NL-12-2270, SNCV061-RPT-01, Ver 1.0, Vogtle Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. Part 1 of 20

SNCV061-RPT-01, Ver 1.0, Vogtle Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. Part 1 of 20

ML13003A240
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	11/26/2012
From:	Volodarsky D Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-12-2270 SNCV061-RPT-01, Ver 1.0
Download: ML13003A240 (192)

Text

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant -Unit 1 Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 Enclosure Vogtle Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 PROJECT REPORT VERSION 1.0 COVER SHEET Page I of 56 Vogtle Unit 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC432485 For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by: (ENERCON)Project Manager or Designee~~~1-6~' 2 k, 0 /.r -.1 -David Volodarsky LPaiick Kelly uom Bill Henne Date: Date://-- Z6 -2o/Z It Z, -2012 Date: Approved by: (SNC)Technical LeAd or Designedi Pea Review Team Leader Approved by.(SNC)Melanie Brown David Whitman Date: Date: (//- z c-z'/ Z Project Mmnager or Desigcne VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 SFOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PACE 2 OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE

...................................................................................................

4 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH ..................

5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

.......................................................................

6 3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE

..................................................................................

6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS ..........................................................

7 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

......................................................................................

8 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES

..............................................................

9 4.2 TEAM EXPERIEN CE SUM M ARIES ....................................................................................

11 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING

.....................................................................

17 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT

................................

18 6.1 D EV ELO PM EN T O F SW EL I ............................................................................................

18 6.2 DEVELOPM EN T OF SW EL 2 ............................................................................................

20 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS ......................................................

22 7.1 IN A CC ESSIBLE ITEM S ....................................................................................................

24 8.0 R ESU LTS ..................................................................................................................................

30 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS

...................................................

30 8.2 EQUIPM EN T OPERA BILITY ..........................................................................................

48 8.3 PL A N T C H A N G E S .................................................................................................................

48 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS

...........................................................................

49 9.0 PEER R EVIEW ........................................................................................................................

50 9.1 PEER R EV IEW PR O C ESS .....................................................................................................

50 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

...........................................................................

50 10.0 RE FERE NCES .........................................................................................................................

55 11.0 ATTACH M ENTS .....................................................................................................................

56 VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 56 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The Seismic Walkdowns at Vogtle Unit I in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012,"Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are complete.

The walkdowns were performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report number 1025286).Plant Vogtle Unit I had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant. Plant Vogtle Unit 1 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 56 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at Vogtle Unit 1 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (Reference 10.1).The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Vogtle Unit 1 are complete.

All items on the SWEL were accessible.

This report is comprehensive and documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 5 OF 56 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(0 Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), the following topics are addressed in this report:* Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the SSCs in the plant (Section 3.0);* Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);* Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events IPEEE program (Section 5.0);" Selection of SSCs to be inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);* Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);* Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and" Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the Vogtle Unit I walkdowns were complete.

However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened. Further discussion is provided in Section 7.0.Due to the occurrence of a scheduled refueling outage at Vogtle Unit I in late September 2012, items inaccessible during the initial walkdowns were accessible during subsequent walkdowns performed during the outage. In addition, during subsequent Seismic Walkdowns of Vogtle Unit 1, electrical cabinets (where no extensive disassembly was required) were opened to inspect the cabinet internals for mounting of internal components, inspect the condition of fasteners of adjacent cabinets, and confirm absence of any other adverse seismic conditions.

Therefore, all cabinets at Vogtle Unit I have now been made accessible for internal inspections and inspections of these panels are complete.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 6 OF 56 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems., and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.

3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE The plant site geologic and seismologic investigations are covered in Section 2.5 of the Vogtle FSAR (Reference 10.7). Based on this data, the peak ground accelerations for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) are established as 0.20g and 0.12g, respectively, as discussed in subsection 2.5.2 (Reference 10.7).The VEGP site design response spectra are provided in Figures 3.7.B.1-1 and 3.7.B.1-2 for the horizontal and vertical components of the SSE and in Figures 3.7.B.1-3 and 3.7.B.1-4 for the horizontal and vertical components of the OBE (Reference 10.7). The design response spectra are in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 10.5). The ground spectra were applied to models of the various structures and amplified in-structure response spectra were generated taking into account the flexibility of the soil and structure.

POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASES Seismic Category I systems, structures and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during the OBE and to ensure that they will perform their safety-related functions during and/or after an SSE.MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASES The horizontal and vertical OBE and SSE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity of Seismic Category II SSCs, where required.

In addition, systems running between structures shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements.

The seismic analysis of safety related systems, equipment, and components is based on the response spectra method, time-history method, or equivalent static method.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 56 All Seismic Category I safety-related instrumentation and- mechanical and electrical equipment meet the requirements and recommendations of IEEE 344-1975.

Damping values are consistent with those specified in Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 10.10).3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS The design codes and standards for seismic qualification are listed in Chapter 3 of the Vogtle FSAR (Reference 10.7). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used in the original design of Vogtle Unit I are listed below.* ANSI B331.1, Power Piping" ANSI/ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Division I" ANSI/ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division I-A, Appendix N, Dynamic Analysis Methods* IEEE 317-1976, Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* IEEE 344-1975, Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 0 Manual of Steel Construction (AISC), 7th Edition VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 8 OF 56 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 identifies the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities.

Section 4.1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities.

Section 4.2 includes brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.Table 4-1 Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Name Point of Selection

/ Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer (POC) Reviewer (SWE)Justo Chacon X X X James Dovel X X Parimal Gandhi X X Jose Hernandez X X X X Thomas Petrak X X Winston Stewart* X X David Volodarsky X X Matthew X X Wilkinson Frank Yao X X VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 9 OF 56 Table 4-2 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Review Basis Report Name Tem Peer Peer Leader Reviewer Reviewer Peer Peer Leader Reviewer Reviewer Robert Ashworth

• X X X X Melanie Brown

• X X X X Richard Starck

• X X Kenneth Whitmore

• X X X X Notes (Table 4-1 and Table 4-2): 1)

• Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer 2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.

4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization.

The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations.

The POC was responsible for development of the walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.

Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns.

The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs. The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program. For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection.

The ESP also VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE10OF56 performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers.

The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown.

For the Vogtle Unit 1 project, the Plant Operations Personnel (POP) is a former licensed Senior Reactor Operator.The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs that had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the Seismic Qualification Utilities Group (SQUG) were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.

The Licensing Basis Reviewer was responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewer has knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Vogtle.A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience.

The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE11OF56 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES Robert Ashworth, SCE (MPR)Mr. Ashworth has more than six years of experience providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems. His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses, and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Report 1025286 and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for resolution of unresolved safety issue (USI) A-46.Melanie Brown., SCE (SNC)Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including:

• Management of the seismic design bases," Seismic equipment qualification,* Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components,* Design documentation and configuration management.

She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants.Justo S Chacon, SWE (SNC)Mr. Chacon is an engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. He is working at Vogtle Nuclear Plant in the Modification Group in the Civil/Mechanical area. Mr. Chacon has a degree in Industrial Engineering and has worked on numerous site projects associated with civil/mechanical applications.

Being part of Modification Group, he is exposed to the seismic engineering issues as they apply to nuclear power plants. His extensive experience also as a Reactor Operator (roughly 6 years) provides experience with nuclear power equipment.

Mr. Chacon completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE12OF56 James Dovel, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Dovel is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 20 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear power plants, and in commercial and Industrial design. Mr.Dovel is a Civil Lead Engineer.

In this capacity he has provided structural support of modification packages for numerous Entergy plants including Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS), River Bend Station, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, and Waterford

3. Mr. Dovel also supported the extended power uprate (EPU) for FPL's Turkey Point plant, pipe stress analysis for DC Cook and the design of new power plants for China. Mr. Dovel completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.Parimal Gandhi, SWE (SNC)Mr. Gandhi is a senior engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. For the past 25 years, he has been working with the design and modifications of numerous Nuclear Power Plants and other industrial facilities including evaluating the condition of structural steel and concrete.

His experience includes static and dynamic analysis of steel frames, platforms, towers, crane girders, and various miscellaneous structures and finite element analysis of pressure vessel and lifting devices. Mr.Gandhi completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.Jose Hernandez, SWE (SNC)Mr. Hernandez is an engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. He is working at Vogtle Nuclear Plant in the Site Design department.

Mr. Hernandez is a registered professional engineer in the state of Georgia. His experience consists of 8 years in reinforced concrete analysis and design, elastic design, seismic rehabilitation, nonlinear analysis, nuclear design engineering, and geotechnical elements on reinforced concrete structures.

Mr. Hernandez is familiar in-depth with structural and civil construction codes. Mr. Hernandez managed the internal project team and subcontractors on numerous site projects.

Mr. Hernandez's previous experience includes participation in several researches that investigated the seismic vulnerability of existing school and hospital buildings located in high intensity activity seismic zones. Mr. Hernandez completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE13OF56 Thomas Petrak (SNC)Mr. Petrak has 30 years of nuclear power plant experience with 26 years at Plant Vogtle. Mr.Petrak's current assignment is the Fukushima Project Manager -Vogtle. During his time at Plant Vogtle, Mr. Petrak maintained an active SRO license for twenty years, 1989 -2009. Positions held by Mr. Petrak include:* Engineering Systems Manager* Shift Manager" Unit Shift Supervisor

• Support Shift Supervisor

• Maintenance Superintendent

• I&C Team Leader* Engineering Supervisor Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment.

He is the principal author of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). He developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to more than 200 engineers.

He has provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr. Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program.This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE14OF56 Winston Stewart, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Stewart is a Mechanical Engineer with over eight years of experience in various capacities including:

Modification Engineer, Engineering Mentor, IOCFR50.59 Evaluator, Apparent Cause Evaluator, Contract Administration and Designated Representative, Project Manager, Procedure Technical Reviewer, and Environmental Monitoring Team Leader for Emergency Response Organization.

Mr. Stewart was responsible for the preparation of technical evaluations for various configuration changes to plant systems, structures, or components, as well as the preparation and revision of civil/structural calculations, pipe stress calculations, and other design documents.

He also served as subject matter expert for Pipe Stress Analysis and Pipe Flaw Evaluation (ASME B31.1,Section III and Section XI). During this time he qualified as SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer.Mr. Stewart completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.David Volodarsky, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Volodarsky is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 30 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear power plants. Mr. Volodarsky is a civil supervisor with Enercon Services.

His design experience includes field survey; piping design and stress analysis; seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; design of supports for various systems (piping, ductwork, raceways) for nuclear power plants. His recent work is associated with 10 CFR 73.55 nuclear plant security upgrades at Plant Farley, Plant Hatch, and Plant Vogtle. Mr.Volodarsky supported modification packages for the installation of the Emergency Sump Strainer for Davis Besse, Crystal River Unit 3, McGuire Nuclear Station Unit I & 2, Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 & 2, Indian Point Unit 2 & 3, Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit I and Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3. Mr. Volodarsky completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE15OF56 Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components.

Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components.

Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr.Whitmore completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.Matthew Wilkinson, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Wilkinson is a Civil Engineer with over 5 years of experience.

He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering.

As a civil engineer, he is responsible for the development of engineering packages, calculations, analyses, drawings, and reports. Mr. Wilkinson has significant design experience with Florida Power and Light, primarily providing his services for Turkey Point Nuclear Station (PTN) on several modification packages and calculations.

Mr. Wilkinson has significant site support experience at PTN, McGuire Nuclear Station and River Bend Nuclear Station. Moreover, Mr. Wilkinson worked directly at PTN for the majority of 2010 to support the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) construction and 2011 to 2012 to support the Extended Power Uprate (EPU) project design phase. Mr. Wilkinson completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE16OF56 Frank Yao, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Yao is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 40 years of Civil Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear and fossil power plants and highway bridge design. His design experience includes structural steel design (including anchorages);

supports for suspended systems (piping, ductwork, raceways);

seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; rigging and scaffold; and retaining walls, cooling towers concrete slabs, beams and foundations.

His recent work associated with 10 CFR 73.55 nuclear plant security upgrades at Plant Hatch, and Plant Vogtle. Mr.Yao supported modification packages for the installation of the Emergency Sump Strainer for Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, Catawba Unit I & 2, McGuire Unit I & 2, Qinshan Unit 3 & 4 (China), and Ling Ao Unit 3 & 4 (China). He has also supported several plants during the implementation phase of the strainers, providing engineering support, resolving construction issues and performing structural evaluation to qualify changes made during the installation phase of the project. Mr. Yao completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE17OF56 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program is reported in Attachment

5. Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings.

For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also reports a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability, and specifies whether the configuration management program has maintained the IPEEE action (including procedural changes) to ensure that the vulnerability continues to be addressed.

As part of a Seismic PRA/IPEEE update, in May 2012 Plant Vogtle conducted a walkdown of Equipment modified under the IPEEE -Seismic. As a result of this walkdown, Document No.12L0075-RPT-001 was issued (Reference 10.9). That walkdown revisited systems and components that have been either significantly modified or replaced since the issuance of the original VEGP IPEEE- Seismic Report to NRC (Reference 10.8). The findings of the walkdown conducted in May are documented in Appendix A-2 (Previous IPEEE Open Item Walkdown Resolution Notes) (Reference 10.9). Appendix A-2 is included in Attachment

5. The purpose of these walkdowns was to ensure that the IPEEE vulnerabilities had been resolved.

During those walkdowns, 2 outliers were discovered that were potentially unresolved (either had never been resolved or were currently no longer resolved, i.e., the problem had "re-occurred).

Two items specifically dealt with hoists in the Diesel Generator Buildings were found not properly restrained (see CR 504859).The seismic walkdown equipment list (SWEL) for Vogtle Unit I included 6 components that had seismic vulnerabilities previously identified during the IPEEE program. Even though the items identified as IPEEE vulnerabilities had been walked down in May 2012, implementation of these modifications for SWEL items was verified again during the walkdowns performed for resolution of the NTTF Recommendations 2.3, Seismic. During the walkdowns, the walkdown teams verified that the recommended resolutions to the IPEEE vulnerabilities associated with these six items had been implemented.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 : SEISMIC PAGE18OF56 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Vogtle systems and components developed the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0 of this report. The equipment selection personnel used a SNC-template to ensure compliance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.Two SWELs were developed (SWEL I and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL I consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant.Attachment I provides the final SWEL I and SWEL 2.In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with equivalent components.

These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve during a walkdown.

For example, components located very high overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding.

All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SWELs provided in Attachment I reflect the final SWELs after all changes were incorporated.

6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 1 SWEL I was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).Screens 1 to 3 Screens 1 to 3 were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that do not undergo regular inspection and support the five safety functions.

In accordance with the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (page 3-3), Screens I through 3 can be satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Vogtle Nuclear Plant IPEEE Unit I (Reference 10.8) was used as Base List I for the development of SWEL 1.The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin" (Reference 10.12). The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE -Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE19OF56 EPRI Report 1025286. The intent of the Base List I was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a Seismic Safe Shutdown Earthquake.

The EPRI Report 1025286 (page 3-1) listed three screens to use in selecting the Base List 1 if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations.

Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions:

• Reactor reactivity control" Reactor coolant pressure control" Reactor coolant inventory control* Decay heat removal, and* Containment function.The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.1.2.5 of the IPEEE -Seismic Report (Reference 10.8).Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List, it was determined that the list did satisfy the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which is a list comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions described in EPRI Report 1025286, which are used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment cooling integrity.

Base List I is presented in Attachment

1. However, before proceeding any further with the subsequent screens for the base list, it was necessary to confirm that the components satisfied screens 1 to 3. Hence, screens I to 3 were applied to the base list and a small number of components were identified and screened out of the base list.Screen 4 Screen 4 provides the sample considerations to select components from the Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL I was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample (i.e., Screen 4 from EPRI Report 1025286).

Various drafts of SWEL I were provided to POP for review and input. The POP identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.

The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1: " Variety of systems" Major new or replacement equipment* Classes of equipment VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 -SEISMIC PAGE20OF56

• Variety of environments

• Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program" Risk significance Variety of Systems -EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.Major New and Replacement Equipment

-Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment and input from the plant personnel familiar with plant modification and from the PRA group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.Variety of Equipment Classes -A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286. SWEL I includes components from each equipment class except Class 12 (Air Compressors) and Class 13 (Motor Generators).

Vogtle does not contain any safety-related Air Compressors or Motor Generators.

Variety of Environments

-The EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that the SWEL contain components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures.

SWEL 1 includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g.Containment Building, Main Steam Valve Room), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Auxiliary Building), and Outdoors Structures (e.g. valve boxes, Nuclear Service Cooling Towers).IPEEE Vulnerabilities

-SWEL I includes equipment identified with seismic vulnerabilities identified in Reference 10.8.Risk Significance

-Information from the Vogtle Unit 1 PRA and the Maintenance Rule implementation documentation were used to determine whether items were risk significant.

Representative samples of Risk Significant items are included in the SWEL.6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment

1.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE21OF56 Screens 1 to 2 The equipment selected through Screens 1 and 2 provide any Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also accessible for a walkdown.

For Vogtle Unit 1, the only Seismic Category 1 equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System. The SSCs in the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System that are accessible and available for a walkdown comprise Base List 2.Screen 3 Screen 3 provides the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment included in SWEL 2. These considerations include:* Variety of systems* Major new or replacement equipment* Classes of equipment" Variety of environments For Vogtle Unit I, SWEL 2 is developed from the Base list 2 which is provided in Attachment 1.Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

For Vogtle Unit 1, there are no SFP penetrations within 10 feet above the fuel in the SFP. All piping connected to the SFP, either terminates more than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes, located more than 10 feet above the fuel, to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP. Based on the fact that there are no penetrations within 10 feet of the fuel and accompanied with the design of the anti-siphon hole in the SFP discharge piping, no rapid drain-down items exist.Therefore, there are no components associated with rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool included on SWEL 2.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE22OF56 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined)

SWEL. A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs and AWCs are provided in Attachments 3 and 4, respectively.

The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdown guidance.Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings).

Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns.

Organization included assignment of specific components to the teams; review of the walkdown packages; development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-bys; and familiarization with the plant.The second week began with peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions were answered.

After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by. This initial walkdown was performed in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer.

The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the different teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potentially adverse seismic conditions, and to allow team members to provide and obtain feedback.Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians, engineering) was obtained as required to open equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components.

All Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively.

The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicated one of the three following statuses:* "Y" -Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions;

• "N" -No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition;

• "U" -Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHINIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE23OF56 The walkdown focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to the structure.

This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage.

These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions." As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components was evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation.

The document that provides the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document.

In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e. g.where the anchorage is inside a cabinet that could not be opened at the time of the walkdown), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until the piece of equipment was available for inspection.

However, all other possible inspections associated with that item were completed and the results were documented on the SWC. These items were considered to be incomplete at that time and deferred to a time when they would be available for inspection.

Subsequent to that initial walkdown, all "U" items were walked down during Refueling Outage 1 R17 in September 2012. At the time of this report preparation, there are no open items related to Vogtle Unit 1.In cases where the seismic walkdown team members identified a potentially adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a Condition Report (CR) was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition.

As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns.

Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required.

Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.

Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns.

For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachment

4.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE24OF56 SWEL I Walkdowns A total of 110 Component Walkdowns were performed.

All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of 5 Component Walkdowns were performed.

In addition, a total of 4 Area Walk-bys were completed.

All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns.

These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were not completed for these items during the initial phase of walkdowns.

However, all the items were later walked down during the 1R17 refueling outage in late September 2012. Items in Table 7-1 are now complete.Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope I. 1-1804- 4160V Switchgear No cabinet door opening Inspect Outage I R 7$3-A02 I AA02 was allowed during plant anchorage operation 2. 1-1501- CTB CoolinUnit

& Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R 17 A7-004- Motor accessible during plant AWC 000 operation 3. 1-HV- Reactor Head Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage IR17 0442B Letdown Line accessible during plant AWC Control SOV operation 4. 1-HV- Normal CTB Sump Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage IR17 0780 Pump Discharge accessible during plant AWC AOV operation VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope Item No. Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope 5. I-HV- Accumulator Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage IR17 0943A nitrogen HDR accessible during plant AWC Vent-Solenoid operation Operated Valve 6. I-HV- ACCW Return Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 1974 From RCP Coolers accessible during plant AWC MOV operation 7. I-HV- CVCS Excess Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage IR17 8154 Letdown Isolation accessible during plant AWC operation 8. 1-HV- Accumulator 1 Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 8875D Nirtrogen Vent- accessible during plant AWC Solenoid Operated operation Valve 9. 1 -LT- Pressurizer Level Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1 RI 7 0459R accessible during plant AWC operation 10. 1-1511- CTB Reactor Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage IR17 E7-002- Cavity Cooling accessible during plant AWC 000 Coil operation 11. 1-1511- CTB Reactor Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage IR17 E7-001- Cavity Cooling accessible during plant AWC 000 Coil operation VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE26OF56 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope 12. 1-1511- Reactor Cavity Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 137-001- Cooling Fan-I accessible during plant AWC IR17 000 operation 13. 1-1511- Reactor Cavity Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage B7-002- Cooling Fan-2 accessible during plant AWC i RI 7 000 operation Table Notes: I) With the exception of the 4160 Volt Switchgear IAA02, all components determined to be inaccessible during the initial walkdowns were located inside an area of the plant not accessible during normal plant operation, such as inside Containment.

Walkdowns of these components and of the associated plant areas were deferred to an outage.Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the Vogtle Unit I Seismic Walkdowns were complete.

However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened.Due to the occurrence of a scheduled refueling outage at Vogtle Unit I in late September 2012, items inaccessible during the initial walkdowns were accessible during subsequent walkdowns performed during the outage. In addition, during subsequent Seismic Walkdowns of Vogtle, Unit I electrical cabinets (where no extensive disassembly was required) were opened to inspect the cabinet internals for mounting of internal components, inspect the condition of fasteners of adjacent cabinets, and confirm absence of any other adverse seismic conditions.

The results of the inspections recorded on a revised version of the SWC and or AWC.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE27OF56 The following table provides a list of components that had to be opened in order to inspect for "other adverse conditions" inside the cabinets.All cabinets at Vogtle Unit I have now been made accessible for internal inspections and inspections of these panels are complete.Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions

1. Item No. Description Remaining Completion Walkdown Scope Date 1. 1-1500-Q5-HVC HVAC Panel Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 2. 1-1602-Q5-NIR Nuclear Inst. Racks Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 3. 1-1604-Q5-PCG BOP Control Panel I Inspect Internals Outage IR17 4. 1-1604-Q5-PS2 Process I & C Protect II Inspect Internals Outage IR17 5. 1-1605-C5-ASI Alternate Shutdown Ind. Eagle 21 Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 Cab.6. 1-1605-P5-SDB Shutdown Panel Train. B Inspect Internals Outage 1R 17 7, 1-1605-Q5-SPB Solid State Protection Sys. Cab.- Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 Trn. B 8, 1-1623-D5-006A Display Processing Unit A Inspect Internals Outage 1R117 9. I-1804-$3-A02 4160V Switchgear IAA02 Inspect Internals Outage IR17 10. 1-1805-S3-ABD 480V MOT Control CTR IABD Inspect Internals Outage IR17 11. 1-1805-S3-ABB 480V MOT Control CTR IABB Inspect Internals Outage 1R 17 12. 1-1805-S3-BBB 480V MOT Control CTR IBBB Inspect Internals Outage IR17 VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE28OF56 Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions

1. Item No. Description Remaining Completion Walkdown Scope Date 13. 1-1805-S3-RHR2A Starter/RHR HV-8702A Inspect Internals Outage 1 R17 14. 1-1805-Y3-1D6R RHR ISO VLV Inverter Inspect Internals Outage IR17 15. 1-1806-B3-CAB Battery Charger IADICB Inspect Internals Outage IR17 16. 1-1806-Q3-DA2 125 VDC Distr. Panel IADI2 Inspect Internals Outage IR17 17. 1-1806-S3-DCA 125 VDC MCC 1ADIM Inspect Internals Outage IR17 18. 1-1805-$3-Bi5 480V Switchgear IAB15 Inspect Internals Outage IR17 19. 1-1805-S3-B07 480V Switchgear IBB07 Inspect Internals Outage IR17 20. 1-1806-S3-DSB 125VDC Switchgear IBDI Inspect Internals Outage 1R 17 21. 1-1807-Q3-VI2 120 VAC Vital Panel IBYIB Inspect Internals Outage IR17 22. 1-1807-Q3-VI3 120 VAC Vital Panel ICYIA Inspect Internals Outage IR17 23. 1-1807-Q3-VI5 120 VAC Vital Dist Panel IAY2A Inspect Internals Outage IR17 24. 1-1807-Y3-IAII R Vital AC Inverter lAD 1111 Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 25. 1-1808-Q3-L47 Emergency LTG Dist Panel Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 INLP47 26. 1-1816-U3-017 Auxiliary Relay Panel Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 27. 1-1821-U3-002 SF Sequencer Board Train B Inspect Internals Outage IR17 28. 1-2403-P5-DG3 DG 1B Gen CTL PNL Inspect Internals Outage I R 17 VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE29OF56 Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions

1. Item No. Description Remaining Completion Walkdown Scope Date 29. 1-1805-S3-1315X Transformer SWC & AWC Outage IR17 Table Notes: 1) Vogtle Unit 1 has 3 transformers (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL-I. The transformers were inspected to the extent practical.

All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected.

The anchorage for the transformers was visible without opening the component.

To inspect the transformer further would require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection.

The inspection of the transformers meets the requirements of the guidance document and the 50.54(f) letter. The transformers are as listed below: 1-1808-T3-115 LTG ISOLATION XFMR 1BBF13X 1-1807-Y3-13 REGULATED XFMR I BBC09RX ALTERNATE FEED TO PANEL IDYIB 1-1807-Y3-11 REGULATED XFMR 1 BBA07RX VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE30OF56 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic".

