ML12125A315

Issuance of Amendment Concerning Approval of Upgrade of Emergency Action Level Scheme

ML12125A315
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	06/01/2012
From:	Feintuch K Plant Licensing Branch III
To:	Wells P Nextera Energy
Wengert T
References
TAC ME6508
Download: ML12125A315 (25)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555"()001 June 1, 2012 Mr. Peter Wells Vice President NextEra Energy Duane Arnold Energy Center 3277 DAEC Road Palo, IA 52324-9785

SUBJECT:

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT CONCERNING APPROVAL OF UPGRADE OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEME (TAC NO. ME6508)

Dear Mr. Wells:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 281 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC). This amendment consists of changes to the DAEC Emergency Plan in response to your application dated May 31, 2011, as supplemented by letters dated March 16, 2012 and April 5, 2012.

The amendment upgrades DAEC Emergency Action Levels based on Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Revision 5, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Actions Levels," using the guidance of NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2003-18, Supplement 2, "Use of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels."

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, K~~~t~~

Karl D. Feintuch, Project Manager Plant licensing Branch 111-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-331

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 281 to License No. DPR-49

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via ListServ

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 NEXTERA ENERGY DUANE ARNOLD, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-331 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 281 License No. DPR-49

1.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC dated May 31,2011, as supplemented by letters dated March 16, 2012, and April 5, 2012, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conductE3d in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, by Amendment No. 281

,Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 is hereby amended to authorize revision to the Duane Arnold Energy Center Emergency Plan as set forth in NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC's application dated May 31, 2011, as supplemented by letters dated March 16, 2012, and April 5, 2012, and evaluated in the NRC staff's safety evaluation dated June 1) 2012. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,

;L:?

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance:.June 1, 2012

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 281 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-49 NEXTERA ENERGY DUANE ARNOLD. LLC DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER DOCKET NO. SO-331

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated May 31,2011 (Reference 12), and supplemented by letters dated March 16,2012, and AprilS, 2012 (References 13 and 14 respectively), NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, (the licensee), requested prior U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval for proposed changes to the emergency action level (EAL) scheme for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC).

The licensee's requested changes support a conversion from its current EAL scheme to a scheme based on Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Revision S, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," dated February 2008 (Reference S).

DAEC stated that its current EAL scheme is based on generic development guidance from NEI 99-01, Revision 4, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,"

(Reference 4). DAEC requested a revision to its EAL scheme to incorporate the numerous enhancements and clarification efforts made to the generic EAL development guidance resulting in the most recent document, NEI 99-01, Revision S, which was found to be acceptable for use as generic EAL development guidance by the NRC (Reference 7).

The supplemental information dated March 16,2012, and AprilS, 2012, contained clarifying information, did not change the scope of the May 31, 2011, application or the initial no significant hazards consideration determination, and does not expand the scope of the original Federal Register notice. Enclosure 6 of the licensee's May 31, 2011, application contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards (security-related) information and accordingly, is withheld from public disclosure.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed revision against the following regulations and guidance described below.

Enclosure

- 2 2.1 Regulations Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.47, "Emergency plans," sets forth emergency plan requirements for nuclear power plant facilities. The regulations in 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1 )(i) states, in part, that

[...] no initial operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

Section 50.47(b) establishes the standards that the onsite and offsite emergency response plans must meet for NRC staff to make a positive finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

Planning Standard (4) of this section requires that onsite and offsite emergency response plans contain:

A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

Section 50.47(b)(4) to 10 CFR specifies a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, assuring that implementation methods are relatively consistent throughout the industry for a given reactor and containment design while simultaneously providing an opportunity for a licensee to modify its EAL scheme as necessary to address plant-specific design considerations or preferences.

Section IV.B of Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," to 10 CFR Part 50, states, in part:

The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to on site and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant....

