ML13275A059

Initial Exam 2012-302 Final Administrative JPMs

ML13275A059
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	09/27/2013
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
References
Download: ML13275A059 (196)

Text

Sequoyah Initial Exam 302 December 2012 Final Material A D 4

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC RO ADMIN A.ia

1211 NRCJPMROA.1.a Page 2 of 7 RO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task: CONTAINMENT FORMALDEHYDE STAY TIME CALCULATION Task#: 1150010201 Task Standard: Calculate containment formaldehyde stay time and determine respiratory protection requirements in accordance with 0-TI-OPS-000-001 .0.

Time Critical Task: YES: NO: X KIA Reference/Ratings: 2.1.26 (3.4 / 3.6)

Method of Testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Evaluation Method:

Simulator In-Plant Classroom X Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:

Trainee Name Evaluator: /

Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating: SAT: UNSAT:

Validation Time: 12 minutes Total Time:

Performance Time: Start Time: Finish Time:

COMMENTS

1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.a Page 3 of 7 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:

ToolslEquipmentlProcedures Needed:

1. 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0, Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation

2. Calculator

References:

Reference Title Rev No.

1. 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0 Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation 7 2.

Read to the examinee:

DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is in Mode 1 at 100% power.

2. A Level Switch inside lower containment needs repair.

3. 0-PI-OPS-000.01 1.0, Containment Access Control during Modes I 4, has been initiated in preparation for a lower containment entry to investigate the alarm condition.

4. The containment entry evolution requires at least 120 minutes.

5. A Chemistry sample taken today at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> yielded a lower containment formaldehyde concentration of 1.32 ppm.

6. Section 4.0, Prerequisite Actions, of 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0 is complete.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Calculate the allowable containment stay time for the given formaldehyde concentration using 0-TI-OPS-000-001.0 Section 5.1.

2. Identify all required action(s) if any to complete the level switch repair in accordance with 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0, Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation and write them on the JPM briefing sheet.

3. Assume all required IVs have been completed.

1211 NRCJPMROA.1.a Page 4 of 7 Start Time Obtain a copy of 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 0, Containment Formaldehyde STEP 1  : Stay Time Calculation. SAT UNSAT Copy of 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0, Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Standard:

Calculation is obtained.

Provide a copy of 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0, Containment Formaldehyde c Stay Time Calculation.

Comment NOTES

1) Section 5.1 may be marked N/A if Unit 1 lower containment entry will not be performed

2) Section 5.1 may be marked N/A if only the Annulus or Airlock will be entered OR if breathing apparatus will be worn.

3) 0-Tl-CEM-090-016.1 or 0-Tl-CEM-090-016.2 can be used by Chemistry to determine formaldehyde concentration in containment. Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are valid.

STEP 2  : 5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry SAT

[1] RECORD U-i lower containment formaldehyde sample results and sample date/time (from Chemistry). UNSAT ppm Date/Time:

The examinee records the lower containment formaldehyde sample Standard:

results.

Comment

1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.a Page 5 of 7 STEP 3  : 5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry SAT

[2] IF entry to Unit 1 lower containment is required with formaldehyde concentration greater than 1.5 ppm, THEN UNSAT PERFORM the folbwing:

Standard: The Examinee addresses the step as N/A based on the initial conditions.

Comment STEP 4  : 5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry SAT

[31 CALCULATE Unit 1 Lower containment stay time UNSA USiNG the following equation:

0.3 ppm X 480 minutes =

sample recorded Step 5.1(1]

Comment 0.3 ppm X 480 minutes =________ minutes Examiner sample recorded Step 5.1[1]

Note:

0.3 ppm X 480 minutes 144 = 109.1 minutes 1.32 1.32 STEP 5  : 5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry SAT

[4] INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY stay time results obtained in Step 5.1(3]. UNSAT Examinee addresses the step as completed based on the initial Standard conditions.

Comment

1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.a Page 6 of 7 STEP 6 5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry SAT

[7] IF any required task CANNOT be performed within allowed stay time,THEN UNSAT PERFORM the following:

[7.1] CONTACT Industrial Safety for additional guidance.

[7.2] EVALUATE need for Lower Containment Purge in accordance with O-SO-3O3.

[7.3] DO NOT CONTINUE task UNTIL one of the following conditions are met:

• Job Safety Analysis has been performed.

OR

• Stay time is acceptable.

Examinee determines the job will take longer than the allowed stay time CRITICAL and writes the following on the JPM briefing sheet.

Contact Industrial Safety.

Standard: Evaluate need for Lower Containment Purge.

Do not continue until a Job Safety Analysis has been performed.

Notify Work Week Manager (not critical).

Notify Rad Protection (not cntical

JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is in Mode 1 at 100% power.

2. A Level Switch inside lower containment needs repair.

3. 0-PI-OPS-000.01 1.0, Containment Access Control during Modes 1 4, has been initiated in preparation for a lower containment entry to investigate the alarm condition.

4. The containment entry evolution requires at least 120 minutes.

5. A Chemistry sample taken today at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> yielded a lower containment formaldehyde concentration of 1.32 ppm.

6. Section 4.0, Prerequisite Actions, of 0-TI-OPS-000-001 .0 is complete.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Calculate the allowable containment stay time for the given formaldehyde concentration using 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0 Section 5.1.

2. Identify all required action(s) if any to complete the level switch repair in accordance with 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0, Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation and write them on the JPM briefing sheet.

3. Assume all required IVs have been completed.

Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.

HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.

I 1I Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit I &2 Technical Instruction 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0 Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation Revision 0007 Quality Related Level of Use: Continuous Use Effective Date: 09-26-2012 Responsible Organization: OPS, Operations Prepared By: R. Cessna Approved By: Mike Brubaker Current Revision Description Revised procedure to remove note 3 in sections as it is confusing and the sections handle the note..

I SQN Unit I & 2 Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-TI-OPS-000-001 .0 Calculation Rev. 0007 L Page2ofl4 Table of Contents

1.0 INTRODUCTION

3 1.1 Purpose 3 1.2 Scope 3 1.3 Frequency/Conditions 3

2.0 REFERENCES

3 2.1 Developmental Reference 3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 4 4.0 PREREQUISITE ACTIONS 5 4.1 PreliminaryActions 5 5.0 PERFORMANCE 6 5.1 Unit 1 Lower Containment Entry 6 5.2 Unit 1 Upper Containment Entry 8 5.3 Unit 2 Lower Containment Entry 10 5.4 Unit 2 Upper Containment Entry 12 6.0 RECORDS 14

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 3 of 14

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose This procedure establishes requirements and responsibilities for reducing employee exposure to Formaldehyde.

1.2 Scope This procedure covers work where formaldehyde is present inside Unit I and Unit 2 containment building at Sequoyah during plant operation.

A. Unless otherwise determined through air monitoring data, all work which could expose personnel to Formaldehyde must be assumed to expose personnel above the Action Level of 0.3 TWA ppm until sampling determines current levels of exposure.

B. When an employees exposure is determined from representative sampling, the measurements used shall be representative of the employees full shift or short-term exposure to formaldehyde, as appropriate.

C. Representative samples shall be taken prior to the oncoming shift entry unless documented objective data shows that exposures are under the 0.3 ppm TWA.

D. When using the representative sampling strategy, the Chemistry organization will utilize sampling points described in 0-TI-CEM-090-016.1 and 0-TI-CEM-090-0l 6.2.

1.3 Frequency/Conditions This instruction is to be performed prior to containment entry for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Upper and Lower containments.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Developmental Reference A. 29 Code of Federal Regulations 1910.1048, Formaldehyde

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 4 of 14 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS A. Employees who will potentially be exposed to Formaldehyde levels greater than 0.3 ppm Time-Weighted Average (TWA) shall wear respiratory protection.

Exposure with respect to 0.3 ppm TWA is tracked using stay time calculation in this procedure.

B. If respiratory protection is required (based upon concentration and exposure time), the level of respiratory protection shall be determined from the chart below:

AIRBORNE CONCENTRATION OF REQUIRED RESPIRATOR FORMALDEHYDE less than 7.5 ppm Any full face air-purifying respirator with formaldehyde filters.

7.5 to 75.0 ppm Supplied air respirators with full face piece operated in positive pressure mode.

Above 75 ppm Any full face self-contained breathing apparatus operated in positive pressure mode.

C. Employees required to wear respirators will be fit tested annually and have a medical review annually.

D. Cartridges are to be replaced after 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of use or at the end of the work shift, whichever occurs first, unless the cartridge contains a National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) approved end-of-service life indicator to show when breakthrough occurs.

E. A Job Safety analysis shall be developed for exposures to personnel above the Action Level of 0.3 ppm TWA by the supervision of the work group requiring entry.

F. Any TVA employee or augmented employee that may be exposed to Formaldehyde shall receive Formaldehyde Awareness training, ATIS 0059188 prior to beginning work and annually thereafter.

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 5 of 14 Date 4.0 PREREQUISITE ACTIONS NOTE Throughout this Instruction, where an IFITHEN statement is encountered, the step will be N/A if the condition does not exist.

4.1 Preliminary Actions

[1] ENSURE Instruction to be used is a copy of effective version.

[2] ENSURE Precautions and Limitations Section 3.0, has been reviewed.

NOTE Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are still valid (based upon the trend of formaldehyde concentration).

[3] NOTIFY Chemistry to determine containment formaldehyde concentration.

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-TI-OPS-000-001 .0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 6 of 14 Date 5.0 PERFORMANCE 5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry NOTES

1) Section 5.1 may be marked N/A if Unit 1 lower containment entry will not be performed

2) Section 5.1 may be marked N/A if only the Annulus or Airlock will be entered OR if breathing apparatus will be worn.

3) O-Tl-CEM-090-016.1 or O-TI-CEM-090-016.2 can be used by Chemistry to determine formaldehyde concentration in containment. Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are valid.

[1] RECORD U-I lower containment formaldehyde sample results and sample date/time (from Chemistry).

ppm Date/Time:

[2] IF entry to Unit 1 lower containment is required with formaldehyde concentration greater than 1.5 ppm, THEN PERFORM the following:

[2.1] NOTIFY Industrial Safety of abnormally high formaldehyde concentration.

[2.2] INITIATE lower containment purge USING O-SO-30-3.

[2.3] RETURN TO Step 5.1[1] of this section.

[3] CALCULATE Unit 1 Lower containment stay time USING the following equation:

0.3 ppm X 480 minutes sample recorded Step 5.1[I]

[4] INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY stay time results obtained in Step 5.1 [3].

IV

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 7 of 14 Date 5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry (continued)

[5] IF the Formaldehyde stay time is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, THEN NOTIFY Work Week Manager of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.

[6] NOTIFY Rad Protection of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.

[7] IF any required task CANNOT be performed within allowed stay time,THEN PERFORM the following:

[7.1] CONTACT Industrial Safety for additional guidance.

[7.2] EVALUATE need for Lower Containment Purge in accordance with O-SO-30-3.

[7.3] DO NOT CONTINUE task UNTIL one of the following conditions are met:

• Job Safety Analysis has been performed.

OR

• Stay time is acceptable.

END OF TEXT

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 8 of 14 Date 5.2 Unit I Upper Containment Entry NOTES

1) Section 5.2 may be marked N/A if Unit I upper containment entry will not be performed.

2) Section 5.2 may be marked N/A if only the Annulus or Airlock will be entered OR if breathing apparatus will be worn.

3) O-Tl-CEM-090-016.i or O-TI-CEM-090-016.2 can be used by Chemistry to determine formaldehyde concentration in containment. Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are valid.

[1] RECORD U-i upper containment formaldehyde sample results and sample date/time (from Chemistry).

ppm Date/Time:

[2] IF entry to Unit 1 upper containment is required with formaldehyde concentration greater than 1.5 ppm, THEN PERFORM the following:

[2.1] NOTIFY Industrial Safety of abnormally high formaldehyde concentration.

[2.2] INITIATE upper containment purge USING O-SO-30-3.

[2.3] RETURN TO Step 5.2[I] of this section.

[31 CALCULATE Unit 1 Upper containment stay time USING the following equation:

0.3 m X 480 minutes sample recorded Step 5.2[I]

[4] INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY stay time results obtained in Step 5.2[3].

IV

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 9 of 14 Date 5.2 Unit I Upper Containment Entry (continued)

[5] IF the Formaldehyde stay time is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, THEN NOTIFY Work Week Manager of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.

[6] NOTIFY Rad Protection of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.

[7] IF any required task CANNOT be performed within allowed stay time, THEN PERFORM the following:

[7.1] CONTACT Industrial Safety for additional guidance.

[7.2] EVALUATE need for Upper Containment Purge in accordance with O-SO-30-3.

[7.3] DO NOT CONTINUE task UNTIL one of the following conditions are met:

• Job Safety Analysis has been performed.

OR

• Stay time is acceptable.

END OF TEXT

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 10 of 14 Date 5.3 Unit 2 Lower Containment Entry NOTES

1) Section 5.3 may be marked N/A if Unit 2 Lower containment entry will not be performed.

2) Section 5.3 may be marked N/A if only the Annulus or Airlock will be entered OR if breathing apparatus will be worn.

3) O-Tl-CEM-090-016.1 or O-Tl-CEM-090-016.2 can be used by Chemistry to determine formaldehyde concentration in containment. Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are valid.

[1] RECORD Unit 2 lower containment formaldehyde sample results and sample date/time (from Chemistry).

ppm Date/Time:

[2] IF entry to Unit 2 lower containment is required with formaldehyde concentration greater than 1.5 ppm, THEN PERFORM the following:

[2.1] NOTIFY Industrial Safety of abnormally high formaldehyde concentration.

[2.2] INITIATE lower containment purge USING O-S0-30-3.

[2.3] RETURN TO Step 5.3[1] of this section.

[3] CALCULATE Unit 2 lower containment stay time USING the following equation:

0.3 m X 480 minutes sample recorded Step 5.3[1]

[4] INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY stay time results obtained in Step 5.3[3].

IV

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-TI-OPS-000-001 .0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 11 of 14 Date 5.3 Unit 2 Lower Containment Entry (continued)

[5] IF the Formaldehyde stay time is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, THEN NOTIFY Work Week Manager of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.

[6] NOTIFY Rad Protection of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.

[7] IF any required task CANNOT be performed within allowed stay time, THEN PERFORM the following:

[7.1] CONTACT Industrial Safety for additional guidance.

[7.2] EVALUATE need for Lower Containment Purge in accordance with O-SO-30-3.

[7.3] DO NOT CONTINUE task UNTIL one of the following conditions are met:

• Job Safety Analysis has been performed.

OR

• Stay time is acceptable.

END OF TEXT

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 .0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 12 of 14 Date 5.4 Unit 2 Upper Containment Entry NOTES

1) Section 5.4 may be marked N/A if Unit 2 upper containment entry will not be perlormed.

2) Section 5.4 may be marked N/A if only the Annulus or Airlock will be entered OR if breathing apparatus will be worn.

3) O-Tl-CEM-090-016.1 or O-Tl-CEM-090-016.2 can be used by Chemistry to determine formaldehyde concentration in containment. Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are valid.

[1] RECORD Unit 2 upper containment formaldehyde sample results and sample date/time (from Chemistry).

ppm Date/Time:

[2] IF entry to Unit 2 upper containment is required with formaldehyde concentration greater than 1.5 ppm, THEN PERFORM the following:

[2.1] NOTIFY Industrial Safety of abnormally high formaldehyde concentration.

[2.2] INITIATE upper containment purge USING 0-SO-30-3.

[2.3] RETURN TO Step 5.4[1]of this section.

[3] CALCULATE Unit 2 Upper containment stay time USING the following equation:

0.3 pim X 480 minutes sample recorded Step 5.4[1]

[4] INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY stay time results obtained in Step 5.4[3].

Iv

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit 1 & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 13 of 14 Date 5.4 Unit 2 Upper Containment Entry (continued)

[5] IF the Formaldehyde stay time is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, THEN NOTIFY the Work Week Manager of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.

[6] NOTIFY Rad Protection of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.

[7] IF any required task CANNOT be performed within allowed stay time, THEN PERFORM the following:

[7.1] CONTACT Industrial Safety for additional guidance.

[7.2] EVALUATE need for Upper Containment Purge in accordance with O-SO-30-3.

[7.3] DO NOT CONTINUE task UNTIL one of the following conditions are met:

• Job Safety Analysis has been performed.

OR

• Stay time is acceptable.

END OF TEXT

SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time O-Tl-OPS-000-O01 .0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 14 of 14 6.0 RECORDS Retain completed copies of this instruction for inclusion with O-Pl-OPS-000-01 1.0 package..

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC SRO ADMIN A.1.a

1211 NRC JPM SROA.1.a Page 2 of 8 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task: Determine the Operability of a BAT before use.

Task#: 1190100302 Task Standard: Determine the operability of BAST C prior to placing tank in service.

Time Critical Task: YES: NO: X KIA ReferenceIRatings: 2.1.25 (3.9/4.2)

Method of Testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Evaluation Method:

Simulator In-Plant Classroom X Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:

Trainee Name Evaluator: I Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating: SAT: UNSAT:

Validation Time: 10 mm Total Time:

Performance Time: Start Time: Finish Time:

COMMENTS

1211 NRC JPM SROA.1.a Page 3of8 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:

ToolslEquipmentlProcedures Needed:

1. TRM

2. TRM Figure 3.1.2.6

3. 1-Sl-OPS-000-003.W, Weekly Shift Log page 24

4. JPM Chemistry Handout

References:

Reference Title Rev No.

1. TRM Technical Requirements Manual 46

2. 1-Sl-OPS-000-003.W Weekly Shift Log 51 Read to the examinee:

DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit us at 100% power

2. Preparations are in progress to place a clearance on BAT A for Maintenance.

3. BAT C level is indicating 9,600 gallons on 0-Ll-62-242.

INITIATING CUES:

1. You have been directed to determine operability status for BAT C level using 1 -Sl-OPS-000-003.W, prior to aligning BAT C to Unit 1.

2. Determine the minimum level required for the operability of BAT C.

3. Determine if the clearance evolution may continue.

4. Notify the Examiner of results when determination of operability has been completed.

1211 NRC JPM SROA.1.a Page 4 of 8 Start Time STEP 1 : SAT Obtain a copy of 1-SI-OPS-000-003.W, Weekly Shift Log, JPM 421 Chemistry Handout and the TRM. UNSAT Standar& Copy of 1-SI-OPS-000-003.W, Weekly Shift Log, JPM 421 Chemistry Handout and the TRM are obtained.

Provide a copy of 1-SI-OPS-000-003.W, Weekly Shift Log page 24, Cue JPM 421 Chemistry Handout and the TRM figure 3.1.2.6.

Comment STEP 2 SAT Examinee goes to 1-Sl-OPS-000-003.W to review BAT C Level operability requirements. UNSAT Examinee reviews 1-SI-OPS-000-003.W, Appendix A, SR Standard requirements for BAT C level operability.

Comment

1211 NRC JPM SROA.l.a Page 5 of 8 STEP 3 : SAT Examinee utilizes the TRM and reviews TR 3.1.2.6.a.1 requirement for BAT C level. UNSAT Examinee utilizes the TRM and reviews TR 3.1 .2.6.a.1 requirement for Standard BATC level.

Comment STEP 4 SAT Examinee goes to TRM Figure 3.1.2.6.

UNSAT Standard: Examinee goes to TRM FIGURE 3.1.2.6 Examiner The figure required to be used is found on page 3/4 1-10.

Note Comment STEP 5 : I Examinee selects the appropriate line on FIGURE 3.1.2.6, Boric Acid SAT Concentration, as determined from the data on the Operations Information page, Attachment 1, to determine region of acceptable UNSAT operation.

1211 NRC JPM SROA.1.a Page 6 of 8 STEP Examinee selects the appropriate line on FIGURE 3.1.2.6 based on 6 SAT

• U-i RWST Boric Acid Concentration as determined from data on the Operations Information page, Attachment 1, to determine the region of acceptable operation. UNSAT Standard Using the chemistry page the Examinee determines the correct RWST Concentration is 2550 ppm. CRITICAL Comment STEP Examinee determines minimum BAT C level in gallons by locating the 7 SAT intersection of the line for the RWST and BAT Boron concentrations and verifying the actual level in the tank is less than the minimum level indicated on TRM page 3/4 1-10 Boric Acid Tank Levels. UNSAT

IIpI:i .

dmIi tee determines the minimum BAT level in gallons required for operability is 9850 gallons (+50/-100 gal.) by picking the point the Standard: boric acid concentration lines for the RWST and the BAT intersect, CRITICAL and verifying the actual number of gallons is in the Region of UeptabIe Operatioft Comment If Examinee addresses the statement at the bottom of graph Examiner concerning the indicated values including the unusable volume and Note the instrument error, they should explain the contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available and is discussed in the TRM bases.

1211 NRC JPM SROA.1.a Page 7 of 8 STEP Examinee identifies the that the level in the C BAT, 9,600 gallons does 8 SAT not meet the operability requirements for level in accordance with TR 3.1.2.6.a U N SAT Comment Terminating The JPM is complete when the Examinee returns the cue sheet to Cue: the Evaluator. STOP Stop Time

JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is at 100% power

2. Preparations are in progress to place a clearance on BAT A for Maintenance.

3. BAT C level is indicating 9,600 gallons on 0-Ll-62-242.

INITIATING CUES:

1. You have been directed to determine operability status for BAT C level using 1 -SI-OPS-000-003.W, prior to aligning BAT C to Unit 1.

2. Determine the minimum level required for the operability of BAT C.

3. Determine if the clearance evolution may continue.

4. Notify the Examiner of results when determination of operability has been completed.

Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.

HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.

Operations Information Sample Point Units Boron Date ITime Goal Limit UI RCS ppm 660 Today/XXXX Variable Variable U2 RCS ppm 968 Today/X)(XX Variable Variable Ui RWST ppm 2550 Today/XXXX 2550 2650

- 2500 2700 U2 RWST ppm 2589 Today/XXXX 2550 2650

- 2500 2700 BAT A ppm 6764 TodayIXXXX Variable Variable BAT B ppm 6872 Today/XXXX Variable Variable BAT C ppm 6450 TodayIXXXX Variable Variable Ui CLA #1 ppm 2532 rwo Weeks Ago/XX)C 2470-2630 2400-2700 Ui CLA #2 ppm 2542 rwo Weeks Ago/XXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 UI CLA #3 ppm 2546 rwo Weeks Ago/XXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 Ui CLA #4 ppm 2515 Fwo Weeks Ago/XXXJ 2470-2630 2400-2700 U2 CLA #1 ppm 2555 Last WeekIXXXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 U2 CLA #2 ppm 2502 Last WeekIXXXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 U2 CLA #3 ppm 2579 Last WeekIXXXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 U2 CLA #4 ppm 2540 Last Week/XXXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 Spent Fuel Pool ppm 2659 Last WeekIXXXX > 2050 > 2000 Lithium Results Date I Time Goal Midpoint UI RCS Lithium ppm 2.44 Today/XXXX 2.26-2.52 2.39 U2 RCS Lithium ppm 3.51 Today/XXXX 3.28-3.54 3.41 Primarj to Secondary Leakrate Information (Total CPM RM-90-99!119)

Indicator Units UI Date ITime U2 Date/Time SI 50 SIG Leakage? Yes/No No Today/)OO(X No Today / Now SI 137.5 CVE Leakrate gpd <0.1 Last Week/XXXX <0.1 Today! Now 5 gpd leak equivalent cpm 1 15 Today / Now 85 Today / Now 30 gpd leak equivalent cpm 490 Today! Now 308 Today! Now 75 gpd leak equivalent cpm 1165 Today / Now 710 Today! Now 100 gpd leak equivalent cpm 1540 Today! Now 933 Today! Now 150 gpd leak equivalent cpm 2290 Today / Now 1380 Today / Now Bkgd on 99 /119 cpm 40 Last Week!XXXX 40 Today! Now Correlation Factor 99/119 cpm/gpd 5.31 Last WeekIXXXX 0.854 Today! Now Steady State conditions are necessary for an accurate determination of leak rate using the CVE Rad Monitor

Operations Information TRM FIGURE 3.1.26 (Units I & 2)

BORIC ACID TANK LIMITS I BASED ON RWST BORON CONCENTRATION 11000 i

I I I I I (EGION_OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION 10500 WST = 2500 ppm B 10000 N/ ,fRWST2600ppmJ I,

z S ARWST=2650ppm81 0

-J

-J N  %%

,(=27O0ppm]

C, 9500 Lii 1

0 z

9000  : 6120 ppm mum) 0 0

8500 -

0 0

0

, 6990 ppm (Maximum)

J Lii I 8000 0

a z

7500

[REGION OF UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION 7000 IInc1caLedva rncftidel 140 gal unusable voIuniead 800 ga for rnstrument error 1 6500 I I I I I I 1 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 6700 6800 6900 7000 7100 BORIC ACID TANK CONCENTRATION - PPM BORON RWST Concentraon 4- 2600 PPM -2550 PPM 4-- 2600 PPM 265O PPM a2700 PPM SEQUOYAH UNITS 1 AND 2

- 3/4 1-10 September28, 2003 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS Revision Nos. 13, 26, 27

NR(

TRM flGURE 3.t26 (Units I &

2)

BORIC ACID TANK LIMITS BASED ON RWST BORON CONCEN TRATION 6500 I I t 1 1 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 6700 6800 600 7000 7100 BORiC ACID TANfr CONCENTRATION - PPM BORON RWST Concnbabon 42500 PPM .2550 PPM 2600 PPM

• 2650 PPM 4-2700 PPM SEQUOYAH - UNITS I AND 2 314 1-10 September 26, 2003 TECHNIPAL REQUIREMENTS Revision Nos. 13, 26, 27 I-) j

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC RO ADMIN A1.b

1211 NRCJPM ROA.1.b Page 2 of 14 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task: Monitor Critical Safety Status Trees for Degraded Core Cooling Task#: 3110450601 Task Standard: The Examinee monitors Status Trees and identifies a Red Path for Pressurized Thermal Shock (P.1) and Orange Paths for Core Cooling and Containment.

