ML13331B475
| ML13331B475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1990 |
| From: | Ray H Southern California Edison Co |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13331A426 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9006080119 | |
| Download: ML13331B475 (32) | |
Text
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON
)
COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY
)DOCKET NO. 50-206 for a Class 104(b) License to Acquire,
)
Possess, and Use a Utilization Facility as
)Amendment No. 183 Part of Unit No. 1 of the San Onofre Nuclear
)
Generating Station
)
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, hereby submit Amendment Application No. 183.
This amendment consists of Proposed Change No.
220 to Provisional Operating License No.
Proposed Change No.
220 modifies both the Provisional Operating License and the Technical Specifications incorporated as Appendix A in the Provisional Operating License.
Proposed Change No. 220 deletes license condition 3.L, "Diesel Generators," in its entirety.
It revises and relocates the requirements of this license condition to Section 3.7, "Auxiliary Electrical Supply,"
and Section 4.4, "Emergency Power System Periodic Testing," of the Technical Specifications.
Amendment Application No. 180, which was submitted on April 19, 1990, included a different set of changes to Section 3.7 and Section 4.4 of the Technical Specifications. The changes included in Amendment Application No. 180 are not reflected in this Amendment Application No. 183.
0oso
-2 In the event of conflict with previous information other than Amendment Application No. 180, the information in Amendment Application No.
183 supersedes the information previously submitted.
Based on the significant hazards analysis provided in the Description and Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis of Proposed Change No.
- 220, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change.
APP183.IAB
Subscribed on this 5th day of June 1990.
Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY By:
Harold B. Ray Senior Vice Presd nt Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of June, 1gq0 OFFICIAL SEAL LINDA L, RULON Notary Public-Califomia ORANGE COUNTY Notary Public in and for the My Comm. Exp. Mar. 4,1992 State of California James A. Beoletto Attorney for Southern California Edison Company By:
0
.Beltt
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
)
EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS &
)
Docket No. 50-206 ELECTRIC COMPANY (San Onofre Nuclear
)
Generating Station, Unit No. 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of Amendment Application No.
183 was served on the following by deposit in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on the 7
day of June 1990.
Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq.
Staff Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 David R. Pigott, Esq.
Samuel B. Casey, Esq.
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 600 Montgomery Street San Francisco, California 94111 Charles W. Lacey Senior Vice President Bechtel Power Corporation 12440 East Imperial Highway Norwalk, California 90650 Michael L. Mellor, Esq.
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges Two Embarcadero Center San Francisco, California 94111 Huey Johnson Secretary for Resources State of California 1416 Ninth Street Sacramento, California 95814 Janice E. Kerr, General Counsel California Public Utilities Commission 5066 State Building San Francisco, California 94102 C. J. Craig Manager U.S. Nuclear Projects I ESSD Westinghouse Electric Corporation Post Office Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230
-2 A. I. Gaede 23222 Cheswald Drive Laguna Niguel, California 92677 Frederick E. John, Executive Director California Public Utilities-Commission 5050 State Building San Francisco, California 94102 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 0IIIt
DESCRIPTION AND SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NO. 220 TO OPERATING LICENSE NO DPR-13 AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS This is a request to delete the six diesel license conditions and to incorporate their requirements into the Technical Specifications.
EXISTING LICENSE CONDITIONS AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS These are in Attachment 1 PROPOSED LICENSE CONDITIONS AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS These are in Attachment 2. Changes from Attachment 1 are identified by vertical bars in the right margin.
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES Section 3.L of the plant operating license contains six license conditions on the emergency diesel generators. These conditions impose load and start-stop restrictions, slow start requirements, maintenance and surveillance requirements, and inspection requirements on the diesel engines. This proposed change will eliminate the license conditions entirely and incorporate their requirements into the Technical Specifications.
The bases for these new requirements will be explained in the Basis portion of the Technical Specifications.
BACKGROUND OF CHANGES During 1983-86, the reliability of emergency diesel generators for nuclear service manufactured by Transamerica Delaval (TDI) became of significant concern to the NRC.
These concerns were prompted by the fracture failure of a diesel crankshaft at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station in August 1983 during pre-operational testing. A broad pattern of deficiencies in critical engine components at various installations became evident later. These deficiencies were believed to be due to inadequacies in design, manufacture and quality assurance/quality control by TDI.
Responding to these problems, thirteen nuclear utilities formed an owners group.
The owners group performed extensive design reviews of all key engine components and made recommendations regarding component replacements and modifications, engine testing, and a comprehensive engine maintenance and surveillance program.
In.August 1986, the NRC issued NUREG-1216, containing a detailed evaluation of the owners group recommendations.
By and large, NUREG-1216 accepted these recommendations, but in a few cases either relaxed the recommendation or made it more stringent. One important conclusion of NUREG-1216 was that a selected number of the recommendations deserve special emphasis and should be imposed as license conditions for the plant. Toward this end, an appendix to NUREG-1216 provided a set of sample license conditions.
