 9
here, back on slide 31, from 2A2 to 2A904, that remained 10 energized through the entire event.
11 MR. CIRCLE: You mean 2A1?
12 MR. MCKENNEY: 2A1, thank you.
13 MR. CIRCLE: See, I was paying attention.
14 But I do have one question. This is Jeff Circle again.
15 You mentioned success paths 1 and 2 might be done in 16 parallel?
17 MR. MCKENNEY: Or 1 and 3.
18 MR. CIRCLE: 1 and 3?
19 MR. MCKENNEY: 1 and 2 or 1 and 3, but 20 not 2 and 3.
21 MR. CIRCLE: So we needed some 22 clarification.
23 MR. MCKENNEY: Yes. That's what that --
24 because 3 is a variation of 2.
25 As you can see, it's basically, the scope Page 74 1
is the same, pretty much, as what we did on the 2
alternate C breaker, which is 901, with the difference 3
being where we wouldn't have to repair the 901 breakers.
4 We would have to do some minor interlock defeats and 5
reconfigurations so the breaker would now think that it 6
had a condensate pump hooked to the other end.
7 In addition to that, we were also looking 8
at other -- and these were three primary methods. We 9
were also looking at a unit back feed in case Startup 1 10 transformer was unavailable, which we'd back feed 11 through our main transformers, hook to the unit aux, 12 we'd basically hook up the same way as we did the 13 starter transformer. Just another source to get power 14 from the switchyard into the plant.
15 We also had a portable diesel generator 16 that was being shipped in that we could have, basically 17 480-volt, the step-up transformer, that could have 18 provided us 480-volt power.
19 MR. DAPAS: Can you elaborate -- this is 20 Marc Dapas. You have a slide there that would indicate 21 these additional success paths were considered and 22 scoped. I'd like to hear, maybe Jeremy, you can provide 23 a little more context. Where did this occur, was it 24 conceptual here or how far along were you in that 25 process scenario?
Page 75 1
And I'm trying to differentiate, quite 2
frankly, after the fact -- we could have pursue this 3
success path versus what was actually being considered 4
by the staff that was involved in responding to the 5
event?
6 MR. BROWNING: The three that we're 7
discussing with you are the three that we are modeling 8
because they were the three primary success paths that 9
we were considering; however, we did order the diesel 10 generator. The diesel generator showed up to the site 11 within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of the event occurring.
12 The back feed option is something that we 13 have done before, had the station back feeding off of --
14 so it's not a concept, it's something we've actually 15 done, but we weren't actually pursuing that because we 16 had stable transformers at that time.
17 And the restoration of A1 non-vital to 18 Startup 2, again, we actually took an approach that we 19 brought in Startup 2 during the recovery and powered it 20 up in the plant. But at the time of the event, those 21 were more concepts. We knew we could do them, but we 22 really weren't putting a lot of effort into it, other 23 than we were ordering the materials and resources we 24 needed to do it.
25 MR. DAPAS: And the context of my Page 76 1
questions here -- I think you've heard the general theme 2
of questioning. What was the understanding of the 3
operators, what's involved in going out and verifying 4
what the plant conditions are, what are the equipment 5
availabilities so we can pursue these contingency 6
options.
7 What -- there's a lot going on here, 8
obviously, in response to this event, right? You had 9
flooding as a result of the fire main being damaged, you 10 had equipment that was damaged and understanding the 11 full extent of that equipment damage to determine 12 whether these paths were viable here, and what you need 13 to do to ensure that the effort expended is going to 14 result in the desired outcome because you fully scoped 15 out the condition. That's what I really need to 16 understand here.
17 MR. MCKENNEY: To give you little context 18 on what was scoped --
19 MR. JAMES: Before we answer that, let's 20 make sure we're talking about the options that you're 21 interested in, Marc. I think you're interested in the 22 three that we discussed in detail; is that correct?
23 MR. DAPAS: Well, the three that you 24 offer, the next step is to credit these and the risk 25 assessment, saying these were viable success paths,
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therefore, NRC where you've assumed as a result of 2
diesel failure here's where you end up. You're planning 3
to --
4 MR. JAMES: Because I think Jeremy was 5
answering that these three on -- these additional ones, 6
so we need to make clear that we're responding to the 7
three that you asked, which were our three success paths 8
that we proposed.
9 MR. BROWNING: So, have we answered your 10 question?
11 MR. DAPAS: After we've completed the 12 full discussion here today, I'll be able to answer.
13 MR. BROWNING: I wasn't sure we did.
14 MR. DAPAS: I think we're in the -- at 15 least I'm in absorb mode right now and I'll need to take 16 a little bit of time to make sure all the questions I 17 have are asked. Right now we're going on.
18 MR. MCKENNEY: That's a good segue into 19 slide 35.
20 MR. WILLOUGHBY: This is Leonard 21 Willoughby. I do have a question.
22 MR. MCKENNEY: Yes.
23 MR. WILLOUGHBY: There was other things 24 going on in the plant at the time. Right now we're just 25 focusing on the recovery of this area, but you had some Page 78 1
other things going on in the plant that you also had to 2
expend resources to address, such as the steam generator 3
seal and stuff -- and how is that factored into all your 4
decision making process and all those other items that 5
you need to look at because there was a lot of things 6
going on over all?
7 MR. MCKENNEY: So different disciplines 8
in a lot of those cases, right, so this is mostly 9
electrical so I've got mechanical disciplines that are 10 working on seals and mechanics, and this is heavy 11 electrical here, right?
12 MR. WILLOUGHBY: But doesn't one person 13
-- who makes the final decision? It all rolls up into 14 one.
15 MR. BROWNING: Just from my observation, 16 from the EOF to the TSC to the implementing organization 17 that day, those decisions are being made by an emergency 18 director. And that emergency director is assessing 19 safety functions. So when we expend resources, we would 20 have put our resources on a safety function that was the 21 most challenging.
22 If the assumption is two diesel 23 generators aren't running and they need them to be 24 running, then based on his understanding of safety 25 functions, the trigger process driven. He goes through Page 79 1
a process that comes out, electrical power is my top 2
priority and his resources.
3 He has to make decisions based on facts, 4
but a flowchart gets him to the end. And that's where 5
he would -- in this case we did have some challenges 6
with our seals, but those seals, even if they would have 7
completely failed, the mechanisms that would have 8
allowed that -- inventory could have been a challenge, 9
but if electrical is gone, the flowchart is going to say 10 priority is electrical, inventory is No. 2. As we 11 continue to watch that inventory because of the rate of 12 loss.
13 So I don't know if I'm answering your 14 question, but it's process driven against safety 15 functions and the information he has will drive him to 16 the that conclusion.
17 MR. WILLOUGHBY: You answered my 18 question.
19 MR. BROWNING: I just wanted to make 20 sure.
21 MR. MCKENNEY: I want to summarize the 22 different success paths in this slide. They're simple 23 design concept and simple to implement. Craft personnel 24 were qualified and scheduled to perform the same type 25 activities with the circ pump cable replacement, so they Page 80 1
had the equipment on site, personnel on site that knew 2
how to do that work. It's activities that we do on a 3
regular basis even with it online maintenance work.
4 Cables were routed away from the damaged 5
area. It's important to know that the success paths, 6
other than 2 and 3, are spatially and electrically 7
independent of each other. They could be implemented in 8
parallel in sufficient time. Could have been done -- we 9
work these sequentially and we'll show that later in the 10 presentation.
11 And all three of the success paths we 12 presented are less complex than what we actually 13 installed in 4.4 days.
14 MR. DAPAS: This is Marc Dapas. I just 15 feel compelled to react to a simple design concepts.
16 You're relying on contingency plans here that involve 17 running cable runs here to establish power to 4160-volt 18 safeguard buses is not where you want to be.
19 So, I understand you're going through and 20 explaining how you would have restored power. But this 21 is -- that's not where you want to be. You want to be 22 in a situation where you're relying on installed 23 equipment here versus these contingency plans, cable 24 runs and terminated here and splicing. That's not the 25 desired approach here to be able to insure plant safety,
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right?
2 MR. KOWALESKI: Absolutely. The fact 3
that the event occurred is unacceptable. The damage 4
that occurred to the plant is unacceptable. But in 5
determining the safety significance of that, we have to 6
look at what would be a realistic response to it. And 7
this is a realistic response to it.
8 MR. CIRCLE: This is Jeff Circle. Just 9
keep in mind what we're talking about here is a station 10 blackout. These success paths are paths for mitigation 11 of a station blackout, so conditions are not typical of 12 normal outage. And it's not typical of normal outage 13 activities, so there's going to be a lot of stress 14 involved.
15 MR. KOWALESKI: Yes, and when you look 16 the timelines you'll see there is a substantial time 17 margin. I would point out, though, that work in the 18 Startup 1 area was done just as it would have been, the 19 environmental conditions, that the work done was the 20 same as a station blackout, the work done the Unit 2 21 area around the alternate ACD generator switchgear would 22 have been the same as it was during the time we 23 implemented would have been the same as a station 24 blackout because that is the opposite unit which had 25 different power sources.
Page 82 1
So there's a consideration that the 2
actual installation that was done had a lot of 3
similarities of plant conditions to conditions they 4
would have seen during a station blackout.
5 MR. DAPAS: I appreciate you're pointing 6
out there this is not significantly different from the 7
actual response you invoked here, right, with how you 8
established power to 4160-volt. It's not just modeling 9
here, you are extrapolating, right, from what you 10 actually ended up doing with timelines that reflect what 11 occurred, right?
12 MR. KOWALESKI: That's correct.
13 MR. DAPAS: So I appreciate that 14 distinction. I think what you're hearing some of the 15 questions here is making sure we understand how you 16 factor various things here, and the station blackout 17 scenario is different than both diesel's are running, 18 continuing of power, the safeguard's buses here, you're 19 in a station blackout and you've indicated you would be 20 having different cable, you would be considering the 21 shorter length. That would be your primary focus here 22 from a safety function and I understand that.
23 But also, with that shift in focus is, 24 there's a little bit different operating environment 25 here, so just how do you account for that?
Page 83 1
MR. KOWALESKI: Yes and we will explain 2
how we account for that when we cover that model.
3 MR. CLARK: This is Jeff Clark. I have 4
one more technical question that I didn't ask before. I 5
thought you might covered it in some of the other 6
diagrams, but going back to success path No. 1 and you 7
had the temporary breaker with the DC control power.
8 Was that just a local operating breaker, or did you have 9
auxiliary operations in control?
10 MR. MCKENNEY: It was local operating, 11 but we ran a cable from the Startup transformer DC and 12 ran it over to the breaker to give it DC power.
13 MR. CLARK: Okay. I understand. Thank 14 you.
15 MR. MITMAN: Jeff Mitman. On slide 35, I 16 want to explore some of your characterization a little 17 bit. The first two bullets, you talk about simple 18 design and simple to implement. First of all, it's my 19 understanding success paths 1, 2, 3, and 4 you haven't 20 completed the design today; is that is correct?
21 MR. MCKENNEY: We did not implement these 22 designs because we didn't have to.
23 MR. MITMAN: Did you complete the 24 designs?
25 MR. MCKENNEY: We scoped the design, we Page 84 1
did not complete a design.
2 MR. MITMAN: So the designs are not 3
complete. So a year and some months later the designs 4
are not finished. All right. Second --
5 MR. KENNEDY: Hey, Jeff, hold on, just 6
for clarification. Did you intend to complete them?
7 MR. MCKENNEY: No.
8 MR. MITMAN: What I'm trying to get at 9
is, conceptually they may be simple, but they're not 10 five minutes worth of work, okay? So the 11 characterization of them as being simple designs, I 12 think, in risk space is -- simple has a certain meaning 13 in risk space, you know, typically simple is something 14 that an operator can do in five minutes. These are not 15 five-minute activities. These are engineering 16 activities that will take a team of engineers hours to 17 complete. The implementation of these are not 18 activities that are done in five minutes.
19 It took your over four days to implement 20 what you wanted with teams of electricians and operators 21 and others to complete the work. So, I understand that 22 they're not rocket science, but nonetheless, in risk 23 space, their complicated activities that take a lot of 24 checks on them and a lot of people verifying what's been 25 done and a lot of care in getting them implemented.
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Is my understanding of that correct?
2 MR. MCKENNEY: The slide is intended from 3
an engineering and installation standpoint that it's 4
simple. Now as far as the time, that's a different 5
concept for engineering.
6 MR. KENNEDY: I would offer that "simple" 7
probably is not the right word to choose for this 8
quorum.
9 MR. DAPAS: I thought that was evident 10 when I made my earlier comment. I don't want to belabor 11 the point here. I think the role I'll offer here of the 12 NRC staff is to fully understand the assumptions here 13 you've made, how you feel the success paths should be 14 credited, and you need to be asking questions that will 15 further illuminate, if you will, how you factored this 16 into your overall risk assessment here.
17 We'll have an opportunity to engage here 18 and determine, based on our independent review, an 19 assessment; how much credit we think is appropriate 20 considering uncertainties, etc. The vein of the 21 questions really need to get to a full understanding of 22 your conclusions and the basis for those.
23 So let's proceed, please.
24 MR. SULLINS: Okay. We'll move to our 25 success path 4. This is Gary Sullins again, and we are Page 86 1
on slide 36. We understand that in the present risk 2
assessment, inventory control considers gravity feed 3
from a borated water storage tank that the assumption 4
that there's no electrical power available.
5 In our loss of decay heat removal 6
procedure and strategy there actually are six prescribed 7
methods for make up. One has been analyzed, which is 8
passive gravity feed. Three involve 4160-volt power.
9 That there are two others that rely on 480-volt driven 10 pumps for the mode of force. And so we'll be discussing 11 one of those alternatives.
12 The success path that we'll be discussing 13 involves use of our borated water recirc pump. And our 14 loss of decay heat removal procedure, we detailed 15 guidance to align P-66 borated water recirc pump with a 16 suction supply from either our BWST or our spent fuel 17 pool for makeup to the RCS.
18 I should also note that this pump also 19 serves as makeup source for spent fuel pool, and given 20 an assumed station blackout, we are interested in 21 restoring this capability for that purpose as well.
22 This is a success path that was not 23 evaluated at that time of that event. And the basis for 24 that is we were setting priorities based on the 25 conditions that we had. After the stator drop event we Page 87 1
had four of our six makeup sources available. And so 2
this was not classified as a need or scoped at that 3
time.
4 But given the assumption of a station 5
blackout, we would from four, actually more than that, 6
prevent to zero make up sources, so with an extended 7
blackout we would recognize that inventory loss would 8
become a concern, and we would be pursuing options 9
through our support staff for that.
10 Any questions on the concept?
11 MR. LOVELESS: Just one point of 12 clarification. This David Loveless. Unless I'm missing 13 something, this is what in risk we would call more of a 14 delaying action, not a success path in and of itself.
15 It would give you more time to get a success path in 16 place. Am I hearing that right because we're going to 17 be boiling in the core and the spent fuel pool. We're 18 not going to be a stable place.
19 MR. SULLINS: That's the first 20 consideration of it. Much like our spent fuel pool, it 21 can be used for longtime cooling, but that involves 22 getting energy out of the reactor building, 23 consideration of the venting, thing of that nature.
24 MR. LOVELESS: Okay.
25 MR. SULLINS: And to support this Page 88 1
function we would, again, use a temporary modification.
2 This time using the London Line power that we referred 3
to earlier and David will explain that for you.
4 MR. MCKENNEY: Okay we're on slide 38.
5 This particular one we're showing a disconnect switch 6
S-28 on this upper left-hand portion of your diagram 7
here.
8 This is actually 600 amp, 480-volt 9
disconnect that's located in the south end of the 10 turbine building, very remote from where the stator 11 dropped. And this is the disconnect we actually used 12 for restorations of our non-vital load centers post 13 event. So this is -- and this is fed from the London 14 Line, which is our yard power, which is -- it was not in 15 the section where the stator dropped. So it wasn't 16 impacted by the stator drop.
17 So what this success path involves is 18 running a cable, 480-volt cable, from the disconnect and 19 tying directly to the B51 bus, which is the motor 20 control, 480-volt motor control center, it's in our aux 21 building. It's also located away from the stator drop 22 area. And then we take from a spare breaker off of B51 23 and feed B21, which is a non-vital. And these motor 24 control centers, I'll show you in a photograph here in a 25 minute, are about 18 inches apart.
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This is very common type of activity that 2
we do during outages, run temporary power. We've 3
actually used this in the opposite direction where we 4
fed B21 power to B51 to supply the spent fuel pool pump 5
when we had bus outages on the red train AC power during 6
refuelling outages.
7 What this does is it brings 480-volt to 8
B51 which gives your battery charger back. So you would 9
be able to maintain your red DC. Also feeds the 10 inverter, spent fuel pump, instrument AC, and gets us 11 over here to B21 where it would feed our borated water 12 storage pump or -- excuse me, borated water pump, which 13 is the pump Gary talked about earlier.
14 MR. LOVELESS: And 600 amps is enough to 15 provide for all those loads?
16 MR. MCKENNEY: Yes. The largest load 17 associated with that is the battery charger, and it has 18 a 150-amp breaker, but it's a hundred-amp load. So 19 there'd be sufficient loads for that.
20 This is overhead view of the cable 21 routing. The stator drop is off the page at the top, so 22 this is in the very far south end, run a cable up 23 through a door, through another door, and B51 is about 24 200 feet of cable. And then we run a jumper from 51 to 25
- 21. You see the relative location of those two.
Page 90 1
A photograph of the S-28 disconnect 2
switch. And this is in the room, this is B51. Here is 3
where we would terminate the cables behind these two 4
doors here, and you can see the relative location 5
between 51 and 21. And we would run the jumper cable 6
from one spare breaker to another and we would be able 7
to power the borated water recirc pump.
8 So I'm hesitant to put this slide up 9
there when it has "simple" on it --
10 (Laughter) 11
-- but it is simple, I mean, from a 12 construction aspect.
13 MR. BROWNING: Dave, did you mention that 14 we actually performed the jumper between those to buses 15 every other outage?
16 MR. MCKENNEY: Yeah, when we do those bus 17 outages, we run the jumper between every other refuel 18 outage, depending on which train outage we're in.
19 MR. BROWNING: And understanding poor 20 choice of words, we've got that feedback. What we're 21 trying to communicate is this is work that we would 22 typically do and implement without a lot of challenges 23 to it's being successful.
24 MR. MCKENNEY: So it's typical of work we 25 do during outages. It wasn't affected by the event, and Page 91 1
it was located remotely from where the event happened, 2
and it's independent of the 4160-volt path. And it 3
doesn't have any relationship between the 4160-volt 4
side.
5 And if for some reason that wasn't 6
available, we could have tied straight on top of the 7
contact here. There's less of the variations you can do 8
on 480-volt side that could accomplish this in the same 9
timeframe. And we estimated this would take 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> to 10 implement. And that includes some scoping time for 11 engineering to figure out exactly what to do because the 12 actual electricians I talked to said they could have it 13 done in less than a shift.
14 MR. WILLOUGHBY: I do have one question.
15 You mention that -- this is Leonard Willoughby. You 16 mentioned that you do this every other outage or every 17 outage. How long does it normally take you?
18 MR. MCKENNEY: Well, we have the, you 19 know, the papers all are proof for this, it's a 20 repetitive kind of task, right, so, it we actually run 21
-- during outages we run a, do a conduit between -- that 22 we wouldn't necessarily do, and in usually takes us a 23 shift to install, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
24 MR. LOVELESS: This is David Loveless.
25 What you're talking about though is just what's labeled Page 92 1
as temporary cable B that you do every outage. You 2
don't connect to the --
3 MR. MCKENNEY: We do not connect to the 4
London Line.
5 MR. SULLINS: The 480-volt power that Mr.
6 McKenney described also supports our other two makeup 7
sources that don't rely on 4160-volt power; the spent 8
fuel pool cooling pump spent fuel pool cooling pump, P-40 9
Alpha, it also sets us up for gravity feed capability.
10 Our capability for the reactor building would be through 11 the reactor building purge system. The inboard purge 12 isolation dampers rely on red DC power and instrument 13 air, both of which were available to us, or would be 14 available to us with N2 supplying instrument air and 15 this temporary mod powering our DC bus.
16 The last item on this slide gives urgency 17 to doing something with 480-volt and that is to preserve 18 our indication.
19 If we were to experience a station 20 blackout, it would be a priority, not as high as 21 restoring the ultimate heat sink, but to get some power 22 to our battery chargers before our batteries are 23 depleted. And this concept that was presented to -- in 24 your meeting today was -- I looked at this from the 25 perspective of, I'm in the TSC, what are our priorities?
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Number one is recovering vital 4160-volt, 2
the diesels, and ultimate source. Number two is keeping 3
the DC so we can see what's going on in the reactor 4
building, and that would prompt some time of power to 5
the battery charger. Number three, we're without makeup 6
capability, we have six methods. They don't all rely on 7
4160-volt power, what can you do with that? Given those 8
priorities, this is what the engineers -- basically this 9
is an exercise that they would be the TSC engineer, I'm 10 the TSC manager with those priorities in very short 11 order you can -- this is what I would propose.
12 The next slides illustrates --
13 MR. MITMAN: Jeff Mitman. Before we go 14 on, the condition the plant's in at this point is the 15 canal, the cavity is flooded. Now the normal source of 16 water to flood the cavity is normally the borated water 17 storage tank. It's my understanding that that's, in 18 fact, what had happened. You used the water in the 19 borated water storage tank to fill the cavity.
20 Is my understanding correct?
21 MR. SULLINS: Yes, that is correct. We 22 had approximately four feet in BWST, it's 9,700 gallons 23 per foot plus some few more.
24 MR. MITMAN: So approximately 30 to 25 40,000 gallons. If you'd gone to using the borated Page 94 1
water transfer pump at, say, a nominal flow rate of a 2
hundred gallons a minute, that would give you something 3
like 40 minutes worth of water.
4 Again, is my understanding correct?
5 MR. SULLINS: From the normal alignment 6
that is correct. We did not describe the details of 7
this strategy, but I would direct that we set up our 8
makeup capability from our B5B security procedure for 9
BWST makeup and we have multiple sources, clean water 10 sources in our yard, and that would provide a makeup 11 capability to our BWST.
12 MR. MITMAN: When you say clean water 13 sources, do you mean non-borated water sources?
14 MR. SULLINS: Yes, that's correct.
15 MR. MITMAN: And so, you've got an 16 analysis you've contemplated putting non-borated water 17 into the primary system?
18 MR. SULLINS: Not directly into the RCS.
19 The strategy, provided we needed this for a longer 20 period of time, the P-66 provides makeup to spent fuel 21 pool or directly to the RCS.
22 So the sequence I would follow is I would 23 first use the borated water in the BWST as makeup to the 24 RCS for boil off. Then I would transfer using the same 25 lost decay heat removal procedure available from Page 95 1
inventory from the spent fuel pool. I would then make up 2
to the spent fuel pool and you have mixing, past reactor 3
engineering -- since we had not reloaded with fresh fuel 4
to maintain one and a half percent shutdown margin, we 5
need approximately -- just slightly under 400 PPM boron 6
in the RCS. So we would not go directly without --
7 MR. KOWALESKI: But you're not leaking 8
the boron? You're evaporating -- the boron stays in a 9
solution, so you're replacing inventory and your boron 10 is still there?
11 MR. SULLINS: That's right. But there is 12 consideration for mixing and so the methodology I 13 prescribed for you would be the course that I would 14 follow.
15 MR. BROWNING: I wanted to be clear. The 16 capacity is 100 gallons a minute, the need was 50 17 gallons a minute.
18 MR. MITMAN: And the operators knew that?
19 MR. SULLINS: Yes. We post required 20 makeup capacities.
21 MR. MITMAN: And, of course, you had some 22 excess capacity in the spent fuel pool that you could 23 also use if the engineering judgment gets to that point.
24 You also talked about, on slide 43, the ability to 25 gravity feed.
Page 96 1
MR. SULLINS: Yes, sir.
2 MR. MITMAN: Now, my understanding is 3
with four feet of water in the BWST, the water level in 4
the BWST is lower than the water level in the cavity, 5
and therefore if you try establish gravity feed, you'll 6
try and won't succeed, but you'll try and refill the 7
BWST. So, I'm surprised -- could you explain a little 8
bit about what you mean by that bullet about gravity 9
feed?
10 MR. SULLINS: Certainly. We would need 11 to make up the BWST again without borated water to our 12 procedurally required -- a value greater than 21 feet, 13 and then this is the last contingency because you are in 14 that case relying on the boil-off effect and you might 15 have some mixing concerns, but it does provide that 16 capability.
17 And that was really all I wanted to make 18 of that.
19 MR. MITMAN: And gravity feed, if I 20 remember correctly, is describe in your loss of decay 21 heat removal procedures, correct?
22 MR. SULLINS: That's correct. That's 23 where the 21-feet limit is supplied.
24 MR. BROWNING: The makeup to the BWST is 25 proceduralized, we do not have to create that makeup
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source. We'd have to think of it.
2 MR. SULLINS: That answer your question?
3 We've had a number of questions related to timing and 4
the fact that -- we appreciate that there are many 5
things going on in our facility and that we would have 6
to establish priorities, but the most significant factor 7
for risk from our perspective is the passive cooling 8
capacity that existed in the fuel transfer canal. That 9
provide for us an available inventory of 4.8 days.
10 What this slide illustrates is the time 11 required for each of our four success paths relative to 12 the time available.
13 And we appreciate the comments regarding 14 parallel paths for success path 1 and success paths 2 or 15
- 3. What I'd like to point out here, if success path 1 16 were our first priority then we would begin that 17 activity with plans to commence the backup if there's a 18 problem with our offsite power source from Startup 1, 19 that we pursue parallel paths. It's illustrated in a 20 simple manner here, but what's key is the time available 21 and that -- what we've modeled, we've taken a reflective 22 look of how do we do business, and what would we 23 reasonably do.
24 And if we're in the TSC and we can't get 25 either of our diesel's back, we will pursue multiple Page 98 1
options -- if there's a problem, if that Startup 2
transformer, that first priority, we want a back up to 3
go to. And Mr. McKenney's established that that was 4
physically viable, and what this illustrates is that we 5
had the time to execute that.
6 Any questions?
7 SPEAKER FROM PHONE: Yeah, this is Sunil 8
Weerakkody at headquarters. I have a question on slide 9
44.
10 MR. SULLINS: Okay.
11 SPEAKER: Just a clarification, I know 12 you're comparing the success path for the different 13 success options for the 4.4 days after the core uncovery 14 then you have the time to start boiling which is about 15 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. So am I understanding this correct that given 16 any of these success paths you would boil the core, 17 start boiling the core or is that also?
18 MR. SULLINS: In the unlikely event of a 19 station blackout where we could not recover diesel, we 20 predict that there would be core boiling in that 21 recovery.
22 SPEAKER: Again, this is something that 23 I'm reflecting on, so when I call this a success path, 24 it's a success path with core boiling where you have 25 started core boil off, but you have prevent core damage?
Page 99 1
MR. SULLINS: Yes, sir, that's correct.
2 SPEAKER: Now, given that you'll be 3
having some boil off, right, where does the steam go?
4 And would that affect any of those follow-up actions 5
that you count on in the success path?
6 MR. SULLINS: That's a good question.
7 Once the core reached the boiling condition that would 8
prohibit access to the reactor building and we have 9
factored that in to what we credit for actions.
10 SPEAKER: Thank you.
11 MR. SULLINS: Other questions?
12 MR. KENNEDY: On the timeline, does it 13 include everything today we've talked about today with 14 respect to the engineering work that would be done, the 15 laying out of cables and breakers, does it take into 16 account the delay in access to inspecting the switchgear 17 and the breakers, you know, initially after the event?
18 You know, pretty much all the questions that were asked.
19 MR. KOWALESKI: Kriss, it's based on what 20 we actually did. So we actually installed this in 4.4 21 days. So all those access issues and all those impact 22 were part of that. And then what we looked at is what 23 scope was eliminated because these didn't include all 24 the breakers, relays and additional routing and 25 additional splices. It essentially prorated that Page 100 1
estimate down.
2 But you can see that there's sufficient 3
margin that if there was 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of delay, there's 4
still substantial margin time to complete these options.
5 MR. KENNEDY: Do you think that would 6
also bound -- implementing these actions, if you had a 7
station blackout -- would there be any complications 8
that would be created by the fact that you were doing 9
these activities in a station blackout plus the 10 conditions that you have actually had?
11 MR. BROWNING: That's correct. And 12 that's what Joe was trying to explain earlier. If you 13 looked at the turbines and look where some of these 14 cables would be routed -- we routed, we spliced around 15 Startup 3, it would be no different than a blackout.
16 The environment we would have been working in were very 17 similar environments to actually work in, where these 18 splices were occurring.
19 MR. MCKENNEY: They were in the turbine 20 building, they weren't anywhere that had any 21 radiological concerns.
22 MR. KENNEDY: -- lighting access --
23 MR. BROWNING: Actual conditions were 24 that of a blackout on Unit 1.
25 MR. DAPAS: This is Marc Dapas, follow
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up. I have a question, and I don't know if this is a 2
significant time contributor, but I think he 3
acknowledged that if you lost the diesel you'd have to 4
understand why and was it the result of a faulty bus 5
here, and what testing you need to do before you go and 6
power that bus via your alternate cable routing 7
associated with your success paths. So there's some of 8
our time associated with that, right? Is that factored 9
in?
10 MR. BROWNING: That would be a correct 11 statement.
12 MR. SULLINS: Let me take just a moment 13 if I could, Jeremy. We have clear distinction through 14 our alarms for the probable cause of loss of the diesel.
15 If we have a switchgear lockout, then we know we've got 16 a problem with the switchgear itself and the conditions 17 that caused the diesel itself to lockout would point 18 toward a problem with the diesel alone. So we do have 19 good indications and alarms to direct us to the cause.
20 MR. MITMAN: This is Jeff Mitman. How 21 would the fact that you don't have a train B battery 22 affect this? Because without the train B battery, you 23 don't have some of your indications, some of your 24 alarms.
25 MR. SULLINS: Okay. You're referring to Page 102 1
our initial condition with the D06 battery disconnect?
2 MR. MITMAN: Correct.
3 MR. SULLINS: The affect would be that, 4
if we had the station blackout and we're having trouble 5
starting the No. 2 diesel then we would address that DC 6
power source on recovery, the No. 2 diesel. Beyond 7
that, it's one additional operator action is how I would 8
assess it.
9 MR. BROWNING: I don't know that we 10 actually answered the question. We had a 480-volt buses 11 cross tied, so we did have DC power. We didn't have the 12 battery connected, but we did have DC power.
13 MR. MITMAN: But in the scenario we're 14 exploring is the station blackout, and with a station 15 blackout there is no battery on the train B DC power.
16 And so when we start talking about knowing, you know, 17 we'll have lockouts, we'll see the lockouts in the 18 control room, we'll know what's going on, whether we've 19 got a lockout or whether we've got a diesel problem, I'm 20 just trying to explore the impacts of what the control 21 room would know if, in the middle of a station blackout, 22 there's also minus the train Bravo DC power?
23 MR. SULLINS: We are getting quite 24 technical, but I'll try to answer that question. At the 25 time of the event, the DC power on the green side Page 103 1
depended on the 480-volt on the red side. And when the 2
non-vital sources went away, the No. 1 diesel started 3
using it's battery and then provided DC power to the 4
green side.
5 So the sequence I believe we're talking 6
about is the No. 1 diesel fails to start and now we're 7
in a blackout. So in terms of assessing conditions of 8
our green train switchgear, it's not been exposed to --
9 we would treat it as functional, but that we haven't 10 given the diesel the opportunity to tie to it.
11 MR. CIRCLE: Would you have considered 12 PDG 2 operable under those conditions? Because you 13 wouldn't have any indication of a problem at that point.
14 MR. SULLINS: We would know that it's not 15 got control power, and we would consider it operable and 16 work toward establishing control power to it for its 17 operation. In our station blackout procedure we're 18 directed to use the EDG procedure and restore the EDG 19 and that's where we --
20 MR. DAPAS: If it doesn't have control 21 power, it's not functional.
22 MR. SULLINS: Yes.
23 MR. DAPAS: So you say you consider it 24 operable. If you don't have control power to that 25 diesel, it's not available.
Page 104 1
MR. SULLINS: Yes, thank you for the 2
clarification Mr. Dapas. What I'm saying is we don't 3
consider it damaged or suspect. And I thought that -- I 4
misunderstood the question.
5 MR. DAPAS: But that diesel wouldn't be 6
available because you don't have control power?
7 MR. SULLINS: Absolutely.
8 MR. DAPAS: You learned that when you 9
went to start the diesel. You didn't otherwise 10 recognize it as having lost diesel 1?
11 MR. SULLINS: And just to directly answer 12 your question, we've not considered the diesel 13 operative.
14 MR. HARRIS: So -- this is Richard 15 Harris. There is a dependency on the No. 1 diesel.
16 That was accounted for in the unit -- in our modeling, 17 the ANO modeling.
18 MR. SULLINS: Does that answer your 19 question, Mr. Mitman?
20 MR. MITMAN: I think we're getting there.
21 One of the questions that was asked was, if you have a 22 lockout of, say, the A3 bus, okay, now there's a fault 23 on the A3 bus. It's not what happened that day, but 24 we're ahead of ourselves in our risk analysis, our 25 consequence analysis, but if we do have a fault of the
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A3 bus and you do have a lockout, now, do you know you 2
have a lockout because you've got DC power on that 3
division. But you don't have DC power on the other 4
division and so you don't know what the condition of the 5
other bus is. And now you don't have the DC power that 6
you need to start the train -- the train B diesel, you 7
don't have DC power on it, and half the plant, half the 8
indication, half the alarms, half the annunciators are 9
not working because they don't have DC power.
10 MR. HARRIS: Jeff, this is Richard 11 Harris. Let me see if I can address that from the 12 perspective of analysis. When you look at the 13 switchgear in the lockout, there is a probability of 14 failure associated with that. When you look at overall 15 risk of diesel failure, then you look at if it fails to 16 start, fails to run, you're looking at support systems, 17 which would be the air supply, the surface water, you're 18 looking at fuel.
19 So all of that rolls into the diesel 20 ability to run and then probability of failure. The 21 switchgear is only a small part of that failure. It 22 should be included, but I would move that it's not a 23 significant impact on risk in relation to the diesel --
24 MR. CIRCLE: For the base case it 25 wouldn't be, but for this particular case this Page 106 1
configuration is very sensitive. Because in this case 2
you're feeding the B train DC from an A train charger.
3 You've disconnected the B train battery. So anything 4
that happens on switchgear A3 is going to have a big 5
impact.
6 MR. HARRIS: You're right, the 7
consequences would be significant; however, the 8
probability is not significant.
9 MR. CIRCLE: I don't quite believe that, 10 but you can go on.
11 MR. SULLINS: The question was related to 12 the operator response. And where he had time to respond 13 and that was implemented, factored into our strategies 14 in our recovery. We operated for weeks with diesels in 15 pull-to-lock with operator control of starting the 16 diesel, since it was not necessary to automatically to 17 tie onto the bus with a blind condition, we wouldn't go 18 blindly close in the DC breaker, but you would go toward 19 a controlled restoration.
20 This is first time presented with the 21 scenario, but I would predict that we would do a 22 controlled restoration where loads are opened up and 23 then you first energize the bus, and then in a 24 controlled manner recover control power to the diesel.
25 MR. BROWNING: I'm thinking the question Page 107 1
is would we start pursuing these success paths, and what 2
I'm trying to assure you of, I personally would not have 3
to know if I had a damaged bus or a damaged diesel. I 4
would be asking my TSE and my EOF what are we doing to 5
establish a connection from offsite to onsite.
6 Now before we land that lead and turn it 7
on, I would want to know the condition of that bus and I 8
know my staff would want to know. But what we're trying 9
to communicate is we didn't wait. We knew we had 10 diesels running, we knew we had to get offsite power, we 11 immediately started assessing the condition of the 12 plant, we immediately started implementing our plan in 13 parallel with the contingencies, and all I'm telling you 14 is if that diesel went away, whether is was the bus that 15 drove it offline, DC that took it offline, or a support 16 system, these guys would have implemented one of those 17 contingency plans.
18 But before we energized it, clearly, we 19 would have understood the condition of that plant.
20 MR. CIRCLE: Right. And we don't doubt 21 it. We're just looking at the impact and trying to 22 assess the impact. As far as the actions are concerned, 23 we know that you would do something.
24 MR. DAPAS: What I've also heard, this is 25 Marc Dapas, that your timeline accounts for the fact Page 108 1
that you have to ensure that the buses in this condition 2
where you could power the feed successfully, and that's 3
accounted for in the timeline.
4 MR. BROWNING: Yes, sir. We're running 5
cables in parallel, we're splicing in parallel, we're 6
accessing what it is that happened.
7 MR. MCKENNEY: When we put Startup 1, the 8
path that we put in service, so we did testing on that 9
transformer and that was part of the 4.4 days, right?
10 So we went through and made sure that the health of 11 Startup 1 was intact before we energized that 12 transformer.
13 MR. DAPAS: I do think the line of 14 question was we have train A DC power cross connected to 15 train B and it impacts control power to a diesel which 16 then gets to the probability that you could have lost 17 that diesel, you know, it's not a normal electrical 18 lineup here, right, for providing full power to the 19 diesel source. However, the questions remains and what 20 we're trying to understand is that is there any 21 additional element there and how did you factor that 22 into your analysis?
23 MR. SULLINS: I do want to assure that 24 the questions are adequately answered. Appreciate the 25 question.
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To summarize, our technical presentation 2
of the success paths, the key item, I guess, is 3
confidence in the success of these the time margin, 4.8 4
days. The second factor is the substantial resources 5
available for response, as we've discussed earlier, we 6
would have the support structure of an emergency 7
response organization setting priorities and supporting 8
operations and maintenance. We have straight forward 9
installations for which our people were trained and it's 10 consistent with their outage responsibilities.
11 The defense in depth aspect is important 12 to me. The fact that we had available to us parallel 13 paths for 4160 and available to us an alternate diverse 14 means for RCS makeup.
15 And then lastly, the demonstrated success 16 with what we did with the full package with the breaker 17 still within the allowed 4.8 days.
18 Any questions for David?
19 MR. KENNEDY: I would propose that we 20 take a break at this point. We've been going for about 21 two and a half hours. Maybe take a ten-minute break 22 before we get into the really good stuff and interesting 23 stuff which is the risk significance. It's 3:31 24 central, if we could be back at 3:41 central and 25 restart. The bathrooms are down out the door to the Page 110 1
left.
2 (Break taken from 3:31 p m. to 3:46 p m.)
3 MR. WERNER: Operator, are you on the 4
line?
5 OPERATOR SYLVIA: Yes, sir, I'm on the 6
line. Just opened up all the lines.
7 MR. WERNER: All right. We're ready to 8
restart.
9 OPERATOR SYLVIA: You may begin.
10 MR. KOWALESKI: Before Richard goes, this 11 is Joe Kowaleski, we'll provide a written timeline for 12 how to safely assess the condition of the bus as input.
13 MR. MITMAN: Thank you.
14 MR. SULLINS: This is Gary Sullins. A 15 point of clarification, we had questions regarding 16 operation of our No. 2 diesel for station blackout and 17 the question was related to operability. We would not 18 consider the diesel operable without DC power; however, 19 we have procedures for starting the diesel without DC 20 power and are trained on those procedures, so that start 21 capability exists for us.
22 MR. CIRCLE: This is Jeff Circle. Just 23 to clarify that question is, actually, what would be the 24 concern if you restore DC power once you start the 25 diesel and not knowing how diesel 2 had failed?
Page 111 1
Let's say you had failure in diesel 1 or 2
some fault or something that blacked out the A3 bus.
3 Now if diesel 2 failed along with diesel 1, there's a 4
chance that they might not have picked up the electrical 5
configuration which was responsible for diesel 2 6
failing, would they be that quick to restart diesel 2 7
given there state of knowledge?
8 That's the question that we asked, 9
actually.
10 MR. SULLINS: Make sure I understand the 11 question. You have diesel 2 operating with DC control 12 power provided from a red train.
13 MR. MITMAN: Right.
14 MR. SULLINS: And if diesel 2 fails --
15 MR. MITMAN: If diesel 1 fails. If 16 something on -- I guess red train is your train A, I'm 17 having a little trouble with the color designations. If 18 diesel on train A, diesel 1 fails or something happens 19 to the switchgear --
20 MR. SULLINS: Okay.
21 MR. MITMAN: Then power is going to be 22 lost in DC control power, and power is going to be lost 23 to A4 and force the start of diesel2, but diesel 2 would 24 not start. So you'll have a situation where diesel 1 25 would lockout for some reason. Diesel 2 wouldn't start.
Page 112 1
And it may not be apparent to the watch what's going on 2
at that time.