Time Critical Task: YES: NO: X K/A ReferencelRatings: 2.1.7 (4.4)

Method of Testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Evaluation Method:

Simulator In-Plant Classroom X Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:

Trainee Name Evaluator: /

Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating: SAT: UNSAT:

Validation Time: 6 minutes Total Time:

Performance Time: Start Time: Finish Time:

COMMENTS

1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.b Page 3 of 14 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:

ToolslEquipmentlProcedures Needed:

1-FR-C UNIT I STATUS TREES

References:

Reference Title Rev No.

1. 1-FR-C UNIT 1 STATUSTREES 2.

JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.

z

-I 0 0 0 0 r m m m muc, r5 CD CD C)

C) 0

() cxJ>< 0.0 -,

0)<

ci II ci I I>< -n-n-n ci w ci I-n-n m ci ci w w>< CD z 00000000, , 00000000Cf) 0 J -.J () 01 - 1 () (0 () - 01 C..) (0 01 - 01 C..) (0 C.) C..) - - CO -

(._, C 01 - k) -J C..) 01 C..) Co ;o U 0)-i - .- - 0)

D Co -1 0)-, (0 -,

. 0 CD 0 0 Cl) 2 CD

-. C,)

CD 0) 0 0

0) D (1)

CD 0 0 CD 0 CD 0)

D 0 0 0 0o 0 CD

- X0)0)0)0)0)0)CO0)X0)0)0)0)0)CO0)0)><0)0)0)0)C0)0)X0)0).J0)-..JC(0X 0 01 )< J 01 (31 M Cii (31 0) J 01 >< 01 M C..) 01 0) (31 tJ 01 >< 0i k) 0) 0) 0) (31 0) >< C..) 01 M 0) C..) 0) 0) CD 001X0100101010.O 0010X0010101 010X01001010 0.

0X01000100 D D

-c,. C..) F.) C5 CD D

C II 11111 1111111 liii liii liii liii liii liii III 0)

Co 0 0)

< 0 0 0 r m m m m CD 0.

C/) C/)

0) 0 ZZZZm0G)m0>00G)m0>J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 - 0 0 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C) o 3 C.) 0)3F)0)0)CS D a- - - - - 0 C P.

-.- .i -- 2_ CD 0 0 0 0 Cl)

CD . CD 0)

CD CD -

0 N) z z 0 C

0 0 0 -t,t1

- 0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0) C 0)0) Xcy 0)0)0)0) C X X 0)0)0)0) -3 C Xo 0)0) - 0)0)0) C -

0 0101FJk)01FJ01FJ0) FJC.) XO1MCJ1J010) XX01M01C01F3ø X01 N) 01MPJO)O)0) C CD E 0 0 (31 01 0 01 0 01 0. 01 01 >< 0 01 0 01 0 0. >< 0 01 0 01 0 01 Q >< 0 01 0 01 01 01 (31 0. 0 CD

-I C.) C0 jO CD

1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.b Page 5 of 14 SIG Pressure S/G NR Levels

1. 1 520 #1 15%

1. 2 550 #2 12%

1. 3 550 #3 12%

1. 4 560 #4 17%

RCS Pressure 0 psig RCS Cold Leg 220 deg F Temperature AFW Flow Containment Pressure 8 psig #1 200 gpm Pressurizer Level 0% #2 170 gpm

1. 3 150 gpm

1. 4 150 gpm INITIATING CUES:

1. You are the Unit 1 CR0.

2. The SR0 has directed you to monitor the status trees using 1-FR-0 UNIT I STATUS TREES.

3. Determine if there are any red and/or orange path safety functions.

4. If you have determined there are red and/or orange path safety functions, write them on the JPM Briefing Sheet.

Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.

HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.

1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.b Page 6 of 14 Start Time Obtain a copy of 1-FR-a UNIT 1 STATUS TREES.

STEP 1  : SAT U N SAT Standard: Copy of 1-FR-O UNIT 1 STATUS TREES is obtained.

Cue Provide a copy of 1-FR-O UNIT 1 STATUS TREES.

Comment

1211 NRCJPM ROA.1.b Page 7 of 14 Monitor Subcriticality STEP 2 SAT SQN SUBCRITICAUTY I -FR-f)

Rev.

UNSAT GO TO 0070 GO TO FR4.2 CSf 47 NOTE I Scure r dnels ernfIy restfe be 1O %on fro,edLve ran Açpx C powes ide marIy reitatgSOUT rge inotn if rces.y.

GO TO FR4.2 CSF A7 Standard: Examinee determines a green path exists for Subcriticality Comment Examiner The start data is provided to the examinee on the handout sheet.

Note:

1211 NRC JPM RO A.1.b Page 8 of 14 Monitor Core Cooling CORE COOLING UN SAT HOlE 2:

VOl ge lfl3n

• fleTCle3vE

1211 NRC JPM RQA.1.b Page 9 of 14 Monitor Heat Sink HEAT SINK U N SAT

1211 NRCJPMROA.1.b Page 10 of 14 Monitor Pressurized Thermal Shock UNIT 1 PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK F-O.4 UNSAT UNIT 1 CURVE 1 PTS LIMITS exists for Pressurized Thermal Shock CRITH

1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.b Page 11 ofl4 Monitor Containment STEP 6  : SAT CONTAINMENT SON I-FR-Rev. I UNSAT GO TO FR-LI GO TO CSF SAT Standard: amee determines an orange path exists for Containment CRITICAL Comment

1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.b Page 12 of 14 Monitor Inventory STEP 7 SAT Inventory SON F-O.6 t-FR-O Rev. I UNSAT Standard: Examinee determines a yellow path exists for Inventory Comment Examiner The start data is provided to the examinee on the handout sheet.

Note:

Terminating The JPM is terminated when the Examinee returns the JPM Cue: briefing sheet to the Examiner. STOP Stop Time

JPM BRIEFING SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The crew is responding to an event in Unit 1 that started 20 minutes ago.

2. The following data has been obtained.

Source Range 5x10 RCS Subcooling - 50 deg IR and SR SUR negative RCP Not running GET (XR-94-101) Quad 1 CET (XR-94-102) Quad 1 B03 735 A06 685 B05 685 C06 685 D03 725 E06 625 D07 650 G04 725 E02 635 C04 650 FOl XXX C08 625 F05 685 G02 650 HOl 650 G08 XXX GET (XR-94-101) Quad 2 CET (XR-94-102) Quad 2 B09 685 AlO 725 811 685 C12 650 Dli 625 E14 635 B13 650 G12 650 D13 xxx C08 625 F09 650 ElO 650 F13 625 G08 XXX F15 650 G14 XXX CET (XR-94-112) Quad 3 CET (XR-94-102) Quad 3 Hil 650 J08 650 H15 635 J10 675 K09 625 J14 650 K13 650 L08 625 k15 675 L12 650 Mu xxx L14 XXX M13 650 N10 635 D09 675 N12 625 GET (XR-94-112) Quad 4 GET (XR-94-102) Quad 4 HOl 650 J02 625 H03 650 J06 650 H07 625 J08 625 KOl 650 L02 650 K05 650 L04 625 M03 675 L08 625 M07 XXX N02 650 D07 650 N04 650 RVLIS Lower range 40% RVLIS Lower range 40%

Ll-68-368 LI-68-371

SIG Pressure SIG NR Levels

1. 1 520 #1 15%

1. 2 550 #2 12%

1. 3 550 #3 12%

1. 4 560 #4 17%

RCS Pressure 0 psig RCS Cold Leg 220 deg F Temperature AFW_Flow Containment Pressure 8 psig #1 200 gpm Pressurizer Level 0% #2 170 gpm

1. 3 l5Ogpm

1. 4 150 gpm INITIATING CUES:

1. You are the Unit I CRC.

2. The SRO has directed you to monitor the status trees using 1-FR-0 UNIT 1 STATUS TREES.

3. Determine if there are any red and/or orange path safety functions.

4. If you have determined there are red and/or orange path safety functions, write them on the JPM Briefing Sheet.

Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.

HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EOI PROGRAM MANUAL FUNCTION RESTORATION PROCEDURE 1-FR-O UNIT I STATUS TREES Revision I QUALITY RELATED PREPARED/PROOFREAD BY: D. A. PORTER RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: OPERATIONS APPROVED BY: K. A. PERKINS EFFECTIVE DATE: 01/09/2007 REVISION DESCRIPTION: Revised containment status tree setpoints for DCN E21988.

SQN UNIT I STATUS TREES 1-FR-O I

Rev. I 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides status trees for monitoring Critical Safety Functions which ensure the integrity of fission product barriers.

Append ix A contains a summary of rules of usage for status tree monitoring, if needed.

Appendix B contains a list of preferred instruments for status tree monitoring, if needed.

Appendix C contains guidance on manually reinstating source range indication if needed.

2.0 SYMPTOMS AND ENTRY CONDITIONS 2.1 ENTRY CONDITIONS E-O Reactor Trip or Safety Injection:

• status tree monitoring initiated upon transition from E-O.

• when directed to monitor status trees by applicable E-O step Page 2 of 16

SQN SUBCRITICALITY 1-FR-O Rev. I 0

INTERMEDIATE RANGE SUR MORE NEGATIVE THAN -0.2 DPM CSF SAT NOTE I Source range channels automatically reinstate below i0 4 % on intermediate range.

Appendix C provides guidance for manually reinstating source range indication if necessary.

SOURCE RANGE SUR ZERO OR NEGATIVE CSF SAT Page 3 of 16

CORE COOLING SQN F-O .2 1-FR-O Rev. I (See Note 2)

CORE EXIT TICs LESS THAN 1200°F RVLIS LOWER RANGE GREATER THAN 42%

NOTE 2:

Red path requires at least 5 T/Cs greater than applicable (See Note 2) limit as follows: CORE EXIT TICs

• one TIC near core center LESS THAN 700°F

• hottest T/C in each quadrant.

RVLIS LOWER RANGE GREATER THAN 42%

RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE GREATER THAN APPLICABLE VALUES IN TABLE 2 RCS SUBCOOLING BASED ON CORE EXIT TICs GREATER THAN 40°F WI WIllill Ii WIIIIIWI WI 1(1111 ii 1WI WI [G CSF SAT Page 4 of 16

CORE COOLING SQN F-0.2 1-FR-0 Table 2 Rev. I NOTE: RVLIS indication greater than values listed below indicates average system void fraction less than 50%.

RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE RUNNING RCP CONFIGURATIONS Ll-68-367 Ll-68-370

(%) (%)

Loop 1 16 10 Loop 2 10 10 Loop 3 10 16 Loop 4 10 10 Loopsland2 23 15 Loops I and 3 23 23 Loopsland4 23 15 Loops2and3 15 23 Loops2and4 15 15 Loops3and4 15 23 Loopsl,2,and3 30 30 Loops 1,2, and4 30 24 Loops 1, 3, and 4 30 30 Loops 2, 3, and 4 24 30 ALLRCPsRUNNING 44 44 Page 5 of 16

HEAT SINK SQN 1-FR-O F-O.3 Rev. I TOTAL FEEDWATER FLOW TO S1Gs NO rn FR-H.1 GREATER THAN 440 GPM YES I,

GO TO NARROW RANGE NO NO

• Y FR-H.2 LEVEL IN AT LEAST PRESSURE IN ALL SIGs ONE SIG LESS THAN 1117 PSIG GREATER THAN 10%

[25% ADVI YES YES

+

• , GOTO NARROW RANGE NO FR-H.3 LEVEL IN ALL SIGs LESS THAN 81%

YES 1

y GOTO NO FR-H.4 PRESSURE IN ALL S/Gs LESS THAN 1064 PSIG YES

+

Y]I GOTO NARROW RANGE LEVEL NO FR-H.5 IN ALL S!Gs GREATER THAN 10%

[25% ADV] YES CSF SAT Page 6 of 16

SQN UNIT I PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK 1-FR-O F-O.4 Rev. I GO TO ALL RCS PRESSURE vs. T-COLD POINTS NO 1 FR-P.1 TO RIGHT OF LIMIT A ONCURVEI YES 4

I ANY T-COLD EXCEEDED COOLDOWN LIMIT NO o FR-RI ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 285°F YES GOTO NO T FR-P.2 ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 31 5°F ALL T-COLDs NO I YES CSF SAT DROPPED ici LESS THAN 100°F IN LAST 60 MINUTES GOTO YES NO FR-P.1 I- ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 285°F YES y GOTO RCS PRESSURE NO FR-P.2 LESS THAN COLD ALL T-COLDs WITHIN OVERPRESSURE LIMIT COOLDOWN LIMIT ONCURVE3 YES CSFSAT NO ALL T-COLDs AND T-HOTs GREATER THAN 350°F YES II CSF SAT Page 7 of 16

UNIT I SQN 1-FR-O CURVE I PTS LIMITS Rev. I 3000 2500 2000 (j

L..

0 1 500 0

C) a Cl)

C.)

1 000 500 0

RCS Temperature (Deg F)

Page 8 of 16

9-0 0

I 0 0

-J w

a::

D C,)

U) Cu-w o a::

-a 4-(0 w I E 0 Do a)

I-G) 00 3)

-J OQ 0

0 C) w D 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LO 0 IC) 0 (6isd) OJflSSOJd SON

CONTAINMENT SQN 1-FR-O F-O.5 Rev. I 1

G OTO CONTAINMENT PRESSURE I R FR-Z.1 LESS THAN 12.0 PSIG YES 4

GOTO CONTAINMENT NO 0 FR-Z.1 PRESSURE LESS THAN 2.8 PSIG YES I

NO FR-Z.2 CONTAINM ENT SUMP LEVEL LESS THAN 68%

YES 1 GO TO UPPER AND LOWER NO Y FR-Z.3 CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORS LESS THAN 100 R/HR YES iiriri c CSF SAT

i Page 10 of 16

Inventory SQN F-O.6 I -FR-O Rev. I NO GOTO RVLIS UPPER Y FRI3 RANGE GREATER I THAN 104%

YES [ GOTO NO FR-I.1 AT LEAST ONE RCP RUNNING YES NO GO TO NO RVLIS DYNAMIC PRESSURIZER FR-I.3 LEVEL RANGE GREATER LESS THAN 92% THAN TABLE 3 YES VALUES YES GO TO FR-LI I

NO GO TO PRESSURIZER FR-I.2 LEVEL GREATER THAN 17%

YES NO GO TO RVLIS UPPER FR-I.3 RANGE GREATER THAN 104%

YES CSF SAT AT LEAST NO ONE RCP RUNNING YES NO GO TO RVLIS DYNAMIC FR-I.3 RANGE GREATER THAN TABLE 3 VALUES YES it:;;i CSF SAT Page 11 of 16

INVENTORY SQN F-0..4 I -FR-0 Table 3 Rev. I NOTE: RVLIS value corresponding to an average system void fraction of 0%.

RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE RUNNING RCP CONFIGURATIONS LI-68-367 LI-68-370

(%) (%)

Loop 1 47 16 Loop 2 16 16 Loop 3 16 47 Loop4 16 16 Loops I and 2 56 25 Loops 1 and 3 56 56 Loops 1 and 4 56 25 Loops 2 and 3 25 56 Loops2and4 25 25 Loops 3 and 4 25 56 Loops 1,2, and3 71 71 Loopsl,2,and4 71 43 Loops 1,3, and4 71 71 Loops 2, 3, and 4 43 71 ALL RCPs RUNNING 94 94 Page 12 of 16

SQN UNITISTATUSTREES I 1-FR-O Rev.1 Appendix A Page 1 of 1 Summary of Status Tree Rules of Usage

• If any RED or ORANGE path exists, then Status Trees shall be monitored continuously.

• When no RED or ORANGE path exists, Status Trees monitoring may be reduced to once every 10 to 20 minutes, UNLESS a significant change in plant status occurs.

• Status Trees shall be monitored and implemented in the order in which they appear in this procedure (Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Containment, and Inventory).

• If a RED path is diagnosed, then the applicable FRP for the highest priority RED path condition shall be implemented IMMEDIATELY.

• If an ORANGE path is diagnosed, then remaining Status Trees shall be checked.

If no RED path exists, then the highest priority ORANGE path FRP will be implemented IMMEDIATELY.

• Once implemented due to any RED or ORANGE path, FRP shall be performed to completion or to a point of transition UNLESS a higher priority condition develops.

• When no RED or ORANGE path exists, the YELLOW path FRP may be implemented at the Operators discretion.

• Status tree monitoring is terminated under two circumstances:

• cold shutdown (Mode 5) reached OR

• Normal GOs are implemented and automatic SI actuation is armed.

Page 13 of 16

1-FR-O SQN UNITISTATUSTREES Rev.1 APPENDIX B Page 1 of 2 Preferred Instrumentation for Monitoring Status Trees NOTE 1: Preferred Instrument should be used if available.

Status Tree Parameter Preferred lnstrumentlLocation Alternate Instrument/Location Subcriticality Power Range Xl-92-5005B, 5006B, 5007B, & 5008B [M-13] Xl-92-5005C, 5006C, 5007C, & 5008C [M-4]

(F-O. 1)

Intermediate Range SUR XX-92-5041 [M-1 3 Comparator & Rate Drawer] Xl-92-501 1 C & 501 1 D [M-41 Source Range Re-Instated Xl-92-5001B & 5002B [M-131 Xl-92-5001A, & 5002A [M-4]

Source Range SUR XX-92-5041 [M-13 Comparator & Rate Drawer] Xl-92-501 1A, & 501 lB [M-4J Core Cooling Core Exit T/Cs (Note 2) Xl-94-101 & 102 [M-4 Exosensor] ICS (F-O.2)

RCS Subcooling Xl-94-101 & 102 [M-4 ExosensorJ XR-94-101 & 102 (Core Exit Margin to Saturation Recorders) OR determine from PAM Thot and RCS Pressure RCP Running RCP Handswitches [M-4] Fl-68-6A, 6B, 6D, 29A, 29B, 29D, 48A, 48B, 48D, 71A, 71B, 71D (RCS Flow)

RVLIS Lower Range Ll-68-368 & 371 [M-4] LR-68-367 RVLIS Dynamic Range Ll-68-367 & 370 [M-4] LR-68-367 NOTE 2: Hottest TIC on Exosensor TC TEMPS displays (both trains should be checked) may be used to verify all T/Cs are BELOW Status Tree setpoints. If the Hottest T/C on either of these displays is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL to Status Tree Setpoints, then all of the individual quadrants on both displays must be checked to determine if the 5 T/C criteria (one T/C in each quadrant and one T/C near the center of the core) is met. To determine specific location of TICs, refer to ICS T/C Temperature display or NDR Incore TC maps.

Page 14 of 16

I-FR-O SQN UNIT I STATUS TREES Rev.I APPENDIX B Page 2 of 2 Status Tree Parameter Preferred Instrument/Location Alternate Instrument/Location Heat Sink SIG Narrow Range Level LI-3-42, 39, 55, 52, 97, 94, 110, & 107 [M-4] LI-3-38, 51, 93, 106 [M-4]

(F-O.3)

Feedwater Flow Fl-3-163A, 155A, 147A, & 170A [M-4] ICS OR Fl 3-142A1M-3 for TDAFW flow SIG Pressure Pl-1-2A, 2B, 9A, 9B, 20A, 20B, 27A, & 27B P1-1-5, 12, 23, & 30 [M-4]

[M-4]

Pressurized T-Cold Tl-68 18, 41, 60, & 83/M-5 TR-68-1, 24, 43, & 65 Thermal Shock T-Hot Tl-68-1, 24, 43, & 65/M-5 TR-68-1, 24, 43, & 65 RCS Pressure Xl-94-101 & 102 [M-4 Exosensor) PR-68-69 OR Pl-68-66A, 62, & 69/M-6 Containment Containment Pressure PDI-30-44 & 45 [M-6] PDI-30-43 & 42 [M-61 (F-O.5)

Containment Sump Level Ll-63-178, & 179 [M-6j Ll-63-176, & 177 [M-6]

Upper Containment Rad Monitors RM-90-271 & 272 [M-30] CS Lower Containment Rad Monitors RM-90-273 & 274 [M-30] ICS Inventory (F-O.6) Pressurizer Level LI-68-339A, 335A, & 320 [M-4] LR-68-339 [M-4]

RCP Running RCP Handswitches [M-41 Fl-68-6A, 6B, 6D, 29A, 29B, 29D, 48A, 48B, 48D, 71A, 71B, 71D [M-5 RCS Flow]

RVLIS Upper Range Ll-68-369 & 372 [M-4] LR-68-367 RVLIS Dynamic Range Ll-68-367 & 370 [M-4] LR-68-367 Page 15 of 16

SQN UNITISTATUSTREES I 1-FR-O Rev.1 Appendix C Page 1 of 1 Manually Reinstating Source Range Indication NOTE This appendix may be performed as directed by the Unit Supervisor to restore source range indication. This appendix should be performed by a Unit Operator as time permits and should NOT delay status tree monitoring or other EOP actions.

1. VERIFY intermediate range flux less than  % power on operable channels.

2. REINSTATE source range channels by simultaneously placing both SRM TRIP RESET-BLOCK switches to RESET position. [M-4]

END Page 16 of 16

L1{ ir4 z SUBCRITICALITY SQN F-O.I I-FR-O Rev. I GO TO 0 FR-S. I INTERMEDIATE RANGE SUR MORE NEGATIVE THAN -0.2 DPM CSF SAT NOTE I Source range channels automatically reinstate below iO % on intermediate range.

Appendix C provides guidance for man ually reinstating source range indication if necessary SOURCE RANGE SUR ZERO OR NEGATIVE Page 3 of 16

CORE COOLING SQN F-O.2 1-FR-O Rev. I (See Note 2)

CORE EXIT TICs GO TO LESS THAN 1200°F FR-C.1 RVLIS LOWER RANGE GO TO FR-C.1 GREATER THAN 42%

NOTE 2:

GO TO Red path requires at least 0 FR-C.2 5 T/Cs greater than appl limit as follows: (See Note 2)

CORE EXIT TICs

• one TIC near LESS THAN 700°F

• hottest TIC in each quadrant RVLIS LOWER RANGE GREATER THAN 42%

GO TO FR-C.3 RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE GO TO FR-C.2 GREATER THAN APPLICABLE VALUES IN TABLE 2 GO TO FR-C.3 RCS SUBCOOLING BASED ON CORE EXIT T/Cs GREATER THAN 40°F I J mi. rimvm

• G CSF SAT Page 4 of 16

HEAT SINK SQN I -FR-O Rev. I TOTAL FEEDWATER FLOW TO SIGs GREATER THAN 440 GPM NARROW RANGE LEVEL IN AT LEAST PRESSURE IN ALL S/Gs ONE SIG LESS THAN 1117 PSIG GREATER THAN 10%

[25% ADV]

NARROW RANGE V GOTO LEVEL IN ALL SIGs FR-H.3 LESS THAN 81%

PRESSURE IN ALL S/Gs LESS THAN 1064 PSIG NARROW RANGE LEVEL IN ALL SIGs GREATER THAN 10%

[25% ADVI Page 6 of 16

UNIT I PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK SQN F-O.4 1-FR-O Rev. I ALL RCS PRESSURE vs. T-COLD POINTS t 15 TO RIGHT OF LIMIT A ON CURVE I ANY T-COLD EXCEEDED COOLDOWN LIMIT

• 1 ALL T-COLDs DROPPED LESS THAN 100°F i G [1 IN LAST 60 MINUTES RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN COLD ALL T-COLDs WITHIN OVERPRESSURE LIMIT COO LDOWN LIMIT ON CURVE 3 hi G j CSFSAT cc $1 ALL T-COLDs AND T-HOTs GREATER THAN 350°F CSF SAT Page 7 of 16

RCS Pressure (psig 01 C,)

C 01 0 C C 01 0 C C C o C 0 0 0 C C.)