Another important NUREG-1216 conclusion dealt with the San Onofre Unit 1 diesel crankshafts.
The crankshafts may crack because of high stresses experienced during the transient period associated with engine startup and shutdown.
The
-2 owners group made several remedial recommendations.
These included regular inspections of the critical areas of both crankshafts at intervals of approximately fifty engine start-stop cycles and removal of any cracks detected during these inspections.
The owners group did not make a recommendation to restrict engine load or to replace or modify the crankshafts. NUREG-1216 took the position that SCE should implement the owners group recommendations, restrict normal engine test load to a level consistent with the emergency demand and at the same time initiate efforts to permanently correct the root cause of the cracking problem. It presented crankshaft replacement or modification as two acceptable long term solutions. In January 1987, the NRC transmitted a slightly revised version of NUREG-1216 (see Reference 1).
Among other changes, it required contingency inspections of the crankshaft after an overload event.
The six existing license conditions (See Attachment 1) were the result of extensive discussions and negotiations between SCE and the NRC centering around the owners group findings, the NUREG-1216 requirements, and uncertainties associated with the owners group crankshaft crack propagation analysis (see Reference 2).
These conditions were intended to be temporary requirements, pending long term resolution of the remaining issues.
In November 1989, the NRC issued its safety evaluation on the crankshaft cracking problem (see Reference 3).
This safety evaluation specified the conditions under which the existing crankshafts may continue to be used.
The transmittal letter suggested that the remaining requirements of the license conditions be incorporated into the Technical Specifications and the license conditions be deleted. In February 1990, SCE informed the NRC that proposed amendments to the operating license to delete the license conditions would be submitted (see Reference 4).
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES The following is a brief discussion of the changes.
License Condition 3.L(1)
This license condition limits to 6,000 kW the total connected electrical load on each diesel and also limits to fifty the total number of start-stop cycles on each diesel between successive crankshaft inspections. It was imposed on a temporary basis pending completion of the NRC's review of the owners group crack propagation analysis. With the issuance of the safety evaluation (Reference 3),
the NRC has completed its review of the analysis.
The proposed change deletes the license condition and transfers its requirements to Sections 3.7 and 4.4 of the Technical Specifications.
Unlike the license condition, the new requirements permit start-stop cycles associated with no load engine operation at 200 rpm or less to be disregarded and not counted toward the limit of fifty.
For further discussion on this license condition, see the section on significant hazards consideration analysis.
-3 License Condition 3.L(2)
This license condition requires that a comprehensive diesel engine maintenance and surveillance program, based on the owners group recommendations and NUREG-1216, be implemented.
This program is one of the major benefits that came out of the owners group efforts.
For changes to the program, a 10 CFR 50.59 review would be necessary.
The proposed change transfers the requirements of this license condition to Section 4.4 of the Technical Specifications. It deletes the existing requirement in Technical Specification 4.4.F.1 to inspect the diesels in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations (see Attachment 1).
For further discussion on this license condition, see the section on significant hazards consideration analysis.
License Condition 3.L(3)
This license condition incorporates by reference the owners group recommendation relating to frequency of major engine overhaul (once every ten years).
The proposed change extracts and incorporates the basic recommendation into Section 4.4 of the Technical Specifications.
License Condition 3.L(4)
This license condition requires regular inspections of critical areas of the crankshaft (selected oil hole locations and fillets) to detect if any cracking has occurred. It specifies the methods to be used to detect and evaluate any new cracks. It requires that new cracks be reported to the NRC and that the diesel generator be declared inoperable under those conditions.
The proposed change transfers the requirements of this license condition to Section 4.4 of the Technical Specifications.
License Condition 3.L(5)
This license condition requires that the left bank and right bank cylinder blocks on each diesel engine be inspected using the methods specified by the owners group.
It requires an augmented inspection schedule if "ligament" cracks are found and provides reportability requirements if "stud-to-stud" or "stud-to end" cracks are found. It specifies the nondestructive methods to be used for crack detection.
The right bank cylinder block of diesel generator No. 1 contains some degraded material ("Widmanstaetten graphite"), that has less than the optimum mechanical strength. The license condition requires that the defective cylinder block be visually inspected if the diesel has been operated in excess of fifty percent of its design rating for one hour or more.
0I
II
-4 The proposed change transfers the requirements of this license condition to Section 4.4 of the Technical Specifications.
License Condition 3.L(6)
This license condition requires that all diesel starts for testing and surveillance be slow, i.e., greater than 24 seconds in duration, except where a fast start is required by the Technical Specifications or is required by specific maintenance considerations.
The proposed change transfers this requirement to a footnote in Section 4.4 of the Technical Specifications.
Basis The proposed change identifies the basis for each new requirement included in the Technical Specifications, by changing the appropriate Basis section.
