ML13178A368

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2013 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Initial License Examination Administered Scenarios
ML13178A368
Person / Time
Site: Perry  FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/14/2013
From:
NRC/RGN-III
To:
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
Bielby, M.
Shared Package
ML11354A271 List:
References
Download: ML13178A368 (73)
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Text

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.: 1-93% Op-Test No.: 2013-01 Examiners: Operators: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: Reactor power was lowered to ~93% power two hours ago for Quarterly Turbine Stop and Control Valve SVI (which was just completed last shift). M29 Boiler is out of service for repair. NCC B pump is OOS to replace motor. IOI-3 Attachment 3 at Step 2.0. Rods at Step 69. A Severe Thunderstorm Watch is in effect for Lake County. Not in ONI-ZZZ-1, but doing ONI walkdowns. PSA Risk is Green. Grid is Normal.

Turnover: Start ECC B pump for vibration testing (Maintenance Engineering is waiting). When concurrence granted from WCC, restore Rx Power per IOI-3 to 100%.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N (BOP/ Start ECC B pump SRO) 2 R (ATC/ Raise Rx power with flow to 100%

SRO)

CP03_1P4 3 2C0001B C (BOP) ECC B Pump slow degradation, Enter TS 3.7.10 C (SRO) 4 B21n0073g Small OBE Earthquake. Enter ONI-D51 Earthquake C (BOP) Inadvertent HPCS initiation. Enter ONI-E12-1 Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS C (SRO) or RCIC. Enter ONI-C51 on HPCS injection. Enter T.S. 3.5.1 5 M (ALL) Large OBE Earthquake causes failure of SJAE (H2 recombiner leak). Enter C (BOP/ ONI-D51, ONI-D17 & ONI-N11 SRO) Lower Rx power with Flow then insert manual Rx scram R (ATC/

SRO) 6 Earthquake causes loss of RPV Level Indication (L8) resulting in loss of FW C (ATC/

& HPCS. Enter EOP-1 RPV control.

Zd1c71s1 SRO)

Mode switch fails. (A&D Manual P/Bs works) 7 Enter EOP-04-4 RPV Flooding Rv04_1b21 f0051c C (BOP/ ADS SRV fails to open.

SRO)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor FENOC Facsimile Rev 1

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 1 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

N/A - Driver Instructions Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:

Reset Simulator to IC 90 Load Schedule File: NRC 2013 Scen 1.sch Verify Schedule File Loaded: ECC_B_Pump_failure.sch loss_level-min.sch seismic_Hi-OBE.sch seismic_Low-OBE.sch SJAE-Failure.sch SJAE-Fix.sch NRC-13_info.sch Verify Event File Loaded: NRC 2013 Scen 1.evt Verify APRM gains are adjusted and recorders in SLOW speed Verify temporary Recirc placard is removed from P680.

Note: All Schedule files and Event files should be in the respective EXAM folder.

Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:

Reactor Power 93%. BOL Pull Sheets, Rods @ Step 69.

IOI-3 Attachment 3 Power Maneuvering.

Place yellow switch cap on NCC B pump control switch.

PSA - Green Risk.

Grid - Normal Driver Driver Turnover:

Reactor power was lowered to ~93% power two hours ago for Quarterly Turbine Stop and Control Valve SVI (which was just completed last shift). M29 Boiler is out of service for repair. NCC B pump is OOS to replace motor. IOI-3 Attachment 3 at Step 2.0. Rods at Step 69. A Severe Thunderstorm watch is in effect for Lake County. Not in ONI-ZZZ-1, but doing ONI walkdowns.

Start ECC B pump for vibration testing then notify Maintenance Engineering (Jeff Reeves. When concurrence granted from WCC, restore Rx Power per IOI-3 to 100%.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 2 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

1 - Start ECC B pump Cue: From Turnover - SRO direction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Role play as NLO, Chemistry and Maintenance Engineering as necessary to support ECC B startup.

SRO Ensures plant operations are conducted IAW Operations Expectations and Standards.

SRO Directs BOP to start ECC B pump IAW SOI-P42.

Driver If asked to walkdown pump, respond, Pump is ready for a start, oil level in bubbler is sat.

BOP Starts ECC B pump IAW SOI-P42 SOI-P42 Sect 4.4 ECC Loop Manual Startup Driver If asked, ESW not required BOP 4.4.1 IF required, THEN REFER TO SOI-P45/49, ESW Loop A(B) Manual Startup from Standby Readiness and STARTUP the ESW Loop.

4.4.2 TAKE the oncoming ECC PUMP control switch to START.

1P42-C001B 4.4.3 NOTIFY Chemistry to sample as required.

4.4.4 IF the Combustible Gas Control System Hydrogen Analyzer is in service OR standby, THEN VERIFY the following valves are open:

COMB GAS H2 ANAL OUTLET CLG VLV 1M51-F260B COMB GAS H2 ANAL INLET CLG VLV 1M51-F270B BOP Informs SRO that ECC B pump startup is complete Notifies Maintenance Engineering that ECC B pump is started.

Driver Driver While BOP is performing ECC B pump start, call as Wadsworth Dispatcher and inform operator that power can now be raised to 100%

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 3 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

2 - Raise Rx power with flow to 100%

Cue: Call from Wadsworth Dispatcher Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs ATC to raise power to 100% using flow IAW Reactivity Plan, IOI-3, and SOI-B33 ATC Commences raising reactor power to 100%

SOI-B33 Sect 7.7 Rcirc Flow Control in Loop Manual 7.7.1 CONFIRM RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is in MAN. 1B33-K603A 7.7.2 CONFIRM RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is in MAN. 1B33-K603B 7.7.3 PERFORM the following concurrently as required for the desired Recirc Flow:

ADJUST RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL with the slide switch.

1B33-K603A ADJUST RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL with the slide switch.

1B33-K603B Driver Role play as necessary as Shift Manager, Chemistry, RP, etc.

Evaluator Note: It takes almost 2 minutes from the time the next Event is triggered until the first alarm comes in.

Driver Driver When Power is restored to 100% or Evaluator has determined sufficient power increase has been achieved, proceed to next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 4 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

3 - ECC B Pump slow degradation, Enter TS 3.7.10 Cue: Annunciator H13-P601-17A-C6 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When directed, initiate Event 3.

BOP Respond to annunciator H13-P601-17A-C6, ECC PUMP B DISCHARGE PRESSURE LOW BOP Direct NLO to investigate ECC B pump.

Evaluator NOTE: If ECC not S/D within 5 minutes, the ECC HX B OUTLET FLOW LOW alarm is also received.

Driver Role play as NLO to investigate ECC B pump. Report pump is making abnormal noise and is vibrating more than normal.

BOP Report ECC parameters and NLO findings to SRO.

SRO Direct shutdown on ECC B pump Evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.10 for 1 ECCW Subsystem INOP and OAI-1701 to ensure appropriate actions taken.

(T.S. 3.7.10 Cond A, 3.4.9 RHR Hot Shutdown, 3.5.1 RHR B and C, 3.6.1.7 Cntmt Spray, 3.6.2.3 SP Cooling, P47B, 3.6.3.3 Comb Gas Mixing, 3.7.4 CR HVAC, M23/24 B, M28B, ORM 6.2.21 H2 Analyzer).

Driver NOTE: Remote function HV39 can be used to secure the ECC B Pump Area Ventilation fan.

BOP Secures ECC B pump IAW SOI-P42 BOP 6.1.1 IF shutting down ECC Loop (B) to Standby Readiness, THEN CONFIRM the following automatic initiation signals are reset:

  • LOOP initiation 6.1.3 IF shutting down ECC Loop B to standby readiness, THEN PERFORM the following 6.1.3.a VERIFY the following:
  • RHR Pump B is shutdown in accordance with SOI-E12.
  • RHR Pump C is shutdown in accordance with SOI-E12.
  • RHR B Room Cooler is shutdown in accordance with SOI-M39.
  • RHR C Room Cooler is shutdown in accordance with SOI-M39.
  • CCCW Chiller B is shutdown in accordance with SOI-P47.

6.1.5 CONFIRM the offgoing ECC HX OUT TEMP is > 60°F. P42-R052B

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 5 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

3 - ECC B Pump slow degradation, Enter TS 3.7.10 Cue: Annunciator H13-P601-17A-C6 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 6.1.6 TAKE the offgoing ECC PUMP control switch to STOP. 1P42-C001B 6.1.7 IF the H2 Analyzer is required to remain in service OR standby by an approved instruction or Notification, THEN VERIFY the following valves are open:

  • COMB GAS H2 ANAL INLET CLG VLV 1M51-F270A 1M51-F270B 6.1.8 REFER TO SOI-M28, Emergency Closed Cooling Pump Area Cooling System and PERFORM Shutdown to Standby Readiness.

BOP Informs Crew that ECC B pump is secured.

Directs NLO to shutdown ECC B pump area ventilation.

Evaluator SRO may direct ECC B pump to be shutdown to secured status.

RO Shutdown ECC B pump to secured status as directed.

Driver Driver If directed to rack-out breaker EF1D04 for ECC B pump, wait 10 minutes then use Remote Function SW058 to rack-out breaker.

Driver Driver When directed, proceed to the next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 6 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

4 - Small OBE Earthquake. Enter ONI-D51 Earthquake, Inadvertent HPCS initiation.

Enter ONI-E12-1 Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS. Enter ONI-C51 on HPCS injection.

Cues: ONI-D51 Annunciator H13-P680-8A B3 & C3 ONI-E12-1 Annunciator H13-P601-16A-C5 ONI-C51 Annunciator H13-P680-3A-A9 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When directed, initiate Event 4.

Driver Immediately following initiation of Event 4, call as plant personnel and report the occurrence of an earthquake.

Role play as plant personnel to support crew activities.

Crew Crew responds to alarms / recognizes seismic event and inadvertent initiation of HPCS.

SRO Announces entry into ONI-E12-1 and ONI-D51.

If HPCS injected into RPV and Rx power changed, announce entry into ONI-C51.

BOP Overrides HPCS pump to OFF after US concurrence.

BOP Investigates H13-P969 for seismic alarms and reports discovery of 1 Red and multiple Amber seismic lights.

SRO Directs ONI-E12-1 and ONI-D51 Supplemental Actions or assigns owner.

BOP Performs ONI-E12-1 Supplemental Actions, including - verify closed HPCS injection valve, 1E22-F004 BOP Performs ONI-D51 Supplemental Actions, including - Attachments 1, 2 & 3.

Driver Driver NOTE: If asked to investigate, the EVENT INDICATOR flag on H51-P021 is white, and the SEISMIC SWITCH YELLOW light is illuminated on H51-P021.

SRO If power change (HPCS injection) observed, enter ONI-C51 flow chart.

Directs actions IAW ONI-C51 flowchart.

Directs normal plant shutdown per IOI-3 as directed by ONI-D51 Step 4.5.1 Directs ROs to perform other time sensitive ONI-D51 Supplemental Actions Evaluates T.S. for INOPERABILITY of HPCS per Technical Specifications 3.5.1, 3.3.5.1, 3.3.6.1, & ORM 6.2.7 (Seismic Monitoring)

Driver Driver When directed, proceed to next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 7 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - Large OBE Earthquake causes failure of SJAE. Enter ONI-D51, ONI-D17 & ONI-N11, Mode Switch failure Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-3A-C6 & C7 (ONI-D51)

Annunciators H13-P680-4A-E2 & E11 (ONI-D51)

Red and Amber lights illuminated on H13-P969 (ONI-D51)

Annunciators H13-P680-7A-A9 & A11 (ONI-D17)

Annunciator H13-P845-E5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator NOTE: Mark time of initiation of Event 5 __________ and mark time of closure of 1N62-F020A ___________for evaluation of critical task.