0 C Ci)

C2 4 CD CD co m 0 -C I, CD F

0)

-I CD I

ci CD 1 -1 Cl) 01 0

C O-Cfl

CONTAINMENT SON F-O.5 1-FR-a Rev. I GO TO FR-Z.1 n GOTO FR-Z.2 UPPER AND LOWER GO TO FR-Z.3 CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORS .

LESS THAN 100 R/HR I UIS1 p G NCSF SAT Page 10 of 16

Inventory SQN F -0.6 I -FR-C Rev. I HI GO TO FR-L3 GO TO Y FR-I.I RVLIS DYNAMIC GO TO RANGE GREATER FR-L3 THAN TABLE 3 VALUES 1 GOTO I FR-LI CSFSAT iii_G RVLIS DYNAMIC GO TO RANGE GREATER FR-L3 THAN TABLE 3 VALUES CSF SAT Page 11 of 16

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC SRO ADMIN A1.b

1211 NRCJPMSROA.1.b Page 2 of 9 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task: Perform an RCS Void Determination and Apply the Result to Determine RCS Pump Sweep Requirements.

Task #: 33440100302 Task Standard: The examinee will:

1. Determine that the volume required to pressurize the RCS from 50 to 340 psig is 1733 (1733.4 acceptable) gallons.

2. Evaluates Steps 19, 20 and 21 of GO-i, Section 5.5.1 and determines that sweeps and vents must be continued.

Time Critical Task: YES: NO: X K/A ReferencelRatings: 2.1.7 (4.7)

Method of Testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Evaluation Method:

Simulator In-Plant Classroom X Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:

Trainee Name Evaluator: I Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating: SAT: UNSAT:

Validation Time: 20 minutes Total Time:

Performance Time: Start Time: Finish Time:

COMMENTS

1211 NRCJPM SROA.1.b Page 3 of 9 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:

ToolsiEquipmentiProcedures Needed:

I. 0-GO-I, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Section 5.5.1 and Appendix E Handout

References:

Reference Title Rev No.

1. 0-GO-l UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO 65 HOT STANDBY 2.

Read to the examinee:

DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. 0-GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Section 5.5.1 RCP Sweeps and Vents, is in progress at step 18.

2. The first 30 second run of #4 RCP is the only RCP sweep that has been completed.

3. 0-GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, has been completed through step 10.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Complete 0-GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, starting at step ii to determine the volume (total makeup) that was required during the pressurization of the RCS from 50 psig to 340 psig.

2. Based on your review determine the required actions (if any) to be taken.

1211 NRCJPMSROA.1.b Page 4 of 9 Start Time STEP 1  : Obtain a copy of GO-i UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO SAT HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, and Section 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance UNSAT Activities.

Copy of GO-i UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT Standard: STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, and Section 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities.

Provide a copy of GO-I UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, and Cue Section 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities.

Comment 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED STEP 2  : DETERMINATION. SAT

[111 DETERMINE volume required to pressurize the RCS U S T from 50 psig to 340 psig as follows:

lii .11 Determine makeup volume added based on change in Boric Acid Batch Counter [FQ$2-1 39] totalizer readings.

Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10) (Step 6)

Comment

1211 NRCJPM SROA.1.b Page 5 of 9 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED STEP 3 DETERMINATION. SAT

[112] Determine makeup volume added based on change in UN SAT Primary Water Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 42] readings Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10) (Step 6)

ITIi Comment

1211 NRCJPM SROA.1.b Page 6 of 9 NOTE A higher final VCT level will result in the change in VCT level being subtracted from total totalizer change 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED STEP 6 DETERMINATION. SAT (12] DETERMINE total volume required to pressurize RCS UNSAT

+ +1-change in Boric change in Pn. change in Total makeup Acid totalizer Water totahzer VCT level required (Stepll.1) (Stepli2) (Stepii4)

Examinee adds 709 gallons, 429 gallons and 595 gallons and Standa determines the total makeup required to be 1733 gallons. (1733.4 is CRITICAL acce table)

Comment Examiner The following actions are taken from GO-i UNIT STARTUP FROM Note: COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Section 5.5.1, RCP Sweeps and Vents.

1211 NRCJPM SROA.i.b Page 7 of 9 7 . 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance QTED Activities (continued)

[191 IF total makeup required in App. E is less than UNSAT or equal to 465 gal Examinee evaluates step 19 of GO-i, Section 5.5.1 and determines Standard step is N/A.

Comment 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and vents Following Maintenance STEP 8 Activities (continued) SAT

[20j IF total makeup required in App. E is between 465 gal UNSAT and 1723 gal Examinee evaluates step 20 of GO-i, Section 5.5.1 and determines Standar&

step is N/A.

Comment 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance STEP 9 : Activities (continued) SAT

[211 IF total makeup required (App. E) is greater than 1723 gal UNSAT OR additional RCP sweeps and vents are desired, THEN PERFORM the following:

[21 .11 IF sweeps and vents have NOT been completed for all four individual RCS loops, THEN GO TO Step 5.5.1[6]. C 1 *l_1,*

Comment

1211 NRCJPM SROA.1.b Page 8 of 9 rrminating The JPM is terminated when the Examinee returns the JPM Cue: briefing sheet to the Examiner. STOP Stop Time

JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. 0-GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Section 5.5.1 RCP Sweeps and Vents, is in progress at step 18.

2. The first 30 second run of #4 RCP is the only RCP sweep that has been completed.

3. 0-GO-I, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, has been completed through step 10.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Complete 0-GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, starting at step 11 to determine the volume (total makeup) that was required during the pressurization of the RCS from 50 psig to 340 psig.

2. Based on your review determine the required actions (if any) to be taken.

Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.

HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.

[ SQN Unit I & 2 UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO-I SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 44 of 155 Unit I Date 5.5 RCS Sweeps and Vents Following Mainte nance Activities 5.51 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Follow ing Maintenance Activities C9N Starting RCP with a large AT between RCS and SIGs (secondary side warmer than primary side) could lead to a rapid RCS pressure change. Maximum delta T shall be limited to 25°F.

During UIC16 RFO, 12,385 gallons of bor ated water was required for sweeps and vents.

PERFORM 0-Sl-OPS-000-004.O on an hourly basis to verify 5 temperatures greater than 70°F (TRM 4.7.

2).

N Use of an isolation valve on vent hose is spe cified to avoid spilling borated water on reactor vessel head when hose is dIsconn ected later.

ç7 ENSURE temporary manual valve installed at hos e connection for r68-5971 Reactor Vessel vent valve.

NOTIFY Chemistry and Radiation Protection RCS swe eps and Vents activities will be performed.

ENSURE FCV-68-340D1 and IFCV-68-340B1, Normal Spr ay valves OPEN.

/7 RCP sweeps and vents could cause a crud burst which could impact filter DIP.

,fj NOTIFY AUO to periodically monitor seal water injection filter and reactor coolant filter DfP during and following sweeps and vents.

SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD Unit I & 2 0-GO-I SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page4SoflSS Unit I Date )A.-i 5.5.1 individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities (continued)

N4ES P Starting RCP #4 FIRST is preferred in order to swee p air AWAY from the RHR suction on the Loop 4 hot leg.

Ø Each RCP will need individual copy of this subsec loop. Preparations in I (2)-SO-68-2 for RCP start tion for each sweep performed on a may be in progress on all RCPs to be started prior to completion of this subsection.

5

(çJ SELECTRCPtobeSTARTED, PUMP //

RCPNo,4 El RCPNo.1 D RCPNo.2 El RCPNo.3 El VERIFY instruments necessary for RCP operation

/ are available.

ON Performing sweeps and vents with PCV-62-81 in AUTO could result in erratic RCS pressure changes and possible overpressure condition

. (INPO OE 25091)

ENSURE fjiiC-62-81A1 Letdown Pressure Control in MANUAL.

çj5 WHEN RCS pressure is greater than 100 psig, THEN ENSURE [FCV-62-631, seal return isolation valve OPEN using IHS-62-63A1.

ENSURE [FCV-62-611, seal return isolation valve OPEN using IHS-62-61A1, INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY I FCV-62-631, seal return isolation valve is OPEN.

Iv

SON UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD Unit I & 2 0-GO..1 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 46 of 155 Unit I Date 1-5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Main tenance Activities (continued)

INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY IFCV-62-611, seal return isolation valve is OPEN.

IV CAjN RCS pressure should be maintained at approxim ately 340 psig. This will provide the greatest margin from the setpoint of the RHR system relief valves and ensure adequate RGP seal DIP.

Flows in the following step may be mismatched to stabiliz e pressure when RCP is started.

ADJUST [HIC-62-81A1 and/or [HIC-62-93A] to stabilize RCS pressure at -34O psig.

NOTE Prior to unit cooldowri each Loose Parts Monitoring Channel for shutdown unit is placed in Inhibit to eliminate unnecessary nuisance alarms. Therefore man

, ual monitoring is required during RCP starts (ref. GOl-6 Sect. W).

4 MONITOR Loose Part Monitoring System (Aux Inst Rm O-R139) for abnormal noise during each RCP start.

CAUTIONS Operators should be alert for pressure changes when RCP is started. Expected Y response is a drop in pressure due to slight temperature drop as flow is circulated through SIGs and air is compressed.

RCS pressure should be controlled within the following limits:

• RCP seal DIP greater than 220 psid.

• RCS pressure less than 405 psig (RHR press high alarm, M-6C window E-7).

This prevents lifting RHR reliefs and provides margin from LTOPS setpoint.

If any uncontrollable RCS pressure changes occur, RCP should be immediately V stopped to allow restoring RCS pressure.

START selected RCP per 1(2)-SO-68-2.

SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD Unit I & 2 0-GO-I SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 47 of 155 Unit I Date 1°AA-i 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Main tenance Activities (continued) 43 WHEN selected RCP has been operated for 30 seconds 7 AND has been STOPPED, THEN CONTINUE with step 5.5I[14].

ADJUST IHIC-62-81Aj and!or [HIC-62-93A1 to initiate V RCS pressure reduction to 50 psig,

[ WHEN RCS pressure is less than 100 psig, THEN CLOSE [FCV-62-631, seal return isolation valve.

ROS pressure reduction is acceptable when venting head and pressurizer.

[( PERFORM Appendix F to vent reactor head.

PERFORM the following to vent the pressurizer:

?j OPEN one pressurizer PORV.

WHEN level rise observed in PRT, 7 THEN CLOSE pressurizer PORV.

If Appendix E cannot be completed due to equipment unavailability, then Step s 5.5.1 [1 81 through 5.5.1[201 should be marked N/A. Additional sweeps and vents will be performed in Step 5.5,1[21).

WHEN reactor head and pressurizer have been vented, THEN PERFORM Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination.

SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD Unit I & 2 0.00-1 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 48 of 155 Unit_______

Date 5.51 individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Follow ing Maintenance Activities (continued)

[19] IF total makeup required in App. E is less than or equal to 465 gal AND no further sweeps and vents are desired THEN PERFORM the following:

[19.1] RECORD the following in narrative log:

• no further sweeps and vents are required

• credit CANNOT be taken for a filled RCS and 2 S/Gs per Tech Spec LCO 3.4.1.4 UNTIL the RCS is pressurized to 150 psig.

[19.2] MARK Steps 5.5.1(20] and 5.5.1(21] as N/A.

EJ

[19.3] GO TO Section 5.3 Step 5.3(22].

0

[20] IF total makeup required in App. E is between 465 gal and 1723 gal AND no further sweeps and vents are desired, THEN PERFORM the following:

[20.1) RECORD the following in narrative log:

• no further sweeps and vents are required

• credit CANNOT be taken for filled RCS and 2 S/Gs per Tech Spec LCO 3.4.1.4 UNTIL two opposing loop RCPs are in service (after bubble is drawn).

[20.2] MARK Step 5.5.1(21] as N/A. 0

[20.3] GO TO Section 5.3 Step 5.3(22]. 0

SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD Unit 1 & 2 0GO-1 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev 0065 Page 49 of 155 Unit_______

Date 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities (continued)

[21] IF total makeup required (App. E) is greater than 1723 gal OR additional RCP sweeps and vents are desired, THEN PERFORM the following:

[21.1] IF sweeps and vents have NOT been completed for all four individual RCS loops, THEN GO TO Step 5.5.1[6].

U

[21.2] IF sweeps and vents are complete for all individual RCS loops, THEN PERFORM Section 5.5.2 for Multiple RCP Sweeps.

End of Section

SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD Unit I & 2 0-GO-f SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 144 of 155 Appendix E (Page 1 of 4)

RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit Date I41 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION.

Ø MONITOR RCS pressure rise by using of the following EQUIPMENT INDICATION NUMBER RCS Hot Leg Press Wide Range P-68-68A (P0499A) Ij RCS Hot Leg Press Wide Range P1-68-62 (P2000A) f5 ADJUST IHIC-62-81A1 and/or LHIC-62-93A1 as nece ssary to maintain RCS pressure stable at 50 psig.

This appendix will require raising RCS pressure to 340 psig. Performance of 0-SI-OPS-000-004.0 is required to verify SIG temperatu re prior to exceeding 200 psig.

This SI must be repeated hourly thereafter UNTIL RCS and S/G pressures are less than 200 psig OR until an RCP is placed in service.

4P PERFORM 0-Sl-OPS-000-004.0 on an hourly basis to verif y

SIG temperatures greater than 70°F (TR 4.7.2).

p ENSURE RCS temperature is between 85°F and 105°F.

ENSURE VCT makeup system is aligned for AUTO operation in accordance with 0-SQ-62-7, Boron Concentration Control.

j SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO-I Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 L Pagel45of 155 Appendix E (Page 2 of 4)

RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit t Date l0M._1 I0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION. (continued)

) RECORD the following initial values:

5 VCT level using one of the following:

Computer point [LOl 12A] (  %

OR

. VCT level indicator [Ll-62-129]

Boric Acid Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 39] totalizer 1H9q1 i1 Primary Water Batch Counter [FQ-62-142] totalizer y

9AJtON Charging flow must be maintained witakeup capacity. CCP suction must remain aligned to VCT to allow accurate measurement of volume changed ADJUST IHIC-62-BIA1 and/or [HIC-62-93A1 to raise RCS T pressure to 340 psig.

,$J1 WHEN RCS pressure is greater than 100 psig, 7 THEN OPEN IFCV-62-631, seal return isolation valve using IH S-62-63A1.

OPEN IFCV-62-611, seal return isolation valve using IHS-62-61A1.

[j iNDEPENDENTLY VERIFY IFCV-62-631, seal return isolation valve is OPEN.

INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY 1FCV-62i], seal return Isolation valve is OPEN.

I SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO-I I Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 L Pagel46of 155 Appendix E (Page 3 of 4)

RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit I Date 1-I2M 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION. (continued)

JJ WHEN RCS pressure is 340 psig, THEN ADJUST IHIC-62-81A1 and/or EHIC-62-93A1 as necessary to maintain RCS pressure stable at 340 psig.

RECORD the following final values:

VCT level using one of the following:

Computer point [1.01 12A] 2. 9 1 OR

. VCT level indicator [LI-62-129]

Boric Acid Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 39] totalizer Y- 7ii5V r Primary Water Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 42] totalizer Jj1 DETERMINE volume required to pressurize the RCS from 50 psig to 340 psig as follows:

Determine makeup volume added based on change jn Boric Acid Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 393 totalizer readings.

Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10) (Step 6)

[11.2] Determine makeup volume added based on change in Primary Water Batch Counter [FQ-62-142] readings.

Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10) (Step 6)

SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD Unit I & 2 0-GO-I SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 147 of 155 Appendix E (Page 4 of 4)

RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit_______

Date 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION. (continued)

[11.3] Determine change in VCT level.

Initial level Final level  % change (step 6) (Step 10)

[11.4] Convert VCT level change to gallons as follows:

X 19.27 =

% change gallons I % gallons (step 11.3)

NOTE A higher final VCT level will result in the change in VCT level beIng subtracted from total totalizer change.

[12] DETERMINE total volume required to pressurize RCS.

+ +1-change in Boric change in Pri. change in Total makeup Acid totalizer Water totalizer VCT level required (Step 11.1) (Step 11.2) (Step 11.4)

End of Section

SQN UNIT STARTUP 0-GO-I Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0063 Page 144 of 151 Appendix E (Page 3 of 4)

RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit 1 Date 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FiLLED DETERMINATION. (continued)

WHEN RCS pressure is 340 psig, THEN ADJUST [HIC-62-81A1 and/or [HIC-62-93A1 as necessary to maintain RCS pressure stable at 340 psig.

RECORD the following final values:

VCT level using one of the followIng:

/ Computer point [LOII2A] Z 7 OR

• VCT level indicator [Ll-62-1 29]

• Boric Acid Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 39] totalizer 51iO

• Primary Water Batch Counter [FQ-62-142] totalizer DETERMINE volume required to pressurize the RCS r from 50 psig to 340 psig as follows:

[11.1] Determine makeup volume added based on change in totalizer readings.

7S1SD -

79 1 ILHI = 7 0 cL Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10) (Step 6)

[11.2] Determine makeup volume added based on change in Primary Water Batch Counter tFQ-62-1421 readings.

Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10) (Step 6)

I SON UNIT STARTUP FROI COLD Unit I & 2 10-GO-I SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0063 Page 145 of 151 Appendix E (Page4of4)

RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit 1 Date 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOO PS FILLED DETERMINATION. (continued)

[11.3] Determine change in VCT level.

• Initial level Final level  % change (step 6) (Step 10)

[11.4] Convert VCT level change to gallons as follo ws:

9 X 19.27 = S7 4

% change gallons I % gallons (step 11.3)

ØE A higher final VCT level will result in the chan ge in VCT level being subtracted from total totalizer change.

to pressurize RCS.

+ q25 sq = 1733q 1

p change in Boric Acid totalizer change in Pri.

Water totalizer change in VCT level Total makeup required L (Step 11.1) (Step 11.2) (Step 11.4)

END OF TEXT Lf iij i

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC RO ADMIN A2

1211 NRCJPMROA.2 Page 2 of 9 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task: Perform a Reactivity Balance Calculation using 0-SO-62-7, Appendix E Task#: 0040070101 Task Standard: Examinee performs 0-SO-62-7 Appendix E, Reactivity Balance Calculation and determines a dilution is required to reduce RCS boron concentration by 100 ppm. (100 to 104 is allowed)

Time Critical Task: YES: NO: X KIA ReferencelRatings: 2.2.12 (3.7)

Method of Testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Evaluation Method:

Simulator In-Plant Classroom X Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:

Trainee Name Evaluator: I Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating: SAT: UNSAT:

Validation Time: 30 minutes Total Time:

Performance Time: Start Time: Finish Time:

COMMENTS

1211 NRCJPM ROA.2 Page 3 of 9 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:

ToolslEquipmentIProcedures Needed:

1. O-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control Appendix E

References:

Reference Title Rev No.

I 1. 0-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control Appendix 65 Read to the examinee:

DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is in MODE 1, Cycle 19 with initial conditions as follows:

2. Time in Core Life is 200 MWD/MTU.

3. Power is at 25%.

4. Boron Concentration 1400 ppm.

5. CBDl85steps.

6. Current Xenon concentration is -2430 pcm FINAL CONDITIONS:

1. Power 100%.

2. GB D 228 steps.

3. Final projected Xenon concentration will be -2250 pcm.

4. Power change rate is 3%/hour.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Perform steps 1 and 2 of 0-SO-62-7, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL Appendix E, Reactivity Balance calculation.

2. Determine the change in boron concentration, round to the nearest whole number ppm.

1211 NRCJPMROA.2 Page 4 of 9 Start Time STEP 1 : SAT Obtain a copy of O-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E Reactivity Balance Calculation.

UNSAT Copy of O-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E Standard Reactivity Balance Calculation is obtained.

Provide a copy of 0-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E Cue Reactivity Balance Calculation.

Comment REACTIV)TY BALANCE CALCULATION NOTE I One calcuation is required for each major change. Cajta5on is an apprximaon of required Boron change Eyeball interpolation of graphs is expected.

NOTE 2 Dilution or Boration value for power clange from Pf % to P% power irt lime period Twith rods moving from step poaitiort Ri to R. (Subscript convention: 1 = current point, 2 = target point)

(lj ENTER the following data STEP 2  : DATA REQUIRED -

DATA Where To Get SAT Current RCS Baron ppm Chem Lab or Estimate usIng P.ppendis 0 Core Bumup MWD(MTU ICS UCI9EI UNSAT CurrentReactorpower NlSorlC5 Final Reactor power As required for plant condItions TotsI Reactor Power change Current and final Reactor power Rate of Reactor power change %Ihr As required for plant conditions Number of hours to change power hr(a) As required for plant conditions ICS or MCR Board Current Rod Position steps Estimate number of rod steps required to Final Rod Position steps control il and rod withdrawal requirements for power change.

Examinee records the data from O-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Standard:

Control, Appendix E Reactivity Balance Calculation.

Comment Examiner The start data is provided to the examinee on the JPM briefing sheet.

Note:

1211 NRCJPMROA.2 Page 5 of 9 CAUTION Follow sign conventions explicitly. (See Example Powef Ascension and Power Reduction.)

Figure 1 UICI9 Power Defect 801 NOTE Use eye-bal1 interpolation between closest parameter lines.

[21 CAICU LATE change a boron concentratton by pertormng the following:

STEP 3 Parameter f Where To Get Calculation vatue SAT Attaohatt Powar Ofot Garven (al P 3ratl Figee I 2 c,3 PD PD =

Ltnit2Fie8,ga,1o U N SAT

1211 NRCJPMROA.2 Page 6 of 9 flgure 4 UICI9 Inserted Rod Worth BOL NOTE Use eye-baIr thterpdation between cksest parameter Ithes.

12] CAlCULATE cbange n boron concenirabon by pertonmng the fohowing:

STEP 5  : I Parameter Where To Get CalculnUon Value I SAT c} p AhedRodWothCnrow:

ROIS Rods, e

i,1i3 UNSAT Standard: Examinee determines reactivity change for control rods is +300 pcm. CRITICAL Comment Examiner Refer to 0-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E Figure 4.

Note:

Examiner Initial and final rod positions were given in the initial conditions.

Note:

1211 NRCJPMROA.2 Page 7 of 9 (2] CALCULATE change in boron concentration by perfonmng the following:

STEP 7 Parameter Where To Get Calculation Value SAT l] P va (GIANGE IN noccc*t PEACTCJIN)

X (1)

UNSAT

1211 NRC JPM ROA.2 Page 8 of 9 Figure 7 1J1C19 Differential Boron Worth NOTE Use eye-bair inte poiaton between closest parameter lines, 121 CAI,CULATE cflare n boron concentrabor, by pertormeg the foting:

STEP 8  : Parameter Where T Get Calcutatton Value SAT (V3 Appm CR coEru

( 1.1 p oc) ÷ ( pnn,Ippnr boron Worth frneFrg7J-1)nrrgl4J-2

= U N SAT Comment Examiner Refer to O-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E Figure 7 Note: to determine the differential boron worth of -6.18 to 6.17 pcm/ppm.

Examiner .. . . .

Note: Initial boron concentration was given in the initial conditions.

Terminating The JPM is complete when the examinee returns the JPM briefing Cue: sheet to the Examiner. STOP Stop Time

JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit us in MODE 1, Cycle 19 with initial conditions as follows:

2. Time in Core Life is 200 MWD/MTU.

3. Power is at 25%.

4. Boron Concentration 1400 ppm.

5. CBDl85steps.

6. Current Xenon concentration is -2430 pcm FINAL CONDITIONS:

1. Power 100%.

2. CBD228 steps.

3. Final projected Xenon concentration will be -2250 pcm.

4. Power change rate is 3%/hour.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Perform steps I and 2 of 0-SO-62-7, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL Appendix E, Reactivity Balance calculation.

2. Determine the change in boron concentration, round to the nearest whole number ppm.

Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.

HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 1,2 0-SO-627 Rev. 65 Page 164 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 1 of 18 REACTIVITY BALANCE CALCULATION NOTE I One calculation is required for each major change. Calc ulation is an approximation of required Boron change.

interpolation of graphs is expected. Eyeball NOTE 2 Dilution or Boration value for power change from P1 % to P 2 % power in time period T with rods moving from step position R 1 to R 2 (Subscript convention: 1 = current point, 2 = targe t point)

[1] ENTER the following data:

DATA REQUIRED DATA Where To Get Current RCS Boron ppm Chem Lab or Estimate using Appendix 0 Core Burnup MWD/MTU ICS U0981 Current Reactor power NIS or ICS Final Reactor power

% As required for plant conditions Total Reactor Power change A Current and final Reactor power Rate of Reactor power change

%/hr As required for plant conditions Number of hours to change power hr(s) As required for plant conditions Current Rod Position ICS or MCR Board steps Final Rod Position Estimate number of rod steps required to steps control Al and rod withdrawal requirements for power change.

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTRO L O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev, 65 Page 165 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 2 of 18 CAUTION Follow sign conventions explicitly.

(See Example Power Ascension and Power Reduction.)

[2] CALCULATE change in boron concentration by performing the following:

Parameter Where To Get Calculation Value Attached Power Defect Curves:

I a] tP POWER DEFECT Unit 1: Figure 1, 2, or 3 pcm PD., -

2 PD = (negative (current) for power Unit 2: Figure 8, 9, or 10. POWER DEFECT raise)

Xenon,; From ICS* or REACTF (either current conditions or projection to initial condition) NOTE: Xenon reactivity must be negative (negative

[b] XENON Xenon From ICS* or REACTF 2 for rise in pcm XE = Xenon (projection over time period T). 2 -

1 XE pcm

• (ICS Xenon values must add negative sign). iip XENON conc)

(current)

[c] p RODS Attached Rod Worth Curves:

Unitl:Figure4,5,or6 2 Rod s - 1s Rod = (negative pcm forrod Unit 2: Figure 11, IZ or 13. (current)

IP RODS insertion)

[d] Lp POWER DEFECT. XENON + RODS (CHANGE IN REACTIVY DUE TO POWER DEFECT, XENON, AND RODS)

M pcm Ap POWER DEFECT + fl1 pcm p XENON + Ed pcm p RODS

[e] Ap BORON (CHANGE IN BORON REACTIVITY) pcm

[f]

( [dI pcmAp POWEROEFECT÷XENON

+RODS) X (1) = tri BORON Appm BORON (CHANGE IN BORON CONCENTRATION)

(negative

( M POrn Ap BORON) ÷ ( pcmlppm Boron Worth) ppm for dilution, positive for from Fig. 7 (U-I) or Fig. 14 (U-2) boration)

[3] ENSURE independently verified by SRO in accordance with Appendix J.

(N/A if performed by an SRO to verify data provided by Rx. Eng)

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTRO 1,2 L 0-SO-62-7 Rev. 65 Page 166 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 3 of 18 Example Power Ascension NOTE Typical values displayed in this example are Unit and Cycle specific, however, the foll owing example indicates proper sign convention Current RCS boron 1000 ppm Core burnup 3000 MWD/MTU Current reactor power 70%

Final reactor power 100%

Total reactor power change 30%

Rate of reactor power change 5%/hr Number of hours to change power 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Current rod position 180 steps Final Rod Position 220 steps Reactivity Balance:

[a] Ap Power Defect = 1210 porn PDI 1720 pem PD2

= 510 pcm

[b] Lp Xenon = 2262 pcm XE2 (2436) pcm XE1 = +174 porn

[C] Ap Rs 10 porn Rods2 (275) porn Rods I

= +265 pcm

[d] zp POWER DEFECT + XENON RODS = 510 porn 174 pcm

+ + + 265 porn = 71 pcm

[e] Ap BORON 71 porn x (I) = + 71 pcm Change in Boron PPM:

[II (+71) porn Boron ÷ (6.35) pcm/pprn Boron worth = 11 ppm (dilution)

I SQN 1,2 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 0-SO-62-7 Rev. 65 L PagelG7of2Ol APPENDIX E Page 4 of 18 Example Power Reduction NOTE Typical values displayed in this example are jQ Unit and Cycle specific, however, the following example indicates proper sign convention.

Current RCS boron 500 ppm Core burnup 18000 MWD/MTU Current reactor power 100%

Final reactor power 80%

Total reactor power change -20%

Rate of reactor power change -5%/hr Number of hours to change power 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Current rod position 220 steps Final Rod Position 200 steps Reactivity Balance:

[a] PPOWDeTe = 2630 porn PDI 2100 porn PD2 = +530 porn

[b] PXenon = 3030 porn XE2 (2884) pcrn XEI = 146 pcm

[c] p Rs = 220 pcm Rods2 (20) pcm Rods I = 200 pcm

[d] ip POWER DEFECT + XENON + RODS = +530 porn + (146 pcm) + (200 porn) = + 184 porn

[e] zp BORON= +184 porn x (1) = 184 pcm Change in Boron PPM:

[f] (184) pcm Boron -- (7.47) pornfppm Boron worth = +25 ppm (boration)

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 1,2 O-SO-62-7 Rev. 65 Page 168 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 5 of 18 Figure 1 UICI9 Power Defect BOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.

UNIT I CYCLE 19 POWER DEFECT - BOL (150 4,000 MWDIMTU) 1800 1700 1000 ppm 1600 --

1400 ppm 1500 -----

1400

--rr 1800 ppm 1300 1200 7

- -. . - -- - z - --- --

1100 -, F

- 7 1000 900 7

z-800 700 7-600 7

500 400 -::E::E:E:

--4Z 300 200 100 0 EEE::::EEEEEE___

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Power Level (%)

Reference:

NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27

I SQN 12 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 0-SO-62-7 Rev. 65 L Page 169of 201 APPENDIX E Page 6 of 18 Figure 2 UICI9 Power Defect MOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.

UNIT I CYCLE 19 POWER DEFECT - MOL (10,000 MWD/MTU) 2200 2100 2000 El III IEEE II 11111111 4x ppm 1900 1800 1700 9O ppm 1600 1500 zEzIzzEzzzzIzlIE.E

l400ppm 1400 1300 EEEEEzE 1200 1100 EEEEEEEEEEEEEEE

-7 800 -

700 600 EzIzEEzzE: -

500 400

--..4.-

300 200 E!EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE 100 ZIZIIEIEEEEEE E

0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Power Level (%)

Reference:

NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27.

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 1,2 O-SO-62-7 Rev. 65 Page l7Oof 201 APPENDIX E Page 7 of 18 Figure 3 UICI9 Power Defect EOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.

UNIT I CYCLE 19 POWER DEFECT - EOL (16,000 - 22,655 MWDIMTU) 3000 2900 Oppm 2800 2700=--

2600-2500

=

2400 2300 2200 = = = = = = =

=

2100= ==== z = = = =

2000 1900 = = =

>1800 1600 = = = Z

=Z=======ZZZ===

1500

=

==

1400 - - - --i 2EE E 1300 r1200 ====_==;==== --

==

1100 1000 900 700 = = =

600=

= = = =

==

500 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

400 300 200 100 0

o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Power Level (%)

Reference:

NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 1,2 O-SO-62-7 Rev. 65 Page 171 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 8 of 18 Figure 4 UI C19 Inserted Rod Worth BOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.

UNIT I CYCLE 19 BOL INSERTED ROD WORTH (150 -4000 MWD IMTU) 0 20 40 80 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 0- *. .. .- .

I.

-100- . --..

-200

-300

-400

-500 -

-600 -

? -900 - -

-1100*

-1200

[1300

-1400

-1500

-1600 *

-1700

-1800 .

-1900 1111! 1111111 [FF1111 HI F 111111111 Fu D Bank Steps Withdrawn (steps) 1100% Power -75% Power 50% Power .25% Power --- 0% Power

Reference:

NDR Table 6-34.

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 1,2 0-SO-62-7 Rev. 65 Page 172 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 9 of 18 Figure 5 UICI9 Inserted Rod Worth MOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.

UNIT 1 CYCLE 19 MOL INSERTED ROD WORTH (10,000 MWD 1MTU) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 4I I fl N fI+I hrrtr

-100 N.W.1 +

If fit I 111111 **

-400 .

-500

-600 n

-700 * -

-800

-900 1100

-1200

-1300 p .

-1400 .

-1500 -

-1600 .

-1700 .

-18Q0 - -

-1900 .

D Bank Steps Withdrawn (steps) 100%Power -- 50%Power 25%PoWer tv. 0%Powerj

Reference:

NDR Table 6-34.

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 12 0-SO-62-7 Rev. 65 Page 173 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 10 of 18 Figure 6 UICI9 Inserted Rod Worth EOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.

UNIT I CYCLE 19 EOL INSERTED ROD WORTH (16,000 - 22,655 MWD!MTU) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240

-100 * . . - . - - -

-200-  ::  ::

300-  :  : :  :

-400 *

-500

-600 *

-700  :

)-800 --

-900 *-

1100

[1200. - - .

-1300 - . - - .

-1400 D Bank Steps Withdrawn (steps) 100% Power 75% Power 50% Power .-25% Power i. 0% Power

Reference:

NDR Table 6-34.

_J 0 0 0 LIJ 0

C\JL)i 0 o

,r >

G) 0)

CU IINI111111111 II 1111111111 A111111111 I1IIIIiII!IIIpIIIIIIIIII 111111 IIIIIlIIII1I 11111 Ill 111111 Ill 111111 Ill 1111111 II1H IiiiIiiIiti 111111 F1 a,

0 0

a, 0

(N

-J 0

ci) E

-J 0

Ix I

0 C

2 0

0)

(I) 0 0

C ci)

E 0

ci C

(N I

z £0 ci)

II C

o (0

0 -

wu::

C 0.)

C) LU Cu ci) C C -a

-Q _jO C 0 CU z C C 0

I

-J 0 >-z 0 o

C 0 CU [I TI Ill In 111111 II all ii a I] I III 111111 11111 II II I Ij 11111 a cO D 0 IT! IllIII III IIILIIIIIII II NI I IIfl lllIlIIIIlllIlllIIlIlI lIaaiiiii C z LII 0

0-0) 0

urauanuwu U LTh tt 0 a)

I CU 11111 11111 I C C.)

<0 rtwftUNuhIruhIiw:uU flI ti urrniri 0

11111111 111111 Ill Ill huh I (4.1 liIfff C

C 11111 lii 11111 Ii ,:i i j..

=

ci)

C z w

III lIllPll Ill llf 0 ci)

10) w IIIU II 11111 IIIIlIIIIII[ I I Ill II II I ill .11 TI II 11111 1 III. 0 0

> ci) IL 1.1114+I 11111111 IllIllIlIll II Ill (Ill ILL 3LLU III C

o (N

-J I H 111 IL LU 1ff IfI III, 111111,,, III 1

0 a

Ililiflhll liii I It I IiIff.I I 1

Uffi II liii Ill Ill III 111111 I C 1

IHhlllh NlII IJli Ililill 411 111111 IL.

a LI Iii I C

(4 w

I 0

C CDcOCD(0(

IIIIll IiiIl11IlIlIII1l I C a CD 11111 CO 0)0 (4 Lu liii II c

t--

I hlhlhllhllIllhll

) CD p.-

) C f.

z __&x.

Cl,

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 12 0-SO-62-7 Rev. 65 Page 175 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 12 of 18 Figure 8 U2C18 Power Defect BOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.

UNIT 2 CYCLE 18 POWER DEFECT BOL (0-4000 MWD/MTU) 1900 I

1800 7-1700 ,

1600

/

1500 / /

1400 1300 I

1200

- 1100 1000 900 z: :: ::

0 Q.. 800 700 600 500 EEEEEEEEEEEHEEEEE 400

z:::::::zE::ZZ 300 200

z::::::z::::

100 0

0 20 40 60 50 100 Power Leve (%)

l000ppm l400ppm ---------

18OCpmj

Reference:

NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27, Total Power Defect

I SQN 1,2 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 Rev. 65 L Page 176of 201 APPENDIX E Page 13 of 18 Figure 9 U2C18 Power Defect MOL NOTE Use ation between closest UNIT 2 CYCLE 18 POWER DEFECT - MOL (4000-16000 MWDIATU) 2300 2200 E:E:E:E:+/-:EEE::

2100 E:z::E:E:z:::E:E::

2000 ,

1900 1800 1700 -

, /

1600 1500 1400 1300 z  : = :

0 ---

1200

-- 7,..

1100

7Z::::::

!IOOO 7

L L__

700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 EEE 0 10 20 30 40 60 60 70 80 0 100 Power Leve (%)

Reference:

NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27, Total Power Defect

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7

• 1,2 Rev. 65 Page 177 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 14 of 18 Figure 10 U2C18 Power Defect EOL NOTE Use eye-baIl interpolalion between closest parameter lines.

LJNIT2 CYCLE 18 POWER DEFECT EOL (16000-20682 MWD!MTIJ) 3100 3000 EEEEEEEEEErEEEEI 2900 2800 EEEZEEEZEEZEEEEEZ 2700 1 ,

2500 2200 -

2100----

EEE :zEI 1600 -

0 --,

. 1700 1800 -

6----

1500 :EEEEE:EE2-E:EEE:ZE 1400 ---

&°° EEEE:EEEE:EEEEE 1200 -

1100 1000 900.11 :

:111:111 700 500 ---p 400 E1111111__

300 -

200 100 0

0 20 40 60 100 Power Level (%)

Opprn -500 ppm -------- iooornj

Reference:

NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27, Total Power Defect

T J

SQN 1,2 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 Rev. 65

[ Page 178 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 15 of 18 Figure 11 U2C18 Inserted Rod Worth BOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest paramete r lines.

UNIT 2 CYCLE 18 BOL INSERTED ROD WORTH (0-4000 MWDIMTU

)

0

-100 . ----------I ----

-200  :::::::::  :::  :::::::::::::::

-400

-600

-600

-700 ---- ------ -- - - -

B00 1000 o ,;__

-1100 t.0 120 i :::: - -  : : : : : : : ::

/ - - -

-1300 400 -

-1500 -

-1600 7,,

-1700

fl((HflHHU 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 V B3nk Steps Withdrawn (steps) 100%Power -75%-Pwe 50%Power 25%Powe

-- 0%Power

Reference:

NDR Table 6-34, HFP Integral Rod Worth as a function of Steps withdrawn and burnup for Banks CD, CC, CB in overlap.

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 Page 179 of 201 APPENDIX B Page 16 of 18 Figure 12 U2C18 Inserted Rod Worth MOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.

UNIT 2 CYCLE 18 MOL INSERTED ROD WORTEI (4000.16000 MWD1MTU 0

i:::::::::::::::::::::::::::

-100

-200

-300

-400 -

--- ---p;,-

-500 ,

00 700

-900 0

-1000

-1100

-1200

-1300

-1400

-1600

-1500

-1700

-1800

-1900

-2000 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 0 Brnik Steps Withdrawn (steps) 100% Power . 7% Power 50% Power - - 25% Power .- a%.Powerj

Reference:

NDR Table 6-34, HFP Integral Rod Worth as a function of Steps withdrawn and burnup for Banks CD, CC, GB in overlap.

j SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 f 1,2 Rev. 65 L PagelBOof2Ol APPENDIX E Page 17 of 18 Figure 13 1J2C18 Inserted Rod Worth EOL NOTE Use eye-balI interpolation between closest parameter lines.

LJNIT2CYCLE 18 EOL INSERTED ROD WORTH (16000-20682 MWDIMTU) 0

-100 . . . . . . .

.200 300 . .-

-400 -

-500 1

-600

/

-700-

-600 - -

U

-900 -

p b0O0 - -

-1100 - - - -

-1200 -

ft 1300  : .

-14001111111111111 iIIII1lIIiII1,1:

1sooHII11IIIfI

-16001111 III I IY, 111111111 V

.1700 1!

-1800

/

/ /

-2000

-2100 0 20 40 60 60 100 120 140 160 160 200 220 244) 0 Bank Steps Withdrawn (stepa) 100%PafA-er --- Th%Pot 5D%Pow . 25%Pewr

Reference:

NOR Table 6-34, HFP integral Rod Worth as a function of Steps withdrawn and burnup for Banks CD, CC, CB in overlap.

SQN 1,2 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL j O-SO-62-7 Rev.

jPage 181 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 18 of 18 Figure 14 U2C18 Differential Boron Worth NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.

UNIT2 CYCLE 18 DIFFERENTIAL BORON WORTH (pcmIppm)

-6.0 BOL

-6.1 .

42

-6.3 p-

-64

-8.5 4.6

-68 SEESSEE S SE ES SEE SESESEE SEES SE

-70

-7.1

- EOL

-72 -- ... -.

.73 - ,,

-7.4 -

-7.5 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 8oonQoricentration (ppm)

SOL (0-4000) , MOL (4000-18000) EOL (16000-20632J

Reference:

NDR Table 6-7, HFP Differential Boron Worth

SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65

12. I I RL Q Page 165 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 2 of 18 CAUTION Follow sign conventions explicitly. (See Example Power Ascension and Power Reduction.)

[2] CALCULATE change in boron concentration by performing the following:

Parameter Where To Get Calculation Value Attached Power Defect Curves: i I 2Q pcm ?negative

[a] Ep POWER DEFECT Unit 1: Figure 1, 2, or 3 30 porn pD 1 - I 3 Tc pcm PD2=

for power (current) 1P POWER DEFECT raise)

Unit 2: Figure 8, 9, or 10.

, From ICS* or REACTF (either current NOTE: Xenon reactivity must be negative 1

Xenon (negative conditions or projection to initial condition). for rise in

[b] tp XENON 2 From ICS or REACTF Xenon Xenon (projection over time period T). 2Z5D porn XE 2 - 1 XE pcm conc)

• (ICS Xenon values must add negative sign). (current) XENON

[C] P RODS Attached Rod Worth Curves: (negative t pcm 2 Rods -

1 Rods Unit 1: Figure 4,5, or6 for rod (current) insertion)

Unit 2: Figure 11, 12, or 13. RODS

[d] 14 POWER DEFECT.XENON+RODS (CHANGE IN REACTIVY DUE TO POWER DEFECT, XENON, AND RODS) porn lal porn Ap POWER DEFECT + [iJ porn p XENON + id pcm tp RODS

= ( 620 -i -

[e] zp BORON (CHANGE IN BORON REACTIVITY) pcm BORON

( Ni porn I.p POWER DEFECT + XENON + RODS) X (1) =

[t] ippm BORON (CHANGE IN BORON CONCENTRATION)

(- I, I L / ) - I co 4 - 10%) (negative for dilution,

( M porn p BORON) ÷ (from Fig. 7 (U-i>3 or Fig.porn/ppm I

14 (U-2)

Boron Worth) ppm

[3] ENSURE independently verified by SRO in accordance with Appendix J.

(N/A if performed by an SRO to verify data provided by Rx. Eng) p

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC SRO ADMIN JPM A.2

1211 NRC SRO Admin A.2 Page 2 of 8 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task: Determine the risk level for safety systems as identified by PSA for scheduling maintenance.

Task#: 0001720302 Task Standard: The Examinee determines the Unit 1 risk level changes from green to orange by using the EQOS test case computer program.

Time Critical Task: YES: NO: X KIA ReferencelRatings: 2.2.14 (3.9/4.3)

Method of Testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Evaluation Method:

Simulator In-Plant Classroom X Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:

Trainee Name Evaluator: I Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating: SAT: UNSAT:

Validation Time: 5 minutes Total Time:

Performance Time: Start Time: Finish Time:

COMMENTS

1211 NRC SRO Admin A.2 Page 3 of 8 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:

Tools!EquipmentlProcedures Needed:

1. NPG-SPP-09. 11.1 Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Management

2. EOOS test case program capability

3. Ensure the lB-B EDG is removed from service by inserting WO TAGROLLIB using the EOOS test case program

References:

Reference Title Rev No.

1. NPG-SPP-09.1 1.1 Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Management 5 Read to the examinee:

DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Uniti isinMODEl

2. lB-B EDG is OOS in preparation for 1-Sl-OPS-082-007.B ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM DIESEL GENERATOR lB-B performance.

3. lA-A Diesel Generator was found to be unavailable due to loss of jacket water cooling (flood from the heat exchanger.)

INITIATING CUES:

1. Perform a Risk Assessment for Unit 1 based on the above plant conditions using the EOOS test case program.

2. Notify the examiner of your results.

1211 NRC SRO Admin A.2 Page 4 of 8 Start Time Obtain a copy of NPG-SPP-09. 1 1 .1 Equipment Out of Service (EQOS)

STEP 1 Management. SAT U N SAT Standard Copy of NPG-SPP-09. 1 1.1 Equipment Out of Service (EOOS)

Management is obtained.

Cue Provide a copy of NPG-SPP-09.1 1.1 Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Management.

Comment NOTES

1) The Operators Screen is typically used to analyze the risk for the current unit configuration.

The What if mode of the Operators Screen may be used to analyze the potential future maintenance configuration.

2) Changes to the configuration of shared or common systems/components may affect the EOOS model of more than one unit. For example. the unavailability of a diesel generator will have a separate risk impact on each unit.

3) BFN ONLY System alignments in the BFN model can affect EQOS results and therefore must be verified before running an evaluation. Note: The SQN and WBN PRA models do not currently have any system alignments identified.

STEP A. From appropriately installed location, access EQOS for the desired 2

plant and unit. SAT UN SAT Standard: Examinee accesses the test case EQOS program by clicking on the Unit CRITICAL Comment

1211 NRC SRO Admin A.2 Page 5 of 8 STEP B. Log in using the assigned User Name and Password which are

. available from the Corporate PRA Group. SAT UNSAT Standard: Examinee logs in the test case EQOS program Cue If asked, provide the following cue, The password is OPS.

Comment STEP 4 . C. Select the Examinees Screen.

SAT UNSAT The Examinee selects the Examinees Screen from the test case EQOS Standard:

program Comment STEP D. Determine if any Functional Equipment Groups (FEGs) or 5

. components are unavailable. SAT UNSAT Examiner Note The 1 BB EDG was OOS in the initial conditions.

Comment

1211 NRC SRO Admin A.2 Page 6 of 8 STEP E. Ensure the list of components/FEGs out of service matches the 6

current unit configuration or make updates as necessary. The SAT changes may be made in the What- If mode first to determine the risk impact before the component/FEG is actually removed from UNSAT service.

The Examinee selects lA-A EDG from the drop down menu in the Standard: CRITICAL change active ftem list in the EOOS test program.

Comment STEP F. BFN only 7 : SAT UNSAT Standard: The Examinee determines the step is not applicable.

Comment STEP G. Calculate Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early 8

Release Frequency (LERF) Multiplier (i.e., the risk measure(s) on SAT the Examinees Screen or the risk profile on the Schedulers Screen) for the unit configuration using EQOS (Calculate Risk UNSAT Measure(s) Button).

JTICAL Examiner CDF remains green with a value of approximately 2.44.

Note LERF changes to orange with a value of approximately 7.2.

Comment

1211 NRC SROAdminA.2 Page 7 of 8 3.2.3 Thresholds for Quantalive EvaILiatoiis STEP 8 SAT A. The gilcarce given in this seclion is for clarificalion of the colors shown in EOOS. The values tor KDP and IIERP are based or We caculated UU aid LR1- tar the gven configuration over a seven day penod. I hese nsk thresholds described in this section UNSAT are incorporated into the EOOS model. On the Operator Screen, the colors are shown by the risk meters and the CJP Status w-iich is brought up by depressing the Top Probabulties button. Ea& of the thresiods are tiefined below:

3. Oranj Ornqe mprsrds an incr.asd Iul of risk alov yellow. Entry in:o tle oan)e threshold should be i:-ifrequent. Establish ns managernen: actions per NUMARC 3-C1 as given in Attachment 3. In addition, 1VA management expe:taons are to ensure protective measures are established (i.e. rope and slantons around vital equipment).

Examiner The examiner will determine the standard is met by the use of follow-up Note questions.

Comment Terminating The JPM is terminated when the Examinee returns the JPM Cue: Briefing sheet to the examiner STOP Stop Time

JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is in MODE 1

2. lB-B EDG is OOS in preparation for 1-Sl-OPS-082-007.B ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM DIESEL GENERATOR lB-B performance.

3. lA-A Diesel Generator was found to be unavailable due to loss of jacket water cooling (flood from the heat exchanger.)

INITIATING CUES:

1. Perform a Risk Assessment for Unit 1 based on the above plant conditions using the EOOS test case program.

2. Notify the examiner of your results.

Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.

HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC SRO ADMIN A3

1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Page 2 of 8 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task: Determine Reporting Requirements for a Contaminated and Injured Worker Task#: 3440030302 Task Standard:

Time Critical Task: YES: NO: X KIA Reference!Ratings: 2.3.14 (3.8)

Method of Testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Evaluation Method:

Simulator In-Plant Classroom X Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:

Trainee Name Evaluator: /

Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating: SAT: UNSAT:

Validation Time: 10 minutes Total Time:

Performance Time: Start Time: Finish Time:

COMMENTS

1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Page 3 of 8 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:

ToolsiEquipmentlProcedures Needed:

1. NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements

References:

LI Reference Title Rev No.

I NPG-SPP-03.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements 5 Read to the examinee:

DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage, no fuel is in the Reactor Vessel.

2. A vendor was performing work activities in the SIG bowl area.

3. The vendor was overcome with heat exhaustion and fell into the SIG bowl area.

4. The fall caused a compound fracture on his right leg that pierced his bubble suit.

5. Radcon reports the individual was contaminated 9000 cpm in the area of the wound.

6. Due to congested conditions and other delays in lifesaving activities, the injured individual received an estimated exposure of 16 Rem.

7. Due to the nature of his injury, he was immediately transferred to Erlanger Hospital.

8. Site personnel are preparing a news release for immediate delivery to the media.

INITIATING CUES:

1. You are the Shift Manager.

2. Determine all applicable (if any) NRC notifications of less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3. Determine all applicable (if any) Internal Management Notifications the SHIFT MANAGER is required to make.

4. Record your answers on the JPM briefing sheet.

1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Page 4 of 8 Start Time STEP 1  : SAT Obtain a copy of NPG-SPP-3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.

UNSAT Standard: Copy of NPG-SPP-3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements is obtained.

Cue Provide a copy of NPG-SPP-3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.

Comment

1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Page 5 of 8 NOTES

1) Internal management notification requirements for plant events are found in Appendix U. The Operations Shift Manager is responsible for notifying Site Operations Management and the Duty Plant Manager The Duty Plant Manager is responsible for making the remaining internal management notification&

2> NRC NUREG-1022, Supplements and subsequent revisions should be used as guidance for determining reportability of plant events pursuant to §50.72 and §50.73.

A text searchable copy of NUREG-1022 is maintained on the WA NPG Nuclear Licensing Webpage at address http:1/tvanweb.cha.tva.gov)licensinglPageslNRC-Industry Guidance Documents. htm -

3.1 Immediate Notification NRC -

STEP 2  : SAT WA is required by §5072 to notify NRC immediately if certatn types of events occur. This appendix contains the types of events and the allotted time in which NRC must be notified.

(Refer to Form NPG-SPP-03.5-1 or NRC Form 361). Operations is responsible for making U N SAT the reportability determinations for §50.72 and §50.73 reports. For any event, condition, or issue having the potential for being reportable, contact Site Licensing for consultation and concurrence on the reportabitity determination. In no event shall the lack of licensing concurrence result in a failure to meet specified reporting timeframes. Operations is responsible for making the immediate notification to NRC in accordance with §50.72.

A. The Immediate Notification Critena of §50.72 is divided into I-hour, 4-hour, and 8- hour phone calls. Notify the NRC Operations Center within the applicable time limit for any item which is identified in the Immediate Notification Criteria.

C. The following criteria require 4-hour notification:

4. §50.72(b){2)(xi) Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an onsite fatality or inadvertent release of radioactive contaminated materials.

Examinee reviews the data and determines a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification to the St an d ard- CRITICAL NRC is required due to the impending news media release.

Comment

1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Page 6 of 8 NOTE According to §5012 (b)(3)(vi) events covered by §5012(b)(3)(v) may include one or more procedura errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design.

analysis, fabacation, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required safety function.

3.1 Immediate Notification - NRC STEP 3 SAT WA is required by §5072 to notify NRC immediately if certain types of events occur. This appendix contains the types of events and the allotted time in which NRC must be notitied (Refer to Form NPG-SPP-03.5-1 or NRC Form 361). Operations is responsible for making U N SAT the reportability determinations for §5(172 and §5073 reports. For any event, condition, or issue having the potential for being reportable, contact Site Licensing for consultation and concurrence on the reportability determination In no eent shall the lack of licensing concurrence resut in a failure to meet specified report rig timefrarnes Operations is responsible for making the immedale notification to NRC in accordance with §50 72 D. The following criteria require 8hour notfication.

5 §50.72(b)(3)(xii) Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment Examinee reviews the data and determines an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> notification to the Standard: NRC is required due to the required transport of the contaminated and CRITICAL injured worker to Erlanger Hospital.

Comment I NOTE The Operations Shift Mariaer is responsible for notifytog Site Operatons management and the Ouy Plant Manager. The Duty Plant Manager is esponsibie fcc

[re47aining ttemal management notificatons as noted in the matrix.

Appendix 0 (Page 2 of 21 STEP 4 Site Event Notification Matnx SAT Nxti& Re EwetiCondition Outyptet PManagc 0psOutySp&

l Site VP Coporafe U N SAT hos, 4 tee. Shoi, picne cats. Yes Yes ice ce Yest I hoe 5ps slxcdcves. ,d 4 hoe secçol I cab yined xc it hos e,d for less c Comment

1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Paqe 7 of 8 Terminating The JPM is complete when the examinee returns the JPM briefing Cue: sheet to the Examiner. STOP Stop Time

JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage, no fuel is in the Reactor Vessel.

2. A vendor was performing work activities in the SIG bowl area.

3. The vendor was overcome with heat exhaustion and fell into the SIG bowl area.

4. The fall caused a compound fracture on his right leg that pierced his bubble suit.

5. Radcon reports the individual was contaminated 9000 cpm in the area of the wound.

6. Due to congested conditions and other delays in lifesaving activities, the injured individual received an estimated exposure of 16 Rem.

7. Due to the nature of his injury, he was immediately transferred to Erlanger Hospital.

8. Site personnel are preparing a news release for immediate delivery to the media.

INITIATING CUES:

1. You are the Shift Manager.

2. Determine all applicable (if any) NRC notifications of less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3. Determine all applicable (if any) Internal Management Notifications the SHIFT MANAGER is required to make.

4. Record your answers on the JPM briefing sheet.

Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.

HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC RO ADMIN A4

1211 NRCJPMROA.4 Page 2 of 6 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task: Complete a NRC Event Notification Worksheet Task#: 0001460501 Task Standard: The examinee completes an Appendix D from procedure EPIP-5, General Emergency with no errors on items annotated with a

• and selects ONE NRC contact number to the NRC as stated on EPIP-5 Appendix D step 2.

Time Critical Task: YES: X NO:

KIA ReferencelRatings: 2.4.39 (3.9)

Method of Testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Evaluation Method:

Simulator In-Plant Classroom X Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:

Trainee Name Evaluator: I Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating: SAT: UNSAT:

Validation Time: 10 minutes Total Time:

Performance Time: Start Time: Finish Time:

COMMENTS

1211 NRCJPMROA.4 Page 3 of 6 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:

ToolslEquipmentlProcedures Needed:

1. EPIP 5, GENERAL EMERGENCY Appendix D

2. Marked up copy of EPIP 5, GENERAL EMERGENCY Appendix A

References:

Reference Title Rev No.

1. EPIP-5 GENERAL EMERGENCY 42 Read to the examinee:

DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 has experienced a Reactor trip and Safety Injection Today at 1500.

2. Unit 1 was in MODE 1 before the event.

3. Unit 1 was in MODE 3 after the event.

4. The Shift Manager declared a General Emergency at 1510.

5. The reason for the General Emergency is as follows

a. LOSS of the Fuel Clad Barrier EAL Designator 1.1.2.L.

b. LOSS of the RCS Barrier EAL Designator I .2.3.L.

c. Potential LOSS of the Containment EAL Designator 1.3.4.L

6. The Shift Manager has issued a Protective Action Recommendation #2 to the State of Tennessee.

7. The CECC has not yet been staffed.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Using the information provided complete an EPIP 5, GENERAL EMERGENCY Appendix D, NOTIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

2. Notify the Examiner of your results.

1211 NRCJPMROA.4 Page 4 of 6 Start Time STEP 1 : SAT Obtain a copy of the in progress State Notification Form Handout and NRC Event Notification Worksheet. UNSAT Standard: Copy of NRC Event Notification Worksheet is obtained.

Provide a copy of the completed State Notification Form Handout iA (Appendix A) and a blank NRC Event Notification Worksheet (Appendix D).

Comment NOTES a NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS) should he used (if available) or, if NRC ENS is unavailable, any plant telephone may be used.

a Ensure prior to making this notification that all previously made emergency classifications have been communicated, Fast breaking plant conditions may have resulted in classifications that have not been officially communicated.

a Completed Appendix A should be used for determining information below.

STEP 2  : SAT

[1] COMPLETE applicable portions of table on next page.

U N SAT Standard: GENERAL EMERGENCY Appendix D with CRITICAL Examiner Note; See copy of the attached key for correct answers.

Comment

1211 NRC JPM ROA.4 Page 5 of 6

[2] CONTACT NRC USING one of the foIIowng telephone STEP 3 numbers 9-1 may be required): SAT Main 800-532-3469 OR 301-816-5100 UNSAT Backup 1 800-449-3694 OR 301-951-0550 Backup 2 301-415-0550 Backup 3 301-415-0553 Fax 301-816-5151 Region IV (alternate site) 817-860-8100 Terminating The JPM is complete when the examinee returns the JPM briefing Cue: sheet to the Examiner. STOP Stop Time

JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 has experienced a Reactor trip and Safety Injection Today at 1500.

2. Unit 1 was in MODE 1 before the event.

3. Unit 1 was in MODE 3 after the event.

4. The Shift Manager declared a General Emergency at 1510.

5. The reason for the General Emergency is as follows

a. LOSS of the Fuel Clad Barrier EAL Designator 1.1.2.L.

b. LOSS of the RCS Barrier EAL Designator 1 .2.3.L.

c. Potential LOSS of the Containment EAL Designator 1 .3.4.L

6. The Shift Manager has issued a Protective Action Recommendation #2 to the State of Tennessee.

7. The CECC has not yet been staffed.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Using the information provided complete an EPIP 5, GENERAL EMERGENCY Appendix D, NOTIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

2. Notify the Examiner of your results.

Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.

HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.

L ( 5L :: lZt2 t A Lj SQN GENERAL EMERGENCY Unit 0 EPIP-5 Rev. 0042 Page 18 of 31 Appendix 0 (Page 2 of 2)

NOTIFICATION OF THE NUCLEA R REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC EVENT NOTIFICATION WO (NRC)

RKSHEET) 1.0 NRC NOTIFICATION (continued)

NOTE Caller should be prepared to answer other questions from NRC based upo n the event.

[3] PROVIDE the following information to NRC.

[4] RETURN completed Appendix D to Site Emerg ency Director.

jL1 r%j1cc- )LQ /41.1 1 HA p uT SON GENERAL EMERGENCY EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0042 Pagel2of3l Appendix A (Page 1 ofl)

GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM

1. tJ This is a Drill C This is an Actual Event Repeat This is an Actual Event

2. i4 t 1T T\AA A4&1 , the SED at Sequoyah, has declared a GENERAL EMERGENCY.

3. EAL Designator 4(Use three EAL designators when using the Fission Product Barrier Matrix)

L34 L

4. Brief Des ription ofjhe Event: -l 2p4vreA. ii 14A F+ t 4A 5/

_jiVA \L

5. Radiological Conditions: (Check one under both Airborne and Liquid column.)

Airborne Releases Offsite C Minor releases within federally approved limits* Liquid Releases Offsite C Minor releases within federally approved limits*

C Releases above federally approved limits*

C Releases above federally approved limits*

Release information NOT known

(*Tech Specs/ODCM) LRele ase information NOT known

(*Tech Specs/ODCM)

6. Event Declared: Time: ç Date: TL2PA Eastern 7.The Meteorological Conditions are: (Use 46 meter data from the Met Tower. IF data is NOT available from the MET tower, contact the National Weather Service by dialing 9-1-423-586-8400. The National Weather Service will provide wind direction and wind speed.)

Wind Direction is FROM: 210 degrees Wind Speed: p m.p.h Li,rninaverae (15 mm averagej 8.Provide Protective Action Recommendation USING Appendix H: Jçheck either I or 2 or 3)

C Recommendation 1 a EVACUATE LISTED SECTORS (2 mile J

)

WIND FROM DEGREES 0

• Recommendation 2 Radius & 10 miles downwind) EVACUATE LISTED (Mark wind SECTO RS (2 mile radius & 5 a Shelter remainder of 10 mile EPZ. direction from miles downwind) a Consider issuance of POTASSIUM Step 7)

• SHELTER remainder of 10 IODINE in accordance with the State mile EPZ.

Plan.

• Consider issuance of POTASSIUM IODIDE in accordance with the State Ai 81 Plan Ci Di C2 6 7 8 D2 3 5 6 Frorni2 49 Al 81 Ci Di C2 02 A-i, B-i, C-i, 0-i, D-2, -3, -4, -5, -6 From 5O-7O< A-i, B-i, C-i, D-i, 0-2 A-i, B-i, Cl, 0-i, A-3, -4, 0-2, -3, -4, -5 From 71-ii2° A-i, B-i, C-i, 0-1, A-3, 0-2 Al Bi Cl Di A2 3 4 5 6 0-4

• Fromll3 146

• Ai Bi Ci Dl A2 A3 A-i, B-i, C-i, 0-i, A-2, -3, -4, -5, -6, 8-2 From 147<-173 A-i, B-i, c-i, D-i, A-2, A-3, 8-2 A-i,B-i,C-l,D-1,A-2,-5,-6,8-2,-3,-4 From l74-2i4° A-i,B-l,C-i,D-1,A-2,B-2 A-i, B-i, C-i, 0-i, 8-2, -3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8 From 2i5-258° A-i. B-i, C-i, D-l, 8-2, 8-5 A-i. B-I, C-i, 0-1, 8-2, -3, -5, -6, -7, -8, C-2, -3, -4, -5, -6 From 259-33i A-I, B-i, C-i, 0-i, 8-2, 8-5, C-2 A-1,B-1, C-i, D-1,B.5,C-2,-3,-4,05, -6, 8 Frorn332-11 A-lB-iC-I. 0-1, 8-5, C-2 C Recommendation 3 a SHELTER all sectors a CONSIDER issuance of Potassium Iodide in accordance with the State Plan.

Completed By: Approved By:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT I2IINRC SRO ADMIN A.4

1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 2 of 9 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task: Classify the Event using the EPIP-1 and Complete a WA INITIAL NOTIFICATION.

Task#: 3440190302 Task Standard: The Examinee classifies the event as a GENERAL EMERGENCY based on EAL 1.1.2.L and 1 .2.3.L and 1 .3.4.L and the Examinee issues a Protective Action Recommendation #3.

Time Critical Task: YES: X NO:

KIA Reference!Ratings: 2.4.41. (2.9/4.6)

Method of Testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Evaluation Method:

Simulator In-Plant Classroom X Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:

Trainee Name Evaluator: I Name! Signature DATE Performance Rating: SAT: UNSAT:

Validation Time: 20 minutes Total Time:

Performance Time: Start Time: Finish Time:

COMMENTS

1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 3 of 9 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:

ToolslEquipmentlProcedu res Needed:

1. EPIP- 1, EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX

2. EPIP-5 General Emergency.

3. A clock must be available in classroom that all examinees and evaluator can see

References:

Reference Title Rev No.

1. EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Matrix 43

2. EPIP-5 General Emergency 39 Read to the examinee:

DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!

1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 4 of 9 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 and Unit 2 have experienced a Reactor trip due to major storms that have occurred in East Tennessee.

2. The State of Tennessee has issued notifications of road closures in Northern Hamilton County and Hixson due to flooding.

3. Unit 1 has had a Safety Injection.

4. Security reports that at the time of the trip, steam started blowing from the roof of the Unit 1 east valve vault and steam flow is still in progress at this time.

5. Steam Generator #2 is isolated per E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

6. CR0 has informed you that SG #2 pressure is slowly lowering.

7. Containment pressure is 0.1 psig and steady.

8. RCS pressure is 1500 psig.

9. Core exit TCs 532 °F and slowly rising.

10. The most recent Chem Lab sample of RCS indicates that RCS activity has risen to 345 pCi/gm Dose Equivalent Iodine-i 31.

11. There are no indications of an Onsite Security Event.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Using the data provided and the applicable procedure (s) classify the event.

2. Raise your hand when you have classified the event.

3. Determine what, if any, Protective Action Recommendations are required.

4. Raise your hand when you have completed the Protective Action Recommendations.

5. Record your answers on the JPM briefing sheet.

6. There is (are) an element (s) of this task that is (are) time critical.

1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 5 of 9 Start Time Obtain a copy of EPIP-1, EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION STEP 1 : MATRIX. SAT UNSAT Examinee obtains a copy of EPIP-1, EMERGENCY PLAN Standar&

CLASSIFICATION MATRIX.

Provide a copy of EPIP-1, EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX.

Comment Examiner Annotate start time when the examinee acknowledges the task is Note understood. Start time____________

INSTRUCTIONS Note: A condition is considered to be Procedure MET if, in the judgment of the SED, the condition will be MET IMMINENTLY (i.e.:

with two hours). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.

STEP 2

t. In the matrix to the left, REVIEW the SAT initiating conditions in all three barrier columns and circle the conditions that UNSAT are MET.

2. In each of the three barrier columns, IDE NTIFY if any Loss or Potential Loss INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.

Examinee reviews the EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Standard.

and identifies initiating conditions provided in the initial conditions.

Comment

1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 6 of 9

3. COMPARE the number of barrier STEP 3  : Losses and Potential losses to the SAT criteria below and make the appropriate declaration. UNSAT Emergency Class Criteria General Emergency LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier The examinee compares barrier losses and classifies the event as a General Emergency within 15 minutes of starting the task.

LOSS of the Fuel Clad Barrier 1.t2.L due to RCS sample activity greater than 300 pCi/gm dose equivalent 1131 Standard: AND CRITICAL LOSS of the RCS Barrier 1.2.3.L due to the SGTR AND Potential LOSS of the Containment I .3.4.L RUPTURED SIG that is also faulted outside contaInment (E2 and E3.

Comment EXAMINER NOTE: Annotate the stop time for the event classification here.

EXAMINER Annotate the start time for the Protective Action Recommendation NOTE: here.

EXAMINER NOTE: The start data is provided to the examinee on the JPM briefing sheet.

EXAMINER NOTE: Examinee transitions to EPIP-5, GENERAL EMERGENCY

1211 NRCJPMSROA.4 Page 7 of 9 Obtain a copy of EPIP-5 GENERAL EMERGENCY STEP 4  : SAT UNSAT Standard: Examinee obtains a copy of EPIP-5, GENERAL EMERGENCY.

Provide a copy of EPIP-5, GENERAL EMERGENCY Comment

1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 8 of 9

[41 EVALUATE Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) USIfl9 Appendix B.

STEP 6 SAT U NSAT Terminating The task is complete when the Examinee has classified the event Cue: and issued Protective Action Recommendations. STOP Stop Time

JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit I and Unit 2 have experienced a Reactor trip due to major storms that have occurred in East Tennessee.

2. The State of Tennessee has issued notifications of road closures in Northern Hamilton County and Hixson due to flooding.

3. Unit I has had a Safety Injection.

4. Security reports that at the time of the trip, steam started blowing from the roof of the Unit I east valve vault and steam flow is still in progress at this time.

5. Steam Generator #2 is isolated per E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

6. CR0 has informed you that SG #2 pressure is slowly lowering.

7. Containment pressure is 0.1 psig and steady.

8. RCS pressure is 1500 psig.

9. Core exit TCs 532 °F and slowly rising.

10. The most recent Chem Lab sample of RCS indicates that RCS activity has risen to 345 pCi/gm Dose Equivalent lodine-131.

11. There are no indications of an Qnsite Security Event.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Using the data provided and the applicable procedure (s) classify the event.

2. Raise your hand when you have classified the event.

3. Determine what, if any, Protective Action Recommendations are required.

4. Raise your hand when you have completed the Protective Action Recommendations.

5. Record your answers on the JPM briefing sheet.

6. There is (are) an element (s) of this task that is (are) time critical.

Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.

HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.

j SEQUOYAH j EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-i FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1 -4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier I 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 ControL Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7 2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 9 of 49 Revision 47

j SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP1 Definitions and Abbreviations:

BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION) 00CM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls. Environs Monitoring controls, and CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses persons within the EAB monitor atarmltrip setpoints. and violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEM ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one orrnore CSFs by FR-U which indicates ENT that BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the CSF(s) is under severe challenge: prompt operator action is required.

the vent and drain port cover plates). MPC closure ring, and associated welds. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFS): A plant safety function resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the required to affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment

. There six CSFs; Subonticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink. Pressurized Thermal are therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). Shock, PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition which access is controlled, is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event in this definition is the need for timely assessment within exist. Implicit RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including 15 minutes. the pressurizer safety and relief valves, arid other connections up to and including EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the primary and secondary isolation valves.

the reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities including RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSF5 by FR-U which indicates exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the that the area. For purposes of CSF(s) is under extreme challenge: prompt operator action is required.

Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measuremen ts and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakag as the EA8. e of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of failure SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of sufficient force to plant potentially damage permanent structures or equipment. equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security by threat or force. contingency plan that constitutes a threal)compromise to site securIty, threetirisk FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety the leakage (e.g., of plant. A steam or feed tine break) that results in an uncontrolled decrea SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

se in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized . SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor Sources of smoke such as power; (2) slipping drive bells or overheated electrical components Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load: (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety do not Observation of flame is pireferred but is NOT required if large constitute a lire. Injection System Activation: (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 10%.

smoke andlor heat are observed. quantities of STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body FLAMMAELE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA, The STRIKE

> than the LOWER ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or that skin contact (e.g., chlorine. CO2 etc.)

demands will be met by the site. ,

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear plant or its personnel that operalions. testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are andlor intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land UNPLANNED.

or water: using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the be included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of Civil release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (OP). Implicit in this disobedience or felonious acts that are not part or a concerted attack on the definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases nuclear power plant. that exceed a condition specified on the DP. (e.g., alarm setpoirlts, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates. andlor discharge HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined of incorrect tank).

assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on IMMINENT Within two hours. related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes, INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observabte without 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH. measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface Classification. blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

INTRUSIONJINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains area without authorization.

equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

exposure to radiation.

Page 10 of 49 Revision 47

j SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CL ASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1

1. Critical Safety Function Status 1.2 RCS Barrier

1. Critical Safety Function Status PotentiáI LOSS Core Cooling Red Core Cooling Orange Potential LOSS (FR-Cl) Not Applicable Pressurized Thermal (FR-C.2)

OR Shock Red (FR-RI)

Heat Sink RED (FR-H.1) OR and RHR Shutdown Cooling not in service Heat Sink RED (FR-Hi)

-OR and RHR Shutdown

2. Primary Coolant Activity Level Coolinq not in service i* -OR Potential LOSS 2. RCS Leakage I LOCA RCS sample activity is Not Applicable greater than 300 pCilgm ,*1 Potential LOSS dose equivalent 1131 RCS leak results in Non Isolatable RCS leak subcooling <40 °F as exceeding the capacity

-OR- indicated on Xl-94-101

3. Incore Thermocouple Hi Quad Ave of one charging pump in rage or 102 (EXOSENSOR) the normal charging

.1* Potential LOSS Greater than 1200 °F on Greater than or alignment equal to Xl-94-10I or 102 700 °F on Xl-94-101 or (EXOSENSOR) OR 102 (EXOSENSOR)

-OR- RCS leakage results in

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level entry into E-1

.i* PótentiaILOSS Not Applicable VALID RVLIS level -OR-

<42% on Ll-68-368 or 3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture Ll-68-371 with no RCP Ie1* Potential LOSS running SGTR that results in a Not Applicable

-OR- Safety Injection

5. Containment Radiation Monitor actuation

!.1* Potential LOSS VALID reading of Not Applicable OR greater than:

Entry into E-3 2.5E+02 Rlhron RM-90-271A and -272A *OR 4.

OR ** potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level Not Applicable 1 .5E+02 R/hr on <42% on Ll-68-36e or RM-90-273A and Ll-68-371 with no RCP 2.1E+02 Rlhron running RM-90-274A (see instruction note 4) OR-

5. SED Judgment

-OR Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or

6. SED Judgment SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the RCS Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or Barrier comparable to the condItions listed SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the Fuel above.

