ML13331A393

Application for Amend to License DPR-13,consisting of Proposed Change 217,modifying Sys to Provide Two Electrical Buses Per 480 Volt Train W/Addl Manual Transfer Bus

ML13331A393
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	04/19/1990
From:	Ray H Southern California Edison Co
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Shared Package
ML13331A392	List: ML13331A391 ML13331A393 ML20034A724
References
NUDOCS 9004240185
Download: ML13331A393 (22)

Text

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-206 for a Class 104(b) License to Acquire, Possess, and Use a Utilization Facility as Amendment No. 180 Part of Unit No. 1 of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, hereby submit Amendment Application No. 180.

This amendment consists of Proposed Change No. 217 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13. Proposed Change No. 217 modifies the Technical Specifications incorporated in Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13 as Appendix A.

Proposed Change No. 217 is a request to revise Appendix A, Technical Specifications Section 3.7, "Auxiliary Electrical Supply," Section 3.14, "Fire Protection," and Section 4.1.1, "Operational Safety Systems," to provide changes associated with the 480 volt system modifications. An additional station service transformer and 480 bus will be installed during the Cycle 11 refueling outage such that each electrical train will consist of two 480 volt buses and associated station service transformers. The current configuration includes three 480 volt busses; two are train aligned and the third is shared as a swing bus. The proposed change also:

0042401135 00419 PDR ADOCK 05000206

-2 incorporates the language and the format of the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications to provide train definition and MODE applicability; incorporates changes associated with redesignation of plant equipment; adds a surveillance requirement for a manual transfer switch, which will be installed to provide the capability to power MOV-883 and the MOV-850C UPS from either electrical train.

In the event of conflict, the information in Amendment Application No. 180 supersedes the information previously submitted.

Based on the significant hazards analysis provided in the Description and Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis of Proposed Change No. 217, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

)

EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS &

)

Docket No. 50-206 ELECTRIC COMPANY (San Onofre Nuclear

)

Generating Station, Unit No. 1)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of Amendment Application No.

180 was served on the following by deposit in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on the 20 day of April

, 1990.

Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq.

Staff Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 David R. Pigott, Esq.

Samuel B. Casey, Esq.

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 600 Montgomery Street San Francisco, California 94111 Charles W. Lacey Senior Vice President Bechtel Power Corporation 12440 East Imperial Highway Norwalk, California 90650 Michael L. Mellor, Esq.

Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges Two Embarcadero Center San Francisco, California 94111 Huey Johnson Secretary for Resources State of California 1416 Ninth Street Sacramento, California 95814 Janice E. Kerr, General Counsel California Public Utilities Commission 5066 State Building San Francisco, California 94102

-2 A. I. Gaede 23222 Cheswald Drive Laguna Niguel, California 92677 Frederick E. John, Executive Director California Public Utilities Commission 5050 State Building San Francisco, California 94102 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 hI s A. B o e t

-3 Subscribed on this

/K day of 1990.

Re--ctull ys su m it te a SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY By:

H. B. 'Ray Vice Presiden Subscribed and sworn to before me this

/1 ?

day of OFFICIAL SEAL YOMAR V. CLEARY Notary Public-Californ3 ORANGE COUNTY Ky c--mm.Ex:p. M4:v.y,1 C92 ary Public in and for the C ty of s Angeles, State of California Charles R. Kocher James A. Beoletto Attorneys for Southern California Edison Company By:

Jam A. Beoletto

0 DESCRIPTION AND SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NO. 217 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PROVISIONAL LICENSE NO. DPR-13 This is a request to revise Technical Specification Section 3.7, "Auxiliary Electrical Supply," Section 3.14, "Fire Protection," Section 4.1.1,

'--4.4,-f eSargentciy-Power System Periodic Testing," of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Unit 1.

I. EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See Attachment 1.

II. PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See Attachment 2.

III.

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE This change is being requested to reflect modifications to the 480 volt system scheduled for implementation during the Cycle 11 refueling outage. The 480 volt system will be reconfigured from three buses and three Station Service Transformers (SST) to four buses and four SSTs. The addition of the fourth bus will allow each electrical train to have two 480 volt buses instead of the current one bus for each train with a third manual transfer bus. The change will correct a situation discovered during the Cycle 10 outage in which certain potential post-accident configurations of the system could lead to transformers, breakers, and cables exceeding their normal design rating; however, the short term emergency ratings would not be exceeded. This issue was reported during the Cycle 10 refueling outage and the NRC issued an evaluation requesting long term corrective measures on April 27, 1989. By adding a new bus and transformer, the potential load on each individual bus will be reduced such that the normal design rating of the bus is not expected to be exceeded.