Duration should not exceed 15 minutes.

Driver Driver When directed, initiate Event 5.

Driver Driver Immediately following initiation of Event 5, call as plant personnel and report the occurrence of an earthquake.

Role play as plant personnel to support crew activities.

Crew Responds to field report of second earthquake.

Crew Responds to Offgas / Radiation alarms and informs Unit Supervisor of earthquake and Offgas/SJAE problem.

Evaluator NOTE: Closing 1N62-F020A, MN STEAM TO SJAE SUPPLY will isolate the leak. This will also require a Rx shutdown as Main Condenser vacuum will be lost.

Driver Driver Verify Event 18 initiates when 1N62-F020A is taken to CLOSE Driver Driver NOTE: If crew fails to close 1N62-F020A, but the MSIVs close, then initiate Event 18 manually.

Evaluator NOTE: Actions to isolate SJAEs are specific in ONI-D17 and ONI-D51 rather than general in ONI-N11. Therefore, US may not enter ONI-N11.

SRO Announces entry into ONI-D51, ONI-D17, and ONI-N11.

BOP Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of ONI-D17 & ONI-N11: (Evacuate the area).

SRO Directs Supplemental Actions of ONI-D51, ONI-D17, and ONI-N11 BOP Performs Supplemental Actions ONI-D51, ONI-D17, and ONI-N11 SRO Directs RO to isolate steam to SJAE IAW ONI-D17 or ONI-D51 (Critical Task #1)

BOP Isolates steam to SJAE. (Critical Task #1)

SRO Directs ATC to Close both RCIRC Loop Flow Control Valves simultaneously until total core flow is approximately 58 Mlbm/hour and insert a manual scram per ONI-D17 or D51 supplemental actions ATC Closes both RCIRC Loop Flow Control Valves simultaneously until total core flow is approximately 58 Mlbm/hour and inserts a manual scram per ONI-D17 or D51 supplemental actions.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 8 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - Large OBE Earthquake causes failure of SJAE. Enter ONI-D51, ONI-D17 & ONI-N11, Mode Switch failure Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-3A-C6 & C7 (ONI-D51)

Annunciators H13-P680-4A-E2 & E11 (ONI-D51)

Red and Amber lights illuminated on H13-P969 (ONI-D51)

Annunciators H13-P680-7A-A9 & A11 (ONI-D17)

Annunciator H13-P845-E5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognizes failure to scram from Mode Switch and initiates RPS. Determines RPS pushbutton actuation successful in inserting all control rods.

Performs SCRAM Hardcard actions:

Verify the following actions are complete:

  • Mode Switch Locked in Shutdown

If Reactor Recirc Pumps are running in fast speed:

Then simultaneously take the following to XFER:

  • RECIRC PUMP A BRKR 5A
  • RECIRC PUMP B BRKR 5B IF Reactor power is above 4%, THEN START SLC A and SLC B pumps.

Perform crew update with the following information:

  • The Mode Switch is locked in Shutdown (Report any failures)
  • If RPS was initiated, the RPS is initiated (Report any failures)
  • If ARI was initiated, then ARI is initiated (Report any failures)
  • Reactor Power is ________________ %
  • Reactor Pressure is _______________ psig
  • Reactor Level is ________________ inches
  • Reactor Recirc Pumps (Running in Slow Speed/Tripped)
  • EOP-01 Entry (only if conditions met): L2, Rx Press Hi, RPS Failure

Evaluator ATC should report EOP-1 Entry on RPS (Mode Switch) failure

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 9 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - Large OBE Earthquake causes failure of SJAE. Enter ONI-D51, ONI-D17 & ONI-N11, Mode Switch failure Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-3A-C6 & C7 (ONI-D51)

Annunciators H13-P680-4A-E2 & E11 (ONI-D51)

Red and Amber lights illuminated on H13-P969 (ONI-D51)

Annunciators H13-P680-7A-A9 & A11 (ONI-D17)

Annunciator H13-P845-E5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC When generator load less than 90 MWe, then perform the following:

a) TRIP the main turbine by depressing the TURBINE TRIP push-button.

b) VERIFY the following have occurred:

  • MAIN STOP VALVEs, CONTROL VALVEs and COMBINED INTERMEDIATE VALVEs are shut.
  • GEN BRKRs S-610-PY-TIE and S-611-PY-TIE open
  • GEN FIELD BREAKER Insert Nuclear Instruments,
  • Place recorders in IRM (leave A or E in APRM for digital display)

Verify HST Lvl CV Manual Control, N21-S19, in OFF STABILIZE reactor water level.

a) Feedwater (REFER TO FEEDWATER HARDCARD) b) RCIC c) RPV STABILIZE reactor pressure:

a) Turbine/Turbine Bypass valves (REFER TO PRESSURE CONTROL HARDCARD) b) SRVs

  • Evacuate Containment
  • REFER TO PRESSURE CONTROL HARDCARD
  • Evaluate placing RCIC in Pressure Control Mode SRO Enters EOP-1 RPV Control on RPS failure (Mode Switch failure)

Announces entry into EOP-1

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 10 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - Large OBE Earthquake causes failure of SJAE. Enter ONI-D51, ONI-D17 & ONI-N11, Mode Switch failure Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-3A-C6 & C7 (ONI-D51)

Annunciators H13-P680-4A-E2 & E11 (ONI-D51)

Red and Amber lights illuminated on H13-P969 (ONI-D51)

Annunciators H13-P680-7A-A9 & A11 (ONI-D17)

Annunciator H13-P845-E5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs ATC to:

  • Monitor and Control Reactor Power
  • Stabilize Reactor Water Level
  • Stabilize Reactor Pressure SRO Directs BOP to verify Isolations and Actuations BOP Verifies Isolations and Actuations using Hardcards.

Driver Event 6 will be automatically triggered after the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 11 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Earthquake causes loss of RPV Level Indication (L8) resulting in loss of FW & HPCS.

Enter EOP-1 RPV control.

Cue: Level indicators peg high or low and SPDS validated level is magenta Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Event 6 is triggered in Event 5 when Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown Evaluator A sequential loss of level indication will occur, which results in loss of Feedwater and HPCS (Level 8 trips) and a failure of all ECCS systems to actuate and a loss of all level indication as shown by the magenta color of all level instruments on the SDS RPV Level Validation screen. (RLVLV)

Crew Identify RFPTs and MFP not operating, and HPCS has L8 signal.

Identify Low Pressure ECCS will not initiate due to level indications.

Crew Makes determinations that RPV level cannot be determined due to a loss of RPV level instrumentation.

SRO Announces entry into EOP-04-4, RPV Flooding SRO Announces entry into EOP-2 on rising DW Temperature/Pressure Driver Transition to Event 7 will occur when SRO announces entry into EOP-04-4.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 12 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

7 - Entry into EOP-04-4 RPV Flooding/ADS SRV fails to open Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Transition to Event 7 will occur when SRO announces entry into EOP-04-4.

SRO Announces entry into EOP-04-4, RPV Flooding Directs RO to verify Suppression Pool is above 5.25 feet.

RO Verifies Suppression Pool is above 5.25 feet and informs SRO.

SRO Directs BOP to open 8 ADS valves. (Critical Task 2)

BOP Opens 8 ADS valves, determines by indication that 1B21-F051C failed to open.

Notifies SRO that 1B21-F051C failed to open.

SRO Directs BOP to open additional SRVs to get 8 SRVs open and Bypass Instrument Air isolation per EOP-SPI-2.8. (Critical Task 2)

BOP Opens another SRV to obtain 8 open SRVs and notifies SRO of valves status.

(Critical Task 2)

1. Isolate all steam line
  • RCIC Steam Isolations
2. Control injection into the RPV to maintain steam lines flooded with injection as low as practical.

Directs ATC to inject to establish RPV level above the Main Steam Lines using system available from EOP-04-4 table (RF-6)

RO Injects water into RPV to establish RPV level above Main Steam Lines using system available from EOP-04-4 table (RF-6) (Critical Task #3)

Evaluator Scenario can be terminated when RPV level is above main steam lines.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 13 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

Scenario Termination Criteria Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. Reactor depressurized.
2. Inject water to maintain Main Steam Lines flooded.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 14 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #1 - With the failure of a SJAE discharge line, take action to manually isolate Main Steam to the SJAEs.

Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Within 15 minutes following a loss of flow in Offgas due to a SJAE discharge line failure, isolate Main Steam to the SJAEs.

1. Safety Significance:
  • Isolating high energy sources can preclude failure of secondary equipment, injury to plant personnel, and subsequent radiation release to the public.
2. Cues:
  • Procedural compliance.
  • Area temperature indication.
  • Area radiation levels
3. Measured by:
  • The RO places MN STEAM TO SJAE SUPPLY valve, 1N62-F020A (B) Control Switch in CLOSE.
4. Feedback:
  • Area temperature trend.
  • Area radiation level trend.
  • valve position indications

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 15 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #2 - When RPV water level cannot be determined, initiate Emergency Depressurization.

Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When RPV water level cannot be determined, initiate Emergency Depressurization.

1. Safety Significance:
  • Precludes fuel damage by establishing adequate core cooling.
2. Cues:
  • Procedural compliance.
  • Loss of all level indication.
3. Measured by:
  • Observation - At least 2 SRV's are open when RPV water level cannot be determined.
4. Feedback:
  • RPV pressure trend.
  • Suppression Pool temperature trend.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 - 93% Page 16 of 16 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #3 - With reactor water level unknown, inject into RPV to establish RPV level above the MSL's.

Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With reactor water level unknown, inject into RPV to establish RPV level above the MSL's.

1. Safety Significance:
  • Prevent fuel damage by establishing and maintaining adequate core cooling.
2. Cues:
  • Procedural compliance.
  • RPV water level unknown.
3. Measured by:
  • Observation - RPV level established and controlled above the MSL's (10 psig increase in RPV pressure, ADS SRV tailpipe temperature decreasing).
4. Feedback:
  • RPV pressure trend.
  • SRV tailpipe temperature trend.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.: 2- 100% Op-Test No.: 2013-01 Examiners: Operators: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: Reactor is at full power. RHR B was tagged out of service yesterday for valve work. RHR C breaker was racked out late last shift due to observation of nicked control power wire in breaker cubicle. TS 3.5.1 Condition C was entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. Efforts are in progress to restore RHR B or C to Operable status.

M29 Boiler is out of service for repair. Service Water B pump is OOS due to high vibrations - awaiting new motor. IOI-3 Section 4.5 is complete, rods at Step 69. Unusually low ambient temperatures are predicted for today. Very low load on grid today. PSA Risk is Green. Grid is Normal Annunciators locked in: H13-P970 F6 (MH #11 B/U Pump Start) & H13-870-7A E2 (SSE Drain Tank Low Level)

Turnover: Shift TBCC pumps to equalize run time. When concurrence granted from WCC, commence Rx Power reduction per IOI-3 for low grid load.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N (BOP/ Shift TBCC pumps SRO) 2 R (ATC/ Lower Rx power with flow SRO) 3 CP03_0P4 C (BOP/ NCC B Pump degradation / trip. Enter ONI-P43 3C0001B SRO) 4 Cb01_1n21 C (ATC/ Condensate booster pump B trip c0002b SRO) 5 RP01A C (BOP) Loss of RPS Bus A. Enter ONI-C71-2 C (SRO) Enter ORM 6.3.1 Testing Requirement 5 C(BOP) RWCU Valve G33-F004 fails on isolation C(SRO) Evaluate TS 3.6.1.3 cb04_1e21 6 c0001 M (ALL) Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure C (BOP) due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter C (SRO) EOP-1 and EOP-1A Enter T.S. 3.6.1.3 C (BOP) LPCS fails to auto start on T&P 7 TH25 C (BOP/ SRV failure to open during manual operations while controlling Rx pressure MS01A & SRO) with SRVs.