Editorial Changes/Clarifications This proposed change includes other changes that are editorial or clarify the existing requirements.
All new changes included with this proposed change are identified by vertical bars in the margin of Attachment 2.
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION ANALYSIS 10 CFR 50.91(a) requires the applicant for a license amendment to provide a "no significant hazards consideration" analysis using the three standards given in 10 CFR 50.92.
Such an analysis is provided below.
It compares the diesel license conditions with the proposed changes.
- 1.
Question: Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No The function of the emergency diesel generators is to provide A.C. power for accident mitigation if offsite power to the plant is lost.
An improvement in the reliability of these diesels is therefore beneficial to the plant and will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The purpose of the six diesel license conditions was to improve and maintain the reliability of the diesels by ensuring that certain operational restrictions and maintenance and surveillance recommendations which were the result of the owners group effort are implemented.
The proposed change will ensure that this continues to be the case.
-5 License condition 3.L(1) was imposed by the NRC on a temporary basis. Its purpose was to ensure the interim reliability of the diesel crankshafts while the NRC was completing its review of the owners group crack propagation analysis for the crankshafts.
Since then, the NRC has completed its review and documented the remaining diesel reliability issues in a safety evaluation (Reference 3).
The safety evaluation leads to the following conclusions:
- 1) Operation of the diesels up to 6,000 kW is acceptable for the long term.
- 2)
A crankshaft inspection interval of fifty start-stop cycles is acceptable for the long term, if SCE demonstrates that the eddy current testing (ECT) technique can detect 10 mil deep cracks.
Recent experimental results have shown that ECT is capable of detecting 5 mil deep cracks. For details regarding this experiment, see Attachment 3 to this proposed change.
- 3) Engine start-stop cycles with engine speed less than 200 rpm need not be counted toward meeting license condition 3.L(1), if SCE demonstrates that the stresses induced in the crankshaft at startup and coastdown are less than the 6,000 kW steady state values.
The required analysis has been completed. to this proposed change presents a summary of the results.
The crankshaft stresses during idle speed startup (0-150 rpm), idle speed operation (150--200 rpm),
and coastdown from idle speed were analyzed.
These stresses were compared with the crankshaft stresses previously calculated by FaAA (Reference 2) for full load (6,000 kW) steady state operation. In all cases, the full load stresses were found to be higher.
- 4) Since crankshaft cracks as deep as 1/4 inch were reported previously, it is possible that oil impurities, which result from engine operation or oil manufacture, may have contributed to crack initiation and propagation.
SCE should therefore review and make appropriate revisions to its diesel oil maintenance procedures.
The diesel oil sampling, testing and analysis procedure has been reviewed.
No evidence was found to indicate that the diesel oil used by San Onofre Unit 1 accelerates stress corrosion cracking or bulk corrosion processes.
A review of the oil sampling and analysis methods shows that the total base number and water content of the oil are within acceptable limits.
The crankshaft material has the recommended hardness value and yield strength to resist corrosion in a sulfide bearing environment. Key oil parameters are trended. No changes to the procedures are considered necessary. For additional
-6 details regarding the review, see Attachment 4 to this proposed change.
Based on the above information, the requirements of license condition 3.L(1), as modified by this proposed change for long term application, are acceptable and will not adversely impact diesel reliability nor increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
License condition 3.L(2) requires the implementation of a comprehensive diesel engine maintenance and surveillance program.
The proposed change makes this requirement a part of the Technical Specifications.
With this change, the diesel inspection requirement found in existing Technical Specification 4.4.F will become superfluous and will be deleted. This entire change is considered administrative and will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes relating to license conditions 3.L(3) through 3.L(6) are also administrative and will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2.
Question: Will operation of the~facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No The proposed changes do not affect plant equipment or plant operations other than the diesels and their operation.
The proposed changes are designed to improve and maintain diesel reliability. They do not include any changes that go beyond the issues covered in the NRC's safety evaluation (Reference 3).
Based on this information the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or a different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3.
Question: Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No The proposed changes affect only the diesels and their operation.
They are designed to improve and maintain the reliability of the diesels.
They do not introduce any new safety issues.
As such, they do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
II
-7 SAFETY AND SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETERMINATION Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that Proposed Change No. 220 does not involve significant hazards considerations as defined by 10 CFR 50.92, and there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by this proposed change.
REFERENCES (1) NRC to SCE letter dated January 28,
- 1987, Safety Evaluation Report on Operability/Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators Manufactured by Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI).
(2) Evaluation of Transient Conditions on Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshafts at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (FaAA-84-12-14, Revision 1.0), dated April 1985. (This report was transmitted by SCE to the NRC on January 13, 1989.)
(3) Letter dated November 21,
- 1989, from NRC to SCE, TDI Diesel Crankshaft Cracking Problem.
(4) Letter dated February 21, 1990, from SCE to NRC, TDI Diesel Crankshaft Oil Hole Cracking Problem.