DAEC's proposed changes were submitted to the NRC for a technical and regulatory review prior to implementation by the licensee. This review is based upon a revision to the DAEC EAL scheme provided in the licensee's application letter and supplemented by the licensee's responses to the NRC staff's requests for additional information. Enclosure 3 of the licensee's

- 3 letter dated April 5, 2012 (Reference 14), contains the final version of the licensee's proposed plant-specific EAL scheme for DAEC and is therefore, the final version reviewed by the NRC staff for acceptability.

2.2 Guidance EAL development guidance was initially established via Generic Letter (GL) 79-50 (Reference 1) and was subsequently established in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 (Reference 2),

which was endorsed as an approach for the development of an EAL scheme via NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.101, Revision 2 (Reference 15). As industry and regulatory experience was gained with the implementation and use of EAL schemes, the industry issued revised EAL scheme development guidance documents to reflect lessons learned. To date, NUMARC/NESP-007 (Reference 3), NEI 99-01 Revision 4 (Reference 4), and NEI 99-01 Revision 5 were provided to the NRC for review and endorsement as generic (non plant specific) EAL development guidance. RG 1.101, Revisions 3 and 4 (Reference 6) endorsed NUMARC/NESP-007 and NEI 99-01 Revision 4 as acceptable alternatives for licensees to consider in the development of their plant-specific EAL schemes, as well as allowing licensees to develop plant-specific EALs based upon an alternative approach not endorsed by the NRC.

NEI 99-01 Revision 5 was endorsed by the NRC as generic (non plant-specific) EAL development guidance via letter dated February 22, 2008 (Reference 7), and this endorsement is expected to be reflected in the next revision of RG 1.101.

The EAL development guidance contained in GL 79-50, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, NUMARC/NESP-007, NEI 99-01 Revision 4, and NEI 99-01 Revision 5 are all considered generic EAL development guidance, as they are not plant-specific and may not be entirely applicable for some reactor designs. However, the guidance contained in these documents bounds the most typical accident/event scenarios for which emergency response is necessary, in a format that allows for industry standardization and consistent regulatory oversight. Most licensees choose to develop their plant-specific EAL schemes using the latest endorsed EAL development guidance with appropriate plant-specific alterations as applicable. Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B (2), a revision to an EAL must be approved by the NRC before implementation, if the licensee is changing from one EAL scheme to another EAL scheme.

In sum, the NRC staff considers the following methods acceptable for use in developing plant specific EALs that meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), with the understanding that licensees may want to develop EALs that differ from the applicable guidance document as allowed in RG 1.101 and in the letter dated February 22, 2008:

• Appendix 1, "Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants," to NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 1980; NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," dated January 1992;

-4 NEI 99-01, Revision 4, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,"

dated January 2003; and NEI 99-01, Revision 5, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,"

dated February 2008.

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2003-18, with Supplements 1 and 2, "Use of NEI99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels" (Reference 9), also provide guidance for developing or changing a standard emergency classification and action level scheme. In addition, this RIS and its supplements provide recommendations to assist licensees, consistent with Section IV.S of Appendix E to Part 50, in determining whether to seek prior NRC approval of deviations from the guidance.

Regardless of the generic EAL scheme development guidance document used by a licensee to develop its EAL scheme, or if a licensee chose to develop its EAL scheme using an alternative approach not endorsed by the NRC, or a combination of the two (most typical), the NRC staff will review the EAL scheme to assure it meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47{b){4).

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

In its application and supplemental letters, the licensee submitted the proposed EAL scheme for DAEC, the technical basis, a comparison matrix, the EAL numbering scheme, and an explanation for any difference or deviation from NEI 99-01, Revision 5. The comparison matrix provided a cross reference relating the proposed EAL scheme to the EAL scheme in NEI 99-01, Revision 5 and the current EAL scheme.

DAEC currently utilizes an EAL scheme based on the generic EAL scheme development guidance from NEI 99-01, Revision 4 (Reference 4) with plant-specific modifications due to design issues and/or licensee preference. The licensee is converting to an EAL scheme using the development guidance from NEI 99-01, Revision 5 (Reference 5), with plant-specific modifications due to design issues and/or licensee preference.