Clad Barrier comparable to the conditions listed abo ve.

Page 11 of 47 Revision 46

) SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CL ASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1

1. Critical Safety Function Sta INSTRUCTIONS tus Note: A condition is considered to be Not Applicable

ptentiaiLoss MET if, in the judgment of the SED, the Containment Red condition will be MET IMMINENTLY (FR-Z.1) (i.e.:

with two hours). The classification sha OR ll be made as soon as this determinati Actions of FR-Cl (Red Path) on is made.

are INEFFECTIVE (i.e.; core TCs trending up) 1. In the matrix to the left, REVIE W the

-OR initiating conditions in all three barrier

2. Containment Pressure I H columns and circle the conditions that droen are MET.

Rapid unexplained pressure Potential LOSS 2. In each of the three barrier colu Containment Hydrogen mns, decrease following initial IDENTIFY if any Loss or Potential Los increases to >4% by volume on s increase on PDI-30-44 or 45 INITIATING CONDITIONS have bee H2l-43-200 or 210 n 2a MET.

Containment pressure or sump Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) 3. COMPARE the number of barrier level not increasing on Ll with < one full train of Losses and Potential losses to the 178 and 179 with a LOCA in containment spray progress criteria below and make the appropriate declaration.

-OR- 4. Containment Radiation Monito

3. Containment Isolation Status rs are temperature sensitive and can be i:.i. Poteal LOSS affected by temperature-induced Containment isolation, when Not Applicable currents. These monitors should be required is incomplete and a release path to the environment used for trending only until containmen t

exists. temperature has been stable for approximately 5 minutes after a Ste

-OR- am

4. Containment Bypass Line Break or LOCk RUPTURED SIG that is also Pbtental LOSS Note: MONITOR the respective status tree Unexpected VALID increase in criteria if a CSF is listed as an faulted outside containment (E2 area or ventilation RAD and E3) INITIATING CONDITION.

monitors adjacent to

>4 hour secondQ ary side release containment (with LOCA in progress). Emergeny Class Criteria outside containment from a SIG with a S/G tube leak >T/S limits General Emergency (AOP R.01 App A)

LOSS of any two barriers Potential

-OR- LOSS of third barrier

5. Significant Radiation in Containmen t

• I- PotentiaftOSS Not Applicable Site Area Emergency VALID reading of greater than:

5.8E+03 R/hr on LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two RM-90-271A and RM-90-272A barriers OR 3.4E+03 R/hr on Alert RM-90-273A and 4.9E+03 Rihr on Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad RM-90-274A barrier (see instruction note 4) OR

-OR I 6. SED Judgment Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED

, indicates loss or potential loss of the Containment Barrier compara the conditions listed above. ble to Unusual Event LOSS or Potential LOSS of Containment bar rier Page 12 of 49 Revision 47

j SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATIO MAT N RIX I EPIP1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX

, 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier (Modes 1 -4) 1 2 RCS Barrier I .3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety LimIt LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4 2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5 2 Tornado 5 6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 Aircrafi/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 13 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MA TRIX j EPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:

BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPL 00CM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manua OSION) l isa supporting document to the Tech Specs, that contain Red Effluent Controls, CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of Environs Monitoring controls, and twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB methodology for calculating routine gase ous and liquid effluent offsite doses and violently protesting onsite operations monitor alarmltrip setpoints.

or activities at the site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more BOUNDARY consists of MPG shell, Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; promp CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the t operator action is required.

vent and drain port cover plates),

MPG closure ring, and associated welds.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure CRJTICAL$AFETY FUNCTION (CSFS resulting in damage sufficient to cause concer

):

prevent significant release of core radioac A plant safety function required to affected structure or the operability or reliabi n regarding the integrity of the tivity to the environment. There are lity of safety equipment contained six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Coolin therein. The source of the projectile may be g,

Integrity (Containment) arid Inventory Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, onsite or offsite.

(RCS).

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT comm which access is controlled. by the security fence and to one or more of the initiating conditions ences when recognition is made that associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely ROS: The RCS primary side and ils connec assessment within 15 minutes. tions up to and including the pressurizer safety arid relief valves, and other connections up to and including EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB) the primary and secondary isolation valves which the reactor licensee has the author That area surrounding the reactor, in ity exclusion or removal of personnel and properto determine all activities including RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs ty from the area. For purposes of by FR-0 which indicates that the Emergency Action Levels, based on radiolo CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; promp t operator action is required.

assessments, arid for design calculations, gical field measurements and dose the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence a magnitude greater then the capacity one of primary to secondary leakage of charging pump.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined of pressurized or electrical equipment combustion, or a catastrophic failure SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment that imparts energy of sufficient force to ,

potentially damage permanent structures equipment with the intent to render the equipm or misoperation of plant or equipment. ent inoperable, EXTORTION: An attempt to cause SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event an action at the site by threat or force, as contingency plan that constitutes a threatlcompr listed in the approved security omise to site security, threatirisk FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence to site personnel, or a potential degradation of secondary side leakage (e.g., the level of safety of the plant. A steam or feed line break) that results in an SECURITY CONDITION does not involv to e a HOSTILE ACTION.

generator pressure or the steam genera uncontrolled decrease in steam tor being completely depressurized.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNE D

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heal and light. Sources 01 smoke such the following: (1) An automatic turbine runbac event involving one or more of slipping drive belts or overheated as k >15% thermal reactor power, (2) electrical components do not constitute Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical a fire. load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Observalion of flame is preferred but is Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power NOT required if large quantities of Oscillations 1 0%.

smoke andlor heat are observed.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gase s at concentrations> than the LOWER of workers to enforce compliance with demandsPROTECTED AREA by a body EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL). ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant made on WA. The STRIKE operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverag TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life e against the Site to ensure that or limb by reason of inhalation or demands will be met by the site. skin contact (e.g.. chlorine, CO2 etc.)

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward nuclea UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not a the includes the use of violent force to destroy r plant or its personnel that operations, testing or maintenance. Events that expected result of normal equipment, take hostages, andlor result in corrective or mitigative intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. actions being taken in accordance with abnorm This includes attack by air, land or al or emergency procedures are water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, UNPLANNED.

vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioac satisfy the overall intent may be tivity is UNPLANNED if the included, HOSTILE ACTION should NOT release has not been authorized by a Discharge be construed to include acts of cl/il Permit (DP). Implicit in this disobedience or felonious acts that are definition are unintentional releases, unmon not part of a concerted attack on the itored releases, or planned releases nuclear power plant. that exceed a condition specified on the OP. (e.g.,

alarm setpoints. minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals release rates, andlor discharge who are engaged in a determined of incorrect tank).

assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruc VALID: An indication, report or condition is consid tion. ered to conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, be VALID when it is IMMINENT: Within two hours. related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observ or (2) indication on ation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely asses INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration sment within 15 minutes.

action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORAN VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily GE PATH condition within observable without 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is suffici RED or ORANGE PATH. ent to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affecte safOty d structure, INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiati system, or component. Example damage includes deform on monitor readings or ation due to heat or personnel observations that identify an Event for impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint Classification.

purposes of Emergency Plan blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches. etc.) should blistering. Surface NOT be included as visible damage.

INTRUSIONI)NTRUDER: Suspected hostile individ ual present in the protected area without authorization. VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contain s

equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruc tion, or ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 14 of 49 Revision 47

1 SEQIJOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICA TION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Mod 0

Refer to °Fission Product Barrier Mod, j! Condition Matrix (Section 1) and Radiological Effluents (Section Not Applicable.

7) and Continue in This Column.

On either unit an inability to mon itor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and Not Applicable.

2 and and 4):

1, Loss of> 75% of MCR annunciat or windows AND the annunciator printer AND the annu nciat 1, horseshoe OR> 75% of safety syste or CRT in the m indications.

2, 2. LossofiCS.

3. Inability to directly monitor any 3, of the following CSFs:

Subcriticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory

4. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.

On either unit an UNPLANNED MCR annunciators and annunc loss of >75% of the Not Applicable.

of safety system indications for> iator printer or> 75%

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in pro 15 minutes with a unavailable. gress or (CS i

(land2 and3):

2 1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% of both MCR annunciator windows AND the channels of printer AND the annunciator annunciator 3, for> 15 minutes OR> 75% ofCRT in the horseshoe safety system indicators for> 15 minutes.

4 2. SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is required (> shift complement) to safely operate the unit.

3. (aorb)

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.

OR

b. Loss of ICS.

On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of 75% of the Significant Loss of Communications (1 or MCR annunciators or> 75% of safety sys 2) tem 1. UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant com indications for> 15 minutes and (CS munication available. capabilities listed below (a and b and c):

(1 ancf2and3):

a. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX phones.

1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% of both chan b. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phon nels of es.

MCR annunciator windows AND the annunciat c. UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant radio 2, printer AND the annunciator CRT in the hors or frequencies.

for> 15 minutes OR > 75% of safety syste eshoe A m L indicators for > 15 minutes.

2. SM/SED judgment that increased surveilla I L 2. UNPLANNED loss of all offsite communicati nce on A required (> shift complement) to safely oper is capabilities listed below: (a and b and c and d

ate the and e and I) unit.

a. UNPLANNED loss of all EPA6X phones

3. The ICS is capable of displaying requested data. b. UNPLANNED loss of all offsite radio frequencies

c. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system

d. UNPLANNED loss of all 1-FB-Bell fines

e. UNPLANNED loss of all NRC ENS and HPN lines

f. UNPLANNED loss of all satellite phones

Page 15 of 49 Revision 47

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICA TION MATRIX I E-1 1 lcor mOfl Reactor -

- . -. _. - not decreasing after VALID trip signals and loss of core Refer to Fission Product Barrier cooling capability. Main.. i 1) and (1 and 2): Continue in This Column.

1. FR-S.1 entered and imm ediate operator actions did not result in a reactor power of 6% and decreasing.

I

2. (aorb)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1).

OR

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1)

I Reactor power> 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto and manual trip signals. Refer to fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

I NOTE: Althou9h a mode chan ge may classifIcation this event will stilloccur before and declared as SAE, be classified Reactor power> 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto trip signal but a manual Refer to Fission Product Barrier trip from the Control Matrix (Section 1) and Room Is successful. (1 and Continue in This Column.

2)

1. Reactor power> 5% and not decreasing following auto tiip signal.

2. Manual trip in the Main Con trol Room successfully reduces reactor power 5%.

2 NOTE: Although a mode chan ge will occu will still be classified and declared r, this event as an ALERT.

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matr ix (Section 1). Reactor coolant system specific activ ity exceeds LCO (Refer to SON Tech. Spec. 3.4.8);

1. Radiochernistry analysis indicates (a or b):

I, a. Dose equivalent Iodine (l-131)>0.35 Ci/g m for

>48 hours or in excess of TIS Figure 3.4-1 with Tave 500 F.

2 OR 3

b. Specific activity> 100/ E )LCI!gm with Tave 500 °F.

Page 16 of 49 Revision 47

LSEQUOYAH j EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICA TION MATRIX EPIP1 I Mode Referto 1 Continue in This Column, Refer top, Continue in, 1) and Column.

Refer to Fission Product Bar rier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Con!mue in This Column.

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Continue in This Column. Matrix (Section 1) and Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matr ix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

RCS unidentified or pressure bounda

>10 GPM. ry leakage RCS Identified lealcage>25 GPM.

1. Unidentified or pressure bounda 1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by ry leakage (as 1, Tech. Spec.>

• 1, defined by Tech. Spec.)> 10 SPM as > 25 GPM as indicated by (a orb or C):

indicated by (a orb):

2, 2, a. Sl-OPS-06B-137.0 results or RCS Flow Bal ance

a. Sl.OPS068137.0 results or RCS Calculation (AOP.R.05, Appendix I or Flow Balance J)

Calculation (AOP-R.05, Appendix I or 3 J)

OR OR 4 4 b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM into PRT, RCD T

b. With RCS temperature and PZR level stab or CVCS holdup tank (Refer to Tl-28).

le, the VCT level on Ll-62-129 or Ll-62-130 is dropping at a rate > 10 GPM. OR

c. RCS leakage through a steam generator to the Refer to Shutdown Systems Degradatio (Sec secondary system (primary to secondary n tion 6.3). leakage).

I Refer to Shutdown Systerris Degradation Seclio 6.33 n .

Page 17 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICA TION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Mode Referto 1 Continue in This Column. Refer to,,, LL t Barrier ! ion 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to Fission Product Barr ier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matr ix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to Fission Product Barr ier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue Fr, This Column. Turbine failure has generated pro jectiles that cause visible damage to any area con taining safety related equipment.

1, 1. Turbine generated PROJECTILES have resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following areas:

2, Control 8uilding Diesel Generator Bldg.

Auxiliary Building RWST 3 Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station Unit #2 Containment Common Ste. Serv. Xfmrs ERCW Pumping Station Condensate Storage Tanks Addi Equipment Bldgs.

UNPLANNED rapid depressuriz ation of the main steam system resulting in a rap Turbine failure results in casing pen id RCS cooldown etration or main and safety injection initiatIon. (1 and generator seal damage.

2):

1, 1. Rapid depressurization of any or 1. Turbine failure which results in pen etration of the all steam 1, turbine casing or damage to main generat generators or the main steam system or seals.

to 600 psig 2, on Pl-1-2A, 2B or 9A ,98 or 20A, 208 or 27A 2,

, 27B.

3 2. Safety injection has initiated or requ is ired. 3 Refer La Hazards and SED Judgment (Sec tion 4.3)

Page 18 of 49 Revision 47

[SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 j Initiatinq I Condition Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

Safety Limits have been exceeded.

(1 or 2):

1. The combination of thermal power, 1, RCS temperature and RCS pressure > safety limit indic ated Tech. Spec. Figure 2.1-1 Reactor Core by SON Safety 2, Limit.

OR 3, 2. RCSlPressurizer pressure exceeds safet

(>2735 psig). y limit 4

Page 19 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICA TION MATRIX j EPIP-1 This Page Intentionally Blank Page 20 of 49 Revision 47

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER I EPIP-1 I MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protec 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage tion 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Op s) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGME NT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion Table 4-1 4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-A 4.5 Control Room Evacuatio Figure 4-B n

4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMEN ON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADAT ION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 I 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 21 of 49 Revision 47

SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLAS S IFICATION MATRIX Definitions and Abbrevia tions:

I EPIP-1 I BOMB: An explosive devi ce, (See EXPLOSION) ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculati on CIViL DISTURBANCE: Specs. that contain Red Effluent Manual is a supporting document to the Tech A group of twenty (20) or more methodology for calculating Controls, Environs Monitoring vklentiy protesting onsite oper routi controls, and persons within the EAB monitor alarm/trip setpoinls. ne gaseous and liquid effluent ations or activities at the offsite doses and site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDA RY: ORANGE PATH: Monitoring BOUNDARY consists of MPC Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT the CSF(s) is under severe of one or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that vent and drain port cove shell, bottom baseplate, MPG challenge: prompt operator actio r plates), MPG closure ring, Ild (including the n is required.

and associated welds, PROJECTILE: An object eject CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTIO N (CSFs): A plant safety resulting in damage sufficient ed, thrown or launched towards a plant structure prevent significant release func to cau six CSFs: Subcriticality, of core radioactivity to the environment. There are tion requ ired to affec ted structure or the operabili se concern regarding the integrity of the Core Cooling, Heat Sink. Pres therein. The source of the ty or reliability of safety equipme Integrity (Containment) and suriz nt contained ed Thermal Shock, prolectile may be orisite or offsite.

Inventory (RCS).

PROTECTED AREA: The EVENT: Assessment of area encompassed by the secu an EVENT commences when which access is controlled. rity fence and to one or more of the initiating recognition is made that In this definition is the nee conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit d for timely assessment with RCS: The RCS primary side in 15 minutes, and its connections up to and pressurizer safety and relief including the EXCLUSION AREA BOU valves, and other connections NDARY (EAB): That area the primary and secondary isola up to and including which the reactor license surro unding the reactor, in tion valves.

e has exclusion or removal of perso the authority to determine all activities including RED PATH: Monitoring of nnel and property from the one Emergency Action Levels, area, For purposes of or more CSFs by FR-0 which bas CSF(s) is under extreme chall indicates that the assessments, and for design ed on radiological field measurements and dose enge: prompt operator action is required.

as the EAB. calcu latio ns, the Site Boundary shall be defined RUPTURED: (Steam Gene rator) Existence of primary a magnitude greater than the capa to secondary leakage of EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent. city one charging pump.

of pressurized or electrical unco nline d com bust ion, or a catastrophic failure equi SABOTAGE: Deliberate dam potentially damage permanen pment that imparts energy of sufficient force to equipment with the intent to age, misalignment, or misopera tion of plant t structures or equipment. render the equipment inoperab le.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the Site SECURITY CONDITION: Any by threat or force. Security Event as listed in the contingency plan that constitute approved seci.irity FAULTED: (Steam Generator s a threalicompromise to site

) Exis tence of seco ndar y side leakage (e.g., to site perso nnel , or a pote ntial degradation to the level of security, threat/risk steam or feed line break) that safety of the plant. A results in an uncontrolled dec SECURITY CONDITION does generator pressure or the reas e in steam not involve a HOSTILE ACT steam generator being complete ION.

ly depressurized. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:

FIRE: Combustion character An UNPLANNED event involving ized by heat and light. Sour the following: (1) An automatic slipping drive belts or ove ces of smoke such as turbine runback >15% thermal one or more of rhe Electrical load rejection >25% reactor power (2>

Observation of flame is prefeated electrical components do not constitute a fire. full electrical load: (3) Reactor rred but is NOT required if Injection System Activation: Trip: (4) Safety smoke and/or heat are obse large quantities of (5) Thermal Power Oscillatio rved. ns 10%.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Com STRIKE ACTION: A work stop bustible gases at concentra of workers to enforce complian page with in the PRO TEC TED AREA by a body EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL). tions> than the LOWER ce ACTION must threaten to inter with demands made on WA. The STRIKE rupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dang demands will be met by the as leverage against the site to ensure that erous to life or limb by reason site. skin contact (e.g., chlorine. CO 2 etc.) of inhalation or HOSTILE ACTION: An act UNPLANNED: An event or actio toward a nuclear plant or its n that is not the expected result includes the use of violent force personnel that operations, testing or maintenan of intimidate the licensee to achie to destroy equipment, take host ages, and/or ce. Events that result in corrective normal ve an end. This includes attac actions being taken in accordan or mitigative k by ce with abnormal or emergency water; using guns, explosives, air, land or UNPLANNED. procedures are projectiles, vehicles, or other deliver destructive force. Othe devices used to acts that satisfy the overall inten UNPLANNED RELEASE: A relea included. HOSTILE ACTION t may be se of radioactivity is UNPLAN should NOT be conslrued to release has not been authorize NED disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted include acts of civil d by a Discharge Permit (DP). Impl if the attac defin ition are unintentional release icit in this k

nuclear power plant, on the that exceed a condition specified s, unmonitored releases, or planned releases on HOSTILE FORCE: One or more dilution flow, minimum release time the OP. (e.g., alarm setpoinls, minimum individuals who are engaged in s, maximum release rates, anchor assault, overtly or by stealth and a determined of incorrect tank). discharge deception, equipped with suita capable of killing, maiming, or ble weap ons causing destruction. VALID: An indication, report or cond ition is considered lobe VALID when conclusively verified by (1) an instr IMMINENT: Within two flours. ument channel check, or (2) indication it is related or redundant indicators, or on (3)

Implicit in this definition is the need by direct observation by plant personnel.

INEFFECTIVE: When the spec for timely assessment within 15 minu ified restoration action(s) does not tes.

reduction in the level of severity result in a of the RED or ORANGE PATH cond ViSIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equi 15 minutes from identification of ition within pment that is readily observable with the CSF Status Tree RED or ORA measurements, testing, or analysis. Dam out NGE PATH.

regarding the continued operability or reliaage is sufficient to cause concern INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plan system, or component. Example dam bility of affec ted safet y struc ture, t Parameters, radiation monitor personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergen readings or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, age includes deformation due to heat or Classification. cy Plan cracking, or paint blistering. Surf blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scrat ace ches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

INTRUSION/1NTRUDER: Suspec ted hostile individual present in the area without authorization. protected VITAL AREA: Any area within the PRO TECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or mate ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Stor rial which the failure, destruction, or age Installation release of. could directly or indirectly enda nger the public health and safety exposure to radiation. by Page 22 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH j EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSiF ICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I 1 U, Prolonged loss of all l and all onsite AC power Initiatina I Condition to either unit. (1 and 2): Not Applicable.

1, 1. Both unit related 6.9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for> 15 minutes.

2,

2. (aorb) 3, a. Core Cooling Status Tree Red or Orange Path.

4 OR

b. Restoration of either a 6.9 Ky a 6.9 KV unit board is not likel shutdown board or y within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the loss, Loss of all offslte and all ons ite AC power to either unit for> 15 MInutes. Not Applicable.

1. Both unit related 6,9 KV shutdow de-energized for> 15 minutes. n boards 2,

3, 4

Loss of offsite power to eith er unit with degraded onsite AC power for> 15 min UNPLANNED loss of all offs utes. (f Ia and 1bJ or ite and all onsite AC 2): power to either unit for> 15 min utes.

1, la. AD four (4) 6.9KV unit boards 1. Both unit related 6.9KV shut do-energized for 6, down boards de

> 15 minutes. energized for> 15 minutes.

2, lb. One (1) unit related 6.9 KV D shutdown board do-energized for> 15 minutes. E F

OR 4 U

2. Any AC power condition last E ing>

a single additional failure will resul15 minutes where Also Refer to GLass of Shutdown Syst t in a unit blackout. L continue in this column.

em& (6.1) and E

D Loss of offaite power to either unit for> 15 minutes.

(1 and 2): UNPLANNED loss of all offsite pow er to either unit for> 15 minutes. (1 and 2):

1. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards do-e 1, nergized for> 15 minutes. 1. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de..e 6, nergized for

> 15 minutes.

2. Both unit related 6.9KV shutdown 2 boards are energized. o 2. One (1> unit related 6,9KV shutdow energized for> 15 minutes.

n board do 3, E F

4 U E

I E

D Page 23 of 49 Revision 47

j SEQUOYAI-I j EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Initiating I Condition Refer to Fission Product Bar rier Loss of Communication (2.2) Matrix (Section 1) and and Continue in This Column.

Loss of all vital DC power for>

15 minutes.

1 Voltage < 105 V DC on 1, buses I 125V DC vital battery board dlIlIlrjIVfor> 15 minutes 2,

3, 4

Also Refer to Fission Produc 1), Loss of Communication t Barrier Matrix (Section (2,2) end, Loss of Instrumentation (2.1) and Con tinue in This Column.

Refer to Fission Product Bar rier Matrix (Section 1).

Loss of Communication (22

), and Loss of Instrumentation (2.1).

UNPLANNED loss of a require d train of DC power for 15 minutes: (1 or 2>.

1. Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V do vital battery board buses I and III for> 15 minutes 5 QB.

2. Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V do vital 6 busses II and IV for> 15 minutes battery board I

Page 24 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER I EPIP-1 1 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation

/ 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protec 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage tion 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGME NT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion Table 4-1 4

4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-A 4.5 Control Room Evacuation Figure 4-B 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMEN ON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.5 RiverLevelLow 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGR ADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capabilit y

6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent k

4 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 I 7.3 Radiation Levels Table 7-2 7.4 Fuel Handling Figure 7-A 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 25 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASS WICATION MATRIX Definitions and Abbreviatio ns:

I EPIP-1 BOMB: An explosive devi ce. (See EXPLOSION) 00CM: Offsite Dose Calculati on Manual is a supporting docu Specs. that contain Red Efflu ment to the Tech CIViL. DISTURBANCE: ent A group of twenty (20) or more methodology for calculating routi Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and violently protesting onsile persons within the EAB ne gaseous and liquid effluent operations or activities at the monitor alarm/trip setpoints. offaite doses and site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDA ORANGE PATH: Monitoring RY:

BOUNDARY consists of MPC Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT of the CSF(s) is under severe challone or more CSFs by FR-0 which Indicates that vent and drain port cover plateshell, bottom baseplate. MPG lid (including the enge; prompt operator action is required.

s), MPC closure ring, add asso ciated welds, PROJECTILE: An object eject CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTIO ed, throw n or laun ched towa resulting in damage sufficient rds a plant structure prevent significant release of N (CSFS): A plant safety function required to affected structure or the oper to cause concern regarding the integrity of the core radioactivity to the envi ability or reliability of safety equi six CSFs; Subcriticalily, Core ronment. There are therein. The source of the proje pme nt contained Integrity (Containment) and Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock. ctile may be onsite or offsile.