Changes to the following sections of the Technical Specifications are proposed to reflect the system changes.

Section 3.7, "Auxiliary Electrical Supply" will be revised to specify operability requirements for the new 480 volt system and to adopt train definition, MODE applicability, and action statements consistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications to the extent practical.

Section 3.14, "Fire Protection," will be revised to reflect new equipment designations due to this change.

Section 4.1.1, "Operational Safety Items," will be revised to relocate surveillance requirements for Manual Transfer Switch 7 (MTS-7) to Section 4.4.

-2 Section 4.4, "Emergency Power System Periodic Testing," will be revised to provide surveillance and testing requirements for the new components added by this change.

IV. DISCUSSION A. Background The electrical system ensures that adequate power supplies exist for normal operation and to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents. On January 30, 1989, while calculating voltage transients in the auxiliary electrical system, we determined that the loading on 480V Buses No. 1 and No. 2 main breakers, 52-1102 and 52-1202, and 480V Station Service Transformers No. 1 and No. 2 (SST 1 and SST 2) could exceed the design rating assuming a worst case combination of loading. This condition is postulated to occur during a Safety Injection Signal (SIS) without a Loss of Offsite Power.

Since the sequencer system does not shed or lock-out non-essential loads on an SIS unless there is a concurrent Loss of Offsite Power, these loads remain running or could start. We analyzed this overload condition and found it to be within the allowable 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> emergency loading of the breakers and transformers based on ANSI standards. Operator action is credited within this period to decrease the loading to return the system to within its design rating.

We provided the details of the potential overload conditions to the NRC in our letter dated March 17, 1989, "Technical Issues Impacting San Onofre Unit 1 Restart."

The NRC accepted the interim measure for operation until the Cycle 11 outage and required permanent modifications to eliminate the overload condition at that time. The NRC's SER on this issue is dated April 27, 1989.

B. Description of Plant Modifications Following are details of the plant modifications. Figures 1 and 2 are main one line diagrams before and after the changes, respectively. Breakers will continue to be labeled using standard industry designations. For example, the designations for the safety related 4160 volt breakers and the 480 volt breakers are 152-xxCxx and 52-xxxx, respectively. The designation for motor control center breakers is 8-xxxx or 42-xxxx, depending on the breaker types.

1.

A new station service transformer, designated SST 3 will be installed.

The Train A 480V loads will be split between SST 1 and SST 3 by feeding a section of 480V Bus 1, breakers 52-1125 through 1131, from SST 3 through spare main breaker 52-1100. Breaker 52-1100 and breakers 52-1125 through 52-1131 will be designated as the new 480V Bus 3. Also breaker 52-1109 which feeds pressurizer backup heaters Group C will be connected to SST 3. This will eliminate potential overloading of SST 1 and the 480V Bus 1 main feeder cables and main breaker, 52-1102, during a SIS event.

-3

2.

The existing SST 3 will be dedicated to Train B. The planned modifications will disconnect existing SST 3 from 4160V Bus IC, permanently feed it from 4160V Bus 2C, and redesignate it as SST 4.

SST 4 will feed existing 480V Bus 3 and a section of 480V Bus 2, i.e.,

breakers 52-1225 through 1231, all of which will be redesignated as 480V Bus 4. This will eliminate the potential overloading of SST 2 and 480V Bus 2 main feeder cables and main breaker, 52-1202.

3.

MCC-1B, IC, 2B, 3 and 3A will be designated as MCC-3B, 3, 4B, 4 and 4A, respectively, consistent with designation of the 480 volt buses.

4.

A control switch and indicating lights will be added on the 480V mimic bus of the main control panel C-12 to control the main breaker to new 480V Bus 3. In addition, a bus ground detector and a bus voltmeter will be installed on the mimic board to monitor new 480V Bus 3. Control pushbuttons with override will be added for the redesignated MCC-4 main feed breaker 52-1414, similar to the controls for existing MCC-1C and MCC-3A.

Other control room modifications will include rearranging the mimic bus on the main control panel and on the diesel generator panels, C-41 and C-42, to reflect the bus splitting at the 480V level and the addition of indicating lights for breaker 152-12C11 and breaker 52-1402 on the diesel generator panel, C-42.