As potentially adverse conditions were identified conditions reports were initiated in the Plant CAP program and evaluated.

The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.

8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CAP) per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely manner. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 below do not necessarily indicate that SSCs were deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Vogtle Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Vogtle seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 33 Unit I Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, another 4 were entered that are Common to both Units I and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 31 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Comnponent/

Brief Description of Potentially CR# Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component A lighting hook was found that did not 501548 The seismic analysis group Repair/replace hook. Open 1-1206-P6-001 seem to be fully closed. This was performed an evaluation of the as Due found in D77 in the Auxiliary Building found condition and concluded 1/31/2013 Unit 1. The light was above the that no seismic interaction Containment Spray pump I-1206-P6-hazards exists that could affect 002. A closer inspection needs to be equipment operability.

made to verify a set screw is missing or bent in the connection.

Reference info on similar past lighting hooks include the following:

CR 421479, CR 426198, CR 426209, CR 428582.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 32 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Two out of sixteen screws were found 501650 The seismic team judged the 14 Screws tightened.

Closed 1-1593-B7-002 loose on the ]-1593-B7-002 AFW (fourteen) screws to be adequate Pump B Supply Fan and Motor. to hold the motor in place as the two loose screws were still located in the holes. As a result, all 16 (sixteen) screws would still provide restraint for shear which is the major load case on the screws. Also supporting frame structure for this Fan-Motor is seismically adequate and there is no significant impact on the structural adequacy.

There are no operability concerns for this as found condition.

Tighten screws.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUiSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 33 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component A hoist controller is not adequately 504859 The seismic team judged no The hoist has been Closed 1-2403-P5-DG3 restrained.

This condition is located operability concerns for this secured.next to a panel with the location condition.

Secure hoist.Area number 1-2403-P5-DG3 on the Unit I D/G Bldg RI01 Diesel Generator Room RI01. This condition does not meet the Vogtle standards of the procedure 00352-C General Plant Housekeeping and In-Process Materials Control section 5.8.1 which states that Safety-Related Equipment will not be vulnerable to impacts from controllers of hoist during a seismic event.Component A discrepancy was found between the 504874 Seismic Walkdown Team judged Subsequent to the Closed I-1808-Q3-L47 as-built condition and the drawing that in case ofa seismic event the initial walkdown, the anchorage details. The drawing shows component would not have the correct anchorage the connection to be bolted while the potential to fail and the drawings were as-built condition was found to be connection does not show any obtained and a welded. sign of degradation.

There is no second walkdown operability concerns related to confirmed that the as this condition, built anchorage matched the drawing details.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE34OF56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR 4 Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Area Unrestrained equipment found in the 504882 The Vogtle site design group Move or seismically Closed Control Bldg, Control Building Room R163 next to performed an evaluation of the as secure the copy R163 the panels labeled as INCQEHC and found condition and concluded machine. No further I NCQEHC I. The equipment was that the copy machine should action required for identified to be a copy machine on a either be seismically secured or the cabinet.wheeled cart and a storage cabinet. The moved away from safety related equipment was not tied or secured as equipment.

The Vogtle site required per procedure 00352-C design group performed an General Plant Housekeeping and In- evaluation of the as found Process Materials Control. condition and concluded that the cabinet, because of its location away from safety related, was acceptable.

No further action required.Area A fluorescent lighting fixture hook 505954 The Vogtle site design group Repair/tighten hook. Open Control Bldg, screw was found to be not fully closed, performed an evaluation of the as Due RB48 This was found in Room RB48 in the found condition and concluded 1/28/2013 Control Building.

This sign was nearby that no seismic interaction the panel labeled "IDDI 125v SWGR". hazards exists that could affect equipment operability.

Repair/replace hook.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01_

FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA, NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 35 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Two out of sixteen bolts were not found 507939 The seismic team judged the Replace screws. Open 1-1593-B7-001 installed on the I-1593-B7-001 AFW remaining 14 (fourteen) bolts to Due Pump A Supply Fan and Motor. be adequate to hold the motor in 11/8/2013 place. The 14 (fourteen) bolts would still provide restraint for shear which is the major load case on the bolts. Also supporting frame structure for this Fan-Motor is seismically adequate and there is no significant impact on the structural adequacy.

There are no operability concerns for this as found condition.

Replace screws.

VOGTLE IJNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUJSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 36 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Area Connection of tube steel to base plate 509123 The Vogtle site design group Clean and recoat Open NSCT, R 103 has significant oxidation on a surface of performed an evaluation and supports Due Outage weld (pipe support for line associated concluded that the corrosion of IR18 w/valve 1-1202-X4-457).

Edge of base the pipe support near valve I-plate for a support for three instrument 1202-X4-457 is mild and that the lines is degraded.

condition does not represent a seismic concern. The corrosion of the base plate is limited to the edges of the plate. The welds and the fasteners have no corrosion.

Clean and recoat supports.Area Seismic Walkdown Team found hatch 511980 The Temp Storage area should be Hatch covers have Closed Aux Bldg, R203 cover steel plates to be temporary reviewed to ensure it is in full been moved.stored next to safety related valves compliance with Procedure which is not consistent with the 00352-C.procedure 00352-C "General Plant Housekeeping and In-Process Materials Control".

The storage area was only a couple of inches next to the safety related valves I-HV- 11704 and 1-1202-U4-150. This occurred on the Auxiliary Building level 2 Room R-203 next to the Unit I A CCW Heat Exchanger (Ioc I- 1203-E4-00l1).

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUK-USHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 37 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Corn ponent / Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team found two 517078 During the internal cabinet None required.

Closed 1-1804-S3-A02 cases of a possible rigid connection inspection of I-1804-S3-A02, it between cabinets and cable trays. These was clear that the connection cases occurred for the components between the cabinets and the number I-1804-S3-A02 and 1-1623- cable tray are not rigidly D5-001. connected.

A second walkdown was performed of cabinet 1-1623-D5-00 1. This walkdown confirmed that the connections were not rigid.Component Seismic Walkdown Team found I of 4 524560 Fastener should be installed.

Fastener has been Closed 1-1806-Q3-DA2 bolts that connect the back right side of installed.

panel 1-1806-Q3-DA2 (IAD12 125 VDC PNL to inner frame to be missing.This missing bolt is located at the top right corner from the back part of the panel. Also, the hinge pin on the second from the bottom hinge on the rear door is partially withdrawn.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE38OF56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team found I of 4 524568 Fastener should be installed.

Fastener has been Closed 1-1806-Q3-DAI bolts connecting the back left side of 1- installed.

1806-Q3-DAI (IADII 125 VDC PNL)to inner frame is missing. This missing bolt is located at the top left comer from the back part of the panel. The condition of the panel should be evaluated to determine seismic adequacy.Component For the component number I-1807-Q3-525039 Fastener should be installed.

Fastener has been Closed 1-1807-Q3-VI3 V13 (ICYIA 120 VAC PNL), the installed.

Seismic Walkdown team found I of 4 bolts connecting the back left side of Panel to inner frame is missing. This missing bolt is located at the top left comer from the back part of the panel.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 39 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Cisd)

Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component 1-1806-Q3-DC I Seismic Walkdown team found I of 4 bolts connecting the back left side of I-1806-Q3-DCI (ICDI 1125 VDC PNL), to inner frame is missing. This missing bolt is located at the top left corner from the back part of the panel.The condition of the panel should be evaluated to determine seismic adequacy.525046 Fastener should be installed.

Fastener has been installed.

Closed 4- 4 4 4 Component 1-1805-S3-B115 For the component number I -1805-S3-B15 (480V SWITCHGEAR IABI5), the Seismic Walkdown team found that I interconnector fastener is missing.This missing bolt connects the buckets IAB1510 and IAB1506 on the lower left side of IAB31510.525340 The seismic analysis group performed an evaluation of the as found condition and concluded that switchgear could perform its intended function during a seismic event. Install fastener.Install fastener.Open Due Outage IR19 Fall 2015+ 4 4 4 4 Component 1-1805-S3-ABD For the component number 1-1805-S3-ABD (480V MOT CONTROL CTR IABD), the Seismic Walkdown team found that some nuts and screws used to secure the protective covers and the link blocks were missing. These findings are occurring randomly across different link blocks.525343 Fasteners should be installed.

Fasteners have been installed.

Closed VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 40 OF 56 Table 8-I. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component/

Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component For Component number 1-1805-S3-527135 The seismic analysis group Install fastener.

Open 1-1805-S3-B07 B07 (480V SWITCHGEAR I BB07), performed an evaluation of the as Due Outage the Seismic Walkdown team found that found condition and concluded 1R19 Fall I interconnector fastener is missing. that switchgear could perform its 2015 This missing bolt connects the bays intended function during a IBB0710 and 1BB0714 on the upper seismic event. Install fastener.left side of IBB07 10. On this same switchgear, the team identified this same condition on the top right side of the bay IBB0701; however, it could not be determined if in this case there was supposed to be a fastener or if this was left intentionally empty.Component For component number M-1500-Q5-527556 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open I-1500-Q5-HVC (HEATING VENTILATION AIR that this condition does not Due Outage HVC CONDITIONING PANEL (QHVC)), represent a seismic or operability 1R18 the Seismic Walkdown team found that concern. Install fasteners.

some nuts and screws used to secure the protective covers, link blocks, and conduits supports inside the cabinet were missing. These findings are occurring randomly across the cabinet's sections 1 through 4.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE41OF56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Potentially CR N Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component For component number 1-1500-Q5-527608 The seismic walkdown judged Based on the Open 1-1500-Q5-HVC (HEATING VENTILATION AIR that this condition does not evaluation performed Due Outage HVC CONDITIONING PANEL (QHVC)), represent a seismic or operability by the Vogtle Site 1R18 the Seismic Walkdown team found that concern: however, the condition design group, the as-one of the rods that latches the door is should be evaluated to determine found structural missing. Specifically, this occurs on the seismic adequacy of the cabinet, configuration right door of the section 1 of the back provides reasonable of the cabinet. expectation that no seismic hazard exists that could adversely affect the safety related cabinet I-1500-Q5-HVC equipment's operability or structural integrity with the missing door latching rod.Appropriate maintenance is recommended in order to replace the missing latching rod.Replace rod.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUTSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE42OF56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component I- For component number I-I604-Q5-527624 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1604-Q5-PCG PCG (BOP Control Panel 1), the that this condition does not Due Outage Seismic Walkdown team found a screw represent a seismic or operability IR 18 missing to secure the protective cover concern. Install fasteners.

for a terminal block.Component For component number I-1605-Q5-527627 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-1605-Q5-SPB SPB (SOLID STATE PROTECTION that this condition does not Due Outage SYSTEM CABINET (QSPB)), the represent a seismic or operability IR18 Seismic Walkdown team found missing concern. Install fasteners.

and loose screws used to secure the protective covers, terminal blocks, and also a cracked cable tray inside the cabinet. These findings are occurring randomly across the cabinet.Component For component number I-1623-D5-527695 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-1623-D5-006A (DISPLAY PROCESSING UNIT that this condition does not Due Outage 006A (DPU)), the Seismic Walkdown team represent a seismic or operability IR18 found some screws missing used to concern. Install fasteners.

secure the protective covers inside the cabinet.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 43 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Corn ponent / Brief Description of Potentially CR# Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component For component number 1-18 16-U3- 527701 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-1816-U3-017 017 (AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL that this condition does not Due Outage (ARP)), the Seismic Walkdown team represent a seismic or operability 1R18 found screws missing used to secure the concern. Install fasteners.

terminal blocks and to secure a door alarm relay inside the cabinet.Component For component number 1-2403-P5-528369 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-2403-P5-DG3 DG3 (DG I B Control Panel DG3), the that this condition does not Due qualified Seismic Walkdown team represent a seismic or operability 11/1/2013 found screws missing used to secure a concern. Install fasteners.

ventilation panel door window and a cover plate.Component Seismic Walkdown team found the 528375 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners/fully Open 1-1807-Q3-VI2 following in ]-1807-Q3-VI2 (120 VAC that this condition does not insert pin. Due Outage VITAL PANEL I BY 1B): One (I) door represent a seismic or operability IR 18 (120 VAC hinge pin partially withdrawn (picture concern. Install fastener, fully VITAL PANEL 01). One (1) bolt/screw missing for an insert pin.I BY I B) isolation panel (picture 02).

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUJKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 44 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component For the location number I-1805-S3-528379 The seismic walkdown judged Replace tie Open 1-1805-S3-B07 B07 (480V SWITCHGEAR IBB07), that this condition does not wraps/fully insert Due Outage the Seismic Walkdown team found the represent a seismic or operability pins. 1R18 following:

One (I) tie wrap used to concern. Replace tie wrap, fully support a cable bundle broken in bay I I insert pins..Two (2) door hinge pins partially withdrawn on bay 18.Component Seismic Walkdown team found the 528389 The seismic walkdown judged Install Open 1-1806-S3-DSB following in 1-1806-S3-DSB (125 that this condition does not fastener/Correct Due Outage VDC SWITCHGEAR IBDI): One (I) represent a seismic or operability interference.

IR18 (125 VDC cage nut used to secure the door closed concern. Install fastener/Correct SWITCHGEAR missing. This occurs in the front bottom interference.

IBDI) left bay (picture 01). One ( I ) door that could not be opened due to interference with the breaker face cover in bay 09 (picture 02).

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE45OF56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Com ponent Brief Description of Potentially CR# Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team found the 528395 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-1805-S3-BBB following in 1-1805-S3-BBB (480V that this condition does not Due Outage MOT CONTROL CTR 1BBB): One represent a seismic or operability I R 19 (480V MOT (1) loose screw and one (I) missing concem. Install fasteners.

CONTROL screw for a terminal block in the top CTR IBBB) right bay of the back of the panel (picture 01). One (1) loose screw/bolt inside bay 05. This is an FME concern because the source of the screw/bolt could not be determined and no component was observed to have any screw or bolt missing (picture 02).Two (2) missing screws in bay 02 (picture 03).Component Seismic Walkdown team found the 528400 The seismic walkdown judged Install Open 1-1605-P5-SDB following in 1-1605-P5-SDB (TRAIN that this condition does not fasteners/repair Due Outage B SHUTDOWN PANEL (PSDB): represent a seismic or operability receptacle.

IR18 TRAIN B Missing and loose screws, bolts, and concern. Install fasteners/repair SHUTDOWN nuts on some cover plates and in a floor receptacle.

PANEL (PSDB) plate (pictures

01. 03. 04, 05, 06 and 07). One (1) broken receptacle (picture 1 02).

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE46OF56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Cisd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component For component number 1-2403-G4-540134 The seismic walkdown judged Review of anchorage Closed 1-2403-G4-001-001-V02 (DG AIR START that the missing washers do not documentation V02 RECEIVER), the Seismic Walkdown represent a seismic or operability revealed that washers team found two (2) missing washers on concern. are not required.

No the bolts of the base anchorage.

further action needed.Area Seismic walkdown found an "Exit" sign 540137 The seismic walkdown judged Repair Cover. Open CNMT Bldg, had the cover loose or partially open that this condition does not Due Outage near column inside Unit I Containment Building represent a seismic or operability IR 18#12, Elev 197'- near column #12 on elevation 197'-0". concern. 4/15/2014 01" Component For component number 1-2403-G4-540141 The seismic walkdown judged Review of anchorage Closed 1-2403-G4-001-001-FOI (DG INTAKE AIR FILTER), that both of these findings do not documentation FOI the Seismic Walkdown team found four represent a seismic or operability revealed that washers (4) missing washers on the bolts of the concern. are not required.

No base anchorage.

The team also further action needed.identified a deficiency on a component nearby on a HVAC duct access hatch panel door which had two missing latch screws.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE47OF56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Area Seismic walkdown team found a metal 542455 The box was installed at the end Perform an Open CNMT Bldg, box near valve I-HV-8875D located in of a rigid conduit that is anchored evaluation to identify Due 5/1/14 Elev 184'-0" the Unit I Containment that was not and a flexible conduit was the need for any secured (anchored).

The box is located attached to one of the other sides, corrective actions.on level B near column 16. The qualified seismic walkdown team judged that this is not a seismic concern. Perform an evaluation to identify the need for any corrective actions.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are warranted.

These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.CR 537446: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the failure of plant personnel to properly secure hoist and cranes following use. 00352-C requires that "that safety related equipment will not be vulnerable to impacts, from chains or controllers of hoists and monorail cranes, during a seismic event. Place any hoist or monorail cranes in the vicinity of the safety related equipment in a location where, during a seismic event, the chains and controllers cannot strike or become entangled with the equipment." Contrary to the requirements of 00352-C, 3 of 4 hoist controllers near the D/G electrical panels and a hoist near Unit 2 Loops 1&4 ARV's were not properly secured. All controllers have seen been secured. Reference CR's 502483 & 504859.CR 537451: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the failure of plant personnel to maintain housekeeping and temporary storage areas in accordance with procedure 00352-C. Reference CR's 500988, 504853, 504860, 504882, 504895, 504901, 511980, 513336 & 517075.CR 537453: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the management of seismic restraints of lighting fixtures.

Reference CR's 500990, 501548, 504862, 504868, 505324 & 505954.CR 537454: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to fasteners and hardware.

Several CR's were generated which identified missing or loose fasteners and hardware.

Reference CR's 501546, 501650, 504850, 505329, 507939, 509102, 513331, 524560, 524568, 525039, 525046, 525340 & 525343.8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Vogtle Unit I had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE49OF56 8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions.

Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions.

All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary.

These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the site CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE50OF56 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities:

• review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);" review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;* review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and" review of the final submittal report.This report provides results of the review process for each review activity as well as the results of the peer review.9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to the guidance in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the Seismic Walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of all four peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) were met. Specifically, the Peer Reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL I and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections.

Specific considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL I and SWEL 2. The peer review check sheet of the SWEL is provided in Attachment

2.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE51OF56 For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2): " Reactor Reactivity Control" Reactor Coolant Pressure Control" Reactor Coolant Inventory Control" Decay Heat Removal and" Containment Function For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes: " Various types of systems* Major new and replacement equipment" Various types of equipment* Various environments" Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE and" Risk insight consideration The final SWEL 1 contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list.SWEL I contains components from all the classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for cases where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in the development of the list.For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system at Vogtle Unit I are Seismic Category I and all different types of components are represented on the SWEL 2. No items that could cause rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool for Vogtle Unit I were identified.

Therefore, SWEL 2 does not contain any VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 -SEISMIC PAGE52OF56 components associated with potentially rapid drain down of the pool. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).In summary, all of the Peer Review comments made during development of SWEL I and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed.

The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.During the process of conducting the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removed from the list and in most cases equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added. The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these changes had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELS with respect to the provisions contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Checklist of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.9.2.2 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review was performed as follows: " Each of the three walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by under the observation of the other teams and the walkdown Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams." During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A member of the Peer Review Team accompanied each of the three walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns.

SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE53OF56 carry a copy of Section 4 from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it, as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.Finally, the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages completed during the first week to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the guidance provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the walkdowns and walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable.

The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions.

The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team inspected all the checklists completed during the first week of Seismic Walkdowns, which represents approximately 30% of the total number of the checklists.

Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information.

Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly.

The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.Since the peer review occurred at the start of the Seismic Walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at the early stages of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages.

Subsequently, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate.

In addition, all members of the Peer Review Team, including Mr. Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.9.2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the seismic walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 54 OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC performed as part for the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.

9.2.4 Submittal Report The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to provide guidance and input and verify the submittal report would meet the objectives and requirements of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate.

The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(0 letter.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE55OF56

10.0 REFERENCES

10.1 1OCFR50.54(f)

Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.5 Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, December 1973 10.6 NMP-GM-033-GLO0 Ver. 1.0, SAM NTTF Seismic Walkdowns Guide 10.7 VEGP FSAR, Rev.18, September 2012 10.8 Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) -Seismic, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 10.9 Document No. 12L0075-RPT-001, Revision 0, May 18, 2012, "Southern Nuclear Company Seismic IPEEE Walkdown of Modified Equipment in Support of IOCFR50.69 Risk Informed Project -Plant Vogtle" 10.10 Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973 10.11 NUREG/CR-0098, Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, May 1978 10.12 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Revision 1, August 1991 VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE56OF56 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT I -SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS ATTACHMENT 2 -PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR THE SWEL I AND 2 ATTACHMENT 3 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 4 -AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 5 -IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION ATTACHMENT 6 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS NO. SNCVO61-RPT-O1 PROJECT REPORT VERSION 1.0 COVER SHEET Page I of 56 Vogtle Unit I SEISMIC, WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC432485 For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by: (ENERCON)Project Manager or Designee David Volodarsky Date: Date: 1-Z6 -2o,914 11- ze --you I Patrick Kelly "rCUvo Bill Henne Date: Approved by: (SNC)Technical Lead or Designeed Peo Review Team Leader Approved by: (SNC)Melanie Brown David Whitman Date: Date: f ~Ava' /d2/Project Manager or Designee VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 20OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE

...................................................................................................

4 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH .................

5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

....................................................................

6 3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE

.........................................................................

&............

6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS ..........................................................

7 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

......................................................................................

8 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES

............................................................

9 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES

....................................................................................

11 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING

....................................................................

17 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT

.................................

18 6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 1 ..........................................................................................

18 6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 ........................................................................................

20.7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS ......................................................

22 7.1 IN A CCESSIBLE ITEM S ...................................................................................................

24 8.0 RE SULTS ...................................................................................................................................

30 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS

....................................................

30 8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY

..........................................................................................

48 8.3 PLA N T C H A N G E S .................................................................................................................

48 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS

.............................................................................

49 9.0 PEER REVIEW ........................................................................................................................

50 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS .............................................

50 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

..........................................................................

50

10.0 REFERENCES

.... .....................................................................................................................

55 11.0 ATTACHMENTS

.....................................................................................................................

56 VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 56 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The Seismic Walkdowns at Vogtle Unit 1 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012,"Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are complete.

The walkdowns were performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report number 1025286).Plant Vogtle Unit 1 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant. Plant Vogtle Unit 1 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 56 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at Vogtle Unit 1 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3,. Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (Reference 10.1).The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Vogtle Unit 1 are complete.

All items on the SWEL were accessible.

This report is comprehensive and documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 5 OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), the following topics are addressed in this report: " Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the SSCs in the plant (Section3.0);

," Assignment of appropriately qualifiedpersonnel (Section 4.0);" Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events IPEEE program (Section 5.0);* Selection of SSCs to be inspected in the plant (Section'6.0);

• Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);* Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and" Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the Vogtle Unit 1 walkdowns were complete.

However, the affected.components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened. Further discussion is provided in Section 7.0.Due to the occurrence of a scheduled refueling outage at Vogtle Unit 1 in late September 2012, items inaccessible during the initial walkdowns were accessible during subsequent walkdowns performed during the outage. In addition, during subsequent Seismic Walkdowns of Vogtle Unit 1, electrical cabinets (where no extensive disassembly was required) were opened to inspect the cabinet internals for mounting of internal components, inspect the condition of fasteners of adjacent cabinets, and confirm absence of any other adverse seismic conditions.

Therefore, all cabinets at Vogtle Unit 1 have now been made accessible for internal inspections and inspections of these panels are complete.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC pAGE 6 OF 56 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.

3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE The plant site geologic and seismologic investigations are covered in Section 2.5 of the Vogtle FSAR (Reference 10.7). Based on this data, -the peak ground accelerations for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) are established as. 0.20g and 0.12g, respectively, as discussed in subsection 2.5.2 (Reference 10.7).The VEGP site design response spectra are provided in Figures 3.7.B.1-1 and 3.7.B.1-2 for the horizontal and, vertical components of the SSE and in Figures 3.7.B.1-3 and 3.7.B.1-4 for the horizontal and vertical components of the OBE (Reference 10.7). The design response spectra are in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 10.5). The ground spectra were applied to models of the various structures and amplified in-structure response spectra were generated taking into account the flexibility of the soil and structure.

POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASES (Seismic Category I systems, structures and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during the OBE and to ensure that they will perform their safety-related functions during and/or after an SSE.MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASES The horizontal and vertical OBE and SSE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity of Seismic Category II SSCs, where required.

In addition, systems running between structures shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements.

The seismic analysis of safety related systems, equipment, and components is based on the response spectra method, time-history method, or equivalent static method.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 56 All Seismic Category I safety-related instrumentation and mechanical and electrical equipment meet the requirements and recommendations of IEEE 344-1975.

Damping values are consistent with those specified in Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 10.10).3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS The design codes and standards for seismic qualification are listed in Chapter 3 of the Vogtle FSAR (Reference 10.7). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used in the original design of Vogtle Unit 1 are listed below.* ANSI B31.1, Power Piping 0 ANSI/ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Division 1 e ANSIIASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1-A, Appendix N, Dynamic Analysis Methods 0 IEEE 317-1976, Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* IEEE 344-1975, Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* Manual of Steel Construction (AISC), 7th Edition VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 8 OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2)., Table 472 identifies the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities.

Section 4,1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities.

Section 4.2_includes brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.Table 4-1 Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Point of Selection I Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Revis (POC) Reviewer (SWE) Reviewer Justo Chacon X X X James Dovel X X Parimal Gandhi X X Jose Hernandez X X X X Thomas Petrak X X Winston Stewart

• X X David Volodarsky X X Matthew X X Wilkinson Frank Yao X- X VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 9 OF 56 Table 4-2 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Name Review Peer Peer Basis Report NameTeam PeerPee Peer Leade Reviewer Reviewer Peer Pe Leader RReviewer Reviewer Robert Ashworth

• X X X X Melanie Brown

• X X X X Richard Starck* X X Kenneth Whitmore

• X X X X Notes (Table 4-1 and Table 4-2): 1)

• Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer 2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.