3 So, would they be quick to restore --
4 let's say they restore DC power and manage to get diesel 5
2 started, would they be quick to start diesel 2, not 6
knowing if there was some electrical fault that failed 7
it in the first place?
8 MR. SULLINS: MR circle, now that I 9
understand the question, what I'd like to do is to give 10 it some thought and then come back to it later so we can 11 proceed.
12 MR. CIRCLE: That's perfectly fine.
13 MR. HARRIS: Okay. Let's get started on 14 the significant termination discussion. My name again 15 is Richard Harris and I am the Manager of Emergency 16 Planning at ANO, and you might ask yourself why is the 17 Manager of Emergency Planning talking to you about risk 18 significance. Previous before assuming the position of 19 emergency planning, I was a risk analyst for ANO. I've 20 also previously held an operating license on Unit 1, but 21 more importantly, Jason Hall, our PRA engineer, is in 22 the back of the here, so we may call on him if you have 23 any questions, because he actually performed the 24 analysis, he may be able to answer any specific 25 questions, but we did have a group of PRA engineers that
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could pull together to go through the analysis and 2
provide the results that we'll talk about today.
3 The main point that I think we should get 4
out of the previous discussion from David and Gary is 5
that when you look at the timeline for the available 6
time to core uncovery, and you look at the actual time 7
that it took us to restore power to Startup 1, we 8
restored power before our estimated time to core 9
uncovery and that's a fact.
10 So when you consider that fact then you 11 have to acknowledge that the probability of failure 12 restoring off that power is something less than one.
13 What we want to do in addition to that 14 discussion is talk about the success paths that Gary and 15 David outlined and how we considered those in our risk 16 assessment, and the methodologies that we looked at in 17 relation to this particular issue.
18 So our key objective that I think we want 19 to come away is that we want to insure that we have a 20 realistic estimate of risk using the best available 21 information that we have.
22 At the end of the presentation, I will 23 provide and discuss real briefly the results that we 24 derived independently for ANO.
25 So, what we started with was the event Page 114 1
tree model that provided to us, and we reviewed that 2
model to understand the method used and the results that 3
were obtained. We didn't have the complete model that 4
the NRC utilized, so we were somewhat restricted in our 5
review and our analysis on the information that was 6
available.
7 So, you know, at the end of day, whenever 8
we go back and whenever you guys go back and look at the 9
information provided today, you'll be able to take this 10 information and use it in your full PRA analysis.
11 The assumption relating to 4160-volt 12 power, it's currently in the model and if you look at 13 event tree, what I'm talking about is this branch here 14 and also associated with DHR, mainly because there are 15 some assumptions in the DHR cut sets that are driven by 16 a loss of power. We believe that the assumptions are 17 not realistic simply from the fact that we did recover 18 onsite power in the available time.
19 Again, this is the event tree that we 20 just looked at.
21 On slide 50, one of the things that we 22 were challenged with, and I believe it's one of the 23 things the NRC was challenged with as well, is what 24 method do you use to perform an HRA-type of analysis for 25 the conditions and the situation we found ourselves in Page 115 1
based upon the stator drop.
2 We were in a shutdown condition, the fuel 3
transfer canal was flooded up. So what we did is we 4
took -- we felt like it was imperative upon ANO to 5
develop a methodology that could be used by the NRC 6
going forward.
7 We reviewed the standards that were 8
available in the industry and could not identify a 9
definitive standard that could be used for this type of 10 analysis. But, again, our ultimate goal is to get a 11 best estimate factor to be used and acknowledging that 12 it's not 1.0.
13 So what we did is we determined a -- we 14 assembled an expert team and we considered the different 15 methods that were available. At the end of day the 16 following methods that we ultimately selected were the 17 HRA calculator and we also used EPRI's SHARP 1, 18 Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure.
19 The elements that we considered when we 20 went through this development and this methodology was 21 we looked at cognitive and decision making portion of 22 the HEP or the human error probability calculation. We 23 also looked at the design development. And I want to 24 spend a little bit of time on the design development 25 just based on some discussions we had earlier during Page 116 1
Gary and David's presentation. And also the execution.
2 So the first thing we want to talk about 3
is the cognitive decision making.
4 Much like the operator in the control 5
room, when he gets a cue, the cues were self-evident 6
post stator drop. We knew that we had lost our 7
connectivity to offsite power. The engineering starr 8
and the TSC in the plant recognized that we had to 9
protect ourselves against -- protect the safety 10 functions of plant. And we also recognized that we had 11 resources available, and we had to look the 12 modifications that were also available.
13 Given these conditions, we reviewed the 14 HRA calculator for it applicability. And when we looked 15 at the cognitive portion of the HRA calculator, we 16 deemed that that portion of the HRA calculator for this 17 particular element of the human error probability.
18 MR. MITMAN: Before you move on, Jeff 19 Mitman here, the HRA calculator has several methods 20 imbedded in it to do cognitive analysis. Which of the 21 embedded methods did you use for this?
22 MR. HARRIS: Jason, I'll let you speak to 23 that.
24 MR. HALL: We used the cause-based 25 decision.
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MR. MITMAN: Could I get a copy of the 2
analysis, please?
3 MR. HALL: Yeah.
4 MR. HARRIS: Moving on to the next 5
element that we had to consider was the design 6
development. As was discussed during Gary and David's 7
presentation, you know, there weren't any procedures in 8
place. There wasn't any guidance in place post stator 9
drop. It was up to the engineering team to develop 10 these design factors or do the design development going 11 forward.
12 So, looking at the resource limitations, 13 the effect on effect on existing systems, the operating 14 crew and the staff interaction, taking credit for the 15 fact that we've done this before, the type of 16 modifications we're talking about here were not unique 17 to ANO and they've been performed many times during 18 outages, we did conclude -- and looking at this 19 particular portion of the HEP that the HRA calculator 20 really didn't do a good job of adequately addressing 21 this issue.
22 So alternate approaches were considered.
23 And at the end of day we decided -- we determined that 24 the SHARP event tree, recovery event tree approach would 25 be an adequate approach to assess this different element Page 118 1
in the HRA analysis.
2 MR. KOWALESKI: Just want to make sure of 3
a clarification on a point. We didn't have one 4
individual do this risk assessment in the HRA 5
calculator. We had a team of experts, we contracted 6
experts in to assist us with this. So we had 7
considerable resources applied to this. Just wanted 8
make sure that was clear.
9 MR. LOVELESS: This is David Loveless.
10 Can you spend a moment explaining the demarcation 11 between where you said the cognitive portion of the 12 action was done versus this, I'm assuming it's part of 13 the action of the design development?
14 MR. HARRIS: Certainly. In the cognitive 15 portion, you would have to consider the cues that were 16 available to the team as they determine what the status 17 of plan is. They would also have to look at -- compare 18 that cue against the safety's functions because, 19 ultimately, that's what we want to protect.
20 The team would then go in and look at 21 those safety functions to prioritize. They would look 22 at the resources available. They would look at the 23 temporary modifications that needed to be developed to 24 protect that safety function. And they would make a 25 decision as -- the decision-making point of that would Page 119 1
be to determine which access to go after first, and 2
which modifications that needed to be planned and 3
developed first.
4 MR. LOVELESS: And all of that, that you 5
just described, was done with cause-based HRA 6
calculator.
7 MR. HARRIS: The portion of the HRA 8
calculator that would apply to that, we did.
9 So moving on to the -- looking at the 10 recover event tree, what we used was, and we've talked 11 about, I think, most of these in Gary and David's 12 presentation, so I won't spend all our time -- we spent 13 a lot of time earlier talking about simple versus 14 complex. From an engineering perspective, this was a 15 very simple modification, and that's why we chose the 16 simple branch on this particular event tree. Again, 17 because we've done it so many times in the past, the 18 engineering team, as David mentioned, he's got a lot of 19 years of experience and done this with many outages, the 20 practice and the ability to do this, the training was 21 there.
22 We did consider that the nature of the 23 work environment was poor based on stress and safety 24 factors associated with the issue that the team may have 25 been under at the time.
Page 120 1
And that would have led us to a 2
qualitative probability failure to moderate flow and 3
then using screening values as defined by SHARP, we 4
determined that that value would be.03 for this 5
particular aspect of the HRA.
6 MR. MITMAN: I'm going to have a couple 7
questions on this slide. I was able to get a hold of a 8
copy of SHARP 1 and take a quick look at it last night.
9 I found in there the event tree, the decision tree that 10 you're looking at here, and I understand where you got 11 the questions from and the splits on that.
12 Could you talk a little bit about the 13 values that put in there that describe short, 14 intermediate, and long, and how you came up with less 15 than one hour, one to four hours, and greater than 4 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />?
17 MR. HARRIS: The long leg associated with 18 this particular branch is the fact that we had 4.8 days.
19 MR. MITMAN: Yes, but, again, it was only 20 a quick review of SHARP 1, but I didn't see SHARP 1 21 defining long as greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and so I assume 22 that that was a decision that your expert team made as 23 they evaluated that.
24 Is that a fair assumption?
25 MR. HARRIS: I understand your question.
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You're saying, where did that 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> come from?
2 MR. MITMAN: Correct.
3 MR. HARRIS: It came from our HRA anal --
4 the fleet, southern fleet have an HRA analysis, and the 5
guiding principles within the HRA analysis are defined 6
based on 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. So that's typically what we use for a 7
typical HRA analysis would be a 4-hour timeframe.
8 Obviously, in this case, the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 9
didn't apply, and so -- and we probably should have 10 taken it off of this presentation because it does add a 11 little confusion, but the fact that we had 4.8 days did 12 provide us that we had time available for the action.
13 MR. DAPAS: I guess the question I have 14 is does this human action reliability procedure which I 15 guess is the SHARP 1, does it provide any guidance there 16 regarding the timeframe that you're talking about, long 17 or medium or short differentiation?
18 MR. MITMAN: Based on -- I haven't 19 thoroughly read SHARP 1 yet to know, and so I turn it 20 over to Entergy and say, does SHARP 1 tell you how to 21 define short, intermediate, and long?
22 MR. HARRIS: I'd have to go back and look 23 and see if there's any specific guides there.
24 MR. MITMAN: Next question is, you're 25 using this as an --
Page 122 1
MR. KOWALESKI: That was an output of the 2
expert team, so what we need to do is provide that for 3
you.
4 MR. DAPAS: Yeah, I think it would be of 5
value for -- I'll ask the risk analysts here on this 6
side of the table, but I think it would be of value for 7
us to understand where you relied on, if you will, the 8
expert judgment of the team you assembled versus 9
applying the guidance that exists and the standards that 10 you were using --
11 MR. HARRIS: Certainly.
12 MR. DAPAS: -- HRA calculator or the 13 SHARP procedure.
14 MR. HARRIS: Certainly. I think that 15 would be -- we can certainly do that.
16 MR. DAPAS: And of course, associated 17 with that is the basis for the judgment of the exercise 18 and why you considered that reasonable.
19 MR. HARRIS: Okay.
20 MR. MITMAN: And looking at SHARP in the 21 column that's labeled qualitative probability of 22 failure, if I remember, that comes right out of SHARP.
23 The low through high-end state qualitative values. In 24 the far right column you associated some quantitative 25 values. Did that come directly out of SHARP or did that Page 123 1
come out of your expert judgment?
2 MR. HARRIS: If you look in SHARP, it 3
will define an upper bound of 0.1 and lower bound of 4
0.01 and then it also specifies that for those that -- a 5
range between low and high, that the range be 6
distributed evenly. So it's somewhat subjective as to 7
what goes where, but there is a little bit of guidance 8
to chart as to how to assign these values.
9 And our fleet guidance, the Entergy fleet 10 guidance, we've used, we've done that. So this 11 information that you see here, these numbers came right 12 out of our guidance, our internal fleet procedures.
13 MR. MITMAN: I'd like to see -- could I 14 get a copy of that guidance, please, and could I get a 15 copy of the entire analysis on, you know, how you set 16 the tree up and how you made the decisions on the branch 17 points?
18 MR. HARRIS: Okay.
19 MR. MITMAN: And the last question about 20 this is, you've characterized it as a decision tree for 21 evaluating the engineering judgment. But isn't it a 22 little bit more than that? It's the engineering 23 judgment and the actual construction work that went into 24 building the connection between offsite and onsite 25 power?
Page 124 1
MR. HARRIS: No, this is just dealing 2
with the design development where we looked at, you 3
know, what the engineers had to do to put a process in 4
place and develop the guidance, the written 5
instructions, to provide to the craft in the field to 6
perform that execution -- that activity.
7 MR. MITMAN: So you're going to talk 8
shortly about the evaluation of the execution?
9 MR. HARRIS: That's right. So the next 10 element we would talk about is the execution factor.
11 And what we looked at here was the execution steps that 12 were developed for successful implementation. Again, 13 what Jason did in his analysis, was he took the, 14 actually, work order instructions that were developed 15 and he used those in the context.
16 We did determ -- the team -- say -- I'll 17 clarify that. The team determined that the HRA 18 calculator could be used for this application because if 19 you think in terms of the HRA calculator and how it's 20 structured, it's structured to be used via procedures 21 for execution. By the time we get to this portion of 22 the recovery, the team in the field will have 23 constructions available to them that were developed by 24 the engineering team.
25 And so using the temp mod process the
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written instructions were developed. We used those 2
written instructions as part of this analysis and deemed 3
that the HRA calculator could indeed be used.
4 So now that we've gone through these 5
various elements and we've determined which tools could 6
be applied, what we did was we actually did the 7
quantification. And I'm just going jump right along, 8
move right along and we'll look at the fault tree that 9
we used to quantify this particular recovery.
10 What you'll see on the left side of the 11 screen or on your hard copies in front of you is 12 actually the recovery associated with the Startup 1 13 recovery. The branch -- the event that you're looking 14 at here at the bottom actually is the numeric value 15 quantification results from the HRA calculator for this 16 particular element.
17 On the right side of the branch here 18 you'll see the recovery efforts associated with the 2A9 19 and also the condensate pump feeder breaker. And you'll 20 note than that they are anded as two independent 21 recovery efforts, but there is a dependency here 22 associated with the alternate AC 2A9 recovery and the 23 condensate pump recovery.
24 Also you'll note at the top of the tree, 25 the development of -- the design development factor.
Page 126 1
This is the factor that came out of the SHARP 1 2
methodology. So what we've done is we've used this 3
fault three tree to capture the portion of the analysis 4
we could perform in the HRA calculator and the portion 5
of the analysis that we could -- would pull from the 6
SHARP methodology, the event tree.
7 And using this quantification or this 8
fault tree, we did calculate a recovery factor 9
associated with 4160-volt. And you note that rather 10 than put the recovery factor for the design development 11 down in the tree, as -- for each one of these elements 12 we pulled it to the top which provides a little bit of 13 an overestimation of risk associated with that 14 particular parameter.
15 MR. MITMAN: Jeff Mitman. Before you 16 leave that, the far left solution is the actual solution 17 that you implement, correct?
18 MR. HARRIS: No, this is actually the 19 success, this is actually one of the success paths that 20 we presented to you.
21 Now, given the way that we quantify this 22 value, it wouldn't change very much if we were to assess 23 it based on what we actually did.
24 MR. KOWALESKI: But, to be clear, the 25 actually installed power recovery is not included in the Page 127 1
model.
2 MR. HARRIS: So, using this fault tree --
3 MR. LOVELESS: Can we go back for a 4
moment? This is David Loveless. I guess I'm trying to 5
understand exactly what you're modeling here in the two 6
recoveries under an or gate -- those are recoveries 2 7
and 3 that have some combination, so there's really a 8
50/50 chance that you take on each one of those, right?
9 I'm not sure the quantification is right putting those 10 both under an or gate.
11 MR. HARRIS: And I'll have to look at 12 that in a little bit more detail, David, you may be 13 right. But I will point to the fact that this risk here 14 is going to dominate these results.
15 MR. MCKENNEY: In actuality -- this is 16 David McKenney -- we would have pursued that particular 17 path and you could use it either place, so it wasn't --
18 in the development and the design section you could have 19 just moved the termination point from one place to 20 another.
21 MR. HARRIS: So it would have been a true 22 or.
23 MR. MCKENNEY: If we had a problem with 24 one of the two breakers, we could have moved to the 25 other breaker with sufficient time.
Page 128 1
MR. MITMAN: But the way you've got it 2
modeled, if one fails then the whole train, then the 3
whole -- then the or gate fails?
4 MR. HARRIS: Right.
5 MR. LOVELESS: The other question I have 6
is that, I guess, are these numbers your cognitive and 7
your execution --
8 MR. HARRIS: Yes they are.
9 MR. LOVELESS: -- values?
10 MR. HARRIS: Yes they are. We didn't 11 break them down in -- used HRA calculators using those 12 two elements to come up with a value that we used in 13 this fault tree.
14 MR. LOVELESS: And when send those to us, 15 we'd like to actually have the calculator files so we 16 can pull it up in calculator and look at your selections 17 on your usages.
18 MR. HARRIS: Sure. Okay. So as we 19 quantify the fault tree, our resulting point estimate is 20 3.1E-2 for this particular recovery pattern.
21 MR. LOVELESS: Before we leave this, one 22 more thing that I struggle with as I'm looking at this 23 and I struggle with it every time we're looking at a 24 complex event occurs and you have multiple pathways.
25 You're modeling pathways that you've
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determined at this point would be success paths. But at 2
the time of an event, it just happens, you're not sure 3
what the conditions are, there are going to be failure 4
paths, and those paths are going to be split fractions 5
with these, so they're going to pull off resources, 6
they're going to pull off decisions and you may make the 7
decision to go down a failure path, and that's not 8
modeled in here.
9 MR. HARRIS: Well, HRA we don't model 10 failures of commission.
11 MR. LOVELESS: We don't typically try to 12 model recovery after a dropped stator.
13 MR. HARRIS: The questions you're asking 14 are very good questions, and I was thinking earlier when 15 you guys were quizzing Dave and Gary, the questions you 16 asked us are questions any good PRA or risk analyst 17 would ask. And so, when I came on board to participate 18 we asked those same questions.
19 And I asked these guys, you know, did you 20 really do this? And if you did, how did you come to 21 this conclusion? And if you came to this conclusion, 22 how did you develop these success paths and how far did 23 you take it? And I walked away from that conversation 24 with these gentleman convinced that those guys had done 25 the right thing and developed the right tools and the Page 130 1
right models and the right strategies to develop this 2
particular recovery action.
3 MR. LOVELESS: And I understand that. I 4
understand that you took a look at one item and said 5
they did the right thing here, but we're talking about 6
failure probabilities in each of those in the one in a 7
hundred range. So this happens a hundred times and 8
you're going to have different groups of people in your 9
TSC, different response teams, how many times do you 10 have to get that group together before they come up with 11 a failure path that goes the other direction?
12 MR. KOWALESKI: The whole premise, 13 because it's an event that occurred and setting the 14 event frequency to one, is that this event occurred.
15 And so it occurred during this outage. And that's in 16 essence what's bothering you. And I think if you look 17 at the timelines, there is substantial margin in time to 18 account for a lot of these deviations from normal 19 practice.
20 And typically the timelines for an online 21 model your talking about are a couple hours to taking 22 action, minutes to taking action. And we're talking 23 days to taking action. And so, we could have given 24 these installations -- design an installation in time, 25 could have gone down the path, failed option one, gone Page 131 1
to option two, failed it and gone to option four 2
sequentially.
3 If we'd have done that, we'd have pursued 4
parallel paths, but given a different set of 5
circumstances, would the design evaluations come up a 6
little differently? Yes. But what we are looking at 7
the circumstances that occurred, which is the whole 8
basis for setting the event frequency at one in the 9
first place.
10 MR. LOVELESS: Well, we set the event 11 frequency to one and then we have, what we'll call 12 failure memory model where everything beyond that can 13 fail in different ways at whatever their nominal value 14 is. Unfortunately we don't have data to show what's the 15 nominal value of your TSC failing to come up with these 16 ideas. That's the struggle in using these.
17 You're modeling the three that you 18 thought of on that day, and I'm not -- they're probably 19 the best thing for your plant, you know your plant 20 better than I do, I'm not challenging that at all.
21 We're simply looking at the frequency and probability of 22 failing under those types of conditions.
23 MR. DAPAS: You had a comment.
24 MCCANN: Thank you. John McCann, 25 Entergy. We clearly acknowledge that this is, to some Page 132 1
degree, new ground, right? I mean, we're at a place 2
where, I think we would all agree, probability of 3
failure of any of these success paths is not a hundred 4
percent. But then what is it?
5 I think this approach that we've come up 6
with is clearly going to be subject to some tweaking, to 7
some rethinking. But what we're trying to get across 8
here is this is a logical way to approach it that is 9
kind of consistent with the way we normally do 10 probabilistic risk assessment. I'm sure we will have 11 more than ample opportunity, hopefully, to discuss it 12 further, but, you know, for now, that's what we're 13 trying to get across.
14 MR. DAPAS: I'd offer, John, from looking 15 at your slides and listening to your discussion, you 16 indicated you're looking for the realistic estimate of 17 risk here and you feel that the probability for failure 18 to restore offsite power was something less than one.
19 Now how do you best determine what that 20 probability is, and then, you know, what influence does 21 that have when you apply that to your event tree. And 22 so, I heard there's no definitive standard for 23 calculating the recovery actions you were using.
24 The methodologies and guidance that is 25 available in trying to determine how best to provide
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that realistic estimate of the risk. I'll offer the 2
questions you are hearing here is in a vein seeking to 3
understand how you apply those and may have some 4
different views on how best to apply those, but the 5
objective, clearly, of this conference is to understand 6
how you applied those and how you arrived at your 7
results.
8 And I'll offer, should we arrive at a 9
different conclusion, we are subject to the same 10 rigorous evaluation or review of how we got there and we 11 have to clearly justify our conclusions and what 12 methodology's we used and do that.
13 MR. SULLINS: I hope it will help, I was 14 a member of the team from the operations' perspective 15 and I would look at final result and is say, is that 16 reasonable, also look at the activity involved and what 17 are the fatal errors that one could make. And the key 18 thing is you don't cause damage through your recovery 19 activities, and there are very few of those type errors 20 to make, given that we would apply electrical testing 21 standards, measuring and checking that there's integrity 22 before you put power on a circuit.
23 And given the time, it's in the modeled, 24 but when I looked at are those numbers reasonable, I'm 25 recognizing that if there's a logic error when they were Page 134 1
correcting the -- or adjusting the logic in the circ 2
water pump breaker, there's ample time to adjust for 3
that and achieve success. So that was the sanity check 4
applied from an operations perspective.
5 MR. HARRIS: And the main thing we want 6
you to get out of this is to understand what we did.
7 And you asked some good questions and you've asked for 8
some documentation that we owe you. So we can sit down, 9
you know, outside of this purview and go through the 10 analysis and we'll be available to answer any of these 11 questions as well.
12 So, in the alternate evaluation, really 13 what we're doing here is we're just trying to take some 14 different approaches, much like Gary said, that it makes 15 sense to him that what we were doing was reasonable and 16 the results we were getting were reasonable. So we took 17 just a couple of different approaches to say does the 18 numbers that we're getting make sense in relation to a 19 different look.
20 Here we looked -- we just used a simple 21 statistical method, and using a normal distribution, 22 mean time to repair, assuming 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />, which is the 23 long leg for the Startup 1 recovery effort, and a 24 standard deviation of 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, gives you a probability 25 of failure of 2.6E-3. Just a simple look.
Page 135 1
MR. LOVELESS: We read this slide earlier 2
and weren't completely sure what you were saying. You 3
started with -- well, maybe I'm wrong. Why don't you 4
start with how you applied that.
5 MR. HARRIS: We didn't apply this, first 6
off. We did not apply this. All we're doing here is 7
we've already established what we feel like is the best 8
estimate, and using the method that we discussed a few 9
minutes ago.
10 MR. DAPAS: 3.1E-2.
11 MR. HARRIS: That's correct.
12 MR. KOWALESKI: So this is just if you 13 look at it a different way is it even close.
14 MR. LOVELESS: I understand, but we're 15 not clear on how you looked at it.
16 MR. HARRIS: So, we simply took a macro 17 that was set up to do, using normal distribution, 18 calculate a probability of success, probability of 19 failure. We went into that, again, looking at the mean 20 time to repair, which, again, we assume to be 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />.
21 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> we assume for the standard deviation, and then 22 we calculated, basically it's a plug and chug within 23 this particular application, put in those values, see 24 what you get out for success.
25 MR. LOVELESS: So the distribution was a Page 136 1
time distribution and you just randomly sampled the 2
across it and said the tail is --
3 MR. HARRIS: That's right. It's a very 4
simple analysis.
5 MR. MITMAN: So the 2.63 is the mean 6
failure probability out of that analysis?
7 MR. HARRIS: That's correct. Jeff 8
clarified that in his slide.
9 MR. MITMAN: The 2.6E-3 is 10 the mean failure probability out of that analysis.
11 MR. HARRIS: That's right.
12 (Many speakers on top of one another) 13 But it's all driven based on the 14 assumption that 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> and a 20-hour standard 15 deviation are correct.
16
-- that is correct --
17
-- we have a high degree of confidence --
18
-- if you could change those --
19
-- based on the discussions --
20
-- the 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, we could debate that all 21 day, but I don't think that would serve our mutual 22 purpose.
23 MR. DAPAS: I think we're making progress 24 in terms of it being all day here.
25 MR. HARRIS: I'll try to help us along.
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So alternate two, in this case all we did was we assumed 2
the fact that we did have off offsite power restored in 3
4.4 days, we knew that we had an available time of 4
4.8 days. We look at the fact that night orders were 5
in place, operator actions to close the breakers and 6
energize the buses were not complicated, and we simply 7
did an HRA -- used the HRA calculator in this particular 8
application to find out what the value would be for 9
failure probability, and we came up with 2.0E-3.
10 Again, this assumes actual condition. We 11 were, we actually had power, how long would it take us 12 to get that power in place should we need it.
13 MR. LOVELESS: Rather than assume for 14 you, once you -- the conditions you were at, my 15 understanding, you had to make a decision that you were 16 in an emergency, you met your emergency standards. Some 17 amount of time, I'm assuming not a lot, at that point 18 you had to go out and close the breaker, what's the next 19 operator actions at that point? You've been boiling in 20 there for a long time, you're way down, I'm going to 21 guess probably whatever the next operator actions, the 22 timing, just getting power to the bus is not successful 23 by itself.
24 MR. HARRIS: That's a very good point.
25 All this looks at is restoring power to that bus. There Page 138 1
would be additional operator actions that are needed.
2 We didn't look at those. And those would increase this 3
value as well.
4 But again, looking just looking at this 5
perspective, we felt like we've got at least an insight 6
that we didn't have before. And were we to include the 7
things you're talking about, this number would go up.
8 How much would it go up? My guess, it would probably 9
double or triple. So it really wouldn't invalidate what 10 we had done before. Good question.
11 So the final thing we're going to talk 12 about is the inventory recovery in relation to the NRC.
13 We looked at the event tree here and concluded there was 14 no real credit given for this particular recovery action 15 here and David spent a lot of time looking at it. One 16 of the things we looked at in relation to the 4160-volt 17 and the inventory recoveries was, is there any 18 dependencies?
19 And the conclusion, ultimately, is, as 20 was discussed earlier, there were no dependencies 21 between 4160-volt recovery and the inventory control.
22 We had sufficient resources on site to pursue those 23 paths.
24 MR. MITMAN: Before you leave that --
25 Jeff Mitman -- the three other contingencies that you Page 139 1
developed to supply power to the 4160 buses. Those were 2
to some degree scoped out during the event, okay you had 3
those conceptually in your mind, you started to think 4
about them and what resources you would need and what 5
analysis you would have to do and maybe even start 6
thinking about writing work orders.
7 But this other contingency to supply 8
480-volt power to the borated water transfer pump, you 9
didn't think of that during the process, during the 10 event. That was something that was developed after the 11 event was over, you restored power, and now you were 12 thinking about risk.
13 Do I understand that correctly?
14 MR. HARRIS: That is correct. But as 15 David and Gary talked about earlier, our processes would 16 have driven this.
17 MR. MITMAN: Personally, I think that 18 this is a success path with -- it's a very valuable 19 success path. Have you incorporated it into your 20 procedures as of this point more than it was previously 21 incorporated into your procedures.
22 MR. HARRIS: I'll let Gary or David 23 respond to that.
24 MR. SULLINS: Not yet, but we've had 25 active discussions regarding that. It highlighted the Page 140 1
value of this pump and this strategy.
2 MR. MITMAN: I think your point here is a 3
very vital one, and that is that it's a method that's 4
completely independent of your failure. And so you 5
don't have to worry about, well, if it happened a little 6
bit differently, you know, the damage would have been 7
somewhat different. It doesn't matter. You can simply 8
run something into the plant, know it's coming from a 9
good source, know it's going to an MCC that can be 10 thoroughly isolated from whatever the fault is.
11 MR. HARRIS: Let's go ahead and move on 12 and we'll look at how we modeled this in the fault tree.
13 On the right side of the fault tree, what you'll see is 14 the alternate source of water, the BWST, and that was a 15 question, I think, Jeff had asked earlier today in the 16 discussion was what about the BWST. What we've done is 17 we've modeled restoration of water to the BWST in order 18 to account for this particular recovery.
19 We've also thrown in the failure, 20 mechanical failures for the necessary pumps and then 21 over on the left here, you'll see the development of 22 recovery, the same thing we used from the SHARP 1 event 23 tree model, and the HRA calculations assuming the 24 cognitive execution steps.
25 MR. LOVELESS: This is David Loveless.
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The whole right side of this looks like it's fire water.
2 MR. HARRIS: We have the B5B pump. We 3
assumed credit for a fire truck that was on site at the 4
time. And then we had also a decent fire water pump.
5 MR. LOVELESS: Well, during the event we 6
had broken headers and that affected mostly how do we --
7 how would that have come into play?
8 MR. SULLINS: We have three portable 9
pumps. And this would have been given priority for at 10 least one. We called the local fire department, the 11 London Fire Department was on station standby as a 12 contingency for fire water. We did isolate the fire 13 main, the ruptured section, within a couple hours so the 14 fire water pumps were available to restore pressure to 15 the header in short order. So I don't see that as a 16 competing factor.
17 MR. LOVELESS: The portions that were 18 damaged were not used in your fire water makeup 19 procedures?
20 MR. SULLINS: No, it's independent.
21 MR. BROWNING: It's completely on the 22 other side.
23 MR. MITMAN: The fault tree that you've 24 set up here and we've been talking about this fire 25 protection component of it. That's an or gate up there.
Page 142 1
Didn't you intend that to be an and gate that not one 2
of, you know, the way it's currently written, any one of 3
these five things fail and the whole scenario fails.
4 MR. HARRIS: That's right.
5 MR. MITMAN: And so it should been an and 6
gate and not an or gate.
7 MR. HARRIS: Well, when you look at the 8
failures, though, we've got a common cause failure of 9
all the pumps -- you've got a common cause failure --
10 you also have a hydrant -- we have a valve closure here.
11 So these failures -- and then the operator action to 12 align off that water source -- the recovery action to 13 actually take those steps -- so any of one of those 14 failures would have caused failures to the --
15 MR. CIRCLE: They need to isolate the 16 hydrant from everything else.
17 MR. DAPAS: The answer here is you feel 18 an or gate is appropriate. We were questioning why it 19 shouldn't be an and gate.
20 MR. HARRIS: We believe it would be 21 nonconservative to apply an and gate there. Something 22 we would definitely go back -- we'll go back and revisit 23 that. But we believe that to be the case.
24 MR. DAPAS: I think our role here is to 25 see if we can understand why you decided to use an or Page 143 1
gate.
2 MR. HARRIS: And just to go to the top 3
again, you know, the operator action. If the operator 4
fails to perform this action, this top gate fails, 5
regardless of anything else. That's the biggest 6
argument for the or gate.
7 If you quantify this model, or this fault 8
tree, we get a value of 4.0E-2. So, given the recovery 9
factor we've talked about the results, when we apply 10 these to the NRC's event tree model, and again, we don't 11 have the entire model, but given what we do have, we 12 feel like the -- well, from the results that we've 13 determined would be around 5.5E-06 conditional core 14 damage probability.
15 MR. KOWALESKI: I do believe when you 16 look at two of the inputs on the ultimate source of 17 water, I believe one of them should be an and gate here.
18 I think they're all or, but I think we did have an and.
19 MR. HARRIS: We can certainly go back and 20 revisit that. It really won't affect the overall 21 results. The numbers down there are not going to be 22 significantly -- was there another question?
23 MR. BROWNING: This is Jeremy. I was 24 going to make a comment about the concept around what we 25 were doing. If I could bring you back to the Page 144 1
discussion. An element of this is something that we 2
would have done during every other refueling outage, so 3
the concept to put it in place, given the question, you 4
said, you'd have had to thought all this up because you 5
didn't have it.
6 The concept would have already been there 7
because we're jumpering between two buses that we would 8
typically do. That other leg that would come off from 9
this connection, we have used that, not in this specific 10 application, but in a similar application. So that's 11 why, from my perspective, the basis for why this would 12 be credible is the concepts were pretty much already on 13 the table. Although we didn't ask the question during 14 the event because the need never arose.
15 MR. HARRIS: What you're looking at here 16 in relation to -- we performed a sensitivity analysis on 17 the results. Basically, using a factor of about 10 low 18 and a bounding upper value estimate of 0.1 for the 19 4160-volt recovery and the inventory control, Jason 20 performed this analysis. And basically, we got a range 21 of values in E-06. You'll notice the gray blocks in the 22 middle is approximately what we got for the point 23 estimate.
24 MR. LOVELESS: Can you explain this to us 25 a little bit better? What it is your --
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MR. HARRIS: If you'll look in this 2
column here on the left you'll see 4kV recovery. The 3
mean value, the point estimate value that we used in the 4
analysis is here. Simply went, approximately, in order 5
of magnitude low and then a bounding value of 0.1 to the 6
high end.
7 Same thing here for inventory control.
8 The mean value is here with a lower value of about, 9
approximately, 10 and up or down 0.1. So if you go to 10 either one of those boxes here, you can cross reference 11 and determine what the value you would get if you assume 12 0.1 and 0.1.
13 MR. CIRCLE: So all the 4kV recoveries 14 are all the success paths? Combinations of success 15 paths?
16 MR. HARRIS: The 4kV would be the fault 17 tree.
18 MR. SULLINS: It was dominated by the 19 design development factor which was applied at common 20 point.
21 MR. CIRCLE: Right, thanks.
22 MR. HARRIS: Now, real quickly I would 23 like just to present, you know, we looked at -- Jason 24 developed an event tree model and quantified the ANO 25 model using the same results that we've talked about in Page 146 1
this discussion today for recovery factors.
2 Modifying that model, we calculated the 3
value of 4.8E-06, which is relatively close to the value 4
that we projected that the NRC model would provide. So 5
in conclusion, I think we can all agree that 6
overwhelming evidence that the fault of the failure for 7
4160-volt KV is not 1.0. And ANO has researched and 8
instituted what we believe to be a reasonable method for 9
assessing risk of recovery factors.
10 And the bottom is just simply restating 11 what I stated a few minutes ago, that we believe the 12 value to be in the E-6 range associated with risk for 13 the stator drop event in Unit 1.
14 MR. DAPAS: You came up with 4.8E-06 as 15 the overall CDF, right?
16 MR. HARRIS: Not CDF, CCDP. That is 17 correct.
18 And that concludes our presentation.
19 MR. KENNEDY: I know we asked a lot of 20 questions about the SHARP 1 methodology and your 21 evaluation and the process, but I want to hear from both 22 sides. Is the use of that a revolutionary method in our 23 opinion or we just don't know enough about it?
24 MR. LOVELESS: I think SHARP is kind of 25 somewhat outdated method. It wasn't put into the HRA Page 147 1
calculator, which has a large number of methods in it.
2 I don't think we have enough information right now to 3
put our hands around it and say that we agree with their 4
decision that it was the best tool. I think we do agree 5
that there isn't a definitive method for doing this kind 6
of work.
7 MR. MITMAN: And if I can add to that.
8 This is Jeff Mitman. It does add some insights in that 9
it's only method that I've ever seen that talks about 10 non-proceduralized actions and untrained actions and 11 speaks directly to equipment -- trying to calculate 12 equipment recovery probabilities using a human 13 reliability method.
14 So it adds some insights that we didn't 15 have otherwise. But it's not a widely used, widely 16 adapted, widely geared to methodology. But there's a 17 lot of interesting insights from it.
18 MR. KENNEDY: Then just another 19 follow-up. Making an assumption about what our HRA 20 calculator limitations are, but just to confirm, I 21 assume our limitations are associated with what you just 22 described, Jeff, lack of procedures, lack of training, 23 et cetera or --
24 MR. MITMAN: It goes a little bit beyond 25 that. The guidance that we have on how to deal with Page 148 1
this is expressly laid out in RIS 2008-15, which is 2
specifically written to how to credit in pure A for SDP 3
and applications. What we call B5B measures, which is 4
what we're discussing here. It's un-proceduralized use 5
of non-permanently installed equipment.
6 And the guidance in there says that if 7
you don't train and you don't have procedures and you 8
don't have the methodology in the base model, you get no 9
credit. All right? That's what the risk says, and 10 that's what collectively the circ panel had to contend 11 with during our evaluation process. And that's what 12 we'll have to contend with as we go back to make a 13 decision.
14 MR. DAPAS: I just want to comment. I 15 was going to make reference to this in my closing, but I 16 think it's appropriate to comment now. We have 17 guidance. We need to look at that and, you know, your 18 overarching point here is that the recovery probability 19 here is not failure to recover, is not 1.0. You 20 provided your view on what is the best estimate to use 21 for that.
22 I think we need to look at that in the 23 context of what existing guidance we have here and 24 determine does your approach seem reasonable here. I 25 understand where you used SHARP. I understand where
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you've used the HRA calculator. We need to look at that 2
and determine independently here, do we feel that you 3
applied that appropriately and are your conclusions 4
reasonable here.
5 Probably -- a reason why our guidance 6
says, you know, you should use X, Y, and Z here, right, 7
because it's probably a function of our experience over 8
time and the challenges you face in trying to come up 9
with reasonable risk estimates. So, I think you've done 10 a very good job in my view of explaining how you applied 11 the methodology, how you arrived at the risk numbers 12 that is you did.
13 I's offer, unless we have any other 14 questions about how they applied it, I actually see we 15 have "break" on the slide here, which leads me to the 16 next point here. Do you want to take about a 10-minute 17 break? How would you like to proceed here? We've been 18 at it for awhile.
19 MR. KOWALESKI: Before we go there, I 20 would like to add one more point of view to whether a 21 order of magnitude risk from normal risk is reasonable 22 for the post-event conditions that existed. And that 23 point of view would be to go look at what's the required 24 power supplies, given a normal outage.
25 So in a normal outage with reactor vessel Page 150 1
head off and 23 feet of water above the vessel. The 2
shutdown outage protection plan would require one 3
offsite power supply and two other power supplies or two 4
emergency diesel generators, three power supplies.
5 It would require only one decay heat 6
train and that's because that large inventory of water 7
is essentially credited because if you have a decay heat 8
train fail, there's substantial time to recovery that 9
opposite decay train service. So that the difference 10 between the equipment available after this event in a 11 normal shutdown outage protection plan is the one 12 offsite power supply.
13 If you look at tech spec requirements for 14 reactor vessel head off, it's flooded up, 23 feet above 15 the fuel, the requirements are two power supplies. It 16 requires on offsite and one generator. It requires only 17 one decay heat train.
18 So the difference between what we had and 19 what's required by tech specs for that plant condition, 20 flooded up with the vessel head off, is that one of our 21 power supplies was a diesel generator instead of an 22 offsite power supply. That's the only difference.
23 And when you look at the reliability of a 24 diesel versus the reliability of the offsite power, or 25 the frequency of the loss of offsite power, they are not Page 151 1
substantially different. So when you do kind of a 2
comparative to the plant condition after the event to 3
normal outage required conditions, and tech spec 4
required conditions, it seems very reasonable that a one 5
order magnitude of risk is represented. Because all 6
you've done that's different from tech spec requirements 7
is replace an offsite power supply with an emergency 8
one.
9 Just an alternative way of looking at it 10 in terms of is this realistic, believable, reasonable 11 that this would be the outcome of a significant success.
12 Do we need a break?
13 MR. BROWNING: Mr. Dapas, it's up to you.
14 If you would like a break we can take a break. When you 15 come back we will look into the Unit 2 risk assessment 16 and insights and additional information we would like to 17 provide. And conclude with our corrective actions 18 around the event.
19 MR. DAPAS: All right. Let's take a 20 five-minute break here. And I will try to set the 21 example by being disciplined in that regard. If we 22 could come back in five minutes that would be great.
23 (Break taken from 4:44 p m. to 4:52 p m.)