5.

The SIS/SISLOP trip of 4160V breaker 152-1lCl will be deleted. Breaker 152-IlCl will feed new SST 3, which is required for SIS and SISLOP events. The SISLOP trip of 52-1303, redesignated as 52-1402, will also be eliminated. This main breaker will feed new 480V Bus 4 which is required to remain operating during a SIS and SISLOP. The SIS/SISLOP trip of 480V bus tie breakers 52-1103 and 52-1203 will be removed.

These breakers are kept open during normal operation and no longer tie together two separate trains.

Nonessential loads on the new 480V Bus 4 will be tripped on a SIS/SISLOP. Auto start of CCW pump G-15C on a SIS/SISLOP will be restored. Load sequencing changes do not add loads on ESF buses except auto starting of CCW pump G-15C on Train B. Loads have been distributed such that all breakers, etc., remain within their design rating under worst case loading conditions.

6.

Breaker 52-1103 will become a tie breaker between 480V Bus 1 and new 480V Bus 3 on Train A. In addition, electrical interlocks will be provided so the tie breaker can only be closed if one or both source breakers 52-1102 and 52-1302 on Train A are open.

Similarly, tie breaker 52-1203 will connect 480V Buses 2 and 4 on Train B. Electrical interlocks will be provided so that the tie breaker can only be closed if emergency source breaker 52-1200 is open, and one or both source breakers 52-1202 and 52-1402 are open. These interlocks will prevent paralleling of two transformers.

-4

7.

Train B DC Bus 2 will supply control power to redesignated 480V Bus 4.

8.

A manual load transfer switch, MTS-8, will be installed to feed existing MOV-883 and the UPS for MOV-850C and MOV-358 (MOV-850C UPS).

Figure 3 shows the configuration. The normal power supply for MTS-8 will be from MCC-4 on Train B. An alternate power supply will be available from MCC-1 on Train A. This transfer switch will provide the capability to supply power from Train A during post-LOCA conditions in the event Train B power is lost. A SIS or SISLOP signal will trip the normal sources of power to the transfer switch by tripping the main source breaker of MCC-4 to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.75 requirements of tripping unqualified equipment during an accident signal and to mitigate 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(2) interactions.

In addition, the alternate source breaker, 8-1122, will be kept locked in the open position so the single failure of the transfer switch would not cause both electrical trains of power to become paralleled.

9.

In case of a MSLB outside the containment, MCC-4 could be exposed to a steam environment. It is not qualified and is not required to function.

Therefore, a sequencer contact from Train B sequencer will be added to trip MCC-4 main feeder breaker 52-1414 on SIS/SISLOP to eliminate potential environmental effects on 480V Bus 4. A control switch with override will be added in the control room to provide the capability to re-close the breaker for MCC-4 (and thus MTS-8) during post-LOCA conditions.

C. Effect of Changes on System Loading The modifications do not add any significant loads on the Train A diesel generator except the load increase due to losses of the new SST 3. Loading on the Train B diesel generator is increased by losses of SST 4 and the auto loading of CCW pump G-15C. The loading on each D/G still remains below 5500 kW; the Technical Specification limit is 6000 kW. The restoration of auto start on SIS and SISLOP of CCW pump G-15C will provide additional CCW cooling capability in a post accident condition. The implementation of the 480V bus reconfiguration will ensure (1) the maximum loading on the main breakers remain below 1400 A compared to the breaker rating of 1600 A, (2) main feeder cable loading remains below 1600 A compared to 1800 A allowable, and, (3) SST loading remains below 1250 kVA compared to 1400 kVA rating for SSTs 1, 2, and 4, and 1500 kVA rating for SST 3.

D. Effects of Technical Specification Changes on Operability Requirements The proposed change will revise the minimum required OPERABLE AC system components to include an additional transformer and division of 480V buses; thus, the proposed change will require four 480V buses and associated transformers to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. These specifications will ensure the 480V main breakers and transformers are OPERABLE during the worst loading condition in case of a SIS without LOP. The proposed change will require an entry into the action statement in case a tie breaker in either train is closed. A closed tie breaker in one train may be indicative

-5 of an inoperable station service transformer required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 through 4. This is consistent with the criteria established for the modifications to maintain the post accident loading within the rating of the respective 480V system components.

Additional ACTION Statement 3.7.1.D is included to require verification that all required systems and components, which are dependent on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power, are also OPERABLE.

