ML14184A197

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IE Insp Rept 50-261/79-29 on 791210-14.Noncompliance Noted: Inadequate & Substandard Control & Sectional Valves for Fire Protection Water Sys
ML14184A197
Person / Time
Site: Robinson 
Issue date: 01/16/1980
From: Conlon T, Miller W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML14184A192 List:
References
50-261-79-29, NUDOCS 8003270317
Download: ML14184A197 (12)


See also: IR 05000261/1979029

Text

o,

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 31

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-261/79-29

Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company

411 Fayetteville Street

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Facility Name:

Robinson

Docket No. 50-261

License No. DPR-23

Inspection at Rob

son si

near Ha tsvi e, South Carolina

Inspector:

.

/

. H. Miller, Jr.

tate igned

Approved b:

T.

Conlon, Section

ief, RCES Branch

Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on December 10-14, 1979

Areas Inspected

This special, unannounced inspection involved 36 inspector-hours on site in the

area of fire protection/prevention.

Results

Of the area inspected,

one deviation was found (Inadequate and substandard

control and sectional valves for fire protection water system).

8003270 317

DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

  • R. B. Starkey, Jr., General Plant Manager
  • C. W. Crawford, Manager of Operations and Maintenance
  • F. Lowery, Operations Supervisor
  • B. W. Garrison, QA Supervisor

D. H. Baur, QA Specialist

  • H. S. Zimmerman, Manager of Technical and Administrative Services
  • J. M. Curley, Engineering Supervisor

S. B. Clark, Plant Engineer

  • M. C. Morrow, Engineering Technician

K. H. Dripps, Engineering Aide

J. Murray, Training Department

NRC Principal Inspector

  • T..J. McHenry
  • Attended exit interview

2.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 14, 1979, with

those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance

or

deviations.

New unresolved items identified during this inspection are

discussed in Paragraphs 5.b.(50), 5.b.(72), and 6.a.

5.

Fire Protection/Prevention Modifications

This inspection evaluated the licensee's corrective action on the fire

protection modification and improvement commitments made to the NRC.

The

NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (FPSER)

for this facility

dated February 28, 1978 (Amendment 31 to Operating License No. DPR-23) with

Supplement No.

1 dated September 4,

1979, and licensee's Fire Protection

Program Review -

APCSB 9.5.1,

H. B. Robinson Unit No.

2

(FPPR)

dated

January 1, 1977, were used in this evaluation.

These documents describe

-2

the fire protection modifications and improvements required and dates of

implementation. With the exception of the lube oil shielding system (FPSER

Item 3.1.21),

all items were required to be completed prior to the end of

the 1979 refueling outage.

The modifications and findings are as follows:

a.

The fire protection/prevention modifications, FPSER paragraph which

discusses the modifications and current status of the modifications

are listed in the following table. Additional information on all open

and on closed items identified by an * is included in Paragraph 5.c.

FPSER Comment

Number

Location/Item

Paragraph

Status

Diesel Generator Rooms (Areas 1 & 2)

5.1

(1)

Insulate fuel oil and

service water piping

3.1.17

Closed

(2)

Ventilation fans

3.1.18

Closed

(3)

Fire door (3-hr)/detectors

3.1.26

Closed

(4)

Fuel supply - operating pro-

3.1.25 &

cedure

3.2.6

  • Open

(5)

Smoke seal for bus bar

5.1.6

Closed

(6)

Floor drain backflow device

3.1.27

  • Closed

Safety Injection Pump Room (Area 3)

5.2

(7)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

Closed

(8)

Fire barrier/door (3-hr)

3.1.2

Closed

(9)

Fire damper

3.1.1

Closed

(10)

Cable coating

3.1.4

Closed

Charging Pump Room (Area 4)

5.3

(11)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

Closed

(12)

Fire door (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

Component Cooling Water Pump Room

(Area 5)

5.4

(13)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

Closed

(14)

Cable coating

3.1.4

Closed

(15)

Fire door (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

(16)

Fire dampers

3.1.1

Closed

(17)

Administrative Procedures

5.4.6 &

3.2.6

  • Open

Hot Chemical Lab and Counting Room

(Area 6)

5.5

(18)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

  • Closed

(19)

Fire door (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

(20)

Fire dampers

3.1.1

Closed

-3

FPSER Comment

Number

Location/Item

Paragraph

Status

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room

(Area 7)

5.6

(21)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

Closed

(22)

Fire door (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

(23)

Cable coating

3.1.4

Closed

(24)