24 MR. BROWNING: Okay. This is Jeremy 25 Browning again. Just kind of refocus us a little bit.
Page 152 1
We're switching units. We're going to start talking 2
about Unit 2. Unit 2 is a quite a bit different in that 3
what we're going to be talking about from success paths, 4
we're not talking about design development-type things.
5 Everything that we're going to talk about asking for or 6
pursuing credit is already modeled in our PRA. There's 7
no difference on Unit 2 than Unit 1, the operators did 8
respond in an appropriate manner and all our 9
safety-related equipment in actuality did perform it's 10 intended function.
11 Some of our priorities, what we decided 12 to do and what we decided to pursue on Unit 2 is based 13 on actual plant configuration and not the postulated.
14 If I could I'd introduce John Hathcoat, he is our shift 15 AOM, and he was in the control room the day of the 16 event.
17 MR. HATHCOAT: Thanks. I want to try to 18 move things along, so if I move too fast, please stop 19 me. We'll go back and I'll answer questions. The 20 objectives I want to talk are procedurally directed 21 electrical power recovery strategies. Specifically 22 three different options we had: Offsite power coming 23 in, and I want to use in diagram quite a bit, offsite 24 power coming in from Startup 2 to our 2A2, which is our 25 non-vital 4160-volt switchgear, talk about that
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availability path. Alternate AC diesel generator to 2
4160-volt 2A9 bus, which we already talked quite a bit 3
about that, that availability path. And also the 4
ability to cross tie between red train vital 2A3 bus, 5
4160-volt bus, and green train 2A4 4160-volt bus. The 6
ability to cross tie those.
7 So those are the three main recovery 8
strategies I want to talk about. And the availability 9
of each one of those independently reduces the overall 10 risk profile for Unit 2. And then talk a little bit 11 about the differences between the NRC model and the ANO 12 model and how there's no credit provided with the NRC 13 model.
14 Just a quick overview. Unit 2 was a 15 hundred percent power when the event occurred. We had a 16 reactor trip, as you guys have alluded to, uncomplicated 17 post-trip response. The staff did a good job 18 stabilizing everything, going through diagnosing reactor 19 trip recovery.
20 We had normal fast transfer from our unit 21 aux transformer over to our Startup 3 transformer that 22 powered our red side and our green side. And there was 23 no issues with the plant. Everything was stable at that 24 point. And we were supporting Unit 1 at that time.
25 About 90 minutes later, we had a Startup Page 154 1
3 lockout. And that was a result, the water migration 2
into the 2A1 bus from our Startup 3 to 2A113. That 3
created a Startup 3 lockout, at that point we fast 4
transferred power over to Startup 2. Startup 2 5
automatically tied onto our red side, 2A1 bus to our 2A3 6
vital bus, stable.
7 I did want to point out it did not fast 8
transfer over to the 2A2 non-vital side because of the 9
configuration of our hand switch. We hadn't pull-to-10 lock, which basically is a configuration that will not 11 allow the breaker to automatically close.
12 I do want to point out it was available 13 the whole time if we needed it. I'll talk a little bit 14 about that. We had a hundred voltage condition on the 15 green side 2A4 bus, the No. 2 emergency diesel generator 16 automatically started as designed, tied on, we had a 17 stable condition. We had power on the green side, a 18 vital from our diesel, red side from offsite, everything 19 was stable, we were focusing on Unit 1 at that point.
20 MR. MCKENNEY: John, just a couple 21 clarifying. This is David McKenney. The fault actually 22 happened between the transformer and the breaker. So it 23 did not happen in the breaker, it was in the bus work 24 between those two.
25 MR. HATHCOAT: Thank you, David.
Page 155 1
MR. MCKENNEY: And then the reason the 2
diesel generator started on the green side was because 3
of the Startup 2 breaker being in (gets too quiet to 4
hear).
5 MR. KOWALESKI: There's a particular 6
vulnerability for how that bus comes through the floor.
7 It's different than a breaker. So a small amount of 8
water on the floor doesn't cause an issue with the 9
breakers like it does with that bus coming through.
10 MR. WILLOUGHBY: This is Leonard 11 Willoughby. I have one question. It was on slide 75.
12 You said you had an uncomplicated post-trip response.
13 Can you please define uncomplicated?
14 MR. HATHCOAT: Yes, sir. At that point 15 uncomplicated means that there was no adverse conditions 16 that we had to additionally address as far as, like, 17 feed water control, or steam bypass control system; any 18 other additional complications that would create a 19 diagnosis other than reactor trip recovery. So the 20 control room stamped diagnosis reactor trip recovery and 21 stabilized the plant at that point.
22 MR. WILLOUGHBY: My understanding is that 23 you had a problem with the feed reg valve, you had a 24 mismatch indication, wouldn't that complicate the trip 25 response? Because you had to send operators out.
Page 156 1
MR. HATHCOAT: We did, we actually 2
actuated emergency feed water during the trip, but the 3
alpha main feed reg valve failure did not constitute a 4
complication. That question's come up and we've 5
addressed it.
6 MR. BROWNING: I guess by definition, we 7
call an uncomplicated reactor (unintelligible) if we go 8
into reactor trip recovery. If we diagnose an off 9
normal procedure that would require us to go to an 10 emergency operating procedure or an abnormal operating 11 procedure, we consider it somewhat complicated. But 12 because the operators reactor trip recovery, there were 13 no significant challenges, although there was a problem 14 with the P reg valve that did not constitute, for 15 example, a loss of heat or challenge the operator's 16 recovery.
17 MR. MITMAN: Jeff Mitman. Just so I'm 18 clear. It's my understanding that Unit 2 being a CE 19 plant, post trip the normal feed water supply to the 20 steam generator to this main feed water.
21 MR. HATHCOAT: It is normal.
22 MR. MITMAN: But because of an indication 23 problem with a feed reg valve, the operators shut down 24 normal feed water, main feed water and went to -- I 25 don't know whether you call it emergency feed water or
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aux feed water?
2 MR. HATHCOAT: That's right. Emergency 3
feed water. We have a condition called reactor trip 4
override, and that main feed water control system goes 5
into, and if it did not go into reactor trip override, 6
which the indication was it didn't, we trip our feed 7
pump and make sure emergency feed water is actuated.
8 That did occur.
9 MR. MITMAN: And just so everybody 10 understands, the analysis that we did, we didn't do a 11 normal transient analysis, we did loss of feed water 12 analysis. We used the loss of feed water train event 13 tree rather than a transient event tree. Giving credit 14 for emergency feed water.
15 MR. HATHCOAT: Leonard, did we answer 16 your question, sir?
17 MR. WILLOUGHBY: Uh-huh.
18 MR. HATHCOAT: So talk a little bit about 19 our Startup 2 design and why we were in a (pull-to-lock?)
20 configuration to 2A2. Basically, Startup 2 is capable 21 of supplying both units as we talked about. We have 22 procedures that limit the number of the buses that can 23 be automatically transferred to 2A2, but as I mentioned, 24 the configuration we were in, we could have came out of 25 the pull lock condition and it would automatically tie Page 158 1
on the 2A2 if needed. And it's capable of manually 2
loading 2A2 from our Startup to our transformer.
3 So we had Startup 2 transformer available 4
for green train. We had procedural guidance to manually 5
energize 2A2 if we needed it, but we were in a stable 6
condition at the time with red power being supplied from 7
off site and our green vital switchgear being powered 8
from our No. 2 diesel.
9 So we were in a stable condition, and we 10 did later transfer power to 2A2 from Startup 2 11 successfully with no issues.
12 So Unit 2 was in a stable condition with 13 power to all our safety equipment. Redundant systems 14 were available for decay heat removal, and the alternate 15 AC diesel generator was not damaged from the Unit 2 side 16 as we talked about earlier, and it was available.
17 And we initially declared the alternate 18 AC diesel generator in 2A9 unavailable, and that was 19 based on the function of 2A9 and alternate AC diesel 20 generator having to supply Unit 1 and Unit 2, both. So 21 we did not fully assess the damage to 2A9. We believe 22 it was just from the feeds going to A1 and A3 on the 23 Unit 1 side. We later confirmed that.
24 I mean, the big thing is we didn't need 25 it to support Unit 2. We had, as I mentioned, both Page 159 1
diesels available to us and offsite power. We had at 2
this point, basically four or five power supplies 3
available to us.
4 MR. LOVELESS: This is David Loveless. I 5
know we talked a little bit about it when we were in --
6 talking abut Unit 1, but I do believe the AIT interviews 7
indicated that operators in Unit 2 did not believe 8
alternate AC diesel was available to them for some 9
period of time.
10 MR. HATHCOAT: To answer your question, 11 I've talked to the control room supervisor, the shift 12 technical advisor, the shift manager, and multiple SROs 13 that were there, and I was there that day, too. We 14 didn't really have a good understanding of any damage of 15 2A9 until that afternoon. So it was, we fully believed 16 it was available to us to that point. Then we got the 17 indication that, hey, there's damage or the cable pull 18 from going to Unit 1 is pulled out.
19 Now at that point, the question is kind 20 of subjective. It's like, okay, well, do you follow 21 your procedure if you need it in a blackout condition or 22 do you go down and asses it before you actually use it?
23 Half of the SROs I asked would basically say we would 24 follow through. I know it was just the damage to the 25 Unit 1 side, there was no issue with the breakers on Page 160 1
Unit 2. We would have used it, the shift manager 2
basically indicated that, yeah, I know there's 3
something, I think it's isolated to Unit 1 feeds. I 4
would have relay techs go down there and look in the 5
back just to make sure it is isolated. So there is some 6
subjectivity to that, but every one of the SROs that I 7
talked to believed it was available.
8 MR. LOVELESS: Do we have capability -- I 9
know that on the bridge the AIT team lead, but I also 10 know he can't ask a question.
11 SPEAKER FROM PHONE: Actually, David, 12 this is Geoff Miller, I led the augmented inspection 13 team. There was a log entry in the Unit 2 control room 14 logs at 1:30 p m. that indicated that the 2alpha9 bus 15 was degraded and the alternate AC diesel generator was 16 unavailable for either unit.
17 MR. HATHCOAT: Right.
18 MR. KENNEDY: I was wondering where they 19 were going because your bullet says initially declared 20 unavailable. So I think that...
21 MR. HATHCOAT: Yeah, that is not -- that 22 is a poor choice of words right there. Initially it was 23 declared unavailable at 13:30 when we got the feed back 24 from the field at that point.
25 MR. KENNEDY: But up until that time,
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operators -- that's what we're talking about. Between 2
the time of the event 1300, the question is whether 3
operators thought it was available or unavailable?
4 SPEAKER FROM PHONE: This is Geoff Miller 5
again. I'd also like to just bring out that in that 6
period of time there also there had been an emergency 7
declaration on Unit 2 and there was a loss of let down, 8
a loss of charging, trip of all reactor coolant pumps, 9
so by this point I wouldn't consider to have been 10 uncomplicated.
11 MR. HATHCOAT: Well, now that was later.
12 This was the Startup 3 lockout which was 90 minutes 13 later when all those conditions we were dealing with in 14 the control room. The post trip response was 15 uncomplicated. Just to clarify that.
16 SPEAKER FROM PHONE: That is true, but 17 power for Unit 2 really didn't become an issue until 18 that point.
19 MR. HATHCOAT: That's right.
20 MR. DAPAS: I think it's fair to say you 21 had some challenges here in dealing with the event and 22 recovery associated with Unit 2. I understand the 23 post-trip recovery was uncomplicated per your definition 24 of what constitutes complicated versus uncomplicated, 25 but I think the salient point here is, you had some Page 162 1
challenges here that you had to address subsequent to 2
the initial event here as a result of the impact on the 3
bus work here, right?
4 MR. HATHCOAT: That's correct. Let's 5
talk a little bit about priorities being dictated by our 6
circumstances. If additional power challenges were to 7
occur after the Startup 3 lockout, we would assess the 8
condition that we had, whether it be a loss of offsite 9
power of Startup 2, transformer were to go away we would 10 have lost both of our diesels and we would have had a 11 station blackout condition, or if we would have had a 12 feed source with our steam driven EFW pump, we would 13 have diagnosed appropriate EOP, and we would have 14 pursued recovery power based on that scenario where we 15 re-diagnosed.
16 The priority would be feeding from 17 Startup 2 if it would be available. In the loss of all 18 site power condition, obviously wouldn't be, but in this 19 case, if it was available and we lost power to our vital 20 buses, we would pursue bringing power in from Startup 2 21 is it was available.
22 We had procedural direction to do that.
23 Operators are trained on it in the simulator and the 24 classroom. And really the only action that we would 25 have to take in the control room would be taking the Page 163 1
hand switch for 2A211 how to pull a line, it would 2
automatically tie on. So procedural guidance, operators 3
would have that available to them to do that.
4 The second path in a blackout condition 5
would be the alternate AC diesel generator, and again, 6
we're talking about the availability of it. The fact of 7
the matter is, it's physically available to us. We 8
confirmed that later. The question is, how would the 9
operating crew go about getting to that point to 10 starting it up and loading it. And that's kind of up to 11 debate a little bit right now as to whether we go down 12 and inspect it or we would just execute the procedure as 13 it's written and tie it on.
14 And then the cross tie capability of 2A3 15 and 2A4 is another point that we would use, depending on 16 where power was coming in, we had the diesel available 17 on this side, our offsite power available on this side, 18 we could cross tie over and get our electric driven 19 steam pump to our steam generators which is supplied 20 from the red side.
21 So that gives us that capability. Same 22 thing here, if we had power coming in we could cross tie 23 2A1 and 2A2 you get [coughing] steam pump, which is 24 non-vital but is fully capable of supplying our steam 25 generator. Do depending on the combination and safety Page 164 1
function that we needed at the time, we could cross tie 2
our buses.
3 As I mentioned, the feed from Startup 2, 4
we proceduralized -- I won't talk about that a whole lot 5
more, I think everybody has a picture on it. Certainly 6
available to us. I don't want to say simple action, but 7
it's one hand switch in the control room --
8 MR. CIRCLE: This is Jeff Circle. Does 9
Startup 2 have enough capacity for both trains?
10 MR. HATHCOAT: It does. And then the 11 alternate AC diesel generator, you know, the feeds to 12 Unit 2 were unaffected. Visible damage, we talked about 13 being on the Unit 1 side only. It's fully capable of 14 supplying our loads. And this was later confirmed by 15 engineering and electrical maintenance that there was no 16 issue on the Unit 2 feeds from 2A9.
17 And the big thing I want to point out is 18 2A9 at this point was not given a high priority because 19 of the stability of the plan on Unit 2. We had offsite 20 power in, we had a diesel that was running, another 21 operable diesel. So our focus, really was on Unit 1 and 22 supporting them at this time.
23 And I mentioned, emergency, you know, EOP 24 for station blackout condition, we would have used the 25 alternate AC diesel generator to start it and tie it on.
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Just to give everybody perspective, it takes about --
2 once the time the blackout would occur it takes us about 3
15 minutes to re-diagnose the blackout and give the 4
direction to the director operator to actually start it 5
and tie it on.
6 So it's about a 15 minute evolution once 7
we actually have the condition. And that's adequate 8
time available to establish a feed source to our steam 9
generators. And that's considering, you know, we have 10 in this scenario, in a blackout, we have our steam 11 driven EFW pump feeding both steam generators.
12 A blackout gives it, at six-hour point, 13 due to battery depletion, we actually say, okay, let's 14 go ahead and send a local operator down, take manual 15 control of the 2P7 alpha turbine due to DC control 16 circuitry and the DC valves and then transition over to 17 that.
18 Before go to that point, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into the 19 procedure, we would have had adequate time for the 20 control room staff to call relay techs, send them down 21 to 2A9, look in the back of it and say, yep, it is just 22 isolated to Unit 1, and you guys can move forward with 23 tieing it on to one of our safety buses.
24 That's why I wanted to point that out.
25 Even though there is some question about some SROs would Page 166 1
move forward with it, some of them would, maybe, suggest 2
going out and getting the relay techs.
3 MR. CIRCLE: This is Jeff Circle. Are 4
you saying that this -- all these activities could be 5
completed in 15 minutes? Send technicians down?
6 MR. HATHCOAT: No, sir. I'm saying 7
normal procedural guidances is to diagnose the blackout 8
and then give the direction to tie it on procedurally in 9
the control room.
10 MR. CIRCLE: Right.
11 MR. HATHCOAT: But if we'd have had a 12 condition where, say the shift manager -- hey, I want to 13 call relay, send them down there, look in the back of 14 2A9 and make sure that there's no issue with it, we 15 would have done that in, say, an hour or less.
16 MR. MCKENNEY: Yeah, I talked to the 17 relay techs and asked them specifically how long would 18 it take in a blackout condition. They said it would 19 take about an hour and about an hour to get it 20 reenergized. To go to Megger the bus to verify that it 21 was not damaged configuration and the breakers were off.
22 MR. DAPAS: And so just so I understand.
23 There's been a lot of discussion about what the 24 operators understood is the condition of 2A9 here, and I 25 understand it had damage associated with what the load Page 167 1
side from 2A9 to A3 and A1, right? What I think I heard 2
you say is, operators -- you would have dispatched relay 3
technicians to do a Megger test and that would have been 4
the extent of the condition for you to determine if 2A9 5
was in fact available and could be energized from the 6
alternate AC diesel and then power the Unit 2 safely.
7 MR. HATHCOAT: That's correct. We did 8
that several days after when conditions were stable and 9
it tuned out the Meggers test were good and the breakers 10 were good.
11 MR. DAPAS: Okay. What I'm hearing from 12 John is that you were confident that that bus was 13 available and those are the actions you would have 14 expected and the operators considered that as an 15 available...
16 MR. HATHCOAT: Absolutely, sir. And I 17 was in the control room at the time and I followed up 18 and asked each one of them.
19 MR. MITMAN: This is Jeff Mitman. 2A9 is 20 immediately next to 2A1 if I remember correctly. All 21 right. In 2A1, there was water on the floor on 2A1. So 22 is it safe to assume there was water on the floor in 23 front of 2A9, all right? And the question I'm getting 24 at is, I would think that the staff would be cautious 25 about performing a lot of testing on 4160-volt bus work Page 168 1
with water on the floor, and that they're going to be 2
hesitant to do that work.
3 MR. MCKENNEY: The water on the floor was 4
very small and had ran in the back of the one cubicle.
5 So this is next to it. There was some water on the 6
floor in the front and a little bit in the back. All 7
the feeder cables from the alternate AC diesel generator 8
come in the bottom, but it's cables. It's not bus work 9
like this other so, and all the other feeders that go 10 out of it come out the top.
11 MR. MITMAN: I understand the actual 12 situation, but we're talking about working around 13 energized switchgear at 4,000 volts with water also in 14 the vicinity. We've got a busted fire main that's 15 distributing water places were it's never intended to be 16 water, okay? And I think it's going to slow things down 17 at a minimum.
18 MR. MCKENNEY: Well, in this particular 19 case we'd be in a blackout and be de-energized, right?
20 MR. HATHCOAT: Yes. And if I may, I'll 21 try to give a better picture. It wasn't water all over 22 the floor. There was a couple of puddles behind 2A1.
23 The busted fire main was outside the wall in the train 24 bay. It really wasn't in front of the 2A9 switchgear.
25 MR. MITMAN: I understand, but there was
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enough water and enough problems with 2A1 to keep people 2
away from that bus for hours because they weren't sure 3
what was going on, and there was a reluctance to go in 4
front of the bus and check out cubicles, and which one's 5
damaged and what's the extent of damage? So there's 6
damage on the bus, there's water in the vicinity, we 7
know that water caused the damage on the bus.
8 I just think there's going to be the 9
reluctance and the caution, which I think is appropriate 10 around this kind of equipment would extend to, at least 11 slow down the normal response that you wouldn't have 12 under more normal circumstances.
13 MR. BROWNING: And those cautions, again, 14 in my mind I'm trying to see what actually happened. We 15 were protecting that area because we did have energized 16 equipment. In station blackout when the operators get 17 to that step that says go bought the alternate AC 18 generator in, it is de-energized.
19 Now before we -- whatever we would have 20 done or how we would have approached that would have 21 been a different mindset. When we're in a blackout, 22 it's de-energized and how we approach it would be a 23 different approach than the way we actually approached 24 it the day of the event when we had power on those 25 buses.
Page 170 1
MR. MITMAN: But blackout, as I 2
understand it, is defined as de-energizing the vital 3
buses 2A3 and 2A4. So you could be there with power on 4
2A1 and 2A2 and no power on 2A3 and 2A4. Again, all I'm 5
suggesting is that there's going to be a little bit 6
extra caution taken when addressing the issue and trying 7
to reenergize the vital buses from the AC diesel 8
generator.
9 MR. KOWALESKI: We agree, and the 10 probability of failure has been adjusted for that.
11 MR. DAPAS: That's where I was going to 12 go. I think it might be Jeff's done a very good job 13 articulating the challenges the operators faced here, 14 and what reluctance may exist. If you think, John, you 15 accurately, if you characterize from your perspective 16 how you would approach that. If Jeremy, right, the 17 mindset that exists when you're in a station blackout 18 here.
19 I think we need to understand how you 20 accounted for that. We'll need to in our internal 21 discussions reach a view on how we should appropriately 22 account for that. But I'd be interested in 23 understanding how you factored that. When it gets to 24 the uncertainty aspect, you know, we're trying to bound 25 liability analysis and how you accounted for that in Page 171 1
your...
2 MR. BROWNING: That's absolutely fair.
3 MR. HATHCOAT: I'll move us along here.
4 We've already talked about the building the cross tie, 5
2A3 and 2A4 are vital. 4160-volt buses, we have 6
standard attachments and proceduralized and operators 7
would have certainly used it if need be on the day of 8
the event.
9 So in conclusion, on the Unit 2 side, 10 we've talked about the pretty specific paths that we 11 don't have credit for in the NRC model, and the 12 differences between the NRC model and the ANO model.
13 The Startup 2 availability, alternate AC diesel 14 generator, and ability to cross tie or vital buses.
15 So in the end, we ended up with four out 16 of five possible power sources were available to the 17 Unit 2 control room that day of the event. We had the 18 resources, the specific training, and the specific 19 procedures to utilize all those power sources if needed, 20 and the confidence to know that we would have been 21 there.
22 MR. CLARK: Let me ask a question before 23 you go on. This is Jeff Clark. So you lost reactor 24 cooling pumps. Did you go into the cool down?
25 MR. HATHCOAT: We did.
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MR. CLARK: So that was a natural-circ 2
cool down?
3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That is correct.
4 MR. CLARK: Is that considered normal for 5
Unit 2?
6 MR. HATHCOAT: Absolutely not. That is 7
not normal.
8 MR. KOWALESKI: That is not normal 9
operating procedure.
10 MR. HATHCOAT: That occurred, not in that 11 post-trip, that occurred after the Startup 2 lockout 12 which caused us to lose our 6900-volt buses.
13 MR. KOWALESKI: The immediate trip was 14 uncomplicated. 90 minutes later when we lost our 15
[unclear] that's when these additional complications 16 occurred.
17 MR. BROWNING: Operators re-diagnosed and 18 diagnosed the conditions, this is not normal procedure, 19 so they would, again, if we lost the diesel, they would 20 have re-diagnosed and put us in an appropriate EOP where 21 it's functional or blacked out or whatever.
22 MR. CLARK: Okay. Thank you.
23 MR. HARRIS: Let's move on to 24 significance determination. It's getting late in the 25 day, I'm going to move through this pretty quickly. And
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I just want to hit on the very critical points. We 2
looked the at the dominant cut sets that were provided 3
in the NRC assessment for the loss of feed water model, 4
and we looked at what was contributing to that on a 5
sequences we noted that we needed power, okay?
6 Given that and the discussion that John 7
just provided with you, we looked at 2A2, alternate AC, 8
and the cross tie between 2A3 and 2A4. As John 9
indicated, 2A2 was available. It's a simple matter of 10 pull the lock, procedures in place by operations. Our 11 current model for ANO 2 has a failure to recover that 12 8.0E-4 because it is in the control room, it's a simple 13 action, not much time taken to do that.
14 I guess the recovery that's most 15 challenging would be alternate AC and taking credit for 16 that. Model -- we do have a recovery action in the 17 model for the alternate AC. However, because of the 18 issues associated with alternate AC, we felt like we 19 needed to make some adjustments in model to account for 20 these.
21 And what we did was pretty simply we took 22 out availability on the alternate AC and we applied a 23 0.1 factor for unavailability to increase that to.17 24 from the nominal value to account for the fact that the 25 alternate AC did have some issues, it wasn't straight Page 174 1
forward, it wouldn't, you know -- the operator may have 2
had to take additional time to insure that that 3
particular success path was available.
4 And the final one, again, is the 2A3/2A4 5
cross tie capability. Again, it is in our model and we 6
have a value of 2.0E-4 associated with that value.
7 So when we look at the Unit 2 model 8
because we don't have the NRC model again in this case, 9
we calculated a risk of 1.8E-6 conditional core damage 10 probability for Unit 2.
11 MR. LOVELESS: I guess this is what I 12 really don't understand. You say you used values that 13 were in your current model. You say you adjusted the 14 probability of failure of the alternate AC diesel up a 15 little bit, and yet in October-September timeframe you 16 provided an analysis that shows CCDP of 3.0E-5, 17 presumably from your current model. What's different?
18 MR. HARRIS: And I can't answer that 19 question. I'll let Jason respond to that.
20 MR. HALL: Originally, with the -- we had 21 the two 2A9 unavailable in that analysis. It drove the 22 risk up to 3.0E-5 for the CCDP. And we also credited an 23 operator action for the breakers when they were -- in 24 Startup 2 is being -- could fail, these breakers would 25 cause the Startup 2 transfer to fail. So we credited Page 175 1
that operator action.
2 MR. LOVELESS: So you added a new 3
operator action into your model that wasn't there 4
before?
5 MR. HATHCOAT: Correct.
6 MR. LOVELESS: And what is that specific 7
action?
8 MR. HALL: If one of those breakers when 9
you load shed from Startup 2, If they don't --if the 10 breakers fail, an operator will go down and pull, and 11 manually operate the breaker. And there's several 12 breakers. That's included in my analysis for the...
13 MR. LOVELESS: Okay.
14 MR. HARRIS: So performing a -- using an 15 insert program, simply using insert, performed a 16 sensitivity analysis surrounding a point estimate we 17 calculated for the Unit 2 results. We determined that 18 3.9E-07 is the probability for the lower bound and 19 5.3E-06 for the upper bound.
20 MR. LOVELESS: What was it that you 21 adjusted for that sensitivity analysis?
22 MR. HARRIS: That we adjusted -- we ran 23 insert using the point estimate for the additional core 24 damage probability.
25 MR. LOVELESS: So it's like a Monte Carlo Page 176 1
simulation?
2 MR. HARRIS: That's right.
3 MR. CIRCLE: So you didn't change any 4
values, you just ran the insert program?
5 MR. HARRIS: That's all we did. That 6
concludes my presentation.
7 MR. KENNEDY: We're getting ready to 8
transition from risk to some other discussions. I just 9
want to make sure -- we'll have another opportunity, but 10 before we leave the risk, make sure that the senior 11 reactor analyst and these folks don't have any questions 12 before we move on to what is really the non-risk 13 discussion. We'll have another opportunity, you time to 14 think about it. Okay. Not right now?
15 MR. DAPAS: Just check maybe if we could 16 with the risk analyst who joined us on the bridge. I 17 thought I heard a couple.
18 MR. KENNEDY: Sunil, Antonio, do you have 19 any comments for us.
20 SPEAKER ON PHONE: Sunil has -- he left 21 for the day. I don't think that the questions -- I 22 think I'm having questions asking for information from 23 the licensee to give us an understanding of the basis of 24 the calculations. I think those questions have been 25 asked and we will wait for this information and review
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it.
2 MR. DAPAS: Thanks See-Meng.
3 MR. JAMES: Okay. I'm going to cover 4
very briefly with you the site actions that we took 5
associated with corrections or improvements to our 6
material handling procedure that dealt directly with the 7
lifting of the stator. And I'll be very brief on that.
8 I think we've covered that in quite a bit of detail 9
already. And also describe in more detail actions that 10 we've taken associated with our project management 11 procedure from the root cause that we saw, enhancements 12 that have been made there to further enhance the 13 oversight of those activities.
14 And then finally describe the common 15 cause initiative that we have underway that will provide 16 us with some additional insights as well as any 17 additional corrective actions that we could take. That 18 will include a review of the standard op.
19 Just briefly, out of the stator drop root 20 cause, looking at the activities surrounding the review 21 that was performed associated with the temporary lift 22 assembly. What we saw is there were weaknesses in our 23 procedure -- our material handling procedure Unit A 119.
24 Clearly that procedure could be improved by us providing 25 additional specification for the review and approval of Page 178 1
design documentation associated with those temporary 2
lift assemblies.
3 We actually took those lessons learned 4
and applied them in the lift of the refurbished stator 5
that went back into the unit once the construction 6
activity were completed. Included in there were 7
detailed engineering calculation package that documented 8
all that material, which included both the computer 9
modeling of the assembly that was used in that 10 particular application as well as hand calculations, 11 detailed documentation of load testing that was 12 performed.
13 This particular instance we actually load 14 tested the complete assembly at vendor's facility as it 15 would be constructed in the ANO turbine building at 16 greater than 125 percent of anticipated load. That 17 assembly was then disassembled and shipped to the site 18 where we examined all the critical welds associated with 19 it and then reassembled it in the turbine building with 20 an examination performed by Entergy Engineering at that 21 point in time also.
22 And then finally, a third-party 23 independent review was performed by an expert that is 24 familiar with all these codes that are applicable to the 25 design of this particular application.
Page 179 1
Basically what we did is include those 2
same requirements now in our procedural requirements and 3
the material handling procedure. Those are all 4
specified in that procedure for these detailed type 5
evaluations will be documented for all future 6
applications of similar nature.
7 We also revised our fleet procedures 8
associated with project management. What we saw there 9
is that there was enhancements that could be made, 10 particularly with respect to the guidance for contract 11 language. What we are weren't getting is the details 12 that we needed to perform a thorough evaluation. So 13 went into that procedure and verified -- went into that 14 procedure and made modifications to ensure that those 15 type of documentation associated with code compliance, 16 vendor detailed design, calculations were provided, not 17 just for this type of application, but from any 18 applications where that would be necessary for us to 19 perform an independent review.
20 We also looked at that procedure with 21 respect to its guidance on the makeup of the project 22 management team. When you looked at the particular team 23 makeup for the stator project, what we found is it 24 lacked the expertise necessary to evaluate this type of 25 special application.
Page 180 1
We had individuals on that team with 2
expertise in load handling, large load handling, and 3
expertise with respect to civil engineering, but they 4
didn't have this particular expertise associated with 5
this application.
6 So what we went and did is went back into 7
that procedure and revised it to specifically look for 8
-- specifically require when we put together one of 9
these project management teams that we go look at these 10 particular applications where high consequence 11 evolutions are occurring as a result of the project and 12 ensuring that the team makeup either has that expertise 13 within the staff or that it requires that expertise 14 through a third party or some other application.
15 MR. DAPAS: Dale, this is Marc Dapas.
16 I've got a question along those lines where I see that 17 you're looking at verification of a third party, 18 independent review of vendor calculations and I assume 19 that specific to the material handling program --
20 MR. JAMES: That is correct.
21 MR. DAPAS: The question I have, more 22 broadly, do you look at -- do you have the expertise 23 inhouse to independently assess the quality of the 24 deliverable products that you're getting from the 25 vendors there because there's other applications where
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you use contractors, use vendors, so did you leverage 2
the learnings from this to look at other processes for 3
which we use contractors to ensure that it's not some 4
issue there that hasn't been identified as a result of 5
appropriate oversight?
6 MR. KOWALESKI: Maybe I could address 7
that. This is Joe Kowaleski. You could put the 8
engineering work by vendors into two broad categories.
9 One would be engineering work which would effect the 10 design of the plant and plant equipment. And we have a 11 robust procedure that looks at the risks and 12 consequences associated with those activities.
13 And then it applies a structured set of 14 mitigating actions which include for high consequence 15 items, independent third-party reviews. Sometimes we 16 have that expertise, but more often we'll hire an 17 independent third party to come in and do that type of 18 work.
19 Where this improves our oversight is for 20 vendor, or more particularly, usually, project specialty 21 vendors that have to do design engineering or 22 engineering calculations in support of project work, 23 such as a special lifter. Now, and there's other 24 examples of that, like a generator bundle.
25 So this, where we needed to improve this Page 182 1
was relative to engineering done in support of project 2
activities. And so that's what this is looking at.
3 We've taken some actions with that, which is 4
identification to make sure we've got the expertise. We 5
have an ongoing evaluation to look at applying that 6
engineering procedure to project task engineering as 7
well as design engineering. And that is not is complete 8
yet for the fleet, but we are in the process of doing 9
that.
10 MR. DAPAS: Okay. Thank you.
11 MR. JAMES: We also, as part of our 12 corrective actions took an action to reinforce the 13 standards in our -- associated with vendor oversights 14 that are already specified in our EN-DC-114 procedure, 15 our project management procedure.
16 Followed by that we developed what we 17 call a what it looks like sheet or "WILL" sheet, which 18 is a tool that we use to, basically have the project 19 manager assess those particular aspects out of our 20 project manager procedure that deals with the vendor 21 oversight on the projects that they are involved with.
22 Those documents have been reviewed by the senior project 23 management on site.
24 One of the things that we saw from the 25 root cause is that we actually, in this particular Page 183 1
instance, identified the failure of the temporary lift 2
assembly rack, the drop of the stator as a high 3
consequence, low probability event. And we actually 4
based upon that put into place a risk mitigation plan to 5
address that.
6 Part of that risk mitigation plan 7
included a requirement to do a load test on that 8
assembly. Now the root cause describes how, why that 9
didn't occur, but what we is at that level of decision 10 making we could add another barrier by requiring that 11 those risk mitigation plans be specifically the 12 responsibility of a management level individual within 13 our organization that will be accountable to ensure that 14 the plan is carried out appropriately and fully 15 documented and evaluated to assure the adequacy of those 16 plans. We put that in place also since the root cause 17 was completed.
18 As far as communicating the lessons 19 learned out, we've had extensive input with INPO. They 20 have provided them the lessons learned so they could 21 communicate that information out to the industry. In 22 fact, Jeremy just recently participated in a web cast to 23 the industry where we discussed the event and the 24 lessons learned, I believe there was over 150 industry 25 participant.
Page 184 1
MR. BROWNING: Actually, it was closer to 2
200. And the significance of that is IER is coming out 3
on this event. It was very focused on cause and 4
corrective actions and because this event occurred in 5
Arkansas, you can say I'm the primary sponsor of that 6
IER and I'm going to be imposing through INPO actions 7
for the industry to take.
8 So if I felt it was very important for my 9
peers to understand the significance of the consequence, 10 the importance of the cause, and the understanding of 11 the cause, and then this IER results in industry-wide 12 actions, that they understand the basis for those 13 actions.
14 So they heard that from me personally 15 through this web cast and there were over 200 hundred 16 participants in the nuclear industry that were on that 17 web cast.
18 MR. DAPAS: Is that IER capture a 19 contract on oversight? You talked about aspects of 20 that.
21 MR. BROWNING: It captures everything 22 that we are discussing with you today.
23 MR. KOWALESKI: There was a second 24 industry operating experience document that comes out --
25 that is coming out, I think it came out yesterday --
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that more broadly addresses contract oversight in 2
general. So this is specific to this event, but there 3
is one that talks about broad enterprise risk, large 4
consequence to nuclear safety in plant equipment, it 5
addresses other industry that --
6 SPEAKER: Specifically to the senior 7
level oversight of contract work scope.
8 MR. JAMES: I'm on slide 97 now. This 9
last month we also initiated an effort to perform a 10 common cause review of conditions that have occurred in 11 this plant over the last 15 months. That included a 12 standard drop event in that, there were seven total 13 conditions that we had them look.
14 This is being performed by a team of 15 outside analysts with expertise in performing this type 16 of analysis, also with fleet and ANO resources. In 17 addition to looking at those seven specific events, 18 we're also looking back over the last two years at all 19 of our more significant alpha and bravo condition 20 reports to see what additional insights that may give us 21 using trend coding as well as keyword searches of those 22 documents.
23 We are also looking at the part of the 24 last two years worth of external assessments that have 25 been performed on site both from outside agency and then Page 186 1
internal assessment reports.
2 We also were part of that review 3
utilizing interviews of personnel on that evaluation.
4 MR. DAPAS: You say you were looking for 5
common causes you focused on keyword searches like 6
oversight as example. Can you give a little more 7
context to this common cause factor and how you 8
approached it?
9 MR. JAMES: Well, particularly when they 10 were using keywords or using trend codes, they were 11 looking for any particular trend code or keyword that 12 was -- occurred more readily then others for looking for 13 a common causal type evaluation. But also with respect 14 to the identified issues out of the seven specific 15 events that they were looking for, looking for those 16 also in any of those other condition reports using the 17 keywords and causal code evaluations.
18 MR. DAPAS: Were these events that 19 involved mechanical failures, human error, a combination 20 of? Just curious how you targeted those seven.
21 MR. JAMES: Yeah. They were, I'll give 22 you some examples. They were the overspeed trip of the 23 ultimate AC diesel generator, the bravo decay heat pump 24 breaker failure, the stator drop itself, the flooding 25 barrier leakage issues, and other similar events like Page 187 1
that.
2 And also we had them specifically looking 3
for this as part of this evaluation with respect to 4
oversight, and did oversight play a role in any of those 5
events? So we're anticipating getting some good 6
information from that evaluation with respect to 7
oversight specifically also.
8 That effort should be wrapping up this 9
month and we'll be sharing those results.
10 MR. DAPAS: I do have a related question 11 and perhaps the team can answer quickly. You mentioned 12 the alternate AC diesel and the speed trip and I know 13 that we put it was a vendor recommendation preventative 14 maintenance associated with a capacitor, am I recalling 15 that correctly?
16 MR. JAMES: Yes, sir.
17 MR. DAPAS: The question I have is, you 18 know, we were conducting a risk assessment, going 19 through that process, but I do have a question, it may 20 be for internal discussion here. To what degree was 21 that diesel available given that latent condition that 22 existed and does it have any impact -- we heard 23 extensive discussion about alternate AC diesel and 2A9, 24 et cetera, but I do have a question regarding any 25 overlap such that the reliability of that diesel given Page 188 1
that latent condition existed because it didn't manifest 2
itself on the actual overspeed trip, right?
3 MR. JAMES: Yes, sir.
4 MR. DAPAS: And I, quite frankly, don't 5
recall the timeframes, but I think that's something we 6
need to look at if we haven't already.
7 MR. KENNEDY: When did the overspeed trip 8
occur? Before the event or after? So it was before 9
March 31st?
10 MR. BROWNING: And corrective actions.
11 MR. DAPAS: And, well, any other -- I 12 know we've had some discussions about, you know, we look 13 at this event probability of failure of one, but then we 14 also looked at trying to model this if it occurred at 15 any outage at all. So that's why I wanted to make sure 16 I was able to connect the dots there. I think I've 17 nuked this out, thanks.
18 MR. MITMAN: Just one quick addition to 19 that. The rules of the road for RP is you don't 20 normally add more than one form of sufficiency. There 21 all evaluated independently. So we have to look at how 22 that applies here, and whether we would be appropriate 23 under our guidance and procedures to combine, normally 24 we don't combine two analysts.
25 MR. DAPAS: I understand, but it sounds
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like you've implemented corrective actions such that 2
that diesel was available at the time of the event. The 3
issue had been corrected, so we're focusing on plant 4
configuration, equipment availability during the time of 5
the event here, so thanks.
6 MR. JAMES: That concludes my remarks 7
unless there are any further questions.
8 MR. KOWALESKI: Everything we just talked 9
about, the site response and the cause analysis and what 10 I was going to address is this last section is fleet 11 learnings, both actions completed and actions that we 12 currently have in progress associated with primarily 13 contractor oversight.
14 We talked a lot about the safety 15 significance of this in terms of what was the realistic 16 estimate of potential for core damage frequency and 17 we've given you our belief or the best estimate of that.
18 I don't want that to take away at all the 19 other significance of this event which is the fact that 20 we did have a fatality, we did injure other employees, 21 and we did put the plant at some level of risk. And 22 that should not have happened.
23 We depend on contractors because of 24 resource leads and for specific skill sets that we as a 25 utility don't have. But we have to have that Page 190 1
dependence. We are seeing issues, the industry is 2
seeing issues with performance of those contractors. So 3
we have to have in place a robust process of oversight 4
that protects and corrects those errors that a vendor 5
may make before they produce a consequence to the plant 6
or to people.
7 We are committed to putting such a robust 8
process in place to ensure that this never happens 9
again. I've been involved in the industry for over 30 10 years and it's the first time a fatality's occurred in 11 any kind of relationship to a plant or multiple plants 12 that I've had oversight of. And it's quite disturbing.