This ACTION statement is consistent with the STS when one diesel generator is inoperable. Verification in this instance is an administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons.

When in MODES 5 and 6, one SST and 480V main breaker will be capable of supplying the necessary power to the two associated 480V buses without exceeding their maximum load ratings as the loading will be reduced in these modes. Further, these loads will be manually controlled by the operator.

Therefore, the proposed change will require one OPERABLE train, which is defined as two 480V buses and one transformer. Tie breakers are manually closed to energize both 480V buses from one station service transformer.

Temporary cross training between the two emergency AC trains is allowed only during outages for maintenance purposes by use of normally disconnected power cables provided between 480V Bus 4 and Bus 1. The supply 480V bus, when cross-trained, does not become inoperable. This is true since cross-training will require two breakers in series to maintain adequate separation. In addition, the receiving bus cannot be declared OPERABLE. In this condition, loads will be added manually and limited by operator action.

The proposed change will incorporate operability and surveillance requirements of Manual Transfer Switch No. 8 (MTS-8), which powers MOV-883 and the MOV-850C UPS, in Section 4.4 and relocate the existing surveillance of MTS-7 from Section 4.1.1 to Section 4.4. MCC-4, originally MCC-3, and MTS-8 are not qualified for a harsh environment and will be shed on SIS and SISLOP signals.

The surveillance of MTS-8 will ensure that the switch is aligned to its normal power source, MCC-4. Alternate supply through MTS-8 from MCC-1 will be available for post-accident LOCA conditions if Train B power is lost, or during outage conditions. The proposed change will maintain requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75 for electrical separation and 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(2) by checking MCC-1 breaker 8-1122 is locked open during normal plant operation and the manual transfer switch position is locked to MCC-4.

E. Other Changes to Specifications This change also improves the content and format of T.S. Section 3.7 to reflect the Westinghouse STS. As a part of this standardization effort, the proposed change will provide STS LCO and associated action statements for vital buses and inverters, 125 VDC Buses and associated chargers and batteries, and for manual transfer switch, MTS-7. The proposed change will relocate the surveillance requirement for MTS-7 from Section 4.1.1 to Section 4.4. In addition, the proposed change will delete redundant Specification 3.7.I.B.7 for an inoperable DC bus and revise Specification 3.7.1.B.8 to be consistent with the language in the STS.

-6 The proposed change will revise the associated fire protection section, Table 3.14.2.1, which identifies the fire area/zone and hazards with sprinkler or spray system protection, and Table 3.14.6.1, which defines the minimum fire protection instrumentation required to be operable to ensure that adequate warning capabilities are available for the prompt detection of fires.

The proposed change will revise the location description of fire area/zone 40 and 9A to reflect the modifications and associated designations for the station service transformers and motor control centers. The proposed change associated with the fire protection equipment is, therefore, administrative in nature and does not constitute a technical change.

F. Use of Change Bars in Proposed Specifications All of Section 3.7 was revised as a result of standardization and the 480 volt system modifications. However, the change bars indicate only the technical revisions to the contents of the specifications to facilitate the staff review.

G. Implementation of Changes The modifications will be implemented in several phases in MODES 5 and 6 during the Cycle 11 outage. The existing Specification 3.7.111, which requires one train of AC distribution system, will be applicable at the start of the outage. Upon the completion of modifications on Train B, Train B will be declared OPERABLE in its final configuration under the proposed change for the Technical Specifications in MODES 5 and 6 to require two 480 volt buses, i.e., 480V Bus 2 and Bus 4, and at least one station service transformer (SST

1. 2 or SST #4) will be required to be operable. Upon completion of modifications to Train A, Train A will be declared OPERABLE under the proposed change. The proposed change will then be completely implemented for the electrical distribution system.

V. CONCLUSION The proposed change will ensure the maximum loading conditions on the main breakers, cables, and service transformers are within the current design limit during the worst case loading condition. In addition, the proposed change will improve electrical separation between the two redundant trains. As a result, the proposed change will provide operational flexibility and maintain plant safety in all modes of operation.

VI.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION ANALYSIS As required by 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(1), this analysis is provided to demonstrate that Proposed Change Number 217 to implement technical specifications associated with the 480V bus reconfiguration at SONGS 1 does not represent a significant hazards consideration. In accordance with the three factor test of 10 CFR 50.92(c), implementation of the proposed amendment was analyzed using the following standards and found not to:

1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences for an accident previously evaluated; or 2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident

-7 from any accident previously evaluated; or 3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Conformance of the proposed changes to the standards for a determination of no significant hazard as defined in 10 CFR 50.92 (three factor test) is shown in the following:

1.

Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

RESPONSE: No The proposed change will revise a portion of Section 3.7, "Auxiliary Electrical Supply," and associated surveillance and fire protection specification sections to reflect the 480 volt system modifications.

The modifications consist of an addition of a new transformer to power a newly designated 480V bus, and the reconfiguration to four 480V buses to eliminate the potential overloading of the 480V main breakers and associated transformers as a result of worst case accident loading during a Safety Injection Signal (SIS) event without Loss of Offsite Power (LOP).

A manual transfer switch for MOV-883 and the MOV-850C/MOV-358 UPS will be installed. The manual transfer switch will be normally powered from Train B with the provision for an alternate Train A source. Monthly surveillance requirements for the manual transfer switch to ensure that the alignment during normal operations is locked to Train B and that the breaker on Train A is locked open are provided in this proposed change.

In addition, tie breakers between two redundant trains at the 480 volt system level will be eliminated. Thus, electrical separation will be improved to be more consistent with current regulatory guidelines. The bus voltage transient during a SIS event will also be reduced by this bus reconfiguration, reducing the potential delay in opening the safety injection valves and increasing the starting voltage on safety related motors.

LCO and associated action statements for vital buses and inverters, and for a manual transfer switch, MTS-7 will be provided by this change.

Vital buses and associated inverters, and MTS-7 do not currently have an LCO and associated action statement. Changes in Section 3.7 incorporate train definition, MODE applicability, and language in the action statements consistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications to the extent practical.

The STS has been previously accepted by the NRC. Therefore, the proposed change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2.

Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

RESPONSE: No

-8 This proposed change does not result in the possibility of any failure modes or effects not previously evaluated. The 480 volt system modifications ensure that the function of the 480V electrical distribution system to supply power to the engineered safety features (ESF) loads is not adversely affected by a worst case accident loading condition. The ESF loads remain connected to the same electrical trains, and the post accident operation of existing ESF loads remain as before. In addition, the possibility of failures, which result in cross connecting electrical trains, is reduced by the deletion of the 480V tie breakers between redundant trains. The proposed change will ensure electrical separation is maintained during power operations; thus, the proposed change will decrease the potential for adverse electrical interactions. Therefore, the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

RESPONSE: No The proposed change will incorporate specification revisions associated with the 480 volt modifications, which will redistribute the loads on existing 480 volt buses to reduce the maximum loading conditions on the main breakers, cables, and transformers. The addition of a station service transformer and load redistribution at the 480 volt system level by splitting of the three 480V buses to four 480V buses limit the worst case loading combination to within the normal rating of the 480V main breakers, main feeders, and station service transformers.

The Cycle 10 Reload Safety Analysis specifically accounted for the degraded voltage conditions on the 480 volt buses as an increase in the safety injection delay in the LOCA and MSLB analyses which resulted in a higher peak cladding temperature (PCT) in a design basis LOCA. These modifications will decrease voltage transients on the safety related motors for valves and pumps during an accident condition; thus, the modifications will improve the PCT margin in a LOCA. The proposed change will provide specifications to ensure loading conditions remain within the normal ratings of the breakers, buses, and station service transformers for the worst case loading combination. Therefore, the operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

-9 VII.

SAFETY AND SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETERMINATION Based on the above Safety Analysis, it is concluded that: (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the Station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement. :

Existing Technical Specifications :

Proposed Technical Specifications :

Figures PCN217.JMY Existing Technical Specifications

3.7-AUXIL!ARY VLETC71 AL SUPOLf APPLICARLIlY:

Applies to the availability of electrical ;ower for tie operation of the plant auxiliaries.

CSJ'ECT17:

To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary (1) to provide for safe reactor operation, (Z) to provide for the continuing availability of engineered safeguards, and (3) to ensure that the station can :e maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods.

SPEC1FICATlCM:

I.

In MOCES 1, 2. 3 and 4 the following specificatCns shall apply:

A. As a minius the following shall be CPERABLE:

I.

One Southern California Edison Company and one San 0tego Gas & Electric Company high voltage transmission line to the switchyard and two transmission circuits free the switchyard. one imuediate and one delayed access, to the onsite safety-related distribution system. This configuration constitutes the two required offsite circuits.