Fire dampers

3.1.1

Closed

South Cable Vault (Area 9)

(25)

Carbon dioxide system

3.1.5

  • Closed

(26)

Fire door (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

(27)

Cable coating

3.1.4

Closed

Auxiliary Building Hallway (Areas

10A-10C)

5.8

(28)

Reroute hydrogen piping

3.1.12

Closed

(29)

Fire detection

3.1.2

Closed

(30)

Cable coating

3.1.4

Closed

(31)

Sprinkler system

3.1.6

  • Closed

Demineralizer Room, Waste Evaporator

Equipment Room, Heat Exchanger Room,

Pipe Alley, and Waste Hold Tank-Room.

(Areas 1OD-1OH and 14)

5.9

(32)

Hose station

3.1.10

Closed

(33)

Fire dampers

3.3.3

Closed

(34)

Fire door/tank room (3-hr)

3.1.3

  • Closed

(35)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

Closed

(36)

Administrative procedures

5.9.6 &

3.2.6

  • Open

Auxiliary Building Entrance Area

(Area 11)

5.10

(37)

Fire doors

3.1.3

Closed

Solid Waste Handling Room (Area 13)

5.11

(38)

Pre-action sprinkler system

3.1.7

  • &**Open

(39)

Fire dampers

3.1.1

Closed

(40)

Fire doors (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

Auxiliary Building Hallway-Upper Level

(Areas 14A-14C and 14E-14G)

5.12

(41)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

Closed

(42)

Cable coating

3.1.4

Closed

-4

FPSER Comment

Number

Location/Item

Paragraph

Status

Chemical Stge, Boric Acid Tank

(Area 14D)

5.13

(43)

Fire door (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

(44)

Fire dampers

3.1.1

Closed

Battery Room (Area 15)

5.14

(45)

Fire door (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

(46)

Upgrade ventilation

5.14.6

  • Closed

(47)

Ventilation flow monitor

3.1.23

  • Closed

HVAC Room for Control.Room (Area 16)

5.15

(48)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

Closed

(49)

Storage cabinet

3.1.19

  • Closed

Unit 2 Cable Spread Room and Computer

Room (Area 18)

5.16

(50)

Halon system/fire detectors

3.1.9

  • Open

(51)

-

Fire dampers/Halon system

3.1.1

Closed

(52)

Cable coating

3.1.4

Closed

Electrical Equipment Area (Area 19)

5.17

(53)

Halon system/fire detectors

3.1.9

  • Open

(54)

Fire dampers

3.1.1

Closed

(55)

Fire doors (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

(56)

Cable coating

3.1.4

Closed

Rod Control Room (Area 20)

5.18

(57)

Fire doors (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

(58)

Fire dampers

3.1.1

Closed

(59)

Cable coating

3.1.4

Closed

Control Room (Area 21B

5.19

(60)

Fire detectors for consoles

3.1

Closed

(61)

Fire door (3-hr)-"Hagan" Room

3.1.3

Closed

(62)

Upgrade electrical penetrations

3.1.24

Closed

(63)

Hose stations

3.1.10

  • Closed

(64).

Standpipe deluge valve (5.19.6)

3.1.10

  • Closed

(65)

Fire door (3/4-hr)-Kitchen

3.1.20

Closed

(66)

Kitchen smoke detector

3.1.20

Closed

(67)

Kitchen appliances

3.1.20

Closed

(68)

Fire extinguisher-(Water)

3.1.11

Closed

Relay ("Hagan") Room (Area 21C)

5.20

Closed

(69)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

Closed

(70)

Hose station

3.1.10

Closed

-5

FPSER Comment

Number

Location/Item

Paragraph

Status

Containment Cable Penetration Area

(Area 27A)

5.25

(71)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

    • Closed

(72)

Fire extinguishers (large type)

3.1.11

  • Open

(73)

Cable coating

3.1.4

  • Open

Primary Coolant Pumps (Area 27B)

5.26

(74)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

Closed

(75)

Lub oil shield

3.1.21

  • Open

(76)

Addition hose-outside contain-

3.1.10 &

ment

5.26.6

Closed

Containment (Area 27C)

5.27

(77)

Fire detectors-air recircula

tion units

3.1.2

    • Closed

(78)

Fire extinguishers (large type)

3.1.11

  • Open

-

RHR Pump Pit (Area 28)

5.28

(79)

Fire detectors

3.1.2

    • Closed

(80)

Hose station-outside pit

3.1.10

Closed

North Cable Vault (Area 34)