13 You just can't allow it to happen again.
14 That said, actions completed. We talked 15 about the material handling procedures for the fleet has 16 been changed to reflect the lessons learned that Dale 17 discussed, specifically strengthening controls and 18 documentation of load lifts, calculations associated 19 with this. And we also talked about the project 20 management procedure for the fleet has been modified for 21 specification design documentation requirements for 22 engineering activities to support projects for 23 determining specific expertise for high consequence 24 activities that a project vendor may perform.
25 And for putting in place a structure that Page 191 1
defines the oversight for each project given a risk 2
matrix for that project.
3 Development a risk matrix, identify the 4
high consequences, we've put a structure for oversight 5
plan in place around those consequences to ensure that 6
they're mitigated.
7 We've met multiple times with members of 8
the fleet to give them the lessons learned associated 9
with this event and contractor oversight. We've made 10 some organizational changes to be more effective with 11 the contractor oversight. Specifically, for major 12 projects, which is where a lot of these high consequence 13 vendor contract design activities occur, we put in place 14 a corporate engineering group to do those risk 15 assessments and help oversee that the mitigation 16 strategies that are put in place for those 17 engineering-related activities and also the non --
18 engineering related activities in terms of risk.
19 And we've also added oversight for our 20 maintenance support and site project manager. So we now 21 have director levels and senior managers that are 22 providing oversight of our main support services 23 contractors and all those contractors that are doing 24 minor projects at our sites.
25 Across the board, we've made improvements Page 192 1
in the skill assessments of the supplemental supervision 2
that we utilize at the site. So we will assess their 3
skills for being able to implement, hopefully, 4
verifications, peer checks, safety rules, performance 5
rules that we have on the site.
6 So those skill assessments have been 7
improved by assuring that there's an Entergy presence in 8
terms of [can't hear] for those supervisors and also to 9
have a demonstrated activity that does an assessment of 10 how well they do in observation how well they give feed 11 back to workers to make sure they follow the rules.
12 MR. DAPAS: Just a follow-up question.
13 This is an application for the entire fleet, right?
14 MR. KOWALESKI: Yes, these are fleet-wide 15 actions.
16 MR. DAPAS: Not just Entergy south?
17 MR. KOWALESKI: That's correct. The 18 entire fleet.
19 The additional actions in progress.
20 We've initiated a common cause evaluation for contract 21 performance issues. We've started that and completed an 22 initial piece of that, which is a select group of 23 significant contractor issues we've seen on projects.
24 We have selected a group of the most 25 significant contract, major contract issues we've had.
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We've done a vending exercise to try to determine if 2
there's anything immediate we need to go after reflected 3
at.
4 What we found is this last action that 5
I'll talk about that we are starting to implement for 6
the fleet. Again, these are in progress, but we're 7
going to complete that common cause evaluation by 8
looking at two years worth of any project-related cause 9
evaluation that we've done. Any project-related 10 commission report that documented an issue with document 11 limitation, we went back to all the alphas and bravos 12 and the cause analysis and specifically looked into 13 oversight and how the projects were managed --
14 MR. BILL JAMES: Bill James, the project 15 management. Just for clarity we are going to look at 16 all alpha and bravo across the entire Entergy fleet. We 17 are going to then, the conditions found within those 18 conditions reports, we're going to look at them from the 19 vantage point of project management and engineering as 20 well as engineering associated with project management.
21 Anything in the maintenance contractor or 22 otherwise arena that doesn't have an engineering or 23 project management aspect to it, will go to the 24 maintenance organization who will be participating. So 25 it's going to be across the board looking at all the Page 194 1
condition reports and the alpha and bravo space that 2
we've had. So we're not going to go back and pick it up 3
in the future. We're going to do it all the first time 4
through.
5 Objective is to be complete with this 6
summer and then based on the insights, the learnings out 7
of that, that would complement what we've done to date, 8
those will go back into our processes to begin to judge 9
point to preclude something like this from happening to 10 us again.
11 MR. KOWALESKI: Jeremy is participating 12 on a committee that's looking at contractor oversight 13 law and helping mold the document that was just 14 released, that's going to go through the entire industry 15 for these limitation improvements to contract oversight.
16 So we will have both our Entergy-specific analysis as 17 well as the industry analysis to form future actions.
18 And the last item. When we did that 19 initial bit, what we identified as the most single 20 impact we've had [coughing] in the past. If we do a 21 good job of identifying the high consequence tasks or 22 risks in our existing project, if we do a good job of 23 identifying what are acceptable mitigating actions to 24 take, what we can improve on is how we validate or 25 provide oversight of the completion of those mitigating Page 195 1
actions.
2 Elevating that oversight to a management 3
level and providing more rigor in the documentation 4
validation process. And that's the action that we're 5
going to proceed with implementing through the fleet 6
that we think will have the biggest impact to improve 7
our contract oversight to reduce risk.
8 MR. BROWNING: So if there's no 9
additional questions, then I do have a few closing 10 comments that I would like to make and -- one of the 11 fears that I had entering this conference was what I 12 stated in my opening comments. In my mind there's a 13 very distinct difference between us trying to establish 14 a reasonable estimate of the risk of core damage as a 15 result of this event. Clearly, we put the plant and the 16 operators in a challenging configuration that we should 17 have never done. That resulted in some level of 18 increased risk and our job is to achieve an accurate 19 assessment of that.
20 And the distinction between that and what 21 Joe talked about, the actual consequences and the 22 unacceptable consequences that occurred that day, 23 they're real and they're personal to me.
24 I know where I was Easter Sunday at 7:30.
25 And those consequences are real. And there's a Page 196 1
commitment to what Joe is talking about and what I'm 2
talking about, too.
3 Again, the objective of this conference 4
is one in part to make sure you understand that we 5
recognize the significance, and I know from dialoging 6
and based on the feedback that I -- whether it's body 7
language or eyes, I'm not underplaying the significance 8
of the consequence.
9 I'm not underplaying the challenge that 10 we unnecessarily put our operators on -- the unnecessary 11 challenge that we put on our safety-related equipment 12 and that can never happen again, and make a distinction 13 between what was the actual best assessment of the risk 14 of core damage that was present.
15 There's a very clear distinction in my 16 mind that there's two different things. And our 17 objective was to present to you, and I know it's 18 additional information, information we haven't provided 19 to you. It's a methodology that we created that needs 20 challenge to make sure we get to that accurate 21 assessment of risk, but it is our best attempt to take 22 the facts that we have, provide you with that 23 information and our methodology and we're open to 24 receive your challenge and feedback on that methodology.
25 And I do appreciate the opportunity to be
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able to share with you today.
2 MR. WERNER: This is Greg Werner of the 3
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We're going to take a 4
break. The NRC is going to leave the room and we are 5
going to get on a conference with our counterparts at 6
headquarters and other areas and caucus. And then we're 7
going to see if we have any additional questions or 8
information that we need to ask before we complete the 9
conference.
10 So we're going to go to the room next 11 door. Entergy folks, if you guys want to caucus in this 12 room next door, it's also available for y'all if you 13 want to have some internal discussions outside the 14 meeting room.
15 MR. DAPAS: This is Marc Dapas. For 16 those folks on the phone, members of the public that 17 have patiently been waiting for the opportunity to ask 18 questions, I'll just outline it is our intent to 19 expeditiously reach a determination whether we have any 20 additional questions here. And then I'll be closing the 21 regulatory conference here formally and then open it up 22 for any questions to members of public.
23 So we'll do our best to reach closure 24 here on any additional questions that we have in 25 relatively short order, seeing as we've been at this for Page 198 1
five hours.
2 MR. WERNER: We're estimating about 10-15 3
minutes probably.
4 MR. DAPAS: I was reluctant to provide an 5
estimate, but since you -- my goal would be 10-15 6
minutes.
7 (Break taken from 5:55 p.m. to 8
6:25 p m.)
9 MR. KENNEDY: Let's see, the length of 10 time we were out doesn't reflect the quality of the 11 discussion so, but, I think what does reflect the 12 quality of the discussion is a few questions that we 13 actually have. So we do have two follow-up -- I think 14 it's two follow-up questions.
15 So, we'll go through those. In addition, 16 we have a number of information requests. What I would 17 propose is that Mike Bloodgood get together with 18 Stephanie and go through those in detail. We think that 19 what we ask for you all will not have to develop, so we 20 think that you should be able to provide us that 21 information sooner rather than later.
22 MR. KOWALESKI: Is May 9th -- a week from 23 24 MR. KENNEDY: May 9th is, I think --
25 MR. KOWALESKI: -- close of business next Page 199 1
Friday, next Friday. I think that'd be good for 2
anything that we've talked about so far.
3 MR. KENNEDY: And then if something comes 4
up between now and then, just let Greg know and he'll 5
touch base with the folks that requested the information 6
and we'll work through that. Appreciate you, Stephanie 7
and Mike, for documenting those and getting together and 8
make sure we have all the -- I also asked the risk 9
analysts to get together, too, since we want to make 10 sure that we've captured the specific requests.
11 MR. WERNER: I think Jeff and Mike 12 Bloodgood and Stephanie will get together.
13 MR. KENNEDY: We had just a couple of 14 questions and Jeff mitt man has the first one regarding 15 the flooding aspect of the event.
16 MR. MITMAN: This is Jeff Mitman. With 17 the Stator drop, a fire water header was severed and it 18 took a length of time to get the fire water system shut 19 down. And in that length of time it put a certain 20 amount -- quite a bit of water under the basement of the 21 turbine building and some of that migrated over into the 22 aux building. And some of that water ended up in decay 23 heat removal pump fault, and we were wondering if, and 24 if so, how you factored that into any -- into your risk 25 analysis or your review of the risk analysis, and then Page 200 1
any of the consequences it might have had on -- or 2
impact on that risk analysis?
3 MR. SULLINS: I'm not familiar with risk 4
analysis details, I'm sorry.
5 MR. HARRIS: I'm talking with Jeff right 6
now.
7 MR. DAPAS: I will add one comment. We 8
are, of course, looking at that separately in the 9
context of flooding vulnerabilities, or the context 10 there that they have an impact on this event and 11 response associated with this event.
12 MR. HARRIS: Okay. I talked to Jason.
13 The analysis associated with the flooding of the default 14 was done as part of a separate analysis versus flooding 15 events. He did not include any information from the 16 impact of that flood in the analysis he performed as 17 part of the Stator drop that we talked about today.
18 MR. MITMAN: Okay.
19 MR. KENNEDY: Then if you could hand the 20 remote mic to --
21 MR. KOWALESKI: When we provide the 22 information we talked about providing we should go ahead 23 and provide an assessment of potential impact.
24 MR. TINDELL: This is Brian Tindell, the 25 Senior Resident Inspector of Arkansas Nuclear One. How
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did you account for the EALs in your recovery action 2
credit for both Unit 1 and Unit 2?
3 MR. WERNER: And I think that in 4
particular, he was interested in how the personnel 5
availability, if you went beyond alert would be 6
impacted?
7 MR. KENNEDY: So you declare site area 8
emergency or a general emergency, in some of these 9
scenarios and you have accountability to deal with, how 10 did you factor that into...
11 MR. BROWNING: That's a good question.
12 We did consider the availability of resources, and you 13 would have to reach the point beyond set of core damage 14 before you would escalate from the alert so we, in 15 looking at that, we would stay in an alert class for the 16 success paths that were presented today which would keep 17 the resources described.
18 MR. WERNER: So essentially you would 19 have to do a core uncovery? Is that what you said?
20 MR. BROWNING: Yes.
21 MR. DALE JAMES: Yeah, that is correct.
22 Our review looked like it would, before you would be 23 escalating, you would be have to have imminent core 24 recovery.
25 MR. WERNER: Did that answer your Page 202 1
question?
2 MR. LOVELESS: I thought part of the 3
question was that there was that there was a -- if 4
Unit 2 was going towards a site area emergency and 5
station blackout, how would that impact overall safety 6
services?
7 MR. KOWALESKI: Just a clarification.
8 Are you asking if we need to consider both units into a 9
single significance assessment?
10 MR. LOVELESS: I was trying to clarify 11 Brian's question.
12 MR. KENNEDY: Are there scenarios where, 13 you know, in the risk evaluation where personnel 14 availability would be affected because one of the units 15 had declared, you know, site area emergency or general 16 emergency where accountability came into play?
17 MR. SULLINS: This is Gary Sullins. As 18 described previously, we looked at it from the 19 prospective of Unit 1, the Unit 1 analysis, he 20 considered -- recall that we're dealing with 21 unavailability of electrical distribution equipment 22 within Unit 1. Our start up transformers remained 23 available, so we did not extrapolate to consider a 24 degraded power for Unit 2 or that separate initiating 25 event for blackout.
Page 203 1
MR. WERNER: I think that concludes 2
questions for the caucus. Mark, did you want to make 3
any additional closing remarks?
4 MR. DAPAS: Yes I do. Thanks. Couple 5
thoughts. One, I really do appreciate the perseverance, 6
patience, and discipline you've exercised here in 7
providing us your perspective in the stator drop events.
8 We've been at it for over five and a half hours here.
9 We've had extensive discussions and a lot of detailed 10 questions, but very important that we reach a full 11 understanding of your perspective. I think as described 12 in one of slides and I think I mentioned this when I 13 opened, the goal is a realistic estimate of risk 14 utilizing the best available information. Because the 15 consequences of our risk determination are significant 16 here.
17 We're looking at a preliminary red 18 finding, that constitutes high safety significance, 19 that's for Unit 1. Now for Unit 2, a preliminary risk 20 assessment there was a yellow finding which is 21 substantial risk significance.
22 And, you know, obviously, dependent on 23 the finalization of those risk significance 24 determinations depends on where you are in the reactor 25 oversight process action matrix here and what's the Page 204 1
degree of regulatory oversight, and when you have a red 2
finding and supplemental inspection 95003 and 3
independent safety factors, so clearly there's a 4
significant resource expenditure by the agency in 5
providing increased oversight here. And a number of 6
actions that you would end up taking should you find 7
yourself in that particular column of the action.
8 My point in all that is, it's very 9
important that we do all we can as part of our due 10 diligence and independent assessment to arrive at the 11 most realistic assessment of risk significance, and I'll 12 come back to that in a minute.
13 I really appreciate the perspective 14 provided by Mr. Sullins and Mr. Hathcoat, the Assistant 15 Operations Managers for Unit 1 and Unit 2, respectively.
16 You were in the control room and I think it was 17 particularly valuable for us to hear your perspective 18 there regarding what you were facing, and as we 19 underscored, very important that you look at it in the 20 context of what the operators understood to be the plant 21 condition at the time and what equipment was available 22 and what decisions you would have made because it is 23 challenging when you're looking at it over a year after 24 the fact with information and knowledge we have now and 25 try and determine, okay, you're in a station blackout
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event and you're dealing with an adverse environment 2
here and there's the stress factors associated with 3
that.
4 And you know, as part of that realistic 5
assessment of risk, with available information 6
adequately considering those factors that come into play 7
when you find yourself in that particular situation. I 8
was very appreciative of the comment you made, 9
Mr. Browning and yourself, Mr. Kowaleski, regarding the 10 consequences of the event here, in recognizing that it 11 was the actual consequences were unacceptable here given 12 the fatality and the injuries that occurred, not 13 withstanding the focus of this conference certainly is 14 the risk significance. And I do appreciate the comments 15 that you shared with us and the actions you're taking 16 regarding oversight of contractors to insure going 17 forward that the behaviors don't translate into a 18 problem where you actually are dealing with a 19 significant issue from reactor safety context.
20 But let me come back to, for just a 21 minute, this realistic estimate of risk utilizing the 22 best available information. You heard us with our 23 questions. I think one of things we struggle with here 24 is there is no definitive standard for calculating 25 recovery actions for shut down conditions.
Page 206 1
You, I think, did provide us clearly with 2
your perspective regarding methodologies you used and 3
why those were appropriate. And you're correct. We did 4
not give credit for recovery of the 4160-volt bus or 5
inventory control. We're going to go back and look at 6
what you proposed and determine based on our assessment 7
whether that's reasonable here.
8 I do appreciate the significant time 9
margin you've indicated exists here and that provides 10 some additional, if you will, space to consider 11 uncertainty there. And I do appreciate the perspective 12 regarding the comparison of the normal outage 13 configuration and what's required by the tech specs, 14 comparing that with the plant condition after the event.
15 I think we struggle, too, with we have 16 definitive guidance when we talk about recovery actions 17 whether they're proceduralized and when there's training 18 here. And when you're talking about Unit 1 here and the 19 different success strategies, you know, the three 20 success paths here that you've presented to us, those 21 weren't proceduralized and trained on in the same 22 context of what our guidance would provide of how we 23 should treat the manual actions, etc., so we'll need to 24 look at that and determine whether what have you have 25 provided us appears reasonable.
Page 207 1
So, next step here, I think we have a 2
clear understanding by virtue of what you presented to 3
us, the basis for your assumptions and how you 4
approached in determining the risk significance. The 5
next step for us is to consider that fully and then 6
we'll communicate the final risk significance to you via 7
a separate correspondence here. I'll offer, if we do 8
have any questions as we're going through that process 9
we won't hesitate to reach out because it's important 10 that we don't have a gap in information here.
11 So with that, I will close and again 12 thank you for the time and the manner in which you 13 answered our very detailed questions. With that, I'll 14 close the formal portion of the Regulatory Conference 15 and Greg can open it up to entertain any questions from 16 those members of the public that might still be on the 17 phone may have.
18 Thanks.
19 MR. WERNER: Thank you, Mark.
20 Operator, can you go ahead and begin to 21 cue up questions for those on the phone?
22 OPERATOR SYLVIA: Thank you, we would now 23 like to open the lines for any questions. If anyone 24 does have a question, please hit star-one and record 25 your name when prompted. Again, it's star-one to ask a Page 208 1
question. One moment to see if we have questions.
2 MR. WERNER: I'll just provide a quick 3
briefing again, we will alternate between members of the 4
public attending this meeting here in the room, as well 5
as those on the bridge. For both of those in the room 6
and on the phone bridge, please introduce yourself, 7
state your affiliation, and then ask your question or 8
make a comment.
9 Questions and comments be limited to 10 three minutes at a time. So we'll start with a member 11 here in the room. Are there any members of the public 12 that would like to ask a question. If you'll raise your 13 hand, I'll come to you with the mic. Anybody?
14 All right. We have no questions here in 15 the room. Operator, do you have any questions from 16 members on the phone bridge?
17 OPERATOR SYLVIA: I am showing no 18 questions.
19 MR. WERNER: I understand no questions.
20 We'll just second it one more time. This will be the 21 last chance. Sure no questions? No questions?
22 Well, that concludes our conference.
23 Again, thank you for your attendance. And as a 24 reminder, members of the public please fill out a public 25 meeting feedback form. There's some on the table over
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here, up against the wall.
2 And for members of the public on the 3
phone, if you'll go to the public meeting website and 4
look at our announcement, I think there will be a public 5
meeting form that will be automatically populated, I 6
think at midnight tonight, so if you'll go and get that 7
form tomorrow and fill it out and send it to us, we 8
appreciate it.
9 Thank you very much.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Page 210 1
THE STATE OF TEXAS )
COUNTY OF TARRANT )
2 3
This is to certify that I, KATHLEEN MCCURRY, a 4
Certified Shorthand Reporter, reported in shorthand the 5
proceedings at the Nuclear Regulatory Conference meeting 6
on May 1, 2014 at 1:00 p.m., and that the foregoing 209 7
pages contain a full, true and correct transcript to the 8
best of my ability of said proceedings.
9 Given under my hand and seal of office on this the 10
_____ day of ______________, 2014.
11 12 13 Kathleen McCurry, Texas CSR 8567 Expiration Date: 12/31/2015 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
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a1 39:17 41:1 44:25 48:8 63:3 75:17 158:22 167:1 a1a3 45:10 a2 39:17 48:8 63:4 63:6 64:6,7 a201s 64:24 a3 41:1 44:25 61:21 62:2 104:22,23 105:1 106:4 111:2 158:22 167:1 a310410 47:5 a4 61:22 62:2 63:6 66:4 111:23 ability 24:14 95:24 105:20 119:20 153:4,6 171:14 210:8 able 6:24 44:11,18 47:7 51:11 52:2 59:21 66:11 68:4 68:20 71:1,19,22 71:23 77:12 80:25 89:9 90:6 112:24 114:9 120:7 188:16 192:3 197:1 198:20 abnormal 156:10 absolutely 41:19 44:2 46:6 81:2 104:7 167:16 171:2 172:6 absorb 77:15 abut 159:6 ac 21:11 27:3 28:18 38:21,24 42:15 61:13 65:5 65:8 89:5,10 125:22 153:1 158:15,18,19 159:8 160:15 163:5 164:11,25 167:6 168:7 169:17 170:7 171:13 173:7,15 173:17,18,22,25 174:14 186:23 187:12,23 acceptable 194:23 access 38:10 69:23 70:1,11,20,24 71:22,23 99:8,16 99:21 100:22 119:1 accessed 42:13 accessibility 45:17 accessible 69:21 accessing 69:3 108:6 accident 70:23 accomplish 91:8 accorded 16:13 account 82:25 83:2 99:16 130:18 140:18 170:22 173:19,24 201:1 accountability 201:9 202:16 accountable 183:13 accounted 104:16 108:3 170:20,25 accounts 107:25 accuracy 13:12 accurate 15:25 18:2,8 195:18 196:20 accurately 170:15 acd 81:21 achieve 18:1 134:3 195:18 acknowledge 16:17 113:11 131:25 acknowledged 101:3 acknowledging 115:11 acting 2:2,6 8:4 action 22:15 43:25 87:14 102:7 115:18 118:12,13 121:12,14 130:2 130:22,22,23 138:14 142:11,12 143:3,4 162:24 164:6 173:13,16 174:23 175:1,3,7 182:12 193:4 195:4 201:1 203:25 204:7 actions 13:15 14:22 15:6 16:17 17:5,7 18:19 19:1,4 20:6,21 21:4,5,23 22:10 23:18 71:1 99:4 99:9 100:6 107:22 132:23 137:5,19,21 138:1 147:10,10 151:17 167:13 177:4,9,17 181:14 182:3,12 184:4,6,12,13 188:10 189:1,11 189:11 190:14 192:15,19 194:17 194:23 195:1 204:6 205:15,25 206:16,23 activated 32:15 active 22:6 139:25 activities 14:19 15:4 20:24 23:21 24:8 29:20,21 57:5 79:25 80:2 81:13 84:15,16 84:18,23 100:9 133:19 166:4 177:13,20 181:12 182:2 190:22,24 191:13,17,18 activity 30:8 89:1 97:17 124:6 133:16 178:6 192:9 actual 23:4,8 30:10,19 32:10 34:19 37:11,25 42:14 48:23 49:2 51:18 53:12 58:14,17 60:18 71:16 82:2,7 91:12 100:23 113:6 123:23 126:16 137:10 152:13 168:11 188:2 195:21 196:13 205:11 actuality 127:15 152:9 actuated 156:2 157:7 adapted 147:16 add 23:3 66:2 121:10 147:7,8 149:20 183:10 188:20 200:7 added 175:2 191:19 addition 12:2 74:7 113:13 185:17 188:18 198:15 additional 7:10,16 7:17 13:18 17:25 19:21 20:18 36:21 49:10 50:4 51:25 53:24 58:3 58:4 74:21 77:5 99:24,25 102:7 108:21 138:1 151:16 155:18 162:6 172:15 174:2 175:23 177:16,17,25 185:20 192:19 195:9 196:18 197:7,20,24 203:3 206:10 additionally 155:16 address 16:22 17:18 37:4 70:8 78:2 102:5 105:11 155:16 162:1 181:6 183:5 189:10 addressed 17:9 156:5 addresses 185:1,5 addressing 117:20 170:6 adds 147:14 adequacy 183:15 adequate 16:25 117:25 165:7,19 adequately 11:21 17:9 108:24 117:20 205:6 adjourn 7:19 adjust 134:2 adjusted 170:10 174:13 175:21,22 adjusting 134:1 adjustments 173:19 administrative 6:2 administrator 2:5 7:11 8:2 15:16 adverse 155:15 205:1 advised 15:12 advisor 159:12 affect 99:4 101:22 102:3 143:20 affiliation 208:7 afforded 15:23 60:23 afternoon 5:2,11 23:2,11 40:24 45:6 159:15 agency 14:11 185:25 204:4 agenda 6:12,13,15 7:7 19:13,25 ago 135:9 146:11 agree 132:2 146:5 147:3,4 170:9 ahead 6:20 36:15 50:2 104:24 140:11 165:14 200:22 207:20 air 92:13,14
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May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 212 105:17 ait 69:5 159:6 160:9 alarms 101:14,19 101:24 105:8 alert 27:19 201:5 201:14,15 align 32:21 86:15 142:12 alignment 94:5 allegation 2:21,24 alleging 12:15 allow 13:2,4 19:20 59:22 154:11 190:13 allowed 35:21 57:7 68:15 69:7 79:8 109:17 allowing 70:11 alluded 153:16 alpha 69:15 92:9 156:3 165:15 185:19 193:16 194:1 alphas 193:11 alternate 27:3 29:12 38:24 42:15 49:22 57:16,25 63:22 65:5 68:16 74:2 81:21 101:6 109:13 117:22 125:22 134:12 137:1 140:14 153:1 158:14,17 158:19 159:8 160:15 163:5 164:11,25 167:6 168:7 169:17 171:13 173:7,15 173:17,18,22,25 174:14 187:12,23 208:3 alternative 29:7 37:2,15 151:9 alternatives 86:11 altogether 61:3 amount 26:22 137:17 155:7 199:20 amp 88:8 ample 132:11 134:2 amps 89:14 anal 121:3 analysis 18:20,25 21:1 26:13 30:11 36:16 94:16 104:24,25 105:12 108:22 112:24 113:1 114:5,10 114:24 115:10 116:20 117:2 118:1 121:4,5,7 123:15 124:13 125:2 126:3,5 134:10 136:4,6 136:10 139:5 144:16,20 145:4 157:10,11,12 170:25 174:16,21 175:12,16,21 185:16 189:9 193:12 194:16,17 199:25,25 200:2 200:4,13,14,16 202:19 analyst 2:8,10 8:10 8:12 112:19 129:16 176:11,16 analysts 122:5 185:15 188:24 199:9 analyzed 86:7 anded 125:20 announcement 6:5 209:4 annunciators 105:8 ano 3:2,5,6,9,14 8:21,23 12:2 14:20 23:12 35:18 104:17 112:16,19 113:24 115:4 117:17 145:24 146:7 153:11 171:12 173:11 178:15 185:16 answer 5:6 9:23 34:10 46:17 56:21 76:19 77:12 97:2 102:24 104:11,18 112:24 134:10 142:17 152:19 157:15 159:10 174:18 187:11 201:25 answered 77:9 79:17 102:10 108:24 207:13 answering 77:5 79:13 answers 7:13 anticipated 178:16 anticipating 187:5 antonio 176:18 anybody 208:13 anymore 35:1 anyway 39:10 ao1 40:23 aom 152:15 apart 88:25 apparent 11:17 14:3 17:10 44:16 112:1 appearances 4:4 appears 206:25 appendix 5:22 11:17 applicability 116:14 applicable 178:24 application 13:10 124:18 135:23 137:8 144:10,10 178:10,25 179:17 179:25 180:5,14 192:13 applications 54:15 148:3 179:6,18 180:10,25 applied 13:17 21:3 24:22 54:14,15 118:7 125:6 133:6 134:4 135:4 145:19 149:3,10,14 173:22 178:4 applies 35:8 181:13 188:22 apply 22:13 24:24 119:8 121:9 132:21 133:3,4 133:20 135:5,6 142:21 143:9 applying 122:9 182:5 appreciate 7:4 13:8 17:24 18:23 82:5,13 97:4,13 108:24 196:25 199:6 203:5 204:13 205:14 206:8,11 209:8 appreciative 205:8 approach 17:8 35:4 75:18 80:25 117:24,25 132:5 132:8 148:24 169:22,23 170:16 approached 169:20,23 186:8 207:4 approaches 117:22 134:14,17 appropriate 13:6 14:22 19:4,19 21:2 31:24 85:19 142:18 148:16 152:8 162:13 169:9 172:20 181:5 188:22 206:3 appropriately 149:3 170:21 183:14 approval 35:14 177:25 approvals 53:6 approve 34:11 approved 6:1 22:10 approximately 10:8 27:24 34:7 48:2 64:10 93:22 93:24 95:5 144:22 145:4,9 april 10:20 arching 26:7 area 6:9 47:5 48:4 48:5 58:10 60:25 62:23 69:6 70:3 70:5,6,11,13,20 70:24 71:8,11,24 77:25 80:5 81:18 81:21 88:22 169:15 201:7 202:4,15 areas 19:14 20:8 21:3 29:18 60:22 69:3 197:6 arena 193:22 arent 20:23 71:5 78:23 argument 143:6 arkansas 2:18 5:13 5:19 8:17 9:2,4 17:23 46:1 47:18 59:20 184:5 200:25 arose 144:14 arrive 133:8 204:10 arrived 133:6 149:11 arriving 13:6 articulating 170:13 asked 77:7,17 99:18 104:21 111:8 129:16,18 129:19 134:7,7 140:15 146:19 159:23 166:17 167:18 176:25 199:8 asking 36:23 85:14 107:4 129:13