(5) SCE to NRC letter dated May 2, 1990, Emergency Diesel Generators PCN-220.IAA2
ATTACHMENT 1 EXISTING LICENSE CONDITIONS AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
- 3. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions as specified in the following Commission regulations (Title 10, CFR, Chapter 1): Part 20, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, Section 70.32 of Part 70, Section 40.41 of Part 40 and Section 30.34 of Part 30; is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified below:
A. Maximum Power Level Edison is authorized to operate the reactor at steady state power levels up to a maximum of 1347 megawatts thermal.
B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 131 are hereby incorporated in I 131 the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate 11/15/89 the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
C. Spent Fuel Transshipment The licensee is authorized to transship spent fuel from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool to the Unit 2 and 3 spent fuel pools in accordancewith licensee's application for amendment dated April 28, 1988, as supplemented April 25, June 10, September 23, October 18, November 10, and December 1, 1988.
This authorization is limited to those activities needed for 116 transshipment only. The matter of heavy load handling using the 12/2/88 turbine gantry crane for purposes other than transshipment is being reviewed separately.
The licensee may make changes to the transshipment method referenced above without prior NRC approval only if the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
D. The facility may be modified by implementing the "Sphere Enclosure Project" as described in Amendment 52 to the Final Safety Analysis for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, submitted December 3, 1975; Supplement to the Sphere Enclosure Project Report, 20 submitted March 1, 1976; Second Supplement to the Sphere 4/2/77 EnclosureReport submitted March 25, 1978; additional information submitted by letter dated March 25, 1976 (withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2, Section 2.790(d)).
SAN ONOFRE -'UNIT 1 Revised:
11/18/89
E. Steam Generator Inspections During the refueling outage scheduled to begin no later than November 30, 1985, Southern California Edison shall perform an inspection of the steam generators. The inspection program shall be 89 submitted to the Commission at least 45 days prior to the scheduled 6/5/85 shutdown. Commission approval shall be obtained before resuming power operation following this inspection.
F. Deleted G. Physical Protection 10/31/78 SCE shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) 108 and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, 108 which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, 9/6/88 are entitled: "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Physical Security Plan," with revisions submitted through NRC April 22, 1988; "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, ERRATA and 3 Security Force Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions 10/17/88 submitted through October 22, 1986; and "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Safeguards Contingency Plan,"
with revisions submitted through December 29, 1987. Changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 shall be implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth therein.
Typo Revision: 1/17/90 SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 Revised:
12/21/88
H.
Fire Protection The licensee may proceed with and is required to complete the modifi cations identified in Paragraphs 3.1.1 through 3.1.17 of the NRC's 44 Fire Protection Safety Evaluation (SE), dated July 19, 1979 for the 7/19/79 facility. These modifications will be completed in accordance with the schedule in Table 3.1 of the SE and supplements thereto.
In addition, the licensee shall submit the additional information identified in Table 3.2 of this SE in accordance with the schedule contained therein. In the event these dates for submittal cannot be met, the licensee shall submit a report, explaining the circumstances, together with a revised schedule.
The licensee is required to implement the administrative controls identified in Section 6 of the SE.
The administrative controls shall be in effect within 90 days from the date of issuance of this amend ment.
I. DELETED 91 11/14/85 J. Integrated Implementation Schedule Southern California Edison Company shall implement a plan for 98 scheduling all capital modifications based on the Integrated 4/20/87 Implementation Schedule Program Plan (the "Plan") issued in License Amendment No. 98 on April 20, 1987.
(1) The Plan shall be followed by the licensee from and after the effective date of this amendment.
(2) Changes to completion dates for items identified in Schedules B and C do not require a license amendment. Dates specified in Schedule A shall be changed only in accordance with applicable NRC procedures.
K. Post Accident Sampling System (PASS), NUREG-0737, Item ll.B.3 8
- 1)
By July 1, 1986 or startup from the Cycle IX refueling outage, 85 whichever is earlier, SCE shall install a PASS and implement a 11/23/84 post-accident sampling program at San Onofre Unit 1.
- 2)
Prior to the date in (1) above or until the PASS is operable, SCE shall maintain in effect those compensatory measures described in the SCE letter, dated August 14, 1984.
Revised:
5/21/87.
L. Diesel Generators The following requirements shall apply to the standby diesel generators:
(1) Approval to increase total connected loads on each diesel engine to 6000 kW or less is granted pending completion of NRC review of the crankshaft crack propagation analysis prepared by Failure Analysis Associates. This approval will remain in effect for up to 50 start-stops on each engine since the last inspection or until the end of Cycle 10, whichever comes first.
(2) A diesel engine maintenance and surveillance program as described in the Safety Evaluation related to Amendment No. 123 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13 is to be implemented. Changes to this program will be subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
(3) The frequency of the major diesel engine overhauls shall be consistent with Section IV.1, "Overhaul Frequency," in 123 Revision 2 of Appendix II of the Design Review/Quality 4/14/89 Revalidation Report that was transmitted by letter dated June 20, 1986. from M. 0. Medford, (SCE) to G. E. Lear, (NRC).