5.7

(81)

Carbon dioxide system

3.1.5

  • Closed

(82)

Fire doors (3-hr)

3.1.3

Closed

(83)

Cable coating

3.1.4

Closed

General Plant Areas

(84)

Emergency power supply for fire

detection systems

3.1.2

  • Closed

(85)

Storage of combustibles (dry ion

exchange resin)

3.1.8

  • Open

(86)

Replace hose racks with reels

3.1.10

Closed

(87)

Addition hose for stations

located at cable vaults, rod

drive room, containment exhaust

fan room and lower level of

auxiliary building

3.1.10

Closed

(88)

Separate fire water connection

with isolation valves

3.1.13

  • Open

(89)

Self-containing breathing

apparatus

3.1.14

Closed

(90)

Fire fighting equipment storage

building

3.1.15

Closed

(91)

Portable ventilation equipment

3.1.16

Closed

(92)

Sound powered telephone cable

3.1.22

Closed

(93)

Electrical cable penetrations

3.1.24

Closed

-6

FPSER Comment

Number

Location/Item

Paragraph

Status

(94)

Protective posts for (PIV) post

indicator valves and fire

hydrants

4.3.1.3

Closed

(95)

Supervision of control valves

4.3.1.3

  • Open

Notes:

  • See comments in Paragraph No. 5.c.
    • Not inspected due to high radiation.

b.

Procedures for Fire Protection Modifications

The following procedures and documentation data for the design, receipt,

installation, inspection and tests for the fire protection modification

were reviewed:

Number

Title

(1)

445A

Fire doors

(2) -445B

Ventilation system fire dampers

(3)

445C

Automatic fire detection and actuation systems

(4)

445D

Halon suppression systems

(5)

445E

Carbon dioxide suppression systems

(6)

445G

Fire water system

(7)

445J

Support (fire) walls

(8)

445K

Diesel generator room floor drains

(9)

445M

Battery room modification systems

(10)

445N

Fire retardant cable coating and smoke seal

c.

Findings

Additional information on the "open" items and on some of the "closed"

items in paragraph 5.a are listed below.

The below listed numbers

correspond to the numbered items in paragraph 5.a.

(1) The fuel oil makeup line to the "A" diesel formerly routed through

the "B" diesel room has been relocated to the exterior of the

structure. This arrangement should prevent a fire in the "B"

diesel room from affecting the fuel flow to the "A" diesel.

The

service water piping to the "B" diesel generator which is located

in the "A" diesel room has been enclosed with 3-hour fire rated

insulation.

(4) The review of the Administrative Fire Protection Procedures is

currently being conducted by NRC/(NRR).

This area will be exam

ined during a subsequent NRC/(IE) inspection and is listed as an

Unresolved Item (50-261/79-29-04),

Substandard Fire Protection

Adminstrative Procedures.

For details refer to paragraph 6.a.

-7

(6)

In lieu of providing a backflow device in each diesel generator

room floor drain, the former interconnected floor drains have

been revamped and arranged such that each drain discharges into a

separate storm drain pipe.

This arrangement appears to meet the

intent of the FPSER.

(17) Refer to Item (4) above.

(18)

The fire detectors installed do not cover all areas of the labora

tory and counting room; however the detectors are located in the

vicinity of the door penetrations to the adjacent fire areas which

contain safety related equipment and components.

This arrangement

appears to meet the commitments within the FPSER.

(25) The activation circuits from the fire detection system to the

fire suppression system are not electrically supervised.

The

licensee is to evaluate this feature to determine if this circuit

should be electrically supervised or the circuit frequently

tested during the surveillance inspection and tests of the fire

detection system. This item is identified as Inspector Followup

Item (50-261/79-29-05), Nonsupervised actuation circuits to fire

suppression systems, and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC

inspection.

(31)

The sprinkler heads for the system in the auxiliary building hall

way are installed at the ceiling level as required by NFPA-13,,

"Sprinkler Systems" but due to obstructions created by ventilation

ducts, pipes, electrical ducts, etc., the system will not provide

adequate protection against fires involving transient combustibles.

However, the system appears to provide acceptable protection for

the electrical cables in the area which was the intent of the FPSER.

See also Item (25) above.

(34) A 3-hour fire door has been provided to separate the auxiliary

building corridor (fire area 10C) from the residual heat exchangers

and waste holdup tank room (fire area 10H) which appears to meet

the intent of the FPSER.

(36) Refer to Item (4) above.