The proposed plant-specific EAL scheme is unique to DAEC; however, to ensure consistency and regulatory stability, the NRC staff reviewed the proposed plant-specific EAL scheme to ensure the following key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme are in place:

Consistency (i.e., the EALs would lead to similar decisions under similar circumstances at different plants), up to and including standardization in intent, if not in actual wording; Human factors engineering and user friendliness; Potential for classification upgrade only when there is an increasing threat to public health and safety; Ease of upgrading and downgrading;

-S

• Thoroughness in addressing and disposing of the issues of completeness and accuracy raised regarding Appendix 1 to NUREG-06S4;

• Technical completeness for each classification level; Logical progression in classification for multiple events; and Objective and observable values.

To aid in understanding the nomenclature used in this safety evaluation, for each category of EALs reviewed the following naming/numbering convention is used: the first letter signifies the category; the second letter signifies the classification level (G = General Emergency (GE),

S = Site Area Emergency (SAE), A = Alert, U = Notification of Unusual Event (UE)); and the number is the applicable number from the plant-specific EAL scheme. For ease of use, this safety evaluation will use the numbering system from the plant-specific EAL scheme rather than from the generic EAL development guidance.

3.1 Category 'R' - Abnormal Radiological Release/Radiological Effluent 3.1.1 EAL Set RG1/RS1/RA1/RU1 This EAL set is based upon plant-specific indications of a release of radioactivity (gaseous and/or liquid). The progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance, as well as using 'R' in lieu of 'A' to reference this category.

The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO and 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.1.2 EAL Set RA2/RU2 This EAL set is based upon plant-specific indications of fuel uncovery. The progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance, as well as using 'R' in lieu of 'A' to reference this category.

The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The instrumentation and set pOints derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47{b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.1.3 EAL RA3 This EAL is based upon indications of a rise in plant radiation levels that impedes normal access to the Control Room (CR) and Central Alarm Station (CAS).

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance, as well as using 'R' in lieu of 'A' to reference this category.

The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The Alert EAL is primarily intended to ensure the plant emergency response organization is activated to support the CR in removing the impediment to normal access to the CR and CAS.

Indications of increasing radiation levels in the plant are bounded by indication of fission barrier loss or potential loss, as well as in RS1 and RG1.

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

- 7 3.2 Category 'C' - Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malfunction 3.2.1 EAL Set CA3/CU3 This EAL set is based upon a loss of available alternating current (AC) power sources to the emergency busses. The progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The instrumentation, values, and listing of applicable power sources derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.2.2 EAL CU7 This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to ensure an EAL is declared when a loss of direct current (DC) power event occurs, as this condition compromises the ability of the licensee to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling modes of operation.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

- B 3.2.3 EAL CUB This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to highlight the significance of inadvertent criticality events by ensuring an EAL is declared if an unplanned positive and sustained start-up rate is observed on nuclear instrumentation.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.2.4 EAL CU6 This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme as the EAL's intent is to highlight the importance of emergency communications by ensuring an EAL is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or for offsite response organizations including the NRC, are lost.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The communication methods derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.2.5 EAL Set CG1/CS1/CA1/CU1/CU2 This EAL set is based upon a loss of reactor pressure vessel inventory and/or reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage. The progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

- 9 The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.2.6 EAL Set CA4/CU4 This EAL set is based upon an inability to maintain control of decay heat removal. The progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47{b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.3 Category 'H' - Hazards 3.3.1 EAL Set HGlIHS4/HA4/HU4 This EAL set is based upon security-related events originally developed in accordance with the guidance from NRC Bulletin 2005-02 (Reference 10) or RIS 2006-12 (Reference 11) for licensees to implement regardless of the specific version of the generic EAL scheme development guidance used, or if the particular licensee developed its EAL scheme using an alternative approach. Based upon lessons learned from the implementation and use of this EAL

-10 set, particularly the insights gained from combined security and emergency preparedness drills, the NRC staff and the industry worked to enhance the language of these EALs so as to eliminate any confusion without changing the intent of the EAL set as set forth in NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and RIS 2006-12. The NRC staff generated EAL Frequently Asked Question (EALFAQ) 2009-48 (Reference 8) to address the changes made to the generic EAL scheme development guidance document.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47{b){4).