MS01E 8 Emergency Depressurization on lowering Rx level - EOP-4-2

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor FENOC Facsimile

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 1 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

N/A - Driver Instructions Cue: None Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:

Reset Simulator to IC 91 Load Schedule File: NRC 2013 Scen 2.sch Verify Schedule Files Loaded: Loss_of_FW.sch NRC-13_info.sch Verify Event File Loaded: NRC 2013 Scen 2.evt Verify temporary Recirc placard is removed from P680.

Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:

Reactor Power 100%. BOL Pull Sheets, Rods @ Step 69.

IOI-3 Step 4.5 is complete.

M29 Boiler is out of service for repairs.

Place yellow switch cap on RHR B, SWP B and SWP B discharge valve.

PSA Risk: Yellow due to RHR B and C being Inoperable. Verify Traffic Light changed to Yellow.

Driver Driver Turnover:

Reactor is at full power. RHR B was tagged out of service yesterday for valve work.

RHR C breaker was racked out late last shift due to observation of nicked control power wire in breaker cubicle. TS 3.5.1 Condition C was entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

Efforts are in progress to restore RHR B or C to Operable status. M29 Boiler is out of service for repair. Service Water B pump is OOS due to high vibrations -

awaiting new motor. IOI-3 Section 4.5 is complete, rods at Step 69. Unusually low ambient temperatures are predicted for today. Very low load on grid today. PSA Risk is Green. Grid is Normal Annunciators locked in: H13-P970 F6 (MH #11 B/U Pump Start) & H13-870-7A E2 (SSE Drain Tank Low Level)

Shift TBCC pumps from A to B to equalize run times. When concurrence granted from WCC, commence Rx Power reduction per IOI-3 for low grid load.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 2 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

1 - Shift TBCC pumps Cue: From Turnover/SRO direction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 00:00 SRO Directs BOP to shift TBCC pumps IAW SOI-P44 Section 7.2 SRO Ensures plant operations are conducted IAW Operations Expectations and Standards.

BOP Reviews SOI-P44 and performs TBCC pump shift 7.2.1 TAKE the oncoming TBCC PUMP to START. 1P44-C001B 7.2.2 TAKE the offgoing TBCC PUMP to STOP. 1P44-C001A Observes B TBCC pump discharge pressure rise prior to stopping A TBCC.

Driver Driver Role play as NLO, communicate with BOP during pump shift BOP Inform SRO that TBCC pump shift is complete Driver Driver When BOP is ~95% complete with TBCC pump shift, or when directed by the Lead Examiner, continue on to the next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 3 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

2 - Lower Reactor power with flow Cue: From Turnover/SRO direction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When directed by Lead Examiner, inform the Unit Supervisor that WCC has authorized a power reduction to 95% due to low loading on the grid.

SRO Directs ATC to lower power to 95% using flow IAW Reactivity Plan, IOI-3, and SOI-B33 ATC Commences lowering reactor power to 95%

SOI-B33 Sect 7.7 Rcirc Flow Control in Loop Manual 7.7.1 CONFIRM RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is in MAN. 1B33-K603A 7.7.2 CONFIRM RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is in MAN. 1B33-K603B 7.7.3 PERFORM the following concurrently as required for the desired Recirc Flow:

ADJUST RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL with the slide switch.

1B33-K603A ADJUST RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL with the slide switch.

1B33-K603B Driver Driver Role play as necessary as Shift Manager, Chemistry, RP, etc.

Evaluator Note: It takes almost 2 minutes from the time the next Event is triggered until the first alarm comes in.

Driver Driver When Power is lowered to 95% or Evaluator has determined sufficient power decrease has been achieved, proceed to next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 4 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

3 - NCC pump degradation / trip. Enter ONI-P43 Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-8A-B4 & H13-P970-B1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When directed by Lead Examiner, initiate Event 3.

ATC Announces Unexpected Alarm, COM LONG RESPONSE P970. (H13-P680-8A-B4)

BOP Responds to H13-P970 annunciators and NCC header discharge pressure and determines that NCC pump B is degrading.

Informs crew of NCC Pump B degradation.

Refers to ARI and announces entry condition for ONI-P43.

4.1 REFER TO ONI-P43, Loss of Nuclear Closed Cooling.

4.2 VERIFY the NCC Pump Suct valve for the operating NCC Pumps are open.

Directs NLO to verify NCC B Pump Suct valve is open Driver Driver Role play as NLO. If sent to investigate NCC pump B, report abnormal noise and vibration SRO Enters ONI-P43, Loss of Nuclear Closed Cooling Directs BOP to perform Supplemental Actions of ONI-P43 Crew ONI-P43 4.1.1 IF only ONE NCC pump is running AND a standby NCC pump is available, THEN REFER TO SOI-P43 and START the standby NCC pump.

BOP Directs NLO to support shifting of pumps.

BOP Refer to SOI-P43 and performs sections 7.1, 4.2 and 6.1 of the operating instruction.

7.1 Shifting NCC Pumps 7.1.1 REFER TO Additional NCC Pump Startup and START the standby pump.

7.1.2 REFER TO NCC Pump Shutdown and STOP one of the running pump.

4.2 Additional NCC Pump Startup 4.2.1 THROTTLE the oncoming NCC Pump Disch 10% open. P43-F513C 4.2.2 TAKE the oncoming NCC PUMP control switch on Common Long Response Control Panel H13-P970 to START. P43-C001C 4.2.3 OPEN the oncoming NCC Pump Disch. P43-F513C 4.2.4 VERIFY NCC HDR PRESSURE on P970 stabilizes between 94 - 123 psig. P43-R221

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 5 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

3 - NCC pump degradation / trip. Enter ONI-P43 Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-8A-B4 & H13-P970-B1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 6.1 NCC Pump Shutdown CAUTION Operation of the NCC Pump with its discharge valve

< 10% open should be minimized to prevent pump damage.

6.1.1 SLOWLY CLOSE the desired NCC Pump Disch. P43-F513B 6.1.2 IMMEDIATELY TAKE the offgoing NCC PUMP control switch on H13-P970 to STOP. P43-C001B 6.1.3 OPEN the offgoing NCC Pump Disch. P43-F513B 6.1.4 VERIFY proper discharge check valve operation by confirming no indication of reverse pump rotation.

Driver Driver Role play as NLO to support shifting NCC pumps. Use Remote Function SW016 to throttle/open P43-F513C. Use Remote Function SW015 to close/open P43-F513B.

Driver Driver If requested report that there is no indication of reverse pump rotation on the NCC B pump.

Driver Driver When the pump shift is almost complete and the BOP operator is still at P970, or when directed by the Lead Examiner, initiate Event 4.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 6 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

4 - Condensate Booster pump B trip Cue: Annunciator H13-P680-2A-B6 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When directed by Lead Examiner, initiate Event 4.

Evaluator ATC has approximately 3.5 minutes before HST level lowers to 60. Starting the 2nd Condensate Booster pump will stop level lowering and restore HST level.

ATC Announce H13-P680 unexpected annunciators.

Observe alarms, CBP breaker status lights, and discharge pressure meters on P680 and determines CBP B has tripped.

Informs crew of CBP B trip.

Refers to ARI and starts standby CBP IAW Subsequent Actions:

4.1 IF the turbine has NOT tripped, THEN start the standby CBP, 1N21-C002C 4.2 MONITOR HOT SURGE TANK LEVEL & CNDS TO HTR 4 FLOW.

1N21-R323 4.3 IF required, THEN REDUCE reactor power to stabilize Hot Surge Tank level. 1N21-R323 4.4 MAINTAIN motor current <353 amps. (1N21-C001A & 1N21-C001C)

Informs US of CBP C start - completion of ARI steps 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4 Driver Driver If requested respond as NLO to breaker H1205. Report that Overcurrent Relays for the breaker are tripped.

Driver Driver If requested to respond as NLO to the pumps - report that nothing appears abnormal for B pump, and that start-up of the C pump appears normal.

Driver Driver If requested to respond as NLO to Condensate Filter System - High Differential Pressure alarm - reset on Acknowledgement (Use Extreme View to acknowledge local alarms)

Driver Driver When ATC is complete with CBP pump shift, or when directed by the Lead Examiner, continue on to the next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 7 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - Loss of RPS Bus A. Enter ONI-C71-2. Enter ORM 6.3.1 Testing Requirement 5 RWCU Valve G33-F004 fails on isolation. Evaluate TS 3.6.1.3 Cue: RPS CH SCRAM SOL VALVES indicating lights not lit for GP 1A, 2A, 3A and 4A Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When directed by Lead Examiner, insert Event 5.

ATC Announces multiple unexpected alarms.

Responds to multiple Annunciators and the RPS CH SCRAM SOL VALVES indicating lights not lit for GP 1A, 2A, 3A and 4A.

Reports 1/2 scram RPS A bus Driver Driver Role play as NLO. If requested to investigate RPS electrical power, report that 1C71-S003A breaker has green indicating light on, and 1C71-S001A has a red indicating light on and everything else looks normal.

SRO Enter ONI-C71-2, Loss of One RPS Bus.

SRO Direct BOP to re-energize RPS Bus A per ONI-C71-2, Supplemental Actions BOP Co-ordinate with ATC and re-energize RPS Bus A per ONI-C71-2.

MG SET TRANSFER switch is in NORM RPS Bus A GEN ALT AVAIL light on THEN PLACE the MG SET TRANSFER switch in RPS Bus A Alternate Source on P640. (1C71-S1)

SRO Direct ATC to reset 1/2 Scram per SOI-C71.

Direct BOP to reset/restore isolations per IOI-18.

4.1.8 Refer to Technical Specifications -

NOTE: Refer to ONI-C71-2 for multiple applicable Tech Spec/ORMs.

Enter ORM 6.3.1 Testing Requirement 5 ATC Coordinate with BOP to Reset RPS per SOI-C71 Sect 7.4 ATC 7.4.1 VERIFY the following:

The conditions which caused the full or half scram have cleared.

There is reasonable assurance that another scram signal will NOT be generated.

7.4.4 MOMENTARILY DEPRESS the appropriate RPS division pushbuttons on P680: RPS A SCRAM RESET CH A. 1C71A-S5A SCRAM RESET CH B. 1C71A-S5C

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 8 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - Loss of RPS Bus A. Enter ONI-C71-2. Enter ORM 6.3.1 Testing Requirement 5 RWCU Valve G33-F004 fails on isolation. Evaluate TS 3.6.1.3 Cue: RPS CH SCRAM SOL VALVES indicating lights not lit for GP 1A, 2A, 3A and 4A Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC 7.4.7 VERIFY the following SCRAM DISCH VOL DRAIN VALVE lights are on at 1H13-P680:

INSTR VOLUME VENT VLV OPEN.

INSTR VOLUME DRAIN VLV OPEN.

Inform US that 1/2 scram RPS A has been reset.

BOP Perform ONI-C71-2 Supplemental Actions BOP ONI-C71-2 Supplemental Actions 4.1.10 VERIFY all SRV control switches on P601 are in AUTO 4.1.11 VERIFY all SRV control switches on P631 are in AUTO 4.1.12 VERIFY GROSS/FAIL TRIP/LATCH lights are reset at the following panels:

  • 1H13-P694 Driver / If asked, the above gross fail light are reset.