(4) Oil hole locations in the five most heavily loaded main journals, i.e., journals 8 through 12 on each crankshaft shall be inspected at each refueling outage with liquid penetrant.
Indications found shall be evaluated with eddy current testing as appropriate.
During each major engine overhaul, the fillets of the most highly loaded main journals (Nos. 4 through 12) should be inspected together with the oil holes, using liquid penetrant.
Indications found shall be evaluated with eddy current testing as appropriate. In addition, these inspections should be performed for the oil holes and fillets in at least three of the crankpin journals at each major engine overhaul.
If during the refueling outage inspections or the major engine overhaul inspections referred to above, cracks are found in the oil holes or in other crankshaft surfaces, these findings are to be reported to the NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The affected engine ts to be considered inoperable and is not to be restored to operable status until the disposition and/or corrective actions have been approved by the NRC staff.
SAN ONOFRE -
UNIT 1
-5a-Revised: 4/17/89
(5) Cylinder blocks shall be inspected for "ligament" cracks, "stud-to-stud" cracks and "stud-to-end" cracks as defined in the report* by Failure Analysis Associates, Inc. (FaAA) entitled "Design Review of TDI R-4 and RV-4 Series Emergency Diesel Generator Cylinder Blocks" (FaAA Report No.
FaAA-84-9-ll.1) and dated December 1984. (Note that the FaAA report specifies additional inspections to be performed for blocks with "known" or "assumed" ligament cracks.)
The inspection intervals (i.e., frequency) shall not exceed the intervals calculated using the cumulative damage index model in the subject FaAA report. In addition, inspection methods shall be consistent with or equivalent to those identified in the subject FaAA report.
Blocks determined in the future to have "ligament" cracks as the result of the above inspections should be inspected at each refueling outage to determine whether or not cracks have 123 initiated on the top surface, which was exposed because of the 4/14/89 removal of two or more cylinder heads. This process should be repeated over several refueling outages until the entire block has been inspected. If after this process has been completed new "ligament" cracks are found, this process should again be repeated. Liquid penetrant testing or a similarly sensitive nondestructive testing technique should be used as appropriate to determine the depth of any cracks discovered.
Whenever diesel generator No. 1 is operated in excess of 4375 kN for one hour or more, a visual inspection of the right bank cylinder block is to be performed under intense light within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after engine shutdown to verify the absence of "stud-to-stud" and "stud-to-end" cracks.
If "stud-to-stud" or "stud-to-end" cracks are found, these findings are to be reported to the NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The affected engine is to be considered inoperable and is not to be restored to operable status until the disposition and/or corrective actions have been approved by the NRC staff.
(6) All diesel starts for testing and surveillance will be slow starts (greater than 24 seconds duration) except for the fast start required by Technical Specification 4.4.F conducted once per 18 months during shutdown and any other fast start required following specific maintenance involving the fast start capability.
- This report was transmitted to H. R. Denton, (NRC), from C. L. Ray, Jr.,
123 (TDI Owners Group), by letter dated December 11, 1984.
114/89 SAN ONOFRE -
UNIT I
-5b-Revised: 4/17/89 0452J
M. Cycle X Thermal Shield Monitoring Program The neutron noise/loose-parts detection system shall be used to monitor the condition of the reactor vessel thermal shield throughout Cycle X or until repair. Periodic monitoring of both neutron noise and loose-parts vibrations confirms that no long term unacceptable trend of degradation is occurring. The details of this program are described below.
(1) The unit will be shut down no later than June 30, 1990 to inspect the condition of the thermal shield.
(2) During the first 7 days of > 85% power, interim acceptance criteria for neutron noise/loose-parts monitoring will be developed. These interim criteria will be utilized until the final acceptance criteria is developed.
Final acceptance criteria for neutron noise/loose-parts monitoring will be established by performing baseline evaluations for 45 calendar days at > 85% power following return to service for Cycle X operation. The base line data will be established by recording a minimum of 16 segments of data information, each of 20 minute 127 duration at > 85% power. Adjustments to the acceptance criteria will 5/15/89 be made for cycle burnup and boron concentration changes throughout the cycle.
(3) The neutron noise/loose-parts monitoring system shall be OPERABLE in MODE 1 with:
a) At least two horizontal loose-parts detectors monitored for at least five (5) minutes 2 times per day; and, b) at least three (3) neutron noise inputs monitored for at least twenty (20) minutes once a week, and be analyzed for cross power spectral density, including phase and coherence.
(4) The data provided by the loose-parts/neutron noise monitor shall be analyzed once per week and compared with the established criteria.