4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization.

The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations.

The POC was responsible for development of the walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.

Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns.

The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs. The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program. For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection.

The ESP also VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE10OF56 performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers.

The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown.

For the Vogtle Unit 1 project, the Plant Operations Personnel'(POP) is a former licensed Senior Reactor Operator.The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs that had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the Seismic Qualification Utilities Group (SQUG) were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities ,and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.

The Licensing Basis Reviewer was responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewer has knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Vogtle.A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team members, have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience.

The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE11OF56 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES Robert Ashworth, SCE (MPR)Mr. Ashworth has more than six years of experience providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components' and systems. His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses, and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Report 1025286 and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for resolution of unresolved safety issue (USI) A-46.Melanie Brown, SCE (SNC)Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including:

• Management of the seismic design bases," Seismic equipment qualification," Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components,* Design documentation and configuration management.

She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants.Justo S Chacon, SWE (SNC)Mr. Chacon is an engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. He is working at Vogtle Nuclear Plant in the Modification Group in the Civil/Mechanical area. Mr. Chacon has a degree in Industrial Engineering and has worked on numerous site projects associated with civil/mechanical applications.

Being part of Modification Group, he is exposed to the seismic engineering issues as they apply to nuclear power plants. His extensive experience also as a Reactor Operator (roughly 6 years) provides experience with nuclear power equipment.

Mr. Chacon completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE12OF56 James Dovel, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Dovel is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 20 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear power plants, and in commercial and Industrial design. Mr.Dovel is a Civil Lead Engineer.

In this capacity.

he has provided structural support of modification packages for numerous Entergy plants including Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS), River Bend Station, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, and Waterford

3. Mr. Dovel.also supported the extended power uprate (EPU) for FPL's Turkey Point plant, pipe stress analysis for DC Cook and the design of new power plants for China. Mr. Dovel completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.Parimal Gandhi, SWE (SNC)Mr. Gandhi is a senior engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. For the past 25 years, he has been working with the design and modifications of numerous Nuclear Power Plants and other industrial facilities including evaluating the condition of structural steel and- concrete.

His experience includes static and dynamic analysis of steel frames, platforms, towers, crane girders, and various miscellaneous structures and finite element analysis of pressure vessel and lifting devices. Mr.Gandhi completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.Jose Hernandez, SWE (SNC)Mr. Hernandez is an engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. He is working at Vogtle Nuclear Plant in the Site Design department.

Mr. Hernandez is a registered professional engineer in the state of Georgia. His experience consists of 8 years in reinforced concrete analysis and design, elastic design, seismic rehabilitation, nonlinear analysis, nuclear design engineering, and geotechnical elements on reinforced concrete structures.

Mr. Hernandez is familiar in-depth with structural and civil construction codes. Mr. Hernandez managed the internal project team and subcontractors on numerous site projects.

Mr. Hernandez's previous experience includes participation in several researches that investigated the seismic vulnerability of existing school and hospital buildings located in high intensity activity seismic zones. Mr. Hernandez -completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE13OF56 Thomas Petrak (SNC)Mr. Petrak has 30 years of nuclear power plant experience with 26 years at Plant Vogtle. Mr.Petrak's current assignment is the Fukushima Project Manager -Vogtle. During his time at Plant Vogtle, Mr. Petrak maintained an active SRO license for twenty years, 1989 -2009. Positions held by Mr. Petrak include: " Engineering SystemsManager" Shift Manager* Unit Shift Supervisor

• Support Shift Supervisor

• Maintenance Superintendent

• I&C Team Leader* Engineering Supervisor Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment.

He is the principal author of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). He developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to more than 200 engineers.

He has provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr. Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program.This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE14OF56 Winston Stewart, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Stewart is a Mechanical Engineer with over eight years of experience in various capacities including:

Modification Engineer, Engineering Mentor, 1OCFR50.59 Evaluator, Apparent Cause Evaluator, Contract Administration and Designated Representative, Project Manager, Procedure Technical Reviewer, and Environmental Monitoring Team Leader for Emergency Response Organization.

Mr. Stewart was responsible for the preparation of technical evaluations for various configuration changes to plant systems, structures, or components, as well as the preparation and revision of civil/structural calculations, pipe stress calculations, and other design documents.

He also served as subject matter expert for Pipe Stress Analysis and Pipe Flaw Evaluation (ASME B311.1,Section III and Section XI). During this time he qualified as SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer.Mr. Stewart completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.David Volodarsky, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Volodarsky is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 30 years of. Civil/Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear power plants. Mr. Volodarsky is a civil supervisor with Enercon Services.

His design experience includes field survey; piping design and stress analysis; seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; design of supports for various systems (piping, ductwork, raceways) for nuclear power plants. His recent work is associated with 10 CFR 73.55 nuclear plant security upgrades at Plant Farley, Plant Hatch, and Plant Vogtle. Mr.Volodarsky supported modification packages for the installation of the Emergency Sump Strainer for Davis Besse, Crystal River Unit 3, McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 & 2, Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 & 2, Indian Point Unit 2 & 3, Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 and Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3. Mr. Volodarsky completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE15OF56 Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components.

Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three Mile: Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components.

Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr.Whitmore completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.Matthew Wilkinson, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Wilkinson is a Civil Engineer with over 5 years of experience.

He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering.

As a civil engineer, he is responsible for the development of engineering packages, calculations, analyses, drawings, and reports. Mr. Wilkinson has significant design experience with Florida Power and Light, primarily providing his services for Turkey Point Nuclear Station (PTN) on several modification packages and calculations.

Mr. Wilkinson has significant site support experience at PTN, McGuire Nuclear Station and River Bend Nuclear Station. Moreover, Mr. Wilkinson worked directly at PTN for the majority of 2010 to support the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) construction and 2011 to 2012 to support the Extended Power Uprate (EPU) project design phase. Mr. Wilkinson completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

SVOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE16OF56 Frank Yao, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Yao is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 40 years of Civil Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear and fossil power plants and highway bridge design. His design experience includes structural steel design (including anchorages);

supports for suspended systems (piping, ductwork, raceways);

seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; rigging and scaffold; and retaining walls, cooling towers concrete slabs, beams and foundations.

His recent work associated with 10 CFR 73.55 nuclear plant security upgrades at Plant Hatch, and Plant Vogtle. Mr.Yao supported modification packages for the installation of the Emergency Sump Strainer for Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, Catawba Unit 1 & 2, McGuire Unit 1 & 2, Qinshan Unit 3 & 4 (China), and Ling Ao Unit 3 & 4 (China). He has also supported several plants during the implementation phase of the strainers, providing engineering support, resolving construction issues and performing structural evaluation to qualify changes made during the installation phase of the project. Mr. Yao completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE17OF56 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic, vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program is reported in Attachment

5. Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings.

For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also reports a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability, and specifies whether the configuration management program has maintained the IPEEE action (including procedural changes) to ensure that the vulnerability continues to be addressed.

As part of a Seismic PRA/IPEEE update, in May 2012 Plant Vogtle conducted a walkdown of Equipment modified under the IPEEE -Seismic. As a result of this walkdown, Document No.12L0075-RPT-001 was issued (Reference 10.9). That walkdown revisited systems and components that have been either significantly modified or replaced since the issuance of the original VEGP IPEEE- Seismic Report to NRC (Reference 10.8). The findings of the walkdown conducted in May are documented in Appendix A-2 (Previous IPEEE Open Item Walkdown Resolution Notes) (Reference 10.9). Appendix A-2 is included in Attachment

5. The purpose of these walkdowns was to ensure that the IPEEE vulnerabilities had been resolved.

During those walkdowns, 2 outliers were discovered that were potentially unresolved (either had never been resolved or were currently no longer resolved, i.e., the problem had "re-occurred).

Two items specifically dealt with hoists in the Diesel Generator Buildings were found not properly restrained (see CR 504859).The seismic walkdown equipment list (SWEL) for Vogtle Unit 1 included 6 components that had seismic vulnerabilities previously identified during the IPEEE program. Even though the items identified as IPEEE vulnerabilities had been walked down in May 2012, implementation of these modifications for SWEL items was verified again during the walkdowns performed for resolution of the NTTF Recommendations 2.3, Seismic. During the walkdowns, the walkdown teams verified that the recommended resolutions to the IPEEE vulnerabilities associated with these six items had been implemented.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE18OF56 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Vogtle systems and components developed the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0 of this report. The equipment selection personnel used a SNC-template to ensure compliance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.Two SWELs were developed (SWEL, 1 and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 1 consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant.Attachment 1 provides the final SWEL 1 and SWEL 2.In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with-equivalent components.

These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve during a walkdown.

For example, components located very high overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding.

All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SWELs provided in Attachment 1 reflect the final SWELs after all changes were incorporated.

6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 1 SWEL 1 was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).Screens 1 to 3 Screens 1 to 3 were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that do not undergo regular inspection and support the five safety functions.

In accordance with the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (page 3-3), Screens 1 through 3 can be satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Vogtle Nuclear Plant IPEEE Unit 1 (Reference 10.8) was used as Base List 1 for the development of SWEL 1.The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin" (Reference 10.12). The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE -Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE19OF56 EPRI Report 1025286. The intent of the Base List 1 was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a Seismic Safe Shutdown Earthquake.

The EPRI Report 1025286 (page 3-1) listed three screens to use in selecting the Base List 1 if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations.

Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions: " Reactor reactivity control* Reactor coolant pressure, control* Reactor coolant inventory control* Decay heat removal, and" Containment function.The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.1.2.5 of the IPEEE -Seismic Report (Reference 10.8).Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List, it was determined that the list did satisfy the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which is a list comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions described in EPRI Report 1025286, which are used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment cooling integrity.

Base List 1 is presented in Attachment

1. However, before proceeding any further with the subsequent screens for the base list, it was necessary to confirm that the components satisfied screens 1 to 3. Hence, screens 1 to 3 were applied to the base list and a small number of components were identified and screened out of the base list.Screen 4 Screen 4 provides the sample considerations to select components from the Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL 1 was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample (i.e., Screen 4 from EPRI Report 1025286).

Various drafts of SWEL 1 were provided to POP for review and input. The POP identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.

The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1:* Variety of systems* Major new or replacement equipment* Classes of equipment VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 20 OF 56* Variety of environments

• Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program* Risk significance Variety of Systems -EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.Major New and Replacement Equipment

-Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment and input from the plant personnel familiar with plant modification and from the PRA group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.Variety of Equipment Classes -A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286. SWEL 1 includes components from each equipment class except Class 12 (Air Compressors) and Class 13 (Motor Generators).

Vogtle does not contain any safety-related Air Compressors or Motor Generators.

Variety of Environments

-The EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that the SWEL contain components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures.

SWEL 1 includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g.Containment Building, Main Steam Valve Room), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Auxiliary Building), and Outdoors Structures (e.g. valve boxes, Nuclear Service Cooling Towers).IPEEE Vulnerabilities

-SWEL 1 includes equipment identified with seismic vulnerabilities identified in Reference 10.8.Risk Significance

-Information from the Vogtle Unit 1 PRA and the Maintenance Rule implementation documentation were used to determine whether items were risk significant.

Representative samples of Risk Significant items are included in the SWEL.6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment

1.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 21 OF56 TASK FORCERECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC Screens 1 to 2 The equipment selected through Screens 1 and 2 provide any Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also accessible for a walkdown.

For Vogtle Unit 1, the only Seismic Category 1 equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System. The SSCs in the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System that are accessible and available for a walkdown comprise Base List 2.Screen 3 Screen 3 provides the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment included in SWEL 2. These considerations include: " Variety of systems" Major new or replacement equipment" Classes of equipment* Variety of environments For Vogtle Unit 1, SWEL 2 is developed from the Base list 2 which is provided in Attachment 1.Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

For Vogtle Unit 1, there are no SFP penetrations within 10 feet above the fuel in the SFP. All piping connected to the SFP, either terminates more than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes, located more than 10 feet above the fuel, to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP. Based on the fact that there are no penetrations within 10 feet of the fuel and accompanied with the design of the anti-siphon hole in the SFP discharge piping, no rapid drain-down items exist.Therefore, there are no components associated with rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool included on SWEL 2.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 22OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined)

SWEL. A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs and AWCs are provided in Attachments 3 and 4, respectively.

The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdown guidance.Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings).

Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns.

Organization included assignment of specific components to the teams; review of the walkdown packages; development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-bys; and familiarization with the plant.The second week began with peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions were answered.

After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by. This initial walkdown was performed in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer.

The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the different teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potentially adverse seismic conditions, and to allow team members to provide and obtain feedback.Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians, engineering) was obtained as.required to open equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components.

All .Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively.

The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicated one of the three following statuses:* "Y" -Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions;" "N" -No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition;" "U" -Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE23OF56 The walkdown focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to the structure.

This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage.

These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions." As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components was evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with ,plant documentation..

The document that provides the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document.

In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e. g.where the anchorage is inside a cabinet that could not be opened at the time of the walkdown), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until the piece of equipment was available for inspection.

However, all other possible inspections associated with that item were completed and the results were documented on the SWC. These items were considered to be incomplete at that time and deferred to a time when they would be available for inspection.

Subsequent to that initial walkdown, all "U" items were walked down during Refueling Outage 1R17 in September 2012. At the time of this report preparation, there are no open items related to Vogtle Unit 1.In cases where the seismic walkdown team members identified a potentially adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a Condition Report (CR) was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition.

As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns.

Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required.

Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.

Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns.

For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachment

4.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE24OF56 SWEL 1 Walkdowns A total of 110 Component Walkdowns were performed.

All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were'included in the Area Walk-bys.SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of 5 Component Walkdowns were performed.

In addition, a total of 4 Area Walk-bys were completed.

All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS -Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns.

These items are located throughout the plant and the required-Seis:mic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were not completed for these items during the initial phase of walkdowns.

However, all the items were later walked down during the 1R17 refueling outage in late September 2012. Items in Table 7-1 are now complete.Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope 1. 1-1804- 4160V Switchgear No cabinet door opening Inspect Outage 1R17$3-A02 1AA02 was allowed during plant anchorage operation 2. 1-1501- CTB CoolinUnit

& Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 A7-004- Motor accessible during- plant AWC 000 operation 3. 1-HV- Reactor Head Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 0442B Letdown Line accessible during- plant AWC Control SOV operation 4. 1-HV- Normal CTB Sump Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 0780 Pump Discharge accessible during plant AWC AOV operation VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 25 OF 56 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope 5. 1-HV- Accumulator inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 0943A nitrogen HDR accessible during plant AWC Vent-Solenoid operation Operated Valve 6. 1-HV- ACCW Return Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 1974 From RCP Coolers accessible during plant AWC MOV operation 7. 1-HV- CVCS Excess Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 8154 Letdown Isolation accessible during plant AWC operation 8. 1-HV- Accumulator 1 Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 8875D Nirtrogen Vent- accessible during plant AWC Solenoid Operated operation Valve 9. 1-LT- Pressurizer Level Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 0459R accessible during plant AWC operation 10. 1-1511- CTB Reactor Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 E7-002- Cavity Cooling accessible during plant AWC 000 Coil operation 11. 1-1511- CTB Reactor Insidecontainment.

Not SWC & Outage 1R17 E7-00 1- Cavity Cooling accessible during plant AWC 000 Coil operation VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 26 OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope 12. 1-1511- Reactor Cavity Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage B17001- Cooling Fan-I accessible during plant AWC 1R17 000 operation 13. 1-1511- Reactor Cavity Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage B7-002- Cooling Fan-2 accessible during plant AWC 1R17 000 operation'Table Notes: 1) With the exception of the 4160 Volt Switchgear IAA02, all components determined to be inaccessible during the initial walkdowns were located inside an area of the plant not accessible during normal plant operation, such as inside Containment.

Walkdowns of these components and of the associated plant areas were deferred to an outage.Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the Vogtle Unit 1 Seismic Walkdowns were complete.

However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened.Due to the occurrence of a scheduled refueling outage at Vogtle Unit 1 in late September 201-2, items inaccessible during the initial walkdowns were accessible during subsequent walkdowns performed during the outage. In addition, during subsequent Seismic Walkdowns of Vogtle, Unit 1 electrical cabinets (where no extensive disassembly was required) were opened to inspect the cabinet internals for mounting of internal components, inspect the condition of fasteners of adjacent cabinets, and confirm absence of any other adverse seismic conditions.

The results of the inspections recorded on a revised version of the SWC and or AWC.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 27 OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC The following table provides a list of components that had to be opened in order to inspect for "other adverse conditions" inside the cabinets.All cabinets at Vogtle Unit 1 have now been made accessible for internal inspections and inspections of these panels are complete.Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions.

1. Item No. Description Remaining Completion Walkdown Scope Date'1. 1-1500-Q5-HVC HVAC Panel Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 2. 1-1602-Q5-NIR Nuclear Inst. Racks Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 3. 1-1604-Q5-PCG BOP Control Panel 1 Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 4. 1-1604-Q5-PS2 Process I & C Protect II Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 5. 1-1605-C5-ASI Alternate Shutdown Ind. Eagle 21 Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 Cab.6. 1-1605-P5-SDB Shutdown Panel Train. B Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 7. 1-1605-Q5-SPB Solid State Protection Sys. Cab.- Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 Trn. B 8. 1-1623-D5-006A Display Processing Unit A Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 9. 1-1804-$3-A02 4160V Switchgear 1AA02 Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 10. 1-1805-S3-ABD 480V MOT Control CTR 1ABD Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 11. 1-1805-S3-ABB 480V MOT Control CTR 1ABB Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 1-2. 1-1805-S3-BBB 480V MOT Control CTR lBBB Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 28 OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions

1. Item No. Description Remaining Completion Walkdown Scope Date 13. 1-1805-S3-RHR2A Starter/RHR HV-8702A Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 14. l-1805-Y3-1D6R RHR ISO VLV Inverter Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 15. 1-1806-B3-CAB Battery Charger 1ADlCB Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 16. l-1806-Q3-DA2 125 VDC Distr. Panel lAD12 Inspect Internals Outage .1R17 17. 1-1806-S3-DCA 125 VDC MCC 1ADIM Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 18. 1-1805-S3-B15 480V Switchgear 1AB15 Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 19. 1-1805-S3-B07 480V Switchgear 1BB07 Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 20. 1-1806-S3-DSB 125VDC Switchgear iBDI Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 21. 1-1807-Q3-VI2 120 VAC Vital Panel 1BYIB Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 22. 1-1807-Q3-VI3 120 VAC Vital Panel ICY1A Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 23. 1-1807-Q3-VI5 120 VAC Vital Dist Panel 1AY2A Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 24. 1-1807-Y3-IA1IR Vital AC Inverter 1AD1II1 Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 25. 1-1808-Q3-L47 Emergency LTG Dist Panel Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 1NLP47 26. 1-1816-U3-017 Auxiliary Relay Panel Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 27. 1-1821-U3-002 SF Sequencer Board Train B Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 28. 1-2403-P5-DG3 DG lB Gen CTL PNL Inspect Internals Outage 1R17 VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE29OF56 Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions

1. Item No. Description Remaining Completion Walkdown Scope Date 29. 1-1805-S3-B15X Transformer SWC & AWC Outage 1R17 Table Notes: 1) Vogtle Unit 1 has 3 transformers (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL-1. The transformers were inspected to the extent practical.

All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected.

The anchorage for the transformers was visible without opening the component.

To inspect the transformer further would require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection.

The inspection of the transformers meets the requirements of the guidance document and the 50.54(f) letter. The transformers are as listed below: 1-1808-T3-115 LTG ISOLATION XFMR 1BBF13X 1-1807-Y3-13 REGULATED XFMR 1BBC09RX ALTERNATE FEED TO PANEL 1DYlB 1-1807-Y3-11 REGULATED XFMR 1BBA07RX VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 30 OF56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic".

As potentially adverse conditions were identified conditions reports were initiated in the Plant CAP program and evaluated.

The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.

8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CAP) per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely manner. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 below do not necessarily indicate that SSCs were deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Vogtle Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Vogtle seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 33 Unit 1 Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, another 4 were entered that are Common to both Units 1 and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE31oF56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component

/Area Brief Description of Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Planned to Address/Resolve the Condition Status (Open/Clsd) 4 +Component 1- 1206-P6-001 A lighting hook was found that did not seem to be fully closed. This was found in D77 in the Auxiliary Building Unit 1. The light was above the Containment Spray pump 1-1206-P6-002. A closer inspection needs to be made to verify a set screw is missing or bent in the connection.

Reference info on similar past lighting hooks include the follow1ing:

CR 421479, CR426198, CR 426209, CR 428582.501548 The seismic analysis group performed an evaluation of the as found condition and concluded that no seismic interaction hazards exists that could affect equipment operability,.

Repair/replace hook.Open Due 1/31/2013 VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 -SEISMIC PAGE 32 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Two out of sixteen screws were found 501650 The seismic team judged the 14 Screws tightened.

Closed 1-1593-B7-002 loose on the 1-1593-B7-002 AFW (fourteen) screws to be adequate Pump B Supply Fan and Motor. to hold the motor in place as the two loose screws were still located in the holes. As a result, all 16 (sixteen) screws would still provide restraint for shear which is the major load case on the screws. Also supporting frame structure for this is seismically adequate'and there is no significant impact on the structural adequacy.

There are no operability concerns for this as found condition.

Tighten screws.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSH1MA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 33 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component A hoist controller is not adequately 504859 The seismic team judged no The hoist has been Closed 1-2403-P5-DG3 restrained.

This condition is located operability concerns for this secured.next to a panel with the location condition.

Secure hoist.Area number 1-2403-P5-DG3 on the Unit 1 D/G Bldg R101 Diesel Generator Room R101. This condition does not meet the Vogtle standards of the procedure 00352-C General Plant Housekeeping and In-Process Materials Control section 5.8.1 which states that Safety-Related Equipment will not be vulnerable to impacts from controllers of hoist during a seismic event.Component A discrepancy was found between the 504874 Seismic WalkdownTeam judged Subsequent to the Closed 1-1808-Q3-L47 as-built condition and the drawing that in case of a seismic event the initial walkdown, the anchorage details. The drawing shows component would not have the correct anchorage the connection to be bolted while the potential to fail and the, drawings were.as-built condition was found to be connection, does not show any obtained and a welded. sign of degradation.

There is no second walkdown operability concerns related to confirmed that the as this condition.

built anchorage matched the drawing details.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 34 OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 : SEISMIC Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the'Condition Area Unrestrained equipment found in the 504882 The Vogtle site design group Move or seismically Closed Control Bldg, Control Building Room R163 next to performed an evaluation of the as secure the copy R163 the panels labeled as 1NCQEHC and found condition and concluded machine. No further 1NCQEHC 1. The equipment was that the copy machine should action required for identified to be a copy machine on a either be seismically secured or the cabinet.wheeled cart and a storage cabinet. The moved away from safety related equipment was not tied or secured as equipment.

The Vogtle site required per procedure 00352-C design group performed an General Plant Housekeeping and In- evaluation of the as found Process MaterialsContrlcodition and concluded that-L the cabinet, because of its location away from safety related, was acceptable.

No further action required.Area A fluorescent lighting fixture hook 505954 The Vogtle site design group Repair/tighten hook. Open Control Bldg, screw was found to be not fully closed, performed an evaluation ofthe as Due RB48 This was found in Room RB48 in the found condition and concluded 1/28/2013 Control Building.

This sign was nearby that no seismic interaction the panel labeled "IDD1 125v SWGR". hazards exists that could affect equipment operability.

Repair/replace hook.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 35 OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION, 2.3: SEISMIC Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Two out of sixteen bolts were not found 507939 The seismic team judged the Replace screws. Open 1-1593-B7-001 installed on the 1-1593-B7-001 AFW remaining 14 (fourteen) bolts to Due Pump A Supply Fan and Motor. be adequate to hold the motor in 11/8/2013 place. The 14 (fourteen) bolts would still provide restraint for shear which is the major load case on the bolts. Also supporting frame structure for this Fan-Motor is seismically adequate and the..re i no significa..nt mpat on the structural adequacy.

There are no operability concerns for this as found condition.

Replace screws, 0 VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE36OF56 Table, 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component

/Area Brief Description of Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Planned to Address/Resolve the Condition Status (Open/Clsd)

Area NSCT, R103 Connection of tube steel to base plate has significant oxidation on a surface of weld (pipe support for line associated w/valve I-1202-X4-457).

Edge of base plate for a support for three instrument lines is degraded.-)09123 The Vogtle site design group performed an evaluation and concluded that the corrosion of the pipe support near valve 1-1202-X4-457 is mild and that the condition does notrepresent a seismic concern. The corrosion of the base plate is limited to the edges of the plate. The welds and the Cfsteners have no corrosion.

Clean and recoat supports.Clean and recoat supports Open Due Outage IR18+ Area Aux Bldg, R203 Seismic Walkdown Team found hatch cover steel plates to be temporary stored next to safety related valves which is not consistent with the procedure 00352-C "General Plant Housekeeping and In-Process Materials Control".

The storage area was only a couple of inches next to the safety related valves 1-HV- 11704 and 1-1202-U4-150. This occurred on the Auxiliary Building level 2 Room R203 next to the Unit 1 A CCW Heat Exchanger (loc 1-1203-E4-001).

511980 The Temp Storage area should be reviewed to ensure it. is in full compliance with Procedure 00352-C.Hatch covers have been moved.Closed VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 37 OF-56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team found two 517078 During the internal cabinet' None required.