Evaluator BOP Inform SRO above actions are complete.

BOP 4.1.13 REFER TO IOI-18 and RESTORE the following isolations as appropriate.

BALANCE OF THE PLANT ISOLATION (L2 /1.68#)

RESTORATION 4.1.16 If required then OPEN the MSL DRM & MSIV BYP OTBD ISOL B21F019.

RO Identifies G33-F004 failed to isolate. Inform US.

SRO Evaluates TS 3.6.1.3 and enters Condition A . Directs G33-F001 to be closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

BOP Closes G33-F001 as directed.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 9 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - Loss of RPS Bus A. Enter ONI-C71-2. Enter ORM 6.3.1 Testing Requirement 5 RWCU Valve G33-F004 fails on isolation. Evaluate TS 3.6.1.3 Cue: RPS CH SCRAM SOL VALVES indicating lights not lit for GP 1A, 2A, 3A and 4A Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note: Restoration of isolations is not necessary and does not impact the remainder of this scenario.

BOP IOI-18 Actions Perform Attachment 33 - BALANCE OF THE PLANT ISOLATION (LEVEL 2 /

1.68#)

1.0 CONFIRM the following alarms reset:

BOP ISOL DW PRESS HIGH H13-P601-19A-A6 BOP ISOL RX LEVEL LO L2 H13-P601-19A-B6 2.0 MOMENTARILY DEPRESS the following:

MSL & NS4 OTBD ISOL SEAL IN RESET. B21H-S32 MSL & NS4 INBD ISOL SEAL IN RESET. B21H-S33 4.0 IF restoring an outboard isolation (Division 1), THEN PERFORM the following:

4.1 VERIFY the following open:

SA SUPPLY HDR CNTMT ISOL. P51-F150 CTS SUPPLY HDR CNTMT ISOL. P11-F060 4.2 AT 1H13-P881, VERIFY the following are open:

PERS AL EL 603 OTBD ALRM ISOL P53-F070 PERS AL EL 692 OTBD ALRM ISOL P53-F075 PERS AL EL 692 SUPP AIR OTBD ISOL P52-F170 PERS AL EL 603 SUPP AIR OTBD ISOL P52-F160 DW EQUIP DRAIN OTBD DW ISOL G61-F035 DW FLOOR DRAIN OTBD DW ISOL G61-F155 CNTMT EQUIP DRAIN OTBD ISOL G61-F080 CNTMT FLOOR DRAIN OTBD ISOL G61-F170 RWCU BACKWASH OUT OTBD ISOL G50-F277 MIXED BED WTR CNTMT SUPPLY ISOL P22-F010 DW CO2 SUPPLY OTBD ISOL P54-F395 4.3 VERIFY the valves closed:

PERS AL EL 603 INNER DR AEGTS ISOL P53-F035 PERS AL EL 692 INNER DR AEGTS ISOL P53-F045 4.4 IF the Containment Airborne Radiation Monitor was in service, THEN VERIFY the following valves open:

CNTMT RAD MON OTBD SUCT ISOL D17-F081A CNTMT RAD MON OTBD DISCH ISOL D17-F089A

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 10 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - Loss of RPS Bus A. Enter ONI-C71-2. Enter ORM 6.3.1 Testing Requirement 5 RWCU Valve G33-F004 fails on isolation. Evaluate TS 3.6.1.3 Cue: RPS CH SCRAM SOL VALVES indicating lights not lit for GP 1A, 2A, 3A and 4A Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 4.5 IF the Drywell Airborne Radiation Monitor was in service, THEN VERIFY the following valves open:

DW RAD MON OTBD SUCT ISOL D17-F071A DW RAD MON OTBD DISCH ISOL D17-F079A 5.0 IF Containment Vessel Chilled Water was in service, PERFORM the following:

5.1 AT H13-P800, VERIFY the following valves open:

CVCW OTBD SUPP ISOL VALVE P50-F060 CVCW OTBD RETURN MOV ISOL VALVE P50-F150 CVCW INBD RETURN MOV ISOL VALVE P50-F140 5.2 REFER to SOI-P50 and SHIFT chillers.

Direct an NLO to start a P50 chiller per SOI-P50 and SHIFT chillers.

6.0 TAKE the following to closed at 1H13-P800:

DW VAL RLF MOV ISOL VALVE M16-F010A DW VAL RLF MOV ISOL VALVE M16-F010B 7.0 VERIFY the following are open at 1H13-P800:

CNTMT VAC RLF MOV ISOL VALVE M17-F015 CNTMT VAC RLF MOV ISOL VALVE M17-F025 CNTMT VAC RLF MOV ISOL VALVE M17-F035 CNTMT VAC RLF MOV ISOL VALVE M17-F045 Driver Driver When 1/2 isolation is reset, or when directed by the Lead Examiner, initiate Event 6

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 11 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter EOP-1 and EOP-1A, Enter T.S.

3.6.1.3 Cue: H13-P680-7A-D6 for Steam Break, 1H13-P601-21A-B2 for EOP-3 entry,1H13-P601-19A-A1 for MSIV Closure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When directed by Lead Examiner, initiate Event 6.

ATC Announce unexpected H13-P680 alarm. (ARI-H13-P680-7A-D6)

Direct BOP to investigate alarm on P800.

BOP Report rising temperatures in Steam Tunnel Areas, including STEAM TUNNEL ZONE 3.

May investigate NUMAC (E31-N700) to determine if rise in temperature are consistent with P800.

SRO Enters ONI-N11, Pipe Break Outside Containment as directed by ARI-H13-P680-7A-D6 Supplemental Action 4.3.

Driver / Role play as Shift Manager and PES Manager if requested.

Evaluator Driver Driver As NLO, call control room and report hearing sound of steam leak in turbine building..

ATC Announce unexpected alarm H13-P601-21A-B2, and potential entry condition for EOP-03 SRO Enter EOP-03 Secondary Containment Control Directs BOP to monitor Area Temperatures and Area Radiation levels.

Directs ATC to monitor Area Water levels.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 12 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter EOP-1 and EOP-1A, Enter T.S.

3.6.1.3 Cue: H13-P680-7A-D6 for Steam Break, 1H13-P601-21A-B2 for EOP-3 entry,1H13-P601-19A-A1 for MSIV Closure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Works way down EOP-03 chart to HOLD box WHEN any area temperature entry condition is currently met THEN.

Evaluator Annunciator H13-P601-21A-B2 is Entry Condition for EOP-03.

BOP Monitors area temperatures on NUMAC E31-N700A A6-2(T) using EOP-03 Conditions Monitoring Hardcard. Reports area above Entry Condition for steam tunnel.

Evaluator The transient will progress such that the MSIV closure event will occur before the crew is able to complete many of the following actions.

Evaluator When steam tunnel temperature reaches MSIV isolation setpoint, 3 of 4 MSLs will isolate and Rx will scram.

SRO Directs crew to Isolate all systems discharging into affected area except for systems required for the following: Shutdown the Reactor, Assure adequate core cooling, Damage control. (Critical Task #1)

Determine if a Primary system is discharging into affected area.

Before any area is above its Max SAFE condition, enter EOP-01, RPV Control and execute concurrently.

ATC Responds to new alarms on P680 and 601. Recognize reactor scram.

Recognizes failure to scram and initiates RPS and ARI. (Critical Task #2)

CREW Recognize MSIV isolation & failure of MSL A to isolate.

RO Isolate MSL A and reports to SRO (Critical Task #1)

SRO Evaluate TS 3.6.1.3, PCIV - Cond A & Cond B Evaluator Due to pace of scenario, TS evaluation should be done following scenario termination.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 13 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter EOP-1 and EOP-1A, Enter T.S.

3.6.1.3 Cue: H13-P680-7A-D6 for Steam Break, 1H13-P601-21A-B2 for EOP-3 entry,1H13-P601-19A-A1 for MSIV Closure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Performs SCRAM Hardcard actions:

Verify the following actions are complete:

Mode Switch Locked in Shutdown RPS Initiated if all control rods are not fully inserted.

ARI Initiated if RPS failed to Scram the reactor.

If Reactor Recirc Pumps are running in fast speed:

Then simultaneously take the following to XFER:

RECIRC PUMP A BRKR 5A RECIRC PUMP B BRKR 5B IF Reactor power is above 4%, THEN START SLC A and SLC B pumps.

Perform crew update with the following information:

The Mode Switch is locked in Shutdown (Report any failures)

If RPS was initiated, the RPS is initiated (Report any failures)

If ARI was initiated, then ARI is initiated (Report any failures)

All Control Rods (are/are not) inserted Reactor Power is ________________ %

Reactor Pressure is _______________ psig Reactor Level is ________________ inches Reactor Recirc Pumps (Running in Slow Speed/Tripped)

Standby Liquid Control System Initiated (only if manually initiated)

EOP-01 Entry (only if conditions met): L2, Rx Press Hi, RPS Failure If MSIVs are closed, then a Time Critical Operator Action for Suppression Pool Cooling is applicable.

Evaluator ATC should report EOP-1 Entry on RPS failure.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 14 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter EOP-1 and EOP-1A, Enter T.S.

3.6.1.3 Cue: H13-P680-7A-D6 for Steam Break, 1H13-P601-21A-B2 for EOP-3 entry,1H13-P601-19A-A1 for MSIV Closure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC When generator load less than 90 MWe, then perform the following:

a) TRIP the main turbine by depressing the TURBINE TRIP push-button.

b) VERIFY the following have occurred:

MAIN STOP VALVEs, CONTROL VALVEs and COMBINED INTERMEDIATE VALVEs are shut.

GEN BRKRs S-610-PY-TIE and S-611-PY-TIE open GEN FIELD BREAKER ATC Insert Nuclear Instruments, SRMs IRMs Place recorders in IRM (leave A or E in APRM)

Verify HST Lvl CV Manual Control, N21-S19, in OFF STABILIZE reactor water level.

a) Feedwater (REFER TO FEEDWATER HARDCARD) b) RCIC c) RPV STABILIZE reactor pressure:

a) Turbine/Turbine Bypass valves (REFER TO PRESSURE CONTROL HARDCARD) b) SRVs Evacuate Containment REFER TO PRESSURE CONTROL HARDCARD Evaluate placing RCIC in Pressure Control Mode

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 15 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter EOP-1 and EOP-1A, Enter T.S.

3.6.1.3 Cue: H13-P680-7A-D6 for Steam Break, 1H13-P601-21A-B2 for EOP-3 entry,1H13-P601-19A-A1 for MSIV Closure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enters EOP-1 RPV Control on Reactor Scram required Reactor Power above 4%

and transitions into EOP-1A, Level Power Control (RPS Failure)

Announces entry into EOP-1 and EOP-1A Directs ATC to:

Monitor and Control Reactor Power Stabilize Reactor Water Level Stabilize Reactor Pressure SRO Works down Power Control leg of EOP-1A Answers YES to Are APRMs downscale?

Directs ATC to INSERT control rods IAW EOP-SPIs 1.1-1.7 If APRMs come off Downscale, then Directs SLC initiation Evaluator If SLC is directed, it will not inject due to leaking piping inside containment.

The CRD B pump will trip.

SRO Works down Level Control leg of EOP-1A Directs BOP to verify Actuations and Isolations.

Directs ATC to inhibit ADS.

Directs BOP to perform EOP-SPI 2.3, Bypass MSIV and ECCS interlocks.

ATC Inhibits ADS BOP Commences verifying Isolations and Actuations IAW Hardcard.