This EAL set is consistent with the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and RIS 2006 12, as further enhanced by the lessons learned from implementation and drills, and revised in NEI 99-01 Revision 5 and evaluated in EALFAQ 2009-48.

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.3.2 EAL Set HS2IHA5 This EAL set is based upon CR evacuation. The progression from Alert to SAE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The GE classification level for this specific accident progression is bounded by indications available in the fission barrier matrix or EAL RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, are consistent with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47{b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47{b){4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.3.3 EAL Set HA1/HU1 This EAL set is based upon the effect that natural and destructive hazards may have on the licensee. The progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident

- 11 progression are bounded by indications available in the fission barrier matrix and EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The licensee's seismic event classification thresholds, for both the UE and Alert classification levels, are appropriate, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, and meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, are acceptable for implementation.

High wind and tornado events, as well as the development of plant-specific areas considered in these EALs, are consistent with the development strategies stated in the generic EAL development guidance. These EALs are consistent with a standard EAL scheme and meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

Therefore, these EALs are acceptable for implementation.

Main turbine rotating equipment failures are appropriately developed using the generic EAL development guidance with plant-specific terminology and plant-specific areas of consideration determined for these EALs. These EALs are consistent with a standard EAL scheme and meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

Therefore, these EALs are acceptable for implementation Internal flooding events are appropriately developed using the generic EAL development guidance with plant-specific terminology and plant-specific areas of consideration determined for these EALs. While consistent with the development strategies stated in the generic EAL development guidance, the actual wording used is different. However, these EALs are consistent with a standard EAL scheme and meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). Therefore, these EALs are acceptable for implementation.

The licensee developed additional EALs related to river water levels for the UE and Alert classification levels. The instrumentation and set pOints developed for these EALs are appropriate and applicable for this facility. The generic EAL scheme development guidance, as well as NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, instructs licensees to consider unique hazard events applicable to their plants and to develop plant-specific EALs to address these hazards. These EALs are consistent with a standard EAL scheme and meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). Therefore, these EALs are acceptable for implementation.

- 12 Events based upon vehicle crashes within the protected area or vital area have typically been difficult to differentiate for EAL purposes, between the UE and Alert classification levels. GL 79 50, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, and NUMARC/NESP-007 used language equating vehicles to aircraft, trains, and barges. NE199-01 Revision 4 addresses vehicles that are large enough to cause damage. With the issuance of NRC Bulletin 2005-02 (Reference 10), the need for EALs related to airborne, waterborne, or land-based security events has been resolved with the development of security-specific EALs. In addition, the intended basis for a UE EAL considers, among other factors, the resultant degradation in the level of safety of the plant. Eliminating the UE EAL for vehicle crashes is consistent with the intent of the UE classification and removes any misunderstanding regarding the remaining Alert classification. The Alert classification is based upon indications of degraded performance or visible damage to a specific list of areas considered applicable to this EAL. Removing the LIE EAL based upon vehicle crashes, and revising the wording of the remaining Alert EAL, is consistent with a standard EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

Therefore, the revisions to these EALs are acceptable for implementation.

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.3.4 EAL Set HA2/HU2 This EAL set is based upon the effect fire and explosions may have on the licensee's facility.

The progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, EALs RS1 and RG1, or applicable EALs from the Systems Malfunction Category.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The development of plant-specific areas considered in these EALs is consistent with the development strategies stated in the generic EAL development guidance even though the actual wording used is different. Therefore, the approach is consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

- 13 3.3.5 EAL HU3 This EAL is based upon the effect that toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases may have on the licensee personnel. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, EALs RS1 and RG1, or applicable EALs from the Systems Malfunction category. The Alert classification level is not applicable to DAEC because the areas that contain equipment necessary for safe operations, safe shutdown, and safe cool down do not require physical access to operate. In addition, the CR has two redundant trains of secured ventilation that maintain a positive pressure envelope, thus negating the impact that a hazardous gaseous environment would have on the CR. If evacuation of the CR is required, for any reason including a hazardous gaseous environment, then the Alert classification level would be bounded by EAL HA5.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.3.6 EAL Set HG2/HS3/HA6/HU5 This EAL set is based upon providing the decision-makers with EALs to consider when, in their judgment, an emergency classification is warranted.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, are consistent with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

- 14 3.4 Category 'E' - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (lSFSI) 3.4.1 EAL EU1 This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is limited to radiological events at the ISFSI. While security-related events at the ISFSI are also of concern, they are bounded by the licensee's EAL HA4.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO and 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.S Category'S' - System Malfunction 3.S.1 EAL Set SG1/SS1/SAS/SU1 This EAL set is based upon a loss of available AC power sources to the emergency busses.

The progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The instrumentation, values, and listing of applicable power sources derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO and 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

- 15 3.5.2 EAL SS3 This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to ensure an EAL is declared when a loss of DC power event occurs, as this condition compromises the ability of the licensee to monitor and control the removal of decay heat The GE classification level for this event is bounded by fission barrier matrix indicators and EAL RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, are consistent with the plant specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.5.3 EAL Set SG2/SS2/SA2/SU8 This EAL set is based upon the effect that a failure of the reactor protection system may have on the plant, as well as inadvertent criticality for SU8. The progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the reqUirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.5.4 EAL Set SS6/SA4/SU3 This EAL set is based upon the effect that a loss of indication, control and annunciation capabilities has on the plant The progression from UE to SAE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The GE classification level for this specific accident progression is bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix or EAL RG1.

- 16 The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO and 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.S.S EAL SU2 This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to ensure an EAL is declared when the plant is not brought into the required operating mode within the time allowed in accordance with the plant's Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) Action Statement completion time.

The numbering and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, it continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO and 10 CFR SO.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.S.6 EAL SUS This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to ensure an EAL is declared when the plant has indications of RCS leakage. By design, this EAL is redundant with corresponding indicators from a loss or potential loss of fission product barriers, as well as radiation monitoring, to ensure reactor and/or fission product barrier events are recognized regardless of the particular EAL table a licensee may be referring to. EAL escalation is bounded by fission product barrier indicators and EALs RA1, RS1, and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, are consistent with the plant specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic

- 17 EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO and 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.S.7 EAL SU4 This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to ensure an EAL is declared when the plant has indications of fuel clad degradation. By design, this EAL is redundant with corresponding indicators from a loss or potential loss of fission product barriers, as well as radiation monitoring, to ensure reactor and/or fission product barrier events are recognized regardless of the particular EAL table a licensee may be referring to. EAL escalation is bounded by fission product barrier indicators and EALs RA 1, RS1, and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, are consistent with the plant specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO and 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.S.8 EAL SU6 This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to highlight the importance of emergency communications by ensuring an EAL is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or for offsite response organizations including the NRC, are lost. No escalation path is necessary for this event progression.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, are consistent with the plant specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The communication methods derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO and 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

- 18 3.6 Category 'F' - Fission Product Barrier Matrix This category is unique in the overall EAL scheme, as the thresholds are not intended to be stand-alone indicators of a particular event occurring at the plant. Rather, they are to be used as triggers within the particular logic configuration needed to reflect a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier. U.S. nuclear power plants have three fission product barriers: fuel cladding, the RCS, and the primary containment. Licensees are to develop thresholds that provide EAL decision-makers input into making an event declaration based upon degradation of one or more of these fission product barriers.

While there are only four EALs within this set (FG1/FS1/FA1/FU1), there are numerous triggers used as logic inputs to decide on the appropriate classification based upon the number of loss and/or potential loss indicators that are triggered for each barrier. By design, these indicators are redundant with other similar indicators in the Category 'R' and Category'S' EAL sets, due to the importance for licensees to be able to recognize reactor and/or fission product barrier events as timely as possible using the best available indicators from several different perspectives.

