ML13316B335

Amend 124 to License DPR-13,approving Request to Uprate Power Rating for Each Emergency Diesel Generator to 6,000 Kw on Interim Basis

ML13316B335
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	04/14/1989
From:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML13316B334	List: ML13316B333 ML13316B335 ML13316B336 ML13316B338
References
DPR-13-A-124 NUDOCS 8905010101
Download: ML13316B335 (16)

Text

NOREGU, oe 1UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-206 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.124 License No. DPR-13

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendiment by Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated November 11, 1988, as supplemented January 13, February 25, and March 4, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requiremniits have been satisfieo.

8905010101 890414 PDR ADOCK O5000206 P

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Speci fications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13 is hereby dmended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.

124, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGU ATORY COMMISSION George.Knighton irector Project Directorate V Division of Reactor Projects -

III, IV, V and Special Projects

Attachment:

Changes to the' Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

April 14, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.1 24 PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-13 DOCKET NO. 50-206 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT 21 21 22 22 22a 22a 22b 22b 22c 33u 33o 45 45 46 46 46a 46a 46b 46b 46b-1 46b-1 46b-2 53b 53b

-21 3.3 SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEMS 3.3.1 OPERATING STATUS APPLICABILITY:

Applies to the operating status of the Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems.

OBJECTIVE:

To define those conditions necessary to ensure availability of the Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems.,

SPECIFICATION:

A. The reactor shall not be made or maintained critical unless the following conditions are met. In addition, the reactor coolant system temperature shall not be increased above 200*F unless the containment spray system, the refueling water storage tank and the associated valves and interlocks are operable.

(1) Safety Injection Systems

a. Refueling tank water storage and boron concentration comply with Specification 3.3.3.

b. ESF Switchover automatic trip channel is OPERABLE with the setpoint less than or equal to 20% and greater than or equal to 18% of RWST level.

c. Two safety injection pumps are OPERABLE.

d. Two feed water pumps are OPERABLE.

e. Two recirculation pumps are OPERABLE, except as indicated in item D below.

f. The recirculation heat exchanger is OPERABLE.

g. Two charging pumps are OPERABLE.

h. Two component cooling water pumps are OPERABLE.

i. Two saltwater cooling pumps are OPERABLE. The reactor may be maintained critical with one saltwater cooling pump provided the auxiliary saltwater cooling pump or two screen wash pumps are available as backup. Return the inoperable pump to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The backup pump(s) shall be demonstrated operable by test within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of declaring the saltwater cooling pump inoperable.

AMENDMENT NO.:

?,7,00,124

22

j. A minimum of 5400 pounds of anhydrous trisodium phosphate is stored in the containment sump in racks provided.

(2) Containment Spray System

a. Two refueling water pumps are OPERABLE.

b. Two hydrazine additive pumps are OPERABLE.

c. Hydrazine tank level and hydrazine concentration comply with Specification 3.3.4.

(3) Valves and interlocks associated with each of the above systems are OPERABLE.

(4) Effective leakage from the recirculation loop outside the containment shall be less than 625 cc/hr as calculated from the following formula.

Effective Leakage. al x Ll + a2 x L2 + a3 x L3

where, LI -

pump and valve leakage which drains to auxiliary building sump L2 - valve leakage in auxiliary building or doghouse L3 -

valve leakage outside al -

iodine release factor for leakage in auxiliary building sump a2 -

iodine release factor for leakage in auxiliary building or doghouse a3 -

iodine release factor for leakage outside the auxiliary building or doghouse If effective leakage from the recirculating loop outside the containment exceeds 625 cc/hr, make necessary repairs to limit leakage to 625 cc/hr.

within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

B. During critical operation or when the reactor coolant system temperature is above 2000F, as appropriate per Item A above, maintenance shall be allowed on any one of the following items at any one time:

AMENDMENT NO.:

,124

22a (1) One motor-operated valve at a time (MOV 1100B or 11000) in the recirculation loop upstream of the charging pump suction header for a period of time not longer than 72 consecutive hours.

(2) One refueling water pump and/or its associated discharge valve at a time, for a period not longer than 72 consecutive hours.

(3) One hydrazine pump and/or its associated discharge valve (SV600 or 601) at a time, for a period of time not longer than 72 consecutive hours.

(4) One charging pump for a period of time not longer than 72 consecutive hours.

(5) One of the two required component cooling water pumps for a period of time not longer than 72 consecutive hours.

(6) One of the two saltwater cooling pumps with the auxiliary saltwater cooling pump or screen wash pumps available as backup for a period of time not longer than 72 consecutive hours. The backup pump(s) shall be demonstrated operable by test within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of declaring the saltwater pump inoperable.

(7) One train of ESF switchover automatic trip for a period of time not to exceed 72 consecutive hours.