Evaluator If not previously discovered on Rx scram, will find MSL A failed to isolate while performing verification of Isolations and Actuations ATC Perform EOP-SPI 1.3, Manual Rod Insertion.

2.0 VERIFY CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL is in MANUAL. C11-R600 3.0 ADJUST CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL output to 100. C11-R600 4.0 CLOSE CRD DRIVE PRESS CONTROL VALVE. C11-F003 5.0 WHEN any CRD Pump is running, THEN PERFORM the following to Insert all control rods to position 00 concurrently with the remainder of this procedure follows:

5.1 DEPRESS AND HOLD the IN TIMER SKIP pushbutton.

5.2 SELECT Control Rods not fully inserted.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 16 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter EOP-1 and EOP-1A, Enter T.S.

3.6.1.3 Cue: H13-P680-7A-D6 for Steam Break, 1H13-P601-21A-B2 for EOP-3 entry,1H13-P601-19A-A1 for MSIV Closure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 6.0 VERIFY the following keylock switches in BYPASS:

AT H13-P629, LO POWER SET PT DIV 1 BYPASS C11A-S4 AT H13-P618, LO POWER SET PT DIV 2 BYPASS C11A-S3 Evaluator Step 6.0 is also performed in EOP-SPI 2.3.

BOP Informs ATC when Lo Power Setpoint is bypassed.

RO 7.0 PLACE BUS XH11 LOCA BYPASS keylock switch in BYPASS.

8.0 PLACE BUS XH12 LOCA BYPASS keylock switch in BYPASS.

9.0 IF Bus EH11 is energized, THEN TAKE ISOLATING BRKR to CLOSED. EH1116 10.0 IF Bus EH12 is energized, THEN TAKE ISOLATING BRKR to CLOSED. EH1214 BOP 11.0 AT H13-P970, VERIFY only one of the following is running:

NCC PUMP A P43-C001A NCC PUMP B P43-C001B NCC PUMP C P43-C001C Evaluator The remainder of EOP-SPI 1.3 is low priority and can be done later.

ATC Announces control rods are going in. (Critical Task #2)

Evaluator ATC may determine MSIV failure to close while stabilizing pressure if not previously identified.

BOP Performs EOP-SPI 2.3, Bypass MSIVs and ECCS Interlocks.

1.0 DEFEAT MSIV low RPV level isolation as follows:

AT H13-P694, PLACE MSIV ISOL LO LEVEL BYPASS CH D keylock switch in BYP B21H-S76D AT H13-P691, PLACE MSIV ISOL LO LEVEL BYPASS CH A keylock switch in BYP B21H-S76A AT H13-P692, PLACE MSIV ISOL LO LEVEL BYPASS CH B keylock switch in BYP B21H-S76B AT H13-P693, PLACE MSIV ISOL LO LEVEL BYPASS CH C keylock switch in BYP B21H-S76C

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 17 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter EOP-1 and EOP-1A, Enter T.S.

3.6.1.3 Cue: H13-P680-7A-D6 for Steam Break, 1H13-P601-21A-B2 for EOP-3 entry,1H13-P601-19A-A1 for MSIV Closure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 2.0 DEFEAT ECCS interlocks as follows:

AT H13-P625, PLACE HPCS LOGIC BYPASS E22-F023 keylock switch in BYPASS. E22AS25 AT H13-P618, PLACE the following Keylock switches in BYPASS:

RHR ISOL BYPASS E12-F053B keylock switch E12AS73 LPCI C LOGIC BYP E12-F021 keylock switch E12AS77 LO POWER SET PT DIV 2 BYPASS C11A-S3 AT H13-P629, PLACE the following Keylock switches in BYPASS:

RHR ISOL BYPASS E12-F053A keylock switch E12AS74 LPCS LOGIC BYPASS E21-F012 keylock switch E21S16 LO POWER SET PT DIV 1 BYPASS C11A-S4 3.0 Instrument Air is isolated to the Drywell NO known air leak is present in Containment NO known air leak is present in Drywell THEN RESTORE Instrument Air to Containment and Drywell as follows:

3.1 VERIFY INST AIR DRYWELL ISOL valve is OPEN. P52-F646 3.3 VERIFY INST AIR CNTMT ISOL valve is OPEN. P52-F200 BOP 4.0 CONFIRM instrument air is available as follows:

4.1 VERIFY BUS XH11 LOCA BYPASS keylock switch in BYPASS.

4.2 VERIFY BUS XH12 LOCA BYPASS keylock switch in BYPASS.

4.3 IF Bus EH11 is energized, THEN TAKE ISOLATING BRKR to CLOSED. EH1116 4.4 IF Bus EH12 is energized, THEN TAKE ISOLATING BRKR to CLOSED. EH1214 4.5 AT H13-P970, VERIFY only one of the following is running:

NCC PUMP A P43-C001A NCC PUMP B P43-C001B NCC PUMP C P43-C001C 5.0 IF RHR C pump is available, THEN PERFORM the following:

5.1 VERIFY LPCI C Injection Valve is CLOSED. 1E12-F042C

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 18 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter EOP-1 and EOP-1A, Enter T.S.

3.6.1.3 Cue: H13-P680-7A-D6 for Steam Break, 1H13-P601-21A-B2 for EOP-3 entry,1H13-P601-19A-A1 for MSIV Closure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs ROs to terminate ECCS for level control IAW Hardcard (Critical Task 3)

Directs Level Band of 150 to 219 inches using Feedwater.

BOP Terminate and prevent ECCS injection per Hardcard for level control.

(Critical Task 3)

BOP Observes LPCS pump fails to auto start on T&P and starts LPCS Pump manually.

SRO Directs startup of Hydrogen Igniters and Hydrogen Analyzers.

Works way down to LPC/L10 HOLD box.

BOP Performs startup of Hydrogen Igniters and Hydrogen Analyzers per Hardcard.

Evaluator Crew may initially determine that Bypass valves are controlling pressure and continue to use Bypass Valves until it is determined that the MSIVs should have isolated, and the A MSL valves are manually taken to close. Then Pressure Control will shift to SRVs.

ATC As part of Stabilizing Pressure, should determine that MSIVs are isolated with exception of MSIV line A. With A line open, pressure control will be on Bypass Valves, ATC Once MSIV line A is isolated by at least one valve, should report that Pressure Control is on SRVs.

SRO Works down Pressure Control leg of EOP-1A Direct Pressure Band of 800-1000 psig.

Evaluator When taking first SRV (1B21-F0051D) to OPEN for pressure control, it will not open manually, commencing Event 7.

RO Controls Rx pressure in directed band using SRVs (or BPVs if MSIV still open).

SRO Works down to LPC/P4 HOLD box. Proceeds through HOLD box when MSIVs close.

Works down to LPC/P6 HOLD box and waits until Rx is shutdown with boron

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 19 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter EOP-1 and EOP-1A, Enter T.S.

3.6.1.3 Cue: H13-P680-7A-D6 for Steam Break, 1H13-P601-21A-B2 for EOP-3 entry,1H13-P601-19A-A1 for MSIV Closure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO When all control rods are inserted, goes to override step LPC/L-1 and directs RO to terminate Boron Injection.

RO Terminates Boron injection by taking SLC pumps to OFF SRO Transitions to EOP-01 Driver Driver If previously directed to investigate RCIC turbine trip, insert Event 17 (to remove trip units) after Transition to EOP-01 and report that the RCIC mechanical trip mechanism is reset.

RO Use RCIC to restore RPV level to directed band.

7.8 Recovery to Operating Status from Automatic Turbine Trip 7.8.3 VERIFY the following are closed:

RCIC TRIP THROTTLE VLV POSITION RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE 1E51-F019 RCIC INJECTION VLV 1E51-F013 RCIC INJ CHECK VLV 1E51-F066 7.8.4 IF RPV level is less than level 2, THEN REMOVE the following trip units from 1H13-P629:

1B21-N692A 1B21-N692E 7.8.5 MOMENTARILY DEPRESS the RCIC INIT - MN & FDW TB TRIP -

SEAL IN RESET pushbutton.

1E51A-S18 7.8.6 CONFIRM the following:

The initiation signal has reset.

The white seal in light goes off.

7.8.7 TAKE the RCIC STEAM SHUTOFF to CLOSE. 1E51-F045 7.8.8 PLACE the RCIC PUMP FLOW CONTROL in MANUAL. 1E51-R600 7.8.9 ADJUST the RCIC PUMP FLOW CONTROL to minimum (0 gpm).

7.8.10 HOLD the RCIC TURBINE TRIP THRT V LATCH in CLOSE UNTIL closed to reset the trip latch. 1E51-F510 7.8.11 IF the mechanical overspeed trip has actuated AND RCIC Turbine speed is below 3,000 RPM, THEN PULL the mechanical trip rod to the reset position locally to reset the trip device.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 20 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel. Enter EOP-3, Plant scram on MSIV Closure due to high tunnel temperature with MSL A failure to isolate. ATWS - enter EOP-1 and EOP-1A, Enter T.S.

3.6.1.3 Cue: H13-P680-7A-D6 for Steam Break, 1H13-P601-21A-B2 for EOP-3 entry,1H13-P601-19A-A1 for MSIV Closure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 7.8.13 START the RCIC Turbine as follows:

7.8.13.b HOLD the RCIC TURBINE TRIP THRT V LATCH in OPEN.

7.8.13.c TAKE the RCIC STEAM SHUTOFF to OPEN to roll the turbine.

7.8.13.d ADJUST the RCIC PMP FLOW CONTROL to raise RCIC Turbine speed to above 2000 RPM on RCIC TURB RPM.

7.8.13.e IF pump discharge pressure is > 125 psig. THEN VERIFY the RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE opens WHEN pump flow is < 120 gpm.

7.8.14 RECORD the appropriate Maintenance Rule status in the Plant Narrative Log.

7.8.15 IF injecting to the reactor vessel, THEN TAKE the RCIC INJECTION VLV to OPEN. 1E51-F013 7.8.17 REFER TO RPV Level and Pressure Control, and ADJUST the flow rate.

Evaluator It is anticipated that all control rods will be inserted prior to reaching -25 inches. If the crew fails to insert all rods prior to reaching -25 inches, transition to EOP 4-2 Emergency Depressurization would be appropriate. ED would then be a Critical Task.

SRO If control rods are out and RPV level lowers to -25 inches, transitions to EOP 4-2 Emergency Depressurization. (Critical Task 4)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 21 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

7 - SRV failure to open during manual operations while controlling Rx pressure with SRVs.

Cue: Red indicating light for SRV discharge pressure high not illuminated, SOLENOID A STATUS light for SRV not illuminated on P601, no change in Rx Pressure after attempting to open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP When opening SRVs in sequence listed on P601 for pressure control, SRV 1B21-F0051D fails to open.

Opens next SRV to control pressure.

Announces SRV failure to open to crew. Uses next SRV in sequence to control pressure and updates crew.

Driver Driver Role play as NLO/Maintenance/I&C if requested to respond to determine why valve failed to open

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 22 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

8 - Emergency Depressurization on lowering Rx level - EOP-4-2 Cue: Contingency if level lowers to < -25 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Transitions to EOP 4-2 Emergency Depressurization based on control rods out and RPV level < -25 inches.

Directs ATC to Terminate and Prevent Feedwater per Hardcard for ED ATC Terminates Feedwater IAW Hardcard for ED SRO Directs RO to open 8 ADS SRVs (Critical Task 4)

RO Opens 8 ADS SRVs (Critical Task 4)

SRO Directs ROs to inject to maintain 150 to 219 inch level band using outside the shroud systems when RPV pressure lowers to 140 psig.

