ML14181A563
| ML14181A563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1994 |
| From: | Christensen H, Ogle C, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14181A561 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-94-15, NUDOCS 9406290032 | |
| Download: ML14181A563 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1994015
Text
64p8 REG&
UNITED STATES
0,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
Report No.:
50-261/94-15
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.: DPR-23
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Unit 2
Inspection Conducted: April 24 - May 21, 1994
L e a d I n s p e c t o r :
A S
o
e
n I s e t
D e
W. T. ders, SeniorResident Inspector
Date Si ned
Other Inspector:
C. R.]le, Residen Inspector
D te
igned
Approved by:
'----
"
H. 0. Christensen, Chief
Date Signed
Reactor Projects Section 1A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational
safety verification, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, and
followup.
Results:
One violation with three examples was identified dealing with the licensee's
failure to properly establish, implement, and maintain maintenance procedures
as they related to maintenance on: control room pressure differential pressure
instrument DPI-6520, paragraph 3; the B boric acid storage tank temperature
controller and alarm, paragraph 4; and the EDG B lube oil strainer
maintenance, paragraph 4.
A second violation was identified involving an operator erroneously draining
safety injection accumulator A instead of accumulator B, paragraph 3.
9406290032 94061
ADOCK 05000
1
a
PR-
2
A third violation was identified involving control room operators failing to
take prompt corrective actions after being provided with chemistry sample
results which indicated that the boric acid concentration in the A BAST was in
excess of the concentration allowed by Technical Specification 3.2.2.c.,
paragraph 5.
An Unresolved Item was identified involving the operability of the control
room ventilation system, paragraph 6.
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Barnett, Manager, Projects Management
S. Billings, Technical Aide, Regulatory Compliance
- A. Carley, Manager, Site Communications
- B. Clark, Manager, Maintenance
- D. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
J. Eaddy, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Support
- D. Gudger, Specialist Regulatory Affairs
- S. Farmer, Manager, Engineering Programs, Technical Support
B. Harward, Manager, Engineering Site Support, Nuclear Engineering
Department
- M. Herrell, Manager, Robinson Training
- S. Hinnant, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project
J. Kozyra, Acting Manager, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
- R. Krich, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
A. McCauley, Manager, Electrical Systems, Technical Support
- G. Miller, Manager, Robinson Engineering Support
R. Moore, Acting Operations Manager
M. Pearson, Plant General Manager
M. Scott, Manager, Reactor Systems, Technical Support
L. Woods, Manager, Technical Support
- Attended exit interview on May 27, 1994.
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
engineers, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2. Plant Status
The unit began the report period operating at 100 percent power, and
performed at power for the entire report period with no major
operational difficulties. Unit power was restricted to less than full
power on selected days to prevent exceeding an environmental limitation
on circulating water discharge temperature.
3. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
General
r
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the
facility was being operated safely and in conformance with
regulatory requirements. These activities were confirmed by
direct observation, facility tours, interviews and discussions
with licensee personnel and management, verification of safety
system status, and review of facility records.
2
The inspectors reviewed shift logs, Operation's records, data
sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions
to verify equipment operability and compliance with TS.
The
inspectors verified the staff was knowledgeable of plant
conditions, responded properly to alarms, adhered to procedures
and applicable administrative controls, cognizant of in-progress
surveillance and maintenance activities, and aware of inoperable
equipment status through work observations and discussions with
Operations staff members. The inspectors performed channel
verifications and reviewed component status and safety-related
parameters to verify conformance with TS. Shift changes were
routinely observed, verifying that system status continuity was
maintained and that proper control room staffing existed. Access
to the control room was controlled and operations personnel
carried out their assigned duties in an effective manner. Control
room demeanor and communications were appropriate.
Plant tours were conducted to verify equipment operability, assess
the general condition of plant equipment, and to verify that
radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical
protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures were
properly implemented.
b.
