Text

Initial Exam 2011-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML112650295
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	09/21/2011
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Duke Energy Carolinas
References
	Download: ML112650295 (148)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Drff(RvJINALi Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

I Op Test No.:

Nil-i Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 75% power (MDL), and has been at this power level for 4 days. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

lB KG Pump is DOS for motor replacement.

1NIP-5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, subcooling has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).

Event MaIf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO 2

SMOO1 D C-RD SG ID PORV leak C-SRO 3

XMT I(TS)-SRO SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW CFOO8B 4

NCOO3D C-BOP PORV Leakage C(TS)-SRO 5

EPOO3C C-RD Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO IREOO9 C-BOP C-SRO 6

ISEOOIC M-RO Inadvertent SI Actuation M-BOP M-SRO 7

IPEOO1NB NA Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available 8

KCOO1B C-BOP KC Pump fails to Auto Start C-SRO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (ReVJINAL)

McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

lB KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

INIP-5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, subcooling has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%

starting with Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate

Dilute, of OP/i/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/i /A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

During the power increase, the I D Steam Generator PORV will develop a leak through the seat. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator may address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

After this, a Narrow Range Level transmitter on the IA Steam Generator will fail LOW.

The operator will respond in accordance with OP/i/A/6100/0i0 E,

Annunciator Response for Panel IAD-4, Fl, S/G A LO-LO LEVEL ALERT.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.

Next, a B Train PORV (INC-32B) will fail slightly open.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs), and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection.

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

Following this, Train A Safety Injection will spuriously actuate.

The Reactor will fail to trip automatically and the operator will need to trip the Reactor manually. On the Safety Injection actuation, the 1A2 KC Pump will fail to automatically start, and the operator will need to manually start this pump.

The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to step 10 of EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ev_FlAL)

Upon entry into EP/l/AI5000IES-l.l, the operator will stop NI and ND pumps.

The scenario will terminate in EPI1IAI5000IES-1.l at Step 12 when the operator determines that Safety Injection is NOT required.

Critical Tasks:

E-OA Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear GenerationlATWS.

Safety Significance:

Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist.

This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

SS (PT460011 I 31E13.6)

Terminate SI by closing NI-9110 within 15 minutes of SI actuation.

Safety Significance:

An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves.

PTIOIA/4600/113, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation).

The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains >

500°F.

If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

PROGRAM:

McGuire Operations Training MODULE:

Initial License Operator Training Class 27 TOPIC:

NRC Simulator Exam Scenario Nil-I-I

REFERENCES:

1.

0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. (Rev 168) 2.

0P111A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control. (Rev 110) 3.

0P111A163001001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. (Rev 9) 4.

APIIIAJ5500IOI, Steam Leak. (Rev 17) 5.

Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs).

6.

Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

7.

OP/1/A16100/010 E, Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-4.

8.

Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation.

9.

Technical Specification 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.

10. AP/1/A15500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. (Rev 11)

11. Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs).

12. Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

13. AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection. (Rev 25)

14. AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction. (Rev 14)

15. EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 31)

16. EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. (Rev 23)

Author:

David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review:

Rev. FINAL 1

Scenario Event Description NRCSceriariol Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

I Op Test No.:

Nil-i Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

lB KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

1NIP-5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, subcooling has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).

Event Maif.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO 2

SMOO1D C-RO SG 1D PORV leak C-SRO 3

XMT I(TS)-SRO SG 1A Narrow Range Level fails LOW CFOO8B 4

NCOO3D C-BOP PORV Leakage C(TS)-SRO 5

EPOO3C c-RO Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO IREOO9 C-BOP C-SRO 6

ISEOO1C M-RO Inadvertent SI Actuation M-BOP M-SRO 7

IPEOOIA/B NA Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available 8

KCOO1B C-BOP KC Pump fails to Auto Start C-SRO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days.

The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1 B KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

1 NIP 5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD 2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, subcooling has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/l/A16300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

During the power increase, the 1 D Steam Generator PORV will develop a leak through the seat.

The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV.

The operator may address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

After this, a Narrow Range Level transmitter on the 1A Steam Generator will fail LOW.

The operator will respond in accordance with OP/1/A16100/010 E, Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-4, Fl, S/G A LO-LO LEVEL ALERT.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS)

Instrumentation, 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)

Instrumentation.

Next, a B Train PORV (1NC-32B) will fail slightly open. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/1l, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs), and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection.

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

Following this, Train A Safety Injection will spuriously actuate.

The Reactor will fail to trip automatically and the operator will need to trip the Reactor manually.

On the Safety Injection actuation, the 1A2 KC Pump will fail to automatically start, and the operator will need to manually start this pump.

The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to step 10 of EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination.

Upon entry into EP/1/N5000/ES-1.1, the operator will stop NI and ND pumps.

The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1 at Step 12 when the operator determines that Safety Injection is NOT required.

Scenario Event Description NRCScenariol Critical Tasks:

E-OA Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear GenerationlATWS.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist.

This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

SS (PT460011 131E13.6)

Terminate SI by closing Nl-9110 within 15 minutes of SI actuation.