If the data exceeds the acceptance criteria:
a) Within 1 day the NRC will be informed of the exceedance.
b) Within 14 days the conditions will be evaluated and a report provided to the NRC documenting future plans and actions.
c) The plant will be shutdown should the remaining flexure be demonstrated failed.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1
-5c-Revised 5/24/89
(5) Each channel of the loose-part detection system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in MODE 1 by performance of a:
a) CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> b) CHANNEL TEST at least once per 31 days The surveillance requirements for neutron noise monitor are covered by the Appendix A Technical Specification 4.1.1 for the Power Range Neutron Flux.
(6) With the neutron noise/loose-parts detection instrumentation inoperable for more than 7 days, licensee shall submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Appendix A Technical 127 Specification 6.9.2 within the next 3 days outlining the cause of the 5/15/89 malfunction and the plans for restoring the system to operable status.
(7) In the case of a seismic event of 0.25g or greater as indicated on site sensors, a controlled shut down shall be initiated. Before operations are resumed, it will be demonstrated that no thermal shield damage has occurred due to the seismic event.
(8) The provisions of Appendix A Technical Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to this license condition.
Typo Revision:
1/17/90 SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1
-d-Revised:
5/24/89
3.7 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SUPPLY APPLICABILITY:
Applies to the availability of electrical Power for the operation of the plant auxiliaries.
OBJECTIVE:
To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary (1) to provide for safe reactor operation, (2) to provide for the continuing availability of engineered safeguards, and (3) to ensure that the station can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods.
SPECIFICATION:
- 1. In MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4 the following specifications shall apply:
A. As a minimum the following shall be OPERABLE:
- 1. One Southern California Edison Company and one San Diego Gas & Electric Company high voltage transmission line to the switchyard and two transmission circuits fro the switchyard, one immediate and one delayed access, to the onsite safety-related distribution system. This configuration constitutes the two required offsite circuits.
- 2. Two separate and independent diesel generators each with:
- a. A separate day tank containing a minimum of 290 gallons of fuel,
- b. A separate fuel storage system containing a minimum of 37.500 gallons of fuel, and
- c. A separate fuel transfer pump.
- 3. AC Distribution
- a. 4160 Volt Bus IC and 2C,
- b. 480 Volt Bus No. 1. Bus No. 2 and Bus No. 3, and
- c. Vital Bus 1, 2, 3, 3A, 4, 5 and 6.
- 4. DC Bus No. 1 and DC Bus No. 2 (including at least one full capacity charger and battery supply per bus).
- 5. The two Safety Injection System Load Sequencers.*
The automatic load function may be blocked in Made 3 at a pressure 1 1900 psig.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 3.7-1 AMENDMENT NO: 25. 52, 68.
84, 130
- 8. ACTION:
- 1. With one of the required offsite circuits inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining AC sources by performing Surveillance Requirement A of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per eight (8) hours thereafter and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 8.l.a within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; restore an additional offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
- 2. If one diesel generator in declared inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the two offsite transmission circuits and the'remaining diesel generator by performing Surveillance Requirement A of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per eight (8) hours thereafter and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 8.1.a within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable diesel generator to service within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
- 3. With one offsite circuit and one diesel generator of the above required AC electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining AC sources by performing Surveillance Requirement A of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per eight (8) hours thereafter and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT B6l.a within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Have at least two offsite circuits and two diesel generators OPERABLE within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from, the time of initial loss or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
- 4. With two required offsite circuits inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement B.l.a of Technical Specification 4.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, unless the diesel generators are already operating; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
With only one of the required offsite circuits restored, restore the remaining offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from the time of initial loss or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 3.7-2 AMENDMENT NO: 25, 84, 106, 130
- 5. With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two offsite circuits by performing Periodic Testing Requirement A of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per two (2) hours thereafter: restore at least one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Restore both diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from time of initial loss or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
- 6. With less than the above complement of AC buses OPERABLE, restore the inoperable bus within a hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
- 7. With one required DC bus inoperable, restore the inoperable bus to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
- 8. With a required CC bus battery and both of its chargers inoperable, restore the inoperable battery and one of its chargers to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
- 9. With one Safety Injection Load Sequencer inoperable, restore the inoperable sequencer to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
II. Additionally, in MOCES 1, 2 and 3 the following specifications shall apply:
A. As a minimum, the following shall be OPERABLE:
- 1. The MOV850C Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS).
- S. ACTION:
- 1. With the MOV850C UPS inoperable, restore the UPS to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least OT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 3.7-3 AMENOMENT NO:
25, 84, 130
III. In MODES 5 and 6 the following specifications shall apply:
A. As a minimum, the following shall be OPERABLE:
- 1. One Southern California Edison Company or San Diego Gas and Electric Company high voltage transmission line to the switchyard and one transmission circuit from the switchyard, immediate or delayed access, to the onsite safety-related distribution system.