ROs Inject using RHR A or feedwater booster pumps to restore and maintain RPV level in 150 to 219 inch level band.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 23 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Termination Criteria Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. Control rods are being inserted with Rx < range 3 on IRMs.
2. Maintaining level and pressure in assigned bands.

3*. RPV depressurized if RPV level lowered to < -25 inches with control rods not inserted

  • Contingency

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 24 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #1 Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With the failure of a MSIV automatic isolation, take action to manually isolate the Main Steam Lines.

1. Safety Significance:

Take action to prevent degradation of a barrier to fission product release.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

MSL "x" MSIV position indication shows valves OPEN.

3. Measured by:

The RO places B21-F022x Control Switch in CLOSE.

4. Feedback:

Main Steam Line Tunnel temperature trend MSIV valve position indications.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 25 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #2 Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by initiating ARI to cause control rod insertion /manually inserting control rods.

1. Safety Significance:

Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

Correct reactivity control.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

Reactor power indication.

3. Measured by:

Observation - ARI pushbuttons armed and depressed to cause control rod insertion.

4. Feedback:

Reactor power trend.

Rod status indication.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 26 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #3 Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior During an ATWS, when conditions are met to deliberately lower RPV level; Terminate and Prevent injection into the RPV from ECCS and Feedwater until conditions are met to reestablish injection.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes loss of primary containment integrity and uncontrolled release of radioactivity into the environment.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Observation - With Emergency Depressurization not required and the deliberate lowering level override met (>4% power, and > 110°F Suppression Pool temperature, and >16.5" RPV level, and > 1.68#

Drywell pressure or SRV open) injection systems are terminated and prevented until <4% power, or 16.5" RPV level, or SRV's closed with

<1.68# Drywell pressure.

4. Feedback:

Injection system flow rates into RPV.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 - 100% Page 27 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #4 Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After RPV water level drops to 0 inches, when RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above MSCRWL (-25"), RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintaining adequate core cooling.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

RPV level indication.

3. Measured by:

At least 5 SRV's are opened when RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above -25".

4. Feedback:

RPV pressure trend.

Suppression Pool temperature trend.

SRV open status indication.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.: 3- 71% Op-Test No.: 2013-01 Examiners: Operators: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: Yesterday Reactor power was reduced to ~68% due to degrading vacuum caused by debris on the Circ Water screens. Currently, Rx power is at ~70%. Cleaning of Circ Water screens A & C is complete.

Power ascension will follow Circ Water Pump shift. IOI-3 Att. 3 Step 2.4, rods at Step 69. Unusually low ambient temperatures are predicted for today. HPCS is out of service for motor replacement - in day 2 of a 14 day LCO - TS 3.5.1, Condition B. Stator Water Cooling Pump B is out of service for high vibrations. M29 Boiler is out of service for repair. PSA Risk is Green. Grid is Normal.

Turnover: Shift Circulating Water pumps from A/B to A/C to allow Maintenance to clean the B pump inlet screen. Personnel have been briefed and are on station to support field activities. When concurrence granted from WCC and Plant Manager, commence Rx Power ascension per IOI-3. Per the Reactivity Plan, Power can initially be raised 5% and then 3%/Hr until 100% power is attained.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N (BOP/ Shift Circulating Water pumps SRO) 2 R (ATC/ Raise Rx power with flow SRO PC01 3 PC02 C (SRO) Both upper containment airlock doors open simultaneously - enter TS 3.6.1.2 1H13P800 4 3AD6 C (BOP/ Hi vibrations on DW Cooling Fan 2A SRO)

NM04A 5 I (ATC) APRM A fails upscale I (SRO) TS 3.3.1.1 & ORM 6.2.1 Cb01_1b33 6 s101B C (ATC/ Recirc Pumps down shift to Slow Enter ONI-C51 SRO)

TH21A 7 C (ATC/ Power Oscillations Enter EOP-1 on failure to scram Ry02-1c71k14A- SRO)

H RD15, 8 cb04_1e12 M (ALL) ATWS, loss of high pressure injection Enter EOP-1A c0002a C (ATC/ Rod Gang Drive fails (Selects Individual Drive)

SRO) RHR A pump fails to start on Terminate & Prevent C (BOP/

SRO) 9 Emergency Depressurization Pt01_1b21 10 n0091e C (BOP/ CRD Pump trip SRO)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor FENOC Facsimile Rev 1

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 1 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

N/A - Driver Instructions Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:

Reset Simulator to IC 92 Load Schedule File: NRC 2013 Scen 3.sch Verify Schedule Files are loaded: NRC Info Tag.sch Loss_of_FW_no.sch Ins18.sch DEL18.sch Verify Event File Loaded: NRC 2013 Scen 3.evt Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:

Reactor Power 71%. BOL Pull Sheets, Rods @ Step 69.

IOI-3 Attachment 3 Step 2.3 is in progress.

Place Yellow switch caps on HPCS Pump start switch and HPCS Injection Valve (1E22-F004)

Place Yellow switch cap on Stator Water Cooling Pump B.

PSA Risk is Green.

Driver Driver Turnover:

Yesterday Reactor power was reduced to ~68% due to degrading vacuum caused by debris on the Circ Water screens. Currently, Rx power is at ~70%. Cleaning of Circ Water screens A & C is complete. Power ascension will follow Circ Water Pump shift. IOI-3 Att. 3 Step 2.4, rods at Step 69. Unusually low ambient temperatures are predicted for today. HPCS is out of service for motor replacement - in day 2 of a 14 day LCO - TS 3.5.1, Condition B.

Stator Water Cooling Pump B is out of service for high vibrations. M29 Boiler is out of service for repair. PSA Risk is Green. Grid is Normal.

Shift Circulating Water pumps from A/B to A/C IAW SOI-N71 to allow Maintenance to clean the B inlet screen. Personnel have been briefed and are on station to support field activities. When concurrence granted from WCC and Plant Manager, commence Rx power ascension per IOI-3 Power Maneuvering. Per the Reactivity Plan, Power can initially be raised 5% and then 3%/Hr until 100% power is attained.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 2 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

1 - Shift Circulating Water pumps Cue: Turnover and SRO direction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 00:00 SRO Directs BOP to shift Circulating Water pumps from A/B to A/C running.

BOP Reviews SOI-N71 and performs Circulating pump shift.

BOP 7.1.1 NOTE CIRW PUMP DISCH VALVE position for the offgoing pump on local position indication. (1N71-F020B)

Driver Driver If asked, local valve position indication for B is ~80% and A is ~78%.

BOP 7.1.2 WHILE observing the requirements of the following sub-steps, START the oncoming CIRW PUMP per the following:

7.1.2.a TAKE the oncoming CIRW PUMP to START on 1H13-P870.(1N71-C001C) 7.1.2.b IF the oncoming discharge valve (1N71-F020C) does NOT begin opening within 7 seconds, THEN IMMEDIATELY TAKE the oncoming CIRW PUMP (1N71-C001C) to STOP.

7.1.2.c WHEN the oncoming CIRW PUMP DISCH VALVE reaches the same position as that of the offgoing pump, THEN DEPRESS the oncoming CIRW PUMP DISCH VALVE STOP pushbutton.(1N71-F020C)

Driver Driver If asked to give mark on local position indication, observe valve position indication on simulator Camera 2 7.1.3 TAKE the offgoing CIRW PUMP to STOP.(1N71-C001B) 7.1.4 VERIFY the offgoing CIRW PUMP DISCH VALVE closes. (1N71-F020B)

NOTE When adjusting pump discharge pressures, computer points N71BA035, 71BA036 and N71BA037 may be used in place of meters 1N71-R012A, B and C.

7.1.5 THROTTLE the CIRW PUMP DISCH VALVES of each inservice pump to maintain the following:

1N71-F020A 1N71-F020C

  • CIRC WATER PUMP DISCH PRESS between 36 and 48 psig, but as close as possible to 36 psig.

N71BA035 N71BA036 1N71-R012A 1N71-R012C

  • CIRC WATER PUMP AMPS less than 260.

1N71-R255 1N71-R257 7.1.6 DIRECT Chemistry to align the circulating water chemical treatment system in accordance with SOI-P83A for the current Circ Water lineup.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 3 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

1 - Shift Circulating Water pumps Cue: Turnover and SRO direction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Role play as NLO & Chemistry, communicate with BOP during pump shift.

BOP Inform SRO that pump shift is complete Driver Driver When BOP is complete with Circulating Water pump shift, or when directed by the Lead Examiner, continue on to the next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 4 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

2 - Raise power with flow Cue: Turnover, WCC request, SRO Direction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Call as Janka from WCC and inform Control Room you are ready for Perry to raise power to 80%.

SRO Direct ATC to raise Rx power to 80% IAW the reactivity plan. Per the reactivity plan, can raise power 5% initially and 3%/Hr thereafter.

Driver If requested, role play as Reactor Engineer agreeing with reactivity plan.

ATC Using SOI-B33 section 7.7, Rcirc Flow Control in Loop Manual, perform the following:

7.7.1 CNFIRM RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is in MAN. (1B33-K603A) 7.7.2 ONFIRM RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is in MAN. (1B33-K603B) 7.7.3 PERFORM the following concurrently as required for the desired Recirc Flow:

  • ADJUST RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL with the slide switch.

(1B33-K603A)

  • ADJUST RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL with the slide switch.

(1B33-K603B).

Driver Driver When Rx power at ~76%, or when directed by the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 5 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

3 - Both upper containment airlock doors open simultaneously - enter TS 3.6.1.2 Cue: Annunciator H13-P680-7A-C5, Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When power at 76% or directed by the Lead Examiner, initiate Event 3.

ATC Announce unexpected alarm; PERS AL DOORS BOTH OPEN BOP Reviews ARI H13-P680-7A-C5 & observe the Div 1 & Div 2 Isolation Valve matrices to determine that cause of alarm is both upper airlock doors are open.

Driver Driver When PERS AL DOORS BOTH OPEN alarm clears, contact the control room as NLO and report that you observed laborers moving scaffold poles into containment with both upper containment airlock doors open at the same time. The laborers were coached and both airlock doors are now reclosed.

SRO Evaluate TS 3.6.1.2. Determine that Condition B is applicable.

Directs Required Actions B1 and B2.

Driver Driver When directed by the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 6 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

4 - High vibrations on Drywell Cooling fan 2A Cue: Annunciator H13-P800-03-D6 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When directed by the Lead Examiner, initiate Event 4.

ATC Announces Unexpected Alarm, HVAC P800.

BOP Checks and responds to H13-P800 annunciator H13-P800-03-D6. Informs crew of High vibrations on Drywell Cooling Fan 2A Reviews ARI H13-P800-03-D6 & recommends shifting DW fans IAW Subsequent Action 4.1.

Driver Driver If asked, as NLO to investigate Vibration Monitoring Monitor (in IB 620), wait several minutes then inform RO that the Indicator Light Pushbutton is Lit.

SRO Directs BOP to Shift Drywell Cooling fan from 2A to 2B per SOI-M13.

BOP Shifts DW Cooling Fans IAW SOI-M13 Section 7.2.

7.2 Shifting Middle Drywell Cooling Fans 7.2.1 PLACE the oncoming MID DW CLG FAN in ON. (1M13-C002B) 7.2.2 PLACE the offgoing MID DW CLG FAN in STBY. (1M13-C002A) 7.2.3 CONFIRM the green status light energized on the standby fan.

Driver Driver If directed to reset the Indicator Light Pushbutton light on the Vibration Monitoring Monitor (in IB 620) - reset annunciator H13-P800-03-D6.