Safety Significance:

An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase.

Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves.

PT101A146001113, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains > 500°F.

If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

Scenario Event Description NRC Snao1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q

Sim. Setup RodStepOn Q

Reset to Temp I/C T =0 Malfunctions:

158.

LOA KG006, KG Pump I B CS = Remote Value (IC-37, adjusted LD to 75 (PTL) gpm, added 60 of dilution XMT-CLA-OII = o water.)

IPEOOIA, Failure of Auto Rx Trip Train A IPEOOIB, Failure of Auto Rx Trip Train B KCOOIB, Failure of KC Pump 1A2 to start = 0 (Auto)

ANN-ADII-B05 = ON ANN-ADII-C05 = ON ANN-ADII-E05 = ON ANN-ADII-F05 = ON Q

RUN Place Tagoutlo-Stick on:

I NIP-5070 (0-stick)

Reset all SLIMs MCB Annunciator lAD-I, E-l (0-stick)

MCB Annunciator IAD-9, E-2 (0-stick)

MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-5 (0-stick)

Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Setup OAC Q

Freeze.

Q Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Q Fill out the NEOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Scenario Event Description 1kRCScenanol

Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing 1.

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements 2.

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3.

Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/11A16100!003, marked up as follows:

Step 2.3 Initialed.

Step 3.1 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.2 Initialed.

Step 3.3Initialed.

Step 3.3.1 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.3.2 Checkbox Checked. Entry Step: 3.32 Step 3.3.3 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.3.4 Initialed.

Step 3.32.1 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.2 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.3 Initialed. Person Notified: Monty Champion!

Step 3.32.5 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.6.1 Initialed. Person Notified: Ben Smith!

Step 3.32.6.2 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.32.6.3 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.32.7 Initialed.

Step 3.32.7.1 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.7.2 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.7.3 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.7.4 Initialed.

Step 3.32.8 Initialed.

Step 3.32.8.1 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.8.2 Initialed.

Step 3.32.10 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.32.11 NA/Initialed.

4.

Handout a copy of OP/1/A/61 50/009, Boron Concentration Control. (Rev 110), Enclosure 4.4; and OPI1IA16300IOO1A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. (Rev 9) 5.

Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

Q T-0 Begin Familiarization Period Q

At direction of Event I Power Increase examiner Q

At direction of Event 2 SG 1 D PORV Controller Failure examiner (MALF) SMOOID = 100 Ramp = 10 seconds Trigger #1 Scenario Event Description NRCScenariot Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of Event 3 SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW examiner (XMT) CFOO8 = 0 No Ramp Trigger #3 Q

At direction of Event 4 PORV Leakage examiner (MALF) NCOO3D = 5%

No Ramp Trigger #7 (LOA-NC033 (Racked OutI300 seconds delayed).

Trigger #5 Q

At direction of Event 5 Zone I B Lockout causing Runback/Rods Fail to examiner (MALF) EPOO3C move in AUTO (MALF) IREOO9 = 0 (Fail in Auto ONLY)

No Ramp Trigger #9 Q

At direction of Event 6 Inadvertent SI Actuation examiner (MALF) ISEOQIC Trigger #11 Q

Post-SI Event 7 Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available (MALF) IPEOOIA (T0)

NOTE: This malfunction must be removed (MALF) IPEOOI B (T=0) prior to the operator reset of SI.

Q Post-SI Event 8 KC Pump fails to Auto Start (MALF) KCOOIB = 0 (T=0)

Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

I Event#

1 Page 8

of 45 Event

Description:

Power Increase Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%

starting with Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/11A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate

Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance wfth OP/1/A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

Booth Operator Instructions:

NA Indications Available:

NA Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments OP!11A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.32) Increase power to 95% RTP.

RO (Step 3.32.4) IF AT ANY TIME Power Mismatch% (Excore/Thermal Power Mismatch) indicates greater than 4% during power increase, perform the following:

Stop power increase.

Have IAE calibrate each Power Ranage NI Channel to +/-1% Power Mismatch (Nls vs BETP).

WHEN calibration complete, continue power increase.

ROI (Step 3.32.9) WHEN 77-80% RTP, enable, BOP OTDT DCS alarming as follows:

On DCS graphics, select MAINTENANCE MENU.

Select TAVG, DELTA T INPUTS &

ALARM CHECKING graphic.

Select ON for the following:

NCAA 5422 NCAA 5462 NCAA 5502

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario#

I Event#

I Page 9

of 45 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos CRS Expected ActionslBehavior NCAA 5542 OTDELTAT-FAIL (Step 3.32.12) Continue power increase to 95% RTP.

Comments NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 MWe/minute.

OPII 11150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.

BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.).

Total Reactor Makeup Water:

BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys MIU Controller.

BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through I NV-I 75A (BA Blender to VCT Outlet), select CLOSED on INV-171A (BA Blender to VCT Inlet).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

1 Page 10 of 45 Event

Description:

Power Increase Op Test No.:

Time Pos.,

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust rx adjust reactor makeup water M/U Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow.

desired flowrate.

BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:

(Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual.

(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.

BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:

(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.

(Step 3.13.2) Select HUT on INV-137A NOTE: The BOP may do this (NC Filters Otit 3-Way Control).

at any time to lower VCT level.

(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.

(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1 NV-I 37A (NC Filters OtIt 3-Way Control).

BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:

(Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.)

(Step 3.14.2) IF INV-137A (NC Filters Otit 3-Way Control) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO.

BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

1 Page 11 of 45 Event

Description:

Power Increase Pos.

BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.

(Step 3.17) Check INV-175A (BA Blender To VCT Outlet) open.

(Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water To Blender control) open or throttled as required.

(Step 3.19) IF INV-171A(BA Blender To VCT Inlet) in AUTO (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.

(Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter.

Comments BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows:

(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off:

1A Rx M/U Water Pump lB Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:

BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs:

Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated NOTE: INV-171A is NOT in AUTO.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Ni 1-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 12 of 45 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos.

BOP BOP BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior 1NV-175A (BA Blender To VCT Outlet) 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water To Blender Control) 1NV-171A(BA Blender To VCT Inlet)

(Step 3.24) Ensure INV-171A (BA Blender to VCT Inlet) in AUTO.

(Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.)

(Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control adjusted per Step 3.11...

(Step 3.27) Ensure INV-137A (NC Filters OtIt 3-Way Control) in AUTO.

Comments NOTE: The Rx M.U Water Flow Control was NOT adjusted.

BOP (Step 3.31) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up.

BOP (Step 3.32) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.

BOP BOP BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender....

(Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller.

(Step 3.30) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 13 of 45 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pose Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.

OPII 1A163001001 A, TU RBI N E-GENERATOR STARTU PISHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO,_perform the following:

(Step 3.5.1.1) Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve.

(Step 3.5.1.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

(Step 3.5.1.3) Depress LOAD RATE.

(Step 3.5.1.4) Enter desired load NOTE: the RO will select 2 rate in VARIABLE DISPLAY.

MWe/Min loading rate.

(Step_3.5.1.5)_Depress ENTER.

(Step 3.5.1.6) Depress REFERENCE.

(Step 3.5.1.7) Enter desired load in VARIABLE DISPLAY.

(Step_3.5.1.8)_Depress ENTER.

(Step_3.5.1.9)_Depress GO (Step 3.5.1.10) Check load changes at selected rate.

0P111A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Ni 1-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 14 of 45 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos ROI BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 3.32.13) At greater than 85% steam flow from each SIG, ensure the following valves in auto and open:

ICFIO4AB (IA SIG CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass) 1CF1O5AB (lB S/G CF Cntrl VIv Bypass)

ICF1O6AB (1C SIG CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass)

ICF1O7AB (1D SIG CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass)

Comments At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 15 of 45 Event

Description:

SG ID PORV leak During the power increase, the 1D Steam Generator PORV will develop a leak through the seat.

The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator may address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #1 (SMOOI D (100))

Indications Available:

1CF-26AB Red status light LIT, Green status light OFF.

Various OAC alarms (3 associated with open PORV)

NCS Tavci is lowering.

APIIIAJ5500IOI, STEAM LEAK Time Pose CRS RO Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

(Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following:

Excore NIs LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

NC Loop D/Ts LESS THAN 60°F D/T T-Avg AT T-REF.

Comments NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the I D SG PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.

(Step 13)

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry IN PROGRESS.

NOTE: The CRS will likely directthe RO to take the Turbine to HOLD.

NOTE: A Containment Entry is NOT in progress.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Ni 1-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 16 of 45 Event

Description:

SG ID PORV leak Time BOP BOP BOP CRS CRS RO RO Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event

GREATER THAN P-li (1955 PSIG).

Comments (Step 6) Check Pzr level STABLE OR GOING UP.

(Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6.

(Step 8) GO TO Step 12.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

(Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging system.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

RO (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves CLOSED.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

(Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

(Step i3a) Check SM PORVs

CLOSED.

Open.

NOTE: The 1D SG PORV is (Step 13a RNO) IF S/G pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Close affected SIG SM PORV manual loader.

IF SM PORV is still open, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: Closing the Manual Loader will have no effect.

Close SM PORV isolation valve.

NOTE: The 1D SG PORV Isolation Valve will need to be closed.

IF SM PORV isolation valve still open NOTE: The PORV Isolation valve is closed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-I Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 17 of 45 Event

Description:

SG ID PORV leak Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions NORMAL:

Containment temperature Containment pressure Containment humidity Containment floor and equipment sump level.

RO /

(Step 1 3d) Check TD CA pump OFF.

BOP (Step 13.e) Check valves on STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1MC-9)

CLOSED.

CRS (Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2)

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RD STEAM HEADER PRESSURE

for AS Header pressure.

GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.

If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is> 200 psig.

(Step 13.g) Dispatch operator to check NOTE: The CRS may NOT for leaks.

dispatch NEOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the SM PORV opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.

CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:

Check unit status IN MODE I OR 2.

Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria:

the startup.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. If needed, as Station management direct that the startup be continued.

GOP (Step 14) Check UST level STABLE OR GOING UP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 18 of 45 Event

Description:

SG ID PORV leak Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBebavior Comments Size of leak Location of leak Rate of depletion of secondary inventory IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve...

IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak...

Check unit shutdown or load reduction

NOTE: Shutdown/Load REQUIRED.

Reduction will NOT be required.

CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:

Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.

Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.7, STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (SG PORVs)

CRS LCO 3.4.7 Three SG PORV lines shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

2 Page 19 of 45 Event

Description:

SG ID PORV leak Time Pose Expected ActionslBehavior CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME Comments NOTE: After evaluation, the CRS will determine that LCO 3.4.7 is NOT entered.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.41, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1.

entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months pressure or parameter(s)

RCS average to within limit.

temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 20 of 45 Event

Description:

SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW Next, a Narrow Range Level transmitter on the 1A Steam Generator will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with OP/i /N6100/OiO E, Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-4, Fl, S/G A LO-LO LEVEL ALERT.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #3 (XNIT-CFOO8 (0)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, E-8, DCS TROUBLE.

MCB Annunciator 1AD-4,

, SIG A LO-LO LEVL ALERT CRS/

(IA Step 1) IF Channel in Test NOTE: The Channel is NOT in RO Test.

CRSI (IA Step 2) IF loss of feedwater....

NOTE: There is no loss of RO feedwater.

CRS/

(IA Step 3) IF CF Pump speed control NOTE: A loss of CF Pump RO failure...

Speed Control has NOT occurred.

RO (IA Step 4) Control S/G A Levels at program level:

Place ICF-32AB (IA SIG CF Control)

NOTE: The RO will place iCE-or ICF-IO4AB (IA S!G CF Control 32AB in MANUAL.

Bypass) in manual.

Manually control SIG CF valve(s) to restore level.

CRS (SA Step 1) Refer to Tech Specs Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments OPIIIAI6IOOIOIO E, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL IAD-4 F-I, S!G A LO-LO LEVEL ALERT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

3 Page 21 of 45 Event

Description:

SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW Time Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS)

INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCD 3.3.1 The RTS Instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

CRS ACTIONS ACne or more functions with one or more required channels inoperable.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months NOTE: This Action is associated with Function 13 (SG Water Level Low-Low).

78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months Pos.

Expected Actions!Behavior CONDITION E. One channel inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 for the channel(s).

E.1 Place channel in trip.

OR E.2 Be in MODE 3 COMPLETION TIME Immediately TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCD 3.3.2 The ESFAS Instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.

CRS ACTIONS

ADDendix D Orerator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

3 Page 22 of 45 Event

Description:

SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW

Pos, Expected AcionsiBehavior CONDITION A.One or more functions with one or more required channels or trains inoperable.

D. One channel inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 for the channel(s) or trains(s).

D. 1 OR Place channel in trip.

D.2.lBe in MODE 3.

AND D.2.2 Be in Mode 4.

COMPLETION TIME Immediately 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 78 hours 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months Comments NOTE: This Action is associated with Function 6.b (SG Water Level Low-Low).

CRS LCO 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3.

CRS ACTIONS Time TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.33, POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM)

INSTRUMENTATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N11.1 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 23 of 45 Event

Description:

SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW Time

Pos, CONDITION A.One or more functions with one or more required channels inoperable.

B. One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A. 1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.3-1 for the channel(s).

B.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status.

COMPLETION TIME Immediately 30 days NOTE: This Action is associated with Function 12 (Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range)).

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Comments Expected ActionslBehavior Booth Instructor:

Prior to proceeding on to the next event, call as IAE and state that ICF-32AB (IA SIG CF Control) can be returned to AUTO.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 24 of 45 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage Next, a B Train PORV (INC-32B) will fail slightly open.

The operator will enter APIIIAI5500II 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs), and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #5 (NCOO3D (5%))

Indications Available:

INC-32B Red and Green Status lights LIT.

Pzr Relief Line FLOW RED Status light LIT.

MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, F5, 1 NC 1 2 or 3 FLO Detected.

MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, A9, PZR SAFETY DISCHARGE HI TEMP.

BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

Time Pos.

BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the Pzr PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.

AP!1115011, PRESSURIZER PRESSU RE ANOMALIES (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure HAS GONE DOWN.

(Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

CLOSE PORVs.

IF PORV will not close, THEN CLOSE PORV isolation valve.

(Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED.

(Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

Immediate Action Immediate Action Immediate Action NOTE: 1 NC-32B will display dual indication, even after closing the PORV.

Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator AcUon Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 25 of 45 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CLOSE associated PORV inlet drain valve as follows:

IF 1 NC-32B (PZR PORV) failed, THEN CLOSE INC-271 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For I NC-32B).

IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed...

IF 1NC-36B (PZR PORV) failed...

CRS IF Pzr PORV isolation valve is closed for failed Pzr PORV, THEN GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED.

CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check 1 NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol)

CLOSED.

BOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters

ON:

IA lB 1D BOP (Step 9) Check 1C Pzr heaters ON.

(Step 9 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired NOTE: By this time, NC pressure...

System pressure should be recovering.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

4 Page 26 of 45 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage Time P08.

BOP BOP BOP Expected ActioisIBehavior (Step 10) Check PZR PRESS MASTER

IN AUTO.

(Step 11) Check 1NC-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch

SELECTED TO NORMAL.

(Step 12) Check 1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch

SELECTED TO NORMAL.

Comments NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

BOP CRS (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.

(Step 14) Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVs)

CRS LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 AND 3.

CRS ACTIONS

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenano#

1 Event#

4 Page 27 of 45 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION Booth Instructor:

ACTION TIME Operate Trigger #7 (LOA B. One or two B.1 Close 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months PORVs associated NC33 (Racked Out!5 minutes inoperable block valves, delayed).

capable of AND After 5 minutes, as NEO being B.2 Remove 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months report that the breaker for the manually power from Block Valve has been

cycled, associated Racked Out.

block valves.

AND B.3 Restore one 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months PORVto OPERABLE status if two PORVs are inoperable.

CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months pressure or parameter(s)

RCS average to within limit.

temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

CRS CRS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTIONS NOTE: If NC System Pressure drops to < 2216 psig on the failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be entered and exited during the transient.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%.

The operator will implement AP111A15500103, Load Rejection.

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in manual, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #9 (EPOO3, IREOO9)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator lAD-i, D6, DEH TURBINE RUNBACK, alarms.

MCB Annunciator lAD-I, F9, DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT, alarms.

Turbine Generator MWe lowering.

Tavg-Tref deviation with no Auto Rod motion.

MCB Annunciator lAD-il, K3, UNIT 1 LOCKOUT, alarms.

MCB Annunciator lAD-il, L3, GEN BKR A OR B FAULT TRIP, alarms.

1 of 2 Main Generator Breakers is OPEN.

PCB-1l and 12 OPEN.

RO (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto.

Immediate Action NOTE: While the RO will see that the Control Rods are in AUTO, it will also be observed that Rods are NOT moving, and that they are required to move. The RD will inform the CRS of the situation, and the CRS will direct that the RD control the rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg-Tref.

RD (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:

Check Generator TIED TO GRID.

Check Generator output GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior AP111A15500103, LOAD REJECTION Comments OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

5 Page 28 of 45 Event

Description:

Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-I Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 29 of 45 Event

Description:

Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows:

Check control banks MOVING IN AS REQUIRED.

(Step 3 RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following:

Place Control Rods in manual.

Insert rods to reduce T-avg equal to programmed T-Ref.

If no rods will move, THEN Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

(Step 4) Check CM system response as follows:

Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps RUNNING.

1CM-420 (Unit I Generator Load Rejection Bypass control)

OPEN.

(Step 5) IF 50% runback, THEN ensure turbine impulse pressure going down to less than 410 PSIG.

(Step 6) Announce: UNIT I LOAD REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG.

(Step 7) Check P/R meters LESS THAN 20%.

Time Pos.

RO Comments RO NOTE: The Control Rods will NOT be moving in as required.

RO NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.

BOP CRS /

(Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

RO RO CRS RO NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

I Event #

5 Page 30 of 45 Event

Description:

Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Pos.

CRS RO BOP Expected ActionslBehavior Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to stabilize reactor power.

GO TO Step 9.

(Step 9) Check condenser dump valves

MODULATING OPEN.

(Step 10) Check IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE alarm (lAD-il, J-5)

DARK.

Comments RO (Step 10 RNO) within 15 minutes of lockout initiation, restore 1 PB cooling as follows:

IF MAIN GENERATOR less than NOTE: The Main Generator is 10,000 amps...

NOT < 10,000 amps.

CRS Dispatch operator to check the following NOTE: The CRS will dispatch areas for signs of fire and notify Control an NEO.

Room of results within 5 minutes:

1A Main Step Up Transformer lB Main Step Up Transformer Unit I IPB Fan Enclosure area.

CRS Record approximate time lockout occurred.

CRS Do not continue until operator has been Booth Instructor:

given sufficient time (approximately 5 Within 3 minutes, as NEO minutes) to complete fire inspection, report that there does NOT appear to be a fire around the transformers or IPB Fan area.

CRS IF operator confirms a fire has occurred...

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will designate the RO to observe this action.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

I Event #

5 Page 31 of 45 Event

Description:

Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time

Pos, Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS IF operator confirms no fire has NOTE: The CRS will dispatch occurred, THEN dispatch operator to an NEC.

perform the following at the Unit 1 IPB ALARM PANEL:

Depress LOCKOUT OVERRIDE on the fan in MAN.

IF IPB fan in MAN cannot be Booth Instructor:

started, THEN depress LOCKOUT Within 3 minutes as NEO OVERRIDE on the fan in AUTO.

report that the Lockout Overide has been pressed, and NEITHER IPB Fan is running.