The NRC staff verified that the logic used to determine the appropriate emergency classification is consistent with the generic EAL scheme development guidance.

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The licensee chose to modify this EAL category by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, are consistent with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The plant-specific implementation method for this EAL category is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and, while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, is acceptable for implementation.

3.7 Summary The NRC staff has reviewed the technical bases for the proposed EAL scheme, the modifications from NEI 99-01 Revision 5, and the licensee's evaluation of the proposed changes. The licensee chose to modify its EAL scheme from the generic EAL scheme development guidance provided in NEI 99-01 Revision 5 in order to adopt a format that is better aligned with how it currently implements its EALs, as well as with plant-specific writer's guides and preferences. The NRC staff determined that these modifications do not alter the intent of any specific EAL within an EAL set, EAL category, or within the entire EAL scheme as stated in NEI 99-01 Revision 5.

- 19 Based on its review, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed EAL scheme uses objective and observable values, is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, follows logical progressions for escalating events, and allows for event downgrading and upgrading based upon the potential risk to the public health and safety. Risk assessments were appropriately used to set the boundaries of the emergency classification levels and ensure that all EALs that trigger an emergency classification are in the same range of relative risk. In addition, the NRC staff found that the proposed EAL scheme was technically complete and consistent with EAL schemes implemented at similarly designed plants.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Iowa State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

S This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no Significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (76 FR 70774). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),

no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed changes meet the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b).

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed EAL scheme, as stated in Enclosure 3 of the licensee's letter dated April 5,2012 (Reference 14), provides reasonable assurance that the licensee can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency.

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

- 20

7.0 REFERENCES

1.

Generic letter 79-50 dated October 10, 1979 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031320278).

2.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, November 1980 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040420012).

3.

Nuclear Management and Resources Council/National Environmental Studies Project (NUMARC/NESP) - 007, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,"

Revision 2, dated January 1992 (ADAMS Accession No. ML041120174).

4.

NEI 99-01 Revision 4, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,"

dated January 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML041470143).

5.

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Revision 5, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," February 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080450149).

6.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors," Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 3, dated August 1992 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003740302), and Revision 4, dated July 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032020276).

7.

Miller, C. G., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Letter to Alan Nelson, Nuclear Energy Institute, "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review and Endorsement of NEI-99-01, Revision 5, dated February 2008," dated February 22, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080430535).

8.

Emergency Action Level Frequently Asked Question 2009-48, (ADAMS Accession No. ML100710728).

9.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Issue Summary 2003-18, with Supplements 1 and 2, "Use of NEI-99-01, 'Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,' dated January 2003," dated October 8,2003 (ADAMS Accession Nos.

ML032580518, ML041550395, and ML051450482).

10. NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security Based Events," dated July 18,2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML051740058).

11. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12, "Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance 'Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action',"

(ADAMS Accession No. ML072670421).

12. Letter from NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC., to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Proposed Changes to the Emergency Plan," dated May 31,2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11154A069).

21

13. Letter from NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC.. to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Response to Request for Additional Information Re: Amendment to Change Emergency Action Levels," dated March 16. 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12076A236).

14. Letter from NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC.* to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Response to Supplemental Request for Additional Information Re: Amendment to Change Emergency Action Levels," dated AprilS, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML121000327).

15. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors," Regulatory Guide 1.101. Revision 2. dated October 1981 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090440294).

Principal Contributor: D. Johnson. NSIR Date: June 1, 2012

ML12125A315

• via memo OFFICE NRR/LPL3-1/PM NRR/LPL3-1/PM NRR/LPL3-1/LA NSIR/DPR/ORLOB/BC*

OGC NAME TWengert KFeintuch BTuily JAnderson STurk NLO w/comments DATE 5/24/12 5/11/12 5/24/12 04/12/12 5123/12 OFFICE NRR/LPL3-1 BC(A)

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