Driver Driver When BOP is ~95% complete with shifting Drywell Cooling fans, or when directed by the Lead Examiner, continue on to the next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 7 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - APRM Upscale Failure Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-06A-B5 & C4 and APRM instrumentation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When directed by the Lead Examiner, initiate Event 5.

ATC Announces Unexpected alarms.

Responds to numerous alarms on H13-P680.

Determines that APRM A is failing (or has failed) upscale causing a 1/2 scram and that AFDL is in control.

Performs immediate actions of ARI-H13-P680-04-E9:

3.1 IF the alarm is due to APRM A or E failed upscale, THEN PERFORM the following:

  • 3.1.1 VERIFY reactor power has NOT increased.
  • 3.1.2 ARM and DEPRESS HPU A SHUTDOWN pushbutton.
  • 3.1.3 ARM and DEPRESS HPU B SHUTDOWN pushbutton.

Notify SRO that Recirculation HPUs have been locked-up.

SRO Enters ONI-C51, Unplanned Changes in Reactor Power or Reactivity if power changed.

Evaluator If ATC locks-up FCVs before they move, no power change will occur.

If the Crew enters ONI-C51, there are no pertinent actions in the ONI for this event.

Crew Determine that APRM A should be bypassed and that 1/2 scram should be reset per SOI-C51(APRM and SOI-C71.

SRO Direct ATC to bypass the APRM A channel per SOI-C51(APRM).

ATC Bypasses APRM A IAW SOI-C51(APRM) Section 7.4:

7.4.1 REFER TO Technical Specification Table 3.3.1.1-1 Item 2 for applicability.

NOTE When bypassing APRM A, the following step must be performed to ensure a Rcirc Flow change does not occur.

7.4.2 IF APRM Channel A is to be bypassed, THEN VERIFY that all conditions of either 7.4.2.a OR 7.4.2.b exist:

7.4.2.a Both of the following conditions exist:

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 8 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - APRM Upscale Failure Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-06A-B5 & C4 and APRM instrumentation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC 7.4.2.b All of the following conditions exist:

  • RCIRC AUTOMATIC FLOW DEMAND LIMITER indicates zero output. (1B33-K650)
  • The AFDL Setpoint on RCIRC AUTOMATIC FLOW DEMAND LIMITER tapeset is higher than the APRM CH E reading. (1B33-K650) 7.4.3 PLACE the NEUTRON MONITOR BYPASS, APRM joystick on 1H13-680, in the BYPASS position for the APRM Channel being bypassed.

1C51B-S3 CH A 7.4.4 CONFIRM that the BYPASS half of the APRMs DNSC/BYPASS status lights is on.

Directs BOP to perform Steps 7.4.5 & 7.4.6.

BOP Performs Steps 7.4.5 & 7.4.6.

7.4.5 CONFIRM that the APRM Bypass status light comes on at the selected APRMs Power Range Neutron Mon Panel. (1H13-P669) 7.4.6 IF the bypassed APRM channel caused any trips or alarms, THEN RESET those trips or alarms.

ATC Inform Crew that APRM A has been bypassed and informs SRO that Technical Specification 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 Item 2 should be referenced.

SRO Direct ATC to reset 1/2 scram IAW SOI-C71 and ARI-P680-06A-B5.

ATC Reset 1/2 scram by performing SOI-C71, section 7.4:

7.4.1 VERIFY the following:

  • The conditions which caused the full or half scram have cleared.
  • There is reasonable assurance that another scram signal will NOT be generated.

7.4.2 IF the RPS INST VOL HI annunciator is in alarm on 1H13-P680-5A-A7, THEN PLACE the appropriate RPS division keylock switches in BYPASS.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 9 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

5 - APRM Upscale Failure Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-06A-B5 & C4 and APRM instrumentation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC 7.4.3 VERIFY the following Manual Scram pushbuttons are NOT armed:

  • SCRAM RESET CH C. 1C71A-S5C Evaluator The remaining portion of SOI-C71 Section 7.4 is N/A.

ATC Inform Crew that 1/2 scram has been reset.

SRO Reviews TS 3.3.1.1 and ORM 6.2.1 for failure of APRM A. Determines PLCOs are required for both.

Driver Driver When Crew is completed with resetting 1/2 scram, or when directed by the Lead Examiner, continue to the next Event.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 10 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Recirculation Pump A & B down shift to Slow Enter ONI-C51 Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-3A-A9, H13-P680-4A-A3 & A12 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver When directed by the Lead Examiner, Initiate Event 6.

ATC Announces Unexpected alarms.

Responds to numerous alarms on H13-P680.

Determines that both A and B Recirculation pumps have shifted to slow speed.

Reports to Crew that recirc pumps have shifted to slow speed and that entry condition are met for ONI-C51.

Observes Reactor Power and Core Flow and determines that Immediate Exit Region of the Power To Flow Map has been entered and action to insert CRAM rods is necessary (per FTI-B02).

SRO Announces entry into ONI-C51 and confirms that plant is in Immediate Exit Region of Power To Flow Map. Verifies that ATC is inserting CRAM rods per FTI-B02.

SRO Directs ATC to monitor nuclear instruments for power oscillations. If oscillations are observed, scram the reactor.

ATC Insert CRAM Rods per FTI-B02:

4.7 Use of Cram Rods NOTE There are three methods to control the use of cram rods. The Command SRO will select the method to be used based on the situation.

4.7.1 Method 1 - Use of the Control Rod Movement Sheet

1. Insert Cram Rods listed on the Control Rod Movement Sheet steps in descending order.
2. Gang motion is recommended where not prohibited.
3. Select the control rods listed in the Current Step of the Control Rod Movement Sheet and continuously insert to positions between 04 and 00, inclusive. Further leveling of all rods in a step between 04 and 00 is not required. Skip the step if the rods are already between 04 and 00.
4. Per Step 4.5.5, the Current Step is the lowest numbered step in which all the control rods in that step are not positioned at the withdrawal limit. If all steps are at the withdrawal limit, then the last step is the current step.
5. Do not leave control rods at an intermediate position, i.e., a position other than the withdraw limit or between 04 and 00.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 11 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

6 - Recirculation Pump A & B down shift to Slow Enter ONI-C51 Cue: Annunciators H13-P680-3A-A9, H13-P680-4A-A3 & A12 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC 6. Complete the insertion of a control rod or gang in the step even if the required power reduction has been achieved.

7. Document in the comments on the Control Rod Movement Sheets the altered insert limits when inserting Cram rods. Documentation may be performed when plant conditions permit.
8. Deselect the final cram rod or gang to reset the Rod Withdrawal Limiter, RWL.
9. Continue with Step 4.7.4.

4.7.4 When Cram Rods are inserted and Thermal Power is 19% RTP, assume the Rod Pattern does not meet the Low Power Setpoint constraints of the Rod Pattern Controller.

4.7.5 Increasing recirc flow after inserting Cram rods may lead to thermal limits problems.

4.7.6 Contact Reactor Engineering expeditiously after the insertion of Cram rods for the coordination of recovery actions.

NRC / NRC / After first CRAM Rod is inserted Power Oscillations will commence (Event 7 will Driver Driver be initiated).

NRC NRC It is not expected that the SRO will progress past the evaluation of thermal limits in ONI-C51 prior to receiving a 1/2 scram on OPRMs.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 12 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

7 - Power Oscillations Enter EOP-1 on failure to scram Cue: Annunciator H13-P680-6A-A3/APRM indications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver After first CRAM Rod is inserted in previous Event, Power Oscillations will commence.

NRC NRC Numerous annunciators will alarm as power oscillations start then increase in size.

ATC should be able to diagnose power oscillations by observing P680 annunciators and APRM indications. Prior to manually scramming its expected that a full scram signal will be generated (but not occur).

ATC Respond to alarms on P680. Recognize and announce Reactor scram.

Recognizes failure to scram and places Mode Switch in Shutdown, initiates RPS and ARI. (Critical Task 1)

Performs SCRAM Hardcard actions:

Verify the following actions are complete:

  • Mode Switch Locked in Shutdown

ATC If Reactor Power is above 4% then start SLC A and B pumps. (Critical Task 1)

ATC Perform crew update with the following information:

  • The Mode Switch is locked in Shutdown (Report any failures)
  • If RPS was initiated, the RPS is initiated (Report any failures)
  • If ARI was initiated, then ARI is initiated (Report any failures)
  • Reactor Power is ________________ %
  • Reactor Pressure is _______________ psig
  • Reactor Level is ________________ inches
  • Reactor Recirc Pumps (Running in Slow Speed/Tripped)
  • EOP-01 Entry (only if conditions met): L2 Rx Press Hi RPS Failure

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 13 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

7 - Power Oscillations Enter EOP-1 on failure to scram Cue: Annunciator H13-P680-6A-A3/APRM indications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NRC NRC ATC should report EOP-1 Entry on RPS Failure ATC When generator load less than 90 MWe, then perform the following:

a) TRIP the main turbine by depressing the TURBINE TRIP push-button.

b) VERIFY the following have occurred:

  • MAIN STOP VALVEs, CONTROL VALVEs and COMBINED INTERMEDIATE VALVEs are shut.
  • GEN BRKRs S-610-PY-TIE and S-611-PY-TIE open
  • GEN FIELD BREAKER ATC Insert Nuclear Instruments,
  • Place recorders in IRM (leave A or E in APRM)

Verify HST Lvl CV Manual Control, N21-S19, in OFF STABILIZE reactor water level.

a) Feedwater (REFER TO FEEDWATER HARDCARD) b) RCIC c) RPV STABILIZE reactor pressure:

a) Turbine/Turbine Bypass valves (REFER TO PRESSURE CONTROL HARDCARD) b) SRVs

  • Evacuate Containment
  • REFER TO PRESSURE CONTROL HARDCARD
  • Evaluate placing RCIC in Pressure Control Mode Driver Crew will transition from Event 7 to 8 as ATWS is discovered and malfunctioning water sources are detected.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 14 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

8 - ATWS, loss of high pressure injection Enter EOP-1A RHR A pump fails to start on Terminate & Prevent Cue: Reactor Power & Reactor Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enters EOP-1 RPV Control and transitions into EOP-1A, Level Power Control Announces entry into EOP-1 and 1A Directs ATC to:

Monitor and Control Reactor Power Stabilize Reactor Water Level Stabilize Reactor Pressure Works down EOP-1A Power Leg Directs ATC to INSERT control rods IAW EOP-SPIs 1.1-1.7 Verifies SLC has been initiated.

Directs RO to inhibit ADS. (Critical Task 2)

RO Inhibits ADS by placing keylock switches in INHIBIT. (Critical Task 2)

Crew Determine as part of STABILIZE reactor water level that RFWPs have tripped and MFP has failed to start. Also that RCIC has failed to start and that CRD pump A has tripped.

Driver Driver Restart of the CRD pump is covered by Event 10.

ATC Informs SRO of loss of high pressure injection.

NRC NRC ATC will not be able to insert control rods until CRD pump is restarted.

ATC Manually Inserts Control Rods.

EOP-SPI 1.3 1.0 Instrument Air is isolated to Containment NO known air leak is present in Containment THEN OPEN INST AIR CNTMT ISOL. P52-F200 2.0 VERIFY CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL is in MANUAL. C11-R600 3.0 ADJUST CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL output to 100. C11-R600 4.0 CLOSE CRD DRIVE PRESS CONTROL VALVE. C11-F003 5.0 WHEN any CRD Pump is running, THEN PERFORM the following to Insert all control rods to position 00 concurrently with the remainder of this procedure follows:

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 15 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

8 - ATWS, loss of high pressure injection Enter EOP-1A RHR A pump fails to start on Terminate & Prevent Cue: Reactor Power & Reactor Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC 5.1 DEPRESS AND HOLD the IN TIMER SKIP pushbutton.