CRS IF neither IPB fan can be started, THEN NOTE: The CRS will transition GO TO Enclosure 1 (Load Reduction to Enclosure 1.

Following Loss of IPB Cooling).

AP111A15500103, LOAD REJECTION ENCLOSURE I, LOAD REDUCTION FOLLOWING LOSS OF IPB COOLING Check MW LOOP IN SERVICE.

BOP (Step 1) Reduce Generator output less than NOTE: The BOP will need to 10,000 amps within 15 minutes of lockout as take this action since the RO follows:

will need to operate the Control Rods in MANUAL.

BOP (Step Ia RNO) Depress MW IN/OUT pushbutton.

Determine load reduction rate based NOTE: The load reduction rate on time since lockout occurred PER will be 70MWe/minute.

the following table:

Initiate turbine load reduction to approximately 350 MW.

Maintain power factor 0.9 to 1.0 lagging during load reduction.

WHEN Generator output amps are less than 10,000 amps, THEN stop load reduction.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 32 of 45 Event

Description:

Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time Pos.

Expected Actionslsehavior Comments CRS (Step 2) GO TO Step I I in body of this procedure.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 33 of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available!

KG Pump fails to Auto Start Following this, Train A Safety Injection will spuriously actuate.

The Reactor will fail to trip automatically and the operator will need to trip the Reactor manually. On the Safety Injection actuation, the 1A2 KC Pump will fail to automatically start, and the operator will need to manually start this pump.

The operator will enter EP/l/AI5000IE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to step 10 of EPII/A15000/ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination.

Upon entry into EPII/AI5000IES-1.1, the operator will stop NI and ND pumps. The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 at Step 12 when the operator determines that Safety Injection is NOT required.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #11 (ISEOOI C)

Indications Available:

Train A Safety Injection actuates.

Reactor does not trip.

1A2 KC Pump does NOT start as recwired on SI actuation.

Time Pos..

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Examiner NOTE:

Mark Time of Train A SI Actuation (To the Minute):

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

NOTE: Reactor does not trip on SI Actuation as required, and will need to manually tripped.

All rod bottom lights LIT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 34 of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available/

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos RO CRITICAL TASK:

(E-OA)

Expected ActionslBehavior Reactor trip and bypass breakers

OPEN hR amps GOING DOWN.

(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip the reactor.

IF reactor will not trip...

Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Generation/ATWS.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist. This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

All throttle valves CLOSED.

BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB

ENERGIZED.

RO /

(Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

BOP BOP (Step 5 RNO) Initiate SII.

NOTE: Train B of SI must be manually initiated.

SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1SI-18)

LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14)

LIT.

Comments NOTE: The Reactor will trip manually.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available!

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos CRS Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection.

Comments NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Booth Operator Instructions: Remove Malfunction ISEOOIC at Step 6 of E-O RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (ISI-4)

- LIT BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights

DARK.

BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Group3LIT CRS GO TO Step Booth Operator: As IAE, Call Control Room and report that the Train A SI Actuation was caused inadvertently during maintenance.

RO /

(Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

BOP Groups 1,2,5DARK.

OAC-lN SERVICE.

Group 4, Rows A through F LIT AS REQUIRED.

MDCApumpsON.

N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 36 of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available!

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Pos.

BOP BOP CRS BOP CRS Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 11) Check all KC pumps ON.

(Step 11 RNO) Perform the following:

Start pumps.

IF all KC Pumps running, THEN GO TO Step 12.

(Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.

(Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.

Comments NOTE: The 1A2 KC Pump has failed to start automatically.

NOTE: The BOP will manually start the 1A2 KC.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is running.

BOP (Step 16b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:

RO BOP BOP (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures

GREATER THAN 775 psig.

(Step 15) Check Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

(Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressures LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

NOTE: Containment Pressure is 0.15 psig.

NOTE: NV Flow is 320 gpm.

NOTE: NC System pressure is 2250 psig.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

6,7&8 Page 37 of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available!

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos.

CRS CRS RO/

BOP Expected ActionslBehavior IND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

(Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EPI1IAI5000IG-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

(Step 18) Check CA flow:

Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R level between 1 1% (32% ACC) and 50%.

Comments BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

NOTE:

1 NC-32B has previously failed OPEN.

RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

OR IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F IF all NC pumps off, THEN...

NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: All NC Pumps will be ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 38 of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip failsimanual available!

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Op Test No.:

BOP BOP BOP Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 20a RNO) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE Pzr PORV(s).

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE its isolation valve.

CLOSE the following_valve(s):

IF 1NC-32B (PZR PORV) failed, NOTE: INC-271 has been THEN CLOSE I NC-271 (PZR previously CLOSED.

PORV Drn Isol For 1NC-32B).

IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed...

IF 1NC-36B (PZR PORV) failed...

IF PORV isolation valve cannot be NOTE: INC-31B has been closed..,

previously CLOSED.

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed NOTE:

1 NC-32B has been or isolated....

previously CLOSED.

BOP Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.

NOTE: depending on NC System pressure the Spray Valve may be OPEN.