Closed 1-1804-S3-A02 cases of a possible rigid connection inspection of 1-1804-S3-A02, it between cabinets and cable trays. These was clear that the connection cases occurred for the components between the cabinets and the number 1-1804-S3-A02 and 1-1623- cable tray are not rigidly D5-00 1. connected.

A second walkdown was performed of cabinet 1-1623-D5-001. This walkdown confirmed that the connections were not rigid.Component Seismic Walkdown Team found I of 4 524560 Fastener should be installed.

Fastener has been Closed 1-1806-Q3-DA2 bolts that connect the back right side of installed.

panel 1-1806-Q3-DA2 (lAD12 125 VDC PNL to inner frame to be missing.This missing bolt is located at the top right corner from the back part of the panel. Also, the hinge pin on the second from the bottom hinge on the rear door is partially withdrawn.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSMIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMICPAE3OF5 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team found 1 of 4 524568 Fastener should be installed.

Fastener has been Closed 1-1806-Q3-DA1 bolts connecting the back left side of 1- installed.

1806-Q3-DA1 (lAD 11 125 VDC PNL)to inner frame is missing. This missing bolt is located at the top left comer from the back part of the panel. The condition of the panel should be evaluated to determine seismic adequacy.Component For the component number 1-1807-Q3-525039 Fastener should be installed.

Fastener has been Closed-1-1807-Q3-VI3 V13 (1CY1A 120 VAC PNL), the installed.

Seismic Walkdown team found 1 of 4 bolts connecting the back left side of Panel to inner frame is missing. This missing bolt is located at the top left comer from the back part of the panel.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 39 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team found 1 of 4 525046 Fastener should be installed.

Fastener has been Closed 1-1806-Q3-DC1 bolts connecting the back left side of 1- installed.

1806-Q3-DC1 (1CD11 125 VDC PNL), to inner frame is missing. This missing bolt is located at the top left comer from the back part of the panel.The condition of the panel should be evaluated to determine seismic adequacy.Component For the component number 1-1805-S3-525340 The seismic analysis group Install fastener.

Open 1-1805-$3-BI5 B15 (480V SWITCHGEAR lAB15), performed an evaluation of the as Due Outage the Seismic Walkdown team found that found condition and concluded 1R19 Fall 1 interconnector fastener is missing. that switchgear could perform its 2015 This missing bolt connects the buckets intended function during a 1AB1510 and lAB 1506 on the lower seismic event. Install fastener.left side of lAB1510.Component For the component number 1-1805-S3-525343 Fasteners should be installed.

Fasteners have been Closed 1-1805-S3-ABD ABD (480V MOT CONTROL CTR installed.

1ABD), the Seismic Walkdown team found that some nuts and screws used to secure the protective covers and the link blocks were missing. These findings are occurring randomly across different link blocks.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 40 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component For Component number I-1805-S3-527135 The seismic analysis group Install fastener.

Open 1-1805-S3-B07 B07 (480V SWITCHGEAR 1BB07), performed an evaluation of the as Due Outage the Seismic Walkdown team found that found condition and concluded 1R19 Fall 1 interconnector fastener is missing. that switchgear could perform its 2015 This missing bolt connects the bays intended function during a 1BB0710 and 1BB0714 on the upper seismic event. Install fastener.left side of 1BB10710.

On this same switchgear, the team identified this same condition on the top right side of the bay 113130701; however, it could not be determined if in this case there was supposed to be a fastener or if this was left intentionally empty.Component For component number 1-1500-Q5-527556 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-1500-Q5-HVC (HEATING VENTILATION AIR that this condition does not Due Outage HVC CONDITIONING PANEL (QHVC)), represent a seismic or operability IR18 the Seismic Walkdown team found that concern. Install fasteners.

some nuts and 'screws used to secure the protective covers, link blocks, and conduits supports inside the cabinet were missing. These findings are occurring randomly across the cabinet's sections 1 through 4.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 41 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component For component number 1-1500-Q5-527608 The seismic walkdown judged Based on the Open 1-1500-Q5-HVC (HEATING VENTILATION AIR that this condition does not evaluation performed Due Outage HVC CONDITIONING PANEL (QHVC)), represent a seismic or operability by the Vogtle Site 1R18 the Seismic Walkdown team found that concern; however, the condition design group, the as-one of the rods that latches the door is should be evaluated to determine found structural missing. Specifically, this occurs on the seismic adequacy of the cabinet, configuration right door of the section 1 of the back provides reasonable of the cabinet. expectation that no seismic hazard exists tat tcould adversely affect the safety related cabinet 1-1500-Q5-HVC equipment's operability or structural integrity with the missing door latching rod.Appropriate maintenance is recommended in order to replace the missing latching rod.Replace rod.r VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSMHMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 42 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component 1- For component number 1-1604-Q5-527624 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1604-Q5-PCG PCG (BOP Control Panel 1), the that this condition does not Due Outage Seismic Walkdown team found a screw represent a seismic or operability 1R18 missing to secure the protective cover concern. Install fasteners.

for a terminal block.Component For component number 1-1605-Q5-527627 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-1605-Q5-SPB SPB (SOLID STATE PROTECTION that this condition does not Due Outage SYSTEM CABINET (QSPB)), the represent a seismic or operability 1R18 Seismic Walkdown team found missing concern. Install fasteners.

and loose screws used to secure the protective covers, terminal blocks, and also a cracked cable tray inside the cabinet. These findings are occurring randomly across the cabinet.Component For component number 1-1623-D5-527695 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-1623-D5-006A (DISPLAY PROCESSING UNIT that this condition does not Due Outage 006A (DPU)), the Seismic Walkdown team represent a seismic or operability 1R18 found some screws missing used to concern. Install fasteners.

secure the protective covers inside the cabinet.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 43 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component For component number 1-1816-U3-527701 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-1816-U3-017 017 (AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL that this condition does not Due Outage (ARP)), the Seismic Walkdown team represent a seismic or operability 1R18 found screws missing used to secure the concern. Install fasteners.

terminal blocks and to secure a door alarm relay inside the cabinet.Component For component number 1-2403-P5-528369 The seismic watkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-2403-P5-DG3 DG3 (DG lB Control Panel DG3), the that this condition does not Due qualified Seismic Walkdown team represent a seismic or operability 11 / 1/2013 found screws missing used to secure a concern. Install fasteners.

ventilation panel door window and a cover plate.Component Seismic Walkdown team found the 528375 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners/fully Open 1-1807-Q3-VI2 following in 1-1807-Q3-VI2 (120 VAC that this condition does not insert pin. Due Outage VITAL PANEL 1BY1B): One (1) door represent a seismic or operability IR18 (120 VAC hinge pin partially withdrawn (picture concern. Install fastenerfully VITAL PANEL 01). One (1) bolt/screw missing for an insert pin.IBY1B) isolation panel (picture 02).

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TAS .K FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 44OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component For the location number 1-1805-S3-528379 The seismic walkdown judged Replace tie Open 1-1805-S3-B07 B07 (480V SWITCHGEAR 1BB07), that this condition does not wraps/fully insert Due Outage the Seismic Walkdown team found the represent a seismic or operability pins. 1R18 following:

One (1) tie wrap used to concern. Replace tie wrap, fully support a cable bundle broken in bay 11 insert pins..Two (2) door hinge pins partially withdrawn on bay 18.Component 1-1806-S3-DSB (125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 1BD1)Seismic Walkdown team found the following in 1-1806-S3-DSB (125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 1BD 1): One (1)cage nut used to secure the door closed missing. This occurs in the front bottom left bay (picture 01). One (1) door that could not be opened due to interference with the breaker face cover in bay 09 (picture 02).528389 The seismic walkdown judged that this condition does not represent a seismic or operability concern. Install fastener/Correct interference.

Install fastener/Correct interference.

Open Due Outage 1R18 0 VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 45 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team found the 528395 The seismic walkdown judged Install fasteners.

Open 1-1805-S3-BBB following in 1-1805-S3-BBB (480V that this condition doesnot Due Outage MOT CONTROL CTR 1BBB): One represent a seismic or operability 1R19 (480V MOT (1) loose screw and one (1) missing concern. Install fasteners.

CONTROL screw for a terminal block in the top CTR 1BBB) right bay of the back of the panel (picture 01). One (1) loose screw/bolt inside bay 05. This is an FME concern because the source of the screw/bolt could not be determined and no component was observed to have any screw or bolt missing (picture 02).'Two (2) missing screws in bay 02 (picture 03).Component Seismic Walkdown team found the 528400 The seismic walkdown judged Install Open 1-1605-P5-SDB following in 1-1605-P5-SDB (TRAIN that this condition does not fasteners/repair Due Outage B SHUTDOWN PANEL (PSDB): represent a seismic or operability receptacle.

1R18 TRAIN B Missing and loose screws, bolts, and concern. Install fasteners/repair SHUTDOWN nuts on some cover plates and in a floor receptacle.

PANEL (PSDB) plate (pictures 01, 03, 04, 05, 06 and 07). One (1) broken receptacle (picture 02).

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 46 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions I I Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component For component number 1-2403-G4-540134 The seismic walkdown judged Review of anchorage Closed 1-2403-G4-001-00 1-V02 (DG AIR START that the missing washers do not documentation V02 RECEIVER), the Seismic Walkdown representa seismic or operability revealed that washers team found two (2) missing washers on concern. are not required.

No the bolts of the base anchorage.

further action needed.Area Seismic walkdown found an "Exit" sign 540137 The seismic walkdown judged Repair Cover. Open CNMT Bldg, had the cover loose or partially open that this condition does not Due Outage near column inside Unit 1 Containment Building represent a seismic or operability 1R188#12, Elev 197'- near column #12 on elevation 197'-0". concern. 4/15/2014 0" Component For component number 1-2403-G4-540141 The seismic walkdown judged Review of anchorage Closed 1-2403-G4-001-00 1-F01 (DG INTAKE AIR FILTER), that both of these findings do not documentation FO1 the Seismic Walkdown team found four represent a seismic or operability revealed that washers (4) missing washers on the bolts of the concern. arenot required.

No base anchorage.

The team also further action needed.identified a deficiency on a component nearby on a HVAC duct access hatch panel door which had two missing latch screws.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 47 OF 56 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component

/ Brief Description of Potentially CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

Area Adverse Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Area Seismic walkdown team found a metal 542455 The box was installed at the end Perform an Open CNMT Bldg, box near valve l-HV-8875D located in of a rigid conduit that is anchored evaluation to identify Due 5/1/14 Elev 184'-0" the Unit 1 Containment that was not and a flexible conduit was the need for any secured (anchored).

The box is located attached to one of the other sides. corrective actions.on level B near column 16. The qualified seismic walkdown team judged that this is not a seismic concern. Perform an evaluation to identify the need for any corrective actions.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE48OF56 During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are warranted.

These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.CR 537446: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the failure of plant personnel to properly secure hoist and cranes following use. 00352-C requires that "that safety related equipment will not be vulnerable to impacts, from chains or controllers of hoists and monorail cranes, during a seismic event. Place any hoist or monorail cranes in the vicinity of the safety related equipment in a location where, during a seismic event, the chains and controllers cannot strike or become entangled with the equipment." Contrary to the requirements of 00352-C, 3 of 4 hoist controllers near the D/G electrical panels and a hoist near Unit 2 Loops 1&4 ARV's were not properly secured. All controllers have seen been secured. Reference CR's 502483 & 504859.CR 537451: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the failure of plant personnel to maintain housekeeping and temporary storage areas in accordance with procedure 00352-C. Reference CR's 500988, 504853, 504860, 504882, 504895, 504901, 511980, 513336 & 517075.CR 537453: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the management of seismic restraints of lighting fixtures.

Reference CR's 500990, 501548, 504862, 504868, 505324 & 505954.CR 537454: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to fasteners and hardware.

Several CR's were generated which identified missing or loose fasteners and hardware.

Reference CR's 501546, 501650, 504850, 505329, 507939, 509102, 513331, 524560, 524568, 525039, 525046, 525340 & 525343.8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Vogtle Unit 1 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE49OF56 8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions.

Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions.

All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary.

These issues included, water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the site CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 50 OF 56 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities:

• review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);* review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;* review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and* review of the final submittal report.This report provides results of the review process for each~review activity as well as the results of the peer review.9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to the guidance in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the Seismic Walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of all four peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) were met. Specifically, the Peer Reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL 1 and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections.

Specific considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL I and SWEL 2. The peer review check sheet of the SWEL is provided in Attachment

2.

VOGTLE UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 51 OF 56 For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):* Reactor Reactivity Control* Reactor Coolant Pressure Control" Reactor Coolant Inventory Control* Decay Heat Removal and" Containment Function For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

• Various types of systems* Major new and replacement equipment* Various types of equipment* Various environments

• Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE and* Risk insight consideration The final SWEL 1 contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list.SWEL 1 contains components from all the classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for cases where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in the development of the list.For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system at Vogtle Unit 1 are Seismic Category I and all different types of components are represented on the SWEL 2. No items that could cause rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool for Vogtle Unit 1 were identified.

Therefore, SWEL 2 does not contain any VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE.52 OF 56 components associated with potentially rapid drain down of the pool. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).In summary, all of the Peer Review comments made during development of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed.

The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.During the process of conducting the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were' not accessible were removed from the list and in most cases equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added. The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these chafnges had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELS with respect to the provisions contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Checklist of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.9.2.2 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review was performed as follows:* Each of the three walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by under the observation of the other teams and the walkdown Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams.During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A member of the Peer Review Team accompanied each of the three walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns.

SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE53OF56 carry a copy of Section 4 from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it, as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.Finally, the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages completed during the first week to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the guidance provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review Team confin-ned that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the walkdowns and walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic condition's such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable.

The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions.

The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team inspected all the checklists completed during the first week of Seismic Walkdowns, which represents approximately 30% of the total number of the checklists.

Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information.

Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly.

The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.Since the peer review occurred at the start of the Seismic Walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at the early stages of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages.

Subsequently, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate.

In addition, all members of the Peer Review Team, including Mr. Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.9.2.3' Licensing Basis Evaluations All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the seismic walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE54OF56 performed as part for the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.

9.2.4 Submittal Report The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to provide guidance and input and verify the submittal report would meet the objectives and requirements of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate.

The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.

VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM PAGE 55 OF 56 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

10.0 REFERENCES

10.1 1 0CFR50.54(f)

Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46.10.5 Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, December 1973 10.6 NMP-GM-033-GLOI Ver. 1.0, SAM NTTF Seismic Walkdowns Guide 10.7 VEGP FSAR, Rev.18, September 2012 10.8 Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) -Seismic, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 10.9 Document No. 12L0075-RPT-001, Revision 0, May 18, 2012, "Southern Nuclear Company Seismic IPEEE Walkdown of Modified Equipment in Support of 10CFR50.69 Risk Informed Project -Plant Vogtle" 10.10 Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973 10.11 NUREG/CR-0098, Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, May 1978 10.12 EPRI Report NP-604 1, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Revision 1, August 1991 VOGTLE UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE56OF56 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS ATTACHMENT 2 -PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR THE SWEL 1 AND 2 ATTACHMENT 3 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 4 -AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 5 -IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION ATTACHMENT 6 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT I UNIT 1 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 -Base List 1 2-30 Unit I -SWEL 1 31-39 Unit 1 -Base List 2 40-41 Unit 1 -SWEL 2 42-44 Page 1 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 1 -BASE LIST 1 NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 Equipment List Panes Unit 1- Base List 1 2-30 Unit 1 -SWEL 1 31-39 Unit 1 -Base List 2 40-41 Unit 1 -SWEL 2 42-44 Page 2 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION 01000 01001 01002 01003 01033 01034 01008 01009 02000 02001 02002 02003 02004 02005 02006 02036 02007 02008 02009 02037 03000 03001 03002 03003 00 00 00 00 18 18 00 00 06 06 06 06 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 21 21 05 05 1-1201-B6-001 1-1201-B6-002 1-1201-16-003 1-1201-B6-004 1-1201-P5-TIAR 1-1201-P5-TIBR 1-1201-V6-001 1-1201-V6-002 1-1202-P4-001 1-1202-P4-002 1-1202-P4-003 1-1202-P4-004 STEAM GENERATOR 1 STEAM GENERATOR 2 STEAM GENERATOR 3 STEAM GENERATOR 4 RVLIS TRANSMITTER RACK TRAIN A RVLIS TRANSMITTER RACK TRAIN B REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURIZER 1-1202-W4-001-FO1 1-1202-W4-001-F02 1-1202-W4-001-F03 1-1202-W4-001-F04 1-1202-W4-002-FO1 1-1202-W4-002-F02 1-1202-W4-002-F03 1-1202-W4-002-F04 1-1203-E4-001 1-1203-E4-002 1-1203-P4-001 1-1203-P4-002 NSCW TRAIN A PUMP NO. 1 NSCW TRAIN B PUMP NO. 2 NSCW TRAIN A PUMP NO. 3 NSCW TRAIN B PUMP NO. 4 NSCT FAN NO. 1 NSCT FAN NO. 2 NSCT FAN NO. 3 NSCT FAN NO. 4 NSCT FAN NO. 1 NSCT FAN NO. 2 NSCT FAN NO. 3 NSCT FAN NO. 4 CCW HEAT EXCHANGER CCW HEAT EXCHANGER CCW PUMP NO. 1 CCW PUMP NO. 2 CTB CTB CTB CTB AUX FB CTB CTB NSCT NSCT NSCT NSCT NSCT NSCT NSCT NSCT NSCT NSCT NSCT NSCT AUX AUX AUX AUX 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 180'-0" 1801-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" R203 14AB 14BB 14CB 14DB RB04 RB08 14AB 14DA R103 R203 R103 250'-0" 250'-0" 250'-0" 250'-0" 250'-0" 250'-0" 250'-0" 250'-0" 245'-0" 245'-0" 195'-0" 195'-0" R105 R108 R106 R106 R205 R208 R206 R206 R203 R202 RA05 RA03 Page 3 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO 03004 05 1-1203-P4-003 03005 05 1-1203-P4-004 03008 21 1-1203-T4-001 03009 21 1-1203-T4-002 04000 05 1-1204-P6-003 04001 05 1-1204-P6-004 04002 21 1-1204-T4-001 04003 21 1-1204-V6-001 05000 21 1-1205-E6-001 05001 21 1-1205-E6-002 05002 05 1-1205-P6-001R 05003 05 1-1205-P6-002R 05004 00 1-1205-U6-019 05005 00 1-1205-U6-020 06000 21 1-1208-E6-001 06004 05 1-1208-P6-002 06005 05 1-1208-P6-003 06006 00 1-1208-U6-151 06007 00 1-1208-U6-152 06008 00 1-1208-U6-153 07002 21 1-1213-E6-001 07013 21 1-1213-E6-002 07003 21 1-1217-E4-001 07004 21 1-1217-E4-002 DESCRIPTION CCW PUMP NO. 3 CCW PUMP NO. 4 CCW SURGE TANK CCW SURGE TANK SI PUMP A SI PUMP B REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK BORON INJECTION TANK RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B RHR PUMP A RHR PUMP B MANUAL RHR THROTTLING GATE VALVE WITH REACH ROD MANUAL RHR THROTTLING GATE VALVE WITH REACH ROD REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER CCP A CCP B MANUAL SEAL INJECTION VALVE WITH REACH ROD MANUAL SEAL INJECTION VALVE WITH REACH ROD MANUAL CCP DISCH ISO VLV WITH REACH ROD SPENT FUEL PIT HEAT EXCH A SPENT FUEL PIT HEAT EXCH B ACCW HEAT EXCHANGER ACCW HEAT EXCHANGER NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM AUX 195'-0" RA05 AUX 195'-0" RA03 AUX 245'-0" R203 AUX 245'-0" R202 AUX 180'-0" RB15 AUX 180'-0" RB19 H OF RWST 220'-0" AUX AUX 180'-0" AUX 119'-3" AUX 143'-6" AUX 119'-3" AUX 119'-3" AUX 143'-6" AUX 143'-6" CTB 183'0" AUX 143'-6" AUX 143'-6" AUX 143'-6" AUX 143'-6" AUX 143'-6" AUX 195'-0" FB 200'-0" AUX 220'-0" AUX 220'-0" RB11 RC90 RC91 RD48 RD49 RC90 RC91 14AB RC115 RC118 RC119 RC114 RC112 RA53 RA07 R105 R104 Page 4 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO, CLASS MARK-NO 09001 05 1-1302-P4-002 09002 05 1-1302-P4-003 09003 21 1-1302-V4-001 21000 18 1-1407-PS-SGS 10000 20 1-1500-Q5-HVC 10001 20 1-1500-V7-001-CBA 10002 20 1-1S00-V7-001-CBB 10003 09 1-1501-A7-001-000 10004 09 1-1501-A7-002-000 10005 09 1-1501-A7-003-000 10006 09 1-1501-A7-004-000 10139 09 1-1531-B7-002-000 10140 09 1-1531-B7-004-000 10017 09 1-1531-N7-001-000 10018 09 1-1531-N7-002-000 10033 09 1-1532-A7-001-000 10034 09 1-1532-A7-002-000 10035 09 1-1532-B7-001-000 10036 09 1-1532-B7-002-000 10039 09 1-1539-A7-001-000 10040 09 1-1539-A7-002-000 10041 09 1-1539-A7-005-000 10042 09 1-1539-A7-006-000 10045 09 1-1540-B7-001-000 DESCRIPTION AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP B AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP A CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK NO. 1 (CST)SGB ISOL SOLENOID RACK HVAC PANEL LOCAL CB HVAC PANEL TRAIN A LOCAL CB HVAC PANEL TRAIN B CTB COOLING UNIT & MOTOR CTB COOLING UNIT & MOTOR CTB COOLING UNIT & MOTOR CTB COOLING UNIT & MOTOR CBCR CHILLER ROOM VENT FAN CBCR CHILLER ROOM VENT FAN CBCR FILTER UNIT CBCR FILTER UNIT CBSF ELEC EQUIP RM AC UNIT CBSF ELEC EQUIP RM AC UNIT BATTERY RM EXHAUST FAN & MOTOR BATTERY RM EXHAUST FAN & MOTOR CB AUX RELAY RM ESF A/C UNIT CB AUX RELAY RM ESF A/C UNIT CB NORMAL AC RM ESF A/C UNIT CB ELEC EQUIP RM ESF A/C UNIT DIESEL POWER CABLE TUNNEL EXHAUST FAN UNIT BUILDING AFWP HOUSE AFWP HOUSE CST NO. 1 AUX CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CTB CTB CTB CTB CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL TUNNEL NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ELEV ROOM 220'-0" R102 220'-0" RI01 220'-0" 180'-0" RB07 220'-0" R163 220'-0" R163 220'-0" R163 220'-0" 14A1 220'-0" 14A1 220'-0" 14D1 220'-0" 14D1 260'-0" R320 260'-0" R312 260'-0" R321 260'-0" R312 180'-0" RB60 180'-0" RB62 180'-0" RB55 180'-0" RB49 200'-0" RA82 240'-0" R226 260'-0" R325 260'-0" R322 195'-0" 0GB Page 5 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS 10047 09 1-1540-B7-003-000 10048 09 1-1540-87-004-000 10049 09 1-1540-B7-005-000 10054 09 1-1555-A7-001-000 10055 09 1-1555-A7-002-000 10056 09 1-1555-A7-003-000 10057 09 1-1555-A7-004-000 10058 09 1-1555-A7-005-000 10059 09 1-1555-A7-006-000 10078 09 1-1561-E7-001-000 10079 09 1-1561-E7-002-000 10080 09 1-1561-N7-001-000 10081 09 1-1561-N7-002-000 10090 09 1-1566-B7-001-000 10091 09 1-1566-B7-002-000 10092 09 1-1566-B7-003-000 10093 09 1-1566-B7-004-000 10098 11 1-1592-C7-001 10099 11 1-1592-C7-002 10100 05 1-1592-P7-001 10101 05 1-1592-P7-002 10102 21 1-1592-T7-001 10103 21 1-1592-T7-002 NSCW TOWER CABLE TUNNEL EXHAUST FAN UNIT NSCW TOWER CABLE TUNNEL EXHAUST FAN UNIT AUX BLDG TRAIN A TUNNEL SUPPLY FAN UNIT ELEC SWGR AND MCC ROOM COOLER A (lAB15)ELEC SWGR AND MCC ROOM COOLER B (1BB16)ELEC SWGR AND MCC ROOM COOLER A (lABO)ELEC SWGR AND MCC ROOM COOLER B (1BBD)ELEC SWGR AND MCC ROOM COOLER A (1ABB)ELEC SWGR AND MCC ROOM COOLER B (1BBB)PIPING PENETRATION AREA COOLER PIPING PENETRATION AREA COOLER PIPING PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION AND EXHAUST UNIT PIPING PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION AND EXHAUST UNIT DG A BLDG ESF SUPPLY FAN NO. 1 DG B BLDG ESF SUPPLY FAN NO. 2 DG A BLDG ESF SUPPLY FAN NO. 3 DG B BLDG ESF SUPPLY FAN NO. 4 CB ESSENTIAL CHILLER CB ESSENTIAL CHILLER ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER PUMP ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER PUMP ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER EXPANSION TANK ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER EXPANSION TANK NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 TUNNEL 220'-0 NSCW TUNNEL 220'-0" NSCW AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX DG DG DG DG 245'-0" 119'-3" 245'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 245'-0" 245'-0" 245'-0", 245'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" R212 RD79 R212 RB13 RB17 R118 R116 R210 R210 R210 R209 R208 R203 R208 R203 R320 R313 R320 R313 R316 R313 CONTROL 260'-0" CONTROL 260'-0" CONTROL 260'-0" CONTROL 260'-0" CONTROL 260'-0" CONTROL 260'-0" Page 6 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARK_NO 10110 09 1-1593-B7-001 10111 09 1-1593-B7-002 13000 20 1-1601-Q5-MCB 13001 20 1-1601-U3-T03 13002 20 1-1601-U3-T04 13003 20 1-1601-U3-TO5 13004 20 1-1601-U3-T06 13005 20 1-1601-U3-T07 13006 20 1-1601-U3-T08 13007 20 1-1601-U3-T10 13008 20 1-1601-U3-T11 13009 20 1-1601-U3-T14 13010 20 1-1601-U3-T1S 13011 20 1-1601-U3-TI9 13012 20 1-1601-U3-T20 13013 20 1-1601-U3-T27 20 1-1602-P5-NFB 14002 18 1-1602-Q5-NIR 15000 20 1-1604-Q5-PC1 15001 20 1-1604-Q5-PC2 15002 20 1-1604-Q5-PC3 15003 20 1-1604-Q5-PC4 15013 20 1-1604-Q5-PCG 15004 20 1-1604-Q5-PCP NO. SNCVO61-RPT-OI, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION AFW PUMP A SUPPLY FAN & MOTOR AFW PUMP B SUPPLY FAN & MOTOR MAIN CONTROL BOARD MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET MN CONT BD TERMINATION CABINET GAMMA-METRICS N32/N36 SR/IR Amplifier Train B NUCLEAR INST RACKS PROCESS CONTROL GROUP 1 PROCESS CONTROL GROUP 2 PROCESS CONTROL GROUP 3 PROCESS CONTROL GROUP 4 BOP CONTROL PANEL 1 MISC SYS/EQPT PANEL AFWP HOUSE AFWP HOUSE CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 200'-0" 240'-0" 200'-0" 240'-0" 200'-0" 240'-0" 240'-0" 200'-0" 240'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 240'-0" 200'-0" 180'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" R101 R102 R163 RA44 R225 RA44 R225 RA44 R225 R225 RA44 R225 RA44 RA44 R225 RA44 RB65 R163 R163 R163 R163 R163 R163 R163 Page 7 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION 15005 20 1-1604-Q5-PP1 15006 20 1-1604-Q5-PP2 15007 20 1-1604-Q5-PP3 15008 20 1-1604-Q5-PP4 15009 20 1-1604-Q5-PS1 15010 20 1-1604-Q5-PS2 15011 20 1-1604-Q5-PS3 15012 20 1-1604-Q5-PS4 16000 20 1-1605-C5-ASI 16001 20 1-1605-P5-SDA 16002 20 1-1605-P5-SDB 16003 20 1-1605-Q5-SPA 16004 20 1-1605-Q5-SPB 16005 20 1-1605-Q5-SPC 16006 20 1-1605-Q5-SPD 16007 20 1-1605-Q5-STA 16008 20 1-1605-QS-STB 21001 20 1-1606-S6-002 21002 20 1-1620-Q5-ESF 17000 20 1-1623-D5-001 17001 20 1-1623-D5-002 17002 20 1-1623-D5-003 17003 20 1-1623-D5-004 17004 20 1-1623-D5-006A 17005 20 1-1623-D5-006B BOP PROTECTION CH 1 PANEL BOP PROTECTION CH 2 PANEL BOP PROTECTION CH 3 PANEL BOP PROTECTION CH 4 PANEL PROCESS I&C PROTECT I PROCESS I&C PROTECT II PROCESS I&C PROTECT III PROCESS I&C PROTECT IV ALTERNATE SHDN IND EAGLE 21 CAB SHUTDOWN PANEL TRN A SHUTDOWN PANEL TRN B SOLID STATE PROT SYS CAB-TRN A SOLID STATE PROT SYS CAB-TRN B SOLID STATE PROT SYS CAB-TRN C SOLID STATE PROT SYS CAB-TRN D SAFEGUARD TEST CAB-TRN A SAFEGUARD TEST CAB-TRN B REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR BOP ESF PANEL REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT A CAB 1 REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT A CAB 2 REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT B CAB 1 REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT B CAB 2 CONTROL 220'-0" CONTROL 220'-0" CONTROL 220'-0" CONTROL 220'-0" CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 240'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 180'-0" 220'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 240'-0" 240'-0" 200'-0" 240'-0" R163 R163 R163 R163 R163 R163 R163 R163 R230 RA75 RA43 R163 R163 R163 R163 R163 R163 RB71 R163 RA48 RA48 R230 R230 RA48 R230 DISPLAY PROCESSING UNIT A DISPLAY PROCESSING UNIT B Page 8 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARK-NO 18000 03 1-1804-S3-A02 18001 03 1-1804-S3-A03 18002 01 1-1805-53-ABA 18003 01 1-1805-S3-ABB 18004 01 1-1805-53-ABC 18005 01 1-1805-S3-ABD 18006 01 1-1805-S3-ABE 18007 01 1-1805-53-ABF 18008 02 1-1805-$3-BOl 18008 02 1-1805-$3-BO0X 18009 02 1-1805-S3-B04 18009 02 1-1805-53-BO4X 18010 02 1-1805-S3-B05 18010 02 1-1805-53-BO5XR 18011 02 1-1805-53-BO6 18011 02 1-1805-53-BO6XR 18012 02 1-1805-53-B07 18012 02 1-1805-S3-BO7X 18013 02 1-1805-$3-BlO 18013 02 1-1805-S3-BlOX 18014 02 1-1805-53-B15 18014 02 1-1805-$3-B15XR 18015 02 1-1805-$3-B1R NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION 4160V SWITCHGEAR 1AA02 4160V SWITCHGEAR 1BA03 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1ABA 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1ABB 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1ABC 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1ABD 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1ABE 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1ABF 480V SWITCHGEAR 1NB01 480V SWITCHGEAR INB01 480V SWITCHGEAR IAB04 480V SWITCHGEAR 1AB04 480V SWITCHGEAR lABOS 480V SWITCHGEAR lAB05 480V SWITCHGEAR 1BB06 480V SWITCHGEAR IBB06 480V SWITCHGEAR 1BB07 480V SWITCHGEAR 1BB07 480V SWITCHGEAR 1NB10 480V SWITCHGEAR 1NB10 480V SWITCHGEAR 1AB15 480V SWITCHGEAR 1AB15 480V SWITCHGEAR IBB16 CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL AUX CONTROL AUX CONTROL DG CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL AUX AUX AUX 200'-0" 200'-0" 260'-0" 220'-0" 180'-0" 143'-6" 1801-0" 220'-0" 1801-0" 1801-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 119'-3" 119'-3" 245'-0" RA48 RA50 R325 R118 RB76 RC109 RB79 R103 RB68 RB68 RB76 RB76 RB76 RB76 RB61 RB61 RB61 RB61 RB50 RB50 RD105 RD105 R207 Page 9 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: 5EISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION 18015 18016 18017 02 01 01 18018 01 18019 01 18020 01 18021 01 18022 02 18023 02 18052 23 18053 23 18054 16 18055 16 19001 15 19002 15 19003 15 19004 15 19005 15 19006 16 19007 16 1-1805-S3-B16X 1-1805-S3-BBA 1-1805-S3-BBB 1-1805-$3-BBC 1-1805-S3-BBD 1-1805-53-BBE 1-1805-S3-BBF 1-1805-S3-NBR 1-1805-53-NBS 1-1805-S3-RHR1A 1-1805-S3-RHR2A 1-1805-Y3-IC5 1-1805-Y3-ID6 1-1806-B3-BN3 1-1806-B3-BYA 1-1806-B3-BYB 1-1806-B3-BYC 1-1806-B3-BYD 1-1806-B3-CAA 1-1806-B3-CAB 1-1806-B3-CBA 1-1806-B3-CBB 1-1806-83-CCA 1-1806-83-CCB 480V SWITCHGEAR 1BB16 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1BBA 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1BBB 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1BBC 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1BBD 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1BBE 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1BBF 480V MCC 1NBR 480V MCC 1NBS STARTER/RHR HV-8701B STARTER/RHR HV-8702A RHR ISO VLV INVERTER RHR ISO VLV INVERTER 125 VDC BATTERY 1ND3AB 125 VDC BATTERY 1ADIB 125 VDC BATTERY 1BDB 125 VDC BATTERY 1CCIB 125 VDC BATTERY 1DDIB BATTERY CHARGER 1ADICA BATTERY CHARGER 1AD1CB BATTERY CHARGER 1BDlCA BATTERY CHARGER 1BDICB BATTERY CHARGER 1CDlCA BATTERY CHARGER 1CDICB AUX 245'-0" CONTROL 260'-0" AUX 220'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" AUX 180'-0" CONTROL 200'-0" DG 220'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 280'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" CONTROL 180'-0" R207 R322 RI16 RB61 RB16 RA77 R101 RB50 RB68 RB55 RB48 RB55 RB48 R409 RB54 RB49 RB56 RB44 RB52 RB52 RB47 R847 RB55 RB55 19008 19009 19010 19011 16 16 16 16 Page 10 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO 19012 16 1-1806-B3-CDA 19013 16 1-1806-B3-CDB 19014 14 1-1806-Q3-DA1 19015 14 1-1806-Q3-DA2 19016 14 1-1806-Q3-DB1 19017 14 1-1806-Q3-DB2 19018 14 1-1806-Q3-DC1 19019 14 1-1806-Q3-DD1 19020 01 1-1806-S3-DCA 19021 01 1-1806-S3-DCB 19022 01 1-1806-S3-DCC 19000 02 1-1806-S3-DN3 19023 02 1-1806-S3-DSA 19024 02 1-1806-S3-DSB 19025 02 1-1806-S3-DSC 19026 02 1-1806-S3-DSD 18024 14 1-1807-Q3-VI1 18025 14 1-1807-Q3-VI2 18026 14 1-1807-Q3-VI3 18027 14 1-1807-Q3-VI4 18028 14 1-1807-Q3-VI5 18029 14 1-1807-O.3-V16 18030 14 1-1807-Q3-VN 1 NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION BATTERY CHARGER lDDlCA BATTERY CHARGER 1DDICB 125 VDC DISTR. PANEL lAD11 125 VDC DISTR. PANEL 1AD12 125 VDC DISTR. PANEL 1BDll 125 VDC DISTR. PANEL 1BD12 125 VDC DISTR. PANEL ICDll 125 VDC DISTR. PANEL 1DD11 125 VDC MCC 1ADIM 125 VDC MCC 1BDIM 125 VDC MCC 1CDIM 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 1ND3A 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR lAD1 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 1BD1 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 1CD1 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 1DD1 120 VAC VITAL PANEL lAYlA 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 1BYIB 120 VAC VITAL PANEL ICYlA 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 1DYIB 120 VAC VITAL DIST PANEL 1AY2A 120 VAC VITAL DIST PANEL 1BY2B 120 VAC ESSENT PANEL 1NYIN 120 VAC ESSENT PANEL 1NY2N CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL AUX AUX CONTROL CONTROL 180'-0" 1801-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 280'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 200'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" RB48 RB48 RB52 RB52 RB36 RB47 RB55 RB48 RB52 RB47 RB84 R408 RB52 RB47 RB55 RB48 RB52 RB47 RB55 RB48 R118 R116 R853 RB53 18031 14 1-1807-Q3-VN2 Page 11 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKI)OWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION 18032 14 1-1807-Q3-VN4 1-1807-Y3-10 1-1807-Y3-11R 1-1807-Y3-12R 1-1807-Y3-13R 1-1807-Y3-14R 1-1807-Y3-15R 18039 16 1-1807-Y3-12 120 VAC ESSENT PANEL 1NY4N CONTROL 260'-0" R322 REGULATED TRANSFORMER REGULATED TRANSFORMER REGULATED TRANSFORMER REGULATED TRANSFORMER 18040 18041 18042 18043 18044 18045 18046 18047 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 1-1807-Y3-13 1-1807-Y3-14R 1-1807-Y3-1AIR 1-1807-Y3-IA11R 1-1807-Y3-IB12R 1-1807-Y3-IB2 1-1807-Y3-IC3R 1-1807-Y3-ID4 1-1807-Y3-RX25R 1-1807-Y3-RX26 1-1807-Y3-RX21R 1-1807-Y3-RX22R 1-1808-Q3-L12 1-1808-Q3-L19 1-1808-Q3-L29 1-1808-Q3-L32 ESSENTIAL AC INVERTER IND312 ESSENTIAL AC INVERTER IND313 ESSENTIAL AC INVERTER IND314 VITAL AC INVERTER 1AD11i VITAL AC INVERTER 1AD1111 VITAL AC INVERTER 1BD1112 VITAL AC INVERTER 1BD112 VITAL AC INVERTER 1CD113 VITAL AC INVERTER 1DD114 1-1807-Y3-RX25 1-1807-Y3-RX26 1-1807-Y3-RX21 1-1807-Y3-RX22 ESSENTIAL LTG DIST PANEL 1NLP12 ESSENTIAL LTG DIST PANEL 1NLP19 EMERGENCY LTG DIST PANEL 1NLP29 EMERGENCY LTG DIST PANEL 1NLP32 CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL AUX AUX CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL 1-1807-Y3-RX25 1-1807-Y3-RX26 1-1807-Y3-RX21 1-1807-Y3-RX22 AUX AUX CONTROL CONTROL 180'-0" RB53 180'-0" RB53 260'-0" R322 180'-0" RB52 220'-0" R118 220'-0" R116 180'-0" RB47 180'-0" RB55 180'-0" RB48 1-1807- Y3-Y3-RX25 RX25 1-1807- Y3-Y3-RX26 RX26 1-1807- Y3-Y3-RX21 RX21 1-1807- Y3-Y3-RX22 RX22 195'-0" RA22 143'-6" RC98 220'-0" R149 220'-0" R149 22000 14 22001 14 22002 14 22003 14 Page 12 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION 22004 14 1-1808-Q3-L47 22005 14 1-1808-Q3-L50 22010 04 1-1808-T3-105 22011 04 1-1808-T3-106 1-1808-T3-116R 1-1808-T3-113R 1-1808-T3-114R EMERGENCY LTG DIST PANEL 1NLP47 EMERGENCY LTG DIST PANEL 1NLP50 LTG ISOLATION XFMR 1ABF13X LTG ISOLATION XFMR 1BBF13X DG 220'-0" R101 DG 220'-0" R103 DG 220'-0" R103 DG 220'-0" RIO1 REGULATED TRANSFORMER 20000 20001 20002 20003 20004 20005 20006 20007 20008 20009 20010 20011 20012 21003 21004 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 1-1808-T3-115R 1-1816-U3-001 1-1816-U3-002 1-1816-U13-003 1-1816-U3-004 1-1816-U3-005 1-1816-U3-006 1-1816-U3-007 1-1816-U3-009 1-1816-U13-010 1-1816-U3-014 1-1816-U13-015 1-1816-U3-017 1-1816-U13-018 1-1821-U3-001 1-1821-U3-002 1-1823-Q5-BPS AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL A AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL N-A AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL B AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL N-B ISOLATION DEVICE PANEL AB ISOLATION DEVICE PANEL B-C ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BOARD ISOLATION DEVICE PANEL C ISOLATION DEVICE PANEL AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL SF SEQUENCER BOARD TRAIN A SF SEQUENCER BOARD TRAIN B SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR PANEL CONTROL 200'-0" CONTROL 200'-0" CONTROL 240'-0" CONTROL 240'-0" CONTROL 220'-0" CONTROL 220'-0" CONTROL 220'-0" CONTROL 220'-0" CONTROL 220'-0" CONTROL 200'-0" CONTROL 240'-0" CONTROL 200'-0" CONTROL 200'-0" CONTROL 200'-0" CONTROL 200'-0" CONTROL 220'-0" RA45 RA45 R226 R226 R163 R163 R163 R163 R163 RA45 RA226 RA45 RASO RA48 RA5O R163 21005 20 Page 13 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO 21006 03 1-1825-S3-lAAA 21007 03 1-1825-S3-IBAB 21008 03 1-1825-$3-1CAC 21009 03 1-1825-S3-iDAD 11002 17 1-2403-G4-001 11003 24 1-2403-G4-001-FO1 11004 24 1-2403-G4-001-F02 DESCRIPTION 11005 11006 11007 11008 11009 11010 11011 11012 11013 11014 11015 11016 11017 11018 11019 11020 11021 1-2403-G4-001-VO1 1-2403-G4-001-V02 1-2403-G4-002 1-2403-G4-002-FOl 1-2403-G4-002-F02 1-2403-G4-002-VO1 1-2403-G4-002-V02 1-2403-P4-001 1-2403-P4-003 1-2403-P5-DG1 1-2403-P5-DG2 1-2403-P5-DG3 1-2403-P5-DG4 1-2403-T3-NGA 1-2403-T3-NGB 1-2403-T4-001 1-2403-T4-002 13800V RCP SWITCHGEAR 1AAA 13800V RCP SWITCHGEAR IBAB 13800V RCP SWITCHGEAR 1CAC 13800V RCP SWITCHGEAR 1DAD DIESEL GENERATOR A DG INTAKE AIR FILTER DG EXHAUST AIR SILENCER DG AIR START RECEIVER DG AIR START RECEIVER DIESEL GENERATOR B DG INTAKE AIR FILTER DG EXHAUST AIR SILENCER DG AIR START RECEIVER DG AIR START RECEIVER DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP DG 1A GEN CTL PNL DG 1A ENG CTL PNL DG 1B GEN CTL PNL DG 1B ENG CTL PNL DG 1A NEUTRAL GND CABINET DG 1B NEUTRAL GND CABINET DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DFOST DFOST DG DG DG DG DG DG DFOST DFOST NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM CONTROL 200'-0" RA64 CONTROL 200'-0" RA64 CONTROL 200'-0" RA54 CONTROL 200'-0" RA54 220'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 211'-6" 211'-6" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 211'-6" 211'-6" R103 R210 R209 R103 R103 R101 R205 R204 R101 R101 RA01 RA03 R103 R103 R101 R101 R103 R101 RA01 RA03 Page 14 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION 11022 11023 02010 02011 05006 05007 02012 02013 10019 10020 06010 06011 06012 06013 06014 06045 06046 05008 05009 04004 04005 04006 02014 02015 1-2403-T4-003 1-2403-T4-004 1-CV-9446 1-CV-9447 1-FIS-0610 1-FIS-0611 1-FIT-1640A 1-FIT-1641A 1-FSL-12045 1-FSL-12046 1-FT-0138 1-FT-0142 1-FT-0143 1-FT-0144 1-FT-0145 1-FT-0406 I-FT-0407 I-FT-0618 1-FT-0619 1-FT-0917 1-FT-0918R 1-FT-0922R 1-FT-1802 1-FT-1803 DIESEL FUEL OIL DAY TANK DIESEL FUEL OIL DAY TANK NSCT BLOWDOWN ISO AOV NSCT BLOWDOWN ISO AOV RHR PUMP A FLOW TO MINIFLOW VALVE RHR PUMP B FLOW TO MINIFLOW VALVE NSCW RETURN FLOW NSCW RETURN FLOW INTERLOCK FLOW SWTCH CNTL BLD..CLOSES ON LOW AIR INTERLOCK FLOW SWTCH CNTL BLD..CLOSES ON AIR-FLO CCP A FLOW RCP 4 SEAL INJ FLOW RCP 3 SEAL INJ FLOW RCP 2 SEAL INJ FLOW RCP 1 SEAL INJ FLOW REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN LINE FLOW REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN LINE FLOW RHR A FLOW RHR B FLOW FLOW THROUGH BIT SIP A FLOW SIP B FLOW NSCW FLOW TO CB ESS CHILLER NSCW FLOW TO CB ESS CHILLER DG DG NSCT NSCT AUX AUX NSCT NSCT CONTROL CONTROL AUX FB FB AUX AUX CTB CTB AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX CONTROL CONTROL 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 119'-3" 119'-3" 195'-0" 195'-0" 260'-0" 260'-0" 143'-6" 2001-0" 200'-0" 195'-0" 195'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 119'-3" 143'-6" 1801-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 260'-0" 260'-0" R 104 R 102 R 102 R202 RD121 RD53 EL 1T2A EL 1T2B R320 R313 RC114 RA1O RAI0 RA09 RA09 RB03 RB03 RD121 RD53 RB11 RB15 RB19 R320 R313 Page 15 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 03010 19 1-FT-1876 CCW A FLOW AUX 195'-0" RA05 03011 19 1-FT-1877 CCW B FLOW AUX 195'-0" RA04 10104 19 1-FT-22425 ECW FLOW CONTROL 260'-0" R320 10105 19 1-FT-22426 ECW FLOW CONTROL 260'-0" R313 09004 19 1-FT-5150 AFW FLOW TO SG 4 AUX 195'-0" RA17 09005 19 1-FT-5151 AFW FLOW TO SG 2 CONTROL 200'-0" RA62 09006 19 1-FT-5152 AFW FLOW TO SG 1 AUX 195'-0" RA10 09007 19 1-FT-5153 AFW FLOW TO SG 3 CONTROL 200'-0" RA56 AFWP 09008 19 1-FT-5154 AFW B FLOW TO MINIFLOW VALVE HOUSE 220'-0" R101 AFWP 09009 19 1-FT-5155 AFW A FLOW TO MINIFLOW VAVLE HOUSE 220'-0" R101 05010 08a 1-FV-0610 RHR PUMP A MINIFLOW MOV AUX 143'-6" RC90 05011 08a 1-FV-0611 RHR PUMP B MINIFLOW MOV AUX 143'-6" RC91 AFWP 09010 08a 1-FV-5154 AFW PUMP B MINIFLOW MOV HOUSE 220'-0" R102 AFWP 09011 08a 1-FV-5155 AFW PUMP A MINIFLOW MOV HOUSE 220'-0" R101 06015 08b 1-HV-0190A CCP A SAFETY GRADE CHARGING SOLENOID OP VLV AUX 195'-0" RA09 06016 08b 1-HV-0190B CCP B SAFETY GRADE CHARGING SOLENOID OP VLV AUX 143'-6" RC119 06047 08b 1-HV-0442A REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN LINE CONTROL SOV CTB 183'-0" RB03 06048 08b 1-HV-0442B REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN LINE CONTROL SOV CTB 183'-0" RB03 12005 07 