- 2. One diesel generator (capable of automatic start) with:
- a. A day tank containing a minimum 290 gallons of fuel,
- b. A fuel storage system containing a minimum of 37.500 gallons of fuel, and
- c.,A fuel transfer pump.
- 3. The electrical Buses associated with the operable power sources as follows:
- a. One 4.160 Volt AC Bus
- b. One 480 Volt AC Bus
- c. AC Vital Buses 1, 2 and 4, and
- d. One DC Bus (including at least one full capacity charger and battery supply per Bus).
B. ACTION:
- 1. Nith less than the minimum required AC and DC electrical sources specified in III.A above, suspend all operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes.
The station is connected electrically to the Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas & Electric Company system via either of two physically independent high voltage transmission routes composed of four Southern California Edison Company high voltage lines and four San Diego Gas & Electric Company high voltage lines.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 3.7-4 AMENOMENT NO: 25. S2, 68,
- 84. 106, 130
Of the four Southern California Edison Company lines, any one can serve as a source of power to the station auxiliaries at any time. Similarly, any of the four San Diego Gas &
Electric Company lines can serve as a source of power to the station auxiliaries at any time. Sy specifying one transmission line from each of the two physically independent high voltage transmission routes, redundancy of sources of auxiliary power for an orderly shutdown is provided.
Similarly, either transformer A or 8, along with transformer C, provide redundancy of 4160 volt power to the auxiliary equipment, and in particular to the safety injection trains.
Correct operation of the safety injection system is assured by the operability of the load sequencers and the UPS for MOV 850C. Correct operation of the recirculation system is assured by the operability of the UPS for MOV 850C which also supplies MOV 358. In addition, each 4160 volt bus has an onsite diesel generator as backup.
In MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4. two diesel generators provide the necessary redundancy to protect against a failure of one of the diesel generator systems or in case one diesel generator system Is taken out for maintenance, without requiring a reactor shutdown. This also eliminates the necessity for depending on one diesel generator to operate for extended periods without shutdown if it were required for post-accident conditions.
In MODES 5 and 6. the requirement for one source of offsite power and one diesel generator to be OPERABLE will provide diverse and redundant electrical power sources in order that the station can be maintained in the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING condition for extended time periods. Additionally this requirement will assure that operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes can be conducted safely.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 3.7-5 AMENDMENT NO:
- 25. 52, 68.
84, 106, 120, 13N
4.4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM PERIODIC TESTING APPLICABILITY: Applies to testing of the Emergency Power System.
OBJECTIVE:
To verify that the Emergency Power System will respond promptly and properly when required.
SPECIFICATION: A. The required offsite circuits shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and power availability.
B. The required diesel generators shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- 1. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:
- a. Verifying the diesel performs a OG SLOW START from standby conditions,
- b. Verifying a fuel transfer pump can be started and transfers fuel from the storage system to the day
- tank,
- c. Verifying the diesel generator is synchronized and running at 6000 kW (+100 kW, -500 kW) for
> 60 minutes,
- d. Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency
- buses,
- e. Verifying the day tank contains a minimum of 290 gallons of fuel, and
- f. Verifying the fuel storage tank contains a minimum of 37,500 gallons of fuel.
- 2. At least once per 3 months by verifying that a sample of diesel fuel from the required fuel storage tanks is within the acceptable limits as specified by the supplier when checked for viscosity, water and sediment.
C. AC Distribution
- 1. The required buses specified in Technical Specification 3.7, Auxiliary Electrical Supply, shall be determined OPERABLE and energized from AC sources other than the diesel generators with tie breakers without automatic SIS/SISLOP tripping circuitry open between redundant buses at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and power availability.
Change No: 12 SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 4.4-1 AMENDMENT NO:
25, 56, 82, 84, 95, 104, 123, 130.
The required DC power sources specified in Technical Specification 3.7 shall meet the following:
- 1. Each DC Bus train shall be determined OPERABLE and energized at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and power availability.
- 2. Each 125 volt battery bank and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:
(1) The parameters in Table 4.4-1 meet the Category A limits, and (2) The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 129 volts on float charge.
- b. At least once per 92 days and within 7 days after a battery discharge with battery terminal voltage below 110 volts, or battery overcharge with battery terminal voltage above 150 volts, by verifying that:
(1) The parameters in Table 4.4-1 mseet the Category 8 limits, (2) There is no visible corrosion at either terminals or connectors, or the connection resistancl of these items is less than 150 x 10"* ohms, and (3) The average electrolyte temperature of ten connected cells is above 614F for battery banks associated with DC Bus No. I and DC Bus No. 2.and above 48*F for the UPS battery bank.