2. Two separate and independent diesel generators each with:

a. A separate day tank containing a minimum of 290 gallons of fuel.

b. A separate fuel storage system containing a minimus of 37.500 gallons of fuel, and

c.

A separate fuel transfer pump.

3. AC Distribution

a. 4160 Volt Bus IC and ZC,

b. 480 Volt Sus No. 1. Bus No. 2 and Bus No. 3, and

c. Vital Bus 1. 2. 3. 3A. 4. 5 and 6.

4.

DC Bus No. I and OC Bus No. 2 (including at least one full capacity charger and battery supply per bus).

S. The two Safety Injection System Load Sequencers.*

The automatic load function may be blocked in Made 3 at a pressure 1 1900 psig.

SAN ONCFRE - UNIT 1 3.7-1 AMENOIMENT NO:

25, 52. 68.

84, 130

5.

ACTIN:

I. With one of the required offsite circuits Inopersale, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of t'e remaining AC sources by performing Surveillance Requirement A of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once Der eigt (8) hours thereafter and SURVEILLANCE RECUIREENT 9.1.a within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; restore an additicmal offsite circuit to OPERASLE status vi thin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTOOM within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

2. If one diesel generator in declared inoperable, demonstrate the OPERASILITY of the two offsite transmission circuits and the remaining diesel generator by performing Surveillance Requirement A of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per eight (8) hours thereafter and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 8.l.a within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable diesel generator to service within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOCN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

3. With one offsite circuit and one diesel generator of the above required AC electrical power sources inoperable. demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining AC sources by performing Surveillance Requirement A of Technical Specification 4.4 within one hour and at least once per eight (8) hours thereafter and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT I.Ia within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or be in C0LD SHUTOCWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Have at least two offsite circuits and two diesel generators OPERABLE within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> free, the time of initial loss or be in COLD SHUTDON within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

4.

Withl two required offsite circuits inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 1.1.a of Technical Specification 4.4 within a hours, unless the diesel generators are already operating: restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANOY within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

With only one of the required offsite circuits restored, restore the remaining offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> fre the time of initial loss or be in COLD S4UTOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

SAN ONOFRE

• UNIT 1 3.7-2 AMENOMENT NO:

25. 84, 106, 120

5. With two of the above required diesel ;enerators inoperable. demnstrate the OPERABILITY of the offsIte circuits by performing Periodic Testing Requirement A of Technical S0eCIfication 4.4 within one hour and at least once ;er two (2) hours thereafter: restore at least one of Ie inoverable diesel generators to CPERASLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDC6N withit the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Restore both diesel generate :*

OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from time of initial loss or be in CCLD SHUTOONN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

6. With less than the above complement of AC buses OPERABLE. restore the Incoerable bus within a hours or be In COLD SHUTDOCW within the next 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br />.

7. With one required DC bus inoverable. restore the Inooerable bus to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDCWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

8. With a required OC bus battery and both of Its chargers inoperable, restore the inoperable battery and one of its chargers to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

9. With one Safety Injection Load Sequencer inoperable, restore the noperable sequencer to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SMUTDOCHN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

II. Additionally, in MOCES 1. 2 and 3 the following specifications shall apply:

A. As a *iniana, the following shall be OPERABLE:

1. The MOVSSC Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS).

.. ACTION:

1. With the MOV850C UPS Inoperable. restore the UPS to OPERASLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least OT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SNUTDONN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 3.7-3 AMENCMENT NO:

25, 84, 130

0 tiI.

In MCCES 5 and 6 the following specifications shall apply:

A. As a minimum, the following shall be CPERA8LE:

1. One Southern California Edison Comoany or San Olego Gas and Electric Company high voltage transmission line to the switchyard and one transmission circuit from the switchyard, 1fmediate or delayed access, to the onsite safety-related distribution system.

2. One diesel generator (capable of automatic start) with:

a. A day tank containing a minimum 290 gallons of fuel,

b. A fuel storage system containing a minimum of 37.500 gallons of fuel, and C. A fuel transfer pump.

3. The electrical Buses associated with the operable power sources as follows:

a.

One 4.160 Volt AC Bus

b.

One 480 Volt AC Bus C. AC Vital Buses 1. 2 and 4, and

d. One OC Bus (including at least one full capacity charger and battery supply per Bus).

B. ACTION:

1. With less than the minimum required AC and OC electrical sources specified in III.A above, suspend all operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes.