1-HV-0780 NORMAL CTB SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE AOV CTB 198'-0" RB10 12006 07 1-HV-0781 NORMAL CTB SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE AOV AUX 195'-0" RA09 ACCUMULATOR NITROGEN HDR VENT--SOLENOID 04007 08b 1-HV-0943A OPERATED VALVE CTB 180'-0" RB1O ACCUMULATOR NITROGEN HDR VENT--SOLENOID 04008 08b 1-HV-0943B OPERATED VALVE CTB 183'-0" RB10 04009 07 1-HV-10957 RWST TO SLUDGE MIXING PUMP SUCTION AOV RWST 220'-0" R101 04010 07 1-HV-10958 RWST TO SLUDGE MIXING PUMP SUCTION AOV RWST 220'-0" R101 Page 16 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 02016 08a 1-HV-11600 NSCW PUMP 1 DISCHARGE MOV NSCT 220'-0" R103 02017 08a 1-HV-11606 NSCW PUMP 3 DISCHARGE MOV NSCT 220'-0" R103 02018 08a 1-HV-11607 NSCW PUMP 2 DISCHARGE MOV NSCT 245'-0" R203 02019 08a 1-HV-11613 NSCW PUMP 4 DISCHARGE MOV NSCT 245'-0" R203 AFWP 10112 08a 1-HV-12005R AFW PUMP HOUSE AIR SUPPLY DAMPER HOUSE 220'-0" R102 AFWP 10113 08a 1-HV-12006R AFW PUMP HOUSE AIR SUPPLY DAMPER HOUSE 220'-0" R101 10094 08a 1-HV-12050R DG A AIR SUPPLY DAMPER FOR FAN NO. 1 DG 255'-0" R208 10095 08a 1-HV-12051R DG A AIR SUPPLY DAMPER FOR FAN NO. 3 DG 255'-0" R208 10096 08a 1-HV-12053R DG A AIR SUPPLY DAMPER FOR FAN NO. 2 DG 255'-0" R203 10097 08a 1-HV-12054R DG A AIR SUPPLY DAMPER FOR FAN NO. 4 DG 255'-0" R203 10021 08a 1-HV-12128 CBCR FILTER UNIT AIR SUPPLY DAMPER CONTROL 220'-0" R143 10022 08a 1-HV-12129 CBCR FILTER UNIT AIR SUPPLY DAMPER CONTROL 220'-0" R143 10023 08a 1-HV-12130 CBCR FILTER UNIT AIR RETURN DAMPER CONTROL 220'-0" R143 10024 08a 1-HV-12131 CBCR FILTER UNIT AIR RETURN DAMPER CONTROL 220'-0" R143 10025 07 1-HV-12146 CBCR NORMAL AIR SUPPLY DAMPER CONTROL 240'-0" R233 10026 07 1-HV-12147 CBCR NORMAL AIR SUPPLY DAMPER CONTROL 240'-0" R233 10027 07 1-HV-12148 CBCR NORMAL AIR RETURN DAMPER CONTROL 240'-0" R233 10028 07 1-HV-12149 CBCR NORMAL AIR RETURN DAMPER CONTROL 240'-0" R233 PPG PENETRATION NORMAL RETURN AIR ISOLATION 10082 07 1-HV-12604 DAMPER AUX 245'-0" R209 PPG PENETRATION NORMAL AIR SUPPLY ISOLATION 10083 07 1-HV-12605 DAMPER AUX 245'-0" R209 PPG PENETRATION NORMAL AIR SUPPLY ISOLATION 10084 07 1-HV-12606 DAMPER AUX 245'-0" R209 PPG PENETRATION NORMAL RETURN AIR ISOLATION 10085 07 1-HV-12607 DAMPER AUX 245'-0" R209 PPG PEN FILTRATION AND EXHAUST UNIT SUCTION 10086 08c 1-HV-12614 DAMPER AUX 245'-0" R210 PPG PEN FILTRATION AND EXHAUST UNIT SUCTION 10087 08c 1-HV-12616 DAMPER AUX 245'-0" R209 Page 17 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 12021 08b 1-HV-12976 CTB AIR RADIATION MONITOR INLET SOV AUX 180'-0" RB08 12022 08b 1-HV-12977 CTB AIR RADIATION MONITOR OUTLET SOV AUX 180'-0" RB08 08000 07 1-HV-13005A INBOARD MSIV BYPASS AOV--SG 1 AUX 220'-0" R108 08001 07 1-HV-13005B OUTBOARD MSIV BYPASS AOV--SG 1 AUX 220'-0" R108 08002 07 1-HV-13006A INBOARD MSIV BYPASS AOV--SG 4 AUX 220'-0" R108 08003 07 1-HV-13006B OUTBOARD MSIV BYPASS AOV--SG 4 AUX 220'-0" R108 08004 07 1-HV-13007A INBOARD MSIV BYPASS AOV--SG 2 CONTROL 220'-0" R123 08005 07 1-HV-13007B OUTBOARD MSIV BYPASS AOV--SG 2 CONTROL 220'-0" R123 08006 07 1-HV-13008A INBOARD MSIV BYPASS AOV--SG 3 CONTROL 220'-0" R122 08007 07 1-HV-13008B OUTBOARD MSIV BYPASS AOV--SG 3 CONTROL 220'-0" R122 07005 07 1-HV-15196 BFIV FOR SG 1 AUX 195'-0" RAll 07006 07 1-HV-15197 BFIV FOR SG 2 CONTROL 200'-0" RA56 07007 07 1-HV-15198 BFIV FOR SG 3 CONTROL 200'-0" RA56 07008 07 1-HV-15199 BFIV FOR SG 4 AUX 195'-0" RA12 02020 08a 1-HV-1668A NSCW SPRAY VALVE NSCT 195'-0" R102 02021 08a 1-HV-1668B NSCW TOWER BYPASS MOV NSCT 220"-0" R102 02022 08a 1-HV-1669A NSCW SPRAY VALVE NSCT 195'-0" R202 02023 08a 1-HV-1669B NSCW TOWER BYPASS MOV NSCT 220'-0" R202 12007 08a 1-HV-1974 ACCW RETURN FROM RCP COOLERS MOV CTB 198'-0" R101 12008 08a 1-HV-1975 ACCW RETURN FROM RCP COOLERS MOV AUX 195'-0" RA12 12009 08a 1-HV-1978 ACCW SUPPLY TO RCP COOLERS MOV CTB 198'-0" R101 12010 08a 1-HV-1979 ACCW SUPPLY TO RCP COOLERS MOV AUX 195'-0" RA12 12015 07 1-HV-2626B NORMAL CTB PURGE SUPPLY & EQUALIZING AOV CTB 220'-0" R101 12016 07 1-HV-2627B NORMAL CTB PURGE SUPPLY & EQUALIZING AOV CONTROL 220'-0" R125 12017 07 1-HV-2628B NORMAL CTB PURGE EXHAUST & EQUALIZING AOV CTB 220'-0" R101 Page 18 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 LINE NO. CLASS MARK-NO DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 12018 07 1-HV-2629B NORMAL CTB PURGE EXHAUST & EQUALIZING AOV CONTROL 220'-0" R117 08008 08c 1-HV-3006A INBOARD MSIV--SG 1 AUX 220'-0" R108 08009 08c 1-HV-3006B OUTBOARD MSIV--SG 1 AUX 220'-0" R108 08010 08c 1-HV-3016A INBOARD MSIV--SG 2 CONTROL 220'-0" R123 08011 08c 1-HV-3016B OUTBOARD MSIV--SG 2 CONTROL 220'-0" R123 08012 08c 1-HV-3026A INBOARD MSIV--SG 3 CONTROL 220'-0" R123 08013 08c 1-HV-3026B OUTBOARD MSIV--SG 3 CONTROL 220'-0" R123 08014 08c 1-HV-3036A INBOARD MSIV--SG 4 AUX 220'-0" R108 08015 08c 1-HV-3036B OUTBOARD MSIV--SG 4 AUX 220'-0" R108 12023 07 1-HV-3502 HOT LEG SAMPLE & GFF DET AOV FB 180'-0" RA10 12024 07 1-HV-3508 PRESSURIZER LIQUID SAMPLE AOV FB 180'-0" RA10 12025 07 1-HV-3514 PRESSURIZER STEAM SAMPLE AOV FB 180'-0" RA10 09012 08a 1-HV-5132 AFW PUMP B DISCHARGE MOV CONTROL 195'-0" RA56 09013 08a 1-HV-5134 AFW PUMP B DISCHARGE MOV CONTROL 195'-0" RA56 09014 08a 1-HV-5137 AFW PUMP A DISCHARGE MOV AUX 195'-0" RA12 09015 08a 1-HV-5139 AFW PUMP A DISCHARGE MOV AUX 195'-0" RA12 07009 08c 1-HV-5227 MFIV FOR SG 1 AUX 195'-0" RAIl 07010 08c 1-HV-5228 MFIV FOR SG 2 CONTROL 200'-0" RA56 07011 08c 1-HV-5229 MFIV FOR SG 3 CONTROL 200'-0" RA56 07012 08c 1-HV-5230 MFIV FOR SG 4 AUX 195'-0" RA12 REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP DISCHARGE 12019 07 1-HV-7136 AOV FB 200'-0" RA10 Page 19 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARK NO NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION 12026 08016 08017 08018 08019 12020 01010 01011 06041 06042 06043 06044 12003 06017 06018 06019 06020 06021 12004 06022 06023 06024 06025 06026 07 07 07 07 07 07 08a 08a 08b 08b 08b 08b 08a 08a 08a 08a 08a 08a 08a 08a 07 07 07 07 1-HV-7150 1-HV-7603A 1-HV-7603B 1-HV-7603C 1-HV-7603D 1-HV-7699 1-HV-8000A 1-HV-8000B 1-HV-8095A 1-HV-8095B 1-HV-8096A 1-HV-8096B 1-HV-8100 1-HV-8105 1-HV-8106 1-HV-8110 1-HV-8111A 1-HV-8111B 1-HV-8112 1-HV-8116 1-HV-8149A 1-HV-8149B 1-HV-8149C 1-HV-8152 RCDT VENT AOV SG 1 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION AOV SG 2 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION AOV SG 3 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION AOV SG 4 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION AOV REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP DISCHARGE AOV PORV BLOCK VALVE PORV BLOCK VALVE REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN LINE ISOLATION SOV REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN LINE ISOLATION SOV REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN LINE ISOLATION SOV REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN LINE ISOLATION SOV EXCESS LETDOWN & SEAL WATER LEAKOFF ISOLATION MOV CHARGING TO REGEN HX MOV CHARGING DISCHARGE MOV CCP A & B COMMON MINIFLOW MOV CCP A MINIFLOW MOV CCP B MINIFLOW MOV EXCESS LETDOWN & SEAL WATER LEAKOFF ISOLATION MOV CCP A SAFETY GRADE CHARGING ISO MOV LETDOWN ISOLATION AOV LETDOWN ISOLATION AOV LETDOWN ISOLATION AOV LETDOWN ISOLATION AOV FB 180'-0" AUX 180'-0" AUX 180'-0" AUX 180'-0" AUX 180'-0" CTB 183'-0" CTB 220'-0" CTB 220'-0" CTB 183'-0" CTB 183'-0" CTB 183'-0" CTB 183'-0" AUX 195'-0" AUX 195'-0" AUX 195'-0" AUX 180'-0" AUX 143'-6" AUX 143'-6" CTB 180'-0" AUX 195'-0" CTB 183'-0" CTB 183'-0" CTB 183'-0" AUX 195'-0" RA1O RB08 RB08 RB08 RB08 RB07 R 110 Rll0 RB02 RB02 RB02 RB02 RA09 RA09 RA09 RB25 RC114 RC119 RB03 RA09 RB03 RB03 RB03 RA09 Page 20 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 LINE NO. CLASS MARK-NO DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 06027 07 1-HV-8154 EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION AOV CTB 183'-0" RB03 06028 07 1-HV-8160 LETDOWN ISOLATION AOV CONTROL 220'-0" R163 06029 08a 1-HV-8485A CCP A DISCHARGE ISO MOV AUX 143'-6" RC114 06030 08a 1-HV-8485B CCP B DISCHARGE MOV AUX 143'-6" RC119 06031 08a 1-HV-8508A CCP A ALT. MINIFLOW MOV AUX 143'-6" RC114 06032 08a 1-HV-8508B CCP B ALT. MINIFLOW MOV AUX 143'-6" RC119 05012 08a 1-HV-8701A RCS TO RHR PUMP A SUCTION MOV CTB 180'-0" RB03 05013 08a 1-HV-8701B RCS TO RHR PUMP A SUCTION MOV CTB 180'-0" RB02 05014 08a 1-HV-8702A RCS TO RHR PUMP B SUCTION MOV CTB 180'-0" RB03 05015 08a 1-HV-8702B RCS TO RHR PUMP B SUCTION MOV CTB 180'-0" RB03 05016 08a 1-HV-8716A RHR TRAIN A TO RCS HOT LEG ISOLATION MOV AUX 119'-0" RD48 05017 08a 1-HV-8716B RHR TRAIN B TO RCS HOT LEG ISOLATION MOV AUX 119'-0" RD49 04011 08a 1-HV-8801A BIT DISCHARGE TO RCS MOV AUX 195'-0" RA13 04012 08a 1-HV-8801B BIT DISCHARGE TO RCS MOV AUX 195'-0" RA13 05018 08a 1-HV-8804A RHR TO CCP SUCTION HEADER MOV AUX 143'-6" RC90 05019 08a 1-HV-8804B RHR TO SIP SUCTION HEADER MOV AUX 143'-6" RC91 04013 08a 1-HV-8807AR CCP/SIP SUCTION HEADER CROSS-CONNECT MOV AUX 180'-0" RB15 04014 08a 1-HV-8807BR CCP/SIP SUCTION HEADER CROSS-CONNECT MOV AUX 180'-0" RB19 05020 08a 1-HV-8811A CTMT SUMP TO RHR PUMP A SUCTION MOV AUX 143'-6" RC105 05021 08a 1-HV-8811B CTMT SUMP TO RHR PUMP B SUCTION MOV AUX 143'-6" RC09 05022 08a 1-HV-8812A RWST TO RHR PUMP A SUCTION MOV AUX 119'-0" RD48 05023 08a 1-HV-8812B RWST TO RHR PUMP B SUCTION MOV AUX 119'-0" RD49 04015 08a 1-HV-8813 SIP COMMON MINIFLOW MOV AUX 180'-0" RB19 04016 08a 1-HV-8814 SIP A MINIFLOW MOV AUX 180'-0" RB15 Page 21 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM 04017 08b 04018 08b 04019 08b 04020 08b 04021 08b 04022 08b 1-HV-8875A 1-HV-8875B 1-HV-8875C 1-HV-8875D 1-HV-8875E 1-HV-8875F 1-HV-8875G 04023 04024 04025 06054 06055 06056 06057 04030 04031 12028 12027 06049 06050 06051 06052 06053 11024 11025 08b 08b 1-HV-8875H 08a 1-HV-8920 19 1-HY-0190A 19 1-HY-0190B 19 19 19 19 08b 08b 08b 08b 08b 08b 08b 19 19 1-HY-0442A 1-HY-0442B 1-HY-0943A 1-HY-0943B 1-HY-7150 1-HY-7699 1-HY-8149A 1-HY-8149B 1-HY-8149C 1-HY-8154 1-HY-8160 1-LSH-9020 1-LSH-9021 DESCRIPTION ACCUMULATOR 1 NITROGEN VENT--SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ACCUMULATOR 2 NITROGEN VENT--SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ACCUMULATOR 3 NITROGEN VENT--SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ACCUMULATOR 4 NITROGEN VENT--SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ACCUMULATOR 1 NITROGEN VENT--SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ACCUMULATOR 2 NITROGEN VENT--SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ACCUMULATOR 3 NITROGEN VENT--SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ACCUMULATOR 4 NITROGEN VENT--SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE SIP B MINIFLOW MOV I/P CONVERTER FOR HV-0190A I/P CONVERTER FOR HV-0190B I/P CONVERTER FOR HV-0442A I/P CONVERTER FOR HV-0442B I/P CONVERTER FOR HV-0943A I/P CONVERTER FOR HV-0943B SOLENOID VALVE FOR 1-HV-7150 SOLENOID VALVE FOR 1-HV-7699 SOLENOID VALVE FOR 1-HV-8149A SOLENOID VALVE FOR 1-HV-8149B SOLENOID VALVE FOR 1-HV-8149C SOLENOID VALVE FOR 1-HV-8154 SOLENOID VALVE FOR 1-HV-8160 F.O. DAY TANK 3 LEVEL F.O. DAY TANK 4 LEVEL CTB CTB CTB CTB CTB CTB CTB CTB AUX AUX AUX CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL FB CTB CTB CTB CTB CTB CTB DG DG 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 180'-0" 195'-0" 143'-6" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" RB03 RB1O RB1O RB03 RB03 RB1O RB1O RB03 RB19 RA05 RC119 RB78 RB74 RB78 RB74 RAIO RB07 RB03 RB03 RB03 RB03 R163 R1102 R1104 Page 22 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 11026 19 1-LSL-9020 F.O. DAY TANK 3 LEVEL DG 220'-0" R1102 11027 19 1-LSL-9021 F.O. DAY TANK 4 LEVEL DG 220'-0" R1104 03012 19 1-LSLL-1852 CCW SURGE TK 1 LEVEL AUX 245'-0" R203 03013 19 1-LSLL-1853 CCW SURGE TK 2 LEVEL AUX 245'-0" R202 03014 19 1-LSLL-1854 CCW SURGE TK 1 LEVEL AUX 245'-0" R203 03015 19 1-LSLL-1855 CCW SURGE TK 2 LEVEL AUX 245'-0" R202 06033 19 1-LT-0112 VCT LEVEL AUX 195'-0" RA30 06034 19 1-LT-0185 VCT LEVEL AUX 195'-0" RA30 01012 19 1-LT-0459 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CTB 183'-0" RB02 01013 19 1-LT-0460 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CTB 183'-0" RB02 01014 19 1-LT-0461 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CTB 183'-0" RB02 08020 19 1-LT-0501 SG 1 WIDE RANGE LEVEL CTB 183'-0" RB03 08021 19 1-LT-0502 SG 2 WIDE RANGE LEVEL CTB 183'-0" RB10 08022 19 1-LT-0503 SG 3 WIDE RANGE LEVEL CTB 183'-0" RB10 08023 19 1-LT-0504 SG 4 WIDE RANGE LEVEL CTB 183'-0" RB03 08024 19 1-LT-0517 SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R102 08025 19 1-LT-0518 SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" RI01 08026 19 1-LT-0519 SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 08027 19 1-LT-0527 SG 2 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 08028 19 1-LT-0528 SG 2 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" Ri01 08029 19 1-LT-0529 SG 2 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 08030 19 1-LT-0537 SG 3 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 08031 19 1-LT-0538 SG 3 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 08032 19 I-LT-0539 SG 3 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 Page 23 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 08033 19 1-LT-0547 SG 4 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 08034 19 1-LT-0548 SG 4 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" Ri01 08035 19 1-LT-0549 SG 4 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 08064 19 1-LT-0551 SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 08065 19 1-LT-0552 SG 2 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 08066 19 1-LT-0553 SG 3 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 08067 19 1-LT-0554 SG 4 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CTB 220'-0" R101 05024 19 1-LT-0764 CNMT EMERGENCY SUMP LEVEL CTB 183'-0" RB03 05025 19 1-LT-0765 CNMT EMERGENCY SUMP LEVEL CTB 183'-0" RB03 04026 19 1-LT-0990 RWST LEVEL RWST 220'-0" R101 04027 19 1-LT-0991 RWST LEVEL RWST 220'-0" R101 04028 19 1-LT-0992 RWST LEVEL RWST 220'-0" R101 04029 19 1-LT-0993 RWST LEVEL RWST 220'-0" R101 09016 19 1-LT-5111 CST NO. 1 LEVEL CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK CST NO. 1 220'-0" 06035 08a 1-LV-0112B VCT DISCHARGE ISOLATION MOV AUX 195'-0" RA26 06036 08a 1-LV-0112C VCT DISCHARGE ISOLATION MOV AUX 195'-0" RA26 06037 08a 1-LV-0112D CCP SUCTION FROM RWST MOV AUX 143'-6" RC113 06038 08a 1-LV-0112E CCP SUCTION FROM RWST MOV AUX 143'-6" RC120 14003 19 1-N E-0041 NIS DETECTOR--CH.1 CTB 14004 19 1-NE-0042 NIS DETECTOR--CH.2 CTB 14005 19 1-NE-0043 NIS DETECTOR--CH.3 CTB 14006 19 1-NE-0044 NIS DETECTOR--CH.4 CTB 1-PS-8508AR 1-PS-8508BR PRESSURE SWITCH 08036 00 1-PSV-3001 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE AUX 220'-0" R108 Page 24 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 08037 00 1-PSV-3011 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE CONTROL 220'-0" R123 08038 00 1-PSV-3021 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE CONTROL 220'-0" R123 08039 00 1-PSV-3031 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE AUX 220'-0" R108 01019 19 1-PT-0455 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CTB 183'-0" RB03 01020 19 1-PT-0456 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CTB 183'-0" RB02 01021 19 1-PT-0457 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CTB 183'-0" RB02 01022 19 1-PT-0458 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CTB 183'-0" RB02 08040 19 1-PT-0514R SG 1 PRESSURE AUX 195'-0" RA09 08041 19 1-PT-0515R SG 1 PRESSURE AUX 195'-0" RA09 08042 19 1-PT-0516R SG 1 PRESSURE AUX 195'-0" RA09 08043 19 1-PT-0524R SG 2 PRESSURE CONTROL 200'-0" RA62 08044 19 1-PT-0525R SG 2 PRESSURE CONTROL 200'-0" RA62 08045 19 1-PT-0526R SG 2 PRESSURE CONTROL 200'-0" RA62 08046 19 1-PT-0534R SG 3 PRESSURE CONTROL 200'-0" RA51 08047 19 1-PT-0535R SG 3 PRESSURE CONTROL 220'-0" RAS1 08048 19 1-PT-0536R SG 3 PRESSURE CONTROL 220'-0" RA51 08049 19 1-PT-0544R SG 4 PRESSURE AUX 220'-0" R107 08050 19 1-PT-0545R SG 4 PRESSURE AUX 220'-0" R107 08051 19 1-PT-0546R SG 4 PRESSURE AUX 220'-0" R11O 12000 19 1-PT-0934 CNMT PRESSURE AUX 200'-0" RA1O 12001 19 1-PT-0935 CNMT PRESSURE AUX 180'-0" RB08 Page 25 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 LINE NO, CLASS MARKNO DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 12002 19 1-PT-0936 CNMT PRESSURE AUX 180'-0" RB11 08052 19 1-PT-3000 SG 1 PRESSURE TO ARV TRANSMITTER AUX 195'-0" RA09 08053 19 1-PT-3010 SG 2 PRESSURE TO ARV TRANSMITTER CONTROL 200'-0" RA62 08054 19 1-PT-3020 SG 3 PRESSURE TO ARV TRANSMITTER CONTROL 200'-0" RA51 08055 19 1-PT-3030 SG 4 PRESSURE TO ARV TRANSMITTER AUX 220'-0" R107 01023 08b 1-PV-0455A PRESSURIZER PORV CTB 220'-0" 14D1 01024 08b 1-PV-0456A PRESSURIZER PORV CTB 220'-0" R110 PPG PEN FILTRATION AND EXHAUST UNIT 10088 08a 1-PV-2550A DISCHARGE DAMPER AUX 245'-0" R210 PPG PEN FILTRATION AND EXHAUST UNIT 10089 08a 1-PV-2551A DISCHARGE DAMPER AUX 245'-0" R209 08056 08c 1-PV-3000 ATMOS. RELIEF VALVE--SG 1 AUX 245'-0" R206 08057 08c 1-PV-3010 ATMOS. RELIEF VALVE--SG 2 CONTROL 220'-0" R121 08058 08c 1-PV-3020 ATMOS. RELIEF VALVE--SG 3 CONTROL 220'-0" R122 08059 08c 1-PV-3030 ATMOS. RELIEF VALVE--SG 4 AUX 220'-0" R108 08060 19 1-PY-3000 SG 1 PRESSURE TO ARV CONTROLLER AUX 245'-0" R204 08061 19 1-PY-3010 SG 2 PRESSURE TO ARV CONTROLLER CONTROL 200'-0" RA60 08062 19 1-PY-3020 SG 3 PRESSURE TO ARV CONTROLLER CONTROL 200'-0" RA60 08063 19 1-PY-3030 SG 4 PRESSURE TO ARV CONTROLLER AUX 245'-0" R204 ECW COND/EVAP TEMP DIFF TO NSCW CONTROL 10106 19 1-TDC-4170 VLV 1-TV-11740 CONTROL 260'-0" R320 ECW COND/EVAP TEMP DIFF TO NSCW CONTROL 10107 19 1-TDC-4193 VLV 1-TV-11675 CONTROL 260'-0" R313 01025 19 1-TE-0413A RCS HOT LEG TEMP--LOOP 1 CTB 183'-0" RB02 01026 19 1-TE-0413B RCS COLD LEG TEMP--LOOP 1 CTB 183'-0" RB02 01027 19 1-TE-0423A RCS HOT LEG TEMP--LOOP 2 CTB 183'-0" RB02 01028 19 1-TE-0423B RCS COLD LEG TEMP--LOOP 2 CTB 183'-0" RB02 01029 19 1-TE-0433A RCS HOT LEG TEMP--LOOP 3 CTB 183'-0" RB02 Page 26 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 LINE NO, CLASS MARK_NO DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 01030 19 1-TE-0433B RCS COLD LEG TEMP--LOOP 3 CTB 183'-0" RB02 01031 19 1-TE-0443A RCS HOT LEG TEMP--LOOP 4 CTB 183'-0" RB02 01032 19 1-TE-0443B RCS COLD LEG TEMP--LOOP 4 CTB 183'-0" RB02 02027 19 1-TE-11642 NSCW A RETURN TO FAN 2 CONTROL NSCT 220'-0" R102 02028 19 1-TE-11643 NSCW A RETURN TO FAN 3 CONTROL NSCT 220'-0" R102 02038 19 1-TE-11644 NSCW A RETURN TO FAN 4 CONTROL NSCT 220'-0" R102 02030 19 1-TE-11647 NSCW B RETURN TO FAN 2 CONTROL NSCT 220'-0" R202 02031 19 1-TE-11648 NSCW B RETURN TO FAN 3 CONTROL NSCT 220'-0" R202 02039 19 1-TE-11649 NSCW B RETURN TO FAN 4 CONTROL NSCT 220'-0" R202 10029 19 1-TE-12124 CB CR RETURN AIR TEMP CONTROL 260'-0" R321 10030 19 1-TE-12125 CB CR RETURN AIR TEMP CONTROL 260'-0" R312 10037 19 1-TE-12725 ELEC EQUIP RM TEMP CONTROL 180'-0" RB49 10038 19 1-TE-12740 ELEC EQUIP RM TEMP CONTROL 180'-0" RB54 02032 19 1-TE-1668 NSCW A RETURN TO SPRAY/BYPASS VALVES NSCT 220'-0" R102 02033 19 1-TE-1669 NSCW B RETURN TO SPRAY/BYPASS VALVES NSCT 220'-0" R202 10043 19 1-TIC-13150 CB NORMAL A/C RM ESF A/C UNIT CONTROLLER CONTROL 260'-0" R325 10044 19 1-TIC-13152 CB ELEC EQUIP RM ESF A/C UNIT CONTROLLER CONTROL 260'-0" R325 AFWP 10114 19 1-TIS-12005 AFW PUMP B ROOM SUPPLY FAN CONTROLLER HOUSE 220'-0" R102 AFWP 10115 19 1-TIS-12006 AFW PUMP A ROOM SUPPLY FAN CONTROLLER HOUSE 220'-0" R101 10141 19 1-TIS-12300 CBCR CHILLER RM VENT FAN CONTROLLER CONTROL 260'-0" R312 10142 19 1-TIS-12303 CBCR CHILLER RM VENT FAN CONTROLLER CONTROL 260'-0" B320 ELECT SWGR & MCC RM A7001 COOLER 10072 19 1-TISH-12200 CONTROLLER AUX 119'-3" RD105 ELECT SWGR & MCC RM A7002 COOLER 10073 19 1-TISH-12201 CONTROLLER AUX 245'-0" R207 ELECT SWGR & MCC RM A7003 COOLER 10074 19 1-TISH-12202 CONTROLLER AUX 143'-6" RC109 Page 27 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARK NO NO. SNCVOB1-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM 10075 10076 10077 10116 10050 10051 10052 10053 02034 02035 10119 10120 10121 10122 10123 10124 10125 10126 10127 10128 10129 10130 10131 10132 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 08C 08C 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 1-TISH-12203 1-TISH-12204 1-TISH-12205 1-TISH-22501 1-TISH-22505 1-TISH-22509 1-TISH-22516 1-TISH-22519 1-TV-11675R 1-TV-11740R 1-TV-12085 1-TV-12085A 1-TV-12086 1-TV-12086A 1-TV-12094A 1-TV-12094B 1-TV-12094C 1-TV-12094D 1-TV-12095A 1-TV-12095B 1-TV-12095C 1-TV-12095D 1-TV-12096 1-TV-12096A DESCRIPTION ELECT SWGR & MCC RM A7004 COOLER CONTROLLER ELECT SWGR & MCC RM A7005 COOLER CONTROLLER ELECT SWGR & MCC RM A7006 COOLER CONTROLLER DIESEL POWER CABLE TUNNEL EXH FAN CONTROLLER DIESEL POWER CABLE TUNNEL EXH FAN CONTROLLER TB & AB TRAIN A TUNNEL SUPPLY FAN CONTROLLER NSCW TWR CABLE TUNN TRN A FAN CONTROLLER NSCW TWR CABLE TUNN TRN B FAN CONTROLLER NSCW TO ESSENTIAL CHILLER CONDENSER (E/H)CONTROL VLV NSCW TO ESSENTIAL CHILLER CONDENSER (E/H)CONTROL VLV DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER AUX 180'-0" RB116 AUX 220'-0" R117 AUX 220'-0" R118 DG 220'-0" TUNNEL 220'-0" DGB CONTROL 180'-0" RB41 TUNNEL 220-0" NSCW TUNNEL 220'-0" NSCW CONTROL 260'-0" R313 CONTROL 260'-0" R320 DG 220'-0" R101 DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 255'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" RIO1 R103 R103 R208 R208 R208 R208 R209 R209 R209 R209 R103 R103 Page 28 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKOOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARKNO NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION 10133 10134 10135 10136 10137 10138 10031 10032 02040 02041 10143 10144 01004 01005 01006 01007 03006 03007 07000 07001 06001 06002 06003 09000 07 07 07 07 07 07 08c 08c 19 19 19 19 00 00 00 00 05 05 05 05 24 24 05 05 1-TV-12097 1-TV-12097A 1-TV-12098 1-TV-12098A 1-TV-12099 1-TV-12099A 1-TV-12124R 1-TV-12125R 1-TY-11675 1-TY-11740 1-TY-12124A 1-TY-12125A 1-1201-P6-001 1-1201-P6-002 1-1201-P6-003 1-1201-P6-004 1-1203-P4-005 1-1203-P4-006 1-1206-P6-001 1-1206-P6-002 1-1208-F4-004 1-1208-F4-005 1-1208-P6-001 1-1302-P4-001 DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER ECW TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE (E/H)ECW TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE (E/H)CONVERTER FOR TV-11675 CONVERTER FOR TV-11740 CONVERTER FOR TV-12124 CONVERTER FOR TV-12125 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NO. 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NO. 2 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NO. 3 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NO. 4 CCW PUMP NO. 5 CCW PUMP NO. 6 CNTMT SPRAY PUMP A CNTMT SPRAY PUMP B SEAL INJ BACKFLUSHABLE FILTER SEAL INJ BACKFLUSHABLE FILTER POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP (PDP)AFW PUMP C AND TURBINE DRIVER DG DG DG DG DG DG CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CTB CTB CTB CTB AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AFWP HOUSE 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 260'-0" 260'-0" 260'-0" 260'-0" 260'-0" 260'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 183'-0" 195'-0" 1951-0" 119'-3" 119'-3" 1801-0" 180'-0" 143'-6" 220'-0" R103 R 103 R 101 R 101 R 101 R 101 R321 R3 12 R3 13 R320 R321 R3 12 14AB 14BB 14CB 14DB RA05 RAO3 RD76 RD77 RB151 RB152 RC111 R106 Page 29 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS LINE NO. CLASS MARK NO NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 BUILDING ELEV ROOM DESCRIPTION 10007 09 10008 09 10009 09 10010 09 10011 09 10012 09 10013 09 10014 09 10015 09 10016 09 1-1501-A7-005-000 1-1501-A7-006-000 1-1501-A7-007-000 1-1501-A7-008-000 1-1511-E7-001-000 1-1511-E7-002-000 1-1515-A7-001-000 1-1515-A7-002-000 1-1531-B7-005-000 1-1531-17-006-000 10117 09 1-1532-B7-003-000 10118 09 1-1532-B7-004-000 10060 09 1-1555-A7-007-000 10061 09 1-1555-A7-008-000 10062 09 1-1555-A7-009-000 10063 09 1-1555-A7-010-000 10064 09 1-1555-A7-011-000 10065 09 1-1555-A7-012-000 10066 09 1-1555-A7-013-000 10067 09 1-1555-A7-014-000 10068 09 1-1555-A7-015-000 10069 09 1-1555-A7-016-000 10070 09 1-1555-A7-017-000 10071 09 1-1555-A7-018-000 06009 21 1-1208-V4-001 CTB COOLING UNIT CTB COOLING UNIT CTB COOLING UNIT CTB COOLING UNIT CTB REACTOR CAVITY COOLING COIL CTB REACTOR CAVITY COOLING COIL CTB AUX AIR COOLING UNIT (COIL)CTB AUX AIR COOLING UNIT (COIL)CBCR RETURN AIR FAN CBCR RETURN AIR FAN BATTERY RM EXHAUST FAN & MOTOR BATTERY RM EXHAUST FAN & MOTOR RHR PUMP ROOM COOLER A RHR PUMP ROOM COOLER B CS PUMP ROOM COOLER A CS PUMP ROOM COOLER B CCW PUMP ROOM COOLER A CCW PUMP ROOM COOLER B CVCS CHARGING PUMP ROOM COOLER A CVCS CHARGING PUMP ROOM COOLER B SIS PUMP ROOM COOLER A SIS PUMP ROOM COOLER B SFP HX AND PUMP ROOM COOLER A SFP HX AND PUMP ROOM COOLER B PDP SUCTION DAMPENER CTB CTB CTB CTB CTB CTB CTB CTB CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX FB AUX 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 220'-0" 238'-0" 238'-0" 260'-0" 260'-0" 180'-0" 180'-0" 119'-3" 119'-3" 119'-3" 119'-3" 195'-0" 195'-0" 143'-6" 143'-6" 180'-0" 180'-0" 195'-0" 200'-0" 143'-6" 14C1 14C1 14B1 14B1 14A1 14A1 14A2 14C2 R321 R312 RB55 RB49 RD128 RD130 RD79 RD77 RA05 RA03 RC115 RC118 RB15 RB19 RA53 RA07 RC111 Page 30 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT t SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 1 -SWEL 1 NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 Equipment List Papes Unit 1 -Base List 1 2-30 Unit 1 -SWEL 1 31-39 Unit 1 -Base List 2 40-41 Unit 1 -SWEL 2 42-44 Page 31 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Plant Vogtle Unit 1 SWEL-1 Pla'nt Vogtle Unit 1 SWEL-2 SWEL Revision Date: October 23, 2012 Originator:

print:So (L. V.Aei..Reviewer:

print: C. -signature:

Date: 1, 4 4 Date: Date: /0 -,,23-/,2 print:-44omt%-5 Gg.2E Vsgatr~.Ops Reviewer: Peer Reviewer: Peer Reviewer: Peer Reviewer: print: Aeo w^1 signature ture:z'ý :ý,2ýDate:

-2,-i-print: -rr~i '- .signature:

/sign 'LOIZ -f/1 Z.-Peer Reviewer:

print: i',"& S*'rkl signature:Cz t,1- Date: _0___z Page 32 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Mp'.=1-,,, M-)11 I' I'ii ""~'"~ 11 (5) II (6)____ ___ ___ ____ ____ IL.4 455 075'se " IS555.1 ________ B _________________________

tazt~t~t ___ r ________I 1-1201-P5-TIBR RVAIS TRANSMITTER RACK TRAIN B Yes FR ORG-U" RUG8 1x4eB113/19/BS 1-1202-P4-002 NSCW TRAIN B PUMP NO. 2 yes -sF6 220'-0" R203 1X4DB133-2/33/CR 1-1203-E4-002 CCW HEAT EXCHANGER yes All 245'-0" R202 1x4ee136/25/02 1-1203-T4-002 CCW SURGE TANK yes A. 245'-0" R202 1X4DB136/25/B7 1-1204-P6-004 SI PUMP B yes Ax 180'-0" RA19 1X4DB121/2A/C3 1-1204-T4-001 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK yes RUST 220'-0" FF6 os 1A0X4DB021/26/G2 1-1205-E6-002 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B yes -UX 143'-6" RC91 1X4DB122/28/DA 1-1205-PA-002R RHR PUMP S yes A.F 119'3" RD49 1X4DB122/28/D4 1-1206-P6-002 CNTMT SPRAY PUMP B yes .AU 119'-3" RD77 1X40B131/23/C4 1-1208-P6)003 CCP B yes AUj 143'-6" RCO18 SX4DB116-2/17/C4 1-1208-UA-153 MANUAL CCP DISCH ISO VLV WITH REACH ROO yes AUl 143'-6" RC112 lX4DB1OR-1/28/B6 1-1217-E4-002 ACCW HEAT EXCHANGER yes All 220'4)" R104 1X40B138-S/13/B4 1-1302-P4-001 AFW PUMP C AND TURBINE DRGIER yes A,-.U-7220'-0" R106 UX4eBUAU-2/23/G6 1-1302-P4-003 AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP A yes ARWHOUu220'-G" R11 1X4eB161-2/23/86 1-1302-V4-001 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK NO. 1 (CST) yes ICT 11 220'-U" Yard 1X4DB161-1/23/G6 1-1407-PS-SGS SGS ISOL SOLENOD RACK yes Aul 180'-0" RR07 1XSAB01-O001S 1-1N00-QS-HVC HVACPANEL Aes -ONT.1L 220*-0" R163 1X5AB01-OO4-4 1-1531-B7-002-000 CBCR CHILLER ROOM VENT FAN yes -FTROL 260'-0" R320 AX4eB241/12/AN 1-1532-A7-001-000 CBSF ELEC EQUIP RM AC UNIT yes -TROL 180'-0" RB60 1x4eB207-1/21/F3 1-1540-B7-005-00O AUX BLDG TRAIN A TUNNEL SUPPLY FAN UNIT yes TU10,u 245'-0" R212 1X0DB238/9/E2 1-1555-A7-015-0UO SIS PUMP ROOM COOLERA yes AUl U OR'-U" RB15 OXRDB228/10/E2 1-1561-E7-001-000 PIPING PENETRATION AREA COOLER yes AUF 245'-0" R210 1X4DB20O-1/21/B4 1-1592-C7-002 CB ESSENTIAL CHILLER Yes --o7 260'-0" R313 1X4DB221/22/C3 1-1592-P77002 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER PUMP yes Cm-1OR 260'-0" R313 1X4DB221/22/C5 1-1592-T1-702 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER EXPANSION TANK yes CUFTROL 260'-0" R313 1X4eB221/22/D6 1-1593-B7-002 AFW PUMP B SUPPLY FAN & MOTOR yes A,-e--220'-0" R102 1X4DB227/11/E7 1-1602-QN-NIR NUCLEAR INST RACKS yes -oL 220'-0" R163 1XGASO1-00171 1-1604-QO-PCG BOP CONTROL PANEL U yes -os~L 220'-0" R163 1X3D-AA-G02B/1O 1-1604-QS-PS2 PROCESS I&C PROTECT It yes coaL 220'-0" R163 1XRAU01-526/5 1-1605-C5-ASI ALTERNATE SADN IND EAGLE 21 CAB yes 7.7ROL 240'-0" R230 1X6AZ02-564/1 DNE 1-1605-PS-SDB SHUTDOWN PANEL TRN B yes -ORTROR 20R'-O" RA43 lX5ABRO-0D043/14 SOLID STATE PROT SYS CAB-TRN B yes -OL 220'-0" RUS3 1GAAXO146G ONE CH 1-1623-D54-06A DISPLAY PROCESSING UNIT A yes -,O7 200'-0" RA48 XGAAZ02-0OGUG 1-1804-S3-A02 4160VSWITCHGEARIAA02 yes -oL 2GB'-0" RA48 1X3D-AA-D02A 1-180S-S3-ABG 480V MOT CONTROL CTR OARD yes AUF 143'-6" RC109 1X3D-AA-F11A 1-1805-53-ASB 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 1ABB yes Ale 220'-0" RG18 1X3D-AA-F16A 1-1800-S3-BBB 480V MOT CONTROL CTR SBBR yes AlU 220'-0" R116 1X3D-AA-FB7A 1-1805-53-RHR2A STARTER/RHR HV-8702A yes COFTR-L 180'-" RBAS XD30-BD-EO21/7 1-1005-Y3-ID6R RHR ISO VLVINVERTER yes CONTsOo 190'B"" RB48 IX3D'BD'EO2J/7 1-1806-BR-CAB BATTERY CHARGER 1ADGCB yes co--L 130'-D" RB52 lX30-AA-GOIA 1-1806-Q3-DA2 125 VDC DISTR. PANEL IAD12 yes .-sL 180'-0'* R852 1XSD-AA-H01B 1-1806-$3-4CA 125 VDC MCC 1ADIM yes FONRL 10'-0" R352 1X3D-AA-HOAA 1-1805-53-B15 48eV SWiTCHGEAR IAB15 yes AUX 119"3" RD105 1X3D-AA-E16A 1-UBO5-53-B07 480VSWITCHGEAR IBB07 yeS sOoIm1 180'-0" RB61 1X3D-AA-EO7A 1-S806-B3-BYB 125 VTC BATTERY 18D1B yes 1(RO0 180'-0" RB49 1X3D-AA-G01A 1-18OG-S3-DSB 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 1BD1 yes -NTe- 180-0" RB47 1X3SDAAGHO2A 1-1807-03-VIS 120 VAC VITAL DIST PANEL 1AY2A yes AUF 220'-0" RU18 UX3D-AA-G02C 1-1807-Q3-5I3 120 VAC VITAL PANEL UCYUA yes 17.170 180'-0" RB55 1X3D-AA-G02A U-1807-Q3-VI2 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 18YIB yes ...o, 180'-0" RB47 1X3D-AA-GU2B 1-1807-Y3-IA11R VITAL AC INVERTER IAeGIU1 yes AU 220'-U" R118 IX3D-AA-GOGA 1-1808-OG-L47 EMERGENCY LTG DIST PANEL INLP47 yes UU 220'-0" R101 1X3DG020/14 1-18081-T3-115 LTG ISOLATION XFMR 1BBF13X yes os 220'-U" iT4B 1X30-AA-F38A/7 1-1807-Y3-13 REGULATEG XFMR USBC09RX ALTERNATE FEED TO PANEL IDY: yes coINoL 180'-0" RB65 1x23e-AA-FO4A It, 1l A ~ 4 , H 3 ] F 1 I 1 I 11116-1 Ill FS LIF I$1 I Page 33 of 44 TVI /2.12 1-1P.-I ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0"I I SEISMIC 1-1807-Y3-11 REGULATED XFMR 1bBAS7RX 1-1916-U3-017 AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL D-1821-US-002R SF SEQUENCER BOARD TRAIN 8 1-2403-G4-001 DIESEL GENERATOR A 1-2403-GA-001-FOD Do INTAKE AIR FILTER D-2403-G4-XOD-VO2 DD AIR START RECEIVER_-2403-P4-003 DIESEL FUEL OILTRANSFER PUMP D-2403-PS-DG3 DG 1D GEN CTL PNL 1-2403-T4-004 DIESEL FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1-FIT-164DA NSCW RETURN FLOW 1-FSL-12046 INTERLOCK FLOW SWTCH CNTL BLD..CLOSES ON AIR-FLO D-ET-X142 RCP 4 SEAL INJ FLOW 1-ET-0619 RHR A FLOW 1-PT-DEOA NSCW FLOWTO CB ESS CHILLER I-FT-22425 ECW FLOW-FT-5154 AFW B FLOW TO MINIFLOW VALVE 1-FV-Si5N AFW PUMP A MINIFLOW MOV 1-HV-X095 RWST TO SLUDGE MIXING PUMP SUCTION AOV 1-HV-11606 NSCW PUMP 3 DISCHARGE MOV 1-HV-1214D CBCR NORMAL AIR RETURN DAMPER 1-HV-12977 CTB AIR RADIATION MONITOR OUTLET SOD L-HV-R3'SDB OUTBOARD MSIV BYPASS AOV-SG 4 1-HV-1E66A NSCW SPRAY VALVE 1HV-3ROO6A INBOARD MSIU-SG 1 1-HV-7603C So I BLOWDOWN ISOLATION AOV 1-HV-M48SA CCP A DISCHARGE ISO MOV 1-HV-8814 SIP A MINIFLOW MOV 1-HY-01R9B I/P CONVERTER FOR HV-019OB 1-LSEL-1852 CEW SURGE TE I LEVEL 1-LT-0993 RWST LEVEL 1-LT-0112 VCT LEVEL 1-LV-112C VCT DISCHARGE ISOLATION MOV 1-PSV-3011 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE 1-PT-3ODD SG 2 PRESSURE TO ARVTRANSMITTER 1-PV-3OlD ATMOS. RELIEF VALVE--SG 2 1-TDC-4170 ECW COND/EVAP TEMP DIFF TO NSCW CONTROL VLV 1-TV-11S I-TIS-D2OO5 AFW PUMP B ROOM SUPPLY FAN CONTROLLER I-TISH-12200 ELECT SWGR & MCC RM A7D01 COOLER CONTROLLER 1-TISH-22509 TB & AB TRAIN A TUNNEL SUPPLY FAN CONTROLLER 1-TV-1D74OR NSCW TO ESSENTIAL CHILLER CONDENSER (E/H) CONTROL VLV I-TV-U2086 DG BLDG OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER I-TV-12125R ECW TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE (E/H)1-TY-1174DR CONVERTER FOR TV-11740 1-1501-A7-004-000 CTB COOLING UNIT & MOTOR 1-HV-0442B REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN LINE CONTROL SOY 1-HV-0780 NORMAL CTB SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE AOV 1-HV-0943A ACCUMULATOR NITROGEN HRR VENT-SOLENOID OPERATED I 1-HV-1974 ACCW RETURN FROM RCP COOLERS MOV 1-HV-8E54 CVCS EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION 1-HV-E875D ACCUMULATOR 1 NITROGEN VENT--SOLENOID OPERATED VAL I-LT-0459R PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1-1511-E7-002-000 CTB REACTOR CAV1TY COOLING COIL CONTYOL 1D0G-U".UNOUL 200'-0" 200'-0" EU 220'-0" NY 255'-0" 220'-0"-NYNT 211'-6" EU 220'-0" Is 220'-0" NSI 195'-0" ENNRUL 260'-0" 119'-3" A. U 260'-0" r--NN N 220'-0"--N220'-0" N-NT 220'-0"-NR 220'-0" CUNL 240'-0" UJ 220'-U" NR 195'-0" RUN 220'-0" NUN 1DO'-O" AU. 143'-6" UN 143'-6" AU. 245'-0" RWT 220'-0" ux 195'-0" 195S'-0" u 220'-0" U 20O'-O" A 220'-0" 260'-0"---u 119'-3Y C-O 143'-6" CONTRL 260'-0".e 220'-0" CINTROL 26C)'-a" CONTtO 2.0'-8".-T 238'-0"-t 183'-0" cm 197'-0" cm 196'-o" T 194'-0" cm 184'-0" 1N4'-0" c. 206'-6" RB65 DX23D-AA-FP9A RA45 IX3D-AA-HOlB RAND AXSAEO3-OO365 RIDS DX4DBE7O-D/2R/FS R210 UX4DB17O-1/29/H7 RDO3 IX4EDB7O-1/29/HS RA03 DX4DBE7O-2/27/A3 R101 1X4AKOI-313,-365 D RO12 UX4DBI7O-2/27/D2 TUNNEL 1 lX4DB133-1/28/F4 R3S3 AU4DB206-S/24/C3 RA1O DXRDBED4/30/C3 RDS3 DX4DB122/2E/C7 R320 DX4DB134/20/FD R320 EX4DB221/D2/GE RO12 DX4DBA61-2/23/DN RDOl IX4DB161-2/23/A6 R10 DX4DBE21/26/G3 ROD3 lX4DB133-1/28/C4 R233 AX4DB206-2/1R/E4 RBOI DX4DB213-2/20/D2 R1D8 lXRDBADD-2/22/A6 R102 1X4DB133-1/28/G5 RIOS IX4DB159-2/22/H6 RBO8 1X4DB3159-3/19/F2 RC114 lX4DBl16-2/17/G7 RBOIS X4DBl21/26/E3 RC120 lX4DBI16-2/17/B7 R203 1X4DBI36/25/F6 R1Ol lX4DB121/26/H1 RA26 1X4DBE61-1 RA26 IX4081 16-1/2&/14 R123 DX4DB159-2/22/F3 RA62 DX4DBE9-2/22/FX3 R123 DX4DB159-2/22/E2 R320 1X4DB221/22/F2 R0O2 lX4DB227/DT/ET RDE05 DX4DB228/EO/GS RCD9 DX4DB238/9/D7 R320 lX4DBIS4/20/G2 R103 DX4DB217/D3/F8 R312 DX4DB234/1D/E7 R320 IX4DB134/2O/G2 W 1~d6 1X4DB135-2/21, lX3B REDS UIXD-BD-COTH NDI XDABD-POAE/4 NNaUN 3 1USD-BD-CO5J/N NN-U IN 1X3D-BD-LO3F/7X4DBl14/3O/F3 NNN sD 1UX3D-BD-DR4H/5 NNACd 20 1X3D-CD-COD2A, iX6AL 14A1 1X4DB135-2/21 A-1 t x sl I I x x: x x _x x .1 2o1 x x x x x Ia y 2 xI x x xx x sl 1o x x x x x x sl 2 x xx x x x s1 2t x x xx 11 1. xx x x x st 2ý x x 1. xx x x x x x x ' tD III F1 I. Xx XlF..-Il I x (-I x N/ 12 x 1P1 x Fl x m S x x X (s)x x xF2, lF01 I x I-r)X I X x x' xB I -- II-)x F9,FO 6 t. x x x x x F6P, 4 X )Y.S YES Its IO Its Page 3 4 of 44 12,39 pM1 SWEL ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0-. T-m I-1511-E7-001-000 CTB REACTOR CAVITY COOLING COIL yes c. 206'-6" 1431 1X4DB214-1/6/F7

o e x'r a9_ Y 1cc 1-1511-B7-001-000 REACTOR CAM ITY COOLING FAN-1 yes Cre 206'-6" 1401 1X4D0214-1 1 9N-1-1511-K7-002-000 REACTOR CAVITY COOLING FAN-2 Yes c- 206'-6° 14A1 1X4D0214-1 x 5 9 x j ko co 1-1805-53-R15X TRANSFORMER yes -os 119'-3" RD105 1X3D-AA-E16A n e 5 5 11 E Tc t-10593-R7-OO1 AFW PUMP A SUPPLY FAN & MOTOR yes -sox220-0" R10i 1X4DB227 x 5 9 J x x No 0 NOTES: 1 Vogtle does not have Seismic Category 1 Air Compressors I Class 12) or Motor Generators (Class 13)2 These components support the containment function.

The containment function is not identified in Appendix E.3 The systems to which these components are part of and not identified as"Frontline Systems" in Appendix E.4 Reference following pages for cross reference to information provided in column P 5 Source: Appendix LA of original PEEE issued in 1995 6 Source: Appendix I oforiginal PEEE issued in 1995 7 Source: "Maintenance Rule Risk Ranking and Performance Criteria Assessment", Calc I PRA-BC-V-11-003, version 1.8 These components are not anchored.9 The SWEL was developed from original IPEEE issued in 1995 Výe --Page 35 of44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Table B-1 SAFF'1Y 5UNCior4-S'?5TEM WAlI FOR PWRS Safptv Functionsa A. Reac-tivity Cuitnal Frontli acri Systefrrs That Prflor~n a Safety Firict~igi F 1 Retu, Trip Sysbmzir Ciwrmicsi ou vwolum~(4aftr~iirK-y bi~raii~n)

B. IICS Pressure control F3 Ti ine Imrportant foarieorwts, in~0 Waactur Trip Sraitdl-jear 0 Maniral Ar~tnitlori Circuit*fntrdl We Prive ftsffat lies* :e] Inojectioni Talks {EW[1)* Ivt RL~ filr-aci rrj.* doter 0OU-Cad Valves for antreod lrjycticn Ali~trgwnt

1. ilirhine $tnp-s ivo 0 TurW"n Ccntrol Valykes a Electic Trip Sulerrnid Valves I lect~ric u-Mi Valves* Wdhaflica Trip Pilot Valves* Tu, coDvlaen Foodwater P s ( nf tioUrbirr icixiliarics

• MAWt--l~ivaýn Fm~ater 1 1 j14Y* t~1 katarspraltEd Va]lves for&Sicti~i-i ard InIjacticri Alliqrqpmat

• Qxnrdnsate Storaet~ Tank F4 Mitn Steami Is~latirA Valves F5 SItuxlan'lo3ar N0E kIis matrix wass Steam Gcinerator Poema-F6 Operatod Atwrspheric L l~S twi~ieffiHlief Valves F7 fPrsrilri;,Pr oa-4perutW Ral iaF Vallyes F8 Righ Prtsstero lejoticir Iligh Pressurro Safptyv Irdocion Syste tp W ~torC.Veraieii Va] v.s. for Suction anid IJne;tion iAl igrroeri a Refuel irg Water Storage Ileek (i~e-, N~rated waostr)developed assuming Lhat uffsite power is Unavailable.