(38) The preaction sprinkler system for this area was originally pro

posed to be activated by a combination of smoke detectors and

fixed temperature-rate compensated heat detectors.

However, the

(cement dust) within this area causes the smoke detectors to operate

and thus the transmission of false alarms.

Therefore, the licensee

has removed all smoke detectors from this system and is to initiate

a request to NRC/(NRR) for approval to replace the smoke detectors

with fixed temperature-type heat detectors.

This item will remain

outstanding pending the results of this evaluation and is identified

as Inspector Followup Item (50-261/79-29-06),

Actuation devices for

preaction sprinkler system in solid waste handling room.

Refer also

to Item (25) above.

-8

(46) &

(47) The battery room ventilation system has been modified by the

installation of two new exhaust fans and two supply air inlets in

the exterior wall.

The licensee has evaluated this design and

found that adequate ventilation should be provided.

Air flow

indicators have not been provided in the exhaust systems; however,

the 3 fans are supplied power from separate power sources and are

provided with power status indication in the control room.

This

arrangement appears to meet the intent of the FPSER requirements.

(49) The metal cabinet containing the storage of computer tapes has

been removed.

(50) The current design of the halon system for this area will provide

a 5% concentration of halon for approximately 8 minutes.

The

licensee advised that the system is to be redesigned so as to

maintain a 5% concentration for at least 15 minutes.

This item

will remain outstanding pending completion of the modifications

to the system and is identified as Unresolved Item (50-261/79-29

02), Halon system discrepancies.

Also, refer to Item (25) above.

(53) Refer to Item (50) above.

(63) The hose station has not been installed within the control room

but has been installed within the adjacent "Hagan" Room but is

equipped with sufficient hose to reach all portions of the control

room.

This arrangement appears to meet the intent of the FPSER.

(64) A dry pipe valve has been installed in the supply piping to the

control room ("Hagan"

Room) station in lieu of a motor operated

valve as indicated within the FPSER.

This arrangement appears

to meet-the intent of the FPSER.

(70) Refer to Item (63) above.

(72), (73) &

(75) D. Waters of CP&L advised M. Virgilio of NRC/(NRR) during a tele

phone conversation in March 1979 that the fire protection features

for the containment area were to be reevaluated and that the

portable fire extinguishers, coating of the electrical cables and

reactor coolant pump oil shield were not to be provided pending

the results of this evaluation.

The licensee is presently drafting

a letter to the NRC substantiating this conversation.

This item is

identified as Unresolved Item, (50-261/79-29-03) Fire Protection

Requirements for Containment, and will be reviewed upon completion

of this reevaluation.

(78) Refer to Item (72) above.

(81) Refer to Item (25) above.

-9

(84)

A new fire detection system has been provided for all safety

related areas of the plant.

The control panels for the new

system are supplied from emergency power panels.

This arrange

ment meets the intent of the FPSER.

(85)

Refer to Item (4) above.

(88)

The outside post indicator type control valve to the interior

fire hose (standpipe) system in the auxiliary building and the

sectional control valve in the northeast portion of the fire

protection water distribution system as indicated on construction

drawing No. 5137M2017RI were not installed.

A field change request

(FCR) was prepared by the licensee's construction division to delete

these two valves and to provide an interior control valve for the

standpipe system. This FCR (No. FCR-M-174) was initiated due to

the high water table in the area and due to obstructions created

by equipment and other structures existing in the area.

The FCR

was forwarded to the licensee's engineering division for review

but was rejected since the proposed change did not meet the require

ments of Section 3-3.1 and 3-5.1 of NFPA-24, "Outside Protection".

However, this FCR was accomplished without the approval of the

enigineering division and without the issuance of a design change

notice (DCN)

as required by the licensee's Field Change Request

Procedure No. AP-VII-02.

Table 4-1,

Item E.2.a in Section 4.0

of the FPPR states that the underground yard fire main loop

complies with NFPA-24,

"Outside Protection".

Section 3-3.1 of

NFPA-24 requires every connection from the yard main to a

building to be provided with a post indicator type valve.

Section 3-5.1

of NFPA-24 requires large yard systems to be

provided

with sectional controlling valves

at appropriate

points. Construction installation drawings were developed to

provide an adequate number of control valves in the system.

The

failure to follow these design documents resulted in the existing

system not meeting the requirements of NFPA and the commitments to

the NRC and is identified as Deviation Item (50-261/79-29-01),

Inadequate and substandard control and sectional valves for the

exterior fire protection water system.