SA5.Ll:

The station is connected electrically to the Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas & Electric Company system via either of two physically independent high voltage transmission routes composed of four Southern California Edison Company high voltage lines and four San Diego Gas & Electric Company high voltage lines.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 3.7-4 AMENOMENT NO:

25. 52,

68.

84. 106, 120

Of the four Southern California Edison Comvany limes, any noe Can serve as a source of power to the station auxiliaries any time. Similarly. any of the four San Oiego Gas &

Electric Comoany lines can serve as a source of :ower :o t!e station auxiliaries at any time. By specifying one transmission line from each of the two Physically indecomdent high voltage transmission routes, redundancy of sources of auxiliary power for an orderly shutdown is provided.

Similarly. either transformer A or 8, along with transferner C. provide redundancy of 4160 volt power to the auxiliary equipment, and in particular to the safety inlection trains.

Correct operation of the safety injection system is assured by the operability of the load sequencers and the UPS for MOV 850C. Correct operation of the recirculation system is assured by the ooerability of the UPS for MOV 85CC which also supplies MOV 358. In addition, each 4160 volt bus has an onsite diesel generator as backup.

In M00ES 1. 2, 3 and 4. two diesel generators provide the necessary redundancy to protect against a failure of one of the diesel generator systems or in case one diesel generator system is taken out for maintenance, without requiring a reactor shutdown. This alsp eliminates the necessity for depending on one diesel generator to operate for extended periods without shutdown if it were required for post-accident conditions.

In MOCES 5 and 6. the requirement For one source of offsite power and one diesel generator to be OPERABLE will provide diverse and redundant electrical ;over sources in order that the station can be maintained in the COLD SHUTOCHN or REFUELING condition for extended time periods. Additionally, this requirement will assure that operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes can be conducted safely.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 3.7-5 AMENOENT NO: 25.

52. 68.

84, 106.

120, j

TABLE 3.14.2.1 REQUIRED SPRINKLER AND SPRAY SYSTEMS Fire Area/

Zone Hazard Location System Tyne 1

Reactor coolant pumps, Inner Containment Sphere Deluge - borated RHR pumps, cable water spray*

Cable insulation Outer Containment Sphere Deluge - borated outside secondary water spray*

shield 2A Charging Pumps Charging Pump Room Wet Pipe 48/40 Cable Insulation Cable Trays, Deluge water spray Yard/Breezeway Area 40 Transformer oil Station Service Transformer 1 Deluge water spray Transformers 2 & 3 Deluge water spray 9A Turbine lubricating oil System #1 chemical Deluge water spray and cable insulation treatment area Turbine lubricating oil System #2 lube oil Deluge water spray and cable insulation reservoir area (north half)

Turbine lubricating oil System #3 lube oil Deluge water spray and cable insulation reservoir area (south half)

Turbine lubricating oil System #4 480 V room Wet pipe wall & turbine building north wall Turbine lubricating oil System #5 north turbine Wet pipe and cable insulation building area protection Hydrogen seal oil Hydrogen seal oil unit Deluge water spray 17A Diesel Generator North Diesel Generator Pre-Action Sprinkler 18 Diesel Generator South Diesel Generator Pre-Action Sprinkler This includes a refueling water pump, 240,000 gallons of borated water in the refueling water storage tank and associated system valves.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 3.14-6 AMENDMENT NO: 130, 131

TABLE 3.14.6.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS Required Instruments Operable Fire Area/Zone Location Early Warning Actuation 1

Containment Sphere Inside Secondary Shield 8

Outside Secondary Shield 20 2A Reactor Auxiliary Bldg.

Lower Level 9

4A&B East and West Penetration Areas 33 4C Doghouse 2

48/40 Cable Trays Yard/Breezeway Area 2

40 Service Transformer 1 2

Service Transformer 2 & 3 2

4G 050 Diesel Generator Enclosure 6

0SD Switchgear/Battery Room 3

7 480V Switchgear Room 8

8 4160V Switchgear Room 16 9A Turbine Building Ground Floor Instrument Air Compressors 1

Exciter and MCC 3 Area 16 2

Lube Oil Reservoir 29 12**

11A Health Physics and Locker Room 5* (4 at present) 118 HVAC Equipment Room 3

12 Offices Ist Floor Power Block 7

• Upon completion of DCP 3449.01.

• • Includes 6 line-type detectors.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1 3.14-17 AMENDMENT NO:

31, 130. 131