RO (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

(Step 20b RNO) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2100 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE spray valve(s).

IF spray valve(s) cannot be closed...

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

OPEN.

(Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.

NOTE: NC System Subcooling will be 80-90°F.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

I Event#

6, 7 & 8 Page of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available!

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Pose Expected ActionslBehavior All SIG pressure STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs PRESSURIZED.

Comments NOTE: All SG Pressures are 11OOpsig.

BOP (Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact:

NOTE: All EMF instrumentation reads normal.

The following secondary EMFs

NORMAL:

I EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

1EMF-24(S/GA) 1EMF-25 (S/G_B) 1EMF-26(S/GC)

IEMF-27(S/GD)

S/G levels STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

BOP (Step 24) Check if NC System intact:

Check containment EMFs NORMAL:

NOTE: All EMF instrumentation reads normal.

1EMF38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR))

1 EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range))

1EMF-40 (Containment_Iodine)

Check containment pressure LESS NOTE: Containment Pressure THAN 1 PSIG is O.2O psig.

Check containment sump level

NORMAL.

IF offsite power available, THEN check ICE COND LOWER INLET DOORS OPEN alarm (1AD-9, A-5)

DARK.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 40 of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available!

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos ROl BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior Check all Unit 1 6900V buses

ENERGIZED.

(Step 25) Check S/I termination criteria:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Secondary heat sink:

NIR level in at least one SIG

GREATER THAN 11%

OR Total feed flow to S/Gs GREATER THAN 450 gpm.

NC PRESSURE stable or going up.

Pzr level GREATER THAN 11%.

(Step 26) Reset the following:

SIl Comments BOP (Step 28) Check NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 29) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:

Check NV pumps miniflow valves

OPEN:

1NV-150B (NV_Pumps_Recirculation)

INV-151A(NVPumps Recirculation).

Close the following valves:

INI-9A (NC Cold Leg_lnj From NV)

BOP Sequencers.

(Step 27) Stop all but one NV pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available!

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments INI-IOB (NC Cold Leg lnj From Examiner NOTE:

NV).

Mark Time of lNl-9A/1OB Closure (To the Minute):

CRITICAL TASK:

(SS-460011 13/El 3.6)

Terminate SI by closing NI-9110 within 15 minutes of SI actuation.

Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PT/0/N460011 13, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains>

500°F.

If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

BOP (Step 30) Establish charging as follows:

BOP Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

BOP THROTTLE INV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) to maintain 6-10 GPM seal injection flow to each NC pump.

BOP Close I NV-241 (UI Seal Water lnj Flow Control).

BOP Check one of the following valves

OPEN:

INV-13B (NV Supply to A NC Loop NOTE: INV-13B is OPEN.

Isol).

OR 1 NV-I 6A (NV Supply to D NC Loop Isol).

BOP Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray to PZR Isol)

CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available!

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Pos.

BOP CRS BOP Expected ActionslBehavior Open the following valves:

INV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol)

INV-245B (Charging Line cont Outside Isol).

WHEN controlling NV flow in subsequent steps, THEN maintain flow within the following limits while THROTTLING charging and seal injection control valves:

Charging flow LESS THAN 200 GPM.

Seal injection flow to each NC pump 6-10 GPM.

(Step 31) Control charging flow as follows:

Control charging flow as required to maintain Pzr level stable.

Check Pzr level STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 33) Establish VI to containment as follows:

OPEN the following valves:

IVI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside lsol).

lVl-1 GOB (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

IVI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).

BOP (Step 32) Reset the following:

Phase A Isolation Phase B Isolation.

Comments NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available!

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos.

CRS CRS CRS Expected Actions!Behavior Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

(Step 34) Implement EPIIIA/50001F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

(Step 35) WHEN EPIIIAI5000IES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination) is implemented in next step, THEN monitor its Foldout page.

(Step 35) GO TO Step 10 of EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination).

ES-ti, SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION Comments NOTE: The CRS will direct the STA to implement this action.

Floor Instructor: As STA, acknowledge.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-1.1 Step 10.

BOP (Step 11) Check if ND pumps should be stopped:

Check any ND pump ON.

Check running ND pumps suction

ALIGNED TO FWST.

Check both NS pumps OFF.

BOP BOP CRS (Step 10) Check if NI pumps should be stopped:

Check NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.

GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG.

Stop NI pumps.

GOTOStepil Examiner NOTE: After transition to ES-i.1, terminate Exam at Lead Examiner discretion.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event#

6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 45 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available!

KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos.

RO Expected Actions!Behavior Stop ND pumps.

(Step 12) Check S/I flow not required:

Comments BOP NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29%

ACC).

NOTE: NC System Subcooling will be 65-85°F.

NOTE: Pzr Level will be 60-90%.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT I STATUS:

Power Level:

75%

NCS [B]

1136 ppm Pzr[B]:

1139 ppm Xe:

2369.56 pcm Power History:

The Plant 75% power (MOL), for Core Burnup:

250 EFPDs four days.

CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

0P111A16100103 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days.