5.2 SELECT Control Rods not fully inserted.

BOP 6.0 VERIFY the following keylock switches in BYPASS:

  • AT H13-P618, LO POWER SET PT DIV 2 BYPASS C11A-S3 RO 7.0 PLACE BUS XH11 LOCA BYPASS keylock switch in BYPASS.

8.0 PLACE BUS XH12 LOCA BYPASS keylock switch in BYPASS.

9.0 IF Bus EH11 is energized, THEN TAKE ISOLATING BRKR to CLOSED.

EH1116 10.0 IF Bus EH12 is energized, THEN TAKE ISOLATING BRKR to CLOSED.

EH1214 BOP 11.0 AT H13-P970, VERIFY only one of the following is running:

  • NCC PUMP A P43-C001A
  • NCC PUMP B P43-C001B
  • NCC PUMP C P43-C001C NRC NRC The remainder of EOP-SPI 1.3 is low priority and can be done later.

ATC Announces control rods are going in. (Critical Task 1)

ATC Identifies failure of gang drive.

SRO Works down EOP-1A Level Leg.

Directs BOP to verify Isolations and Actuations.

BOP Verifies isolations and actuations using Hardcard.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 16 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

8 - ATWS, loss of high pressure injection Enter EOP-1A RHR A pump fails to start on Terminate & Prevent Cue: Reactor Power & Reactor Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs BOP to Bypass of MSIV and ECCS Interlocks, EOP-SPI 2.3 BOP Performs EOP-SPI 2.3 1.0 DEFEAT MSIV low RPV level isolation as follows:

  • AT H13-P693, PLACE MSIV ISOL LO LEVEL BYPASS CH C keylock switch in BYP B21H-S76C 2.0 DEFEAT ECCS interlocks as follows:
  • AT H13-P625, PLACE HPCS LOGIC BYPASS E22-F023 keylock switch in BYPASS. E22AS25
  • AT H13-P618, PLACE the following Keylock switches in BYPASS:
  • RHR ISOL BYPASS E12-F053B keylock switch E12AS73
  • LPCI C LOGIC BYP E12-F021 keylock switch E12AS77
  • AT H13-P629, PLACE the following Keylock switches in BYPASS:
  • RHR ISOL BYPASS E12-F053A keylock switch E12AS74
  • LPCS LOGIC BYPASS E21-F012 keylock switch E21S16
  • LO POWER SET PT DIV 1 BYPASS C11A-S4 BOP 3.0 Instrument Air is isolated to the Drywell NO known air leak is present in Containment NO known air leak is present in Drywell THEN RESTORE Instrument Air to Containment and Drywell as follows:

3.1 VERIFY INST AIR DRYWELL ISOL valve is OPEN. P52-F646 3.2 VERIFY INST AIR CNTMT ISOL valve is OPEN. P52-F200

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 17 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

8 - ATWS, loss of high pressure injection Enter EOP-1A RHR A pump fails to start on Terminate & Prevent Cue: Reactor Power & Reactor Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 4.0 CONFIRM instrument air is available as follows:

4.1 VERIFY BUS XH11 LOCA BYPASS keylock switch in BYPASS.

4.2 VERIFY BUS XH12 LOCA BYPASS keylock switch in BYPASS.

4.3 IF Bus EH11 is energized, THEN TAKE ISOLATING BRKR to CLOSED. EH1116 4.4 IF Bus EH12 is energized, THEN TAKE ISOLATING BRKR to CLOSED. EH1214 4.5 AT H13-P970, VERIFY only one of the following is running:

  • NCC PUMP A P43-C001A
  • NCC PUMP B P43-C001B
  • NCC PUMP C P43-C001C 4.6 N/A 5.0 IF RHR C pump is available, THEN PERFORM the following:

5.1 VERIFY LPCI C Injection Valve is CLOSED. 1E12-F042C Directs NLO to perform Step 5.2.

SRO Directs ROs to terminate ECCS for Level Control per Hardcard. (Critical Task 3)

Directs Level Band of 50 to 100 inches.

BOP Terminates and prevents ECCS injection per Hardcard for Level Control. (Critical Task 3)

Determines that RHR A failed to auto start on Terminate and Prevent.

Manually starts RHR A.

Informs SRO of RHR A failure to auto start and manual start complete.

SRO Directs startup of Hydrogen Igniters and Hydrogen Analyzers.

BOP Performs startup of Hydrogen Igniters and Hydrogen Analyzers per Hardcard.

Directs NLO to complete Hydrogen Analyzer startup in the field.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 18 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

8 - ATWS, loss of high pressure injection Enter EOP-1A RHR A pump fails to start on Terminate & Prevent Cue: Reactor Power & Reactor Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Makes determination that RPV Water level Cannot be maintained above -25 inches and Emergency Depressurization is required.

Directs Terminate and Prevent of ECCS and Feedwater for Emergency Depressurization IAW Hardcard per Hardcard. (Critical Task 4)

ATC Terminates and prevents Feedwater injection per Hardcard for Emergency Depressurization. (Critical Task 4)

ATC Reports T&P of ECCS & FW for ED is complete.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 19 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

9 - Emergency Depressurization Cue: EOP Requirement Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Transitions to Emergency Depressurization, EOP-04-2 Directs Emergency Depressurization per EOP-04-2. (Critical Task 5)

RO Performs Emergency Depressurization by opening 8 ADS valves and updates Crew.

(Critical Task 5)

SRO Determines the Minimum Steam Cooling Pressure is 140 psig.

Directs Crew to commence injecting slowly into the RPV using outside the shroud systems when RPV pressure is 140 psig. (Critical Task 6)

Directs Level band of 50 to 100 inches.

Enters EOP-2 on rising Suppression Pool Temperature.

RO Commence injection into RPV when RPV pressure lowers to 140 psig. (Critical Task 6)

Control injection rate to prevent power spikes.

Recover RPV level in assigned band. (Critical Task 6)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 20 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

10 - CRD pump trip (Recovery possible)

Cue: Annunciator H13-P601-22A-D2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver This event will be triggered by Crew when they discover CRD pump has tripped.

The pump will trip 120 seconds after Event 7 (ATWS) has started.

RO Determines that CRD pump A has tripped.

Reviews ARI and determines that CRD Pump Trip Recovery is possible and update Crew.

SRO Direct RO to perform CRD Pump Trip Recovery.

RO Perform CRD Pump Trip Recovery.

SOI-C11(CRDH) Section 7.6 - CRD Pump Trip Recovery 7.6.2 TAKE the tripped CRD PUMP to STOP. (1C11-C001A) 7.6.3 TAKE the oncoming CRD AUX OIL PUMP to START. (1C11-C002B) 7.6.4 CONFIRM the CRD PUMP TRIP OIL PRESS LOW alarm clears.

7.6.5 PLACE the CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL in Manual. (1C11-R600) 7.6.6 LOWER the CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL output UNTIL the inservice CRD FLOW CONTROL VALVE is closed. (1C11-R600, 1C11-F002A) 7.6.7 TAKE the oncoming CRD PUMP to START. (1C11-C001B) 7.6.8 SLOWLY THROTTLE the inservice CRD FLOW CONTROL VALVE UNTIL flow is restored on the CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL.

(1C11-F002A, 1C11-R600) 7.6.9 PLACE the CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL in AUTO. (1C11-R600) 7.6.10 IF the tripped CRD Pump will NOT be re-started, THEN PERFORM the following:

7.6.10.a TAKE the tripped CRD PUMP to STOP. (1C11-C001A) 7.6.10.b TAKE the CRD AUX OIL PUMP to STOP. (1C11-C002A) 7.6.11 PERFORM independent verification of required components.

Directs NLO to perform remaining part of SOI.

Driver If requested role play as NLO to perform local steps of CRD pump recovery procedure.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 21 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Scenario Termination Criteria Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. Control Rods are being inserted
2. Reactor depressurized to less than or equal to 140 psig.
3. Injecting to maintain RPV level between 50 and 100 inches.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 22 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #1 Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by injecting boron (If > 4% power and / or still critical with challenge to BITT) and inserting control rods.

1. Safety Significance:
  • Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.
2. Cues:
  • Procedural compliance.
  • Suppression Pool temperature.
3. Measured by:
  • Observation - If operating per EOP-01A Reactor Power Control, US determines that SLC is required (indicated by verbal direction or EOP placekeeping action) before exceeding 110°F degrees in the Suppression Pool.

AND

  • RO places SLC A and B Pump control switches in ON, when directed by US.

AND

4. Feedback:
  • Reactor Power trend.
  • SLC tank level.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 23 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #2 Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization and subsequent power excursion, inhibit ADS.

1. Safety Significance:
  • Precludes core damage due to an uncontrolled reactivity addition.
2. Cues:
  • Procedural compliance.
3. Measured by:
  • ADS logic inhibited prior to an automatic initiation unless all required injection systems are Terminated and Prevented.
4. Feedback:
  • RPV pressure trend.
  • RPV level trend.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 24 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #3 Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior During an ATWS, when conditions are met to deliberately lower RPV level; Terminate and Prevent injection into the RPV from ECCS and Feedwater until conditions are met to reestablish injection.

1. Safety Significance:
  • Precludes loss of primary containment integrity and uncontrolled release of radioactivity into the environment.
2. Cues:
  • Procedural compliance.
3. Measured by:
  • Observation - With Emergency Depressurization not required and the deliberate lowering level override met (>4% power, and > 110°F Suppression Pool temperature, and >16.5" RPV level, and > 1.68#

Drywell pressure or SRV open) injection systems are terminated and prevented until <4% power, or 16.5" RPV level, or SRV's closed with

<1.68# Drywell pressure.

4. Feedback:
  • Injection system flow rates into RPV.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 25 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #4 Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior During an ATWS, when conditions with Emergency Depressurization required, Terminate and Prevent RPV injection from ECCS and Feedwater until reactor pressure is below the MSCP as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:
  • Prevention of fuel damage due to uncontrolled feeding.
2. Cues:
  • Procedural compliance.
3. Measured by:
  • Observation - No ECCS injection prior to being less than the MSCP.

AND

  • Observation - Feedwater terminated and prevented until less than the MSCP.
4. Feedback:
  • Reactor power trend, power spikes, reactor short period alarms.
  • Injection system flow rates into RPV.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71% Page 26 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #5 Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior During an ATWS after RPV water level drops below -25 inches, and when RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above MSCRWL (-25"), RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:
  • Maintaining adequate core cooling.
2. Cues:
  • Procedural compliance.
  • RPV level indication.
3. Measured by:
  • At least 5 SRV's are opened when RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above -25".
4. Feedback:
  • RPV pressure trend.
  • Suppression Pool temperature trend.
  • SRV open status indication.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 - 71`% Page 27 of 27 2013-01 Event

Description:

Critical Task #6 Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With RPV pressure <MSCP, slowly increase and control injection into RPV to restore and maintain RPV level above MSCRWL (-25") as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:
  • Maintaining adequate core cooling and preclude possibility of large power excursions.
2. Cues:
  • Procedural compliance.
  • RPV pressure indication.
3. Measured by:
  • Observation - Injection not commenced until less than MSCP, and injection controlled such that power spikes are minimized, level restored and maintained greater than or equal to -25".
4. Feedback:
  • RPV level trend.
  • RPV pressure trend.
  • Injection system flow rate into RPV.
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