C. Prior to initiating maintenance on any of the components, the duplicate (redundant) component shall be tested to demonstrate availability.

D. In the event of a failure of a recirculating pump, plant operation may continue provided operability of the remaining pump and its associated motive and control power are satisfactorily demonstrated on a daily basis, including verification that the containment spray bypass valves (CV517 and 518) are closed.

BASIS:

The requirements of Specification A assure that before the reactor can be made critical, or before the reactor coolant system heatup is initiated, adequate engineered safeguards are operable. The limit of 625 cc/hr for the recirculation loop leakage ensures that the combined 0-2 hr EAB thyroid dose due to recirculating loop leakage and containment leakage will not exceed the limits of 10 CFR 100. The formula for determining the leakage incorporates consideration of the significance of leakage in different plant areas. The iodine release factor adjusts actual pump or valve leakage to account for the fraction of the iodine in AMENDMENT NO.: ?5,$0,124

0ll) 22b the leakage which would actually be released to the atmosphere. The iodine release factors in the auxiliary building sump, the auxiliary building or doghouse, and outside are 0.05, 0.5, and 1.0 respectively.

When the reactor is critical or the reactor coolant system temperature is above 2000F, maintenance is allowed per Specifications B and C providing requirements in Specification C are met which assure OPERABILITY of the

-redundant component. The specified maintenance times #re a maximum, and maintenance work will proceed with diligence to return the equipment to an operable condition as promptly as possible. OPERABILITY of the specified components shall be based on the results of Specification No. 4.2.

The allowable maintenance periods are based upon the repair of certain specific items. Based on the demonstration that equipment redundant to that removed from service is OPERABLE, it is reasonable to maintain the reactor at power over this short period of time.

In the unlikely event that the need for safety injection should occur:

functioning of one train will protect the core.(1)(2)(3)(4)

Containment sprays alone, however, will maintain containment pressure under design pressure.(5)

-- functioning of one of the two hydrazine additive pumps and associated discharge valve will effect introduction of hydrazine into containment spray water. This provides for adsorption of airborne fission products and reduction of the thyroid doses associated with the maximum hypothetical accident to within 10 CFR 100 limits.

dissolution of 5400 pounds of anhydrous trisodium phosphate stored in the sump will ensure that the pH of the water in the sump will be greater than 7 within four (4) hours, so as to prevent chloride stress corrosion cracking of systems and components exposed to the circulating sump water.

In the event of inoperability of a recirculation pump, plant operation may continue since either pump is sufficient and a daily OPERABILITY demonstration of the remaining pump and its associated motive and control power provides assurance that it will be OPERABLE if required.

The switchover from injection to recirculation modes is a two part process, which consists of the automatic termination of AMENDMENT NO.:

P,77,124

22c the flow from SI/FM pumps including automatic pump trip and automatic closures of MOV's 850 A, B and C followed by manual realignment to recirculation from the containment sump. The automatic trip setpoint is bounded by the minimum water level in the sump to support recirculation for long term post-LOCA cooling and the minimum RWST level to support charging and containment spray during the manual realignment. The setpoint analysis conservatively determined the automatic trip setpoint to be 20% of the RWST level. The automatic trip setpoint is the result of the combination of the worst single active failure considering SIS and SISLOP conditions.

REFERENCES:

(1)

Final Engineering Report and Safety Analysis, Paragraph 10.1.

(2)

Final Engineering Report and Safety Analysis, Paragraph 5.1.

(3)

"San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station," report forwarded by letter dated December 29, 1971, from Jack B. Moore to Director, Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC, subject:

emergency Core Cooling System Performance, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1.

(4)

USAEC Safety Evaluation of ECCS Performance Analysis for San Onofre Unit 1, forwarded by letter date March 6, 1974, from Mr. Donald J. Skovholt to Mr. Jack B. Moore.

(5)

Supplement No. 1 to the Final Engineering Report and Safety Analysis, Section 5, Question 3c.

AMENDMENT NO.: 124

TABLE 3.5.6-1 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS OPERABLE Pressurizer Hater Level 3

2 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication*

2/steam generator 1/steam generator Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor 2

1 PORV Position Indicator (Limit Switch) 1/valve 1/valve PORV Block Valve Position Indicator (Limit Switch) 1/valve 1/valve Safety Valve Position Indicator (Limit Switch) 1/valve 1/valve Containment Pressure (Hide Range) 2 1

Steam Generator Hater Level (Narrow Range) 1/steam generator 1/steam generator Refueling Hater Storage Tank Level 2

1 Containment Sump Hater Level (Narrow Range)*"

2 1

Z Containment Hater Level (Hide Range) 2 1

q Neutron Flux (Hide Range) 2 1

z 0

A Auxiliary feedwater flow, indication for each steam generator to provided by one channel of steam generator level (Hide Range) and one channel of auxiliary feedwater flow rate.