Control Room Pressure Indicator In Error
On April 29, 1994, the inspectors observed that control room
pressure, as indicated on differential pressure instrument DPI
6520, was less than atmospheric pressure. Following the
licensee's investigation of this observation, the inspectors were
informed that DPI-6520 was in error and that the control room was
actually at a slightly positive pressure with respect to
atmospheric pressure. The inspectors were also advised that to
correct this instrument error, DPI-6520 was subsequently adjusted
by the system engineer.
The inspectors determined from interviews of personnel involved,
that maintenance was performed on DPI-6520 on April 27, 1994, to
correct a previous indication problem with the instrument. This
maintenance consisted of adjusting the control room manometer
(DPI-6520) to the level position and tightening the mounting
screws. Following this adjustment, no "zeroing" of the instrument
was performed to compensate for the new instrument position. A
review of the WR/JO indicated that this zeroing was not specified.
Furthermore, the planner involved in generating the maintenance
ticket was unaware of the need to zero the instrument following
the leveling. Discussions with the system engineer and a review
of a vendor bulletin on the instrument revealed that a zeroing was
appropriate. The inspectors noted that DPI-6520 is used to verify
that CR ventilation equipment performance complies with TS
requirements. Overall the inspectors concluded that the
maintenance instructions provided on the work request were
inadequate.
3
TS 6.5.1.1, Procedures, Tests, and Experiments, requires in part,
that written procedures be established, implemented, and
maintained, covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, 1978, including procedures control
of measuring and test equipment.
Work Request/Job Order, WR/JO 94-AEBT1 was provided to
troubleshoot and repair the control room differential pressure
instrument DPI-6520. This instrument is used to verify that
control room ventilation equipment performance complies with
Technical Specification requirements.
Contrary to the above, WR/JO 94-AEBT1 was inadequate in that, it
did not provide adequate instructions for ensuring the instrument
was properly initialized following maintenance. As a result, the
instrument was returned to service following maintenance on
April 27, 1994, with an erroneous indication of control room
pressure. This is one of three examples, which in the aggregate,
constitute violation, VIO: 94-15-01, Failure To Properly
Establish, Implement, and Maintain Maintenance Procedures.
c.
Inadvertent Draining Of Safety Injection Accumulator A
On April 30, 1994, while attempting to reduce the water level in
the B SI accumulator, the reactor operator mistakenly opened the
drain valve for the A accumulator. Shortly thereafter, a low
level alarm was received for that accumulator. The level had been
reduced to just below 61 percent before the drain valve was shut
by the operator. Since the A accumulator level was then below the
TS limit of 61.5 percent the licensee entered TS 3.3.1.2.a..
This
TS requires that the unit be placed in hot shutdown if an
accumulator is inoperable for greater than four hours. According
to the reactor operator logs, eight minutes later SI accumulator A
was refilled and the LCO was exited. Approximately 45 minutes
later the B SI accumulator was drained in accordance with OP-202,
Safety Injection and Containment Vessel Spray System. In response
to this event, the licensee generated an ACR.
The inspectors reviewed the ACR, reactor operator log entries for
the event, and written statements by key watchstanders involved.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the completed Section 6.2 of
OP 202 used to drain the accumulator. Based on this effort, the
inspectors concluded that the incident was the result of a non
cognitive error on the part of the reactor operator. Imbedded in
this error was the failure of the individual involved to properly
implement the licensee's self-checking program. Additionally, the
inspectors noted that though draining an accumulator is a
relatively minor evolution, the reactor operator failed to inform
the senior control operator of his actions. As a result, the
senior control operator was unavailable to independently detect
the error on the part of the reactor operator.
4
Technical Specification 6.5.1.1, Procedures, Tests, and
Experiments requires, in part, that written procedures be
established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities
recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev 2., 1978
including draining emergency core cooling system components.
Operating Procedure, OP-202, Safety Injection and Containment
Vessel Spray System, provides instructions for draining Safety
Injection Accumulators.
Contrary to the above, on April 30, 1994, OP-202 was improperly
implemented during efforts to drain Safety Injection Accumulator B
in that, the drain valve for accumulator A was opened. As a
result, safety injection accumulator A was inadvertently drained
below the minimum technical specification level.