C. At least once per 18 months by verifying that:
(1) The cells, cell plates and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration, (2) The cell-to-cell and terminal connections are clean, tight and coated with anticorrosion material, (3) The resistance of each cell-to-cell and terminal onnection is less than or equal to 150 x 10-0 ohms, SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 4.4-2 AMENDMENT NO: 25. 84, 130
(4)
The battery charger for 125 volt DC Bus No. 1 will supply at least 800 amps DC at 130 volts DC for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, (5) The battery charger for 125 volt DC sus No. 2 will supply at least 45 amps DC at 130 volts DC for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, and (6) The battery charger for the UPS will supply at least 10 amps AC at 480 volts AC for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> as measured at the output of the UPS invertor.
- d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual or simulated emergency loads for the design duty cycle when the battery is subjected to a battery service test.
- e. At least once per 60 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is at least 80%, 85% for Battery Bank No. 1, of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. Once per 60 month interval, this performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the battery service test required by Surveillance Requirement 4.4.0.2.d.
- f. Annual performance discharge tests of battery capacity shall be given to any battery that shows signs of degradation or has reached 85% of the service life expected for the application.
Degradation is indicated when the battery capacity drops more than 10% of rated capacity from its average on. previous performance tests, or is below 90% of the manufacturer's rating.
E. The required Safety Injection System Load Sequencer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, by simulating SISLOP* conditions and verifying that the resulting interval between each load group is within 1 10% of its design interval.
F. The required diesel generators and the Safety Injection System Load Sequencer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by:
- 1. Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 4.4-3 AMENDMENT NO: 25. 56, 82, 84, 117, 130
- 2. Simulating SISLOP*, and:
- a. Verifying operation of circuitry which locks out non-critical equipment,
- b. Verifying the diesel performs a DG FAST START from standby condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency buses with permanently connected loads and the auto connected emergency loads** through the load sequencer (with the exception of the feedwater, safety injection, charging and refueling water pumps whose respective breakers may be racked-out to the test position) and operates for > 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads,
- c. Verifying that on the safety injection actuation signal, all diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed and generator differential, are automatically bypassed.
- 3. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 4,000 kW without tripping. The generator voltage shall not exceed 4,800 volts and the generator speed shall not exceed 500 rpm (nominal speed plus 75% of.
the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint) during and following the load rejection.
SISLOP is the signal generated by coincident loss of offsite power (loss of voltage on Buses IC and 2C) and demand for safety injection.
The sum of all loads on the engine shall not exceed 6,000 kW.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 4.4-4 AMENDMENT NO: 25, 82, 84, 95, 104, 123, 124, 130.
TASLE 4.4-1 BATTERY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CATEGORY Al)
CATEGORY 8(Z)
Parameter Limits for each Limits for each Allowable (3) designated pilot connected cell value for each cell connected cell Electrolyte Minimum level
>Minimum level Above top of Level indication mark, indication mark, plates, and and 11/4" above and.11/4 above not overflowing maximum level maximum level indication mark indication mark Float 22.13 volts z2.13 volts (C)
>2.07 volts Voltage 21.200(b) 21.195 Not more than
.020 below the average of all connected cells Gravity Average of all Average of all connected cells connected cells
>1.205 21.195(b)
(a) Corrected for electrolyte temperature and level.
(b) Or battery charging current is less than 2 amps when on charge.
(c) Corrected for average electrolyte temperature in accordance with IEEE STO 450-1980.
(1) For any Category A parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided that within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> all the Category B measurements are taken and found to be within their allowable values, and provided all Category A and 8 parameter(s) are restored to within: limits within the next 6 days.
(2) For any Category B parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided that the Category 8 parameter(s) are within their allowable values and provided the Category 8 parameter(s) are restored to within limits within 7 days.
(3) Any Category 8 parameter not withi!% its allowable value indicates an inoperable battery.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 4.4-5 AMENOMENT NO: 84, 130
BASIS:
The normal plant Emergency Power System is normally in continuous operation, and periodically tested."
The tests specified above will be completed without any preliminary preparation or repairs which might influence the results of the test except as required to perform the OG SLOW START test set forth in T.S. 4.4.B.1.a. The tests will demonstrate that components which are not normally required will respond properly when required.
DG SLOW STARTS are specified for the monthly surveillances in order to reduce the cumulative fatigue damage to the engine crankshafts to levels below the threshold of detection under a program of augmented inservice inspection. In the event that the OG SLOW START inadvertently achieves steady state voltage and frequency in less than 24 seconds, the surveillance will not be considered a failure and require restart of the diesel generator.
The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the station batteries are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129, "Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants," February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."
Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensure the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.
Table 4.4-1 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity. The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and.020 below normal full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that has stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than.020 below normal full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than.010 below normal full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 4.4-6 AMENDMENT NO:
25, 56, 84, 104, 123, 130.
Operating with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.4-1 is permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7 day period:
(1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than.020 below normal full charge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity, ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than.040 below normal full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.
REFERENCE:
(1)
Supplement No. 1 to Final Engineering Report and Safety Analysis, Section 3, Questions 6 and 8.
SAN ONOFRE -
UNIT 1 4.4-7 AMENDMENT NO:
25, 56, 84, 130