These comprise the two channels of auxiliary feedwater flow indication for each steam generator.

Operation may continue up to 30 days with one less than the total number of channels OPERABLE.

45 4.2 SAFETY-INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM 4.2.1 SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM PERIODIC TESTING APPLICABILITY:

Applies to testing of the Safety Injection System and the Containment Spray System.

OBJECTIVE:,

To verify that the Safety Injection System and the Containment Spray System will respond promptly and properly if required.

SPECIFICATION:

I. System Tests A. Hot Safety Injection System Test (1) When the plant is planned to be shutdown from MODE 1 operation and is planned to enter MODE 5 operation, a Hot SIS Test shall be performed in MODE 3 while RCS pressure is above 1500 psi but not more often than once every 9 months. The test shall include a determination of the force required to open valves MOV 851 A and B and the margin of available actuation force.

(2) The test will be considered satisfactory if:

(a) control board indication and visual observations indicate all components have operated and sequenced properly. That is, the appropriate pumps have started and/or stopped and started, and all valves have completed their travel.

(b) the measured actuator force for both the HV-851 A and B valves is equal to or less than 10,000 1b.*

(3) If the measured actuator force of either HV-851 A or B is between 10,000 and 22,000 lbf, the HV-851 A and 8 valves shall be considered OPERABLE but the future testing interval shall be accelerated as determined by the following equation:

• Upon-receipt of satisfactory data from continuing testing and analysis, the NRC staff will consider a request from Southern California Edison Company to change this number to more accurately reflect existing conditions.

AMENDMENT NO.: 7537,54,114,124

-46 T.TL (22,000 - F) 12,000 where:

T maximum time in days of operation allowed before next surveillance test is required T L. time in days of operation since the last surveillance test F -

measured actuator force (4) If the measured actuator force of either HV-851 A or 8 is greater than 22,000 lbf, test results shall be reported to the NRC pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 along with proposed corrective actions. NRC approval shall be obtained prior to returning the unit to service.

B. Trisodium Phosphate Test (1) A test of the trisodium phosphate additive shall be conducted once every refueling to demonstrate the availability of the system. The test shall be performed in accordance with the following procedure:

(a) The three (3) storage racks are visually observed to have maintained their integrity.

(b) The three (3) racks, each with a storage capacity of 1800 pounds of anhydrous trisodium phosphate additive, are visually observed to be full.

(c)

Trisodium phosphate from one of the sample storage racks inside containment shall be submerged without agitation, in 25+/-0.5 gallons of 150*F to 175*F distilled water borated to 3900+/-100 ppm boron.

(2) The test shall be considered satisfactory if the racks have maintained their integrity, the racks are visually observed to be full, and the trisodium phosphate dissolves to the extent that a minimum pH of 7.0 is reached within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the start of the test.

AMENDMENT NO.: OP,77A,124

46a C. Containment Spray System Test (1) During reactor shutdown at intervals not longer than the normal plant refueling intervals, a "no-flow" system test shall be conducted to demonstrate proper availability of the system. The test shall, be performed either by closing a manual valve in the system or electrically disabling the refueling water pumps and initiating the system by tripping the normal actuation instrumentation.

(2) The test will be considered satisfactory if visual.

observations indicate all components have operated satisfactorily.

(3) At least once every second refueling outage an air flow test shall be performed to demonstrate the absence of blockage at each containment spray nozzle.

II.

Comoonent Tests A. Pump Tests (1) In addition to the above test, the safety injection, recirculation, spray additive and refueling water pumps shall be started at intervals not to exceed one month to verify that they are in satisfactory running order.

(2) Acceptable levels of performance shall be as follows:

(1) The safety injection pumps shall reach and be capable of maintaining 95% of their rated shutoff head within 10 seconds after starting.

(2) The refueling water pumps shall be capable of maintaining 90% of their rated shutoff head.

(3) The recirculation pumps shall be run dry.

Proper starting of the pump is confirmed by observation of the running current on the ammeter.

(4) The spray additive pumps shall be capable of maintaining their rated flow at a discharge pressure not less than 90% of their rated discharge pressure.

AMENDMENT NO.:

,7,JJ4,124

46b B. Leakage Testing (1) The recirculation loop outside containment (including the Containment Spray System) shall be pressurized at a pressure equal to or greater than the operating pressure under accident conditions at intervals not to exceed the normal plant refueling interval.

Visual inspections for leakage shall be made and if leakage can be detected, measurements of such leakage shall be made. In addition, pumps and valves of the recirculation loop outside containment which are used during normal operation, shall 'be visually inspected for leakage at intervals not to exceed once every six months. If leakage can be detected, measurements of such leakage shall be made.

(2) The non-redundant Containment Spray System piping shall be visually inspected at intervals not to exceed the normal plant refueling interval.