0-13 Page 36 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 SAFETY FUNUTON.-SYSTEMF KATRIX FOR PWRs~{k~ S Ch'tifte -A V~i ccilfrnl Syst~em F9 (cixratingj in the~ ý.US f(W*I High Prpsw're F10 Ryecimuliktion Systue Iva Presur~e Enjzct icn SYSLan F111 finpar~on Uqmtents in* Fatar-opek',ted valves for SAictian *,flnl e:ctioe Algrneet* lHio FNessiwre Safety 3nj~tion* Uarinr~rg Puiva* uoSer-optaratwi Vkvfe fcw sut nd I-~.to " ý4 `1igrntn s Sunp Re-circ 'at )n ,e1Aos* PHI: Punps a ERiR Pulps;* btor-C(eratod-Valv~ Ta Suctian and Injection Allgaffeit

• $liw RtKIrculatim Wert*see Mwe 6 Wi Pwros e HI Heat lyhangars D. KIS Hleat om-wvai fNOTE; Thi.s rfiatriK was F13 Aj'i1 I ary Feedmater Sa Cene ernalr Pc4'-er-~F 14 qweatedAt~ele' Relief Vnl~es Pressurizer P~w F15 4O;oratad PIef Valwes High Piesr tfj-Q.t orn F16 or Ilecircuintion System Re'sidual Heat vmlovaJ F17 system Surflan imd likjecticn Al lara-nt dovoloped assumiig that offsite pnwer is tjnavaialabio, Page 37 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 TabIo R1-$MA P0~14 IN s91K ur SY E 2. DCr Powr S2 sel Nti h F Autrzra'ti Fu~astiTnsle

.Lotacy Centers o 0!St ritblonr Parne r a.Breokrs) 430V Isto sas otmortLe xolCnt o20 istro et i.S3v~t r 71oses r 3-v14 ~Page 38 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 labia B-3 (Continued), M'A~JOR COMPOJENTS INJ SUPPORT SYSTEMS Sqmpprt SyVstemf 4. Serice Water and Coponent Cool i aq WaJiter S4 Systems Major Cnmpnennts ilrzontal Pumips Ve~rtic.al Pumps Mntnr-Gp'rat~d VYalve,~AirOperatted Valvesa r4ecu-- vi-,ves pipi-rq Heat Fxdcrrngers Surge Thrnks MaepPumrps bIVAC Systems 1raveing £rrcrtsard

~Screeni Wash Pumpsa Strinr Intake Buy Gates Coal ingr Towers, Coolintj Tower Pumirps Cooling~ Tower Fans Receiveors ED ienoid-Uperato-d 1'a1Ves Check Valwhas Filters Fans Damipers Chillers and Refrijjura~iiw U!IILs D~uctwork 5- Compressed~

Air, System 6. 1IVAC Systems S6 B~-15 Page 39 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 1 -BASE LIST 2 NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 -Base List 1 2-30 Unit 1 -SWEL 1 31-39 Unit 1 -Base List 2 40-41 Unit 1 -SWEL 2 42-44 Page 40 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Vogtle Unit 1 BASE LIST 2 Component ID 11213E6001 11213E6002 11213P6002 11213P6002M01 11213P6005 11213P600SM01 112131U4054 112131U4055 11213U6001 112131U-6003 11213U6005

.11213U6007 112131U6009 11213U-6010 112131U-6028 11213U6030 11213U6050 112131U-6051 11213U6053 11213U6057 112131U6058 11213U6064 1HV8754A 1HV8754B Description Unit SPENT FUEL PIT HX A 1 SPENT FUEL PIT HX B 1 SFCPS SPENT FUEL PIT COOLING PUMP A 1 SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP MTR 1 SFCPS SPENT FUEL PIT COOLING PUMP B 1 SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP MTR 1 SFP CLG RMWST ISOLATION VALVE 1 SFP DEMIN WTR SPLY ISO (1OP2-297) 1 SFPC SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP A SUCTION 1 SFPC SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP B SUCTION 1 SFPC SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP A DISCHARGE (10P2- 1 291)SFPC SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP B DISCHARGE (10P2- 1 292)SFPC HEAT EXCHANGER A OUTLET (1OP2-293) 1 SFPC HEAT EXCHANGER B OUTLET 1 SFCPS SFP A COOLING LOOP DEMIN INLET 1 SFCPS SFP B COOLING LOOP DEMIN INLET 1 SFPCPS RWST SUPPLY TO REFUELING CAVITY ISO 1 (10P2-295)

SFPCPS RWST SUPPLY TO REFUELING CAVITY ISO 1 SFPS PURIFICATION LOOP RETURN TO SFP 1 SFPS PURIFICATION LOOP RETURN TO SFP 1 THROTTLE VLV SFPS PURIFICATION LOOP RETURN TO SFP 1 SFPS,PURIFICATION,LOOP RETURN,TO SEP 1 CHECK,*,*,*

12N8E7 SFCS SPENT FUEL PIT HX A OUTTHROTTLE VLV 1 SFCS SPENT FUEL PIT HX B OUT THROTTLE VLV 1 Plant System Seismic Category 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 Type 1 HX 1 HX 1 Pump 1 Motor 1 Pump 1 Motor 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve 1 Manual Valve Page 41 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 1 -SWEL 2 SNCV061-RPT-0I Equipment List Papzes Unit 1 -Base List 1 2-30 Unit 1 -SWEL 1 31-39 Unit 1 -Base List 2 40-41 Unit 1 -SWEL 2 42-44 Page 42 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Plant Vogtle Unit 1 SWEL-1 Pla'nt Vogtle Unit 1 SWEL-2 SWEL Revision Date: October 23, 2012 Originator:

print: " t.Reviewer:

print: J tAVTO. uU-A signature:

signature, Date: Date: Date: /0.-/2-A prInt:TAm~omA*3 Gg.2 ?AVsigairtJla Ops Reviewer: Peer Reviewer: Peer Reviewer: print: I-ti-signatDate:

u/r-2_signature;

-Date: 'signa~t7 Date: L_"Il.signature:

Date: ______Peer Reviewer:

print: dek-rA ýý,j,,, Peer Reviewer:

print: 'a- Sr*' k'W" Page 43 of 44 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUPMENT LISTS Vogtle Unit 1 SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items NITTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Screen #4 Major Variety of new types of SEISMIC or equipment Anchorage check Walkdown Room Drawing Variety of environments required?

Rapid Drain-Down CAT 1 replcmnt (21 Classes must be MPL# Description Building Elevation or (50% of Column B) Comments Reference equpmnt from deferred to (5) Appendix B) outage?Hydraulic lines connected to the Not SFP and the equipment Class # Submerged Submerged Other Yes No connected to those lines 1 1-1213-E6-001 SFP HX A Yes AUX 195'-0" A53 1X4DBi30/F4 21 X X (4) NO 2 1-1213-P6-005 SFP Pump B Yes FHB 195-0" A07 1X4DB130/B5 S X X (4) NO 3 1-1213-U6-001 SFP Pump A suction isolation valve Yes FHB 195-0" A06 1X4DBi30/F4 0 X (6) (4) NO 4 1-HV-8754B SFP B HX outlet isolation valve Yes FHB 195'-0" A07 lX4DB130/H4 0 X (6) (4) NO S I-1213-U6-005 SPP Pump A discharge isolation valve YES FHB 195'-0" AS3 2X4D6130 0 X (6) (4) NO Notes.2 The Vogtle SFP System has a very basic system design with very limited componenet types. There is only one active component in each train; the SFP Cooling pump.2 The fuel transfer tube is seismic category l and therfore is considered part of the SEP structure.

Therefore the transfer tube was not included in the SWEL 3 The SFP weir gates are seismic category u and therfore considered to be part of the SFP structure.

Therfore the weir gates will not be inIcuded in the SWEL.4 There are no SFP penetrations below 10ft above the fuel in the SFP.All piping connected to the SFP, either terminate greater than l0ft above the fuel or have anti-siphon holes, located greater than 10 ft above the fuel, to prevent draindown of the SFP.5 There have been no new or replaced SFP system equipment.

6 These components are valves and not anchored.Page 44 of 44 ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR THE SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCV061-RTP-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 2 UNIT 1 -PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR THE SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 Page 1 of 3 ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR THE SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCV061-RTP-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Vogtle Unit 1 Instructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist should be used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may have changed to address those findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL 1 selection?

YED NEI SWEL 1 for Vogtle Unit I meets the requirements of having 90 to 120 items and addresses allfive safety functions.

Many components provide safety functions for multiple systems, and/or are part offrontline support systems. Allfive safety functions discussed in EPRI Report 1025286 are well represented in the SWEL 1.2. Does SWEL 1 include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

a. Various types of systems? YN N[J Items included on the SWEL comprise a variety of systems such as Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliaries, Service Water System, Component Cooling Water System, Automatic Depressurization, Residual Heat Removal System, Vital A/C and D/C systems.b. Major new and replacement equipment?

YZ NEl New and replacement components are identified in SWEL 1.c. Various types of equipment?

YZ NEI SWEL 1 includes at least one example of each of the 21 classes of equipment, except Class 12 (Air Compressors) and Class 13 (Motor Generators).

These components did not meet the screening criteria for incorporation in the SWEL as discussed in Section 6 of the submittal report.All other equipment classes were well represented.

In general, the number of components in each class is proportional to the number of safety-related components of that class in the plant as a whole, except that the number of in-line valves is proportionally smaller than anchored equipment.

Anchored equipment is more vulnerable to seismic loads.d. Various environments?

YM NEI The SWEL contains components in mild, harsh, and outdoor environments.

The components are located in different buildings, rooms, and/or on different building elevations.

The SWEL also includes components located inside primary containment.

e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program? YN NEI The SWEL included equipment that had been modified as a result of the IPEEE program. Section 5 and Attachment 5 of the submittal report provides information on resolution of the IPEEE findings.

The SWEL and individual component checklists provide information about the IPEEE modifications and verification of modification incorporation.

Page 2 of 3 ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR THE SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCV061-RTP-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Vogtle Unit 1 f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL 1? YZ NI-1 SWEL 1 includes high risk components based on risk significance in the plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. Section 6 of the submittal report discusses the risk insights used for SWEL development.

3. For SWEL 2: a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in YZ NEI SWEL 2?SWEL 2 includes components for maintaining cooling of the SFP, which are Seismic Category I components.

b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not YN NEil included in SWEL 2?Section 6.2 of the submittal report provides the justification for excluding items on SWEL 2. There were no components identified that could contribute to rapid SFP drain down. Note that there were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would have affected equipment that meets the screening requirements to be included on SWEL 2.4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.The peer review team reviewed the initial SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 and provided comments and suggestions for enhancement of the SWELs. Comments included suggestions to include additional electrical components and more equipment mounted to the structure, since such equipment has shown more potential to be adversely impacted by seismic loads than in-line mounted components.

In addition, comments were made suggesting that certain equipment classes contain more components and that explanations be provided for not including certain equipment (e. g. there are no safety-related or Seismic Category I components in that equipment class installed in the plant). The peer reviewers ensured that the SWELs met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Changes deemed necessary during the walkdown due to inaccessibility were reviewed by the peer reviewers to ensure that the changes did not impact the level of compliance to the EPRI report. The final SWEL meets all requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL? YN NEI Peer Reviewer #1: Robert Ashworth Peer Reviewer#2:

Melanie Brown.( $z' /_j42_ZI.'

Date: 11/05/2012 Date: 11/05/2012 Page 3 of 3 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 3 UNIT 1 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01 PAGE 1 of 668 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 2, Status:-i N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC-)Equipmfientil)D4o.

-IZO/ ..PSi5, Equip.Class" 2 , Equipment Description ( i- 7A .. , 4, Location,-.B tI IF!odrEL /.;2E 6ý' Room, Area A! 0..Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for {Completing Checklist This dchedlkist rnay'be used to document the results oflhe Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipmert on the SWEL, The space below each:oft!e followoing questions m,-y to-record thfeSesults ofjudgments and fididngs.

Additional space is proiid d at the end of this checklistfor documenting other comments.Anhor'ake 1, is the anchorageconfiguration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the5e % of SWELlems requiritig such verification)?

2, Is the anchorage free of bent,.broken, missing or loose,hardWare?:

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion.

that is snore than mild surface.qoxidation?

4. Is the: anchorage free of visiblecracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is coinfiguadtiboiconsisteiit.with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the,50b for which aairanchorage configuration vefificatiofi is required.)

6. Based on.the above apcborancb eveyuattions iI.the aifliorage free: 6f potentially advdrse:seisirm.c conditions?

YD NO/Y~ NEI UD N/AD0 V N ; tD I U N/ADA M~ NDj Q1 N/AD1 Y0 NDI UD NIA'A Y,4NEI UD]'Entpr bwb eqpipmernttclassname from Appendix B: Classes of:Equipment.

<C-3 3>.PAGE 2 of 668 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2.of2 S~elsmic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipi6entDN,'1.

tT EqTluip. Classr 2 IS : Equipment be .cpion , R 1 ft .`4 '#-ý KIT (B Interaction Effects 7. Ac softtargets free fom impact bybnearby eq'iipmentor structures?

YANCJ LJQ N/AC.,8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systejns, ceiling tiles and lighting, Y NO UF1 N/,AC]and mason-y blck walls not likely,to collapse ontothe equipment?

9. Do attached 1ihoes ha,,ve adequate'flexibilitytto avoid damage?10. Based onrthe abovc seismic intefaction evaluations,.is equipmenftecre

ýof potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?NCfN Urn N/AEC Y)4'NC Urn OiierAdverse Conditions

11. Have you looked'for and found rAoothefdsisfnic condftions that could NyO.r UErn adversely sa.fety fuhctidns of the equipment?

, Comments (Additionaispagesýhitty'beafd aS nevsitary)

........... .., .N. 17/ ,~;4<~ .;Evaluated b-.:_____ AJb~~ L 11? ~Date:_"<C4>PAGE 3 of 668 9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSIOV RCS LOOP 4 WnicG F PAGE 4 of 668 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSIONOO S1PT-0418 FICS --P WIDE RANGE PRESS PAGE 5 of 668 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 L-7S Sheet 1 of 2 Status: ) N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)EquipmentIDNo.

I 'Z 4'Z Equip. Class" ...]r2d s.SC4 I6 Equipment Description AIC V1 7"9/AS.J A. PUMP A] 2-Location:

Bldg. AISC" Floor El. z.2o'-&o Room, Area 9 7-P3 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) 4d5-.)" e, -Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

YQ/N/2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

SsU*r-, tj;t~ .ZZ , 0. ~) ~ CZZ fte-4 -24t 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

YP NEI U- N/AD]Y'gNEI UE" N/A~l YANEI UCI N/AUI Y~q NEI UFI N/AF-YX NEI UrQ 12 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

<C-3 >PAGE 6 of 668 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet.21of2:

Seismic Walkdown Chec.klist (SWC)Equipment ID No, V.t2oZ -P -0 .Eq-uip.Class'12 V a r'rcI.A i-Equipmen Description vtp'!ý- -C LA.75,5 &, Interaction Effects.7. Are soft targets fiee fiorn impactby nearby equipmentor structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems,ýceiling ti qsqand lighting, and masonryblock wa!ls not'.hikely to collapse dnto the equipment?

9 'Do attached in<h hesadeequate fiexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaltidatins,.

s equipme.ntfree of potentially adverse seismic int rt.tj6n effects?Y NE] Ut- N/A[]Yp" Nn UDT N/AD Yg-ND UO YX NO UD Other Adverse Conditions 11 Have you looked for and found-no other seismic e onditions Qiat could ND UD adversely affectithe safety functions of the equipmeht?

Comments (Additional pages may be added asnecessary) valimdby:

c Date,".< C-4 >~PAGE 7 of 668 TTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS 0 NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSIO.0 PAGE 8 of 668 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERS1000 PAGE 9 of 668 i ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 2-Sta tu N u Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. I-j. / ýZ 4 ý0v Equip. Class 1 2 24l Equipment Description e_ __ _ _Location:

J*Bldg., _ Y Floor EL. 2-4.4J Room, Area .2 -= .Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but rec6inifended)

._ _ __ ,_ __- _ __.Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used todocument the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item ofeqjuipment on the SWEL.The dspace below each of the following questj'pions may be used to record the resuls ofj udgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end.of this checklist for documenting other comftients.

Anchora e 1.,L Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the itcm:one Y of the 506% of SWEL-.items requiring such'. verification)?

2. Isithe anchorage free of bent, broken,, missing or loose hardware?3. Js the ,fchorage ofcorrosion that.js inordthan mildsura-e oxidation?

4:: Is the:anchorage free ofvisible-crabks in the conucete,.fiear the ancrs?5. Is, the anchorage codnfi'i rationcsistent with Pi.antdocubment ation?(Note:;This questibn only applies if the item is one of the 50%:for.which arfanchorage configuration verification is rcquired.)

6- :,3ased on the above anchorage he anchorage free'of pdtentially adverse seisiiC conditions?, Yd NEI U- N/AC NO ULJ N/AC Y~NC :UC Y U NO uN/Entr te et pm~iieas nae fom~pcdix:

Caseio Eq.ipenet, PAGE 10 of 668 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 2 Seismic.Walkdown Checklist (SWC),, ...... .. ./- z'o3 g-; --o'L. Eqq'ip, Class'2: Equipment iD No. CC- .. V q C E~quipmeit .Description: .C. -vJ Interaction Effects.7. Are soft targets free from iffpact by nearby equipment OfttUcturqs?

8. Are overheadcequipmiient, distrib dtion systems, ceiiing tiiesand iighlting, and masonry'block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipnient?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoi0d. daamage?10. Basedon the above seismic interaction eVaJuatiadns is equipm ent free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effcCts?Y&NEJ LID N/AED Y41NE .ED N/AD]YdNO UF"I N/AD YmE]4 UELI Other Adverse Conditions 1i. Hae'you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YJND tiE ad'resely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (ýAdditional pages may be added iasnecessary)

C..laluatedd by' : 4. .'Date: A ~e __27 u)' of z*< C-4 >" PAGE 11 of 668 9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS 0 NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSIO 9 N.PAGE 12 of 668 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet1 of 2 Statu.s:

NUu Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment IDNNo. I-1203,T4"O02.

Equip. Class.'2 21 (UA. , EquipmentDescription C(a Tq Location:, Bldg. A-uX Floor El. _ __ Room, Area :. .ZO2.Maniufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Complefing Checldist This'checkJist may'be;,used to document theresults, of the Seismic Walkdown of an item Of equipment on the SWEL. The space the following, questions may 1b usedlto record'the results ofjud gmers and ,findings.

Additional spaice is provided at the end of this checklist for: documenfing other co .ent.Anch'orage L. Is the anchorage configuratfion Verification required (i~e., is the it em one YO'ND of the 50% of SWEL itemts requiringsuch verification)?

2. is the adhoriage free of bent,'broken, missing or loose hardware?

Y[X Nn UE: N/AC 3; Is.t.he anchoratge

!ree~of corrosion that~i ,s more than.mfld sufiface.ox idati'on?;

41. Isý the anchoragf'free of Oigible cracks in the concrete near the adnchors?5. Is.theanchorage configutati6.fi'ib6sistcnt with plant documentation?(Note- This question only applies if the item is: one of the 50% fOr which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

YoeJ NEI UC N/*AO YX, NEI UI N/AC YK NC3 UC ?NVAC 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potcniially adyerse seis ini coriditions?

Enter ifit equipment class,name 11rom Appendix B.lChsscs of Equipment.

.( :-3: >PAGE 13 of 668 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 2 Setsmic Walkdown ChecklIst (SWC), Equipment ID. No. V1203' 2- Equip. ClIass1'2.('ok q! I+Xs Equipment Description

(~ASA(Tr Interaction Effects 7,. Are soft ttargets free impact by nearby equipment t' Structures?

8. Are cverhead equipment, disiribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masomy block walls not likeIly to collaps0eOnto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequateý flexibility to avoid damage?10.- Based ar thle above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free adverse seismic interaction effects?Y'NEIN UC N/AO YýNO UQý NIAQýYI6 1 NO UtQ _N/AQ Y4'NO UO Othee Advcrse CondItions ilI. IRAV y'u- lO'ekd for-iad found no other seismic c6ndiions thiit could YPNEJ UIJ adverisely affect~the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments O(ditio nal pages may iendded as necessary)(Foe, MA-JWAL~'W oF gJ1 z-o_ý S$Cg Evaluated by: 0 , t{ j~ U!Alnsmr Date:¶t<4 C-4 >PAGE 14 of 668 9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSIONOO4 PAGE 15 of 668

!ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS 0 0 NO. SNCVO61-RPT-01, VERSIONOO PAGE 16 of 668 O ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION00 PAGE 17 of 668 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 100 PAGE 18 of 668 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION*PAGE 19 of 668 NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Sheet]. pof2 Status; N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)E'quipmednt INo, 1-7A0 C% -0+ Equip. Class!2___ C SS Eq'uipment Description SM Pu:, Location:

Bldg. .ZU) FloorEl. F!&' bRoom,,Area .t ..Manufacturer, Mode!, Etc. (optional but recommeilded).

P~~ 0-x P , Instructionsfor Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the r&sults of the Seismic.Walkdown.of an item of equipment o6 the SWEL. The space below each. ofthe following que stions may be used to record, the results ofjudgments and findings.,Additional space, is provided at the endzof this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchor~ae 1. Is the.anchorage configeurati6nVerification-required (i.e.,.is-the item one MI ND-of ihe 50%19 of SWEL items requiting sucPiverification)?

2. Isthe anchorage free of betit, broken, missing or0loose hardware?3. Ts thedanchorage free of'c.oqw6sion that is more than mild surfah:e'oxidation?

4. Is'the freeof visibl cracks in the concretei nearthe anchors?5..Is the'anchorage configuratibn consistent with plant d6cumentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item iS one ofthe 50% fbr which ananchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on thea ove anchorageevaluations, is the ancfhioag6 free of potentially advereseismic conditions?

YX NDI UDC N/AD Yt< ND IDU N/AD3 YdND] UED N/AD YXf NDI lDN/A YXND] UED 1'~Efiter the cquipineiit dI2ssnriac firom Appdim 1 hne fEninei dix1C1 -isc o >ivct PAGE 20 of 668 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 2 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

No., EquipClass

_ .. .Equipment Description

' .Interaction Effects 7' Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distributibn systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely toQcollapse onto tihe quipment?9. Do attached lines'have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on thle above seismicintera~cti.onevaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic -interaction effects?YX NEI VEJ N/AM YX~NI UEJ N/AEJ YgNEJ Urj ]WAO YX NEI UEJ Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic condiftions ihat could adversely affectthe safety functions of the. equipmenrt?

~NO UQ1 comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

L ~ ~~ "U 0- Cj pv Uj LJWýp I t,'L bpOlm-s Evaluated by:.Date 8,o- Z>tIZ/ /Jk4~ &~)e4~0 lQ, 1 t /" "s< c-4 '>PAGE 21 of 668

• ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION*/PAGE 22 of 668 SACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION .00 PAGE 23 of 668 tACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 9 I PAGE 24 of 668 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION .0 PAGE 25 of 668 1ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION*PAGE 26 of 668 I ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Shieet.i of2 Sfatus:UY N- U Seismic Walkdown.

Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID N O,. tP '1 Eqýip. Cf0-ss' !47 , 1 , ¢ i Equipment Dcscilption FL/$,k.R W'rD7 ii,?A-(? f[tM!<Location:

Bldg. Aw5rS Floor EL Room, Area g._ _ vi _Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

____.... .._._....Instructions for Comipleting Checklist This checklist may be used to.document the res4its ofithc Seismic Walkdown of an item of equirpmention the SWEL. The space bclow each of the following questions may be-used to record the results ofJudgments and: findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of thischecklistifor'documenting other conmm-nents.

Anchorage I. Is the dachrtage..configiration; vification required (i.e., is: theitem ouie YEI Nzxýof the 50% of SWEL;items requiring such verificaiion)?

2. Is the.,anch'orage free of bent, broken, missing or loose haidwarc?3, Is the anchoIrage fre: of corrosion that. is more than uilid surface oxidation?:

4. ls the anchorage free of Visiblqecralcks in the concrete bear the'anchors?

5. Is the anchorage'configu~ration consisten.t with plai.tdocumientation?(Note: This question only applies if the~item is one of the 50% fo:r which an anchorage configuration verification'is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially advers seismic conditio'ns?

YD NEI UE1 N/A%YýE NEI UE1.N/Ax'=Yý NEI U N/AE1 YEJ NE UE1 I/Yý Nn UE 12 tnter th qupeca'ss nadife froniA,4pndix B. Classes of Equiviment.

PAGE 27 of 668 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0'Sheet 20of 2 SeiSmic WaIkdown Checklist.(SWd)

Equipr.entDi t io. Ftl .c ,' ,Euip).7Class' 2_i-#4ia-e 1 _E~quipmentlDescription XRit~EF~LtCW,V W rd r~46 A t4WiL Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free fromimpacf by nearby equipmentor structures?, ,8. Are~overhead equipment .distribution systeafs,ýceiling tiles and lighting, and.masonry'block walls not~likely tocollapse onto the.equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility:to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismicihteradtion evaluations, is eq*uipmentifee, of.potentially adverse seismic interaction, effects?Y'W NE UCf N./Ar NEI N uC N/AC vg NEI UD N/AC 4 NCI UCM:Other- Advcrs& Conditi6ns

11. Have youlook0edfor andfund'no other sefsmic-conditions thatcould NCD UC adversely affect .thl safety functidb§.6f.thd equipment?

.Coinments (Additional pages may beradded as n~ecessary) fivaluatedhby:

0'~ .~ ..k~ e .....Date.. ... ..<C-4>PAGE 28 of 668 9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSION PAGE 29 of 668 9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSIONOO PAGE 30 of 668 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSIOONO PAGE 31 of 668 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCV061-RPT-01, VERSICIONO PAGE 32 of 668