Inventory (RCS).

PROTECTED AREA: The area EVENT: Assessment of encompassed by the security an EVENT commences when which access is controlled. fence and to one or more of the initiating recognition is made that conditions associated with in this definition is the need the event exist. Implicit RCS: The RCS primary side for timely assessment within and its connections up to and inclu 15 minutes. pressurizer safety and relief valv ding the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDA es, and other connections up RY (EAR): That area surroundi the primary and secondary isola to and including which the reactor licensee ng the react or, in tion valves.

has exclusion or removal of perso the authority to determine all activities including RED PATH: Monitoring of one nnel and property from the area. or more CSFs by FR-0 which indic Emergency Action Levels, For purposes of CSF(s) is under extreme chall based on radiological field enge; prompt operator action ates that the assessments, and for design measurements and dose is required.

as the EAB. calcu latio ns, the Site Boundary shalt be defined RUPTURED: (Steam Generator

) Existence of primary to seco a magnitude greater than the ndary leakage of EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, capacity one charging pump.

of pressurized or electrical unco nfine d com bust ion, or a catastrophic failure equi SABOTAGE: Deliberate dam potentially damage permanen pment that imparts energy of sufficient force to age, equipment with the intent to rend misalignment, or misoperation of plant t stwOtures or equipment. er the equipment inoperable.

EXTORTION: An attempt SECURITY CONDITION: Any to cause an action at the site Security Event as listed in the appr by threat or force. contingency plan that constitute oved security FAULTED: (Steam Generator s a threatlcompromise to site

) Existence of secondary side to site personnel, or a potential security, threat/risk steam or feed line break) that leakage (e.g., degradation to the level of safet results in an uncontrolled decr SECURITY CONDITION does y of the plant. A generator pressure or the ease in steam not involve a HOSTILE ACTION steam generator being com .

pletely depressurized, SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An FIRE: Combustion character UNPLANNED event involving the following: (1) An automati one or more of slipping drive belts or over ized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as Electrical load rejection >25%

c turbine runback >15% therm al reactor power; (2) heated electrical components Observation of flame is prefe do not constitute a fire. full electrical load; (3) Reactor Injection System Activation: (5) Trip; (4) Safety smoke and!or heat are obse rred but is NOT required if large quantities of Thermal Power Oscillations 10%

rved. .

STRIKE ACTION: A work stop FLAMMABLE GAS: Combust page within the PROTECTED EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL). ible gases at concentrations of workers to enforce complian AREA by a body ce

> than the LOWER ACTION must threaten to inter with demands made on WA. TIre STRIKE rupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dang demands will be met by the as leverage against the site to ensure that skin contact (e.g.. chlorine, erous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or site. CO . etc.)

HOSTILE ACTION: An act towa UNPLANNED: An event or actio rd a nuclear plant or its perso includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take host nnel that operations, testing or maintenan n that is not the expected result of normal intimidate the licensee to achie ages, and!or ce. Events that result in corrective ve an end, This includes attac actions being taken in accordan or mitigative k by air, land or ce with abnormal or emergency water using guns, explosives, UNPLANNED. procedures are projectiles, vehicles, or other deliver destructive force. Othe devices used to r acts that satisfy the overall inten UNPLANNED RELEASE: A relea included. HOSTILE ACTION t may be se of radioactivity is UNPLANNED should NOT be construed to release has not been authorize if the disobedience or felonious acts include acts of civil d by a Discharge Permit (DP). Impl that are not part of a concerted defin icit nuclear power plant. attack on the ition are unin tenti onal relea ses. unmonitored releases, or plan in this that exceed a condition specified ned releases on the OP. (e.g., alarm setpoints. mini HOSTILE FORCE: One or more dilution flow, minimum release mum individuals who are engaged in limes, maximum release rates, and!

assault, overtly or by stealth and a determined of incorrect tank). Or discharge deception, equipped with suitable capable of killing, maiming, or weapons causing destruction. VALID: An indication, report or cond ition is considered to be VALID when conclusively verified by (1) an instr it is IMMINENT: Within two hours. ument channel check, or (2) indic related or redundant indicators, or ation on (3) by direct observation by plant perso Implicit in this definition is the need for nnel INEFFECTIVE: When the specified timely assessment within 15 minutes. .

restoration action(s) does not resul reduction in the level of severity t in a VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equi of the 15 minutes from identification of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within pment measurements, testing, or analysis. Dam that is readily observable without CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PAT H. regarding the continued operability reliaage is sufficient to cause concern INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Para or bility of affected safety structure, meters, radiation monitor readings system, or component. Example dam personnel observations that iden or age includes deformation due to heat or tity an Event for purposes of Eme impact, denting, penetration, ruptu Classification. rgency Plan re, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scrat ches, etc.) should NOT be included visible damage as INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the prote area without authorization. cted VITAL AREA: Any area within the PRO TECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or mate ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Stor rial which the failure, destruction, or age Installation. release of, could directly or indirectly enda nger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 26 of 49 Revision 47

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CL ASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Mode Initiatinci I Co ndition Refer to Fission Product Bar rier I

Continue in This Column. Matrix (Section 1) and Referto I Continue in This Column. fl 1) and Refer to Control Room Eva Product Barrier Matrix (Se cuation, (4.5) and Fission Refer to Fission Product Bar ction 1) and Continue in Thi rier Matrix (Section 1) and Column. s Continue in This Column.

FIRE in any of the areas liste d In Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related EXPLOSION in any of the are equipment required to as establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2): that is affecting safety related listed in Table 4-1 equipment required to establish or maintain safe shu

1. FIRE in any of the areas tdown. (1 and 2):

listed in Table 4-1.

1. EXPLOSION in any of the

2. (sorb) areas listed in Table 4-1.

A A 2. (aorb)

a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to per L manent structure or L safety related equipment in a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to per the specified area is manent structures or observed due to the FIRE. L to safety related equipment in the specified area is due to the EXPLOSION.

OR

b. Control room indication of OR deg system or component responsraded safety b. Control room indication of deg e due to the FIRE. raded safety system or component response due EXPLOSION. to the Refer to Security (Section 4.6)

FIRE within the PROTECTED .

threatening any of the are AREA (Figure 4-A) as listed in Table 4-1 that is UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within not extInguished within 15 the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) resulting in VIS control room notificatIon orminutes from the time of any permanent structure equipmIBL E DAMAGE to room alarm. verification of control ent.

A L A L L L

I Refer to Security (Section 4.6).

Page 27 of 49 Revision 47

SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLAS SiFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Mode Initiatinq I Condi tion Refer to Fission Produc t Barrier Matrix (Section I Mode Continue in This Column. 1) and Referi Continue in This Column. 1) and Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section Continue in This Column. 1) and Refer to Fission Product Bar rier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within facility structure contain a Release of TOXIC GAS or ing safety related equipment smoke within a facility or associated with safe structure which prohibits safe operation of the plant. operation of systems required to establish maintain Cold SID.

1. Plant personnel report (land 2and3):

the average of three (3) readings taken in an 10 1. Plant personnel report TOX ft. Triangular Area is> IC GAS or smoke within A 25% Lower Explosive Limit, any building listed in Table 4-2 as indicated on the .

L monitoring instrument with Table 4-2.

in any building listed in A L L 2. (aorb)

a. Plant personnel report sev L reactions due to TOXIC GAS ere adverse health Refer to the MSDS for the LEL, burning eyes, nose, throat, or smoke (i.e.,

dizziness).

OR b-. Sampling indication> Per missible Exposure Limit (PEL).

3. Plant personnel unable to per form actions to establish and maintain Cold Shu tdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protect ion equipment.

Refer to the MSDS for the PEL A. UNPLANNED release of .

FLAMMABLE GAS within the EXCLUSION AREA BOU A. Safe operations impeded due NDARY that may to access affect nonnal operations. restrictions caused by TOXIC GA concentrations within a facility S or smoke

1. Plant personnel report the structure listed in average of three Table 4-2.

A readings taken in an 10 ft. Tria ngular Area is>

25% of the Lower Explosive Lim I it, on the monitoring instrument with as indicated A OR L in the L EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDA B. Confirmed report by Local, Cou RY (Figure 4-B). nty, or State L officials that an offsite TOXIC GA S release has OR occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4-B) with potential to enter the EXCL USION AREA B. Confirmed report by Local, Cou BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) in concen trations > the officials that a large offsite FLA nty, or State Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL)

MMABLE GAS causing a site release has occurred within one evacuation.

site (Figure 4-B) with potential to (1) mile of the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDA enter the (Figure 4-B) in Refer to the MSDS for the PEL.

concentrations >25% of LowRY er Explosive Limit.

Refer to the MSDS for the LEL.

Page 28 of 49 Revision 47

SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLAS SIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Mode Refer to Fission Pivduc

. .Jarrier M.tnx Mode Continue in This CoJumn. (......,...

HOSTILE ACTION Resulting of the Facility: in Loss of Physical Control A (I cr2)

L L 1. A HOSTILE ACTiON has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to ope rate to maintain CRITICAL SAFET equipment required Y FUNCTIONs.

2. A HOSTILE ACTION has cau sed failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMM is likely for a freshly off-load INENT fuel damage ed reactor core in pool.

Evacuation of the control room has been initiated and control of alt necess ary equipment has not bee HOSTILE ACTION within established within 15 min n the PROTECTED AREA.

utes of staffing the auxiliary control room. A HOSTILE ACTION is occ (1 and 2): urring the PROTECTED AREA as rep or has occurred within A 1. AOP-C.04 Shutdown A orted by the Security Shift from Aux Control Room Supervisor.

I entered. I 1 2. Control has not been esta I blis Refer to Figure 4-A for a dra of staffing the auxiliary con hed within 15 minutes wing of PROTECTED AREA trol room and completing transfer of switches on pan els Li l and LI lB to the AUX position.

Evacuation of the Control Room is Required.

1. AOP-C.04 Shutdown HOSTILE ACTION within the from Aux Control Room OWNER CONTROLLED been entered. has AREA or airborne attack thre at: (1 or 2)

A 1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occ urring or has occurred I A within the OWNER CONT ROLLED AREA as I I reported by the Security Shi ft Supervisor.

I 2 A validated notification from NR C of an airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.

Note: The Owner Controlled Area is defined by the Physical Security Plan.

Refer to Figure 4-A for a dra Not Applicable. wing of PROTECTED AREA Confirmed SECURITY COND ITION or threat which indicates a potential degradatio n in the level of safety of the plant (1 or 2cr 3)

A 1. A SECUR1Y CONDITION that does NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by I Supervisor.

the Security Shift L

2. A credible SQN security threat notific ation.

3. A validated notification from NRC provid ing information of an aircraft threat.

Page 29 of 49 RevisiOn 47

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX I EPIP1 I I

Events are in proce ur Actual g Imminent Substantiai wolve Melting With Potential for Los Core Degradation s of Containment Integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that resu lts in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.

Releases can be A reasonably expected to exc eed EPA Plume Protective L Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDA L Figure 4-B.

RY, refer to Events are in process have Actual occurred which involve Likely Major Failure needed for the Protection of s of Plant Functions the ACTION that result in intentio Public or HOSTILE acts; (1) toward site person nal damage or malicious nel lead to the likely failure of or; or equipment that could A access to equipment needed (2) that prevents effective I Public. Any releases are not for the Protection of the I Exposure Levels which Exc expected to result in Action Guidelines Exposure eed EPA Plume Protective EXCLUS1ON AREA BOUNDA Levels beyond the RY, Refer to Figure 4.B.

Events are in process hav e occurred which involve Actual Potential Substan tial Degradation of the Level Safety of the Plant or a Securit of y

probable life threatening risk to Event that involves to site equipment because of site per son nel or damage HOSTILE ACTION. Any A releases are expected to be limit I the EPA Plume Protective Acti ed to small fractions of on Guidelines Exposure Levels.

I Events are in process have occ urred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Leve l of or indicate a Security Threat to facil Safety of the Plant ity protection has been initiated. No releases of Rad ioactive Material requiring Offsite Response Mon itoring are expected A unless further degradation of Saf ety Systems occurs.

I I

Page 30 of 49 Revision 47

SEQUOYAH j EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX I EP1P-1 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment Auxiliary Building Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station ERCW Pumping Station Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings CSSTs RWST Condensate Storage Tanks TABLE 4-2 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATE TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GA D WITH S OR SMOKE EALs Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station ERCW Pumping Station Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings COWE Building Page 31 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX

[EPIP-i Figure 4-A Protected Area Figure 4-B Exclusion Area Boundary Page 32 of 49 Revision 47

j SEQUOYAH j EMERGENCY PLAN CLAS SIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 FISSiON PRODUCT BARR IER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

,,. 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 2 RCS Barner 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 1 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protect 2.6 RCS identified Leakage ion 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)

, 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMEN T

,, 41 Fire 1, 4 2 Explosion Table 4-1 4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-A 4.5 Control Room Evacuation Figure 4-B 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

,_. 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADAT ION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 7.3 Radiation Levels Table 7-2 7.4 Fuel Handling Figure 7-A 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 33 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF Definitions and Abbreviations:

ICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 BOMB: At explosive device. (See 00CM: Otfsile Dose Calculation EXPLOSIONI Manual is a supporting document Specs. that contain Rad Effluent to the Tech CIVIL. DISTURBANCE: methodology for calculating routine Controls, Environs Monitoring cont A group of twenty (20) or more perso rols, and violently protesting onsite oper ns within the EAB monitor alarm/trip setpolnts. gase ous and liquid effluent offsite doses and ations or activities at the site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of BOUNDARY consists of MPG shell Spent Fuel Storage Cask CON one or more CSFs by FR-U whic FINEMENT the CSF(s) is under severe chall h indicates that

, bottom baseplate, MPG lid enge; prompt operator action vent and drain port cover plates), (including the is required.

MPG closure ring, and associate d welds. PROJECTILE: An object CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTIO elected, thrown or launched towards a plan N (CSFs): A plant safety func resulting in damage sufficient to t structure cause prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environm tion required to affected structure or the operability or concern regarding the integrity of the six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core ent. There are therein. The source of the proje relia bility of safety equipment contained Coo Integrity (Containment) and Inve ling, I-teat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, ctile may be onsite or offsite.

ntory (RCS).

PROTECTED AREA: The area EVENT: Assessment of an encompassed by the security fenc EVENT commences when reco which access is controlled. e and to one or more of the initiating cond gnition is made that itions associated with the even in this definition is the need for t exist . Implicit RCS: The RCS primary side and timely assessment withIn 15 minu its connections up to and including the tes. pressurizer safety and relief valv EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDA es, arid other connections up to and RY (EAB): That area surroundi the prim ary and secondary isolation valves. including which the reactor licensee has ng the reactor, in the authority to determine all activ exclusion or removal of perso ities including RED PATH: Monitoring of one or nnel Emergency Action Levels, base and property from the area. For purposes of CSF(s) is under extreme challenge more CSFS by FR-U which indicates that the d on radiological field measurem  ; prompt operator action is required.

assessments, and for design calcu ents and dose as the EAB. latio ns, the Site Bou ndar y shall be defined RUPTURED: (Steam Generator

) Existence of primary to secondar a magnitude greater than the capa y leakage of EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unco city one charging pump.

of pressurized or electrical equi ntine d com bust ion, or a catastrophic failure pment that imparts energy of SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, potentially damage permanent sufficient force to misalignment, or misoperation of structures or equipment, equipment with the intent to render plant the equipment inoperable.

EXTORTION: An attempt to SECURITY CONDITION: Any Secu cause art action at the site by threa rity Event as listed in the approved t or force. contingency plan that constitute security FAULTED: (Steam Generalor) s a threat/compromise to site secu Existence of secondary side leaka to site personnel, or a potential degradati rity, threat/risk steam or feed line break) that ge (e.g., SECURITY CONDITION does not on to the level of safety of the plant. A resul generator pressure or the steam ts in an unoontrolted decrease in steam involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

generator being completely depr essurized. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNP FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light the following: (1) An automatic turbi LANNED event involving one or more of slipping drive belts or overheate . Sour ces of smoke such as ne runback >15% thermal react d electrical components do not Electrical load rejection >25% full or power; (2)

Observation of flame is preferred constitute a fire. electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip (4) but is NOT Injec tion System Activation; (5) Thermal Pow  : Safety smoke and/or heat are observed requ ired if large quantities of er Oscillations t10%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible of workers to enforce compliance within the PROTECTED AREA EXPLOS1VE LIMIT (LEL). gase s at conc entra tions > than the LOWER with demands made on WA. The by a body ACTION must threaten to interrupt STRIKE normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held demands will be met by the site.

as leverage against the Site to ensure that TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerou s to life or limb by reason of inhalatio skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO . etc.)

2 n or HOSTILE ACTION: An act towa UNPLANNED: An event or actio rd a nuclear plant or its personnel n that is not the expected result of norm includes the use of violent force to that operations, testing or maintenance. al destroy equipment, take hostages Events that result in corrective or mitig intimidate the licensee to achie , and/or actions being taken in accordance ative ve an end. This includes attack with abnormal or emergency procedur water; using guns, explosives, proje by air, land or UNPLANNED. es are ctiles, vehicles, or other devices used deliver destructive force. Other acts to that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release included. HOSTILE ACTION shou of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the ld NOT be construed to include acts release has not been authorized by of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part 01 a concerted attack definition are unintentional releases.a Discharge Permit (OP). Implicit in this nuclear power plant. on the unmonitored releases, or planned relea that exceed a condition specified on ses the DP. (e.g.. alarm setpoints, minimum HOSTILE FORCE: One or more indiv dilut ion flow, mini mum release times, maximum relea iduals who are engaged in a determine of incorrect tank). se rates, and/or discharge assault, overtly or by stealth and dece d ption, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or caus VALID: An indication, report or condition ing destruction. is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) art instrume IMMINENT: Within two hours. nt channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direc Implicit in this definition is the need for time t observation by plant personnel.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified ly assessment within 15 minutes.

restoration action(s) does not result in reduction in the level of seventy of the a VISI BLE RED or ORANGE PATH condition with DAM AGE: Damage to equipment that is readily obse 15 minutes from identification of the CSF in measurements, testing, or analysis. Dam rvable without Status Tree RED or ORANGE PAT age is sufficient to cause concern H. regarding the continued operability or relia IN1TIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Para bility of affec ted safety structure, meters, radiation monitor readings or system, or component. Example damage personnel observations that identify an includes deformation due to heat or Event for purposes of Emergency Plan impact, denting, penetration, rupture, crack Classification. ing, or pain t blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches

, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization. VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTEC TED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material whic ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage h the failure, destruction, or Installation relea se of, could directly or indirectly endanger the publ exposure to radiation. ic health and safety by Page 34 of 49 Revision 47

rsEQU0YAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF CAT)ON MATRIX I EPIP-1 Refer to Fiss a Prc t ie r

(Section 1) and Continue in This Refer to Fission Product Barrier Column. Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to Fission Product Barrier (Section 1) and Continue in This Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matr Column. ix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Earthquake detected by site seis mic instrumentation. (1 and 2): Tornado or high winds strikes any stru Table 5-1 and results in VISI8LE DAM cture listed in

1. Panel XA-55-158 alarm window 2): AGE. (1 and A 30 (E-2) plus window 22 (0-1) activated.

L A 1, Tornado or high winds (sustained

2. (aorb) >80 m.p.h. > one L L minute on the plant computer) strikes any structure L listed in Table 5-1.

a. Ground motion sensed by plant perso nnel. 2. (aorb)

OR

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE

b. National Earthquake Information .

1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm theCent er at event. OR

b. Control room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to even t.

Note: If site met data is unavailable, National Wea ther Service Morristown 1-(423) -586-8400, provide additional information if need can ed.

Earthquake detected by site seismic Instruments. Tornado within the EXCLUSION ARE (1 and 2): A BOUNDARY.

1. Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 22 1. Plant personnel report a tornado has been (D-1) activated. sighted A within the EXCLUSiON AREA BOUNDA RY L 2. (aorb) A (Figure 5-A)

I- L

a. Ground motion sensed by plant perso 1 nnel.

OR

b. National Earthquake Information Cent er at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

Page 35 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAI-I I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATIO N MATRIX I EPIP1 Refer to the (Section 1).

Refer to ion Product .

(Section 1) and Continue in 7 Refer to the Fission Product Bam er Matrix (Section 1).

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Conimue in This Colu mn.

Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resul River reservoir level is at Stage II Floo ting in VISIBLE d Warning as DAMAGE. (1 and 2): reported by River Operations.

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has A impacted any structure listed in Tabl e 5-1.

IA

2. (sorb) 1 L

a. Confirmed report of VISIBLE L DAMAGE, OR

b. Control Room indications of degr system or component response due aded safety within any structure listed in Table 5-1.to the event Aircraft crash or projectile impact (strik EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY. es) within the River reservoir level Is at Stage I Flood War ning as reported by River Operations.

1. Plant personnel report aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the EXCLUS BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A). ION AREA A

L I..

L Page 36 of 49 Revision 47

SEQLJOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSiF ICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 I I Mode Refer to ml (Section 1) and Continue in Refer to Fission rQcJJf L This Column.

(Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to Fission Product Bar (Section 1) and Continue in rier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Bar This Column. rier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

River reservoir level is 670 Feet as reported by River Operations. Refer to Fission Product Bar rier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

A L

L River reservoir level is <674 Feet as reported by River Operations. Watercraft strikes the ERCW pum pin resulting in a reduction of Essenti g station al Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). (1 and 2):

A L A 1. Plant personnel report a waterer aft has struck the L L ERCW pumping station.

L 2. (sorb)

a. ERCW supply header pressure Train A

1(2)-P)..67493A is < 15 psig.

OR

b. ERCW supply header pressure Train B 1(2)-PI-67-488A is < 15 psig.

Page 37 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I TABLE 5.1 Plant Structure Associated Wit Tornado!High Wind and Aircraf h t EALs Unit #1 Containment Auxiliary Building Turbine Building RWST Unit #2 Containment Diesel Generator Bldg.

CDWE Building Condensate Storage Tanks Control Building ERCW Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs Intake Pumping Station Common Station Service Transfo rmers Page 38 of 49 Revision 47

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX (EPiI-l FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

A 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMEN T

a 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion Table 4-1 4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-A 4.5 Control Room Evacuation Figure 4-B 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADAT ION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 I 7.3 Radiation Levels Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 39 of 49 Revision 47

TSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX Definitions and Abbreviations:

I EPIP-1 I BOMB: An explosive device. 00CM: Offsite Dose Calculati (See EXPLOSION) on Manual is a supporting documen Specs. that contain Rad Efflu t to the Tech CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A grou ent Controls. Environs Monitori p of twenty (20> or more persons methodology for calculating routi ng controls, and violently protesting onsite within the EAB ne gaseous and liquid effluent operations or activities at the monitor alarmitrip setpoints. offsite doses and site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: ORANGE PATH; Monitoring of BOUNDARY consists of MPC Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT the CSF(s) is under severe chall one or more CSFs by FR-0 whic h indic vent and drain port cove shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the enge: prompt operator action is requ ates that r plates), MPC closure ring, and ired.

associated welds. PROJECTiLE: An object eject CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTIO ed, thrown or launched towards resulting in damage sufficient to a prevent significant release N (CSFs): A plant safety funlion cause concern regarding the integplant structure of core radioactivity to the environm required to affected structure or the operabili ty or reliability of safety equipme rity of the six CSFs; Subcriticalily. Core ent. There are therein. The source of the proje nt contained Coo Integrity (Containment) and Inve ling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock. ctile may be onsite or offsite.

ntory (RCS).

PROTECTED AREA: The area EVENT: Assessment of an EVE encompassed by the security fenc NT commences when recognit/ which access is controlled. e and to one or more of the initialing cond on is made that itions associated with the even in this definition is the need t exist. Implicit RCS: The RCS primary side and for timely assessment within 15 its connections up to and including minutes. pressurizer safety and relief valv the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDA es, and other connections up to RY (EAB): That area surroundi the primary and secondary isola and including which the reactor licensee ng the reactor, in tion valves.

has the authority to determine all exclusion or removal of perso activities including RED PATH; Moniloring of one nnel and property from the area. or more CSFs by FR-C which indic Emergency Action Levels, For purposes of CSF(s) is under extreme challenge ates that the based on radiological field meas  ; prompt operator action is required.

assessments, and for design urements and dose calculations, the Site Boundar as the EAB. y shall be defined RUPTURED: (Steam Generator

) Existence of primary to secondar a magnitude greater than the capa y leakage of EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, city one charging pump.

unconfined combustion, or a catas of pressurized or electrical equi trophic failure SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, pment that imparts energy of suffi misalignment, or roisoperation potentially damage permanent cient force to equipment with the intent to rend of plant structures or equipment. er the equipment inoperable.