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 213 152:5 176:22 202:8 aspect 90:12 109:11 120:5 170:24 193:23 199:15 aspects 182:19 184:19 assembled 115:14 122:8 assemblies 178:2 assembly 5:25 6:9 10:3,23 11:21 12:1,3 177:22 178:9,14,17 183:2,8 asses 159:22 assess 10:21 13:24 41:3 44:11 65:19 71:19 102:8 107:22 110:12 117:25 126:22 158:21 162:7 180:23 182:19 192:2 assessed 11:7 14:7 42:14 71:9 assessing 22:12 32:16 38:8 78:18 103:7 107:11 146:9 assessment 8:7,10 16:5 18:2 24:25 27:18 28:5 47:23 76:25 85:16,19 86:2 113:16 118:4 132:10 151:15 173:3 186:1 187:18 192:9 195:19 196:13,21 200:23 202:9 203:20 204:10,11 205:5 206:6 assessments 26:11 68:15 70:5 185:24 191:15 192:1,6 assign 123:8 assist 13:5 118:6 assistant 3:5,6 204:14 associated 5:21,24 10:16 15:6 24:9 49:17 53:7 61:24 65:9,20 70:12 89:17 101:7,8 105:14 114:14 119:24 120:17 122:16,24 125:12 125:18,22 126:9 126:13 146:12 147:21 161:22 166:25 173:18 174:6 177:5,10 177:21 178:1,18 179:8,15 180:4 181:12 182:13 187:14 189:12 190:18 191:8 193:20 200:11,13 205:2 assume 120:21 135:20,21 137:13 145:11 147:21 167:22 180:18 assumed 67:17 77:1 86:20 137:1 141:3 assumes 137:10 assuming 54:13 55:25 59:8 112:18 118:12 134:22 137:17 140:23 assumption 37:5 78:22 86:3 87:4 114:11 120:24 136:14 147:19 assumptions 13:3 15:21 16:12 46:10 68:19 85:12 114:15,16 207:3 assurance 3:10,12 3:14 assure 107:2 108:23 183:15 assuring 192:7 attachments 171:6 attempt 196:21 attendance 2:1 3:1 9:17 208:23 attending 208:4 attention 73:13 augmented 10:20 10:24 13:14 16:2 18:24 160:12 authorization 54:8 authorize 54:3 automatically 106:16 154:5,11 154:16 157:23,25 163:2 209:5 aux 62:10 74:11 88:20 153:21 157:1 199:22 auxiliary 83:9 availabilities 76:5 availability 26:25 46:2,4 58:24 67:12 153:1,3,8 163:6 171:13 173:22 189:4 201:5,12 202:14 available 6:17 7:1 7:2 9:22 13:19 20:12,13,16,17 20:23 21:1,15 22:3 23:6 25:24 27:6,14,19,23 28:1,12 31:15 33:18,22,23 34:3 36:6 37:4 38:9 41:5,10 44:20 51:8 53:8,13 55:1 57:8,10,14 86:4 87:1 91:6 92:13,14 94:25 97:9,12,20 103:25 104:6 109:5,12,13 113:5,20 114:6 114:18 115:8,15 116:11,12 118:16 118:22 121:12 124:23 132:25 134:10 137:3 141:14 150:10 154:12 158:3,14 158:16 159:1,3,8 159:16 160:7 161:3 162:17,19 162:21 163:3,7 163:16,17 164:6 165:8 167:5,13 167:15 171:16 173:9 174:3 187:21 189:2 197:12 202:23 203:14 204:21 205:5,22 aware 9:18 68:14 awhile 71:23 149:18 B
b 5:22 41:20 92:1 101:21,22 102:15 105:6 106:2,3 108:15 b21 88:23 89:4,11 b51 88:19,22 89:4 89:8,23 90:2 b5b 94:8 141:2 148:3 babcock 12:22 back 7:17 25:23 34:17 35:16 40:9 40:16,25 41:1 42:8 44:1,4,5,22 45:5,9 48:20 50:13 53:1 56:19 57:1,20 61:10,10 62:18 64:11 65:5 65:13 66:10 67:10,24 69:24 69:25 71:19,22 71:23 72:23 73:9 74:9,10 75:12,13 83:6 89:8 97:25 98:2 109:24 112:10,22 114:8 114:8 121:22 127:3 142:22,22 143:19,25 148:12 151:15,22 152:19 160:5,23 165:21 166:13 168:4,6 178:5 180:6 185:18 192:11 193:11 194:2,8 204:12 205:20 206:5 backdrop 20:1 background 14:19 backup 97:17 bamford 2:20 barrier 183:10 186:25 base 105:24 148:8 199:5 based 30:10 34:19 78:24 79:3 85:18 86:24 99:19 115:1,25 119:23 121:6,18 126:23 136:13,19 152:12 158:19 162:14 183:4 194:6 196:6 206:6 baseline 38:16 basement 199:20 basic 46:21 basically 38:20 56:16 58:5 63:21 72:21 73:25 74:12,16 93:8 135:22 144:17,20 154:10 157:20 159:2,23 160:2 179:1 182:18 basis 13:17 16:4 18:25 25:10 28:15 34:3 46:10 46:13 60:20 80:3 85:22 86:23 122:17 131:8 144:11 176:23 184:12 207:3
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 214 bathrooms 109:25 batteries 92:22 battery 89:8,17 92:22 93:5 101:21,22 102:1 102:12,15 103:3 106:3 165:13 bay 10:6,10 45:2 48:6 62:23 63:1 168:24 behaviors 205:17 belabor 85:10 belief 189:17 beliefs 14:12 believable 151:10 believe 18:1 19:2 70:8 103:5 106:9 114:16,22 142:20 142:23 143:15,17 146:8,11 158:21 159:6,7 183:24 believed 41:2 159:15 160:7 best 113:20 115:11 131:19 132:19,25 133:4 135:7 147:4 148:20 189:17 196:13,21 197:23 203:14 205:22 210:8 better 46:18 131:20 144:25 168:21 beyond 33:13 102:6 131:12 147:24 201:5,13 big 106:4 158:24 164:17 biggest 143:5 195:6 bill 193:14,14 bit 20:20 21:8 25:9 26:12 36:2,15 41:16 49:9,14 50:2 51:14 52:7 53:10 58:12,21 71:15 77:16 82:24 83:17 96:8 115:24 120:12 123:7,22 126:12 127:12 140:6 144:25 147:24 151:25 152:2,23 153:2,10 154:13 157:18 159:5 162:5 163:11 168:6 170:5 174:15 177:8 194:19 199:20 blacked 111:2 172:21 blackout 32:16 36:17 42:2 43:17 43:22,24 45:8,12 45:22 58:4 71:4 72:3 81:10,11,20 81:24 82:4,16,19 86:20 87:5,7 92:20 98:19 100:7,9,15,24 102:4,14,15,21 103:7,17 110:16 159:21 162:11 163:4 164:24 165:2,3,10,12 166:7,18 168:19 169:16,21 170:1 170:17 202:5,25 204:25 blind 106:17 blindly 106:18 block 27:7 55:8 57:11 blocks 144:21 bloodgood 2:14 198:17 199:12 board 29:1,24 129:17 191:25 193:25 body 196:6 boil 25:4,21 26:9 94:24 98:16,25 99:3 boiling 87:17 98:14,17,20,24 99:7 137:19 boiloff 96:14 book 50:13 borated 86:3,13,15 89:11,12 90:7 93:16,19,25 94:23 96:11 139:8 boron 95:5,8,8,9 bothering 130:16 bottom 40:9 125:14 146:10 168:8 bought 169:17 bound 100:6 123:3 123:3 170:24 175:18,19 bounding 25:21 144:18 145:5 box 40:3,8 boxes 48:7 145:10 branch 2:2 5:12 7:23 114:13 119:16 120:18 123:16 125:13,17 bravo 11:17 102:22 185:19 186:23 193:16 194:1 bravos 193:11 break 19:13,17,19 20:19 50:13 109:20,21 110:2 128:11 149:15,17 151:12,14,14,20 151:23 197:4 198:7 breaker 33:24 35:2 35:5 36:14 42:16 44:13 47:2,15,23 48:2,14,19 53:16 57:12 58:2,2,19 58:20,21 59:8,19 59:19,21,24 60:12 66:25 72:14,16 74:2,5 83:7,8,12 88:22 89:18 90:6 106:18 109:16 125:19 127:25 134:2 137:18 154:11,22,23 155:3,7 175:11 186:24 breakers 42:13,16 42:19,20 44:14 64:15 72:18 74:3 99:15,17,24 127:24 137:5 155:9 159:25 166:21 167:9 174:23,24 175:8 175:10,12 breaking 19:24 brian 2:18 45:25 200:24 brians 202:11 bridge 6:24 9:17 39:12 160:9 176:16 208:5,6 208:16 brief 20:3 177:7 briefing 208:3 briefings 34:1 briefly 34:10 113:23 177:4,19 bring 49:22 143:25 161:5 bringing 162:20 brings 89:7 broad 181:8 185:3 broadened 18:21 broadly 180:22 185:1 broken 141:6 brought 47:16,17 75:19 browder 2:23 browning 3:2 8:16 8:16 17:16,22,23 22:20,23 25:25 26:4 28:11 30:3 30:19 31:6,16,20 32:1,5 34:17 35:16,17 37:19 43:11 50:10 51:3 54:11,11 55:6,10 56:2 59:25 60:15 60:20 62:18 68:6 68:23 75:6 77:9 77:13 78:15 79:19 90:13,19 95:15 96:24 100:11,23 101:10 102:9 106:25 108:4 141:21 143:23 151:13,24 151:25 156:6 169:13 171:2 172:17 184:1,21 188:10 195:8 201:11,20 205:9 bryan 3:12 building 6:6,9 47:4 61:2,3 62:10,10 87:22 88:10,21 92:10,11 93:4 99:8 100:20 123:24 171:4 178:15,19 199:21 199:22 built 24:17 61:17 bullet 96:8 160:19 bullets 83:17 bundle 181:24 bus 10:13,16 24:12 34:22 35:5 37:14 37:16 38:8 40:12 40:16,17 41:12 41:13,15 42:14 42:15,17,23 43:1 44:2 46:14 59:9 59:11 60:6 61:8 63:18 65:8,9 71:15 88:19 89:5 90:16 92:15 101:4,6 104:22 104:23 105:1,5 106:17,23 107:3 107:7,14 110:12 111:2 137:22,25 153:2,4,5,5 154:2,5,6,15,23 155:6,9 160:14 162:3 166:20
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 215 167:12,25 168:8 169:2,4,6,7 206:4 buses 20:12 22:1 23:6 29:17 34:14 39:5 44:7 47:6 53:17 57:7 58:7 58:7 61:6 62:11 62:12,13 80:18 82:18 90:14 102:10 108:1 137:6 139:1 144:7 157:22 162:20 164:2 165:23 169:25 170:3,7 171:5,14 172:12 business 21:21 97:22 198:25 businesses 24:11 busted 168:14,23 bwst 86:16 93:22 94:9,11,23 96:3 96:4,7,11,24 140:14,16,17 bypass 62:16 155:17 bypassing 62:5 C
c 5:1 74:2 cabinet 10:18 cable 45:2 47:1,11 48:3 49:10,11,14 49:16,17,18,22 50:5,10,17,20 51:7,9,11,13 55:18,18 58:6,13 58:18,24 59:2,2 59:3,4 60:11,23 63:5,9 64:6,6,10 64:24 65:1 66:12 66:16,18 67:12 68:15 69:20 70:1 72:7,14,21,23 73:7,8 79:25 80:17,23 82:20 83:11 88:18,18 89:20,22,24 90:5 92:1 101:6 159:17 cables 31:8 48:18 49:1,13 63:2 64:16 80:4 90:3 99:15 100:14 108:5 168:7,8 calculate 25:20 126:8 135:18 147:11 calculated 135:22 146:2 174:9 175:17 calculating 132:23 205:24 calculation 11:23 11:24 115:22 178:7 calculations 25:18 140:23 176:24 178:10 179:16 180:18 181:22 190:18 calculator 115:17 116:14,15,16,19 117:19 118:5 119:6,8 122:12 124:18,19 125:3 125:15 126:4 128:15,16 137:7 147:1,20 149:1 calculators 128:11 call 5:8 39:17 41:9 87:13 98:23 112:22 131:11 148:3 156:7,25 165:20 166:13 182:17 called 28:6 141:10 157:3 calling 57:2 59:13 campbell 2:21 canal 25:3 93:15 97:8 115:3 cant 59:10 97:24 160:10 174:18 190:13 192:8 capabilities 39:3 capability 22:24 86:21 92:9,10 93:6 94:8,11 96:16 110:21 160:8 163:14,21 174:5 capable 31:1 41:13 42:24 47:3 49:24 51:1 52:19 58:25 157:20 158:1 163:24 164:13 capacities 95:20 capacitor 187:14 capacity 95:16,22 97:8 164:9 capture 126:3 184:18 captured 199:10 captures 184:21 care 84:25 careful 37:8 43:5 carlo 175:25 carried 183:14 cascades 39:20 case 9:13 13:11 52:15 74:9 79:5 96:14 105:24,25 106:1 121:8 137:1 142:23 162:19 168:19 174:8 cases 21:2 78:8 cast 183:22 184:15 184:17 categories 181:8 caucus 7:15 197:6 197:11 203:2 causal 18:20 186:13,17 cause 14:21,25 18:21 21:5 37:12 37:13 101:14,19 133:18 142:8,9 155:8 174:25 177:11,15,20 182:25 183:8,16 184:3,10,11 185:10 186:7 189:9 192:20 193:7,8,12 causebased 116:24 119:5 caused 10:10 36:19 61:24 101:17 142:14 169:7 172:12 causes 186:5 causing 10:3 caution 169:9 170:6 cautions 169:13 cautious 167:24 cavity 93:15,16,19 96:4 ccdp 146:16 174:16,22 cdf 146:15,16 ce 156:18 center 72:17 88:20 centers 27:13 88:12,24 central 109:24,24 certain 24:24 84:12 199:19 certainly 15:17 70:12 96:10 118:14 122:11,14 122:15 143:19 164:5 171:7 205:13 certificate 4:6 certified 210:4 certify 210:3 cetera 147:23 187:24 challenge 18:6 34:20,22 35:6 79:8 156:15 196:9,11,20,24 challenged 54:24 114:22,23 challenges 33:12 79:5 90:22 149:8 156:13 161:21 162:1,6 170:13 challenging 41:9 78:21 131:20 173:15 195:16 204:23 chance 111:4 127:8 208:21 change 30:12 31:3 126:22 136:18 176:3 changed 31:11 35:4 55:15 190:16 changes 53:1 191:10 changing 33:1 characterization 83:16 84:11 characterize 170:15 characterized 9:10 123:20 charger 89:8,17 93:5 106:2 chargers 92:22 charging 161:8 chart 123:8 chartered 10:21 check 134:3 169:4 176:15 checking 133:21 checks 84:24 192:4 chief 2:2,21 5:12 7:23 8:18 choice 90:20 160:22 choose 85:7 chose 27:16 29:16 33:7,15,16 119:15 chug 135:22 circ 31:7 50:25 79:25 134:1 148:10 circle 2:7 8:6,6 30:13,13 31:5,19 32:8 35:23,24 36:11 45:16,16 49:4 50:23,23
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 216 51:6 53:2 56:7,8 56:14,24 57:1 73:11,13,14,18 73:21 81:8,8 103:11 105:24 106:9 107:20 110:22,22 112:8 112:12 142:15 145:13,21 164:8 164:8 166:3,3,10 176:3 circuit 47:12,14 133:22 circuitry 165:16 circulating 49:13 circumstances 10:22 32:12 131:5,7 162:6 169:12 civil 180:3 clarification 25:7 73:22 84:6 87:12 98:11 104:2 110:15 118:3 202:7 clarified 136:8 clarify 36:5 46:7 50:24 68:25 110:23 124:17 161:15 202:10 clarifying 154:21 clarity 193:15 clark 2:6 8:3,3 59:6,6,15,17 83:3,3,13 171:22 171:23 172:1,4 172:22 class 71:14 201:15 classifications 70:16 classified 87:2 classify 11:11 classroom 162:24 clean 19:20 94:9 94:12 clear 18:5 20:2 31:13 33:23 42:11 77:6 95:15 101:13 118:8 126:24 135:15 156:18 196:15 207:2 cleared 36:4 69:22 clearly 16:3 38:5 68:18 107:18 131:25 132:6 133:5,11 177:24 195:15 204:3 206:1 clock 27:24 close 53:16 69:10 106:18 135:13 137:5,18 146:3 154:11 198:25 207:11,14 closed 35:2 69:6 closer 184:1 closest 6:3 closing 7:19 21:6 148:15 195:9 197:20 203:3 closure 142:10 197:23 code 179:15 186:11,17 codes 178:24 186:10 coding 185:21 cognitive 115:21 116:3,15,20 118:11,14 128:6 140:24 collapse 10:23 collapsed 10:3 collectively 148:10 color 11:9,10 111:17 colored 39:23 colors 11:11 column 122:21,24 145:2 204:7 combination 127:7 163:25 186:19 combinations 145:14 combine 188:23,24 combustion 12:23 come 7:17 22:15 34:23 49:8 51:10 55:19 70:19 112:10 113:19 121:1 122:25 123:1 128:12 129:20 130:10 131:5,15 132:5 141:7 144:8 149:8 151:15,22 156:4 168:8,10 181:17 204:12 205:6,20 208:13 comes 39:6,6 79:1 122:22 155:6 184:24 199:3 comfortable 51:24 coming 26:17 48:18 140:8 152:22,24 155:9 163:16,22 184:2 184:25 commence 97:17 comment 6:22 46:8 85:10 131:23 143:24 148:14,16 200:7 205:8 208:8 comments 6:25 7:20 9:20,23 21:6 97:13 176:19 195:10,12 205:14 208:9 commission 5:12 5:16 9:19 129:10 193:10 197:3 commissions 14:8 commitment 18:10 196:1 committed 190:7 committee 194:12 common 10:9 21:5 89:1 142:8,9 145:19 177:14 185:10 186:5,7 186:13 192:20 193:7 commonly 27:8 communicate 15:24 16:4 54:12 54:20 90:21 107:9 183:21 207:6 communicated 12:5 16:1 communicating 29:9 183:18 comparable 68:8 comparative 151:2 compare 38:2 57:20 118:17 compared 12:20 comparing 98:12 206:14 comparison 58:16 206:12 compelled 80:15 competing 141:16 complement 194:7 complete 34:11 55:2 65:23 66:11 83:23 84:1,3,6 84:17,21 100:4 114:3 178:14 182:7 193:7 194:5 197:8 completed 10:24 35:14 53:24 77:11 83:20 166:5 178:6 183:17 189:11 190:14 192:21 completely 12:21 60:4 62:10,14,16 64:18 79:7 135:2 140:4 141:21 completes 53:2 completing 30:2 completion 194:25 complex 29:23 80:12 119:14 128:24 compliance 179:15 complicate 155:24 complicated 84:23 137:6 156:11 161:24 complication 156:4 complications 100:7 155:18 172:15 component 11:24 55:14 141:25 components 12:24 16:7 31:10,11 computer 178:8 concept 52:12,13 75:14 79:23 85:5 87:10 92:23 143:24 144:3,6 concepts 75:21 80:15 144:12 conceptual 74:24 conceptually 84:9 139:3 concern 50:2 87:8 110:24 concerned 107:22 concerning 9:24 concerns 96:15 100:21 conclude 117:18 151:17 concluded 138:13 concludes 17:11 146:18 176:6 189:6 203:1 208:22 conclusion 15:20 16:22 79:16 129:21,21 133:9 138:19 146:5 171:9 conclusions 85:22 133:11 149:3 condensate 72:11 72:13 74:6 125:19,23 condition 18:21 27:19 29:15 32:16 33:18 36:4 36:18 38:8 42:2
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 217 43:22 45:8,12 51:22 61:19 65:19 70:16 76:15 93:14 99:7 102:1 105:4 106:17 107:7,11 107:19 108:1 110:12 115:2 137:10 150:19 151:2 154:14,17 157:3,25 158:6,9 158:12 159:21 162:8,11,18 163:4 164:24 165:7 166:12,18 166:24 167:4 185:19 186:16 187:21 188:1 194:1 204:21 206:14 conditional 143:13 174:9 conditions 24:22 24:24 25:12 32:24 33:1,17 34:19 37:1 76:4 81:11,19 82:3,3 86:25 100:10,23 101:16 103:7,12 114:25 116:13 129:3 131:22 137:14 149:22 151:3,4 155:15 161:13 167:8 172:18 185:10,13 193:17,18 205:25 conduct 14:4 conducted 11:2 12:6 14:20 conducting 187:18 conductors 49:1 65:3 conduit 20:13 91:21 cones 66:19 confer 38:8 conference 1:9 5:15 6:16 7:19 9:12,14,15,22,25 12:5,9 13:1,20 14:4,11,13 15:20 17:4 133:5 195:11 196:3 197:5,9,21 205:13 207:14 208:22 210:5 confidence 109:3 136:17 171:20 confident 167:12 configuration 20:5 52:24 106:1 111:5 152:13 154:9,10 157:20 157:24 166:21 189:4 195:16 206:13 configurations 19:5 confirm 45:10 147:20 confirmed 158:23 163:8 164:14 confused 46:2 confusing 48:25 confusion 121:11 connect 20:16 21:15 47:6 60:6 72:6,13 92:2,3 188:16 connected 22:1 31:11 37:15 102:12 108:14 connecting 60:11 72:8 connection 42:12 66:24 72:4 107:5 123:24 144:9 connections 67:1 connectivity 116:7 consequence 104:25 180:10 181:14 183:3 184:9 185:4 190:5,23 191:12 194:21 196:8 consequences 18:7 106:7 181:12 191:4,5 195:21 195:22,25 200:1 203:15 205:10,11 consider 46:15 62:1 103:15,23 104:3 110:18 113:10 117:5 118:15 119:22 156:11 161:9 201:12 202:8,23 206:10 207:5 considerable 118:7 considerably 57:22 consideration 82:1 87:20,23 95:12 considered 46:13 54:6 74:21 75:3 103:11 104:12 113:15 115:14,19 117:22 122:18 167:14 172:4 202:20 considering 14:25 56:10 75:9 82:20 85:20 165:9 205:6 considers 86:2 consistent 109:10 132:9 constitute 156:3 156:14 constituted 11:16 constitutes 161:24 203:18 constructed 178:15 construction 24:6 29:20 90:12 123:23 178:5 constructions 124:23 constructive 17:19 contact 91:7 contain 210:7 contd 3:1 contemplate 41:15 contemplated 94:16 contend 148:10,12 content 13:11 context 15:19 68:13 74:23 75:25 76:17 124:15 148:23 186:7 200:9,9 204:20 205:19 206:22 contingencies 20:10,18 21:18 29:3,25 30:14,16 37:20,23 54:19 56:11 61:17 62:1 107:13 138:25 contingency 24:19 28:19 30:6,20 50:16 52:1 55:25 62:7 67:14,17 68:21 76:5 80:16 80:23 96:13 107:17 139:7 141:12 continue 35:22 79:11 continued 20:11 continuing 82:18 continuously 51:25 contract 179:10 184:19 185:1,7 191:13 192:20,25 192:25 194:15 195:7 contracted 118:5 contractor 189:13 191:9,11 192:23 193:21 194:12 contractors 16:23 17:1,6 181:1,3 189:23 190:2 191:23,23 205:16 contradicting 70:22 contributed 17:3 contributing 173:4 contributor 61:13 101:2 control 22:7 23:21 25:24 28:13 41:21 42:22,25 43:10,12,14 59:22 63:18,19 63:20,21,24 72:16 83:7,9 86:2 88:20,20,24 102:18,20 103:15 103:16,20,24 104:6 106:15,24 108:15 111:11,22 116:4 138:21 144:19 145:7 152:15 155:17,17 155:20 157:4 159:11 160:13 161:14 162:25 164:7 165:15,15 165:20 166:9 167:17 171:17 173:12 204:16 206:5 controlled 54:21 106:19,22,24 controlling 42:1 controls 63:21 190:17 conversation 129:23 convinced 129:24 cool 171:24 172:2 coolant 28:23 161:8 cooling 27:11 32:24 33:11 87:21 92:8,8 97:7 171:24 coordinate 23:17 coordination 2:21 coordinator 24:7 coordinators 23:19 copies 125:11 copy 117:1 120:8 123:14,15
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 218 core 23:10 25:4,21 26:10 28:9 68:22 87:17 98:13,16 98:17,20,24,25 98:25 99:7 113:6 113:8 143:13 174:9 175:23 189:16 195:14 196:14 201:13,19 201:23 corporate 191:14 correct 29:12,13 51:2 56:3 60:13 67:4 76:22 82:12 83:20 85:1 93:20 93:21 94:4,6,14 96:21,22 98:15 99:1 100:11 101:10 102:2 121:2 126:17 135:11 136:7,15 136:16 139:14 146:17 162:4 167:7 172:3 175:5 180:20 192:17 201:21 206:3 210:7 corrected 189:3 correcting 134:1 corrections 177:5 corrective 14:22 15:6 16:17 18:19 151:17 177:17 182:12 184:4 188:10 189:1 correctly 96:20 139:13 167:20 187:15 corrects 190:4 correspondence 207:7 coughing 163:23 194:20 couldnt 45:19 69:16 72:9 73:3 count 99:5 counter 6:15 counterparts 197:5 county 210:1 couple 6:2 12:17 20:7 66:1 71:5 71:17 120:6 130:21 134:17 141:13 154:20 168:22 176:17 199:13 203:4 course 30:12 39:4 65:2 95:13,21 122:16 200:8 cover 13:13 16:20 83:2 177:3 covered 83:5 177:8 craft 27:23 31:9 55:20 57:5 79:23 124:5 create 96:25 155:18 created 100:8 154:3 196:19 credible 144:12 credit 13:17 21:3 22:10,15 68:15 76:24 85:19 99:9 117:14 138:14 141:3 148:2,9 152:6 153:12 157:13 171:11 173:15 201:2 206:4 credited 85:14 150:7 174:22,25 crediting 19:1 22:9 22:15 crew 117:14 163:9 criteria 35:12,18 criterion 5:23 11:18 critical 173:1 178:18 cross 47:6 58:6 102:11 108:14 145:10 153:4,6 163:14,18,22 164:1 171:4,14 173:8 174:5 crystal 18:5 csr 1:25 210:13 cubicle 64:24 72:9 168:4 cubicles 169:4 cue 116:5 118:18 207:21 cues 116:5 118:15 curious 186:20 current 173:11 174:13,17 currently 13:19 24:2 25:12 26:15 114:12 142:2 189:12 cut 27:18 28:16 114:15 173:2 cutting 55:18 D
d 5:1 d06 102:1 daily 25:20 dale 3:8 9:3 180:15 190:16 201:21 damage 10:4,11 28:10 40:15,25 41:11 42:12,14 42:15,18 43:1 44:1,12 47:12 58:10 61:20,21 62:11 65:8,20 66:23 70:2,2 76:11 81:3 98:25 133:18 140:6 143:14 158:21 159:14,17,24 164:12 166:25 169:5,6,7 174:9 175:24 189:16 195:14 196:14 201:13 damaged 15:7 40:2 41:2,8 42:20 45:22 47:5 63:16 64:13 70:4 76:9,10 80:4 104:3 107:3,3 141:18 158:15 166:21 169:5 dampers 92:12 danger 70:17 dapas 2:5 7:11,18 8:1,1 15:15 26:7 29:6 31:23 32:2 36:24 44:8,9,15 46:8 50:14 55:21 55:21 56:4 60:8 60:8,14,16 65:6 65:18 67:2,2,10 68:13 74:19,20 75:25 76:23 77:11,14 80:14 80:14 82:5,13 85:9 100:25,25 103:20,23 104:2 104:5,8 107:24 107:25 108:13 121:13 122:4,12 122:16 131:23 132:14 135:10 136:23 142:17,24 146:14 148:14 151:13,19 161:20 166:22 167:11 170:11 176:15 177:2 180:15,15 180:21 182:10 184:18 186:4,18 187:10,17 188:4 188:11,25 192:12 192:16 197:15,15 198:4 200:7 203:4 data 131:14 date 13:21 194:7 210:13 dated 12:8 16:3 dave 90:13 129:15 david 2:10 3:4 8:11,20 24:1 38:12 54:2 62:18 69:2 70:7,18 87:12 88:3 91:24 109:18 113:4,15 118:9 119:18 127:4,12,16 138:15 139:15,22 140:25 154:21,25 159:4 160:11 davids 116:1 117:6 119:11 day 18:12 23:20,22 24:22 25:2 26:5 27:9,16,21 32:15 32:17 33:9 34:6 36:8 53:24 68:8 70:6 78:17 104:23 114:7 115:15 117:23 131:18 136:21,24 152:15 159:13 169:24 171:7,17 172:25 176:21 195:22 210:10 days 10:8 23:7,8 23:22 25:5 27:11 33:22 35:3 36:6 36:10 47:8 53:13 57:11 71:5 80:13 84:19 97:9 98:13 99:21 108:9 109:4,17 120:18 121:11 130:23 137:3,4 167:8 dc 58:20 63:20 64:2 83:7,11,12 89:9 92:12,15 93:3 102:5,11,12 102:15,22,25 103:3 105:2,3,5 105:7,9 106:2,18 107:15 108:14 110:18,19,24 111:11,22 112:4 165:15,16 deal 147:25 201:9 dealing 124:1 161:13,21 202:20 205:1,18 deals 182:20 dealt 70:14 177:6 debate 136:20 163:11
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 219 decay 32:19,23 33:10,14 86:5,14 94:25 96:20 150:5,7,9,17 158:14 186:23 199:22 decent 141:4 decided 37:22 117:23 142:25 152:11,12 decision 14:4,15 35:8 44:21 61:5 67:5 78:4,13 115:21 116:3,25 118:25 120:9,22 123:20 129:7 137:15 147:4 148:13 183:9 decisionmaking 118:25 decisions 34:19 67:21 78:17 79:3 123:16 129:6 204:22 deck 10:5 declaration 71:15 161:7 declare 201:7 declared 10:18 54:23 158:17 160:19,23 202:15 deemed 116:16 125:2 deenergized 63:4 168:19 169:18,22 deenergizing 170:2 default 200:13 defeats 74:4 defense 32:13 109:11 deficiencies 11:22 deficiency 12:14 17:9 define 52:11,13 121:21 123:3 155:13 defined 72:18 120:3 121:5 170:2 defines 191:1 defining 23:24 120:21 definitely 45:13 142:22 definition 156:6 161:23 definitive 115:9 132:22 147:5 205:24 206:16 degrade 20:11 degraded 24:20 160:15 202:24 degree 37:14 132:1 136:17 139:2 187:20 204:1 delay 99:16 100:3 delayed 71:16,22 delaying 87:14 deliverable 180:24 demarcation 118:10 demonstrate 30:4 demonstrated 57:2 57:3,18 59:7 109:15 192:9 demonstrates 66:11 department 3:9 141:10,11 depas 15:16 depend 189:23 depended 103:1 dependence 190:1 dependencies 138:18,20 dependency 104:15 125:21 dependent 41:8 203:22 depending 52:13 90:18 163:15,25 depends 203:24 depleted 92:23 depletion 165:13 depth 32:13 109:11 deputy 2:16 derived 18:19 113:24 describe 38:12 94:6 96:20 120:13 177:9,14 described 67:13 92:6 119:5 147:22 201:17 202:18 203:11 describes 37:5 52:7 183:8 design 12:23 34:12 35:11 41:14 79:23 80:15 83:18,20,25 84:1 115:23,24 117:5 117:10,10 118:13 124:2 125:25 126:10 127:18 130:24 131:5 145:19 152:4 157:19 178:1,25 179:16 181:10,21 182:7 190:21 191:13 designated 48:5 designations 111:17 designed 5:25 11:21 19:9 40:1 154:16 designs 12:22 16:6 83:22,24 84:2,3 84:11 desired 76:14 80:25 detail 55:6 76:22 127:12 177:8,9 198:18 detailed 45:18 52:20 86:14 178:7,11 179:4 179:16 203:9 207:13 details 94:6 179:11 200:4 determ 124:16 determination 9:11 12:11,16 13:4,7,10 14:15 14:16 15:22,25 26:8 44:13,17 46:12 172:24 197:19 203:15 determinations 14:11 203:24 determine 7:15 44:18 65:20 71:9 76:11 85:18 118:16 119:1 132:19,25 145:11 148:24 149:2 167:4 193:1 204:25 206:6,24 determined 11:8 11:16,19 14:5,19 16:24 115:13 117:23 120:4 124:17 125:5 129:1 143:13 175:17 determining 18:2 29:4 81:5 190:23 207:4 develop 115:5 117:9 124:4 129:22 130:1 198:19 developed 21:18 28:19 30:21 31:21,21 33:16 118:23 119:3 124:12,14,23 125:1 129:25 139:1,10 145:24 182:16 developing 20:10 20:23 70:19 development 13:19 21:24 23:17 115:20,23 115:24 117:6,10 118:13 124:2 125:25,25 126:10 127:18 140:21 145:19 191:3 developmenttype 152:4 deviation 134:24 135:21 136:15 deviations 130:18 devices 59:10 dhr 114:14,15 diagnose 156:8 166:7 diagnosed 162:13 172:18 diagnosing 153:18 diagnosis 155:19 155:20 diagram 34:9 88:6 152:23 diagrams 83:6 dialog 38:9 dialoging 196:5 dictated 32:11 162:5 didnt 45:21 62:2 83:4,22 99:23 102:11 104:9 107:9 114:3 117:20 118:3 120:20 121:9 128:10 135:5 138:2,6 139:9 142:1 144:5,13 147:14 157:6,10 158:24 159:14 161:17 176:3 180:4 183:9 188:1 diesel 10:15 25:1 27:3,5 28:7,9,16 28:17 29:14 30:1 33:12 34:21,24 35:1,19,24 37:6 37:13 38:24 39:5 42:15 43:24 45:22 51:22 52:1 53:19,22 57:7 58:4 61:14 62:8 62:12 63:22 67:8
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 220 74:15 75:9,10 77:2 78:22 98:19 101:3,14,17,18 102:5,6,19 103:2 103:6,10,25 104:5,9,10,12,15 105:6,15,19,23 106:16,24 107:3 107:14 108:15,17 108:19 110:16,18 110:19,25,25 111:1,3,3,5,6,11 111:14,15,18,18 111:23,24,25 112:4,5 150:4,21 150:24 153:1 154:15,18 155:2 158:8,15,18,19 159:8 160:15 163:5,16 164:11 164:20,21,25 167:6 168:7 170:7 171:13 172:19 174:14 186:23 187:12,21 187:23,25 189:2 diesel2 111:23 diesels 21:20,25 36:8,9,13,17,20 37:22 40:9 61:18 82:17 93:2 97:25 106:14 107:10 159:1 162:10 difference 39:8 60:9 74:2 150:9 150:18,22 152:7 195:13 differences 12:16 12:21 66:9 153:11 171:12 different 12:15,18 12:22,24 16:5,7 16:13 19:22 20:20 26:9 34:23 39:3 40:19 55:20 56:19 61:5 64:20 64:21,21 78:7 79:22 81:25 82:6 82:17,20,24 85:4 98:12 100:15 115:14 117:25 130:8,9 131:4,13 133:4,9 134:14 134:17,19 135:13 140:7 151:1,6 152:2,22 155:7 169:21,23 174:17 196:16 206:19 differentiate 75:1 differentiation 121:17 differently 131:6 140:6 difficult 51:10 diligence 204:10 direct 43:11 58:11 60:23 62:15 94:7 101:19 directed 103:18 152:20 direction 6:11 45:14 89:3 130:11 162:22 165:4 166:8 directions 52:14 directly 23:16 60:11 61:22 62:5 62:5 88:19 94:18 94:21 95:6 104:11 122:25 147:11 177:6 director 2:4,6,16 3:8 7:24 8:4 9:3 54:9 78:18,18 165:4 191:21 disagree 16:12 disassembled 178:17 discern 44:23 discipline 203:6 disciplined 151:21 disciplines 78:7,9 disconnect 64:6 72:13 88:5,9,11 88:18 90:1 102:1 disconnected 64:23 72:11 106:3 discovered 35:3 discuss 9:14 13:15 14:1 17:21 20:7 21:17 23:7 31:6 66:1 113:23 132:11 discussed 9:24 13:13 14:7 20:14 33:15 37:20 76:22 109:5 117:6 135:8 138:20 183:23 190:17 discussing 5:17 75:7 86:10,12 148:4 184:22 discussion 17:12 19:16,18 20:3,20 22:9,19 28:4 36:25 37:25 65:7 77:12 112:14 113:4,14 132:15 140:16 144:1 146:1 166:23 173:6 176:13 187:20,23 198:11 198:12 discussions 35:10 115:25 136:19 139:25 170:21 176:8 188:12 197:13 203:9 dispatched 167:2 distinct 195:13 distinction 29:7 43:7 82:14 101:13 195:20 196:12,15 distinguish 26:14 distributed 6:13 123:6 distributing 168:15 distribution 27:8 27:13 38:15 61:25 134:21 135:17,25 136:1 202:21 disturbing 190:12 diverse 109:13 division 2:4,6,10 2:12,14,16 7:25 8:4,7 105:3,4 document 184:24 193:10 194:13 documentation 53:6 134:8 178:1 178:11 179:15 190:18,21 195:3 documented 12:7 26:2 57:13 178:7 179:5 183:15 193:10 documenting 199:7 documents 56:16 182:22 185:22 doesnt 39:14 40:4 78:12 91:3 103:20 140:7 155:8 193:22 198:10 doing 30:9 41:16 42:24 43:5 53:4 55:17 59:5 67:14 68:11 82:10 92:17 100:8 107:4 134:13,15 135:6 143:25 147:5 182:8 191:23 dominant 27:18 28:16 173:2 dominate 127:14 dominated 145:18 dont 25:19 32:5 35:1 36:19 44:2 49:20 52:20 56:22 61:6 70:21 79:13 85:10 92:2 92:7 93:6 101:1 101:21,23 102:9 103:24 104:2,6 105:3,4,5,7,9 106:9 107:20 129:9,11 131:14 133:18 135:3 136:21 140:5 141:15 143:10 146:23 147:2 148:7,7,8 156:25 164:6 171:11 174:8,12 175:9 176:11,21 188:4 188:19,24 189:18 189:25 205:17 207:10 door 6:3 64:7,9,24 89:23,23 109:25 197:11,12 doors 6:7,8 90:4 dots 188:16 dotted 40:5 double 138:9 doubt 107:20 dra 2:7,9 draw 43:6 drawings 5:23 11:18 drive 79:15 driven 20:22 78:25 79:14 86:9 114:15 136:13 139:16 162:12 163:18 165:11 drop 5:18 10:7,9 14:23 15:4,16 23:20 26:25 27:9 30:15 40:2,21 61:22 70:10 86:25 88:16,21 89:21 115:1 116:6 117:9 146:13 177:19 183:2 185:12 186:24 199:17 200:17 203:7 dropped 61:19 88:11,15 129:12 drove 107:15 174:21 drp 2:3
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 221 due 71:17 165:13 165:15 204:9 E
e 2:2 5:1,1 e06 144:21 e6 146:12 eals 201:1 earlier 19:13 20:14 65:8 68:20 85:10 88:3 89:13 100:12 109:5 115:25 119:13 129:14 135:1 138:20 139:15 140:15 158:16 early 66:3 69:4 easily 42:13 44:23 61:20 68:1 70:5 72:19 easter 195:24 edg 103:18,18 effect 96:14 117:13 117:13 181:9 effective 191:10 efficient 60:7 effort 75:22 76:13 134:23 185:9 187:8 efforts 60:24 125:18,21 efw 162:12 165:11 either 38:25 53:16 57:7 86:16 97:25 127:17 145:10 160:16 180:12 elaborate 74:19 electric 32:22 163:18 electrical 10:11,17 15:9 29:22 33:1 33:20 38:15 46:21 61:23,24 66:21 78:9,11 79:1,9,10 86:4 108:17 111:4 112:6 133:20 152:21 164:15 202:21 electrically 80:6 electricians 27:23 67:25 68:1 71:10 84:20 91:12 element 108:21 116:17 117:5,25 124:10 125:16 144:1 elements 115:19 125:5 126:11 128:12 elevating 195:2 elevation 64:8 eliminated 58:1,22 99:23 embedded 116:21 emergency 3:7 6:5 9:1 10:14 21:25 23:15,17 25:1 27:5,17 28:7,8 33:12 34:3,21 35:12,19 39:4 53:20 54:3,25 70:16 71:14 78:17,18 109:6 112:15,17,19 137:16,16 150:4 151:7 154:15 156:2,10,25 157:2,7,14 161:6 164:23 201:8,8 202:4,15,16 employees 14:10 18:15 189:20 endc114 182:14 ended 82:10 171:15 199:22 energize 43:23 106:23 137:6 158:5 energized 33:24 39:24 43:3 47:8 47:9 53:15 57:12 69:17 71:11 73:8 73:10 107:18 108:11 167:5 168:13 169:15 energizing 41:15 43:16 44:7 energy 87:22 enforcement 2:22 2:23 14:8,15 engage 16:11 32:4 44:3 85:17 engineer 2:14 93:9 112:21 engineering 3:4 8:21 12:23 23:19 23:23 24:2,5,6,8 24:10 27:25 35:11 51:23 52:11,11,24 53:1 53:10 54:9,22 84:15 85:3,5 91:11 95:3,23 99:14 116:7 117:9 119:14,18 123:21,22 124:24 164:15 178:7,20 180:3 181:8,9,21 181:22 182:1,6,6 182:7 190:22 191:14,18 193:19 193:20,22 engineeringrelat...