Also, the failure to follow the construction documents resulted

in the installation of an interior non-indicating type control

valve which does not conform to the NFPA criteria.

The instal

lation of this nonconforming control valve is part of the above

deviation.

(95)

Refer to Item (4) above. Presently, all post indicator sectional

control valves and OS&Y type control valves are sealed in the

correct position and are inspected monthly.

Table 4-1,

Item

Nos. E.2.a.2.a.

and E.3.E.3.c. state that the fire protection

water system and automatic sprinkler systems will comply with the

-10

requirements of NFPA-24, "Outside Protection" and NPFA-13, "Sprinkler

Systems".

Section 2-14.2.3. of NFPA-13 and Section 3-6 of NFPA-24

requires control valves to either be locked in the correct position

or sealed in the correct position and inspected weekly.

The Admin

istrative procedures for the plant are currently being reviewed by

NRC/(NRR); therefore, this substandard method of supervising valves

is listed as an example of Unresolved. Item (50-261/79-29-04),

Sub

standard fire protection administrative procedures,

and will be

reexamined during a subsequent NRC inspection.

6.

Fire Protection/Prevention Program

The following items of the fire protection/prevention program for the plant

were reviewed:

a.

Procedures

The fire protection administrative control procedures for the plant are

currently being evaluated by NRC/(NRR).

However, a review of the plant's

Fire Protection Manual (Plant Operating Manual - Volume 19) indicates that

the current procedures do not fully meet the requirements of NRC document

"Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative

Controls and Quality Assurance".

The licensee's Operations Surveillance

Report No. OQAS-79-13(R)

dated November 19-21, 1979, listed a number of

areas in which these procedures failed to meet various commitments to the

NRC. The licensee is currently reviewing and making a number of revisions

to the existing procedures.

Upon completion of the administrative review

by NRC/(NRR) and completion of revisions to the existing procedures by the

licensee, these procedures and their implementation will be evaluated during

an NRC/(IE) inspection.

This item is identified as Unresolved Item

(50-261/79-29-04),

Substandard Fire Protection Administrative Procedures.

b.

Fire Protection Systems

The following periodic test data on the fire protection systems and

equipment conducted in 1979 were reviewed and inspection frequency found

satisfactory except as noted:

(1) PT-9

Fire Protection Pumps and Power Supply (Monthly)

(2) PT-9.OA

Unit 2 Motor Driven Fire Pump and Fire Detection

(24OVAC) System (Monthly)

(3) PT-9.OB

Unit 2 Engine Driven Fire Pump and Water System Valves

(Monthly)

(4) PT-9.1

Fire Detection System Test (Semi-Annual)

(5) PT-9.2

Unit 1 Fire Pumps, Fire System Valves for Units 1 and 2,

Fire Detectors Crusher Pit (Monthly)

(6) PT-9.3

Inspection of Fire Protection System (Yearly)

(7) PT-9.4

Portable Fire Extinguishers, Fire Hose Stations and

Houses (Monthly)

Inspection records for March were not filed; however, licensee had

previously identified this problem and verified by inspections of

extinguisher inspection tags that the March inspection was apparently

conducted.

c.

Fire Protection Inspections

The most recent fire protection insurance inspections report on the

plant which was dated September 19-20,

1979,

and conducted by M&M

Protection Consultants for Nuclear Mutual Limited, was reviewed. This

report did not contain any current recommendations concerning safety

related areas within the plant. A review was made of the entire list

of previously withdrawn recommendations and it appears that all recom

mendations which were not corrected have been addressed by the FPSER.

d.

Fire Brigade Training and Drills

(1) A review was made of the fire brigade roster and training records

and found satisfactory. The shift assignments for December 8-14

were reviewed and indicated that at least 5 fire brigade personnel

were available on each shift for fire fighting operations as required

by the Technical Specifications.

(2) On December 13, 1979, representatives from the Hartsville and Pine

Ridge Volunteer Fire Departments were given a tour of the plant to

review the available fire protection and fire fighting equipment

and features.

Additional inspections and training sessions are

scheduled for key personnel from these departments during early

1980.

e. Facility Tour of Critical Fire Areas

A tour was made of the following critical plant areas:

(1) Cable Spreading Room

(2) Electrical Equipment Room

(3) Lower Level Hallway

(4) Battery Rooms

The housekeeping within these areas was satisfactory.

No open flame

type work was being accomplished in these areas.

The fire protection

equipment in the areas was found operational and appeared to be properly

maintained.