EXTORTION: An attempt to SECURITY CONDITION: Any Secu cause an action at the site by threa rity Event as listed in the approved t or force. contingency plan that constitute security FAULTED: (Steam Generator> s a threat/compromise to site secu Existence of secondary side leaka to site personnel, or a potential rity, threat/risk steam or feed line break> that ge (e.g., degradation to the level of safety resul SECURITY CONDITION does not of the plant. A generator pressure or the steam ts in an uncontrolled decrease in steam involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

generator being completely depr essurized. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNP FIRE: Combustion character ized the following: (1) An automatic turbi LANNED event involving one or more of slipping drive belts or overheate by heat and light, Sources of smoke such as Electrical load rejection >25% full ne runback >15% thermal react or power (2) d electrical components do not electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Observation of flame is preferred constitute a fire. Injection System Activation; (5) Safety smoke and/or heat are observed but is NOT required if large quantities of Thermal Power Oscillations i0%

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage FLAMMABLE GAS: Combust of workers to enforce complian within the PROTECTED AREA EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

ible gases at concentrations>

than the LOWER ce with demands made on WA. The by a body ACTION must threaten to inter STRIKE rupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dang leverage against the site to ensu erous to life or limb by reason of inha demands will be met by the site. re that skin contact (e.g.. chlorine, CO lation or 2 etc.)

HOSTILE ACTION: An act towa UNPLANNED: An event or actio rd a nuclear plant or its personnel n that is not the expected result of norm includes the use of violent force that operations, testing or maintenance. al to destroy equipment, take hostages Events that result in corrective or mitig intimidate the licensee to achieve , and/or actions being taken in accordan with ative an end. This includes attack by air, ce abno rmal or emer gency procedures are water; using guns, explosives, proje land or UNPLANNED.

ctiles, vehicles, or other devices deliver destructive force. Other used to acts that satisfy the overall intent may UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release included. HOSTILE ACTION shou be of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the ld NOT be construed to include release has not been authorized disobedience or felonious acts that acts of civil by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in are not part of a concerted attack on definition are unintentional releases, this nuclear power plant. the unmonitored releases, or planned that exceed a condition specified on releases the OP. (e.g.. alarm setpoints, minimum HOSTILE FORCE: One or more indiv dilution flow, minimum release time iduals who are engaged In a determine s, maximum release rates, and/or disch ol incorrect tank). arge assault, overtly or by stealth and dece d ption, equipped with suitable weap capable of killing, maiming, or caus ons ing destruction. VALID: An indication, report or cond ition is considered to be VALID when conclusively verified by (1) an instrume it is IMMINENT: Within two hours. nt channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for INEFFECTIVE: When the spec timely assessment within 15 minutes.

ified restoration action(s) does not resul reduction in the level of severity of the t in a VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipme RED 15 minutes from identification of the CSF or ORANGE PATH condition within nt measurements, testing, or analysis. Dam that is readily observable without Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH. age is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or relia INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Para bility of affected safety structure, meters, radiation monitor readings or system, or component. Example damage personnel observations that identify includes deformation due to heat or an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan impact, denting, penetration. rupture, crack ing, or Classification. blemishes (e.g., painl chipping. scratches etc.) paint blistering. Surface

, should NOT be included as visible damage.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the prote area without authorization. cted VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTEC TED AREA which contains equipment, systems. devices, or material whic ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage h the failure, destruction, or Installation. release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 40 of 49 Revision 47

[SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICA TION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I I Mdde

!9L Refer to Gaseous L...uents

,. ..n I.,,

in This Column. . .

Not,.

Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover active fuel in the Complete loss of function needed reactor vessel, to achieve or (1 and 2 and 3): maintain hot shutdown. (1 and [2a or 2b]):

1. Loss of RHR capability. 1. Hot shutdown required 5, 2. VALID indication that reactor 1, vessel water level 2a. CSF status tree indicated Core Coo ci. 695. ling Red (FR Ci).

6 3. Incore TCs (if available) indic 2,

ate RCS temperature OR

> 200 F.

2b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red Note: if containment is open refer (RHR shutdown cooling not in service). (FR-H.1)

(Section 7.1) and continue in this to Gaseous Effluents 4 column.

Note: Refer to Reactor Protection Syst em Failure (Section 2.3) and Continue in This Column.

Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown when required (1 and 2): Complete loss of function needed to achieve cold shutdown when cold shutdown requ

1. Cold shutdown required by ired by Tech.

Technical Specs. Specs. (1 and 2 and 3):

2. Incore TCs (if available) indic 1. Cold shutdown required by Tech.

5, temperature ate core exit 1, Specs.

>200F. 2. Loss of RHR shutdown cooling capa bility.

6 2,

3. Loss of secondary heat sink and main condenser 3,

Note: If containment is open refer to 4 Note: Also refer to Failure of Rx Pmte ctian (Section (Section 7.1) and cor,tthue in this Gas eous Effluents column. 2.3) and Continue in This Column.

Not Applicable.

I 1, Inability to reach required shutdown with Spec, limits.

1. The unit has not been placed in the required in Tech.

mode within the time prescribed by the LC0 action statement.

2, 3,

4 Page 41 of 49 Revision 47

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICA TION MATRIX EPIP-1 Ude ReferIo in This Column.

Refer to Gaseous Effluents (Section in This Column. 7.1) and Continue Refer to Gaseous Effluents (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.

Loss of REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM inve with inadequate makeup. (1 and 2 and ntory 3):

1. Reactor cootant system is pressurize d above atmospheric pressure.

5,

2. Unplanned decrease in RCS or pressurize r level requiring initiation of makeup to the RCS.

6

3. With reactor coolant system temperature stabl e, the pressurizer level continues to decrease follo wing initiation of RCS makeup.

Page 42 of 49 Revision 47

[QUOYAH J EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier (Modes 1-4) 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion Table 4-1 4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-A 4.5 Control Room Evacuation Figure 4-B 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 AircraftlProjectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7

7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 43 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATIO Definitions and Abbreviations:

N MATRIX I EPIP-1 I BOMB: An explosive davce. (See ODUM: Otfsite Dose Calculation Manua EXPLOSION)

Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Contro l is a supporting document to the Tech ls, CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB methodology for calculating routine gase Environs Monitoring controls, and violently protesting onsite operation monitor alarm/trip setpoints. ous and liquid effluent offsite doses and s or activities at the site.

CONFINEMENT BQUNDRY; Spen ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or t Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT more CSFs by FR-U which indicates that BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, the CSF(s) is under severe challenge bottom baseptate, MPC lid (including  ; prompt operator action is required.

vent and drain port cover plate s), MPC closure nog, and associated welds.the PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSF resulting in damage sufficient to caus or launched towards a plant structure s): A plant safety function required to e conc prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. Ther affected structure or the operability or reliabiern regarding the integrity of the six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Coolin e are therein. The source of the projectile lity of safety equipment contained

g. Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal may be onsite or offsite.

Integrity (Containment) and Inve Shock, ntory (RCS).

PROTECTED AREA: The area enco EVENT: Assessment of an EVEN mpassed by the security fence and T commences when recognition is which access is controlled. to one or more or the initiating cond made that ition in this definition is the need for timely s associaled with the event exist. Implicit RCS: The RCS primary side and its conn assessment within 15 minutes. ections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY other connections up to and including (EAL3): That area surrounding the the primary and secondary isolation valv which the reactor licensee has the reactor, in es.

authority to determine all activities exclusion or removal of personnel including RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more and property from the area. For purposes CSF Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and of CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prom s by FR-U which indicates that the assessments, and for design calcu dose pt operator action is required.

lations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Exis tence of primary to secondary leakage a magnitude greater than the capacity one of EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent. unco charging pump.

nfined combustion, or a catastroph failure of pressurized or electrical equi ic SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, pment potentially damage permanent struc that imparts energy of sufficient force to equipment with the intent to render the misalignment, or misoperation of plan t

tures or equipment. equipment inoperable.

EXTORTION; An attempt to caus SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security e an action at the site by threat or force. Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threa FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Exis to site personnel, or a potential degr t/compromise to site security, threat/risk tence of secondary side leakage adation to the level of safety of the plan steam or feed tine break) that results (e.g., SECURITY CONDITION does not involv t. A in generator pressure or the steam gene an uncontrolled decrease in steam e a HOSTILE ACTION.

rator being completely depressurized

. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPL FIRE: Combustion characterized ANNED event involving one or more by heat and light. Sources of smoke such the following: (1) An automatic turbine runb of slipping drive belts or overheate d electrical components do not constit as Electrical load rejection >25% full electric ack >15% thermal reactor power (2)

Observation of flame is preferred but ute a fire. al load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety is NOT require Injection System Activation; (5) Ther smoke and/or heat are observed d if large quantities of mal Power Oscillations 210%.

STRIHE ACTION: A work stoppage FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible within the PROTECTED AREA by a body gases at concentrations > than the LOWE of workers to enforce compliance with dem EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL), R ACTION must threaten to interrupt norm ands made on TVA. The STR1KE al plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as lever TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerou to age against the site to ensure that s life or limb by reason of inhalatio or demands will be met by the site. skin contact (e.g., chtorine, CO n 2 , etc.)

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward UNPLANNED: An event or action that a nuclear plant or its personnel that is not the expected result of normal includes the use of violent force to destr operations, testing or maintenance. Even oy equipment, take hostages, and/or ts that result in corrective or mitigative intimidate the licensee to achieve actions being taken in accordance with abno an and. This includes attack by air, land rmal or emergency procedures are water: using guns, explosives, projectile or UNPLANNED.

s, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioac included. HOSTILE ACTION shou tivity Is UNPLANNED if the ld NOT be construed to include acts of civil release has not been authorized by a Disc disobedience or felonious acts that are harge Permit (DP). Implicit in this not part of a concerted attack on the definition are unintentional releases, unm nuclear power plant. onitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g.

dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum , alarm setpoints, minimum HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individ release rates, and/or discharge uals who are engaged in a determine of incorrect tank>.

assault, overtly or by stealth and dece d ption, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destr VALID: An indication, report or condition is cons uction. idered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument chan nel chec IMMINENT: Within two hours, related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direc obse k, or (2) indication on t

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely asses rvation by plant personnel.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified resto sment within 15 minutes.

ratio reduction in the level of severity of the RED n action(s) does not result in a VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that or ORANGE PATH condition within is readily observable without 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Statu measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage s Tree RED or ORANGE PATH. is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Paramete of affected safety structure, rs, radiation monitor readings or system, or component. Example damage inclu personnel observations that identify an Even des deformation due to heat or t [or purposes of Emergency Plan impact, denting, penetration, rupture, crack ing, or paint Classification. blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) shou blistering. Surface ld NOT be included as visible damage.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected host ile individual present in the protected area without authorization. VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installa , destruction, or tion release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 44 of 49 Revision 47

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIF ICATION MATRIX I EPIP1 I Mode 1

Mo 8 from an actu release of gaseous radloactvit >al or imminent Not Applicable.

On y I Rem TEDE or

>5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actu duration of release. (1 or 2 or al or projected

.3):

A 1. A VALID red monitor read ing exceeds the values under General Emergency in Table L 7-1 for assessment within that 15 mm conf >15 nun, unless irms that the criterion is L not exceeded.

OR

2. Field surveys indicate >lRe mlhr amma or an I..131 concentration of 3.9E-06 LlCi lcm at the EAB (Fig. 7-A)

3. Dose assessment results indic ate EAB dose >1 Rem TEDE or >5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actua l or projected duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).

EAB dose resulting from an actu al or Imminent release of gaseous radioactivi Not Applicable.

ty >1 00 mr-em TEDE or

>500 mr-em thyroid CDE for actu al or projected duration of release. (1 or 2 or 3):

A 1, A VALID rad monitor reading > Tabl Area for> 15 mirt, unless assessmene 7-1 values under Site L confirms that the criterion is not t with in that 15 mm exceeded.

L OR

2. Field surveys indicate >100 mrem lhr gamma or an 1-131 conc of 3.9E-07 pCWcnu at the EAB (Fig. 7-A).

OR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >101) mmcm TEDE or >500 mmem thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of the release (Fig. 7-A)

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the 00C Any UNPLANNED release of liqui M Section 1.2.2.1 d radioactivity that Limit for >15 minutes. (1 or 2 exceeds 200 times the 00CM Sec or 3 or 4) tion 1.2.1.1 LimIt for >15 mInutes. (1 or 2)

1. A VALID red monitor reading

> Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 minutes, unless asses A sment within that 15 minutes confirms that the criterion is not exce

1. A VALID red monitor reading > Table 7-1 valu es L eded. A under Alert for >15 minutes, unl ess assessment OR within this time period confirms that L 2. Field surveys indicate >10 mrenhr gamma at the EAB for L the criterion is

>15 minutes (Fig 7-A). not exceeded.

OR OR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release 2. Sample results indicate an ECL >200 (Fig. 7-A). times the

4. E Sample results exceed 200 times the 00CM limit value for an unmonitored rele ase of 00CM limit value for liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in an unrnonitored release of gaseous radio duration activity >15 minutes in duration.

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseou s radioactivity Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioac that exceeds 2 times the 00CM Sec tivity to tion 1.2.2.1 Limit the environment that exceeds 2 tim for >60 minutes. (1 or 2 or 3 or 4) es the 00CM Section 1.2.1.1 Limit for >60 minutes

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 (lor2) values under liE for >60 minutes. unless assessment with A confirms that the criterion l not exce in that 60 minutes L eded. A 1. A VALID rad monitor reading> Table 7-1 valu es OR under UE for >60 minutes, unless assessm L 2. Field surveys indicate >0.1 mrenulhr gam ma at the EAB for L ent 760 minutes (Fig 7-A>

, within this time period confirms that the I criterion is not exceeded.

OR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Fig. OR 7-A).

4. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODC 2. Sample results indicate an ECL >2 times the 00C M limit value for an M unmonitored release of gaseous radioactiv limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid ity >60 minutes in duration radioactivity >60 minutes in duration, Page 45 of 49 Revision 47

SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASS1FIC ATON MATRIX I EPiP-i Mode Refer to Fissi (Sclion 1) or Gaseous Efflu Refer to Continue in This Section. ents (Section 7.1) and i) and Continue in This Section. ,.

Refer to Fission Product Barrier (Section 1) or Gaseous Efflu Matrix ents (Section 7.1) and Refer to Gaseous Effluents (Sec Continue in This Section. tion 7.1) and Continue in This Section.

UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes safe ope Major damage to irradiated fue rations or l or loss of water establishment or maintenanc level that has or will uncove e of cold shutdown. r irradiated fuel outside (1 or 2): the reactor vessel. (1 and 2):

A 1. VALID area radiation mon itor readings or survey 1. VALID alarm on 0-RM-90-101 8 or 0-RM-90-1 02 or L results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the A 0..RM-90-103 or 1-RM-90-130 control room or or 2-RM-90-130 or L 1-RM-90-131 or 2-RM-90-131 1-RM CAS. 1 12A or 1-RM-90-1 128 or 2-RM90-1 12A L 1128.

or 2-RM OR

2. (sandb):

2. (a orb):

a. VALID area radiation monitor read ings exceed values listed in Table 7-2. a. Plant personnel report damage to irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods.

b. Access restrictions impede oper ation necessary for safe operation or the of systems OR establish cold shutdown (See Note ability to Below).

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered in the spent fuel pool or transfer canal.

UNPLANNED increase in radiati on levels within the facility. UNPLANNED loss of water level in spe nt fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel

1. A VALID area radiation monitor remaining covered. (1 and 2 and 3):

reading increases by 1000 mremlhr over the highest read ing in A hours excluding the current peak value. the past 24 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel L A pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal.

Note: In either the VE orALERT EAL, the L L SED determine the cause of increase in radia must 2. VALID alarm on 0-RM-90-IO1B or 0-RM-9 levels and review other initiating condition tion L 0-RM-90-1 03.

0102 or applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mrer s for n/hrin the control room could be caused by a 3. Fuel remains covered with water.

associated with a DBA).

rele ase Page 46 of 49 Revision 47

TSEQUOYAH j EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICA TION MATRIX 1 EPIPml I I

Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

Not Applicable, Damage to a loaded cask CONFINE MENT BOUNDARY from: (1 or 2 or 3)

1. Natural phenomena (e.g., seismic even t, torna flood, lightning, snowlice accumulation. etc.) do, A

I OR L 2. Accident (e.g: dropped cask, tipped over cask explosion, missile damage, fire damage, buria l under debris, etc).

OR

3. Judgment of the Site Emergency Director that the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY damage is a degradation in the level of safety of the ISFS I

Page 47 of 49 Revision 47

[iEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATIO N MATRIX I EPIP-Il TABLE 7-I EFFLUENT RADIATiON MO NITOR EALS NOTE: The monitor values belo w, if met or exceeded, indicate the be completed within 15 minutes (60 need to perform the required assessmen reading. minutes for UE), the appropriate emer t. If the assessment can not gency classification shall be made base d on the VALID GASEOUS MONITORS 21 Uni tst tiE Alert SAE General Site Total Release Limit p.Ci/s 4.90E÷05 4.SOE+07 1-Rl9O40O (EFF LEVEL) U-I 1 .34E+08 1 .34E+09

- Shield Bldg p.CiIs 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1 .34E+08 1 .34E+09 2-Rl9Q-4OO (EFF LEVEL) 11-2 Shi

- eld Bldg gCi/s 4.90E+05 O-RM-90-IOIB -Auxiliary Bldg 4.90E+07 I .34E+08 1 .34E+09 cpm 1 .03E+05 Offscale O-RM-90-1328 Off1 t scale Offscale

- Service Bldg cpm 2.62E÷06 ttsca Off 1 le 1-Rl-90421 thru 424 U-I MSL Ma Offscale 1 Off scale<

nitors jiCi/cc 1,71 E-01 1.71 E+O1 4.68E+01 4.68E+02 2-RI-90-421 thru 424 U-2 MSL Mo nitors isCi/co 1.71 E-01 1.71 E+01 4.68E+01 4.68E+02 1-RM-90-255 or 256A U-I CVE mR/h 4.1OE+02 4.IOE+04 2-RM-9Q..255 or 256A I .12E+05 1 .12E+06

- U-2 CVE mR/h 4.1OE+02 4.10E+04 1.12E+05 RELEASE DUFA TION 1.12E+06 minutes >60 >15 >15 >15 LIQUID MONITORS Units tiE Alert Site Area General Site Total Re/ease Limit pCi/mI 8.20E-03 8.20E-01 O-RM-90-122 RadWaste N/A N/A cpm 1 .74E+06 t Qff scale 1-RM-90-120,121 S!G Bldn N/A N/A cpm I .27E+06 Ofiscale 2-RM-90-120,121 S1G Bldn N/A N/A cpm 1 .27E÷06 Off1 t scale 0-RM-90-225 Condensate Demin N/A N/A cpm 1.65E+06 OffscaleW O-RM-90-21 2 Turbine Building Sum N/A N/A p cpm 2.92E+03 2.92E+05 NIA N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes >60 >15 ASSESSMENT METHODS: >15 >15

• Airborne Dose Assessment per SON EPlP13 Dose Asse

• ODCM Liquid Release Rate assessment per ssment

• Integrated Airborne SON 0-Tl-CEM-030.030.0 Release Rate assessment per SQN 0-TI-CEM

-030.030.0 (1) The calculated value is outside of the upper range for this detector. The I .OE÷07 cpm. Releases in excess maximum monitor output which can be read of monitor capacity should be evaluated for is Assessment. proper classification by use of Dose (2) These unit values are based on flow rates through one PORV of 890,000 lb/hr (0.9975 quality). Before using these values, at 1078.7 psia ensure a release to the environment is ongoing, with 0.25% carry over (e.g., PORV).

NOTE 1: These EALs are based on the assumption that plant. In all cases, the total site EAL is the limitan emergency release is restricted to one pathway from the release paths from the plant, it is the total ing value. Therefore, in the case where ther e are release EAL (obtained from ICS and/or SQN 0-Tl-CEM multiple Manual Calculation of Plant Gas, Iodine, -030-030, and Particulate Release Rates for Offsite Dose Calc (00CM) Compliance) that will determine whet ulation Manual her an emergency classification is warranted.

NOTE 2: In the case when there is no CECC dose assessment available, the length and release is the key in determining the classifica relative magnitude of the tion. For example, in the case of the NOUE EAL of Tech Spec limit, the classification is bas 2 time ed more on the fact that a release above the limit has cont s the unabated for more than 60 minutes, than on the inued projected offsite dose.

NOTE 3: See REP Appendix B for basis informati on.

Page 48 of 49 Revision 47

C L..

0 a,

-c .c c c .c ..c c c .c .c .c

.. ;t c

E uEEEEEEEEEEE 0 w 0 C

0 000 a) ) + + ++

)

+

c 0 000) 4-00

++++ ++)

c CC W Ui Ui Ui L1JLLI LU Ui LU Ui LU LU

> C) L)I)L()LOLL a) 0

>< 2 a,

0 a,

2 U)

U) z a, ooooooqq0Q 0 .0 C)

.tu)c C) C a,

0 0

Hi C-, > a, tjiijiIi Hi .0 C) a, C) (1) 0 C) -C t c 0) 0 (U 0 -C

-J 0 a,

m E C) C) V a) 0) a, z > ,

00 2 ci)

C L COEE CVVNC)

+ 0)

.1 0 0Q . LU (U a,

a) U-0 0jL1 LC

>- 0 L< u C) C 0 .

c 0

2 a, LU a, X WOWOLLLL 0 a) -o_xz ø-O C E a, Ui a) c t.iQ au->(I) a c Z c a,

-C øcoQc,)<OOC Oc)OQ >

a, Lii U)

---

0 2 C 0

0 U 2 a,

ed CJc) a)z;- °? T00CC0- t) .0 a,

a)

-C

°??

0 0 o çcçcçcç

- t D 0 - 00000 a) w 0

C)

SON GENERAL EMERGENCY EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0042 Page 27 of 31 Appendix H (Page 1 of 2)

INITIAL PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATiONS Note 1: iF flowchart decision block conditions are unknown THEN answer NO.

Note 2: State agencies have provided prior knowledge of offsite impediments to evacuation (such as flooding, bridge/road closures, etc.) and recommend that any needed PAR should be sheiter(Rec

1. 3)

Note 3 A short term release is defined as a release that does not exceed a 15 minute duration ABLE,1 Picthie Act on Gukb (PAG)

LIMIT I 3.9 6 mlcbCi/ccIodlne 131 Evacuate 2 mile radius and 10 Evacuate 2 nil e fadluS and 5 I is mile downwind and Shelter mde downwind and Shelter I ,

remainder of 10 mile remainder of 10 mile v D IIPROJECTE

-OR a.,-

El EPZ

- S IIM Thyroid CCE -

SQN GENERAL EMERGENCY EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0042 Page 28 of 31 Appendix H (Page 2 of 2)

INITIAL PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS UPGRADE PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION Note 1: IF flowchart dec4epn block conditions ore uflkhown THEN answer NO.

Note 2: State agencies have provided prior knowledge of offslte impedments to evacuation (such as flooding. bridge/road closures, etc.) and recommend that any needed PAR zhouid be shelter (Rec #3)

Note a: A short term release Is defined us a release that dOes not e,tceed a 15 mInute duration Note 4: Plant conditions ate undovstoOd (Source term). Reldaw, pathway undorstood(flltorediunfiitered. olOvatod. C..t.*n PAR b.od on change. in any oV the follOwing areas:

monitored), and meteorologIcal informatiOn Is available.

• moron. In dose assessment projected values.

Note 5: Refer to site EAL (EFN 231. SON 1.3.5. WBN 1.3.5)

• Increase in field team measured dose vaiu.

• Shift in 15 rain vantga wind diroOtlon resulting in additional soctorS belnO affected.

State provides infomwtlon that Oftalie impediments no iong.r exist.

Hostile Action Eent has b.on terminated.

• Cont&nlnent Red L.Ovois 20 % (sea Note S)

TABLE j.Proteciis.o Aefien Guide. (PAO)

IIMeASURD .. 3,yI f ii ,dsn Cl/ri. ill io.tn, 1:41

- . OR REMm(eU,Og.(fliili3fl.o I.:.

ItuIOJETd

,..:: i.oR L:..:-.: ItM:Tiiyttitd C .