191:17 engineers 68:2 84:16 93:8 112:25 124:3 enhance 177:12 enhancements 177:11 179:9 ensure 15:24 16:10 16:18,25 17:8 36:4 76:13 108:1 179:14 181:3 183:13 190:8 191:5 ensuring 67:12 180:12 entark 24:3 47:18 entergy 3:3,11,13 5:16 6:21 7:12 8:15 9:13,19 18:12 47:18 59:20 121:20 123:9 131:25 178:20 192:7,16 193:16 197:11 entergys 16:22 entergyspecific 194:16 entering 195:11 enterprise 185:3 entertain 207:15 entire 69:5 73:10 123:15 143:11 192:13,18 193:16 194:14 entry 71:19 160:13 environment 53:11 82:24 100:16 119:23 205:1 environmental 81:19 environments 100:17 envision 61:21 eof 78:16 107:4 eop 162:13 164:23 172:20 epris 115:17 equipment 19:9 20:22 24:25 27:10 30:17 31:5 32:11,19 43:3,5 68:16,17 69:17 71:11 76:4,10,11 80:1,23 147:11 147:12 148:5 150:10 152:9 158:13 169:10,16 181:10 185:4 189:4 196:11 202:21 204:21 ero 27:20 error 115:22 116:17 133:25 186:19 errors 133:17,19 190:4 escalate 201:14 escalating 201:23 essence 130:16 essentially 99:25 150:7 201:18 establish 18:8 22:6 29:11 80:17 96:5 97:6 107:5 165:8 195:13 established 23:9 82:8 98:3 135:7 establishing 32:17 103:16 estimate 25:20,21 26:5 37:11,18 100:1 113:20 115:11 128:19 132:16 133:1 135:8 144:18,23 145:3 148:20 175:16,23 189:16 189:17 195:14 198:5 203:13 205:21 estimated 26:15 57:19 91:9 113:8 estimates 25:25 149:9 estimating 198:2 et 147:23 187:24 evacuation 6:6 evaluate 17:7 179:24 evaluated 29:2,24 86:23 120:23 183:15 188:21 evaluating 29:15 123:21 evaluation 14:21 15:1 124:8 133:10 134:12 146:21 148:11 179:12 182:5 186:3,13 187:3,6 192:20 193:7,9 202:13 evaluations 131:5 179:5 186:17 evaporating 95:8
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 222 evening 24:7 evenly 123:6 event 5:17,20 6:4 10:19 11:8,12 12:13 13:16 14:21 15:2,17 17:3 18:3,7,9,11 18:13 19:3 20:6 20:10 21:10,19 23:9,20 24:7,20 24:22 25:14,16 27:9,16 28:20 29:2,3,25 32:15 32:17 33:9 34:2 36:13,13 37:21 38:2 39:23 40:11 42:22 43:8,9 46:20 47:19 48:17 62:9 67:8 69:5 70:10 73:10 75:5,11,20 76:8 81:3 86:23,25 88:13 90:25 91:1 98:18 99:17 102:25 113:25 114:13,19 117:24 117:24 119:10,16 120:9 125:13 126:6 128:24 129:2 130:13,14 130:14 131:8,10 132:21 138:13 139:2,10,11 140:22 141:5 143:10 144:14 145:24 146:13 150:10 151:2,18 152:16 153:15 157:12,13 161:2 161:21 162:2 169:24 171:8,17 183:3,23 184:3,4 185:2,12 188:8 188:13 189:2,5 189:19 191:9 195:15 199:15 200:10,11 202:25 205:1,10 206:14 events 185:17 186:15,18,25 187:5 200:15 203:7 everybody 26:21 38:16 157:9 164:5 165:1 evidence 146:6 evident 85:9 evolution 165:6 evolutions 17:21 180:11 exact 25:23 49:20 58:13 exactly 91:11 127:5 examination 45:18 178:20 examined 178:18 example 55:12 151:21 156:15 186:6 examples 181:24 186:22 excess 95:22 exclusive 70:22 excuse 89:12 execute 31:13 98:5 163:12 execution 116:1 124:6,8,10,11,21 128:7 140:24 exercise 37:2 93:9 122:17 193:1 exercised 60:17 203:6 exist 30:14 170:14 existed 32:24 37:2 97:8 149:22 187:22 188:1 existing 54:10 117:13 148:23 194:22 exists 6:7 48:1 110:21 122:9 170:17 206:9 exit 12:6 expanding 19:1 expect 13:21 69:18 expectations 32:6 38:5,6 expected 167:14 expedited 58:16 59:12 expeditiously 197:19 expend 78:2,19 expended 76:13 expenditure 204:4 experience 24:4,6 92:19 119:19 149:7 184:24 expert 115:14 120:22 122:2,8 123:1 178:23 expertise 179:24 180:2,3,4,12,13 180:22 181:16 182:4 185:15 190:23 experts 118:5,6 expiration 210:13 explain 31:25 83:1 88:3 96:7 100:12 144:24 explaining 80:20 118:10 149:10 explore 83:16 102:20 exploring 102:14 explosion 10:12,17 71:16 exposed 103:8 expressions 14:10 expressly 148:1 extend 169:10 extended 87:6 extensive 14:20 37:9 61:20 183:19 187:23 203:9 extensively 10:4 extent 18:21 65:19 76:11 167:4 169:5 external 185:24 extra 170:6 extrapolate 202:23 extrapolating 82:9 extreme 25:13 eyes 196:7 F
face 149:8 faced 40:7 170:13 facility 5:19 97:5 178:14 facing 204:18 fact 44:19 50:25 67:22 75:2 81:2 93:18 97:4 100:8 101:21 107:25 109:12 113:9,10 114:17 117:15 120:18 121:11 127:13 137:2,4 163:6 167:5 173:24 183:22 189:19 204:24 factfinding 10:25 factor 46:15 67:22 82:16 97:6 108:21 109:4 115:11 124:10 125:25 126:1,8 126:10 141:16 143:9 144:17 145:19 173:23 186:7 201:10 factored 65:22 78:3 85:15 99:9 101:8 106:13 170:23 199:24 factoring 33:4 67:11 factors 12:17 16:14 46:13 117:10 119:24 146:1,9 204:3 205:2,6 facts 10:21 13:3 15:21 16:11 79:3 196:22 fail 36:20 40:10 62:24 131:13 142:3 150:8 174:24,25 175:10 failed 11:22 12:2 24:25 35:20,24 35:25 36:9,17 62:12,13 68:17 79:7 110:25 111:3 112:6 130:25 131:1 failing 111:6 131:15,22 fails 103:6 105:15 105:16 111:14,15 111:18 128:2,3 142:3 143:4,4 failure 5:24 11:19 37:5,13 38:3 61:12,14 62:8 67:8 77:2 105:14 105:15,20,21 111:1 113:11 120:2 122:22 129:3,7 130:6,11 131:12 132:3,17 134:25 135:19 136:6,10 137:9 140:4,19 142:8,9 146:6 148:19 156:3 170:10 173:11 174:14 183:1 186:24 188:13 failures 32:11 61:18,24 129:10 140:20 142:8,11 142:14,14 186:19 fair 120:24 161:20 171:2 fall 10:4,6 familiar 24:13 178:24 200:3 far 31:7 41:12 51:16 64:25 74:24 85:4 89:22 107:22 122:24 126:16 129:22 155:16 183:18
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 223 199:2 fashion 52:3 fast 152:18 153:20 154:3,7 fatal 133:17 fatality 189:20 205:12 fatalitys 190:10 fault 35:25 36:4 104:22,25 111:2 112:6 125:8 126:3,8 127:2 128:13,19 140:10 140:12,13 141:23 143:7 145:16 146:6 154:21 199:23 faulty 101:4 fears 195:11 feature 59:9 february 11:2 12:7 fed 38:22 88:13 89:4 feed 39:5 44:5 57:8 66:3,5 74:9,10 75:12 86:2,8 88:23 89:11 92:9 95:25 96:5,9,19 108:2 155:17,23 156:2,3,19,20,23 156:24,24,25 157:1,3,4,6,7,11 157:12,14 160:23 162:12 164:3 165:8 173:3 192:10 feedback 7:1,4 52:24 90:20 196:6,24 208:25 feeder 42:16 125:19 168:7 feeders 168:9 feeding 75:13 106:2 162:16 165:11 feeds 39:18 40:25 44:25 63:6 89:9 158:22 160:3 164:11,16 feel 6:15 80:15 85:13 132:17 135:7 142:17 143:12 149:2 feet 10:6 48:2 49:2 49:2 59:2,2,3,4 64:10 65:1,2 66:16 89:24 93:22 96:3,12 150:1,14 fell 40:6 48:6 felt 66:22 115:4 138:5 173:18 184:8 fence 70:3 field 40:24 41:23 45:6 52:16 54:21 124:5,22 160:24 fieldwork 55:16 figure 40:1,4 56:18 91:11 files 128:15 fill 7:4 93:19 208:24 209:7 final 12:11 13:6 14:11,16 15:25 78:13 133:15 138:11 174:4 207:6 finalization 203:23 finally 177:14 178:22 find 137:8 204:6 205:7 finding 11:12,16 203:18,20 204:2 findings 5:21 9:9 11:4 12:12,25 13:12 14:2,6 fine 64:15 112:12 finish 49:22 50:24 57:1 60:24 finished 84:4 fire 10:9 15:8 76:9 141:1,3,4,10,11 141:12,12,14,18 141:24 168:14,23 199:17,18 first 6:2 17:19 21:13 25:10 38:14 46:19 57:24 59:7 70:6 83:17,18 87:19 94:23 97:16 98:2 106:20,23 112:7 116:2 119:1,3 131:9 135:5 190:10 194:3 199:14 five 32:13 38:20 41:21 84:10,14 84:18 142:3 151:22 159:2 171:16 198:1 203:8 fiveminute 84:15 151:20 fix 24:3,10 fleet 3:12 21:5 121:4,4 123:9,9 123:12 179:7 182:8 185:16 189:10 190:15,20 191:8 192:13,18 193:6,16 195:5 fleetwide 192:14 flexibility 29:18,21 58:3 60:2,5,21 61:4 flip 32:6 flood 93:16 200:16 flooded 22:4 25:3 33:19 93:15 115:3 150:14,20 flooding 10:10 76:9 186:24 199:15 200:9,13 200:14 floor 43:2 69:18 71:17 155:6,8 167:21,22 168:1 168:3,6,22 flow 28:23 94:1 120:2 flowchart 52:6 79:4,9 focus 20:15 21:10 82:21,23 164:21 205:13 focused 67:20 184:3 186:5 focusing 19:15 77:25 154:19 189:3 focussed 28:5 folks 48:11 176:11 197:11,16 199:5 follow 38:19 43:23 94:22 95:14 100:25 159:20,24 192:11 followed 27:12 33:11 167:17 182:16 following 5:5 9:21 11:15 14:13 15:2 18:3,9 19:3 20:6 20:7 23:22 37:5 65:7 115:16 followup 11:2 13:14 16:2 19:21 25:18 69:14 99:4 147:19 192:12 198:13,14 foot 49:9 93:23 force 28:22 86:10 111:23 ford 3:12 46:17 foregoing 210:6 form 18:6 30:15 34:2 188:20 194:17 208:25 209:5,7 formal 35:14 56:23 56:24,25 207:14 formally 34:11 197:21 forms 7:1,5 forth 56:20 fortuitous 51:7 forward 17:7,8 35:22 44:6 45:4 52:20 109:8 115:6 117:11 165:22 166:1 174:1 205:17 found 114:25 120:9 179:23 193:4,17 four 21:11 41:21 54:22 84:19 87:1 87:5 93:22 96:3 97:11 120:15 131:1 159:2 171:15 fourth 62:4 fractions 129:4 frankly 75:2 188:4 free 6:15 frequency 130:14 131:8,11,21 150:25 189:16 fresh 95:3 friday 199:1,1 front 6:7,23 125:11 167:23 168:6,24 169:4 fuel 12:19 22:4,5,6 22:21,22,25 25:3 27:11 32:23 33:10 86:16,19 87:17,20 89:4,10 92:8,8 94:20 95:1,2,3,22 97:8 105:18 115:2 150:15 fueling 27:21 full 15:23 23:8 71:11 76:11 77:12 85:21 108:18 109:16 114:10 203:10 210:7 fully 16:11 30:21 41:5 65:10 76:14 85:12 158:21 159:15 163:24 164:13 183:14 207:5 function 27:11 33:10 35:20
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 224 41:14 43:22 44:18 54:24 59:21 78:20 82:22 88:1 118:24 149:7 152:10 158:19 164:1 functional 40:13 103:9,21 172:21 functionality 41:7 41:9 functioning 43:6 functions 32:14,22 59:23 78:19,25 79:15 116:10 118:18,21 further 16:9 19:1,9 34:14 85:15 132:12 177:12 189:7 future 29:21 179:5 194:3,17 G
g 5:1 gallons 22:5 93:22 93:25 94:2 95:16 95:17 gantry 11:23 gap 207:10 gary 3:6 8:22 22:20 23:7,11 25:25 85:25 89:13 110:14 113:4,14 116:1 117:6 119:11 129:15 134:14 139:15,22 202:17 garys 35:3 gate 54:25 127:6 127:10 128:3 141:25 142:1,6,6 142:18,19,21 143:1,4,6,17 geared 147:16 general 48:14,23 62:23 76:1 185:2 201:8 202:15 generator 27:3 28:9,17 38:24 52:2 53:19 60:3 62:8 63:22 74:15 75:10,10 78:2 81:21 150:16,21 153:1 154:15 155:2 156:20 158:15,18,20 160:15 163:5,25 164:11,25 168:7 169:18 170:8 171:14 181:24 186:23 generators 10:15 25:1 27:5 28:7 28:16 29:14 33:12 34:21,24 35:19 39:5 51:23 53:23 57:8 61:14 62:13 78:23 150:4 163:19 165:9,11 gentleman 129:24 geoff 160:12 161:4 getting 30:18 46:2 50:1 67:10 70:20 84:25 87:22 102:23 104:20 134:16,18 137:22 163:9 166:2 167:23 172:24 176:7 179:11 180:24 187:5 199:7 give 14:18 22:14 32:4 62:21 76:17 83:12 87:15 94:2 112:9 165:1,3 166:8 168:21 176:23 185:20 186:6,21 191:8 192:10 206:4 given 29:14 33:4 65:7 68:7 86:19 87:4 93:7 98:15 99:2 103:10 111:7 116:13 126:21 130:23 131:4 133:20,23 138:14 141:9 143:8,11 144:3 149:24 164:18 173:6 187:21,25 189:17 191:1 205:11 210:9 gives 62:22 89:8 92:16 134:24 163:21 165:12 giving 60:2 157:13 go 6:7,8,19,23 22:8 31:24 38:15 39:3 46:23 52:6 61:10 69:25 71:1,3 93:13 95:6 98:3 99:3 101:5 106:10,17,18 113:1 114:8,8 118:20 119:1 121:22 127:3 129:7 134:9 137:18 138:7,8 140:11 142:22,22 143:2,19 145:9 148:12 149:19,23 152:19 156:7,9 157:5 159:22 160:4 162:9 163:9,11 165:14 165:18 166:20 168:9 169:3,17 170:12 171:23,24 175:10 180:9 193:2,23 194:2,8 194:14 197:10 198:15,18 200:22 206:5 207:20 209:3,6 goal 14:15 115:10 198:5 203:13 goes 39:11 78:25 110:10 123:7 130:11 147:24 157:4 going 7:7 9:7 17:7 17:8,17,18 19:13 19:25 21:9,17 23:7 24:4,9 26:16,21 29:10 30:4,25 31:1,7 32:4 34:20,21 35:16 38:18 42:6 43:23 44:16 46:19,23 48:19 50:21 51:15 55:10,15 56:5,18 56:25 57:19,21 63:8,8 64:5 67:13 69:18 71:8 71:8 76:3,7,13 77:17,24 78:1,6 79:9 80:19 81:13 83:6 87:16,18 93:3 97:5 102:18 106:4 109:20 111:21,22 112:1 115:6 117:10 120:6 124:7 125:7 127:14 129:3,4,5,6 130:8 132:6 137:20 138:11 140:9 143:21,24 148:15 152:1,3,5 153:18 158:22 159:18 160:19 166:2 168:1,16 169:3,8 170:5,11 172:25 177:3 184:6 187:18 189:10 193:7,15 193:17,18,25 194:2,3,14 195:5 197:3,4,5,7,10 202:4 205:16 206:5 207:8 good 5:2,10 19:24 23:2,11 45:8 47:20 77:18 99:6 101:19 109:22 117:20 129:14,16 134:7 137:24 138:10 140:9 149:10 153:17 159:14 167:9,10 170:12 187:5 194:21,22 199:1 201:11 gravity 86:2,8 92:9 95:25 96:5,8,19 gray 144:21 great 55:6 151:22 greater 5:21 9:11 11:5 96:12 120:15,21 178:16 green 5:21 9:11 11:5,12,12,13 39:19 63:9 64:23 69:20 72:7 102:25 103:4,8 153:5,22 154:15 154:17 155:2 158:4,7 greg 2:2 5:9 15:15 16:2,5 39:13 197:2 199:4 207:15 gregory 5:11 7:23 9:7 ground 28:4 132:1 group 112:25 130:10 191:14 192:22,24 groups 130:8 guard 6:4 guess 71:2 109:2 111:16 121:13,15 127:4 128:6 137:21 138:8 156:6 173:14 174:11 guidance 86:15 117:8 121:15 122:9 123:7,9,10 123:12,14 124:4 132:24 147:25 148:6,17,23 149:5 158:4 163:2 179:10,21 188:23 206:16,22 guidances 166:7 guides 121:23
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 225 guiding 121:5 guys 69:10 107:16 114:8 129:15,19 129:24 153:16 165:22 197:11 H
h 41:20 hadnt 154:9 half 34:7 53:24 58:17,18 66:16 95:4 105:7,7,8,8 109:21 159:23 203:8 halfway 55:17 hall 112:21 116:24 117:3 174:20 175:8 hand 154:9 163:1 164:7 178:10 200:19 208:13 210:9 handling 177:6,23 179:3 180:2,2,19 190:15 hands 147:3 happen 21:21 154:23 190:13 196:12 happened 20:2,5 25:16 29:3 30:12 91:1 93:18 104:23 108:6 140:5 154:22 169:14 189:22 happening 194:9 happens 106:4 111:18 129:2 130:7 190:8 hard 48:7 50:7 125:11 harris 3:7 9:1,1 70:7 104:14,15 105:10,11 106:6 112:13,15 116:22 117:4 118:14 119:7 120:17,25 121:3,22 122:11 122:14,19 123:2 123:18 124:1,9 126:18 127:2,11 127:21 128:4,8 128:10,18 129:9 129:13 134:5 135:5,11,16 136:3,7,11,25 137:24 139:14,22 140:11 141:2 142:4,7,20 143:2 143:19 144:15 145:1,16,22 146:16 172:23 174:18 175:14,22 176:2,5 200:5,12 hasnt 181:4 hathcoat 3:5 8:24 8:24 40:22,22 41:19 43:14 44:14,23 45:19 46:6 63:19 71:13 71:13 152:14,17 154:25 155:14 156:1,21 157:2 157:15,18 159:10 160:17,21 161:11 161:19 162:4 164:10 166:6,11 167:7,16 168:20 171:3,25 172:6 172:10 175:5 204:14 havent 38:5 41:12 71:9 83:19 103:9 121:18 188:6 196:18 head 12:19 150:1 150:14,20 header 10:10 141:15 199:17 headers 141:6 headquarter 14:14 headquarters 8:8 8:10 25:8 30:14 48:11 50:6 69:9 98:8 197:6 health 19:6,10 108:10 hear 6:24 17:5 59:10 74:22 146:21 155:4 192:8 204:17 heard 76:1 107:24 132:22 167:1 176:17 184:14 187:22 205:22 hearing 50:7 69:10 82:14 87:16 133:2 167:11 heat 32:19,23 33:10,14 86:5,14 92:21 94:25 96:21 150:5,7,17 156:15 158:14 186:23 199:23 heavy 11:23 15:10 15:12 78:10 held 9:14 112:20 hell 199:4 help 18:1 38:19 68:25 133:13 136:25 191:15 helping 194:13 hep 115:22 117:19 heres 47:25 77:2 hes 119:18 hesitant 90:8 168:2 hesitate 207:9 hey 45:3 84:5 159:17 166:12 high 11:9 59:16,20 92:20 123:5 136:17 145:6 164:18 180:10 181:14 183:2 190:23 191:4,12 194:21 203:18 highend 122:23 highlighted 139:25 hire 181:16 hit 32:5 173:1 207:24 hoisting 5:25 10:2 10:22 11:20,25 12:3 hold 84:5 120:7 holder 23:14 hook 64:5 66:15 72:23 74:11,12 hooked 47:1 74:6 hooking 72:22 hope 133:13 hopefully 30:3 37:19 46:7 55:11 132:11 192:3 host 5:8 hour 120:15 166:15,19,19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> 25:4,5,8,8 64:14 65:16 71:17,21 75:11 84:16 91:9,23 98:15 100:3 109:21 120:15,16 120:21 121:1,6,8 130:21 134:22,24 135:20,21 136:14 136:20 141:13 165:18 169:2 198:1 203:8 hra 115:17 116:14 116:15,16,19 117:19 118:1,4 119:5,7 120:5 121:3,4,5,7 122:12 124:17,19 125:3,15 126:4 128:11 129:9 137:7,7 140:23 146:25 147:19 149:1 hratype 114:24 human 26:13 27:22 31:16 115:18,22 116:17 121:14 147:12 186:19 hundred 64:10 65:1,2 94:2 130:7,7 132:3 153:15 154:14 184:15 hundredamp 89:18 hydrant 142:10,16 I
id 15:13 17:4 25:9 26:17 68:14 72:1 74:22 97:15 112:9 121:22 123:13 132:14 152:14 161:5 170:22 idea 45:8 ideas 131:16 identification 5:20 182:4 identified 9:10 11:1,4 12:14 51:17 66:3 181:4 183:1 186:14 194:19 identifies 52:11 identify 11:22 115:8 191:3 identifying 194:21 194:23 ier 184:2,6,11,18 ill 5:8 17:12 25:22 34:10 42:3 43:21 46:6 50:24 52:6 64:9 77:12,15 85:11 88:24 102:24 116:22 122:5 124:16 127:11 133:1,8 136:25 139:22 152:19 154:13 168:20 171:3 174:19 177:7 186:21 193:5 197:18,20 204:11 207:7,13 208:2 208:13 illuminate 85:15 illustrated 66:7 97:19 illustrates 93:12 97:10 98:4
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 226 im 5:11,12 7:23,24 8:1,3,3,6,9,11,11 8:13,21,22,22,24 9:3,7 23:11 24:2 24:2 26:16 38:18 41:14 48:12 50:1 56:25 59:8 61:6 61:7 63:8 64:4 65:6 68:14 71:8 71:10 75:1 77:15 79:13 84:8 87:12 90:8 92:25 93:9 96:7 98:23 102:19 104:2 106:25 107:2,13 110:5 111:16 114:13 118:12 120:6 125:7 127:4,9 128:22 131:18,20 132:10 133:24 135:3 137:17,20 156:17 166:6 167:11,23 169:14 170:4 172:25 176:22 177:3 184:5,6 185:8 196:1,7,9 200:3,4,5 imbedded 116:20 immediate 20:1 53:18,22 54:7 172:13 193:2 immediately 20:2 31:15 40:20 61:12 70:9,14,23 107:11,12 167:20 imminent 201:23 impact 12:24 16:7 18:16 37:13 63:15 65:9 99:21 105:23 106:5 107:21,22 162:2 187:22 194:20 195:6 200:2,10 200:16,23 202:5 impacted 47:12 61:1 88:16 201:6 impactful 18:13 impacts 102:20 108:15 imperative 115:4 implement 20:24 31:17,22 33:20 37:23 54:18 65:21 67:17 68:9 68:21 79:23 83:18,21 84:19 90:22 91:10 126:17 192:3 193:5 implementation 51:15,18 52:4 55:4 56:9 84:17 124:12 implemented 14:21 33:21 55:22 80:7 81:23 84:25 106:13 107:16 189:1 implementing 22:14 68:7 78:16 100:6 107:12 195:5 importance 16:10 25:13 36:24 184:10 important 14:3 15:19 16:14 20:4 26:20 29:6 32:25 33:2 37:7 46:9 51:16 64:17 68:18 80:5 109:11 184:8 203:10 204:9,19 207:9 importantly 112:21 imposing 184:6 impression 46:11 improve 181:25 194:24 195:6 improved 177:24 192:7 improvement 3:9 9:4 improvements 177:5 191:25 194:15 improves 181:19 inboard 92:11 inches 88:25 incident 68:12 include 28:2 99:13 99:23 138:6 177:18 179:1 181:14 200:15 included 18:13 105:22 126:25 175:12 178:6,8 183:7 185:11 includes 31:16 91:10 including 13:11 15:4 21:5 incorporated 139:19,21 incorrectly 11:24 increase 138:2 173:23 increased 195:18 204:5 independent 17:10 64:18 80:7 85:18 91:2 125:20 140:4 141:20 178:23 179:19 180:18 181:15,17 204:3,10 independently 16:24 113:24 149:2 153:9 180:23 188:21 index 4:1 indicate 74:20 indicated 16:5 56:1 82:19 132:16 159:7 160:2,14 173:9 206:9 indicating 47:9 55:9 indication 40:14 92:18 103:13 105:8 155:24 156:22 157:6 159:17 indications 38:9 101:19,23 individual 118:4 183:12 individually 67:20 individuals 180:1 industry 115:8 183:21,23,24 184:7,16,24 185:5 190:1,9 194:14,17 industrywide 184:11 influence 28:9 132:20 inform 13:20 information 7:17 13:5,9,18,22,23 13:24 15:24 17:25 38:6 44:19 45:5 79:15 113:21 114:5,9 114:10 123:11 147:2 151:16 176:22,25 183:21 187:6 196:18,18 196:23 197:8 198:16,21 199:5 200:15,22 203:14 204:24 205:5,22 207:10 informs 14:2 inhouse 180:23 initial 24:21,23 26:11 52:13 102:1 162:2 192:22 194:19 initially 19:14,15 99:17 158:17 160:19,22 initiated 185:9 192:20 initiating 202:24 initiative 177:15 injure 189:20 injuries 205:12 injury 18:15 inpo 183:19 184:6 input 44:20 110:12 183:19 inputs 143:16 ins 9:17 insert 175:15,15 175:23 176:4 inside 10:17 40:3 59:21 61:2,4 insight 138:5 insights 17:25 18:23 147:8,14 147:17 151:16 177:16 185:20 194:6 inspect 163:12 inspected 42:8 inspecting 99:16 inspection 10:21 10:24,25 11:4,15 12:7,10,12 13:12 13:14 14:19 16:3 16:21 18:24 160:12 204:2 inspector 2:12,18 8:14 200:25 inspectors 11:4 15:3 install 47:7 52:19 58:19 91:23 installation 23:4 48:23 52:17 53:6 53:12 54:21 55:14 58:14 82:2 85:3 130:24 installations 51:18 51:19 53:9 109:9 130:24 installed 23:6 46:20 48:24 49:7 53:12,14 57:2,20 57:25 58:14,17 59:3,19 64:19 66:10,14 68:16 80:13,22 99:20 126:25 148:5 installing 52:23
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 227 55:12 57:9,18 instance 178:13 183:1 instituted 146:8 instructions 5:23 11:18 33:25 52:16,21 55:11 55:13,19 124:5 124:14 125:1,2 instrument 89:10 92:12,14 insurance 25:18 insure 5:24 11:20 80:25 113:19 174:2 205:16 intact 47:14 108:11 intake 49:14 integrity 133:21 intend 84:6 142:1 intended 85:2 152:10 168:15 intending 18:6 intent 50:14 197:18 interaction 117:14 intercom 6:5 interested 76:21 76:21 86:20 170:22 201:4 interesting 109:22 147:17 interlock 74:4 intermediate 120:14 121:21 internal 123:12 170:20 186:1 187:20 197:13 interviewed 42:1 interviews 159:6 186:3 introduce 6:19 7:9 152:14 208:6 introduction 7:7 introductions 7:22 intrusion 70:12 invalidate 138:9 inventory 20:9 22:3,4,7 28:13 79:8,10,11 86:2 87:7 95:1,9 97:9 138:12,17,21 144:19 145:7 150:6 206:5 inverter 89:10 invoke 54:25 invoked 53:20 82:7 involve 28:17 80:16 86:8 involved 16:23 17:2 28:2 29:11 35:8 54:6 57:23 75:4 76:3 81:14 133:16 182:21 186:19 190:9 involves 28:7 54:6 54:8 72:6 86:13 87:21 88:17 involving 5:18 28:22 isnt 26:13 123:21 147:5 isolate 141:12 142:15 isolated 41:22,23 42:9 44:5,12,25 45:3,10 140:10 160:3,5 165:22 isolation 92:12 issue 14:16 44:6 113:17 117:21 119:24 155:8 159:25 161:17 164:16 166:14 170:6 181:4 189:3 193:10 205:19 issues 9:14 14:1 70:22 99:21 153:23 158:11 173:18,25 186:14 186:25 190:1,2 192:21,23,25 itd 64:25 72:17 item 22:2 23:3 92:16 109:2 130:4 194:18 items 6:2 11:1,3 78:4 181:15 iv 2:5 7:25 8:2,5 8:12,14 ive 24:3 50:13 71:10 78:9 107:24 112:19 147:9 159:11 180:16 188:16 190:9,12 J
james 3:8 9:3,3 76:19 77:4 177:3 180:20 182:11 185:8 186:9,21 187:16 188:3 189:6 193:14,14 201:21 jason 112:21 116:22 124:13 144:19 145:23 174:19 200:12 jeff 2:6,7,8 8:3,6,9 25:7,17 30:13 35:23 40:18 45:16 50:7,23 56:8 59:6 61:11 73:14 81:8 83:3 83:15 84:5 93:13 101:20 105:10 110:22 116:18 126:15 136:7 138:25 140:15 147:8,22 156:17 164:8 166:3 167:19 171:23 199:11,14,16 200:5 jeffs 67:10 170:12 jeremy 3:2 8:16 17:16,22 35:17 54:11 74:22 77:4 101:13 143:23 151:24 170:16 183:22 194:11 job 31:15 49:15,16 117:20 149:10 153:17 170:12 194:21,22 195:18 joe 8:18 19:13 23:3 28:24 31:12 58:23 100:12 110:11 181:7 195:21 196:1 john 3:5,10 8:24 40:22 43:11 71:13 131:24 132:14 152:14 154:20 167:12 170:14 173:6,8 joined 176:16 joseph 3:3 judge 194:8 judgment 95:23 122:8,17 123:1 123:21,23 july 11:2 jump 125:7 jumper 89:24 90:5 90:14,17 jumpering 144:7 june 14:17 justify 133:11 K
kathleen 1:25 210:3,13 keep 81:9 169:1 201:16 keeping 93:2 kennedy 2:4 7:24 7:24 55:3 84:5 85:6 99:12 100:5 100:22 109:19 146:19 147:18 160:18,25 176:7 176:18 188:7 198:9,24 199:3 199:13 200:19 201:7 202:12 key 28:5 32:13,21 44:8,9 59:23 97:20 109:2 113:18 133:17 keyword 185:21 186:5,11 keywords 186:10 186:17 kind 14:18 19:25 24:13 30:1,23 38:15 44:24 47:13 52:7 53:2 91:20 132:9 146:24 147:5 151:1,25 159:19 163:10 169:10 190:11 kits 49:17 66:19 knew 41:23 43:8 43:10 60:24 75:21 80:1 95:18 107:9,10 116:6 137:3 know 16:15 20:2 30:17 36:19 37:9 37:11 40:12 41:20 42:1,5,21 42:23 43:7,16 44:19 45:1,7,10 45:21,21 46:14 48:7 49:20 56:18 67:20 69:20 70:15 79:13 80:5 84:13 91:19 98:11 99:17,18 101:1,15 102:9 102:16,18,21 103:14 105:1,4 107:3,7,8,8,23 108:17 114:7 117:7 121:19 123:15 124:3 129:19 131:19 132:12,20 134:9 140:6,8,9 142:2 143:3 145:23 146:19,23 148:17 149:6 156:25 159:5,24 160:2,9 160:10 164:11,23 165:9 169:7
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 228 170:24 171:20 174:1 187:12,18 188:12,12 195:24 196:5,17 199:4 202:13,15 203:22 205:4 206:19 knowing 43:25 45:1 102:16 110:25 112:6 knowledge 38:16 43:12 45:21 111:7 204:24 known 22:11,13 43:8,12 45:3 kowaleski 3:3 8:18 8:18 17:13,16 23:2,3 28:24,24 29:13 31:12,12 33:3 34:8 36:5 42:11 49:19 56:12,21 58:23 58:23 62:3,9 63:10 66:23 67:7 67:24 68:24 81:2 81:15 82:12 83:1 95:7 99:19 110:10,11 118:2 122:1 126:24 130:12 135:12 143:15 149:19 155:5 170:9 172:8,13 181:6,7 184:23 189:8 192:14,17 194:11 198:22,25 200:21 202:7 205:9 kriss 2:4 7:24 99:19 kv 146:7 L
labeled 91:25 122:21 lack 147:22,22 lacked 179:24 lady 6:19 lag 53:10 laid 60:22 148:1 land 107:6 landed 48:17 language 179:11 196:7 large 147:1 150:6 180:2 185:3 largest 61:13 89:16 lasting 18:16 lastly 109:15 late 172:24 latent 187:21 188:1 laughter 90:10 law 194:13 lay 29:18 60:21 laying 99:15 layout 46:21 47:25 62:23 lead 35:10 107:6 160:9 leader 2:7 8:7 leads 149:15 189:24 leakage 186:25 leaking 95:7 learned 14:25 104:8 178:3 183:19,20,24 190:16 191:8 learnings 181:2 189:11 194:6 leave 7:15 61:9 63:17 69:1 126:16 128:21 138:24 176:10 197:4 leaving 46:11 led 12:13 120:1 160:12 left 6:4,8 63:14 66:14 110:1 125:10 126:16 140:21 145:2 176:20 lefthand 88:6 leg 120:17 134:23 144:8 length 49:2,20,24 58:25 59:1 82:21 198:9 199:18,19 leonard 2:12 8:13 77:20 91:15 155:10 157:15 lessons 14:25 178:3 183:18,20 183:24 190:16 191:8 letter 13:14 14:16 16:1,20 level 96:3,4 183:9 183:12 185:7 189:21 195:3,17 levels 191:21 leverage 181:1 liability 170:25 license 23:14 112:20 licensee 7:12 11:22 16:25 176:23 licensees 9:12 11:20 life 18:14 lift 11:23 14:23 15:6 16:24 17:2 177:21 178:2,4 183:1 lifter 181:23 lifting 15:12 51:4 177:7 lifts 15:10 190:18 light 33:17 lighting 100:22 likewise 26:19 27:19 limit 96:23 157:22 limitation 193:11 194:15 limitations 70:10 117:12 147:20,21 limited 69:8 208:9 line 27:9 39:8,9,10 39:12 40:5 88:2 88:14 92:4 108:13 110:4,6 163:1 lines 5:4 39:23,24 110:6 180:16 207:23 lineup 108:18 link 40:7 linked 53:3 listed 50:19 listen 5:4 6:5 21:9 listening 48:11 132:15 little 14:18 20:20 21:8 24:4 25:9 26:12 36:2,15 40:3 41:16 48:24 49:9 50:2,8 51:14 52:7 53:10 62:21 71:15 74:23 76:17 77:16 82:24 83:16 96:7 111:17 115:24 120:12 121:11 123:7,22 126:12 127:12 131:6 140:5 144:25 147:24 151:25 153:10 154:13 157:18 159:5 162:5 163:11 168:6 170:5 174:15 186:6 load 12:3 15:10,12 27:12 41:7 72:17 88:12 89:16,18 166:25 175:9 178:11,13,16 180:2,2 183:7 190:18 loading 158:2 163:10 loads 62:2 89:15 89:19 106:22 164:14 local 27:7 83:8,10 141:10 165:14 locally 42:5 located 6:3,14 47:3 62:25 88:9,21 91:1 location 48:1,14 64:20 89:25 90:4 locations 55:20 lock 154:10 157:25 173:10 lockout 101:15,17 102:19 104:22 105:1,2,13 111:25 154:1,3 161:12 162:7 172:11 lockouts 102:17,17 log 57:13 71:18 160:13 logic 133:25 134:1 logical 132:8 logs 56:14 160:14 london 27:8 88:2 88:13 92:4 141:11 long 57:21 65:23 91:17 120:14,17 120:21 121:16,21 134:23 137:11,20 166:17 longer 25:9 33:5 36:2,12 60:4 94:19 longterm 60:1,5 61:7 longtime 87:21 look 7:6 17:12,19 26:18 34:17 43:21 45:9 52:9 57:11 58:15,25 69:24 78:5 81:6 81:15 97:22 100:13 105:12,14 105:15 113:5,6 114:8,12 116:11 118:17,20,21,22 120:8 121:22 123:2 125:8 127:11 128:16 130:4,16 133:15 133:16 134:19,25 135:13 137:4
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 229 138:2 140:12 142:7 143:16 145:1 148:17,22 149:1,23 150:13 150:23 151:15 160:4 165:21 166:13 174:7 180:7,9,22 181:2 182:5 185:13 188:6,12,21 193:15,18 204:19 206:5,24 209:4 looked 68:6 92:24 99:22 100:13 113:16 114:20 115:21,23 116:14 124:2,11 133:24 134:20 135:15 138:13,16 145:23 173:2,4,7 179:20 179:22 188:14 193:12 201:22 202:18 looking 32:13 33:5 37:3 42:6 44:4 44:17,22 51:25 60:4,6 67:3 71:3 74:7,9 105:16,18 107:21 117:12,18 119:9 120:10 122:20 125:13 128:22,23 131:6 131:21 132:14,16 135:19 138:4,4 138:15 144:15 151:9 177:20 180:17 182:2 185:17,18,23 186:4,11,12,15 186:15 187:2 193:8,25 194:12 200:8 201:15 203:17 204:23 looks 58:8 137:25 141:1 181:11 182:17 loop 72:23 lose 21:24 52:1 53:19 172:12 loss 10:7,12 18:14 26:25 28:7,8 43:17 58:4 79:12 86:5,14 87:7 96:20 101:14 114:16 150:25 156:15 157:11,12 161:7,8 162:8,17 173:3 lost 21:19,19 28:17 36:7 37:22 60:3 94:25 101:3 104:10 108:16 111:22,22 116:6 162:10,19 171:23 172:14,19 lot 36:12 37:3 46:7 49:3,16,24 50:20 52:18,20 75:22 76:7 78:5,8 81:13 82:2 84:23 84:24,25 90:22 119:13,18 130:18 137:17 138:15 146:19 147:17 164:4 166:23 167:25 189:14 191:12 203:9 lots 39:3 loveless 2:10 8:11 8:11 47:15 54:2 54:2 69:1,2,13 71:2 87:11,12,24 89:14 91:24,24 118:9,9 119:4 127:3,4 128:5,9 128:14,21 129:11 130:3 131:10 135:1,14,25 137:13 140:25,25 141:5,17 144:24 146:24 159:4,4 160:8 174:11 175:2,6,13,20,25 202:2,10 low 122:23 123:5 144:17 145:5 183:3 lower 96:4 123:3 145:8 175:18 M
m 110:2,2 151:23 151:23 160:14 198:7,8 210:6 macro 135:16 magnitude 145:5 149:21 151:5 main 7:8 10:10 15:8 63:15 74:11 76:9 113:3 134:5 141:13 153:7 156:3,20,24 157:4 168:14,23 191:22 maintain 89:9 95:4 maintenance 23:19 80:3 109:8 164:15 187:14 191:20 193:21,24 major 43:20 70:2 191:11 192:25 makeup 20:9 28:23 62:15 86:17,19 87:1 92:6 93:5 94:8,9 94:10,20,23 95:20 96:24,25 109:14 141:18 179:21,23 180:12 making 22:3 34:18 44:17,21 66:19 78:4 82:15 115:21 116:3 136:23 147:19 183:10 man 199:14 manage 112:4 managed 193:13 management 17:1 52:6 177:10 179:8,22 180:9 182:15,23 183:12 190:20 193:15,19 193:20,23 195:2 manager 2:20 3:5 3:6,7,12,14 8:23 8:25 9:2 23:12 23:15,17 35:11 45:7 54:8 93:10 112:15,17 159:12 160:1 166:12 182:19,20 191:20 managers 23:13 191:21 204:15 manifest 188:1 manner 13:23 55:23 60:7 97:20 106:24 152:8 207:12 mans 18:14 manual 165:14 206:23 manually 158:1,4 175:11 marc 2:5 7:11,18 8:1 15:13,16 44:9 55:21 60:8 67:2 74:20 76:21 80:14 100:25 107:25 180:15 197:15 march 5:18 10:1 12:8 16:3 188:9 margin 33:18 37:21 81:17 95:4 100:3,4 109:3 130:17 206:9 mark 203:2 207:19 material 61:2 177:6,23 178:8 179:3 180:19 190:15 materials 30:7 31:9,13 75:23 matrix 191:2,3 203:25 matter 14:12 55:18 140:7 163:7 173:9 matters 9:24 maximum 60:2 61:3 mcc 140:9 mccann 3:10 131:24,24 mccurry 1:25 210:3,13 mckenney 3:4 8:20 8:20 24:1,1 38:12,14 39:16 40:14 46:19 47:17,24 48:12 49:5,12,21 50:12 50:18 51:2,9 54:5 55:7 56:15 56:25 59:12,16 59:18 60:13 61:15 62:21 63:12 64:1,4 65:12,25 66:8 69:24 71:25 73:12,17,19,23 76:17 77:18,22 78:7 79:21 83:10 83:21,25 84:7 85:2 88:4 89:16 90:16,24 91:18 92:3,6 100:19 108:7 127:15,16 127:23 154:20,21 155:1 166:16 168:3,18 mckenneys 98:3 mean 14:5 32:12 33:23 73:11 90:11 94:13 96:8 132:1 134:22 135:19 136:5,10 145:3,8 158:24 meaning 84:12 means 54:20 109:14 155:15 meant 22:22 measured 36:3 measures 148:3 measuring 133:21 mechanical 78:9 140:20 186:19 mechanics 78:10
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 230 mechanisms 79:7 medium 121:17 meet 38:6 meeting 7:3,3 9:18 9:20 14:1 92:24 197:14 208:4,25 209:3,5 210:5 megger 166:20 167:3 meggers 167:9 member 133:14 208:10 members 7:20 9:16,21,23 191:7 197:16,22 207:16 208:3,11,16,24 209:2 memory 131:12 mention 90:13 91:15 mentioned 16:20 28:12 33:3 41:20 73:15 91:16 119:18 157:23 158:25 164:3,23 187:11 203:12 met 35:11,18,21 38:5 137:16 191:7 metering 31:2 method 22:15 114:2,24 134:21 135:8 140:3 146:8,22,25 147:5,9,13 methodologies 22:14 113:16 132:24 206:2 methodology 95:12 115:5,20 126:2,6 146:20 147:16 148:8 149:11 196:19,23 196:24 methodologys 133:12 methods 74:8 86:7 93:6 115:15,16 116:19,21 147:1 mic 69:11 200:20 208:13 microphone 6:22 6:23 middle 102:21 144:22 midnight 209:6 migrated 199:21 migration 154:1 mike 2:14 198:17 199:7,11 miller 160:12 161:4 mind 44:15 45:1 48:10 81:9 139:3 169:14 195:12 196:16 mindset 34:23 169:21 170:17 minimizing 19:6 minimum 168:17 minor 64:12 65:13 65:15,20 66:17 72:15 74:4 191:24 minus 102:22 minute 88:25 94:2 95:16,17 165:6 204:12 205:21 minutes 84:10,14 84:18 94:3 130:22 135:9 146:11 151:22 153:25 161:12 165:3 166:5 172:14 198:3,6 208:10 mismatch 155:24 missed 60:19 missing 87:12 misunderstood 104:4 mitigate 13:16 mitigated 19:2 191:6 mitigating 181:14 194:23,25 mitigation 81:10 183:4,6,11 191:15 mitman 2:8 8:9,9 25:6,7 26:11 34:5,13 40:11,18 40:18 41:11 42:21 49:8 50:1 50:9 61:9,11,16 62:7 63:17,24 64:2 83:15,15,23 84:2,8 93:13,13 93:24 94:12,15 95:18,21 96:2,19 101:20,20 102:2 102:13 104:19,20 110:13 111:13,15 111:21 116:18,19 117:1 120:6,19 121:2,18,24 122:20 123:13,19 124:7 126:15,15 128:1 136:5,9 138:24,25 139:17 140:2 141:23 142:5 147:7,8,24 156:17,17,22 157:9 167:19,19 168:11,25 170:1 188:18 199:16,16 200:18 mitt 199:14 mixing 95:2,12 96:15 mod 35:12,19 36:14,19 92:15 124:25 mode 5:4 77:15 86:10 model 83:2 114:1 114:2,3,12 127:1 129:9,12 130:21 131:12 140:23 143:7,10,11 145:24,25 146:2 146:4 148:8 153:11,12,13 171:11,12,12 173:3,11,16,17 173:19 174:5,7,8 174:13,17 175:3 188:14 modeled 47:22 97:21 128:2 129:8 133:23 140:12,17 152:6 modeling 54:13 75:7 82:8 104:16 104:17 127:5 128:25 131:17 178:9 models 130:1 moderate 120:2 modes 12:18 modification 35:9 52:5 53:7 54:4 88:1 119:15 modifications 15:9 33:25 34:12 116:12 117:16 118:23 119:2 179:14 modified 190:20 modifying 146:2 mold 194:13 moment 50:22 63:9 64:9 101:12 118:10 127:4 208:1 monte 175:25 month 185:9 187:9 months 84:3 185:11 morning 47:19 motor 88:19,20,23 move 6:22,23 19:12,15,22 21:7 22:18 61:1 62:19 72:1 85:24 105:22 116:18 125:8 140:11 152:18,18 165:22 166:1 171:3 172:23,25 176:12 moved 45:4 127:19 127:24 movement 10:1 moving 44:6 117:4 119:9 multiple 51:13,21 62:16 94:9 97:25 128:24 159:12 190:11 191:7 mute 39:15 muted 39:14 mutual 136:21 mutually 70:21 N
n 5:1 n2 92:14 name 24:1 112:14 207:25 names 6:20 8:20 naturalcirc 172:1 nature 13:21 30:11 87:23 119:22 179:6 near 66:6 nearest 6:7 necessarily 91:22 necessary 6:6 62:15 65:21 106:16 140:20 179:18,24 need 7:16 22:6 24:14 31:2,4 37:8 38:6 41:6 51:17 52:11,20 53:18,22 61:12 71:7 76:12,15 77:6,15 78:5,23 85:14,21 87:2 95:5,16 96:10 101:5 105:6 122:2 137:12 139:4 142:15 144:14 148:17,22 149:1 151:12 158:24 159:21 170:19,20 171:7 188:6 193:2 197:8 202:8 206:23
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 231 needed 29:19 30:8 31:13 34:2 37:2 37:12 41:3 45:15 56:10 60:25 61:1 66:22 73:21 75:24 94:19 118:23 119:2 138:1 154:13 158:1,5 164:1 171:19 173:5,19 179:12 181:25 needs 46:14 53:1 196:19 neutral 49:2 never 144:14 168:15 190:8 195:17 196:12 new 13:5 15:24 132:1 175:2 nice 73:6 night 34:2 120:8 137:4 nobodys 69:18 nodes 28:5 noise 39:12 nomenclature 55:15 nominal 94:1 131:13,15 173:24 non 62:12 191:17 nonborated 94:13 94:16 nonconservative 142:21 nonfunctional 40:15 41:10 nonpermanently 148:5 nonproceduraliz...
147:10 nonrisk 176:12 nonvital 27:1,10 39:1,2,7,9,17 40:6 41:1 48:8 72:11 75:17 88:12,23 103:2 152:25 154:8 163:24 noon 45:20 normal 24:11 30:22 39:6 48:1 66:3 81:12,12 93:15 94:5 108:17 130:18 134:21 135:17 149:21,24,25 150:11 151:3 153:20 156:9,19 156:21,24 157:11 166:7 169:11,12 172:4,7,8,18 206:12 normally 30:16 91:17 93:16 132:9 188:20,23 north 6:10 11:25 note 13:25 14:4 16:20 19:8 27:6 86:18 125:20,24 126:9 noted 173:5 notes 56:22 notice 7:3 144:21 noticed 45:24 notification 10:18 nrc 6:21 7:9,10,13 7:15,25 8:2 9:22 11:7,11,15 12:7 12:10,14 13:3,21 13:22 14:5,10,14 15:3 21:10 39:14 77:1 85:12 114:4 114:23 115:5 138:12 146:4 153:11,12 171:11 171:12 173:3 174:8 197:4 nrcs 9:8 143:10 nrr 2:7,9,20 8:7,10 nuclear 1:9 2:19 5:11,13,14,16,19 8:17 9:2,4,18 17:23 18:8 46:1 184:16 185:4 197:3 200:25 210:5 nuked 188:17 number 48:10 67:19 93:1,2,5 97:3 138:7 147:1 157:22 198:16 204:5 numbers 26:17 50:13 123:11 128:6 133:24 134:18 143:21 149:11 numeric 125:14 O
o 5:1 objective 18:1 28:14 113:18 133:5 194:5 196:3,17 objectives 152:20 observation 9:16 78:15 192:10 observe 15:11 observed 15:3,5 obtained 114:3 obviously 18:14 21:6 50:3 76:8 121:8 162:18 203:22 occ 52:10 occur 74:23 157:8 162:7 165:2 183:9 188:8 191:13 occurred 5:18 14:6 18:3 70:10 71:16 81:3,4 82:11 130:13,14,15 131:7 153:15 172:10,11,16 184:4 185:10 186:12 188:14 190:10 195:22 205:12 occurring 75:11 100:18 180:11 occurs 128:24 oclock 45:23 octoberseptember 174:15 offer 9:11 68:14 76:24 85:6,11 132:14 133:1,8 149:13 207:7 offered 16:21 office 8:2 210:9 officer 8:19 offline 107:15,15 offsite 10:8,12 20:11,16 21:16 21:19 22:1 23:5 23:9 29:16 30:2 33:7 38:22 40:7 43:18 61:12 66:5 97:18 107:5,10 116:7 123:24 132:18 137:2 150:3,12,16,22 150:24,25 151:7 152:22,23 154:18 159:1 162:8 163:17 164:19 oftentimes 53:10 okay 34:14 38:11 39:25 50:9 70:1 83:13 84:10 85:24 87:24 88:4 98:10 101:25 104:22 111:20 112:13 122:19 123:18 128:18 139:2 151:24 159:20 165:13 167:11 168:16 172:22 173:5 175:13 176:14 177:3 182:10 200:12,18 204:25 once 7:14 27:4 52:12 99:7 110:24 137:14 165:2,6 178:5 ones 30:10 50:5 72:8 77:5 169:4 ongoing 182:5 online 6:17 7:2 80:3 130:20 onset 70:9 onsite 12:6 21:16 47:16 107:5 114:18 123:24 op 177:18 open 9:15 196:23 197:21 207:15,23 opened 42:8 106:22 110:6 203:13 opening 7:9,11 9:7 15:14 17:11,14 17:17 195:12 operability 110:17 operable 103:12 103:15,24 110:18 164:21 operate 175:11 operated 27:4 33:12,13 106:14 operating 8:19 16:16 33:25 59:19 82:24 83:8 83:10 111:11 112:20 117:13 156:10,10 163:9 172:9 184:24 operation 32:20 33:5 68:3 103:17 110:16 operational 12:18 29:20 60:2,5,21 operations 3:5,6 5:17 8:23,25 23:12,19 27:25 28:1 33:19,22 59:22 83:9 109:8 133:14 134:4 173:10 204:15 operative 104:13 operator 5:2 20:23 38:9 70:11,24 84:14 102:7 106:12,15 110:3 110:5,9 116:4 137:5,19,21 138:1 142:11
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 232 143:3,3 165:4,14 174:1,23 175:1,3 175:10 207:20,22 208:15,17 operators 10:18 19:4 25:14 26:19 34:1 35:2 40:15 40:19 41:6 42:25 44:10,16,20 45:1 76:3 84:20 95:18 152:7 155:25 156:12,15,23 159:7 161:1,3 162:23 163:2 166:24 167:2,14 169:16 170:13 171:6 172:17 195:16 196:10 204:20 opinion 146:23 opinions 14:10 opportunity 5:6 9:12 15:23 16:10 17:24 32:4 60:24 85:17 103:10 132:11 176:9,13 196:25 197:17 opposed 37:23 opposite 48:20 73:1 81:24 89:3 150:9 ops 52:10 53:15 optimum 33:20 option 12:5 49:23 50:16 55:14,17 57:6 58:22 59:1 59:5,5,7,12 62:3 62:4 72:10 73:2 75:12 130:25 131:1,1 options 27:15 29:23,24 31:14 38:17 49:23 50:3 51:13,21 52:1 55:3,5 56:19 59:1 62:16 68:2 73:6 76:6,20 87:8 98:1,13 100:4 152:22 order 31:21 55:11 55:13,19 75:9 93:11 124:14 140:17 141:15 145:4 149:21 151:5 197:25 ordering 75:23 orders 34:2 137:4 139:6 organization 23:16 27:17 78:16 109:7 183:13 193:24 organizational 191:10 organizations 23:24 originally 174:20 outage 25:2 27:21 30:24 51:5,7 63:5 68:8 81:12 81:12 90:15,18 90:18 91:16,17 92:1 109:10 130:15 144:2 149:24,25 150:2 150:11 151:3 188:15 206:12 outages 24:12,12 89:2,5,6 90:17 90:25 91:21 117:18 119:19 outcome 14:3 76:14 151:11 outdated 146:25 outline 197:18 outlined 113:15 output 42:12,19 44:13 66:25 72:14 122:1 outside 60:25 61:3 66:24 134:9 168:23 185:15,25 197:13 overall 85:16 105:14 143:20 146:15 153:9 202:5 overarching 46:8 148:18 overestimation 126:13 overhead 5:24 10:2 11:20 46:22 47:24 62:22 64:9 64:22 89:20 overlap 187:25 overlapping 71:12 override 157:4,5 oversee 191:15 oversight 16:23 17:1,6 23:21 177:13 181:5,19 182:21 184:19 185:1,7 186:6 187:4,4,7 189:13 190:3,12 191:1,4 191:9,11,19,22 193:13 194:12,15 194:25 195:2,7 203:25 204:1,5 205:16 oversights 182:13 overspeed 186:22 188:2,7 overview 21:8 22:18 153:14 overwhelming 146:6 owe 134:8 P
p 5:1 110:2,2 151:23,23 156:14 160:14 198:7,8 210:6 p40 92:8 p66 86:15 94:20 package 109:16 178:7 page 4:3 48:10 58:5 62:22 64:22 67:25 89:21 pages 210:7 paint 19:25 38:1 painted 21:8 panel 18:12 148:10 paper 53:24 papers 91:19 paperwork 54:23 parallel 48:25 49:3 53:5,11 55:5 57:17 59:5 65:3 66:21 67:9,19 68:5 72:25 73:16 80:8 97:14,19 107:13 108:5,5 109:12 131:4 parameter 126:14 parameters 19:22 part 5:22 11:17 13:2 17:4 21:20 29:22 36:16 47:23 56:6,17 99:22 105:21 108:9 118:12 125:2 182:11 183:6 185:23 186:2 187:3 196:4 200:14,17 202:2 204:9 205:4 participant 5:4 183:25 participants 7:8 184:16 participate 129:17 participated 183:22 participating 193:24 194:11 particular 13:13 36:12 49:15,23 51:6 58:22 69:2 72:10 88:5 105:25 113:17 116:17 117:19 119:16 120:5,18 125:9,16 126:14 127:16 128:20 130:2 135:23 137:7 138:14 140:18 155:5 168:18 174:3 178:10,13,25 179:22 180:4,10 182:19,25 186:11 201:4 204:7 205:7 particularly 15:19 179:10 181:20 186:9 204:17 party 180:14,17 181:17 passive 86:8 97:7 path 28:22 33:16 53:11,21 55:4,5 57:24 58:1,16 59:13 60:10,15 60:17,18,23 62:15,19,20 64:18,19 65:10 66:15 67:3,4 69:2 72:1,2,4,24 72:25 75:3 83:6 85:25 86:12,22 87:14,15 88:17 91:2 97:14,15 98:12,23,24 99:5 108:8 127:17 129:7 130:11,25 139:18,19 153:1 153:3 163:4 174:3 paths 20:9 21:18 24:16,19 28:12 28:15,19 29:1,8 29:19 37:3 47:22 53:5 54:25 56:1 57:16 61:17 65:4 65:24 67:4,23 68:5 73:15 74:21 75:8 76:12,25 77:7 79:22 80:5 80:11 81:10,10 83:19 85:13 97:11,14,14,19 98:16 101:7 107:1 109:2,13 113:14 126:19 129:1,4,4,22
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 233 131:4 132:3 138:23 145:14,15 152:3 171:10 201:16 206:20 pathways 128:24 128:25 patience 203:6 patiently 197:17 pattern 128:20 paying 73:13 pdg 103:12 peer 192:4 peers 184:9 people 6:24 18:11 30:7 42:22 56:22 84:24 109:9 130:8 169:1 190:6 percent 12:20 95:4 132:4 153:15 178:16 perfectly 112:12 perform 12:3 79:24 114:24 124:6 126:4 143:4 152:9 179:12,19 185:9 190:24 performance 3:8 9:4 12:14 17:9 190:2 192:4,21 performed 14:24 16:18 19:9 90:14 112:23 117:17 144:16,20 175:15 177:21 178:12,20 178:23 185:14,25 200:16 performing 41:14 51:5 167:25 175:14 185:15 period 37:9 94:20 159:9 161:6 permanent 65:16 perseverance 203:5 person 78:12 personal 56:16,22 195:23 personally 18:16 18:17 107:2 139:17 184:14 personnel 6:21 12:2 14:20 15:18 17:2 27:25,25 28:1 33:1 43:4 79:23 80:1 186:3 201:4 202:13 perspective 41:20 41:25 51:24 92:25 97:7 105:12 119:14 133:14 134:4 138:5 144:11 165:1 170:15 203:7,11 204:13 204:17 206:2,11 peter 2:20 phase 38:11 49:1 70:25 phone 5:7 6:24 9:17 39:12,14,15 98:7 160:11 161:4,16 176:20 197:16 207:17,21 208:6,16 209:3 photograph 48:13 88:24 90:1 photographs 65:14 physical 46:22 62:23 64:20 physically 64:14 98:4 163:7 pick 194:2 picked 111:4 picture 18:8 20:3 29:14 38:1 46:24 66:7 68:25 164:5 168:21 piece 18:13 60:3 192:22 place 19:5 35:15 73:4 87:16,18 112:7 117:8,8 124:4 127:17,19 131:9 132:1 137:5,12 144:3 173:10 183:4,16 190:3,8,25 191:5 191:13,16 placed 53:20 places 39:3 168:15 placing 35:12 plan 23:17 30:9 33:19 67:17 107:12 118:17 150:2,11 164:19 183:4,6,14 191:5 planned 119:2 planning 3:7 9:2 30:10 31:24 52:14,15 53:2 68:7,11 77:2 112:16,17,19 plans 24:19 28:19 30:6 52:1 67:14 68:21 80:16,23 97:17 107:17 183:11,16 plant 16:18 20:5 24:23 32:14,18 32:25 33:1 34:19 39:6 43:4 48:3 48:20 54:8 74:14 75:20 76:4 77:24 78:1 80:25 81:4 82:3 105:7 107:12,19 116:8 116:10 131:19,19 140:8 150:19 151:2 152:13 153:23 155:21 156:19 181:10,10 185:4,11 189:3 189:21 190:5,11 195:15 204:20 206:14 plants 5:14 8:19 19:5 20:1 93:14 190:11 play 34:24 141:7 187:4 202:16 205:6 please 5:7 6:22 13:15,20,25 39:15 50:7 61:11 69:11 85:23 117:2 123:14 152:18 155:13 207:24 208:6,24 plug 135:22 plus 58:25 65:4 69:15 93:23 100:9 podium 6:23 point 17:12 19:3 19:20,24 26:13 28:25 36:7,8 38:4,18 41:2,4,5 41:17 45:7 47:8 47:10 51:3,16 52:12 53:15 55:21 60:14 63:5 66:3,5,17 69:6 70:2 71:2,24 73:1 81:17 85:11 87:11 93:14 95:23 97:15 101:17 103:13 109:20 110:15 113:3 118:3,25 127:13,19 128:19 129:1 137:17,19 137:24 139:20 140:2 144:22 145:3,20 148:18 149:16,20,23 153:24 154:3,7 154:12,19 155:14 155:21 159:2,16 159:19 160:24 161:9,18,25 163:9,15 164:17 164:18 165:12,18 165:24 175:16,23 178:21 193:19 194:9 201:13 204:8 pointed 68:19 pointing 82:5 points 17:18 40:17 42:12,18 64:13 64:20 66:24 123:17 173:1 policy 14:8 pool 22:4,21,25 27:11 32:24 33:11 86:17,19 87:17,20 89:4 92:8,8 94:21 95:1,2,22 poor 90:19 119:23 160:22 populated 209:5 portable 74:15 141:8 portion 47:12,13 88:6 115:21 116:15,16 117:19 118:11,15 119:7 124:21 126:3,4 207:14 portions 10:5 141:17 position 13:2,11 35:13 51:24 112:18 positioning 60:1 possible 171:16 possibly 19:1,20 21:24 post 46:20 88:12 95:19 116:6 117:8 156:19 161:14 posted 25:23 postevent 149:22 posttrip 153:17 155:12 161:23 172:11 postulated 32:10 152:13 potential 40:25 44:1 189:16 200:23 potentially 9:9 11:5 67:22 power 5:14 10:8 10:13,15 12:21
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 234 15:3 20:8,10,11 20:17 21:11,14 21:16,16,19 22:1 23:4,9 24:11,14 24:17,20 27:7,7 27:9,12,15 28:13 28:18,22 29:11 29:16 30:22,25 31:4 32:22 33:8 33:17 34:15 36:18,22 37:15 38:13,21,25 39:6 39:21 40:8,9 43:18 45:14 53:16 55:24 56:10 57:4 61:6 61:8,12,13 62:5 62:15 63:18,20 63:25 66:5 68:16 71:7 73:5 74:13 74:18 79:1 80:17 80:20 81:25 82:8 82:18 83:7,12 86:4,8 88:2,14 89:2,4,5 90:7 92:5,7,12,21 93:4,7 97:18 101:6 102:6,11 102:12,15,22,25 103:3,15,16,21 103:24 104:6 105:2,3,5,7,9 106:24 107:10 108:2,14,15,18 110:18,20,24 111:12,21,22,22 112:4 113:7,8,12 114:12,16,18 116:7 123:25 126:25 132:18 133:22 137:2,11 137:12,22,25 139:1,8,11 149:24 150:3,3,4 150:12,15,21,22 150:24,25 151:7 152:21,22,24 153:15 154:4,17 158:6,10,13 159:1,2 161:17 162:6,9,14,18,19 162:20 163:16,17 163:22 164:20 167:6 169:24 170:3,4 171:16 171:19 173:5 202:24 powered 35:5 75:19 153:22 158:7 powering 92:15 ppm 95:5 pra 112:21,25 114:10 129:16 152:6 practice 119:20 130:19 preclude 194:9 predict 98:20 106:21 preliminarily 5:21 11:8,16 preliminary 12:4 13:4 15:22 16:4 26:8 203:17,19 premise 16:15 130:12 prepare 30:23 prepared 30:18 preparing 18:4 prescribed 86:6 95:13 presence 192:7 present 13:5 18:12 86:1 145:23 196:14,17 presentation 5:5 7:12,14 17:17 19:14 21:4 24:16 27:14 30:4 50:19 80:10 109:1 113:22 116:1 117:7 119:12 121:10 146:18 176:6 presentations 37:20 presented 13:20 25:19 80:12 92:23 106:20 126:20 201:16 206:20 207:2 preserve 92:17 president 3:2,3,10 8:17 17:23 35:18 press 5:7 pressure 141:14 presumably 174:17 pretty 30:12 52:19 74:1 99:18 144:12 171:10 172:25 173:21 prevent 87:6 98:25 preventative 187:13 previous 46:25 58:24 112:18 113:4 previously 25:9,24 112:20 139:20 202:18 primarily 189:12 primary 13:25 74:8 75:8 82:21 94:17 184:5 principles 121:5 printed 6:13 prior 15:2 23:9 30:15 36:22 54:12 priorities 32:11,17 32:21 34:18,20 86:24 92:25 93:8 93:10 97:6 109:7 152:11 162:5 prioritize 118:21 priority 34:25 60:3 79:2,10 92:20 97:16 98:2 141:9 162:16 164:18 probabilistic 132:10 probabilities 130:6 147:12 probability 28:9 105:13,20 106:8 108:16 113:11 115:22 116:17 120:2 122:21 131:21 132:2,17 132:20 134:24 135:18,18 136:6 136:10 137:9 143:14 148:18 170:10 174:10,14 175:18,24 183:3 188:13 probable 101:14 probably 26:20 31:23 85:7 121:9 131:18 137:21 138:8 149:5,7 198:3 problem 29:25 30:1 97:18 98:1 101:16,18 102:19 103:13 127:23 155:23 156:13,23 205:18 problems 61:23 169:1 procedural 45:14 158:4 162:22 163:2 166:7 179:2 proceduralized 96:25 164:4 171:6 206:17,21 procedurally 20:22 96:12 152:20 166:8 procedure 43:23 86:6,14 94:8,25 103:17,18 115:18 121:14 122:13 156:9,10,11 159:21 163:12 165:19 172:9,18 177:6,11,23,23 177:24 179:3,4 179:13,14,20 180:7 181:11 182:6,14,15,20 190:20 procedures 5:23 11:18 15:10 30:18 31:19,20 43:17,17,18 96:21 110:19,20 117:7 123:12 124:20 139:20,21 141:19 147:22 148:7 157:22 171:19 173:10 179:7 188:23 190:15 proceed 6:10 85:23 112:11 149:17 195:5 proceedings 4:5 210:5,8 process 9:9 12:10 22:10 29:11 34:8 34:11 35:7,8,9 35:21 51:15 52:5 52:6,15 54:5,14 54:15 55:1,5,19 55:22,24 56:9 74:25 78:4,25 79:1,14 124:3,25 139:9 146:21 148:11 182:8 187:19 190:3,8 195:4 203:25 207:8 processes 9:11 30:21 52:8,22 54:10 67:13 139:15 181:2 194:8 produce 190:5 products 180:24 profile 153:10 program 2:14 175:15 176:4 180:19 progress 136:23 189:12 192:19 193:6
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 235 prohibit 99:8 project 2:20 177:10 179:8,21 179:23 180:9,11 181:20,22 182:1 182:6,15,18,20 182:22 190:19,24 191:1,2,20 193:14,19,20,23 194:22 projected 146:4 projectrelated 193:8,9 projects 2:2,4,11 2:15,17 7:25 182:21 190:22 191:12,24 192:23 193:13 prompt 93:4 prompted 207:25 promptly 33:10 proof 91:19 properly 16:18 27:4 propose 93:11 109:19 198:17 proposed 30:10 77:8 206:6 proposing 22:11 prorated 99:25 prospective 202:19 protect 32:25 35:1 116:9,9 118:19 118:24 protecting 32:22 32:23,23 62:11 169:15 protection 33:19 59:14 141:25 150:2,11 protective 59:10 protects 190:4 proven 43:25 provide 13:2 17:6 17:13 24:11 25:18 26:4 28:15 28:22 29:17 38:5 38:25 39:20 52:14 53:1,16 68:2 73:2,6 74:22 89:15 94:10 96:15 97:9 110:11 113:2,23 121:12,15 122:2 124:5 132:25 146:4 151:17 177:15 194:25 196:22 198:4,20 200:21,23 206:1 206:22 208:2 provided 18:24 22:24 23:21 25:3 27:20,22 29:20 34:1 55:23 57:6 58:2 59:8 74:18 94:19 103:3 111:12 114:1,9 148:20 153:12 173:2,7 174:16 179:16 183:20 196:18 204:14 206:25 provides 27:15 94:20 126:12 206:9 providing 52:24 108:18 177:24 191:22 195:3 200:22 203:7 204:5 pruett 2:16 public 7:3,21 9:15 9:16,21,24 19:7 19:11 197:16,22 207:16 208:4,11 208:24,24 209:2 209:3,4 publicly 6:17 puddles 168:22 pull 113:1 126:5 128:16 129:5,6 157:25 159:17 163:1 173:10 175:10 pulled 45:2 126:12 159:18 pulling 52:19 66:12,18 pullto 154:9 pulltolock 106:15 157:19 pump 31:7 49:13 50:25 72:11,13 74:6 79:25 86:13 86:15,18 89:4,10 89:12,12,13 90:7 92:8,8 94:1 125:19,23 134:2 139:8 140:1 141:2,4 157:7 162:12 163:19,23 165:11 186:23 199:23 pumps 62:16 86:10 140:20 141:9,14 142:9 161:8 171:24 pure 148:2 purge 92:11,11 purpose 13:1,25 86:21 136:22 pursue 43:16 50:15 68:1,4 75:2 76:5 97:19 97:25 138:22 152:12 162:20 pursued 29:8,10 42:4,9 45:11,14 67:8 127:16 131:3 162:14 pursuing 67:18,23 75:15 87:8 107:1 152:6 purview 134:9 put 19:17 36:10 48:1,15 53:25 70:3 78:20 90:8 108:7,8 120:13 124:3 126:10 133:22 135:23 144:3 146:25 147:3 172:20 180:8 181:7 183:4,16 187:13 189:21 191:4,13 191:16 195:15 196:10,11 199:19 putting 30:17 59:21 75:22 94:16 127:9 190:7,25 pyle 3:14 Q
qualified 57:5 79:24 qualitative 120:2 122:21,23 quality 180:23 198:10,12 quantification 125:7,15 126:7 127:9 quantified 145:24 quantify 125:9 126:21 128:19 143:7 quantitative 122:24 quarters 54:22 question 5:6,8 6:22,25 7:13 25:6,11 26:8 32:2,3,7,9 36:23 38:7 41:22 42:5 42:23,24 44:15 47:20 49:4 50:15 56:7 58:24 59:7 60:9 67:11 70:8 73:14 77:10,21 79:14,18 83:4 91:14 97:2 98:8 99:6 101:1 102:10,24 104:4 104:12,19 106:11 106:25 108:14,25 110:17,23 111:8 111:11 112:9 120:25 121:13,24 123:19 128:5 138:10 140:15 143:22 144:3,13 155:11 157:16 159:10,19 160:10 161:2 163:8 165:25 167:23 171:22 174:19 180:16,21 187:10 187:17,19,24 192:12 201:11 202:1,3,11 207:24 208:1,7 208:12 questioning 76:2 142:18 questions 7:16,18 7:20 9:20,23 19:21 25:10 39:24 46:10,18 54:1 62:20 68:13 72:1 76:1 77:16 82:15 85:14,21 87:10 97:3 98:6 99:11,18 104:21 108:19,24 109:18 110:15 112:23,25 120:7,11 129:13 129:14,15,16,18 133:2 134:7,11 146:20 149:14 152:19 156:4 176:11,21,22,24 189:7 195:9 197:7,18,20,22 197:24 198:12,14 199:14 203:2,10 205:23 207:8,13 207:15,21,23 208:1,9,14,15,18 208:19,21,21 queues 44:24 quick 111:6 112:3 112:5 120:8,20 153:14 188:18 208:2 quickly 7:6 30:12 32:18 145:22 172:25 187:11 quiet 155:3 quite 49:14 58:12
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 236 58:21 75:1 102:23 106:9 152:2,23 153:2 177:8 188:4 190:12 199:20 quizzing 129:15 quorum 85:8 quote 36:7 R
r 5:1 rachel 2:23 rack 183:2 radiological 100:21 raise 208:12 ran 47:3 48:3 64:24 83:11,12 168:4 175:22 176:4 randomly 136:1 range 13:16 123:5 123:5 130:7 144:20 146:12 rate 79:11 94:1 raychem 55:12,12 rcs 86:17 94:18,21 94:24 95:6 109:14 reach 14:14 170:21 197:19,23 201:13 203:10 207:9 reached 46:12 99:7 react 80:15 reactor 2:2,4,6,10 2:11,13,15,16 7:25 8:4,12,14 10:9 12:19,22 15:18 22:25 28:23 87:22 92:10,11 93:3 95:2 99:8 149:25 150:14 153:16,18 155:19,20 156:7 156:8,12 157:3,5 161:8 171:23 176:11 203:24 205:19 read 121:19 135:1 readily 25:19 44:16 186:12 ready 12:19 22:18 110:7 176:7 real 37:25 60:20 113:23 138:14 145:22 195:23,25 realistic 37:18 81:6,7 113:20 114:17 132:16 133:1 151:10 189:15 203:13 204:11 205:4,21 realistically 36:25 really 20:15,23 41:8 46:12 50:19 75:22 76:15 85:21 96:17 109:22 117:20 127:7 129:20 134:12 138:9 143:20 159:14 161:17 162:24 164:21 168:24 174:12 176:12 203:5 204:13 reason 59:18 60:16 73:3 91:5 111:25 149:5 155:1 reasonable 52:3 122:18 133:16,24 134:15,16 146:8 148:24 149:4,9 149:21 151:4,10 195:14 206:7,25 reasonably 97:23 reasons 35:25 reassembled 178:19 recall 67:24 188:5 202:20 recalling 187:14 receive 9:23 13:22 13:22 196:24 received 15:11 56:1 recirc 86:13,15 90:7 recognition 67:18 70:15 recognize 22:6,9 24:18 87:7 104:10 196:5 recognized 116:8 116:10 recognizing 133:25 205:10 recommendation 187:13 reconfiguration 72:16 reconfigurations 74:5 reconstruct 37:1 record 6:20 207:24 records 56:8,13 recover 21:14 27:12 33:6 38:13 71:4 98:19 106:24 114:17 119:10 148:19 173:11 recoverable 26:1 recovered 33:9 recoveries 20:16 127:6,6 138:17 145:13 recovering 28:18 93:1 recovery 20:8,21 21:11,23 23:8,10 23:18,25 24:17 28:12,13 29:18 33:7,16,20,21 35:10 36:2 37:3 43:20 60:1,5,22 60:24 61:7 66:6 70:20,25 75:19 77:25 98:21 102:6 106:14 117:24 124:22 125:9,12,13,18 125:21,22,23 126:8,10,25 128:20 129:12 130:2 132:23 133:18 134:23 138:12,14,21 140:18,22 142:12 143:8 144:19 145:2 146:1,9 147:12 148:18 150:8 152:21 153:7,19 155:19 155:20 156:8,12 156:16 161:22,23 162:14 173:14,16 201:1,24 205:25 206:4,16 red 11:9,13,14 39:19,23 40:5 73:8 89:5,9 92:12 103:1 111:12,16 153:4 153:22 154:5,18 158:6 163:20 203:17 204:1 rediagnose 165:3 rediagnosed 162:15 172:17,20 redirecting 55:18 reduce 195:7 reduces 153:9 reducing 19:10 redundancy 68:17 redundant 158:13 reenergize 62:2 170:7 reenergized 34:7 166:20 refer 27:8 34:8 reference 71:24 145:10 148:15 referenced 16:2,21 referred 88:2 referring 70:9 101:25 refill 96:6 refine 37:10 refining 52:25 reflect 67:18 82:10 190:16 198:10,11 reflected 193:2 reflecting 98:23 reflective 97:21 refocus 151:25 refuel 90:17 refueled 12:20 refueling 30:23,24 51:4 144:2 refuelling 25:2 89:6 refurbished 178:4 reg 155:23 156:3 156:14,23 regard 151:21 regarding 15:22 17:5 26:9 38:7 97:13 110:15 121:16 139:25 187:24 199:14 204:18 205:9,16 206:2,12 regardless 143:5 region 2:5 7:25 8:2 8:4,12,14 regional 2:5 7:11 8:1 14:13 15:16 regular 80:3 regulatory 1:9 3:8 3:10,12,14 5:12 5:15,16 9:4,8,12 9:19 11:6 12:5,9 197:3,21 204:1 207:14 210:5 reinforce 182:12 related 12:17 14:1 14:6 15:10 97:3 106:11 110:17 187:10 191:18 relating 114:11 relation 70:15,19 105:23 113:17 134:18 138:12,16 144:16 relationship 91:3 190:11 relative 14:12 89:25 90:4 97:11
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 237 182:1 relatively 146:3 197:25 relay 42:6 45:9 160:4 165:20 166:2,13,17 167:2 relaying 31:2 62:11 relays 99:24 released 194:14 relevant 13:9 reliability 2:8 26:13 54:7 115:18 121:14 147:13 150:23,24 187:25 reliably 33:11,13 relied 122:7 reloaded 95:3 reluctance 169:3,9 170:14 reluctant 198:4 rely 62:2 86:9 92:7 92:12 93:6 relying 67:21 80:16,22 96:14 remained 73:9 202:22 remains 108:19 remarks 7:10,11 7:19 9:7 15:14 17:11,14,17 189:6 203:3 remember 96:20 122:22 167:20 remind 24:15 reminder 6:18,20 14:9 48:9 208:24 remote 88:10 200:20 remotely 91:1 removal 15:4 32:19,23 33:10 33:14 86:5,14 94:25 96:21 158:14 199:23 repair 15:4 23:18 72:9 74:3 134:22 135:20 repaired 16:19 64:14 67:1 73:4 repairing 15:7 66:20 repairs 65:13,15 65:16,20,22 66:18 repetitive 91:20 rephrase 40:19 replace 49:13 151:7 replacement 14:24 15:5 79:25 replacing 49:17 95:9 report 12:8 13:12 13:15 16:3,21 18:24 23:16 28:6 40:23 41:23 193:10 reported 1:23 210:4 reporter 210:4 reporters 4:6 reports 185:20 186:1,16 193:18 194:1 repowered 27:4 represent 14:11 represented 151:5 request 7:4 requested 9:13 199:5 requests 198:16 199:10 require 30:17 150:2,5 156:9 180:8 required 66:14 95:19 96:12 97:11 149:23 150:19 151:3,4 206:13 requirement 183:7 requirements 11:6 15:12 150:13,15 151:6 179:2,2 190:21 requires 150:16,16 180:13 requiring 183:10 researched 146:7 resident 2:12,18 46:1 200:25 resource 31:17 41:18 117:12 189:24 204:4 resources 21:1 27:23 30:7 31:9 68:4 75:23 78:2 78:19,20 79:2 109:4 116:11 118:7,22 129:5 138:22 139:4 171:18 185:16 201:12,17 respect 99:14 179:10,21 180:3 186:13 187:3,6 respective 57:8 respectively 204:15 respond 27:15 52:2 106:12 139:23 152:8 174:19 responding 24:23 75:4 77:6 response 10:16 20:1 23:15 27:17 28:20 29:2 32:10 76:8 81:6,7 82:7 106:12 109:5,7 130:9 153:17 155:12,25 161:14 169:11 189:9 200:11 responsibilities 109:10 responsibility 5:13 183:12 responsible 111:5 restart 16:19 109:25 110:8 111:6 restating 146:10 restoration 60:18 75:17 106:19,22 140:17 restorations 88:12 restore 29:15,21 45:14 60:11 103:18 110:24 112:3,4 113:7 132:18 141:14 restored 10:15 55:23 57:4 80:20 113:8 137:2 139:11 restoring 36:22 56:10 86:21 92:21 113:12 137:25 restrict 70:24 restricted 69:4 114:4 restrictions 69:19 restrooms 6:3 result 10:14 18:18 26:24 76:9,14 77:1 101:4 133:15 154:1 162:2 180:11 181:4 195:15 resulted 5:20 10:7 67:15 195:17 resulting 10:12 128:19 results 12:4 16:6 26:16 113:2,23 114:2 125:15 127:14 133:7 134:16 143:9,12 143:21 144:17 145:25 175:17 184:11 187:9 retain 56:8 rethinking 132:7 return 15:3 review 11:3 13:23 15:9 17:10 34:11 85:18 114:5 120:20 133:10 176:25 177:18,20 177:25 178:23 179:19 180:18 185:10 186:2 199:25 201:22 reviewed 15:6 28:4 114:1 115:7 116:13 182:22 reviews 14:20 34:12 181:15 revised 179:7 180:7 revisit 142:22 143:20 revolutionary 146:22 richard 3:7 9:1 104:14 105:10 110:10 112:15 right 6:8 17:22 19:17 24:2 32:4 35:23 36:11,14 37:15 39:8,17 48:14 49:10 51:6 53:5,8 55:8 61:15 63:14,14 64:6 66:13 67:4 67:19 70:3 76:8 77:15,17,24 78:8 78:11 81:1 82:7 82:9,11 84:4 85:7 87:16 91:20 95:11 99:3 101:8 106:6 107:20 108:9,18 110:7 111:13 122:22,24 123:11 124:9 125:7,8,17 127:8 127:9,13 128:4 129:25,25 130:1 130:1,5 132:1 136:3,11 140:13 141:1 142:4 145:21 146:15 147:2 148:9 149:6 151:19 157:2 160:17,22
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 238 161:19 162:3 163:11 166:10 167:1,21,23 168:19 170:16 176:2,14 188:2 192:13 200:5 208:14 rigor 195:3 rigorous 18:20 133:10 ris 148:1 risk 2:8 8:7,9,10 9:9 11:7,11,13 11:14 12:15,17 12:25 15:25 16:4 16:7 17:19,20 18:2,9,25 19:2,6 19:10 22:12 24:25 26:8 27:18 28:5 30:10 33:6 36:16 37:4 47:22 56:2 68:14 71:3 76:24 84:12,13 84:22 85:16 86:1 87:13 97:7 104:24 105:15,23 109:23 112:17,19 113:15,20 118:4 122:5 126:13 127:13 129:16 132:10,17 133:1 139:12 146:9,12 148:9 149:9,11 149:21,21 151:5 151:15 153:10 174:9,22 176:8 176:10,16 183:4 183:6,11 185:3 187:18 189:21 191:1,3,14,18 195:7,14,18 196:13,21 199:8 199:24,25 200:2 200:3 202:13 203:13,15,19,21 203:23 204:11 205:5,14,21 207:4,6 risks 181:11 194:22 road 188:19 roads 6:10 robinson 41:20 robust 181:11 190:3,7 rocket 84:22 role 23:15,16,23 85:11 142:24 187:4 rolls 78:13 105:19 room 7:15 23:21 25:24 41:21 42:22,25 43:2,10 43:12,14 63:20 63:21 90:2 102:18,21 116:5 152:15 155:20 159:11 160:13 161:14 162:25 164:7 165:20 166:9 167:17 171:17 173:12 197:4,10,12,14 204:16 208:4,5 208:11,15 root 14:21,25 37:12 177:11,19 182:25 183:8,16 rotor 14:24 roughly 71:21 route 58:11 63:2 72:21 routed 58:10 80:4 100:14,14 routes 29:12 routing 68:15 89:21 99:24 101:6 rp 188:19 rules 188:19 192:4 192:5,11 run 31:1 48:25 50:5,20 58:5 64:7,25 72:24 89:2,22,24 90:5 90:17 91:20,21 105:16,20 140:8 running 36:13 51:22 53:5 66:21 78:23,24 80:17 82:17 88:18 107:10 108:4 164:20 runs 49:3 63:5 80:17,24 ruptured 10:9 141:13 S
s 5:1 s28 88:6 90:1 safe 16:19 60:6 167:22 safeguard 80:18 safeguards 82:18 safely 14:24 71:20 110:12 167:6 safety 2:6,13 8:4 11:9,10 14:2 15:18 18:9 19:6 19:10 20:12,17 23:6 29:17 32:13 32:22 33:2,2 35:20 39:5 43:22 54:7,24 58:7 59:9 61:6 62:11 62:12,13 78:19 78:20,24 79:14 80:25 81:5 82:22 116:9 118:21,24 119:23 158:13 163:25 165:23 185:4 189:14 192:4 202:5 203:18 204:3 205:19 safetyrelated 10:16 19:9 61:8 152:9 196:11 safetys 118:18 salient 55:21 161:25 sampled 136:1 sanity 134:3 saw 177:11,22 179:8 182:24 saying 37:9,9 48:10 76:25 104:2 121:1 135:2 166:4,6 says 55:1 148:6,9 149:6 160:19 169:17 scenario 61:11 74:25 82:17 102:13 106:21 142:3 162:14 165:10 scenarios 201:9 202:12 scheduled 49:12 50:25 79:24 scheme 72:16,18 science 84:22 scope 29:2 30:5,6 30:24 38:1 48:23 52:12,13,25 58:21 68:6 73:25 99:23 185:7 scoped 57:17 74:22 76:14,18 83:25 87:2 139:2 scoping 91:10 screen 6:12 7:6 38:18 125:11 screening 120:3 sda 42:1 sdp 148:2 seal 78:3 210:9 seals 78:10 79:6,6 searches 185:21 186:5 second 25:11 66:5 84:4 109:4 163:4 184:23 208:20 section 21:8,13 38:11 42:3 88:15 127:18 141:13 189:10 sections 21:12 security 94:8 see 27:14 34:14 39:8 40:5 41:13 48:7,14,17,18,24 52:10 55:11 58:17 64:17,23 66:15 69:19 70:7 71:12 72:20 73:13,25 81:16 89:25 90:4 93:3 100:2 102:17 105:11 120:20 121:23 123:11,13 125:10,18 135:23 140:13,21 141:15 142:25 145:2 149:14 169:14 180:16 185:20 197:7 198:9 208:1 seeing 190:1,2 197:25 seeking 133:2 seemeng 177:2 seen 25:9 68:22 82:4 147:9 192:23 segue 77:18 select 192:22 selected 115:16 192:24 selections 128:16 selfevident 116:5 send 45:9 128:14 155:25 165:14,20 166:5,13 209:7 sending 71:10 senior 2:8,10,12,14 2:18,23 3:3,12 8:12,14 23:14 46:1 176:10 182:22 185:6 191:21 200:25 sense 134:15,18 sensitive 26:14 106:1 sensitivity 144:16 175:16,21 sent 44:3 separate 19:14
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 239 62:10 200:14 202:24 207:7 separately 200:8 sequence 28:6 94:22 103:5 sequences 24:24 28:8 173:5 sequentially 80:9 131:2 seriously 18:10,17 seriousness 18:11 serve 23:14 136:21 served 14:22 23:23 serves 86:19 service 23:7 35:13 35:15 36:10 53:21,25 108:8 150:9 services 191:22 202:6 session 5:6 set 19:22 27:18 28:16 94:7 123:15 131:4,10 135:17 141:24 151:20 181:13 201:13 sets 92:9 114:15 173:2 189:24 setting 86:24 109:7 130:13 131:8 seven 27:21 48:25 49:1 65:3,3 185:12,17 186:14 186:20 severed 20:14 199:17 severity 13:16 shaded 40:3,4 shape 18:5 30:15 share 17:25 18:18 18:22 197:1 shared 15:21 16:11,14 38:23 38:25 41:6 205:15 sharing 187:9 sharp 115:17 117:24 120:3,8 120:20,20 121:15 121:19,20 122:13 122:20,22,25 123:2 126:1,6 140:22 146:20,24 148:25 shed 175:9 sheet 182:17,17 shift 8:23,25 20:19 23:12,13 26:16 40:23 45:7 54:8 67:25 68:1,2,3 82:23 91:13,23 152:14 159:11,12 160:1 166:12 shifted 30:8 60:4 shipped 74:16 178:17 short 25:22 93:10 120:13 121:17,21 141:15 197:25 shorter 26:12 49:24 50:20 60:17 82:21 shorthand 210:4,4 shorting 60:15 shortly 124:8 shouldnt 44:6 142:19 show 37:21 40:1 46:21 57:21 63:8 64:9 65:7,14 80:9 88:24 131:14 showed 72:7 75:10 showing 47:25 48:22 88:5 208:17 shown 73:8 shows 39:8 174:16 shut 12:18 33:19 34:24 156:23 199:18 205:25 shutdown 95:4 115:2 150:2,11 side 6:9,15 7:2 41:5,24 42:9,19 43:15 44:1,5 47:4 48:3 59:16 59:20 62:25 63:13,14,16,23 69:8,13,22 71:14 91:4,8 102:25 103:1,4 122:6 125:10,17 140:13 141:1,22 153:22 153:22 154:5,8 154:15,17,18 155:2 158:15,23 159:25 163:17,17 163:20 164:13 167:1 171:9 sides 146:22 signed 16:2 significance 9:10 9:15 11:5,7,9,10 11:12,14,14 12:11,15,17,25 13:4,6,10 14:2 14:14,16 15:22 16:8,13 17:20,20 18:6 37:4 81:5 109:23 112:18 172:24 184:2,9 189:15,19 196:5 196:7 202:9 203:18,21,23 204:11 205:14 207:4,6 significant 9:9 15:17 97:6 101:2 105:23 106:7,8 112:14 151:11 156:13 185:19 192:23,25 203:15 204:4 205:19 206:8 significantly 68:9 68:10 69:4 82:6 143:22 similar 30:5,11 31:10,10 100:17 144:10 179:6 186:25 similarities 82:3 simple 57:22 79:22 79:23 80:15 83:17,18 84:9,11 84:12,13 85:4,6 90:9,11 97:20 119:13,15,16 134:20,25 136:4 164:6 173:9,12 simplification 57:25 simply 18:7 20:25 114:17 131:21 135:16 137:6 140:7 145:4 146:10 173:21 175:15 simulation 176:1 simulator 162:23 single 194:19 202:9 sink 92:21 sir 31:6 32:1,5 34:16 68:23 96:1 99:1 108:4 110:5 155:14 157:16 166:6 167:16 187:16 188:3 sit 134:8 site 3:2 8:16 11:15 17:23 21:4 31:8 31:14,15 35:17 49:11,15 50:11 51:1,7,13 75:10 80:1,1 138:22 141:3 158:7 162:18 177:4 178:17 182:23 185:25 189:9 191:20 192:2,5 201:7 202:4,15 sites 191:24 sitting 18:12 situation 12:13 39:22 49:25 61:21 80:22 111:24 114:25 168:12 205:7 six 64:14 65:15 71:21 86:6 87:1 93:6 sixhour 165:12 sized 11:24 skill 189:24 192:1 192:6 skills 31:17 192:3 skipping 36:15 slide 32:6 34:18 46:25 48:12,13 48:22 54:12,13 58:5,8 61:10 62:22 63:17 64:4 64:23 69:24,25 72:2,20 73:9 74:20 77:19 79:22 83:15 85:2 86:1 88:4 90:8 92:16 95:24 97:10 98:8 114:21 120:7 135:1 136:8 149:15 155:11 185:8 slides 54:20 61:10 66:1,8 68:20 93:12 132:15 203:12 slightly 36:6 95:5 slow 168:16 169:11 small 10:12,17 105:21 155:7 168:4 snake 73:2 solution 95:9 126:16,16 somebody 39:14 somewhat 114:4 123:6 140:7 146:25 156:11 sooner 198:21 sorry 200:4 sound 71:9 sounds 188:25 source 21:16,16 27:10,12 30:2
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 240 31:4 34:3 37:16 57:3 63:18,19,24 74:13 86:19 93:2 93:15 97:1,18 102:6 108:19 140:9,14 142:12 143:16 162:12 165:8 sources 27:1 38:20 64:21 81:25 87:1 87:6 92:7 94:9 94:10,13,13 103:2 171:16,19 south 47:4 48:3 88:9 89:22 192:16 southern 8:19 121:4 space 84:12,13,23 194:1 206:10 spare 88:22 90:6 spatially 80:6 speak 6:18 25:15 34:5 50:8 69:10 116:22 speaker 50:6 69:9 98:7,11,22 99:2 99:10 160:11 161:4,16 172:3 176:20 185:6 speakers 136:12 speaks 147:11 spec 150:13 151:3 151:6 special 179:25 181:23 specialist 2:23 specialty 181:20 specific 30:19 112:24 121:23 144:9 171:10,18 171:18 175:6 180:19 185:2,17 186:14 189:24 190:23 199:10 specifically 11:22 148:2 152:21 166:17 180:7,8 183:11 185:6 187:2,7 190:17 191:11 193:12 specification 177:25 190:21 specified 179:4 182:14 specifies 123:4 specs 150:19 206:13 speed 187:12 spend 115:24 118:10 119:12 spent 22:4,21,25 27:11 32:23 33:10 86:16,19 87:17,20 89:4,10 92:7,8 94:20 95:1,2,22 119:12 138:15 splice 55:12,13 64:10 72:21 spliced 47:11 100:14 splices 49:5,6 66:6 66:12,16 99:25 100:18 splicing 80:24 108:5 split 44:24 129:4 splits 120:11 spoke 19:13 22:21 sponsor 184:5 spot 58:14 72:22 72:23 sros 159:12,23 160:6 165:25 stability 164:19 stabilize 71:6 stabilized 32:18 155:21 stabilizing 153:18 stable 19:5 29:15 33:4,17 43:15 53:22 75:16 87:18 153:23 154:6,17,19 158:5,9,12 167:8 staff 2:22 9:22 14:14 15:11 16:22 25:18 27:16 33:22 44:10 67:19,21 68:3 75:4 85:12 87:9 107:8 117:14 153:17 165:20 167:24 180:13 staged 31:5,14 stamped 155:20 standard 30:15 43:18 115:9 132:22 134:24 135:21 136:14 171:6 177:18 185:12 205:24 standards 6:1 115:7 122:9 133:21 137:16 182:13 standby 141:11 standing 5:3 standpoint 15:18 42:7 85:3 starone 5:7 207:24 207:25 starr 116:7 start 7:22 24:21 29:16 36:7 38:17 39:7 52:15,16 55:4 63:21 98:14 98:17 102:16 103:6 104:9 105:6,16 107:1 110:20,24 111:23 111:24,25 112:5 135:4 139:5 152:1 164:25 165:4 202:22 208:10 started 10:15 49:15 98:25 103:2 107:11,12 112:5,13 113:25 135:3 139:3 154:16 155:2 192:21 starter 74:13 starting 102:5 106:15 110:19 163:10 193:5 startup 23:5 27:2 27:2 38:13,21,23 46:24 47:1,25 48:15 57:3 58:6 58:9 60:14 74:9 75:18,19 81:18 83:11 97:18 98:1 100:15 108:7,11 113:7 125:12 134:23 152:24 153:21,25 154:2 154:3,4,4 155:3 157:19,20 158:2 158:3,10 161:12 162:7,9,17,20 164:3,9 171:13 172:11 174:24,25 175:9 state 111:7 122:23 208:7 210:1 stated 65:15 146:11 195:12 statement 101:11 statements 14:9 stating 35:3 station 6:4 18:16 19:4 36:17 43:17 43:24 51:23 57:13 58:3 59:23 71:4 72:3 75:13 81:9,11,20,23 82:4,16,19 86:20 87:4 92:19 98:19 100:7,9 102:4,14 102:14,21 103:17 110:16 141:11 162:11 164:24 169:16 170:17 202:5 204:25 stationperformed 20:24 statistical 134:21 stator 5:19 10:2,3 10:4,7,9 14:23 14:24 15:5,6,16 16:23 17:2 23:20 26:24 27:9 30:15 36:8 40:2,6,20 48:6,16 51:4 61:19,22 62:24 63:15 70:10 86:25 88:10,15 88:16,21 89:21 115:1 116:6 117:8 129:12 146:13 177:7,19 178:4 179:23 183:2 186:24 199:17 200:17 203:7 status 32:14 40:12 118:16 stay 201:15 stays 95:8 steam 78:2 99:3 155:17 156:20 162:12 163:19,19 163:23,24 165:8 165:10,11 step 12:10 55:7 76:24 169:17 207:1,5 stephanie 3:14 198:18 199:6,12 steps 124:11 140:24 142:13 stepup 74:17 stop 152:18 storage 86:3 89:12 93:17,19 straight 52:19 91:6 109:8 173:25 strategically 19:17 strategies 23:24 43:21 46:18 106:13 130:1 152:21 153:8 191:16 206:19 strategy 47:23 70:20 86:6 94:7 94:19 140:1
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 241 strengthening 190:17 stress 66:19 81:13 119:23 205:2 structural 33:2 70:2 structurally 71:9 structure 11:25 15:7 24:16 27:20 49:14 109:6 190:25 191:4 structured 124:20 124:20 181:13 struggle 128:22,23 131:16 205:23 206:15 stuff 52:18 78:3 109:22,23 subject 16:20 132:6 133:9 subjective 37:10 123:6 159:20 subjectivity 160:6 subsequent 14:23 15:3,5 26:9 35:3 49:23 162:1 subsequently 10:5 11:1 substantial 11:10 27:22 81:16 100:4 109:4 130:17 150:8 203:21 substantially 151:1 substantiate 24:18 succeed 96:6 success 20:9 21:17 24:16,19 28:15 28:18,21 29:1,8 47:22 55:25 57:3 57:16,18,24 58:1 58:16 59:13 60:10 61:17 62:19,20 64:18 64:19 65:9,23 66:15 67:3,3,4 69:2 72:1,2,4,24 72:24 73:15 74:21 75:3,8 76:25 77:7 79:22 80:5,11 81:10 83:6,19 85:13,25 86:12,22 87:14 87:15 88:17 97:11,14,14,15 98:12,13,16,23 98:24 99:5 101:7 107:1 109:2,3,15 113:14 126:19,19 129:1,22 132:3 134:3 135:18,24 139:18,19 145:14 145:14 151:11 152:3 174:3 201:16 206:19,20 successful 90:23 124:12 137:22 successfully 108:2 158:11 succession 22:23 suction 86:16 sufficiency 188:20 sufficient 50:17 67:12 68:4 80:8 89:19 100:2 127:25 138:22 suggest 166:1 suggesting 170:5 sullins 3:6 8:22,22 22:20,21 23:11 23:12 24:15 25:17 26:3,6,24 32:9 34:10,16 35:7 38:7 47:20 66:2 85:24,25 87:19,25 92:5 93:21 94:5,14,18 95:11,19 96:1,10 96:22 97:2 98:10 98:18 99:1,6,11 101:12,25 102:3 102:23 103:14,22 104:1,7,11,18 106:11 108:23 110:14,14 111:10 111:14,20 112:8 133:13 139:24 141:8,20 145:18 200:3 202:17,17 204:14 summarize 28:14 79:21 109:1 summary 7:10 summer 194:6 sunday 195:24 sunil 98:7 176:18 176:20 supervise 23:13 supervising 3:4 supervision 192:1 supervisor 8:21 24:3 42:1 159:11 supervisors 192:8 supervisory 16:25 supplemental 17:2 192:1 204:2 supplied 96:23 158:6 163:19 supplies 68:16 149:24 150:3,4 150:15,21 159:2 supply 23:5 25:10 42:15 58:20 86:16 89:4 105:17 139:1,7 150:3,12,22 151:7 156:19 158:20 supplying 92:14 157:21 163:24 164:14 support 23:24 27:20,22,24 28:1 32:19 54:23 68:3 87:9,25 105:16 107:15 109:6 158:25 181:22 182:1 190:22 191:20,22 supporting 23:23 109:7 153:24 164:22 supports 27:10 92:6 sure 18:5 22:3 26:16 42:8 44:4 53:3 56:5 60:9 65:6,10 76:20 77:13,16 79:20 82:15 108:10 111:10 118:2,8 127:9 128:18 129:2 132:10 135:2 157:7 160:5 166:14 169:2 176:9,10 182:4 188:15 192:11 196:4,20 199:8,10 208:21 surface 105:17 surprised 41:14 96:7 surrounding 10:22 175:16 177:20 suspect 104:3 switch 88:5 90:2 154:9 163:1 164:7 switchgear 10:11 27:1,3 36:1,3 45:18 48:4,8,21 57:4 62:6,24 63:3,6,7,11,13,15 65:5 66:4,20,24 69:6 72:9,12 73:3 81:21 99:16 101:15,16 103:8 105:13,21 106:4 111:19 152:25 158:7 168:13,24 switching 152:1 switchyard 74:14 sylvia 5:2,10 110:5 110:9 207:22 208:17 system 15:8 27:13 28:23 38:16 61:23,25 62:17 64:3 92:11 94:17 107:16 155:17 157:4 199:18 systematic 115:18 systems 12:24 15:9 16:7 39:20 105:16 117:13 158:13 T
table 7:2,9 29:5 31:3 34:25 58:15 122:6 144:13 208:25 tail 136:2 take 7:20 18:10,17 19:18 21:25 30:16,25 34:15 34:25 38:17 57:21 65:23 77:15 84:16,23 88:22 91:9,17 99:15 101:12 109:20,21 114:9 120:8 127:8 129:23 134:13 137:11 142:13 149:16 151:14,19 162:25 165:14 166:18,19 174:2 177:17 184:7 189:18 194:24 196:21 197:3 taken 9:21 13:15 17:6,8 21:5 58:11 97:21 110:2 121:10 151:23 170:6 173:13 177:10 182:3 198:7 takes 91:22 165:1 165:2 talk 19:23 21:4 22:2 24:8 28:21 42:3 43:21 46:6 46:20 47:21 50:21 51:14 62:4 83:17 113:2,14 116:2 120:12 124:7,10 138:11 152:5,20,25
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 242 153:8,10 154:13 157:18 162:5 164:4 193:5 206:16 talked 34:18 41:12 57:11,17 72:4 89:13 91:12 95:24 99:13 119:10 139:15 143:9 145:25 153:2 157:21 158:16 159:5,11 160:7 164:12 166:16 171:4,10 184:19 189:8,14 190:14,19 195:21 199:2 200:12,17 200:22 talking 20:21 21:10 23:4 28:11 30:20 36:15 38:4 38:17 45:6 46:3 46:4 47:21 51:10 51:12 53:13 54:16 57:6 66:9 68:10 69:3,14 70:18 71:5 76:20 81:9 91:25 102:16 103:5 112:17 114:13 117:16 119:13 121:16 130:5,21 130:22 138:7 141:24 152:1,3,4 159:6 161:1 163:6 168:12 196:1,2 200:5 206:18 talks 147:9 185:3 tank 86:3 93:17,19 targeted 186:20 tarrant 210:1 task 91:20 182:6 tasks 43:18 194:21 team 2:7 8:6 10:21 10:24 11:2 13:14 16:3 18:24 24:10 35:10,12 53:20 69:14 84:16 115:14 117:9 118:5,16,20 119:18,24 120:22 122:2,8 124:16 124:17,22,24 133:14 160:9,13 179:22,22 180:1 180:12 185:14 187:11 teams 84:20 130:9 180:9 tech 42:6 150:13 150:19 151:3,6 206:13 technical 28:15 83:4 102:24 109:1 159:12 technicians 44:3 166:5 167:3 techs 45:9 160:4 165:20 166:2,17 tell 121:20 telling 71:8 107:13 temp 35:19 36:14 36:19 124:25 temporary 5:25 10:2,22 11:20,25 12:3 24:11 30:22 34:12 35:9 47:2 47:15 48:2,13,18 51:17 52:5 53:7 54:3 58:2,2,19 58:20,21 60:12 72:14 83:7 88:1 89:2 92:1,15 118:23 177:21 178:1 183:1 tenminute 109:21 term 33:6 terminate 90:3 terminated 64:16 80:24 termination 40:17 42:18 49:16 64:13 66:17,19 112:14 127:19 terminations 49:6 49:7 58:18 66:12 66:16 terms 29:4 37:10 103:7 124:19 136:24 151:10 189:15 191:18 192:8 terribly 51:9 test 12:3 167:3,9 183:7 tested 5:25 11:21 33:24 46:14 47:9 53:14 178:14 testing 29:21 34:14 37:14 41:13,16 52:23 58:20 66:21 101:5 108:8 133:20 167:25 178:11 testings 53:9 texas 210:1,13 tfc 23:15,18 th 69:14 thank 5:3,10 8:15 9:6 15:15 17:15 17:24 23:1 32:9 39:15 69:12 73:12 83:13 99:10 104:1 110:13 131:24 154:25 172:22 182:10 207:12,19 207:22 208:23 209:9 thanks 145:21 152:17 177:2 188:17 189:5 203:4 207:18 thatd 199:1 thats 19:15 20:15 21:20 26:21 29:6 29:13 36:23,23 37:7 38:10 40:3 43:20 46:21 48:5 48:7 50:21 51:2 51:15,24 53:9,13 54:9,19 56:3 60:13 61:5,16 62:7 63:6 65:2 65:21 66:25 71:24 73:23 76:15 77:18 79:4 80:21,24 82:12 85:4 87:19 88:9 93:17 94:14 95:11 96:22,22 99:1,6 100:11,12 103:19 108:2 111:8 112:12 113:9 118:19 119:15 121:6 122:21 124:9 129:7 130:15 131:16 132:12 135:11 136:3,7 136:11 137:24 140:3 141:25 142:4 143:5 144:10 148:9,10 148:11 150:6,22 151:6 157:2 161:1,19 162:4 163:10 165:7,9 165:24 167:7 168:14 170:11 171:2 172:15 173:14 175:12 176:2,5 182:2 188:5,15 192:17 194:12,14 195:4 201:11 203:19 206:7 theirselves 7:9 theme 76:1 thered 89:19 theres 13:9 19:21 21:11 38:20,21 38:22,24 39:10 41:8,11 43:1 44:1,14 49:1,3,5 52:25 56:21 58:21 61:19,21 62:19 63:5 64:8 70:21 76:7 81:13 82:1,24 86:4 91:7 97:17 98:1 100:2,3 101:7 102:22 104:22 111:3 121:23 127:7 132:22 133:21,25 134:2 147:16 150:8 152:6 153:12 155:5 159:17 160:2 166:14,23 169:5,6,8 170:5 175:11 180:25 181:23 192:7 193:2 195:8,12 195:25 196:15,16 204:3 205:2 206:17 208:25 theyre 43:5 52:23 52:24 73:1 79:22 84:9,22 129:5,6 131:18 143:18 168:1 191:6 195:23,23 206:17 theyve 117:17 thing 35:24 38:14 40:4 46:19 50:18 57:15 87:23 116:2 128:22 129:25 130:5 131:19 133:18 134:5 138:11 140:22 145:7 158:24 163:22 164:17 things 24:13 30:23 47:13 57:16 77:23 78:1,5 82:16 97:5 114:21,23 138:7 138:16 142:3 152:4,18 168:16 182:24 196:16 205:23 think 20:4 22:17 22:18,21 26:22 29:6 31:23 32:3 32:3 36:24 39:16 40:19 44:8,9,10
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 243 46:1,3,9,17 50:14 70:21 74:5 76:1,21 77:4,14 82:14 84:12 85:11,19 97:1 100:5 101:2 104:20 108:13 113:3,18 119:11 122:4,6,14 124:19 130:16 132:2,5 136:21 136:23 139:3,9 139:17 140:2,15 142:24 143:18,18 146:5,24 147:2,4 148:16,22 149:9 160:3,20 161:20 161:25 164:5 167:1,24 168:16 169:8,9 170:12 170:14,19 176:14 176:21,22,24 177:8 184:25 188:5,16 195:6 198:11,13,18,20 198:24 199:1,11 201:3 203:1,11 203:12 204:16 205:23 206:1,15 207:1 209:4,6 thinking 21:21 34:6 61:7,7 71:6 106:25 129:14 139:6,12 third 62:3 180:14 180:17 181:17 thirdparty 178:22 181:15 thorough 18:20 179:12 thoroughly 121:19 140:10 thought 19:19,23 25:14,15 26:19 29:10 42:25 83:5 85:9 104:3 112:10 131:18 144:4 161:3 176:17 202:2 thoughts 17:5 203:5 thousand 59:4 threat 54:7 three 21:17 26:25 28:17,18,25 55:25 65:3,4 74:8 75:6,7,8 76:22,23 77:5,7 77:7 80:11 86:8 93:5 126:3 131:17 138:25 141:8 150:4 152:22 153:7 206:19 208:10 thrown 140:19 tie 58:6 63:22 64:11,20 66:3,4 73:1,4 103:10 106:17 153:4,6 157:25 163:2,13 163:14,18,22 164:1,25 165:5 166:8 171:4,14 173:8 174:5 tied 47:5 57:6 58:13 65:4 91:6 102:11 154:5,16 tieing 165:23 time 5:4,7 7:13,17 17:24 23:8 25:4 25:4,14,15,21,21 26:9,9,22,23 31:21 33:17 34:4 36:9,12 37:9,11 37:18 40:11 42:22 43:8,9,10 43:13,15 44:2,3 45:3,11,17,20 50:7 60:21 65:21 67:16,23 71:3 75:16,20 77:16 77:24 80:8 81:16 81:22 85:4 86:23 87:3,15 88:2 91:10 93:4 94:20 97:10,12,20 98:5 98:14 100:4 101:2,8 102:25 106:12,20 109:3 112:2 113:6,6,8 114:18 115:24 119:12,13,25 121:12 124:21 127:25 128:23 129:2 130:17,24 133:23 134:2,22 135:20 136:1 137:3,17,20 138:15 141:4 149:8 150:8 153:24 154:13 158:6 159:9 160:25 161:2,6 164:1,22 165:2,8 165:19 167:17 173:13 174:2 176:13 178:21 189:2,4 190:10 194:3 198:10 199:18,19 204:21 206:8 207:12 208:10,20 timeframe 23:10 36:6 51:10,12 65:18 91:9 121:7 121:16 174:15 timeframes 188:5 timeline 46:16 65:22 68:19,24 99:12 107:25 108:3 110:11 113:5 timelines 37:8 38:4 67:11 81:16 82:10 130:17,20 timely 13:23 times 25:11,12,19 25:20,22,23 26:12,20 41:21 57:19 65:2,4 71:4 117:17 119:17 130:7,9 191:7 timing 97:3 137:22 tindell 2:18 45:25 45:25 200:24,24 titled 11:23 tlc 56:14 today 5:17 13:1 14:7,12 17:5 30:20 42:21 43:7 43:9 77:12 83:20 92:24 99:13,13 113:2 114:9 140:15 146:1 184:22 197:1 200:17 201:16 todays 5:5 tomorrow 209:7 tonight 209:6 tool 147:4 182:18 tools 22:11,13 125:5 129:25 top 22:5 40:8 52:9 79:1 89:21 91:6 125:24 126:12 136:12 143:2,4 168:10 total 58:25 59:1 185:12 touch 199:5 tower 11:25 track 62:19 train 10:6,10 39:19,19 45:2 48:6 57:9 62:23 63:1 89:5 90:18 101:21,22 102:15 102:22 103:8 105:6,6 106:2,2 106:3 108:14,15 111:12,16,16,18 128:2 148:7 150:6,8,9,17 153:4,5 157:12 158:4 168:23 trained 43:18 109:9 110:20 162:23 206:21 training 15:11 31:17 119:20 147:22 171:18 206:17 trains 32:18 33:5 33:13 164:9 transcribed 6:16 transcript 1:7 210:7 transcription 6:19 transfer 22:22 25:3 94:1,24 97:8 115:3 139:8 153:20 154:8 158:10 174:25 transferred 154:4 157:23 transformer 23:5 38:22,23 46:25 47:2,3 48:1,15 48:16,19 58:6,9 59:11,14,15,20 60:14 74:10,13 74:17 83:11 98:2 108:9,12 153:21 153:21 154:22 158:2,3 162:9 transformers 27:2 39:7 74:11 75:16 202:22 transient 157:11 157:13 transition 56:19 72:19 165:16 176:8 transitioned 56:17 translate 205:17 translated 55:13 transporting 10:3 travel 29:19 treat 103:9 206:23 tree 21:10 114:1 114:13,19 117:24 117:24 119:10,16 120:9,9 123:16 123:20 125:8,24 126:3,6,8,11 127:2 128:13,19 132:21 138:13 140:12,13,23 141:23 143:8,10
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 244 145:17,24 157:13 157:13 trend 185:21 186:10,11 tried 22:12 trigger 78:25 trip 10:9 153:16 153:19 155:19,20 155:24 156:2,8 156:12,19 157:3 157:5,6 161:8,14 172:13 186:22 187:12 188:2,7 triple 138:9 trouble 69:10 102:4 111:17 troy 2:16 truck 141:3 true 127:21 161:16 210:7 try 36:25 37:10 70:24 96:5,6,6 102:24 129:11 136:25 151:20 152:17 168:21 193:1 204:25 trying 18:7 44:21 54:12,19 75:1 84:8 90:21 100:12 102:20 107:2,8,21 108:20 127:4 132:7,13,25 134:13 147:11 149:8 169:14 170:6,24 188:14 195:13 202:10 tsc 29:25 32:14 51:20 52:10 78:16 92:25 93:9 93:10 97:24 116:8 130:9 131:15 tse 24:7 107:4 tuned 167:9 turbine 10:5 15:7 47:4 61:2,3 88:10 100:19 165:15 178:15,19 199:21 turbines 100:13 turn 5:8 15:13 17:13 107:6 121:19 tweaking 132:6 two 5:21 11:4 19:14 20:14 25:9 27:2 29:14 32:18 33:4,13 36:17 44:14 47:6 48:6 50:4 54:20 59:1 61:10 62:19 67:5 67:23 69:3 78:22 83:17 86:9 89:25 90:3 92:6 93:2 109:21 125:20 127:5,24 128:12 131:1 137:1 143:16 144:7 150:3,3,15 154:24 174:21 181:8 185:18,24 188:24 193:8 196:16 198:13,14 tying 66:10 88:19 type 79:24 89:1 115:9 117:15 133:19 179:4,15 179:17,24 181:17 185:15 186:13 types 131:22 typical 81:11,12 90:24 121:7 typically 84:13 90:22 121:6 129:11 130:20 144:8 U
uhhuh 157:17 ultimate 29:18 65:8 92:21 93:2 115:10 143:16 186:23 ultimately 16:12 30:2 33:7 115:16 118:19 138:19 unacceptable 81:3 81:4 195:22 205:11 unaffected 27:4 164:12 unavailability 173:23 202:21 unavailable 40:6 41:10 62:14 74:10 158:18 160:16,20,23 161:3 174:21 uncertainties 85:20 uncertainty 170:24 206:11 unclear 24:3 172:15 uncomplicated 153:16 155:12,13 155:15 156:7 161:10,15,23,24 172:14 uncover 36:7 uncovered 68:22 uncovery 25:5,22 26:10 98:13 113:6,9 201:19 undamaged 63:11 63:13 69:21 underplaying 196:7,9 underscored 204:19 underscores 16:9 understand 20:4 21:14 25:12 32:2 44:11,21 46:12 49:10 50:15 56:4 59:17 60:9 65:11 67:3,16 68:18 76:16 80:19 82:15,22 83:13 84:21 85:12 86:1 101:4 108:20 111:10 112:9 114:2 120:10,25 122:7 127:5 130:3,4 133:3,5 134:6 135:14 139:13 142:25 148:25,25 161:22 166:22,25 168:11 168:25 170:2,19 174:12 184:9,12 188:25 196:4 208:19 understanding 15:21 16:11,15 37:12,17 46:9 69:5 76:2,10 78:24 83:19 85:1 85:21 90:19 93:17,20 94:4 96:2 98:15 137:15 155:22 156:18 159:14 170:23 176:23 184:10 203:11 207:2 understands 157:10 understood 56:5 107:19 166:24 204:20 underway 177:15 unfortunately 131:14 unidentified 172:3 unintelligible 156:7 unique 12:13 117:16 unit 5:19 8:23,24 10:2,5,7,8,11,12 10:14,17 11:9,11 12:16,18,20 14:23 15:5,7,8,8 16:6,6 17:19,20 19:15,16,18,23 20:8,19,20,22 21:7 22:8,19 23:12,13,14 28:2 28:3 38:23,25 39:1,1,2,2 40:17 40:23 41:1,2,5,7 41:7,20,24,25 42:3,9,10,13,16 42:19 43:15 44:5 44:13,25 45:4,4 46:2,3,4,5,7 47:4 62:25 63:1,20,21 63:23 64:1,2,7 69:6,8,13,22 70:11 71:14 72:12,12,12 74:9 74:11 81:20,24 100:24 104:16 112:20 146:13 151:15 152:2,2,7 152:7,12 153:10 153:14,20,24 154:19 156:18 158:12,15,20,20 158:23,25 159:6 159:7,18,25 160:1,3,13,16 161:7,17,22 164:12,13,16,19 164:21 165:22 167:6 171:9,17 172:5 174:7,10 175:17 177:23 178:5 201:2,2 202:4,19,19,22 202:24 203:19,19 204:15,15 206:18 units 152:1 157:21 202:8,14 unnecessarily 196:10 unnecessary 196:10 unprecedented 15:17 unproceduralized 148:4 unresolved 11:1,3 untrained 147:10 unusual 10:19 upper 88:6 123:3 144:18 175:19 upstream 59:14
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 245 urgency 52:14 92:16 usages 128:17 use 18:25 28:22 34:3 40:20 50:11 53:9,13 55:1,20 63:9 64:19 67:5 86:13 88:1 94:23 95:23 103:18 114:10,24 116:21 121:6 127:17 142:25 146:22 148:4,20 149:6 152:23 159:22 163:15 181:1,1,3 182:18 useful 38:10 uses 11:11 usually 91:22 181:20 utility 189:25 utilize 171:19 192:2 utilized 114:4 utilizing 186:3 203:14 205:21 V
v 5:23 11:18 valid 32:3 validate 194:24 validation 195:4 valuable 139:18 204:17 value 96:12 120:4 122:5,6 125:14 126:22 128:12 131:13,15 137:8 138:3 140:1 143:8 144:18 145:3,3,5,8,8,11 146:3,3,12 173:24 174:6,6 values 120:3,13 122:23,25 123:8 128:9 135:23 144:21 174:12 176:4 valve 142:10 155:23 156:3,14 156:23 valves 165:16 vantage 193:19 variation 72:3 73:24 variations 91:7 various 46:13 82:16 125:5 vein 85:20 133:2 vending 193:1 vendor 11:23 179:16 180:18 181:20 182:13,20 187:13 190:4,24 191:13 vendors 178:14 180:25 181:1,8 181:21 venting 87:23 verification 180:17 verifications 192:4 verified 179:13 verify 166:20 verifying 76:3 84:24 versus 60:12 75:3 80:23 118:12 119:13 122:8 150:24 161:24 200:14 vessel 12:19 149:25 150:1,14 150:20 viability 24:18 viable 76:12,25 98:4 vice 3:2,3,10 8:16 17:23 35:17 vicinity 168:14 169:6 view 16:9 33:6 37:7 44:10,12 46:22 47:25 62:22 64:9,22 89:20 148:20 149:10,20,23 170:21 views 13:8 14:9 133:4 violation 7:10 11:6 11:17,19 12:15 14:3,5,6 violations 5:22 virtue 207:2 visible 41:11 42:13 164:12 visibly 70:4 vital 10:13,16 27:1 27:3 38:21 39:1 39:2,9 40:7 41:1 44:7 47:6 48:4 48:20 53:17 57:4 57:7 58:7 61:13 63:3,6 66:4 93:1 140:3 153:4 154:6,18 158:7 162:19 170:2,7 171:5,14 vitals 39:18 vivian 2:21 volt 20:8 21:11 24:17 voltage 154:14 volts 43:2 168:13 vulnerabilities 200:9 vulnerability 155:6 W
wait 107:9 176:25 waited 34:6 35:14 53:23 waiting 34:6 197:17 walked 129:23 walking 20:25 wall 62:25 168:23 209:1 wallflowers 32:8 want 43:6 51:14 52:2 57:15 62:21 79:21 80:18,21 80:21 83:16 85:10 98:2 107:7 107:8 108:23 113:13,18,19 115:23 116:2 118:2,19 134:5 146:21 148:14 149:16 152:17,20 152:23 153:8 154:7,12 164:6 164:17 166:12 173:1 176:9 189:18 197:11,13 199:9 203:2 wanted 16:19 18:4 19:3 28:25 38:14 56:5 61:2 65:10 66:2 67:16 79:19 84:20 95:15 96:17 118:7 165:24 188:15 warehouse 30:17 wasnt 45:22 77:13 88:15 90:25 91:5 117:8 127:17 146:25 168:21,24 173:25 175:3 watch 79:11 112:1 water 10:11 22:5 31:7 43:2 49:13 50:25 69:17 70:12 71:11,17 86:3,13,15 89:11 89:12 90:7 93:16 93:16,18,19 94:1 94:3,9,12,13,16 94:23 96:3,3,4 96:11 105:17 134:2 139:8 140:14,17 141:1 141:4,12,14,18 142:12 143:17 150:1,6 154:1 155:8,17 156:2 156:19,20,24,24 156:25 157:1,3,4 157:7,11,12,14 167:21,22 168:1 168:3,5,13,15,16 168:21 169:1,6,7 173:3 199:17,18 199:20,22 waterford 5:13 way 18:5 21:20 29:16,17 30:14 35:20 39:6 40:19 53:23 74:12 126:21 128:1 132:8,9 135:13 137:20 142:2 151:9 169:23 ways 131:13 weaknesses 177:22 web 183:22 184:15 184:17 website 209:3 wed 49:24,25 52:2 66:17 71:23 72:15,18,22 74:10,12 97:1 128:15 131:3,3 166:11 168:19 week 33:11 198:22 weeks 23:22 106:14 weerakkody 98:8 welcome 5:3,15 welds 178:18 went 63:3 103:2 104:9 107:14 108:10 115:20 123:23 135:19 145:4 156:24 178:5 179:13,13 180:6,6 193:11 201:5 werner 2:2 5:9,10 5:11 7:23 8:15 9:6,7 39:13,13 48:9 110:3,7 197:2,2 198:2 199:11 201:3,18 201:25 203:1 207:19 208:2,19 west 63:13 weve 19:17 28:4 29:14 33:15 35:3
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 246 37:20 46:11 58:1 69:16,17 75:14 77:11 89:2 90:20 97:3,21,21 99:13 101:15 102:18,19 104:12 109:5,20 117:15 119:10,17 123:10,10 125:4 125:5 126:2,2 132:5 135:7 138:5 139:24 140:16,17,19 141:24 142:8 143:9,12 145:25 149:17 156:4 168:14 171:4,10 177:8,10 182:3,4 183:19 188:12 189:17 191:4,7,9 191:19,25 192:20 192:21,23,25 193:1,9 194:2,7 194:20 197:25 199:2,10 203:8,9 whats 6:12 26:15 32:14 63:18 65:18 76:3 84:24 91:25 93:3 97:20 102:18 112:1 130:16 131:14 137:18 149:23 150:19 169:5 174:17 203:25 206:13 white 11:13 widely 147:15,15 147:16 wilcox 12:22 willoughby 2:12 8:13,13 77:20,21 77:23 78:12 79:17 91:14,15 155:10,11,22 157:17 winding 60:12 wish 6:21 wit 13:24 withstanding 205:13 wondering 160:18 199:23 wont 96:6 119:12 143:20 164:4 207:9 word 85:7 words 90:20 160:22 work 31:8,10 36:21 42:15 51:5 52:5 55:11,19 68:7,8 69:14 80:2,3,9 81:17 81:19,20 84:10 84:21 90:21,24 99:14 100:17 103:16 119:23 123:23 124:14 139:6 147:6 154:23 162:3 167:25 168:2,8 181:8,9,18,22 185:7 199:6 workers 192:11 working 20:18 23:18 26:22 51:21 52:21 78:10 100:16 105:9 168:12 worry 140:5 worth 84:10 94:3 185:24 193:8 wouldnt 36:1 48:10 72:25 74:3 91:22 103:13 104:5 105:25 106:17 111:25 126:22 138:9 155:24 161:9 162:18 169:11 174:1 wrapping 187:8 writing 139:6 written 56:12 110:11 124:4 125:1,2 142:2 148:2 163:13 wrong 135:3 X
x 149:6 Y
y 149:6 yall 197:12 yalls 7:14 yard 47:3 48:15 88:14 94:10 yeah 17:16 29:13 49:5 59:16 62:3 63:12 90:16 98:7 117:3 122:4 160:2,21 166:16 186:21 201:21 year 5:18 14:17 84:3 204:23 years 24:4,5 119:19 185:18,24 190:10 193:8 yellow 11:10,13 203:20 yep 165:21 yesterday 184:25 youd 6:14 61:11 93:25 101:3 144:4 youll 27:14 52:9,9 81:16 96:5,6 99:2 111:24 114:9 125:10,18 125:19,24 140:13 140:21 144:21 145:1,2 208:12 209:3,6 young 18:14 youre 21:9 36:17 46:3 48:10 53:11 55:10,25 56:4 61:17 67:3,13,18 69:3 70:8 71:5,7 76:20,21 77:2 80:16,19,22 82:5 82:14,18 91:25 95:7,8,9 98:12 101:25 105:16,17 106:2,6 120:10 121:1,16,24 124:7 125:13 127:5 128:25 129:2,13 130:8 131:17 132:16 137:20 138:7 144:15 170:17 180:17,24 204:23 204:25 205:1,15 206:3,18 youve 17:5,7 44:18 67:13 76:1 77:1 82:19 85:13 94:15,16 105:2 106:3 123:20 128:1,25 134:7 137:19 141:23 142:9 149:1,9 151:6 189:1 203:6 206:9,20 Z
z 149:6 zero 71:3 87:6 0
0 115:12 123:3,4 144:18 145:5,9 145:12,12 146:7 148:19 173:23 00 210:6 000 22:5 43:2 49:9 93:25 168:13 000volt 41:15 01 123:4 03 120:4 0e2 143:8 0e3 137:9 0e4 173:12 174:6 0e5 174:16,22 1
1 1:11 5:19 8:23 10:2,5,7,11 11:9 12:18 14:23 15:5 15:7,8 16:6 17:19 19:15,18 21:7 22:8,19 23:12,13 24:3 28:2 38:21 39:1 39:1 40:17,24 41:1,7,24 42:9 42:13,19 44:5,13 44:25 45:4,6,23 46:2,5,24 47:1,4 47:25 48:16 57:3 58:6,9 64:19 67:3 69:6,15 72:12,24 73:15 73:17,18,19,19 74:9 81:18 83:6 83:19 97:14,15 97:18 100:24 103:2,6 104:10 104:15 108:7,11 111:1,3,15,18,24 112:20 113:7 115:12,17 120:8 120:20,20 121:15 121:19,20 123:3 125:12 126:1 134:23 140:22 144:18 145:5,9 145:12,12 146:7 146:13,20 148:19 152:7 153:24 154:19 158:20,23 159:6,18,25 160:3,14 164:13 164:21 165:22 173:23 174:9 201:2 202:19,19 202:22 203:19 204:15 206:18 210:6,6 10 11:1 144:17 145:9 100 12:20 95:16 1015 198:2,5 10cfr 5:22 11:17 10minute 149:16 10th 11:3 12:7 14:17 115 25:5,8 119 177:23
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 247 12 12:8 25:4,8 91:23 98:15 100:3 210:13 125 178:16 13 71:18 160:23 1300 161:2 14 66:17 15 165:3,6 166:5 185:11 150 183:24 150amp 89:18 15th 11:2 17 48:12 173:23 18 48:13 88:25 19 28:6 48:22 1a1 61:20 1a2 61:20 1e2 128:20 135:10 2
2 4:4 8:24 10:8,12 10:14,17 11:11 12:20 15:8 16:6 17:20 19:16,23 20:8,19,20,22 28:3 38:23,23,25 39:2,2 40:23 41:2,5,7,20,25 42:3,10,16 43:15 45:4 46:3,4,7 62:22,25 63:1,20 63:21,23 64:1,2 64:7,18 66:15 67:4 69:8,13,15 69:22 70:11 71:14 72:1,5,12 72:12,25 73:15 73:19,20,24 75:18,19 79:10 80:6 81:20 83:19 97:14 102:5,6 103:12 110:16,25 111:3,5,6,11,14 111:23,25 112:5 112:5 127:6 134:25 136:5,9 137:9 151:15 152:2,2,7,12,24 153:10,14 154:4 154:4,15 155:3 156:18 157:19,20 158:3,8,10,12,15 158:20,25 159:7 160:1,13 161:7 161:17,22 162:9 162:17,20 164:3 164:9,12,16,19 167:6 171:9,13 171:17 172:5,11 173:11 174:6,7 174:10,24,25 175:9,17 201:2 202:4,24 203:19 204:15 20 91:9 134:24 135:21 136:20 200 89:24 184:2,15 200815 148:1 2013 10:1,20,25 12:8 2014 1:11 11:3 12:7,8 210:6,10 2015 210:13 209 210:6 20hour 136:14 21 89:25 90:5 96:12 210 4:6 21feet 96:23 23 150:1,14 24 12:8 16:3 58:5 61:10 2450 59:2 25 58:8 198:8 2500 59:2 27 24:4,4 62:22 69:25 28 49:5 64:4 29 64:23 69:25 295 27:23 2a1 72:12 73:11,12 154:2,5 163:23 167:20,21,21 168:22 169:1 170:4 2a113 154:2 2a12a9 71:15 2a2 73:7,9 152:24 154:8 157:20,23 158:1,2,5,10 163:23 170:4 173:7,9 2a211 163:1 2a3 153:4 154:5 163:14 170:3,4 171:5 173:8 174:4 2a4 153:5 154:15 163:15 170:3,4 171:5 173:8 174:4 2a9 40:12,12,16,20 40:25 41:1,12,13 43:1,16,23 44:1 44:4 45:22 62:24 63:18 65:13 66:20 71:19 72:9 72:22 73:3,7 125:18,22 153:2 158:18,19,21 159:15 164:16,18 165:21 166:14,24 167:1,4,19,23 168:24 174:21 187:23 2a901 64:11,13 66:18 2a904 73:9 2alpha9 160:14 2p7 165:15 3
3 57:16 59:3 72:2 72:25 73:17,18 73:19,20,24 80:6 83:19 97:15 100:15 109:23,24 110:2,2 127:7 128:20 135:10 153:21 154:1,2,3 161:12 162:7 174:16,22 175:18 30 10:6 40:24 45:6 66:8 71:18 93:24 160:14,23 190:9 195:24 300 22:5 31 72:2 73:9 109:23 110:2 210:13 31st 5:18 10:1 188:9 32 72:20 35 77:19 83:15 36 86:1 38 88:4 3e06 175:19 4
4 23:7,7,8 25:5 33:22,22 36:1,6 36:9 41:15 43:2 47:8,8 49:9 53:13,13 57:11 57:11 80:13,13 83:19 85:25 97:9 98:13,13 99:20 99:20 108:9,9 109:3,17 120:15 120:18,21 121:1 121:6,8,11 137:3 137:3,4 143:8 146:3,14 151:23 151:23 168:13 40 27:24 68:2 93:25 94:3 400 95:5 409 73:2 41 109:24 4160 20:8 21:11 24:17 39:19 57:16 109:13 139:1 4160volt 28:13,18 29:1 33:16 47:2 49:7,18 55:24 62:6,14,17 65:8 80:17 82:8 86:8 91:2,3 92:7 93:1 93:7 114:11 126:9 138:16,21 144:19 146:7 152:25 153:2,5,5 167:25 171:5 206:4 43 95:24 44 98:9 151:23 45 27:23 67:25,25 46 110:2 48 75:11 480volt 27:7,13 28:22 39:20 62:5 62:15 74:17,18 86:9 88:8,18,20 89:7 91:8 92:5 92:17 102:10 103:1 139:8 4day 36:1 4hour 121:7 4kv 145:2,13,16 4th 22:2 28:21 5
5 4:5 143:13 175:19 198:7 50 5:22 11:17 48:2 49:2 95:16 114:21 127:8,8 500 49:2 59:3 51 89:24 90:5 52 151:23 525ton 10:4 55 198:7 5e06 143:13 5th 10:20 6
6 10:8 24:5 165:18 198:8 60 27:25 68:3 134:22 135:20 136:14 600 88:8 89:14 63 136:5 6900volt 172:12 6e3 134:25 136:9 7
7 25:2 195:24 700 66:16 93:22
Job No. 18996 Transcript of Proceedings Nuclear Regulatory Conference with Entergy Operations, Inc.
May 1, 2014 Phone: 817-336-3042 depos@merittexas.com Fax: 817-335-1203 Merit Court Reporters LLC Page 248 75 155:11 8
8 23:8 25:5 36:6,9 97:9 109:3,17 120:18 121:11 137:4 173:12 8567 210:13 8e06 146:3,14 8e6 174:9 9
9 67:25 93:22 90 153:25 161:12 172:14 901 74:2,3 95003 204:2 97 185:8 9e07 175:18 9th 10:25 198:22 198:24