This is
identified as a violation, VIO: 93-15-02, Operator Error Results
In Inadvertently Draining Incorrect Safety Injection Accumulator.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
a.
General
The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on
systems and components to ascertain that these activities were
conducted in accordance with TS, approved procedures, and
appropriate industry codes and standards. The inspectors
determined that these activities did not violate LCOs and that
required redundant components were operable. The inspectors
verified that required administrative, material, testing,
radiological, and fire prevention controls were adhered to. In
particular, the inspectors observed/reviewed the following
maintenance activities detailed below:
WR/JO 94-ACYR1
Calibrate BAST A Temperature
Controller and Alarm
WR/JO 94-AGRZ1
Troubleshoot Problem With LI-460
Indicating Out of Tolerance
WR/JO 94-ARWOO8
Perform B Emergency Diesel Generator
Quarterly Inspections
b.
Maintenance On Wrong BAST Controller
On April 12, 1994, the inspectors witnessed licensee efforts to
calibrate the A boric acid storage tank temperature controller and
alarm. When the inspectors arrived to witness this maintenance
evolution, the technician was in the process of removing the
temperature sensing bulb for the B boric acid storage tank. After
reviewing the WR/JO present at the job site, the inspectors
questioned the technician on whether he was removing the correct
sensing bulb. The technician reviewed the tank labeling and
5
acknowledged his error to the inspectors. The bulb was then
reinstalled and the calibration stopped.
TS 6.5.1.1, Procedures, Tests, and Experiments, requires in part,
that written procedures be established, implemented, and
maintained, covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, 1978, including procedures for
control of measuring and test equipment.
Work Request/Job Order, WR/JO 94-ACYR1 was provided to calibrate
the boric acid storage tank A temperature controller and alarm.
Contrary to the above, on April 12, 1994, WR/JO 94-ACYR1 was
implemented incorrectly in that the maintenance technician
assigned to perform the calibration, erroneously commenced work on
the boric acid storage tank B temperature controller and alarm.
This is one of three examples which in the aggregate constitutes a
violation, VIO: 94-15-01, Failure To Properly Establish,
Implement, And Maintain A Maintenance Procedure.
The inspectors also noted that within a minute of the inspector
questioning the appropriateness of the maintenance technician's
activities, an auxiliary operator entered the work area with
similar questions. Subsequent discussions with control room
personnel revealed that the auxiliary operator was dispatched
based on the reactor operator's concerns with an unexpected alarm
on the boric acid storage tank B. The inspectors concluded that
this represented a positive example of a questioning attitude on
the part of the reactor operator and on-shift personnel.
c.
EDG B Lube Oil Strainer Maintenance
On April 25, 1994, the inspectors observed portions of EDG B
quarterly maintenance activities. During the reassembly of the
lube oil strainer, the inspectors observed that the pressure plate
washer was not installed during the reassembly as required by Step
7.3.10 of CM-507, Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Strainers.
When the inspectors questioned the maintenance technicians on this
apparent discrepancy, the strainer reassembly was halted and
efforts were made to locate the washer. The inspectors were
subsequently advised by the manager of mechanical maintenance that
the washer was not present when the strainer was disassembled.
Despite specific references to the washer in three separate,
completed steps of the procedure (disassembly, inspection, and
reassembly steps) the technicians involved failed to detect the
missing washer. Following the installation of a replacement
washer, the unit was assembled and the EDG returned to service
that evening.
TS 6.5.1.1, Procedures, Tests, and Experiments, requires in part,
that written procedures be established, implemented, and
maintained, covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, 1978, including procedures for the
maintenance of safety related equipment. Corrective maintenance
procedure, CM-507, Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Strainers,
provides instructions for the disassembly, inspection, and
reassembly of the emergency diesel generator lube oil strainers.
Contrary to the above, on April 25, 1994, CM-507 was not properly
implemented in that the lube oil strainer was improperly re
assembled. This occurred when the maintenance technicians failed
to install a pressure plate washer as required by step 7.3.10 of
the procedure.
This is one of three examples which in the aggregate constitute
violation, VIO: 94-15-01, Failure To Properly Establish,
Implement, And Maintain Maintenance Procedures.
On April 26, 1994, the inspectors questioned maintenance
department management on whether the technician had documented the
material condition of the non-existent washer on the maintenance
data sheet in the procedure. The inspectors were advised that
this had occurred, but that after the washer was identified as
missing by the NRC inspectors, the maintenance data sheet was
revised to correct the error. The inspectors' subsequent review
of this data sheet revealed that the check mark in the
satisfactory column denoting the satisfactory inspection of the
washer had been crossed out and initialled. (The subsequent
unsatisfactory entry was also crossed out to reflect the
acceptable material condition of the replacement washer.)
The
inspectors were subsequently advised by the maintenance manager
that recording the material condition of the non-existent washer
was the result of a process error on the part of the technician.
The technician had grouped all the strainer internals in one
location during disassembly. The parts were then inspected in
mass without individually referencing them on the procedure
inspection checklist. Following this group inspection, the
checklist was annotated to reflect all parts as satisfactory.
d.
Pressurizer Level Indicator Restoration Following Maintenance
On May 6, 1994, the inspectors observed licensee troubleshooting
of pressurizer level indicator, LI-460 in accordance with WR/JO
94-AGRZ1 and LP-017, Pressurizer Level Protection and Control
Channel 460. This maintenance was conducted to remedy a reported
out of tolerance condition of the instrument.
Following the
alignment of the instrument, the inspector noted that the
technicians were about to perform the instrument restoration out
of the sequence specified by LP-017. Specifically, the
technicians were proceeding to return toggle switch, CT-460, to
its normal position prior to removing the test equipment. This is.
reverse of the order specified in the procedure. The inspectors
questioned the technicians on their intended sequence. Following
this questioning, the technicians removed the test equipment and
7
returned the toggle switch to the correct position in the proper
sequence. Based on their subsequent review of the instrument
drawing, the inspectors concluded that the potential safety
significance of this near-deviation from the procedure was
minimal.
5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain safety-related surveillance activities
on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were
conducted in accordance with license requirements. For the surveillance
test procedures listed below, the inspectors determined that precautions
and LC~s were adhered to, the required administrative approvals and
tagouts were obtained prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished
by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure,
and test instrumentation was properly calibrated. Upon test completion,
the inspectors verified the recorded test data was complete and
accurate. Test discrepancies were properly documented and rectified,
and that the systems were properly returned to service. Specifically,
the inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test
activities:
OST-401
Emergency Diesels (Slow Speed Start)
(EDG B Only)
Emergency Diesel Generator Test
a.
BAST A Boric Acid Concentration Exceeds TS Limits
At approximately 6:30 p.m. on May 4, 1994, the shift supervisor
recognized that BAST A exceeded the TS limit for boric acid
concentration. This discovery occurred during his review of the
daily chemistry sheet when he noted that the 22,681 ppm boric acid
concentration recorded for the tank exceeded the 22,500 ppm limit
in TS 3.2.2.c. Following this discovery, BAST B was placed in
service and backup samples of tank A were ordered. These
additional samples confirmed that the boric acid concentration in
the tank exceeded the TS limit. Following an addition of water,
the boric acid concentration in the tank was confirmed below the
TS limit at 5.35 a.m. on May 5, 1994.
In response to this event, the inspector interviewed key control
room watchstanders and chemistry personnel involved in the initial
out of specification reading. The inspectors reviewed log entries
for the event, chemistry surveillance results sheets, and
historical graphics of BAST boric acid concentrations. During the
course of this review, the inspectors were advised that the out of
specification chemistry results were provided verbally to the
control room almost seven hours prior to the shift supervisor's
recognition of the problem. In fact, the out of specification
results were recorded in the reactor operator's log at 11:46 a.m.
that day.
8
From interviews, the inspectors noted that the reactor operator,
chemistry technician, and chemistry supervisor all recognized the
boric acid results as in excess of the administrative limit but
failed to recognize exceeding the T.S. limit. This failure
delayed action to correct the out of tolerance condition for
almost seven hours. The inspectors also noted that several other
factors contributed to the untimely resolution of this issue.
These included: a communications failure between the reactor
operator and the senior control operator which resulted in the
senior control operator not being aware of the sample results in a
timely fashion; the lack of acceptance criteria on the chemistry
technical specification surveillance sheet; and a dulled sense of
concern on the part of plant personnel for elevated BAST boric
acid levels as a result of recent excursions above the
administrative limit.
While the TS limit for BAST A boric acid concentration was
exceeded, the inspectors concluded that sufficient boric acid was
available in the other tank to satisfy TS requirements.
The
licensee is investigating the reason why the boric acid
concentration in the A BAST increased to above the TS limit. The
inspectors will monitor this effort.
Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires that measures be established so
that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures,
malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and
non-conformance are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above on May 4, 1994, an out of specification
boric acid concentration for BAST A was not promptly identified
following sampling. As a result a boric acid concentration in
excess of Technical Specification 3.2.2.c. went unrecognized for
almost seven hours. This is identified as a violation, VIO 94-15
03: Failure To Take Adequate Corrective Action To An Out Of Spec
BAST Boron Concentration.
6.
Engineering
a.
Control Room Ventilation Operability Evaluation
During a Region II specialist inspection which ended on May 6,
1994, the results of which are documented in Inspection Report
94-14, a Region II inspector questioned the licensee's testing
methodology associated with confirming the ability of the control
room ventilation system to maintain the control room at a positive
pressure with respect to all
adjacent areas during an accident.
The inspector noted that previous testing assessed the system's
ability to maintain a positive pressure relative to the outside
atmosphere, but did not verify the system's ability to maintain a
positive pressure in the control room envelope with respect to
adjoining plant spaces, which is a design basis function. This
apparent deviation from the test methodology as described in the
9
UFSAR, was identified to the licensee as an apparent Deviation.
The resident inspectors questioned the system's operability, given
the apparent inadequate scope of system testing. The Plant
Manager directed his staff to ascertain, and perform the testing
necessary to determine operability.
On the afternoon of May 6, 1994, the control room ventilation
system was tested in the emergency pressurization mode to
determine if the system could produce and maintain a positive
pressure relative to adjacent areas. The testing revealed that
the control room could only be pressurized to a pressure
approximately equal to an adjacent electrical equipment room. By
modifying the system's air flow balance, the licensee was
successful in creating a positive pressure between the control
room and the electrical equipment room, as well as all other
adjacent areas.
On the following day, an auxiliary building exhaust fan was turned
off to support ongoing auxiliary building ventilation flow balance
efforts. This resulted in another electrical equipment room
adjacent to the control room, the EI/E2 room, going to a pressure
of 0.2 inches of water higher than the control room. This
pressure was greater than the maximum pressure differential
attainable by the control room ventilation system when in the
emergency pressurization mode, based on the previous days testing.
This in turn indicated that in that configuration, the E1/E2 room
would have been at a positive pressure with respect to the control
room during certain accident scenarios. The licensee restarted
the auxiliary building exhaust fan, and declared the control room
ventilation system inoperable until the issue could be resolved.
Ultimately, the licensee de-energized the auxiliary building
supply fan which created a large negative pressure in the
auxiliary building which resolved the immediate concern relative
to the E1/E2 room and the control room. Subsequently, the
licensee restarted the auxiliary building supply fan after
applicable procedures were modified to de-energize the supply fan
in certain accident scenarios.
At the end of the report period, the control room ventilation
system had been balanced to maintain the control room at a
positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas during accident
scenarios. The licensee is evaluating the event to determine long
term corrective actions, the past operability of the system, and
the safety significance of having had a potentially inoperable
system. Pending the completion of that evaluation, this issue
will be maintained as Unresolved Item: URI 94-15-04, Control Room
Ventilation System Operability.
7.
Review of LERs (30703)
The below listed LERs were reviewed to determine if the information
provided met NRC requirements. The determination included: adequacy of
description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications
and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of
potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the
relative safety significance of each event.
LER 92-012: Reactor Trip At Shutdown During Surveillance Testing.
LER 92-019: TS Violation Due To Mode Change With WCCU-1A
LER 92-020: Alert Declaration Due To Unplanned Release Of Toxic
Gas
LER 92-021: Failure To Enter TS Action Statement For Inoperable CV
Isolation
LER 89-011: Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate Could Exceed Limit
LER 90-001: Loss Of All Control Rod Indication
LER 90-006: Breech Of Containment Integrity
LER 91-003: Containment Vessel Fire During Refueling
LER 91-004: Rod Control System Urgent Failure
LER 91-008: TS 3.0 Implementation
The corrective actions for the above LERs have been completed. These
items are closed.
8.
Licensee Action on Previous Findings (92701, 90702)
a.
(Open) URI 94-12-02, Basis For Closed Systems Outside Containment
IR 94-12 documents an URI related to credit taken in a licensee
containment isolation valve study for closed systems outside
containment which are normally vented to the RWST. In an attempt
to understand the licensee's basis for this "closed" system
classification, the inspectors reviewed testing associated with
several systems which are normally vented to the RWST.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the following Operations
Surveillance Test: OST-155, Safety Injection System Integrity
Test; OST-254, Residual Heat Removal System and RHR Loop Sampling
System Leak Test; and OST-355, Containment Spray System Integrity
Test. OST-254 is used to demonstrate compliance with RHR system
leakage testing requirements specified in TS 4.4.3. All three OST
procedures (and others) are used to verify compliance with
Operating License requirement 3.G.2 to conduct integrated leak
tests of systems outside containment that would or could contain
highly radioactive fluids during an accident.
Following this
review, the inspectors were concerned that potential
inconsistencies and apparent shortcomings existed in the OSTs.
These concerns could be categorized into two broad areas:
the
adequacy of OST methodology and the apparent failure to conduct an
"integrated" leak test. The latter concern dealt primarily with
the failure of the licensee to conduct a check for seat leakage
past the SI-864 A/B RWST Discharge an SI-856 A/B High Head SI Test
Lined to RWST, valves. Seat leakage past these valves during the
recirculation phase could result in unmonitored release through
the RWST vent.
These concerns were identified to cognizant licensee personnel
during the week of May 9, 1994.
In response, the inspectors were
advised near the end of the inspection period that a licensee
review of these concerns would be conducted. Additionally,
immediately after the report period, the licensee advised the
inspectors that no seat leakage testing had been conducted on the
SI-864 A/B valves. Hence, no firm data existed to quantify the
magnitude of this potential unmonitored release path.
However,
the licensee indicated their intention to develop a plan to
resolve this potential shortcoming as well as review the adequacy
of their existing leakage tests. The inspectors were presented an
unverified calculation on May 27, 1994, that demonstrated that
with seat leakage at the initial procurement limit for the SI-864
A/B valves, no appreciable increase in off-site doses would occur.
Pending further review by the inspectors of the apparent test
inconsistencies and a review of the potential unmonitored release
path by NRR, this item remains open.
9.
Exit Interview (71701)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 27, 1994, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below and in the summary. Dissenting comments were not received from
the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
Item Number
Description/Reference Paragraph
VIO: 94-15-01
Failure To Properly Establish, Implement, and
Maintain Maintenance Procedures. (paragraphs 3
and 4)
VIO: 93-15-02
Operator Error Results In Inadvertently Draining
Incorrect Safety Injection Accumulator.
(paragraph 3)
12
VIO: 94-15-03
Failure To Take Adequate Corrective Action To An
Out Of Specification BAST Boron Concentration.
(paragraph 5)
URI: 94-15-04
Control Room Ventilation System Operability.
(paragraph 6)
10.
List of Acronyms and Initialisms
ACR
Adverse Condition Report
BAST
Boric Acid Storage Tank
Corrective Maintenance
CV
Containment Vessel
DPI
Differential Pressure Indicator
Level Indicator
OP
Operating Procedure
OST
Operators Surveillance Test
Refueling Water Storage Tank
TS
Technical Specification
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Unresolved Item
Violation
WO/JO
Work Order/Job Order