Observations made as part of compliance with Paragraph C, above, or Paragraph I.C(2) of Technical Specification 4.2 will be acceptable as visual inspection of portions of non-redundant Containment Spray System piping.

C. RNST Low Level Trips Monthly, perform a CHANNEL TEST and every refueling interval, perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, of the SI/Feedwater Pump trip and the MOV 850A, 8508 and 850C automatic closure on low-low Refueling Hater Storage Tank level.

BASIS:

The Safety Injection System is a principal plant safeguard.

It provides means to insert negative reactivity and limits core damage in th event of a loss of coolant or steam break accident. (1)(2)(3)

Preoperational performance tests of the components are performed in the manufacturer's shop. An initial system flow test demonstrates proper dynamic functioning of the system.

Thereafter, periodic tests demonstrate that all components are functioning properly. For these tests, flow through the system is generally not required. However, in the case of the "Hot SIS Test," actual conditions of an SI event are simulated. This test is performed to assure that long-term set of the valve seat faces on HV-851 A and 8 has not caused the valves to become inoperable. The test is required to be performed as the plant is shutting down from MODE 1 in order to assure that the valves have not been disturbed (i.e., the long-term set is still in effect) and that full dynamic conditions that would occur during an actual SI event are simulated. When possible the test should be performed prior AMENDMENT NO.: ?XA7,JJ7,124

ni 4 6 b - 1 to stopping the feedwater pumps (this is not a requirement).

This will further assure that the valves will be in the same condition as when required for an actual Safety Injection event since the discharge pressure of the feedwater pumps acting on the valves will keep them seated even considering any backpressure built up in the downstream SI header. The equation used to determine future intervals if actuator force is between 10,000 lbf and 22,000 lbf is developed by shortening the interval in direct proportion to the degree to which the force exceeds 10,000 lbf. During the test, all components are verified to have operated and sequenced.

properly.

The tests required in this specification will demonstrate that all components which do not normally and routinely operate will operate properly and in sequence if required.

The portion of the Recirculation system outside the containment sphere is effectively an extension of the boundary of the containment. The measurement of the recirculation loop leakage ensures that the calculated EAB 0-2 hr. thyroid dose does not exceed 10 CFR 100 limits.

The trisodium phosphate stored in storage racks located in the containment is provided to minimize the possibility of stress corrosion cracking of metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The trisodium phosphate provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to 7.0 - 7.5.

The requirement to dissolve trisodium phosphate from one of the sample storage racks in distilled water heated and borated, to the extent recirculating post LOCA sump water is projected to be heated and borated, provides assurance that the stored trisodium phosphate will dissolve as required following a LOCA. The sample storage racks are sized to contain 0.5 pounds of trisodium phosphate. Trisodium phosphate stored in the sample storage racks has a surface area to volume ratio of 1.33 whereas the trisodium phosphate stored in the main racks has a surface area to volume ratio of 1.15.

Visual inspection of the non-redundant piping in the Containment Spray System provides additional assurance of the integrity of that system.

Surveillance testing of the RNST low-low level main feedwater/safety injection pump trips and automatic closure of MOV 850A, 8508 and 850C valves will ensure that these components will be available to complete their safety functions if required.

AMENDMENT NO.:

719,124

46b-2

REFERENCES:

(1) Final Engineering Report and Safety Analysis, Paragraph 5.1.

(2) "San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station", report forwarded by letter dated December 29, 1971 from Jack B. Moore to Director, Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC, subject:

Emergency Core Cooling System Performance, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1.

(3) USAEC Safety Evaluation of ECCS Performance Analysis for San Onofre Unit 1, forwarded by letter dated March 6, 1974 from Mr. Donald 3. Skovholt to Mr. Jack B. Moore.

(4) Letter, K. P. Baskin, SCE, to D. M. Crutchfield, NRC,.

dated October 16, 1981.

AMENDMENT NO.: 124

-53b

-I p

5

2. Simulating SISLOP*, and:

a. Verifying operation of circuitry which locks out non-critical equipment,

b. Verifying the diesel performs a DG FAST START from standby condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency buses with permanently connected loads and the auto connected emergency loads** through the load sequencer (with the exception of the feedwater, safety injection, charging and refueling water pumps whose respective breakers may be racked-out to the-test position) and operates for 2 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads,

c. Verifying that on the safety injection actuation signal, all diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed and generator differential, are automatically bypassed.

3. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 4,000 kW without tripping. The generator voltage shall not exceed 4,800 volts and the generator speed shall not exceed 500 rpm (nominal speed plus 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint) during and following the load rejection.

SISLOP is the signal generated by coincident loss of offsite power (loss of voltage on Buses IC and 2C) and demand for safety injection.

The sum of all loads on the engine shall not exceed 6,000 kW.

AMENDMENT NO.:

Y04,124