The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

MCB Annunciators associated with the Main Transformer (lAD-il; B-5, C-5, E-5 and F-5) are LIT, which is expected due to the second set of coolers NOT operating at the present power level.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

I B KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

I NIP-5070, ACCUM TK 1 B PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, subcooling has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

Raise power to 100% starting at Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/N6100/03, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/61 50/009, Boron Concentration Control, has been approved.

The Reactor Group has recommended that a Dilution of 200 gallons be made during initial power increase.

Perform the load increase at 2 MWe/Minute.

Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg.

John Aux Bldg.

Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5

th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

Draft(RRNAL)

Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

Nil-I Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).

Event MaIf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description LOA C-RO High Pressure Heaters Bypass/Overpower CFOO7 C-SRO 2

ENBOI3C C-BOP Power Range Failure C(TS)-SRO 3

KCOIOD C-BOP 1B2 KC Pump trip C(TS)-SRO 4

NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5

IREOO3A C-RO Continuous inward Rod Motion C-SRO 6

IPEOO1AJB M-RO Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG Safety Valve on 1 B fails Open IPEOO2AJB M-BOP DEHOO1 M SRO SMOO4B 7

CAOO5 NA TD CA Overspeed Trip 8

CAOO4AIB NA lA/i B MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

- Draft (Re_F1NAL>

McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the High Pressure Heater Bypass Valve (1 CF-75) will inadvertently open. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm Response Procedure M1L2917, Ui WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS, and the Control Room Expectation Manual, and immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.

After this, Power Range Instrument N42 will drift high.

The operator will enter AP/1 /A15500/1 6, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) nstrumentation.

Next, the 1B2 KG Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KG System Leakage.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.

Subsequently, the 1 B DG will be declared inoperable.

The crew will be directed to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A15500/04, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.

Following this, the Turbine will inadvertently trip, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, one Safety Valve on the lB Steam Generator will lift and fail Open.

The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EP/l/A15000/FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

During the performance of FR-S. 1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor.

On the Reactor trip, the TD CA will trip on overspeed, and the lA/I B MD CA Pump will fail to start automatically.

The operator will be expected to manually start the MD CA Pumps.

After completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition back to E-0, and then to EP/1/A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. After the lB Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, SI Termination.

The scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-l.l.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Re_F1NAL)

Critical Tasks:

FR-S.1 C Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken.

Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits.

A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

E-0 F Establish 450 gpm of CA Flow to the Steam Generators before transition out of FR-S.1, unless the transition is made to EPIIIAI5000IFR-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions.

Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators.

Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

PROGRAM:

McGuire Operations Training MODULE:

Initial License Operator Training Class 27 TOPIC:

NRC Simulator Exam Scenario Nil-I -2

REFERENCES:

1.

OAC Alarm Response Procedure M1L2917, UI WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS.

2.

Control Room Crew Expectations Manual.

3.

AP111A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation. (Rev 12) 4.

Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

5.

AP111A15500121, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. (Rev 9) 6.

Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.

7.

AP/11A15500104, Rapid Downpower. (Rev 21) 8.

AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction. (Rev 14) 9.

EPI1IAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 31)

10. EPI1IAI5000IFR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. (Rev 12)

II. EP/I/A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. (Rev 9)

12. EPI1/AI5000IES-1.1, SI Termination. (Rev 23)

Author:

David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review:

Rev. FINAL 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenallo 2 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

2 op Test No.:

Nil-i Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).

Event MaIf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

LOA C-RO High Pressure Heaters Bypass/Overpower CFOO7 C-SRO 2

ENBO13C C-BOP Power Range Failure C(TS)-SRO 3

KCO1 OD C-BOP 1 B2 KC Pump trip C(TS)-SRO 4

NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5

IREOO3A C-RO Continuous inward Rod Motion C-SRO 6

IPEOO1AIB M-RO Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG Safety Valve on 1 B fails Open IPEOO2AIB M-BOP DEHOO1 M-SRO SMOO4B 7

CAOO5 NA TD CA Overspeed Trip 8

CAOO4A/B NA lA/lB MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)om ponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRCSnriO 2 McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the High Pressure Heater Bypass Valve (1CF-75) will inadvertently open.

The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm Response Procedure M1L2917, Ui WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS, and the Control Room Expectation Manual, and immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.

After this, Power Range Instrument N42 will drift high. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Next, the 1B2 KC Pump will trip.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.

Subsequently, the lB DG will be declared inoperable. The crew will be directed to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.

Following this, the Turbine will inadvertently trip, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, one Safety Valve on the 1 B Steam Generator will lift and fail Open.

The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EP/i/A15000/FR-S.1,

Response

to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

During the performance of FR-S. 1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor.

On the Reactor trip, the TD CA will trip on overspeed, and the 1AI1B MD CA Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be expected to manually start the MD CA Pumps.

After completion of FR-S. 1, the operator will transition back to E-0, and then to EP/1 /A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. After the 1 B Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, SI Termination.

The scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-i.1.

Scenario Event Description NRC scenario 2 Critical Tasks: