ML112650295
| ML112650295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/2011 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| Download: ML112650295 (148) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Drff(RvJINALi Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: I Op Test No.: Nil-i Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (MDL), and has been at this power level for 4 days. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: lB KG Pump is DOS for motor replacement. 1NIP-5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, subcooling has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO 2 SMOO1 D C-RD SG ID PORV leak C-SRO XMT 3 I(TS)-SRO SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW CFOO8B 4 NCOO3D C-BOP PORV Leakage C(TS)-SRO 5 EPOO3C C-RD Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO IREOO9 C-BOP C-SRO 6 ISEOOIC M-RO Inadvertent SI Actuation M-BOP M-SRO 7 IPEOO1NB NA Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available 8 KCOO1B C-BOP KC Pump fails to Auto Start C-SRO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (ReVJINAL)
McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: lB KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement. INIP-5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, subcooling has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%
starting with Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/i/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/i /A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.
During the power increase, the I D Steam Generator PORV will develop a leak through the seat. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator may address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.
After this, a Narrow Range Level transmitter on the IA Steam Generator will fail LOW.
The operator will respond in accordance with OP/i/A/6100/0i0 E, Annunciator Response for Panel IAD-4, Fl, S/G A LO-LO LEVEL ALERT. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.
Next, a B Train PORV (INC-32B) will fail slightly open. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs), and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.
Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection. During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.
Following this, Train A Safety Injection will spuriously actuate. The Reactor will fail to trip automatically and the operator will need to trip the Reactor manually. On the Safety Injection actuation, the 1A2 KC Pump will fail to automatically start, and the operator will need to manually start this pump. The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to step 10 of EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
- ev_FlAL)
Upon entry into EP/l/AI5000IES-l.l, the operator will stop NI and ND pumps.
The scenario will terminate in EPI1IAI5000IES-1.l at Step 12 when the operator determines that Safety Injection is NOT required.
Critical Tasks:
E-OA Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear GenerationlATWS.
Safety Significance: Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist. This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.
SS (PT460011 I 31E13.6)
Terminate SI by closing NI-9110 within 15 minutes of SI actuation.
Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PTIOIA/4600/113, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains >
500°F. If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 27 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario Nil-I-I
REFERENCES:
- 1. 0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. (Rev 168)
- 2. 0P111A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control. (Rev 110)
- 3. 0P111A163001001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. (Rev 9)
- 4. APIIIAJ5500IOI, Steam Leak. (Rev 17)
- 5. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs).
- 6. Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.
- 7. OP/1/A16100/010 E, Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-4.
- 8. Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
Instrumentation.
- 9. Technical Specification 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.
- 10. AP/1/A15500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. (Rev 11)
- 11. Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs).
- 12. Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.
- 13. AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection. (Rev 25)
- 14. AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction. (Rev 14)
- 15. EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 31)
- 16. EP/1/A15000/ES-1 .1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. (Rev 23)
Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.
Facility Review:
Rev. FINAL 1
Scenario Event Description NRCSceriariol Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: I Op Test No.: Nil-i Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: lB KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1NIP-5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, subcooling has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).
Event Maif. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO 2 SMOO1D C-RO SG 1D PORV leak C-SRO XMT 3 I(TS)-SRO SG 1A Narrow Range Level fails LOW CFOO8B 4 NCOO3D C-BOP PORV Leakage C(TS)-SRO 5 EPOO3C c-RO Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO IREOO9 C-BOP C-SRO 6 ISEOO1C M-RO Inadvertent SI Actuation M-BOP M-SRO 7 IPEOOIA/B NA Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available 8 KCOO1B C-BOP KC Pump fails to Auto Start C-SRO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1 B KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1 NIP 5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD 2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, subcooling has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/l/A16300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.
During the power increase, the 1 D Steam Generator PORV will develop a leak through the seat.
The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator may address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.
After this, a Narrow Range Level transmitter on the 1A Steam Generator will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with OP/1/A16100/010 E, Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-4, Fl, S/G A LO-LO LEVEL ALERT. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)
Instrumentation.
Next, a B Train PORV (1NC-32B) will fail slightly open. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/1l, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs), and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.
Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection. During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.
Following this, Train A Safety Injection will spuriously actuate. The Reactor will fail to trip automatically and the operator will need to trip the Reactor manually. On the Safety Injection actuation, the 1A2 KC Pump will fail to automatically start, and the operator will need to manually start this pump. The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to step 10 of EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination.
Upon entry into EP/1/N5000/ES-1.1, the operator will stop NI and ND pumps.
The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A15000/ES-1 .1 at Step 12 when the operator determines that Safety Injection is NOT required.
Scenario Event Description NRCScenariol Critical Tasks:
E-OA Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear GenerationlATWS.
Safety Significance: Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist. This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.
SS (PT460011 131E13.6)
Terminate SI by closing Nl-9110 within 15 minutes of SI actuation.
Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PT101A146001113, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains > 500°F. If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.
Scenario Event Description NRC Snao1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Sim. Setup RodStepOn Q Reset to Temp I/C T =0 Malfunctions:
158.
LOA KG006, KG Pump I B CS = Remote Value (IC-37, adjusted LD to 75 (PTL) gpm, added 60 of dilution XMT-CLA-OII = o water.) IPEOOIA, Failure of Auto Rx Trip Train A IPEOOIB, Failure of Auto Rx Trip Train B KCOOIB, Failure of KC Pump 1A2 to start = 0 (Auto)
ANN-ADII-B05 = ON ANN-ADII-C05 = ON ANN-ADII-E05 = ON ANN-ADII-F05 = ON Q RUN Place Tagoutlo-Stick on:
I NIP-5070 (0-stick)
Reset all SLIMs MCB Annunciator lAD-I, E-l (0-stick)
MCB Annunciator IAD-9, E-2 (0-stick)
MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-5 (0-stick)
Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.
Setup OAC Q Freeze.
Q Update Fresh Tech.
Spec. Log.
Q Fill out the NEOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.
Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Scenario Event Description 1kRCScenanol Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
- 3. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/11A16100!003, marked up as follows:
- Step 2.3 Initialed.
- Step 3.1 Checkbox Checked.
- Step 3.2 Initialed.
- Step 3.3Initialed.
- Step 3.3.1 Checkbox Checked.
- Step 3.3.2 Checkbox Checked. Entry Step: 3.32
- Step 3.3.3 Checkbox Checked.
- Step 3.3.4 Initialed.
- Step 3.32.1 Checkbox Checked.
- Step 3.32.2 Checkbox Checked.
- Step 3.32.3 Initialed. Person Notified: Monty Champion!
- Step 3.32.5 Checkbox Checked.
- Step 3.32.6.1 Initialed. Person Notified: Ben Smith!
- Step 3.32.6.2 NA/Initialed.
- Step 3.32.6.3 NA/Initialed.
- Step 3.32.7 Initialed.
- Step 3.32.7.1 Checkbox Checked.
- Step 3.32.7.2 Checkbox Checked.
- Step 3.32.7.3 Checkbox Checked.
- Step 3.32.7.4 Initialed.
- Step 3.32.8 Initialed.
- Step 3.32.8.1 Checkbox Checked.
- Step 3.32.8.2 Initialed.
- Step 3.32.10 NA/Initialed.
- Step 3.32.11 NA/Initialed.
- 4. Handout a copy of OP/1/A/61 50/009, Boron Concentration Control. (Rev 110), Enclosure 4.4; and OPI1IA16300IOO1A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. (Rev 9)
- 5. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
Q T-0 Begin Familiarization Period Q At direction of Event I Power Increase examiner Q At direction of Event 2 SG 1 D PORV Controller Failure examiner (MALF) SMOOID = 100 Ramp = 10 seconds Trigger #1 Scenario Event Description NRCScenariot Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of Event 3 SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW examiner (XMT) CFOO8 = 0 No Ramp Trigger #3 Q At direction of Event 4 PORV Leakage examiner (MALF) NCOO3D = 5%
No Ramp Trigger #7 (LOA-NC033 (Racked OutI300
. seconds delayed).
Trigger #5 Q At direction of Event 5 Zone I B Lockout causing Runback/Rods Fail to examiner move in AUTO (MALF) EPOO3C (MALF) IREOO9 = 0 (Fail in Auto ONLY)
No Ramp Trigger #9 Q At direction of Event 6 Inadvertent SI Actuation examiner (MALF) ISEOQIC Trigger #11 Q Post-SI Event 7 Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available (MALF) IPEOOIA (T0) NOTE: This malfunction must be removed (MALF) IPEOOI B (T=0) prior to the operator reset of SI.
Q Post-SI Event 8 KC Pump fails to Auto Start (MALF) KCOOIB = 0 (T=0)
Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# I Event# 1 Page 8 of 45 Event
Description:
Power Increase Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%
starting with Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/11A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance wfth OP/1/A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments OP!11A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.32) Increase power to 95% RTP.
RO (Step 3.32.4) IF AT ANY TIME Power Mismatch% (Excore/Thermal Power Mismatch) indicates greater than 4% during power increase, perform the following:
. Stop power increase.
. Have IAE calibrate each Power Ranage NI Channel to +/-1% Power Mismatch (Nls vs BETP).
. WHEN calibration complete, continue power increase.
ROI (Step 3.32.9) WHEN 77-80% RTP, enable, OTDT DCS alarming as follows:
. On DCS graphics, select MAINTENANCE MENU.
. Select TAVG, DELTA T INPUTS &
ALARM CHECKING graphic.
. Select ON for the following:
. NCAA 5422
- NCAA 5462
. NCAA 5502
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# I Event# I Page 9 of 45 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. NCAA 5542
. OTDELTAT-FAIL CRS (Step 3.32.12) Continue power increase to NOTE: The power increase 95% RTP. will be at 2 MWe/minute.
OPII 11150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.
BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.).
. Total Reactor Makeup Water:
BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)
. Total Make Up Flow Counter
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys MIU Controller.
BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through I NV-I 75A (BA Blender to VCT Outlet), select CLOSED on INV-171A (BA Blender to VCT Inlet).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 1 Event# 1 Page 10 of 45 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pos., Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust rx adjust reactor makeup water M/U Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow.
desired flowrate.
BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:
(Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual.
(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.
BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:
(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.
(Step 3.13.2) Select HUT on INV-137A NOTE: The BOP may do this (NC Filters Otit 3-Way Control). at any time to lower VCT level.
(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.
(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1 NV-I 37A (NC Filters OtIt 3-Way Control).
BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:
(Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.)
(Step 3.14.2) IF INV-137A (NC Filters Otit 3-Way Control) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 1 Event# 1 Page 11 of 45 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.
BOP (Step 3.17) Check INV-175A (BA Blender To VCT Outlet) open.
BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water To Blender control) open or throttled as required.
BOP (Step 3.19) IF INV-171A(BA Blender To NOTE: INV-171A is NOT in VCT Inlet) in AUTO AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.
BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter.
BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs:
. Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR
. Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows:
(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off:
- 1A Rx M/U Water Pump
. lB Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni 1-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 45 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1NV-175A (BA Blender To VCT Outlet)
. 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water To Blender Control)
. 1NV-171A(BA Blender To VCT Inlet)
BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure INV-171A (BA Blender to VCT Inlet) in AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control NOTE: The Rx M.U Water adjusted per Step 3.11... Flow Control was NOT adjusted.
BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure INV-137A (NC Filters OtIt 3-Way Control) in AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender.... NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.
BOP (Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller.
BOP (Step 3.30) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)
. Total Make Up Flow Counter
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.31) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up.
BOP (Step 3.32) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 13 of 45 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pose Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.
OPII 1A163001001 A, TU RBI N E-GENERATOR STARTU PISHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO,_perform the following:
(Step 3.5.1.1) Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve.
(Step 3.5.1.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.
(Step 3.5.1.3) Depress LOAD RATE.
(Step 3.5.1.4) Enter desired load NOTE: the RO will select 2 rate in VARIABLE DISPLAY. MWe/Min loading rate.
(Step_3.5.1.5)_Depress ENTER.
(Step 3.5.1.6) Depress REFERENCE.
(Step 3.5.1.7) Enter desired load in VARIABLE DISPLAY.
(Step_3.5.1.8)_Depress ENTER.
(Step_3.5.1.9)_Depress GO (Step 3.5.1.10) Check load changes at selected rate.
0P111A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni 1-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 14 of 45 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments ROI (Step 3.32.13) At greater than 85% steam flow from each SIG, ensure the following BOP valves in auto and open:
. ICFIO4AB (IA SIG CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass)
. 1CF1O5AB (lB S/G CF Cntrl VIv Bypass)
. ICF1O6AB (1C SIG CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass)
. ICF1O7AB (1D SIG CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass)
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 15 of 45 Event
Description:
SG ID PORV leak During the power increase, the 1D Steam Generator PORV will develop a leak through the seat. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator may address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #1 (SMOOI D (100))
Indications Available:
. 1CF-26AB Red status light LIT, Green status light OFF.
. Various OAC alarms (3 associated with open PORV)
. NCS Tavci is lowering.
Time Pose Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the I D SG PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.
(Step 13)
APIIIAJ5500IOI, STEAM LEAK NOTE: The CRS will likely directthe RO to take the Turbine to HOLD.
CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following:
. Excore NIs LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.
. NC Loop D/Ts LESS THAN 60°F D/T
. T-Avg AT T-REF.
CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry IN NOTE: A Containment Entry is PROGRESS. NOT in progress.
CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni 1-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 16 of 45 Event
Description:
SG ID PORV leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event GREATER THAN P-li (1955 PSIG).
BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level STABLE OR GOING UP.
BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6. both board operators aware.
CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12.
CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:
. (Step i3a) Check SM PORVs NOTE: The 1D SG PORV is CLOSED. Open.
RO (Step 13a RNO) IF S/G pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following:
- IF SM PORV is still open, THEN perform NOTE: The 1D SG PORV the following: Isolation Valve will need to be closed.
RO * (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves CLOSED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-I Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 17 of 45 Event
Description:
SG ID PORV leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP * (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions NORMAL:
. Containment temperature
- Containment pressure
- Containment humidity
. Containment floor and equipment sump level.
RO / * (Step 1 3d) Check TD CA pump OFF.
. (Step 13.e) Check valves on STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1MC-9)
CLOSED.
CRS * (Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RD STEAM HEADER PRESSURE for AS Header pressure.
GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.
If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is> 200 psig.
- (Step 13.g) Dispatch operator to check NOTE: The CRS may NOT for leaks. dispatch NEOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the SM PORV opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.
GOP (Step 14) Check UST level STABLE OR GOING UP.
CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:
- Check unit status IN MODE I OR 2.
- Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria: the startup.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. If needed, as Station management direct that the startup be continued.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 18 of 45 Event
Description:
SG ID PORV leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBebavior Comments
. Size of leak
. Location of leak
. Rate of depletion of secondary inventory
. IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve...
. IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak...
. Check unit shutdown or load reduction NOTE: Shutdown/Load REQUIRED. Reduction will NOT be required.
CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:
. Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.
. Exit this procedure.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.7, STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (SG PORVs)
CRS LCO 3.4.7 Three SG PORV lines shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.
CRS ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 1 Event# 2 Page 19 of 45 Event
Description:
SG ID PORV leak Time Pose Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: After evaluation, the ACTION TIME CRS will determine that LCO 3.4.7 is NOT entered.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.41, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1. entered and exited during the transient.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> pressure or parameter(s)
RCS average to within limit.
temperature DNB parameters not within limits.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 20 of 45 Event
Description:
SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW Next, a Narrow Range Level transmitter on the 1A Steam Generator will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with OP/i /N6100/OiO E, Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-4, Fl, S/G A LO-LO LEVEL ALERT. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (XNIT-CFOO8 (0)
Indications Available:
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, E-8, DCS TROUBLE.
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-4, , SIG A LO-LO LEVL ALERT Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments OPIIIAI6IOOIOIO E, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL IAD-4 F-I, S!G A LO-LO LEVEL ALERT CRS/ (IA Step 1) IF Channel in Test NOTE: The Channel is NOT in RO Test.
CRSI (IA Step 2) IF loss of feedwater.... NOTE: There is no loss of RO feedwater.
CRS/ (IA Step 3) IF CF Pump speed control NOTE: A loss of CF Pump RO failure... Speed Control has NOT occurred.
RO (IA Step 4) Control S/G A Levels at program level:
. Place ICF-32AB (IA SIG CF Control) NOTE: The RO will place iCE-or ICF-IO4AB (IA S!G CF Control 32AB in MANUAL.
Bypass) in manual.
- Manually control SIG CF valve(s) to restore level.
CRS (SA Step 1) Refer to Tech Specs
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 1 Event# 3 Page 21 of 45 Event
Description:
SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS)
INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCD 3.3.1 The RTS Instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME ACne or more A.1 Enter the Immediately functions with Condition one or more referenced in required Table 3.3.1-1 for channels the channel(s).
E. One channel E.1 Place channel 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> NOTE: This Action is inoperable. in trip.
associated with Function 13 OR 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> (SG Water Level Low-Low).
E.2 Be in MODE 3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCD 3.3.2 The ESFAS Instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.
CRS ACTIONS
ADDendix D Orerator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 1 Event# 3 Page 22 of 45 Event
Description:
SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW Time Pos, Expected AcionsiBehavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A.One or more A.1 Enter the Immediately functions with Condition one or more referenced in required Table 3.3.1-1 for channels or the channel(s) or trains trains(s).
D. One channel D. 1 Place 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> NOTE: This Action is inoperable. channel in trip.
associated with Function 6.b (SG Water Level Low-Low).
OR D.2.lBe in MODE 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> 3.
AND 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> D.2.2 Be in Mode 4.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.33, POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM)
INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3.
CRS ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N11.1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 23 of 45 Event
Description:
SG IA Narrow Range Level fails LOW Time Pos, Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A.One or more A. 1 Enter the Immediately functions with Condition one or more referenced in required Table 3.3.3-1 channels for the inoperable. channel(s).
B. One or more B.1 Restore 30 days NOTE: This Action is Functions required with one channel to associated with Function 12 required OPERABLE ( Steam Generator Water Level channel status. (Narrow Range)).
NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve position.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
Booth Instructor:
Prior to proceeding on to the next event, call as IAE and state that ICF-32AB (IA SIG CF Control) can be returned to AUTO.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 24 of 45 Event
Description:
PORV Leakage Next, a B Train PORV (INC-32B) will fail slightly open. The operator will enter APIIIAI5500II 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs), and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (NCOO3D (5%))
Indications Available:
. INC-32B Red and Green Status lights LIT.
. Pzr Relief Line FLOW RED Status light LIT.
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, F5, 1 NC 1 2 or 3 FLO Detected.
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, A9, PZR SAFETY DISCHARGE HI TEMP.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the Pzr PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.
AP!1 115011, PRESSURIZER PRESSU RE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure HAS GONE Immediate Action DOWN.
BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED. Immediate Action BOP (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action
. CLOSE PORVs. NOTE: 1 NC-32B will display dual indication, even after closing the PORV.
. IF PORV will not close, THEN CLOSE PORV isolation valve.
BOP (Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED. Immediate Action BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.
BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:
Appendix D Operator AcUon Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 25 of 45 Event
Description:
PORV Leakage Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. CLOSE associated PORV inlet drain valve as follows:
. IF 1 NC-32B (PZR PORV) failed, THEN CLOSE INC-271 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For I NC-32B).
. IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed...
. IF 1NC-36B (PZR PORV) failed...
BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED.
CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
BOP (Step 7) Check 1 NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol) CLOSED.
BOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters ON:
- lB
- 1D BOP (Step 9) Check 1C Pzr heaters ON.
(Step 9 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired NOTE: By this time, NC pressure... System pressure should be recovering.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 1 Event# 4 Page 26 of 45 Event
Description:
PORV Leakage Time P08. Expected ActioisIBehavior Comments BOP (Step 10) Check PZR PRESS MASTER IN AUTO.
BOP (Step 11) Check 1NC-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch SELECTED TO NORMAL.
BOP (Step 12) Check 1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch SELECTED TO NORMAL.
BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.
CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve position.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVs)
CRS LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 AND 3.
CRS ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenano# 1 Event# 4 Page 27 of 45 Event
Description:
PORV Leakage Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION Booth Instructor:
ACTION TIME B. One or two B.1 Close Operate Trigger #7 (LOA 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> PORVs associated NC33 (Racked Out!5 minutes inoperable block valves, delayed).
capable of AND After 5 minutes, as NEO being B.2 Remove 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> report that the breaker for the manually power from Block Valve has been cycled, associated Racked Out.
block valves.
AND B.3 Restore one 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> PORVto OPERABLE status if two PORVs are inoperable.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1. entered and exited during the transient.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> pressure or parameter(s)
RCS average to within limit.
temperature DNB parameters not within limits.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 28 of 45 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP111A15500103, Load Rejection. During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in manual, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 (EPOO3, IREOO9)
Indications Available:
. MCB Annunciator lAD-i, D6, DEH TURBINE RUNBACK, alarms.
. MCB Annunciator lAD-I, F9, DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT, alarms.
. Turbine Generator MWe lowering.
. Tavg-Tref deviation with no Auto Rod motion.
. MCB Annunciator lAD-il, K3, UNIT 1 LOCKOUT, alarms.
. MCB Annunciator lAD-il, L3, GEN BKR A OR B FAULT TRIP, alarms.
. 1 of 2 Main Generator Breakers is OPEN.
. PCB-1l and 12 OPEN.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP111A15500103, LOAD REJECTION RO (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto. Immediate Action NOTE: While the RO will see that the Control Rods are in AUTO, it will also be observed that Rods are NOT moving, and that they are required to move. The RD will inform the CRS of the situation, and the CRS will direct that the RD control the rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg-Tref.
RD (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:
. Check Generator TIED TO GRID.
. Check Generator output GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-I Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 29 of 45 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows:
. Check control banks MOVING IN AS NOTE: The Control Rods will REQUIRED. NOT be moving in as required.
RO (Step 3 RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following:
. Place Control Rods in manual.
. Insert rods to reduce T-avg equal to programmed T-Ref.
. If no rods will move, THEN NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.
RO . Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.
BOP (Step 4) Check CM system response as follows:
. Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps RUNNING.
. 1CM-420 (Unit I Generator Load Rejection Bypass control) OPEN.
RO (Step 5) IF 50% runback, THEN ensure turbine impulse pressure going down to less than 410 PSIG.
CRS (Step 6) Announce: UNIT I LOAD NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL to make Plant Announcement.
PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
RO (Step 7) Check P/R meters LESS THAN 20%.
CRS / (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # I Event # 5 Page 30 of 45 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.
. IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to Action. The CRS will stabilize reactor power. designate the RO to observe this action.
CRS . GO TO Step 9.
RO (Step 9) Check condenser dump valves MODULATING OPEN.
BOP (Step 10) Check IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE alarm (lAD-il, J-5) DARK.
RO (Step 10 RNO) within 15 minutes of lockout initiation, restore 1 PB cooling as follows:
. IF MAIN GENERATOR less than NOTE: The Main Generator is 10,000 amps... NOT < 10,000 amps.
- Dispatch operator to check the following NOTE: The CRS will dispatch areas for signs of fire and notify Control an NEO.
Room of results within 5 minutes:
. 1A Main Step Up Transformer
. lB Main Step Up Transformer
. Unit I IPB Fan Enclosure area.
- Record approximate time lockout occurred.
- Do not continue until operator has been Booth Instructor:
given sufficient time (approximately 5 Within 3 minutes, as NEO minutes) to complete fire inspection, report that there does NOT appear to be a fire around the transformers or IPB Fan area.
- IF operator confirms a fire has occurred...
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # I Event # 5 Page 31 of 45 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time Pos, Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS
- IF operator confirms no fire has NOTE: The CRS will dispatch occurred, THEN dispatch operator to an NEC.
perform the following at the Unit 1 IPB ALARM PANEL:
. Depress LOCKOUT OVERRIDE on the fan in MAN.
- IF IPB fan in MAN cannot be Booth Instructor:
started, THEN depress LOCKOUT Within 3 minutes as NEO OVERRIDE on the fan in AUTO.
report that the Lockout Overide has been pressed, and NEITHER IPB Fan is running.
- IF neither IPB fan can be started, THEN NOTE: The CRS will transition GO TO Enclosure 1 (Load Reduction to Enclosure 1.
Following Loss of IPB Cooling).
AP111A15500103, LOAD REJECTION ENCLOSURE I, LOAD REDUCTION FOLLOWING LOSS OF IPB COOLING BOP (Step 1) Reduce Generator output less than NOTE: The BOP will need to 10,000 amps within 15 minutes of lockout as take this action since the RO follows: will need to operate the Control Rods in MANUAL.
BOP (Step Ia RNO) Depress MW IN/OUT pushbutton.
- Determine load reduction rate based NOTE: The load reduction rate on time since lockout occurred PER will be 70MWe/minute.
the following table:
- Initiate turbine load reduction to approximately 350 MW.
- Maintain power factor 0.9 to 1.0 lagging during load reduction.
- WHEN Generator output amps are less than 10,000 amps, THEN stop load reduction.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 32 of 45 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actionslsehavior Comments CRS (Step 2) GO TO Step I I in body of this procedure.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 33 of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available!
KG Pump fails to Auto Start Following this, Train A Safety Injection will spuriously actuate. The Reactor will fail to trip automatically and the operator will need to trip the Reactor manually. On the Safety Injection actuation, the 1A2 KC Pump will fail to automatically start, and the operator will need to manually start this pump. The operator will enter EP/l/AI5000IE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to step 10 of EPII/A15000/ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination. Upon entry into EPII/AI5000IES-1.1, the operator will stop NI and ND pumps. The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 at Step 12 when the operator determines that Safety Injection is NOT required.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #11 (ISEOOI C)
Indications Available:
- Train A Safety Injection actuates.
- Reactor does not trip.
- 1A2 KC Pump does NOT start as recwired on SI actuation.
Time Pos.. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Examiner NOTE:
Mark Time of Train A SI Actuation (To the Minute):
NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: NOTE: Reactor does not trip on SI Actuation as required, and will need to manually tripped.
- All rod bottom lights LIT
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 34 of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available/
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers NOTE: The Reactor will trip OPEN manually.
. hR amps GOING DOWN.
RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:
. Trip the reactor.
. IF reactor will not trip...
CRITICAL TASK:
(E-OA)
Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Generation/ATWS.
Safety Significance: Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist. This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.
BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:
. All throttle valves CLOSED.
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB ENERGIZED.
RO / (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:
- SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1SI-18) LIT.
. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) LIT.
BOP (Step 5 RNO) Initiate SII. NOTE: Train B of SI must be manually initiated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available!
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
Booth Operator Instructions: Remove Malfunction ISEOOIC at Step 6 of E-O RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (ISI-4) LIT BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK.
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):
- Groups 1,2,5DARK.
. Group3LIT
- OAC-lN SERVICE.
- Group 4, Rows A through F LIT AS REQUIRED.
- GO TO Step Booth Operator: As IAE, Call Control Room and report that the Train A SI Actuation was caused inadvertently during maintenance.
RO / (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:
- MDCApumpsON.
- N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 36 of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available!
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps ON. NOTE: The 1A2 KC Pump has failed to start automatically.
BOP (Step 11 RNO) Perform the following:
. Start pumps. NOTE: The BOP will manually start the 1A2 KC.
CRS . IF all KC Pumps running, THEN GO TO Step 12.
BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.
CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:
. Start 2A RN pump.
. THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Floor Instructor: As U2 RO for existing plant conditions. report 2A RN Pump is running.
RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures GREATER THAN 775 psig.
BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is 0.15 psig.
BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:
. Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG NOTE: NV Flow is 320 gpm.
FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.
. Check NC pressures LESS THAN NOTE: NC System pressure 1600 PSIG. is 2250 psig.
BOP (Step 16b RNO) Perform the following:
. Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 1 Event# 6,7&8 Page 37 of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available!
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. IND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol)
. 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).
CRS . IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.
CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to perform EPI1IAI5000IG-1 (Generic address.
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.
RO/ (Step 18) Check CA flow:
. Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
. Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.
WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R level between 1 1% (32% ACC) and 50%.
RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:
. IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC NOTE: All NC Pumps will be T-Avg STABLE OR TRENDING TO ON.
557°F OR
. IF all NC pumps off, THEN...
BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:
. All Pzr PORVs CLOSED. NOTE: 1 NC-32B has previously failed OPEN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 38 of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip failsimanual available!
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 20a RNO) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:
. CLOSE Pzr PORV(s).
. IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following:
. CLOSE its isolation valve.
. CLOSE the following_valve(s):
. IF 1NC-32B (PZR PORV) failed, NOTE: INC-271 has been THEN CLOSE I NC-271 (PZR previously CLOSED.
. IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed...
. IF 1NC-36B (PZR PORV) failed...
. IF PORV isolation valve cannot be NOTE: INC-31B has been closed.., previously CLOSED.
. IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed NOTE: 1 NC-32B has been or isolated.... previously CLOSED.
- Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED. NOTE: depending on NC System pressure the Spray Valve may be OPEN.
BOP (Step 20b RNO) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2100 PSIG, THEN perform the following:
- CLOSE spray valve(s).
- IF spray valve(s) cannot be closed...
- At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN.
BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on NOTE: NC System Subcooling core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
will be 80-90°F.
RO (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # I Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available!
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pose Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. All SIG pressure STABLE OR GOING NOTE: All SG Pressures are UP 11OOpsig.
. All S/Gs PRESSURIZED.
BOP (Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact: NOTE: All EMF instrumentation reads normal.
. The following secondary EMFs NORMAL:
. I EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust)
. 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))
. 1EMF-24(S/GA)
. 1EMF-25 (S/G_B)
. 1EMF-26(S/GC)
. IEMF-27(S/GD)
. S/G levels STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.
BOP (Step 24) Check if NC System intact:
. Check containment EMFs NORMAL: NOTE: All EMF instrumentation reads normal.
. 1EMF38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR))
. 1 EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range))
. 1EMF-40 (Containment_Iodine)
- Check containment pressure LESS NOTE: Containment Pressure THAN 1 PSIG is O.2O psig.
- Check containment sump level NORMAL.
. IF offsite power available, THEN check ICE COND LOWER INLET DOORS OPEN alarm (1AD-9, A-5) DARK.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 40 of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available!
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
- Check all Unit 1 6900V buses ENERGIZED.
ROl (Step 25) Check S/I termination criteria:
. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
. Secondary heat sink:
. NIR level in at least one SIG GREATER THAN 11%
. Total feed flow to S/Gs GREATER THAN 450 gpm.
. NC PRESSURE stable or going up.
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 11%.
BOP (Step 26) Reset the following:
. SIl
. Sequencers.
BOP (Step 27) Stop all but one NV pump.
BOP (Step 28) Check NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.
BOP (Step 29) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:
. Check NV pumps miniflow valves OPEN:
. 1NV-150B (NV_Pumps_Recirculation)
. INV-151A(NVPumps Recirculation).
. Close the following valves:
. INI-9A (NC Cold Leg_lnj From NV)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available!
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments INI-IOB (NC Cold Leg lnj From Examiner NOTE:
NV).
Mark Time of lNl-9A/1OB Closure (To the Minute):
CRITICAL TASK:
(SS-460011 13/El 3.6)
Terminate SI by closing NI-9110 within 15 minutes of SI actuation.
Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PT/0/N460011 13, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains>
500°F. If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.
BOP (Step 30) Establish charging as follows:
- THROTTLE INV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) to maintain 6-10 GPM seal injection flow to each NC pump.
- Close I NV-241 (UI Seal Water lnj Flow Control).
- Check one of the following valves OPEN:
- INV-13B (NV Supply to A NC Loop NOTE: INV-13B is OPEN.
Isol).
- 1 NV-I 6A (NV Supply to D NC Loop Isol).
- Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray to PZR Isol)
CLOSED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available!
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP . Open the following valves:
. INV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol)
INV-245B (Charging Line cont Outside Isol).
CRS . WHEN controlling NV flow in subsequent NOTE: This is a Continuous steps, THEN maintain flow within the Action. The CRS will make following limits while THROTTLING both board operators aware.
charging and seal injection control valves:
. Charging flow LESS THAN 200 GPM.
- Seal injection flow to each NC pump 6-10 GPM.
BOP (Step 31) Control charging flow as follows:
. Control charging flow as required to maintain Pzr level stable.
. Check Pzr level STABLE OR GOING UP.
BOP (Step 32) Reset the following:
. Phase A Isolation
. Phase B Isolation.
BOP (Step 33) Establish VI to containment as follows:
. OPEN the following valves:
. IVI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside lsol).
. lVl-1 GOB (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).
. IVI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available!
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments
. Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.
CRS (Step 34) Implement EPIIIA/50001F-0 NOTE: The CRS will direct the (Critical Safety Function Status Trees). STA to implement this action.
Floor Instructor: As STA, acknowledge.
CRS (Step 35) WHEN EPIIIAI5000IES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination) is implemented in next step, THEN monitor its Foldout page.
CRS (Step 35) GO TO Step 10 of NOTE: The CRS will transition EP/1/A/5000/ES-1 .1 (Safety Injection to ES-1.1 Step 10.
Termination).
ES-ti, SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION BOP (Step 10) Check if NI pumps should be Examiner NOTE: After stopped: transition to ES-i .1, terminate Exam at Lead Examiner discretion.
. Check NC pressure
. STABLE OR GOING UP.
- GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG.
- Stop NI pumps.
- GOTOStepil BOP (Step 11) Check if ND pumps should be stopped:
. Check any ND pump ON.
. Check running ND pumps suction ALIGNED TO FWST.
. Check both NS pumps OFF.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 1 Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 45 Event
Description:
Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available!
KC Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments
. Stop ND pumps.
RO (Step 12) Check S/I flow not required:
. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs NOTE: NC System Subcooling GREATER THAN 0°F. will be 65-85°F.
BOP . Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29% NOTE: Pzr Level will be 60-ACC). 90%.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
UNIT I STATUS:
Power Level: 75% NCS [B] 1136 ppm Pzr[B]: 1139 ppm Xe: 2369.56 pcm Power History: The Plant 75% power (MOL), for Core Burnup: 250 EFPDs four days.
CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: 0P111A16100103 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:
- The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days.
- The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.
- MCB Annunciators associated with the Main Transformer (lAD-il; B-5, C-5, E-5 and F-5) are LIT, which is expected due to the second set of coolers NOT operating at the present power level.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:
- I B KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement.
- I NIP-5070, ACCUM TK 1 B PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).
- MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, subcooling has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).
Crew Directions:
- Raise power to 100% starting at Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/N6100/03, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.
- Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/61 50/009, Boron Concentration Control, has been approved.
- The Reactor Group has recommended that a Dilution of 200 gallons be made during initial power increase.
- Perform the load increase at 2 MWe/Minute.
Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5
t h Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
Draft(RRNAL) -
Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: Nil-I Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.
1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description LOA C-RO High Pressure Heaters Bypass/Overpower CFOO7 C-SRO 2 ENBOI3C C-BOP Power Range Failure C(TS)-SRO 3 KCOIOD C-BOP 1B2 KC Pump trip C(TS)-SRO 4 NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 IREOO3A C-RO Continuous inward Rod Motion C-SRO 6 IPEOO1AJB M-RO Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG Safety Valve on 1 B fails Open IPEOO2AJB M-BOP DEHOO1 M SRO SMOO4B -
7 CAOO5 NA TD CA Overspeed Trip 8 CAOO4AIB NA lA/i B MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
- Draft (Re_F1NAL> -
McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.
1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, the High Pressure Heater Bypass Valve (1 CF-75) will inadvertently open. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm Response Procedure M1L2917, Ui WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS, and the Control Room Expectation Manual, and immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.
After this, Power Range Instrument N42 will drift high. The operator will enter AP/1 /A15500/1 6, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) nstrumentation.
Next, the 1B2 KG Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KG System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.
Subsequently, the 1 B DG will be declared inoperable. The crew will be directed to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A15500/04, Rapid Downpower.
During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.
Following this, the Turbine will inadvertently trip, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, one Safety Valve on the lB Steam Generator will lift and fail Open. The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EP/l/A15000/FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. During the performance of FR-S. 1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor.
On the Reactor trip, the TD CA will trip on overspeed, and the lA/I B MD CA Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be expected to manually start the MD CA Pumps.
After completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition back to E-0, and then to EP/1/A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. After the lB Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/ES-1 .1, SI Termination.
The scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-l.l.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Re_F1NAL)
Critical Tasks:
FR-S.1 C Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2).
Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.
E-0 F Establish 450 gpm of CA Flow to the Steam Generators before transition out of FR-S.1, unless the transition is made to EPIIIAI5000IFR-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 27 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario Nil-I -2
REFERENCES:
- 1. OAC Alarm Response Procedure M1L2917, UI WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS.
- 2. Control Room Crew Expectations Manual.
- 3. AP111A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation. (Rev 12)
- 4. Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.
- 5. AP111A15500121, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. (Rev 9)
- 6. Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.
- 7. AP/11A15500104, Rapid Downpower. (Rev 21)
- 8. AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction. (Rev 14)
- 9. EPI1IAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 31)
- 10. EPI1IAI5000IFR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. (Rev 12)
II. EP/I/A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. (Rev 9)
- 12. EPI1/AI5000IES-1 .1, SI Termination. (Rev 23)
Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.
Facility Review:
Rev. FINAL 1
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenallo 2 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 2 op Test No.: Nil-i Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.
1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description LOA 1 C-RO High Pressure Heaters Bypass/Overpower CFOO7 C-SRO 2 ENBO13C C-BOP Power Range Failure C(TS)-SRO 3 KCO1 OD C-BOP 1 B2 KC Pump trip C(TS)-SRO 4 NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 IREOO3A C-RO Continuous inward Rod Motion C-SRO 6 IPEOO1AIB M-RO Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG Safety Valve on 1 B fails Open IPEOO2AIB M-BOP DEHOO1 M-SRO SMOO4B 7 CAOO5 NA TD CA Overspeed Trip 8 CAOO4A/B NA lA/lB MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)om ponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRCSnriO 2 McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, the High Pressure Heater Bypass Valve (1CF-75) will inadvertently open. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm Response Procedure M1L2917, Ui WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS, and the Control Room Expectation Manual, and immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.
After this, Power Range Instrument N42 will drift high. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.
Next, the 1B2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.
Subsequently, the lB DG will be declared inoperable. The crew will be directed to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower.
During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.
Following this, the Turbine will inadvertently trip, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, one Safety Valve on the 1 B Steam Generator will lift and fail Open.
The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EP/i/A15000/FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. During the performance of FR-S. 1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor.
On the Reactor trip, the TD CA will trip on overspeed, and the 1AI1B MD CA Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be expected to manually start the MD CA Pumps.
After completion of FR-S. 1, the operator will transition back to E-0, and then to EP/1 /A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. After the 1 B Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, SI Termination.
The scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-i .1.
Scenario Event Description NRC scenario 2 Critical Tasks:
FR-S.1 C Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2).
Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.
E-0 F Establish 450 gpm of CA Flow to the Steam Generators before transition out of FR-S.1, unless the transition is made to EPIIIAI5000IFR-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions.
Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenar[o 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp I/C T = 0 Malfunctions:
159. ANN-ADO9-D04 = I (OFF)
MALF-CAOO4A = 0 (Fail in AUTO)
(IC-39, Adjust LD to 75 MALF-CAOO4B = 0 (Fail in AUTO) gpm, SD Bank B Group 2 MALF-CAOO5 made to be 226)
MALF-EPQOOIA MALF IPEOOIA MALF IPEOOIB MALF IPEOO2A MALF IPEOO2B LOA-DGOII = Racked Out IND-KF002 = 0 Q RUN Place TagoutlO-Stick on:
Reset all SLIMs IA DG Control Power (Tagout)
IND-KFO2 (0-Stick)
MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-6 (0-stick)
MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-4 (0-stick) j Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.
Setup OAC Q Freeze.
Q Update Fresh Tech.
Spec. Log.
Q Fill out the NEOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.
Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
- 3. TSail Sheets for 1A DG.
- 4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
Q T-O Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Event I High Pressure Heaters Bypass/Overpower examiner (LOA) CFOO7 =
(OPEN)
Ramp = 50 seconds Trigger #1 At direction of Event 2 Power Range Failure examiner (MALE) ENBOI3C = 200 (High)
Ramp = 20 Seconds Trigger #3 Q At direction of Event 3 1 B2 KC Pump trip examiner (MALE) KCOIOD Delay = 10 seconds Trigger #5 Q At direction of Event 4 Rapid Down power examiner NOTE: Trigger #7 (EPQOOIB) will be operated at start of event.
NOTE: Floor instructor will need to provide the BOP with a copy of 0P111A161501009, Enclosure 4.7, during this event.
Upon Event 5 Continuous inward Rod Motion (MALF) IREOO3A 0 Rod Motion (IN)
Trigger #9 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION U At direction of Event 6 Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG Safety Valve examiner on 1 B fails Open (MALF) DEHOOI No Delay (MALF) SMOO4B = 100 NOTE: LOA-SAOO3 = 0 TD CA Turbine
. isolation during event.
Trigger #11 Trigger #13 Q At direction of Event 7 TD CA Overspeed Trip examiner Q Continued Event 8 lA/i B MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO from Event 7 U Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 2 Event# 1 Page 8 of 53 Event
Description:
High Pressure Heaters Bypass! Overpower Shortly after taking the watch, the High Pressure Heater Bypass Valve (1CF-75) will inadvertently open. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm Response Procedure M1L2917, Ui WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS, and the Control Room Expectation Manual, and immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #1 (LOA CFOO7 (I))
Indications Available:
. OAC Alarm M1L2917 (UI Water Bypassing A&B Heaters).
. TPBE will update over 100%.
. Excore NIs will read in excess of 100%.
. Main Generator MW output will increase.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Ml L291 7, UI WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS CRS (Step 1) Dispatch operator to check position of 1 CF-75 (HP HTRS Bypass VIv).
CRS (Step 2) Investigate for leakage through 1CF-75 (HP HTRS Bypass Vlv).
CRS (Step 3) Notify System Engineering.
CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RD Immediately reduce 2OMWe and then NOTE: The RD will drop load reduce as needed to maintain Rx power on the Turbine 30-60MWe less than pre-transient condition. with the Turbine in MANUAL.
NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an NED.
If so, FloorlBooth Instructor acknowledge as NEC.
Wait 3 minutes of time, and report that 1 CF-75 is OPEN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 2 Event# 1 Page 9 of 53 Event
Description:
High Pressure Heaters Bypass! Overpower Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve position.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
If the CRS directs that the valve be closed, Booth Instructor, as the WCC Supervisor, inform CRS that IAE will investigate prior to operating valve.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 10 of 53 Event
Description:
Power Range Failure After this, Power Range Instrument N42 will drift high. The operator will enter AP/11A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (ENBOI3C(200))
Indications Available:
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-2 B3, P/R CHANNEL DEVIATION
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-2 08, PIR OVERPOWER ROD STOP
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-2 A8, OTDT RUN BACK/ROD STOP ALERT
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-2 E8, DOS TROUBLE
. MOB PR N42 indicates HIGHER than other Power Range channels
. OAC Alarm, UI Quad 3 AFD Deviation
. PR N42 Drawer indicates HIGHER than other Power Range drawers
. PR N42 Drawer Upper Detector indicates HIGH.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP111A15500116, MALFUNCTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CASE Ill, POWER RANGE MALFUNCTION RD (Step 1) Place control rods in manual.
RD (Step 2) Check S/G levels AT PROGRAMMED LEVEL.
CRS (Step 3) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RD to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RD.
RD (Step 4) Check P/R channels ONLY ONE NOTE: A channel Check will CHANNEL FAILED. reveal that only the Upper Detector on N42 has failed.
CRS (Step 5) Secure any power increase in progress.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page 11 of 53 Event
Description:
Power Range Failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RD (Step 6) Check the following interlocks IN REQUIRED STATE FOR EXISTING PLANT CONDITONS:
. P-7 Lo Power Rx Trips Blocked
- P-8 Hi Pwr Lo Flo Rx Trip Blocked
. P-iD Nuclear at Power.
BOP (Step 7) Perform the following actions at the MISCELLANIOUS CONTROL AND INDICATION PANEL drawer:
. Place the appropriate ROD STOP NOTE: The BOP will operate BYPASS switch to the failed channel the switch for N42.
position.
. Place the POWER MISMATCH NOTE: The BOP will place BYPASS switch to the failed channel the switch in the N42 position.
position.
BOP (Step 8) Perform the following actions at the DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR d rawer:
. Place the UPPER SECTION switch NOTE: The BOP will place to the failed channel position. the switch in the N42 position.
. Check the CHANNEL DEFEAT light for the upper section LIT.
. Place the LOWER SECTION switch NOTE: The BOP will place to the failed channel position. the switch in the N42 position.
. Check the CHANNEL DEFEAT light for the lower section LIT.
BOP (Step 9) Perform the following action at the COMPARATOR AND RATE drawer:
. Place the COMPARATOR CHANNEL NOTE: The BOP will place DEFEAT switch to the failed channel the switch in the N42 position.
position.
. Check the COMPARATOR DEFEAT light LIT.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page 12 of 53 Event
Description:
Power Range Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments BOP (Step 10) Trip bistables of failed channel as follows:
. Remove Control Power fuses from NOTE: This action will cause POWER RANGE A drawer for failed Annunciators to alarm on MCB channel. Panel 1AD-2.
BOP . IF Power Range Cabinet shows evidence NOTE: There is no such of damage evidence displayed.
BOPI (Step 1 1) Check the following status lights for the failed channel LIT:
RD
. NUC OVERPOWER ROD STOP CH 1(11, III, IV) BYP (1 SIi 9)
. P/R HI FLUX LO STPT (iSl-2)
. P/R HI FLUX HI STPT (1SI-2)
BOP/ (Step 12) Check the following annunciator RD lights LIT:
. PIR HI VOLTAGE FAILURE (1AD-2, F-3)
. PIR HI FLUX HI STPT ALERT (1AD-2.
A-3)
. PIR HI FLUX RATE ALERT (1AD-2, A 1)
BOP/ (Step 13) Check the following status lights on 1 SI-i 8 LIT:
RD
. PIR LO SETPOINT TRAIN A TRIP BLOCKED
. PIR LO SETPOINT TRAIN B TRIP BLOCKED RD (Step 14) Check all CF control valves IN AUTO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 13 of 53 Event
Description:
Power Range Failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RD (Step 15) Ensure operable PIR channel NOTE: The RD will ensure selected to record on NIS Recorder. that N42 is NOT selected to be recorded.
RD (Step 16) Adjust control rods to maintain T Avg at T-Ref.
RD (Step 17) WHEN T-Avg within 1°F of T-Ref NOTE: The RD may place the AND auto rod control desired, THEN return Control Rods back in AUTO.
control rods to auto.
CRS (Step 18) Instruct IAE to trip the following NOTE: The CRS may call bistables associated with failed PIR channel WCC/IAE to address the within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of failure PER switch position.
I P/i 1A130901014 (Tripping Inoperable Protection Channels): If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
. OPDT
. OTDT CRS (Step 19) IF AT ANY TIME failed PIR NOTE: The Power Range channel is repaired prior to IAE tripping Channel will NOT be repaired.
bistables CRS (Step 20) IF AT ANY TIME IAE completes Step 18....
CRS (Step 21) WHEN malfunctioning PIR channel repaired, THEN perform the following:
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 33.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS)
INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCD 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE (Functions 2a, 2b, 3, 6, 7, 16b, 16c, and 16d).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni 1-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 53 Event
Description:
Power Range Failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1 CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A. 1 Enter the Immediately Functions Condition with one or referenced in more Table 3.3.1-1 required for the channels channel(s).
D. One channel D.1.1 Perform SR 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> inoperable 3.2.4.2 NOTE: This Action is AND associated with Functions 2.a 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 3 (Hi Flux Hi setpoint and D.1.2 Place channel in trip. hi positive rate trips).
OR D.2 Be in MODE 3 78 Hours E. One channel E.1 Place channel 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> NOTE: This Action is inoperable, in trip.
associated with Functions 2.b, OR 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> 6 and 7 (Hi Flux Lo setpoint, E.2 Be in MODE 3 OPDT and OTDT trips).
T. One or more T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> channel(s) interlock is in inoperable, required NOTE: This Action is state for associated with Functions 16.b existing unit and 16.c (P-7 and P-8).
conditions.
OR T.2 Be in MODE 2 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> S. One or more S.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> channel(s) interlock is in inoperable. required NOTE: This Action is state for associated with Function 16.c existing unit (P-I 0).
conditions.
OR S.2 Be in MODE 3 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 15 of 53 Event
Description:
1B2 KC Pump trip Next, the 1B2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP111A15500121, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (KCOIOD)
Indications Available:
- MCB Annunciator IAD-6, Bi through B4, A (B, C, and D) NC PUMP UPPER MTR BRG LO KC FLO, alarms.
- 1B2 KC Pump Green Status light LIT.
- 1B2 KC Pump amps go toO.
- MCB Annunciator I RAD1 1 EMF 46A, LOSS OF TRN A KC SAMPLE FLO.
- MCB Annunciator 1 RAD1 1 EMF 46B. LOSS OF TRN B KC SAMPLE FLO.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an NEC to check out the 1B2 KC Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor, wait 3 minutes, and then report that the 1B2 KC Pump Breaker shows a 51150 Relay has operated, and the pump is NOT running.
NOTE: The CRS will transition toAP-21.
AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KG SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check any KC pump ON. NOTE: The 1 Bi KC Pump is ON, and running properly.
ROl (Step 2) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP BOP (Step 3) Secure any dilution in progress.
BOP (Step 4) Check ND IN RHR MODE. NOTE: ND is NOT in the RHR Mode.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 16 of 53 Event
Description:
1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 7.
CRS (Step 7) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
BOP (Step 8) Check both trains KC Surge Tank level STABLE OR GOING UP.
BOP (Step 9) Start standby KC train as follows:
. Check standby KC train AVAILABLE TO START.
. Check standby KC Surge Tank Level GREATER THAN 2 FT.
. Start standby KC train PER one of the following:
. To start A Train, GO TO Enclosure 4 (Startup of 1A KC Train).
AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 4, STARTUP OF IA KC TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check 1KC-56A (KC To A ND HX)
CLOSED.
BOP (Step 2) Check 1 KC-81 B (KC To B ND HX)
CLOSED.
BOP (Step 3) Check 1 B Train KC pumps OFF. NOTE: The 1B1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly.
CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # .2 Event # 3 Page 17 of 53 Event
Description:
1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 5) Check 1A Train KG pumps OFF.
BOP (Step 6) IF voiding of 1A train KC is NOTE: Voiding is NOT suspected.... suspected.
BOP (Step 7) Close the following:
. I KC-50A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
. IKC-IA (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. I KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
. IKC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret lsol).
BOP (Step 8) Start IA RN pump.
BOP (Step 9) Ensure 1 RN-86A (A KC Hx Inlet Isol) opens.
BOP (Step 10) Place control switch for IKC 51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the AUTO.
BOP (Step 11) Ensure 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) opens.
BOP (Step 12) Start IAI KC pump.
BOP (Step 13) Check IKC-6 (1A1 KC Pump NOTE: IKC-12 was NOT Discharge) LOCALLY THROTTLED IN locally throttled in Step 6.
STEP 6.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event# 3 Page 18 of 53 Event
Description:
1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments BOP (Step 13 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The CRSIBOP may dispatch an NEO to check out the A Train KC Pumps.
If so, Booth Instructor, as NEO report that both pumps are operating normally.
. StartlA2KCpump.
CRS . GO TO Step 17.
BOP (Step 17) Check ND pumps ANY ON NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE. and have been OFF.
CRS (Step 17 RNO) GO TO Step 20.
BOP (Step 20) Check KC leak HAS NOTE: A KC System Leak has OCCURRED. NOT occurred.
BOP (Step 20 RNO) Perform the following:
. Limit KC pump flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in next step.
. Open the following valves:
. IKC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. IKC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_1501).
. Close the following valves:
. IKC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_lsol).
. IKC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. Open the following valves:
. IKC-IA (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. IKC-50A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 19 of 53 Event
Description:
1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS
- GO TO Step 25.
BOP (Step 25) Check 1 B ND pump OFF.
BOP (Step 26) Check 1 KC-81 B (KC To B ND HX)
CLOSED.
BOP (Step 27) Place control switch for IKC 54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in the CLOSE position.
BOP (Step 28) Ensure 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc IsoI) closes.
BOP (Step 29) Stop I BI and I B2 pumps. NOTE: The BOP will stop the 1B1 KC Pump.
BOP (Step 30) Check KC flow LESS THAN 4000 GPM PER OPERATING KC PUMP.
BOP (Step 31) Check ND pumpsANY ON NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are PRIOP TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE. and have been OFF.
CRS (Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 37.
BOP (Step 37) Check KC System leak HAS NOTE: A KC System Leak has OCCURRED. NOT occurred.
CRS (Step 37 RNO) GO TO Step 41 in body of this procedure.
APIIIAI5500!21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 41) Check any letdown path IN NOTE: Normal Letdown is in SERVICE. service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 2 Event# 3 Page 20 of 53 Event
Description:
1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 42) Check NC pump thermal barrier valves OPEN:
. 1 KC-394A (A NC Pump Therm Bar Otit)
. 1 KC-345A (C NC Pump Therm Bar Otit)
. 1 KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar Otit)
. 1KC-413B (D NC Pump Therm Bar OtIt).
BOP (Step 43) Check KC to Aux Bldg Non essential header ESTABLISHED.
BOP (Step 44) Check NM valves (on 1 MC-8) NOTE: NM Valves have NOT PREVIOUSLY CLOSED BY THIS been previously Closed by this PROCEDURE. procedure.
CRS (Step 44 RNO) GO TO Step 46.
CRS (Step 46) Evaluate KC chemistry requirements as follows:
. Notify Primary Chemistry of KC NOTE: KC System makeup makeup that has occurred or is in has NOT occurred.
progress.
. Evaluate recirculating the KC Surge NOTE: There is NO NEED for Tank volume and feed and bleed of KC System Feed and Bleed.
KC System PER 0P111A164001005 (Component_Cooling Water System).
BOP (Step 47) Check both trains RN suction ALIGN ED TO LLI.
CRS (Step 48) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 21 of 53 Event
Description:
1B2 KG Pump trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will declare ACTION TIME the B KC Train inoperable.
A. One CCW A.1 Restore CCW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> train train to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System; and
. Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems; AND
. The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-I Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 22 of 53 Event
Description:
1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will declare ACTION TIME the A KC Train inoperable
- b. One DG B.2 Declare 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the B KC inoperable, required discovery of Train.
feature(s) Condition B supported by concurrent with the inoperability of inoperable redundant DC required inoperable feature(s) when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 23 of 53 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Subsequently, the 1 B DG will be declared inoperable. The crew will be directed to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP111A15500104, Rapid Downpower.
Booth Operator Instructions: As WCC Supervisor call Control Room and report that there is a major leak of Lube Oil in the lB DG Room.
2 minutes later Operate Trigger #7 EPQOOI B.
As WCC Supervisor call Control Room and report that Station Management has directed that the plant be placed in Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Indications Available:
MCB Annunciator lAD-li, D8, DIG B 125 VDC CONTROL POWER TROUBLE, alarms.
(2 minutes delayed)
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP111A15500104, RAPID DOWNPOWER ROl (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
RO (Step 3) Check turbine control IN AUTO. NOTE: Auto turbine control is available.
RO (Step 4) Check MW LOOP IN SERVICE.
RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress MW INIMW OUT pushbutton.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 24 of 53 Event
Description:
Rapid Down power Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3 DESIRED.
CRS (Step 6) Check if Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power appropriate:
. Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15%
Power DESIRED.
. At least two CA pumps OPERABLE. NOTE: With Both EDGs OOS neither MD CA Pump is OPERABLE.
RO (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF Mode 3 is time critical AND the reactor NOTE: The shutdown will not will be shutdown by manually inserting be performed using manual control rods rod control.
CRS . Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8.
CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power NOTE: The CRS will reduce reduction rate (MW/mm). load at 1 0-23 MWe/minute.
RO (Step 9) Check control rods IN AUTO.
BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red Booth Instructor: as SOC, dispatcher phone). acknowledge.
RO (Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.
BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:
. Energize all backup Pzr heaters.
. Check unit to be shutdown VIA REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER.
. Calculate total power change (%): NOTE: The CRS will determine the total power change to be 85%.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 25 of 53 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Determine boration amount based on the following:
. Power Reduction Rate (MW/mm)
. Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)
. Total Power change (%). NOTE: The BOP will determine to inject 680-1 020 gallons of Boric Acid.
. Record calculated boration amount:
- Check auto or manual rod control AVAILABLE.
- Perform boratiori in 4 equal additions Floor Instructor: When BOP during load reduction PER attempts to obtain copy of 0P111A161501009 (Boron procedure from NDL, provide Concentration Control), Enclosure 4.7 copy.
(Boration Using INV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 when I NV-265B is OPEN (IREOO3A (0))
Examiner NOTE: When RO alerts crew to the fact that the Control Rods are moving uncontrollably, Move to event 5.
RO (Step 13) Check control rods MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF.
RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code RIL.
RO (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, B-9) is lit, THEN perform one of the following to comply with Tech Spec 31.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits):
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event# 4 Page 26 of 53 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 16) IF AT ANY TIME during this procedure C-7A is received, THEN ensure Transient Monitor freeze is triggered.
CRS (Step 17) REFER TO the following: NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.
. RPIOIAI5700I000 (Classification of Emergency)
. RP/OIA/57001010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).
CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Group Duty NOTE: The CRS may call Engineer of load reduction. WCC/RE to address the switch position.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE.
RD (Step 19) Check target load LESS THAN 1000 MW.
RD (Step 20) Check Unit 2 AVAILABLE TO NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 SUPPLY AUX STEAM (AS) HEADER. RD to report AS Header pressure.
Floor Instructor: As U2 RD report that U2 is available.
CRS (Step 21) Dispatch operator to ensure the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch following valves are OPEN: an NED.
Booth Instructor:
Within 5 minutes, as NEO report that Valves are OPEN.
. 1AS-74 (Unit 1 & Unit 2 Aux Steam Hdr Cross-Tie Isol) (service bldg, 739+12, room 202, R-27, over B RL Pump)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 27 of 53 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Unit 2 valve 2AS-74 (Unit 1 & Unit 2 Aux Steam Hdr Cross-Tie Isol) (service bldg, 739+14 room 202, S-27, above RL strainer)
. 1AS-253 (Unit 1 Aux Steam Hdr Isol)
(service bldg, 739+15, P-28, above overhead door to Unit 1 turbine bldg).
RO (Step 22) Check SM flow on all SIGs Examiner NOTE: When RO GREATER THAN 25%. alerts crew to the fact that the Control Rods are moving uncontrollably, Move to event 5.
RO (Step 23) WHEN all SM flows are less than 75%, THEN ensure that following valves ramp CLOSED:
. iCE-i O4AB (1A SIG CF Control Bypass)
. 1CF-1O5AB (lB SIG CF Control Bypass)
. 1CF-1O6AB (1C SIG CF Control Bypass)
. 1CF-1O7AB (ID S/G CF Control Bypass)
RO (Step 24) WHEN PIR instruments indicate less than 48%, THEN check P-8 HI PWR LO FLO RX TRIP BLOCKED status light (151-I 8) LIT.
RO (Step 25) PIR meters indicate reactor power NOTE: It is NOT expected that LESS THAN 40%. the crew will be less than 40%
at this time.
CRS (Step 25 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF target load is less than 40%, THEN perform the following:
. Do not continue with this procedure until:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 28 of 53 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. PIR instruments indicate reactor power is less than 40%.
. All CF flows are less than 40%.
. Impulse pressure is less than 260 PSIG.
. WHEN all parameters above are met, THEN GO TO Step 26.
Examiner NOTE: When RO alerts crew to the fact that the Control Rods are moving uncontrollably, Move to event 5.
When the RO diagnoses the unwarranted Continuous Rod movement move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni i-i Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 29 of 53 Event
Description:
Continuous inward Rod Motion During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 (IREOO3A (0))
(Previously operated during Event #4 when I NV 265B was opened)
Indications Available:
- Control Rods are moving inward in AUTO without a proper signal.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS could go one of two ways at this point. The operator may back-up to Step 9 of AP4 and drive rods inward in MANUAL, or proceed to AP14. BOTH are scripted here.
AP111A1550014, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE: Upon recognition that the Control Rods are moving uncontrollably, the RO may take the Control Rods to MANUAL If NOT, move forward to Page 29.
CRS (Step 9) Check control rods IN AUTO RD (step 9 RNO) Perform the following:
IF auto control available.... NOTE: AUTO rod control is NOT available.
. IF manual control available, THEN move rods as required to maintain T Avg at T-Ref.
IF rods cannot be moved in auto or NOTE: MANUAL rod control is manual... available.
APII 1A15500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page 30 of 53 Event
Description:
Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: Upon recognition that the Control Rods are moving uncontrollably, the CRS may enter AP14.
RO (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, Immediate Action THEN perform the following:
NOTE: No Rods have dropped in this event.
RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action NOTE: The RO will place the rods in MANUAL.
RO (Step 3) Check rod movement STOPPED. Immediate Action NOTE: When the RO places the Rods to MANUAL, continual inward Rod Motion will stop.
RO (Step 4) Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.
RO (Step 5) Check ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm (1AD-2, A-b) DARK.
RO (Step 6) Check T-AVG/T-REF FAILURE ROD STOP alarm (1AD-2, B-7) DARK.
CRS (Step 7) IF this AP entered due to NOTE: The CRS will transition unwarranted rod insertion or withdrawal, to Enclosure 3 of AP-14.
THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response To Continuous Rod Movement).
ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 3 RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS ROD MOVEMENT
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event# 5 Page 31 of 53 Event
Description:
Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
CRS (Step 2) Notify IAE to investigate problem. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
CRS (Step 3) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal:
. Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur.
. Ensure control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactors response.
RO (Step 4) Check T-Ref indication - NORMAL CRS! (Step 5) Do not move rods until IAE Booth Instructor: after 2 RO determines rod motion in permissible. minutes, as IAE, report that MANUAL rod control only is permissible.
RO (Step 6) Maintain T-Avg within 1°F of programmed T-Ref as follows:
. Adjust Turbine load OR
. Borateldilute NC System.
RO (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs NOTE: This is a Continuous while in this procedure, THEN observe the Action. The CRS will make following guidance: both board operators aware.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event# 5 Page 32 of 53 Event
Description:
Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments IF IAE has determined that it is permissible to move rods, THEN respond to the runback PER AP111A15500103 (Load Rejection).
. For all other circumstances, assume rod control is not available and respond to the runback as follows:
. Trip Reactor
. GO TO EPI1IAI5000IE-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).
RO/ (Step 8) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure a unit shutdown is required AND Action. The CRS will make BOP rods cannot be moved, THEN perform the both board operators aware.
following:
. Borate as required during shutdown to maintain T-Avg at T-Ref.
. Monitor AFD during load reduction.
. IF AT ANY TIME AFD reaches Tech Spec limit AND reactor power is greater than 50%, THEN perform the following:
. Trip Reactor
. GO TO EP/11A15000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).
. IF entry into Mode 3 is desired...
CRS (Step 9) WHEN problem is repaired, THEN perform the following:
. Ensure T-Avg atT-Ref+/- 1°F. NOTE: The RO can move rods in MANUAL.
. IF auto rod control desired, THEN place rods in auto.
CRS (Step 10) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 33 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Following this, the Turbine will inadvertently trip, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, one Safety Valve on the lB Steam Generator will lift and fail Open. The operator will enter EPI1IAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EPI1IAI5000IFR-S.l, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. During the performance of FR-S. 1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor. On the Reactor trip, the TD CA will trip on overspeed, and the IA/lB MD CA Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be expected to manually start the MD CA Pumps. After completion of FR-S. 1, the operator will transition back to E-O, and then to EPI1IAI5000IE-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. After the lB Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EPI1IAI5000IES-1.1, SI Termination. The scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-1.1.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #11 (DEHOOI, SMOO4D(100))
Indications Available:
. MCB Annunciator 1 FO-1 F5, TURB TRIP CAUSES RX TRIP
. MWe drops immediately to 0
. Both Main Generator Breaker GREEN Status lights are LIT.
. Reactor Trip breakers RED Status lights are LIT.
. DRPI indicates that Control Rods have NOT tripped.
. Pzr Pressure rises
. All three Pzr PORVs indicate OPEN.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.
EPIIIAI5000IE-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO? (Step I) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor trip: Immediate Action
. All rod bottom lights LIT
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers -
OPEN
. hR amps GOING DOWN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 34 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine Tr1pIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action
. Trip reactor RO
- IF reactor will not trip, THEN perform the NOTE: The CRS may dispatch following: an NED to locally trip the reactor.
If so, Booth Instructor After 30 seconds delete MALF IPE0OIAIB, and report that the Reactor Trip Breakers have been opened.
- Implement EPI1IAI5000/F-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).
- GO TO EP/1/A15000/FR-S.1 NOTE: The CRS will transition (Response To Nuclear Power to FR-Si.
Generation/ATWS).
EPIIIAI5000IFR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATIONIATWS RD (Step 1) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action
- All rod bottom lights - LIT
- Reactor trip and bypass breakers -
OPEN
- hR amps - GOING DOWN.
RD (Step I RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action
- Trip the reactor
- IF reactor will not trip, THEN manually NOTE: The RD will manually insert rods. drive Rods inward.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-I Scenario # 2 Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 35 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:
FR-S.I C Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.I (Step 2).
Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.
BOP (Step 2) Check Turbine Trip:
- All throttle valves CLOSED.
RO/ (Step 3) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:
- MDCApumps-ON. NOTE: The lA/lB CA Pumps have failed to AUTO start, and the TD CA Pump has tripped on overspeed.
BOP (Step 4.a RNO) Start pumps. NOTE: The BOP will start both MD CA Pumps.
- Check N/R Level in at least 3 SIGs GREATER THAN 17%.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 2 Event# 6, 7&8 Page 36 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:
(E-0 F) Establish 450 gpm of CA Flow to the Steam Generators before transition out of FR-S.l, unless the transition is made to EPIIIAI5000IFR-H.l, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.
BOP (Step 5) Initiate emergency boration of NC System as follows:
. Ensure one NV pump ON -
. Align boration flowpath as follows:
. Open INV-265B (Boric Acid To NV Pumps).
. Start both boric acid transfer pumps.
. Check emergency boration flow GREATER THAN 30 GPM.
(Step 5b.3 RNO) IF NV pump suction is NOTE: The NV Pump suction aligned to VCT... is NOT aligned to the VCT.
- Check if NV flowpath aligned to NC System:
- 1 NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) OPEN.
- 1NV-245B (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) OPEN.
(Step 5c RNO) Perform the following:
- Open the following valves:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 37 of 53 Event
Description:
. Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. INI-9A (NC Cold Leg lnj From NV).
. INI-IOB (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).
- GO TO Step 5e.
- Check Pzr pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.
BOP (Step 6) Close the following VQ valves:
. IVQ-IA (UI Cont Air Release Inside Isol)
- IVQ-6A (UI Cont Air Addition Inside Isol)
- IVQ-2B (UI Cont Air Release Outside IsoI)
- IVQ-5B (UI Cont Air Addition Outside Isol)
BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure an S/I signal exists or occurs, THEN perform the following:
- Have another Licensed Operator check Examiner NOTE: SI may or S/I equipment PER Enclosure 3 may NOT have occurred at (Subsequent S/I Actions), this point.
If it has, or when it does, the CRS will hand Enclosure 3 off to the BOP.
Examiner following the BOP, continue with the Enclosure 3 scripted steps below.
Examiners following the CRSIRO proceed to FR-SI Steps on Page 39.
- Continue with this procedure.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 & 8 Page 38 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWS/SG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments EPIIIAI5000/FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATIONIATWS ENCLOSURE 3, SUBSEQUENT SIl ACTIONS BOP (Step 1) Check I ETA and I ETB ENERGIZED.
BOP (Step 2) Check both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) LIT.
BOP (Step 3) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):
. Groupsl,2,5DARK.
. Group 3 LIT.
. OAC-IN SERVICE.
. Group 4, Rows A through F LIT AS REQUIRED.
. GOTOStep4.
BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:
. MDCApumps-ON NOTE: Both MD CAPumps should be RUNNING.
. N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.
BOP (Step 5) Check all KC pumps ON.
BOP (Step 5.a RNO) Start pumps. NOTE: The 1 B2 KC Pump has previously failed.
BOP (Step 6) Check both RN pumps ON.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 39 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 7) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump. NOTE: The BOP will direct the U2 BOP to start the 2A RN Pump.
Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is running.
BOP (Step 8) Check all SIG pressures NOTE: The BOP will GREATER THAN 775 PSIG. determine that the 1 B SG is depressurizing.
BOP (Step 8a RNO) Perform the following:
. Check the following valves closed:
. AIIMSIV5
. All MSIV bypass valves
. AIISMPORVs.
. lFvalvesopen... NOTE: All 1 B SG Valves are Closed.
BOP (Step 9) Check Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.
BOP (Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure containment pressure goes above 3 PSIG, THEN perform Step 9).
BOP (Step 11) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The BOP may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I).
acknowledge as OSM.
NOTE: The BOP will report that Enclosure 3 has been completed to the CRS.
EPIIIAI5000IFR-S.l, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATIONIATWS Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIRO continue HERE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 40 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine Tr1pIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an NEO.
RO (Step 9) Check reactor subcritical:
. PIR channels LESS THAN 5%
. W/R Neutron Flux LESS THAN 5%
. hR SUR - NEGATIVE.
CRS (Step 10) GO TO Step 17.
RO (Step 17) Ensure adequate shutdown margin as follows:
. Obtain current NC boron concentration NOTE: The CRS/RO may call from Primary Chemistry. Chemistry.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.
WHEN current NC boron concentration is NOTE: The CRS may ask the obtained, THEN perform shutdown U2 RO to perform this action.
margin calculation PER If so, Floor Instructor OP/0/A/6 100/006 (Reactivity Balance acknowledge as U2 RO.
Calculation).
. WHEN following conditions satisfied, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN NC System boration may be Action. The CRS will make stopped: both board operators aware.
. Adequate shutdown margin is obtained.
. Uncontrolled cooldown has been stopped.
CRS (Step 18) REFER TO RP/0/A/5700/000 NOTE: The CRS may ask (Classification of Emergency). OSM to address.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.
CRS (Step 19) RETURN TO procedure and step NOTE: The CRS will transition in effect. back to E-0.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni -1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments EPIIIAI5000IE-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO! (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor trip: Immediate Action
. All rod bottom lights LIT
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN
. hR amps GOING DOWN.
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action
. All throttle valves CLOSED.
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB Immediate Action ENERGIZED.
RO? (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP
. A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED NOTE: It is expected that SI status light (151-i 8) LIT. will either be actuated already, or REQUIRED by this time.
. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) LIT.
CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
BOP (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) LIT.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK.
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):
. Groupsl,2,5DARK.
. Group 3 LIT
. OAC-IN SERVICE.
. Group 4, Rows A through F LIT AS REQUIRED.
- GO TO Step 10.
BOP (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:
- MDCApumps-ON NOTE: Both MDCAPumps should be RUNNING.
- NIR level is at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.
BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps ON. NOTE: The I B2 KC Pump has previously failed.
(Step 11 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The BOP will NOT attempt to start the 1 B2 KC Pump.
- Start pumps.
- IF all KC pumps running... NOTE: The 1B2 KC Pump is NOT running.
- IF any NC pump KC low flow annunciator NOTE: No KC System flow lit on 1AD-6, . annunciators are LIT.
BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWS/SG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the NOTE: The CRS will direct following: the U2 BOP to start the 2A RN Pump.
Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is running.
. Start 2A RN pump.
. THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.
RO (Step 14) Check all SIG pressures NOTE: The lB SG is GREATER THAN 775 PSIG. depressurizing.
RO (Step 14 RNO) Perform the following:
. Check the following closed:
. All MSIVs
. All MSIV bypass valves
. AIISMPORVs.
. IFanyvalveopen, NOTE: All 1 B SG Valves are Closed.
RO! (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is normal.
BOP BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:
. Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.
. Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 NOTE: NC Pressure is >1600 PSIG. psig.
BOP (Step 16.b RNO) Perform the following:
. Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running_pump(s) OPEN:
. 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).
CRS . IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.
CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.
ROI (Step 18) Check CA flow:
. Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
BOP . Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.
RO WHEN N/R level in any S/G greater than 1 1% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R level between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.
RD (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:
. IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC NOTE: All NC Pumps will be T-Avg STABLE OR TRENDING TO ON 557°F.
CRS (Step 17 RNO) Perform the following based NOTE: The CRS may assign*
on plant conditions: the RD to perform this action.
If so, RO(BOP) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.
Examiners following the CRSIBOP (RO) should move ahead to Page 46 to continue in E-0.
IF temperature less than 557°F AND going down, THEN attempt to stop cooldown PER Enclosure 3 (Uncontrolled NC System_Cooldown).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine Tr1pIATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RD (Step 1) Check steam dump valves Examiner NOTE: Follow the CLOSED. actions associated with (BOP) Enclosure 3 if RD is assigned by CRS to perform.
RD (Step 2) Check all SM PDRVs CLOSED.
(BOP)
RD (Step 3) Check MSR RESET light LIT.
(BOP)
RD (Step 4) Check any NC pump ON.
(BDP)
RD (Step 5) Check NC T-Avg GOING DOWN.
(BDP)
RD (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:
(BDP)
. IF SJG N/R level is less than 11% (32% NOTE: NR levels are> 11%.
ACC) in all S/Gs...
. WHEN NIR level is greater than 11%
(32% ACC) in at least one SIG, THEN throttle feed flow further to:
. Minimize cooldown
. Maintain at least one S/G N/R level greater than 11% (32%ACC).
RO (Step 7) Check MSlVs ANY OPEN. NOTE: All MSIVs are Closed.
(BDP)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni i-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 46 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWS/SG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:
. Close MSIV bypass valves.
. Exit this enclosure.
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIBOP(RO) continue HERE.
BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray (RO) valves:
. All PzrPORVsCLOSED.
. Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.
. At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN.
BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on (RO) core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
BOP (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:
(RO)
. All S/G pressures STABLE OR GOING NOTE: One lB SG Safety UP Valve is stuck OPEN.
. All S/Gs PRESSURIZED.
CRS (Step 22 RNO) IF any SIG is faulted, THEN perform the following:
. IF AT ANY TIME both of the following conditions exist, THEN start one train of VX PER Enclosure 4 (VX Manual Start):
. Containment pressure is between 1 PSIG and 3 PSIG.
. Containment pressure has remained less than 3 PS 1G.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 47 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWS!SG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS . Implement EP/1/A15000/F-O (Critical NOTE: Since N42 has Safety Function Status Trees). previously failed high, an invalid Red Path will exist on Subcriticality.
CRS . GO TO EPI1IAI5000/E-2 (Faulted Steam NOTE: The CRS will transition Generator Isolation), to E-2.
EPII IAI5000IE-2, FAU LTED STEAM GEN ERATOR ISOLATION RO! (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP CRS (Step 2) Maintain any faulted S/G or NOTE: This is a Continuous secondary break isolated during subsequent Action. The CRS will make recovery actions unless needed for NC both board operators aware.
System cooldown.
RO/ (Step 3) Check the following valves BOP CLOSED:
. AIIMSIVs
. All MSIV bypass valves.
RO! (Step 4) Check at least one S/G pressure NOTE: Although all SG BOP STABLE OR GOING UP. pressures may be decreasing slowly, the operator will report stable based on plant conditions (i.e. faulted SG).
Otherwise a transition to ECA 2.1 will be made.
RO! (Step 5) Identify faulted SIG(s): NOTE: The 1 B SG is Faulted.
. Any S/G pressure GOING DOWN IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR
. Any S/G DEPRESSURIZED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 48 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWS/SG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO! (Step 6) Maintain at least on SIG available for NC System cooldown in subsequent BOP steps.
RO! (Step 7) Check faulted SIG(s) SM PORV BOP CLOSED.
BOP (Step 8) Reset CA modulating valves.
RO! (Step 9) Isolate faulted S/G(s) as follows:
BOP RO/
- For1BS/G:
. Check S!G B FDW ISOLATED status light (ISI-4) LIT.
- Close ICA-54A (UI TD CA Pump Disch To IBSIG Isol).
- Close 1CA-58A (1A CA Pump Disch To lB SIG Isol).
RO/
- Check at least on MD CA pump RUNNING.
- Dispatch operator to unlock and CLOSE the following valves:
Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Maint Operate Trigger #13 (LOA Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 5A003 767+12, FF-53)
After 3 minutes, as NEO report that the ISA-2 and ISA-78 are CLOSED.
- 1 SA-78 (1 B S/G SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Loop Seal Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse,_767+10,_FF-53).
- Check BB valves CLOSED:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 4 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWS!SG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1BB-2B (lB SIG Blowdown Cont Outside lsol Control)
. 1 BB-6A (1 B SIG BB Cont Inside Isol).
. Close ISM-89 (lB SM Line Drain Isol).
RO (Step 10) Close IAS-12 UI SM To AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol).
BOP (Step 11) Check if SIG tubes intact as follows:
Check the following EM Fs NORMAL:
. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust)
. 1 EMF-24 (SIG_A)
. 1EMF-25(S/GB)
. 1EMF-27 (SIG_D).
IF any SIG has previously been identified NOTE: There is no previously as ruptured... known SGTL.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.
- If SIG(s) fault known to be outside containment, THEN monitor area of steam fault for radiation.
- Frisk all Unit I SIG cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly_higher for any SIG.
- Notify Control Room of any abnormal radiation conditions.
- WHEN activity results reported, THEN notify station management to evaluate SIG activity.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni 1-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 50 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine Trip!ATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments ROI (Step 12) Check S/I termination criteria:
. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F
. Secondary heat sink:
. N/R level in at least on intact S/G GREATER THAN 11% (32%ACC)
. Total feed flow to intact S/Gs GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
. NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29%
AC C).
CRS . GO TO EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1 (Safety NOTE: Since N42 has Injection Termination). previously failed high, an invalid Red Path will exist on Subcriticality.
NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-il.
EPIIIAI5000IES-1 .1 SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP BOP (Step 2) Reset the following:
. Sil
- Sequencers
. Phase A Isolation.
. Phase B Isolation.
. IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN restart S/I equipment previously Action. The CRS will make on. both board operators aware.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 51 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3) Establish VI to containment as follows:
. OPEN the following valves:
. IVI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol)
. IVI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol)
. IVI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).
. Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.
BOP (Step 4) Check is NS pumps should be stopped:
. Any NS pump ON.
(Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:
BOP . IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure NOTE: This is a Continuous an NS pump starts, THEN perform Step Action. The CRS will make
- 4. both board operators aware.
- GO TO Step 5.
BOP (Step 5) Stop all but one NV pump.
RO/ (Step 6) Check NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.
BOP BOP (Step 7) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:
- Check the following valves OPEN:
. 1 NV-221A (NV Pumps Suct From FWST)
. 1 NV-2223 (NV Pumps Suct From FWST).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N11.1 Scenario # 2 Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 52 of 53 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Turbine Trip!ATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Check the following valves - OPEN:
. INV-150B (NV Pumps Recirculation)
. 1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation).
. CLOSE the following valves:
. INI-9A (NC Cold Leg lnj From NV)
. INI-IOB (NC Cold Leg lnj From NV).
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
UNIT I STATUS:
Power Level: 100% NCS [B] 1035 ppm Pzr [B]: 1036 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: The Plant is at 100% power (MOL), Core Burnup: 250 EFPDs for 250 days.
CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/I /A/6 100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:
- None The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:
- I KFP-5I 30, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).
- MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).
Crew Directions:
- Maintain present plant power level.
Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike th 5
Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ft(RevFItAL)
Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: Nil-i Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: Unit I is at 1x10 8 amps in accordance with OPIIIAI6IOOIOO3, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase. It is intended to raise power on this shift. The CF&E Sump level is high, and the crew will need to pump the contents of the sump to the Floor Drains Tank.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: IA KR Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1CAP-5610, CAST LEVEL CH 1, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).
MCB Annunciator IAD-4, A-5, BB BLOWOFF TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).
Event Maf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description I NA N-BOP Pump CF&E Sump N-SRO 2 NA R-RO Raise power to 2-3%
N-SRO 3 ENBOO7A C-RO Intermediate Range Channel failure C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 4 KCOO5A C-BOP KC System leak C(TS)-SRO 5 IREOO6H8 C-RO Sequentially Dropped Control Rods IREOO6D4 C-SRO ANN 6 M-RO Seismic Event/Steam Line Break AD1 3E07 SMOO8A -
M-SRO 7 EPOOI NA Loss of Offsite Power (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Dft v FlNAL McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #3 Unit 1 is at 1x10 8 amps in accordance with 0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase. It is intended to raise power on this shift. The CF&E Sump level is high, and the crew will need to pump the contents of the sump to the Floor Drains Tank.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A KR Pump is OOS for motor replacement.
1CAP-5610, CAST LEVEL CH 1, failed last shift (IAE is investigating). MCB Annunciator 1AD-4, A-5, BB BLOWOFF TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).
Upon shift turnover, before the operator initiates the power increase, the operator will pump the Containment Floor and Equipment (CF&E) Sump in accordance with Section 3.3 of Enclosure 4.2, Containment Floor and Equipment Sump and Incore Instrument Room Sump Operation, of OP/i 1A165001001, Liquid Waste System.
Following this, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OPI1IAI6I 00/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.
After this, the Compensating Voltage for Intermediate Range Channel N35 will fail. The operator will enter APII/A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, and perform Case II, Intermediate Range Malfunction The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.
Subsequently, a leak will develop in the KC System. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/2i, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water System.
Next, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP/i/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. 30 seconds later a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor. The crew will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
On the reactor trip, the O.B.E. Exceeded annunciator will alarm, indicating that an earthquake has occurred. Within seconds a large Steam Rupture will occur outside Containment on the A Steam Generator, and ultimately Safety Injection will be actuated.
Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur. Both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and load onto the Emergency Busses, and all SI loads will sequence on as designed.
Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition to either EP/1/A15000/E-i, Response to Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant, or EP/1/A15000/ES-1 .1, SI Termination.
The scenario will terminate this transition is made.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 iDraft (Rev FINALy Critical Tasks:
ss Trip the reactor upon recognition of the second dropped rod (46001113/El 3.19)
Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant from challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PTIO/A1460011 13, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod.
E-2A Isolate the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that would not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).
NOTE: This scenario will require the assignment of a Surrogate Licensed Operator to monitorlcontrol Steam Generator level, Steam Dumps, Tavg, Tcold and the operating CF Pump during this scenario. This is based on Step 3.t2 of Enclosure 4.8 of 0P111A161001003 which requires the assignment of this operator during reactor startup. The surrogate may be released after event 2.
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 27 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario Nil-I -3
REFERENCES:
- 1. 0P111A16500/OO1, Liquid Waste System. (Rev 76)
- 2. 0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. (Rev 168)
- 3. API1IAI5500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation. (Rev 12)
- 4. Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.
- 5. AP111A15500121, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. (Rev 9)
- 6. Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water System.
- 7. AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction. (Rev 14)
- 8. EPI1IAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 31)
- 9. EPI1IAI5000IE-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. (Rev 9)
- 10. EPI1IAI5000IE-1, Response to Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant. (Rev 13)
- 11. EPI1IAI5000IES-1.1, SI Termination. (Rev 23)
Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.
Facility Review:
Rev. FINAL 1
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: Nil-I Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: Unit I is at 1x108 amps in accordance with OPI1IA/61001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase. It is intended to raise power on this shift. The CF&E Sump level is high, and the crew will need to pump the contents of the sump to the Floor Drains Tank.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: IA KR Pump is OOS for motor replacement. ICAP-5610, CAST LEVEL CH 1, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).
MCB Annunciator IAD-4, A-5, BB BLOWOFF TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description I NA N-BOP Pump CF&E Sump N-SRO 2 NA R-RO Raise power to 2-3%
N-SRO 3 ENBOO7A C-RO Intermediate Range Channel failure C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 4 K0005A C-BOP KC System leak C(TS)-SRO 5 IREOO6H8 C-RO Sequentially Dropped Control Rods IREOO6D4 C-SRO ANN 6 M-RO Seismic Event/Steam Line Break AD13EO7 M-BOP SMOO8A M-SRO 7 EPOO1 NA Loss of Offsite Power (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #3 Unit 1 is at 1x10 8 amps in accordance with 0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase. It is intended to raise power on this shift. The CF&E Sump level is high, and the crew will need to pump the contents of the sump to the Floor Drains Tank.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A KR Pump is DOS for motor replacement.
ICAP-5610, CAST LEVEL CH 1, failed last shift (IAE is investigating). MCB Annunciator lAD-4, A-5, BB BLOWOFF TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).
Upon shift turnover, before the operator initiates the power increase, the operator will pump the Containment Floor and Equipment (CF&E) Sump in accordance with Section 3.3 of Enclosure 4.2, Containment Floor and Equipment Sump and Incore Instrument Room Sump Operation, of OP/1/A/6500/001, Liquid Waste System.
Following this, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling.Procedure for Unit Operation.
After this, the Compensating Voltage for Intermediate Range Channel N35 will fail. The operator will enter AP111A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear nstrumentation, and perform Case II, Intermediate Range Malfunction The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.
Subsequently, a leak will develop in the KC System. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water System.
Next, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. 30 seconds later a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor. The crew will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
On the reactor trip, the O.B.E. Exceeded annunciator will alarm, indicating that an earthquake has occurred. Within seconds a large Steam Rupture will occur outside Containment on the A Steam Generator, and ultimately Safety Injection will be actuated. Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur. Both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and load onto the Emergency Busses, and all SI loads will sequence on as designed.
Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition to either EP/1/A15000/E-1, Response to Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant, or EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, SI Termination.
The scenario will terminate this transition is made.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Critical Tasks:
ss Trip the reactor upon recognition of the second dropped rod (460011131E1319)
Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant from challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PT/0/A/4600/1 13, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod.
E-2A Isolate the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that would not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).
NOTE: This scenario will require the assignment of a Surrogate Licensed Operator to monitorlcontrol Steam Generator level, Steam Dumps, Tavg, Tcold and the operating CF Pump during this scenario. This is based on Step 3.1.2 of Enclosure 4.8 of 0P111A161001003 which requires the assignment of this operator during reactor startup. The surrogate may be released after event 2.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup RodStepOn Reset to Temp I/C T 0 Malfunctions:
Q LOA-KROO4 = Racked Out 160.
XMT-CAO5I =32 (IC-9, Close 1WL-65B, ANN-ADO4-A05 = 0 (ON) entered MALF-PLPO25= 30 gpm and raise Sump lAto 13, When there, inset a value of 0.0 to MALE PLPO25. When the sump has stopped filling, delete MALF-PLPO26.)
RUN Place TagoutlO-Stick on:
IA KR Pump (Tagout)
Reset all SLIMs ICAP-5610 (0-Stick)
MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-6 (0-stick)
Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO <1000 ppb.
Q =
Setup OAC Freeze.
Update Fresh Tech.
Spec. Log.
Q Fill out the NEOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.
Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
- 3. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/l/A/6100/003, marked up as follows:
- Step 2.1 Initialed.
- Step 3.1 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.2 Initialed.
- Step 3.3 NA/Initialed.
- Step 3.4 NA/Initialed.
- Step 3.5 Initialed.
- Step 3.6 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.7 Initialed.
- Step 3.8 Initialed. (Four Sub-Bullets)
- Step 3.9.1 Initialed.
- Step 3.9.2 Initialed.
- Step 3.9.3 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.9.4 Initialed.
- Step 3.9.5 Initialed.
- Step 3.10.1 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.10.2 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.10.3 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.11 NA/Initialed.
- Step 3.12 Initialed. (Management Designee: John Williams, Evolution Coordinator: Pam Smith)
- Step 3.13.1 Initialed twice.
- Step 3.13.2 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.13.3 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.13.4.1 Checkboxchecked.
- Step 3.13.4.2 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.13.4.3 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.13.4.4 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.13.5 Initialed twice.
nd 2
- Step 3.13.6 Checkbox checked.
- Step 3.13.7 Initialed.
- Step 3.13.8 Initialed.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing (Contd)
. Step 3.13.9 2 nd Checkbox checked.
. Step 3.13.10 NA/Initialed.
. Step 3.13.11 Initialed.
. Step 3.13.12 Checkbox checked.
. Step 3.13.13 Initialed.
- Step 3.13.13.1 Checkbox checked.
. Step 3.13.13.2 Initialed.
. Step 3.13.13.3 Both Checkboxes checked.
. Step 3.13.13.4 Initialed.
. Step 3.13.13.14 Checkbox checked.
. Step 3.13.15 Checkbox checked.
. Rod Position Bank: D Steps: 123
. Tavg: 557.5
. Boron Concentration: 1847
. Time: 0600
. Xenon Worth: 0
- Samarium Difference from equilibrium: -98.95
. Step 3.13.16 Checkbox checked.
. Step 3.13.17 Initialed.
. Step 3.13.18 NA/Initialed.
. Step 3.13.19 Initialed.
. Step 3.14 Initialed.
- 4. Provide Enclosure 4.8 of OP/1/A16100/003, marked up as follows:
- Step 3.1 Initialed.
. Step 3.1.1 Initialed. Reactor Operator: Enter Candidates Name on Exam Day
. Step 3.1.2 Initialed. Reactor Operator: Enter Candidates Name on Exam Day
. Step 3.1.3 Initialed. Reactor Operator: Enter Candidates Name on Exam Day
. Step 3.1.4 Initialed.
. Step 3.2.1 Checkbox checked.
. Maneuvering Fuel Limit: No rate restriction 0-50%
. Control Rod Withdrawal Limits: None
- Step 3.2.2 Initialed, Person Notified: John Doe!
. Step 3.2.3 Initialed.
. Step 3.2.4 NA/Initialed.
- Step 3.2.5 Checkbox checked.
- 5. Provide operators with a reactivity plan that includes the information that the reactor power increase will be accomplished using Control Rods ONLY.
- 6. Provide a copy of Enclosure 4.14 (Reactor Power/Expected Tavg), Table 4.14-1 (Reactor Power/Expected Tavg) of OP/1/A/6100/003, (Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation).
- 7. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
Scenario Event Description lJRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION T-O Begin Familiarization Period Q At direction of Event I Pump CF&E Sump examiner At direction of Event 2 Raise power to 2-3%
examiner J At direction of Event 3 Intermediate Range Channel failure examiner (MALE) ENBOO7A = 0 No RamplDelay Trigger #1 Q At direction of Event 4 KC System leak examiner (MALF) KCOO5A = 5 No RamplDelay LOA-KCOII 0.6 (OPEN) (120 second Delay)
Trigger #3 LOA-KC012 = 0.6 (OPEN) (120 second Delay)
Trigger #5 LOA-KC023 = 0.1 (OPEN)
Trigger #7 LOA-KC024 = 0.1 (OPEN)
Trigger #9 At direction of Event 5 Sequentially Dropped Control Rods examiner (MALE) IREOO6H8 = I No Delay (MALE) IREOO6D4 = I Delay = 30 seconds Trigger #11 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Upon Reactor Event 6 Seismic Event/Steam Line Break Trip ANN-ADI3-E7 = ON Trigger #13 NOTE: Trigger 13 is tied to the Rx trip.
(MALF) SMOO8A 4.125 E+6 Ramp = 20 Seconds Delay = 5 Seconds Trigger #13 Q Post-Trip Event 7 Loss of Offsite Power (MALF) EPOOI Delay = 5 Seconds Trigger #13 Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 1 Page 10 of 42 Event
Description:
Pump CF&E Sump Upon shift turnover, before the operator initiates the power increase, the operator will pump the Containment Floor and Equipment (CF&E) Sump in accordance with Section 3.3 of Enclosure 4.2, Containment Floor and Equipment Sump and Incore Instrument Room Sump Operation, of OP/11A165001001 Liquid Waste System.
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 0P111A165001001, LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.2, CONTAINMENT FLOOR AND EQUIPMENT SUMP AND INCORE INSTRUMENT ROOM SUMP OPERATION BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.
BOP (Step 3.2) Perform the following sections, as applicable:
. Section 3.3, Pumping Containment Floor and Equipment Sump(s)
BOP (Step 3.3) Pumping Containment Floor and Equipment Sump(s)
. IF time allows...
. IF in Modes 1, 2, 3, or4, perform the following:
. Declare Containment Floor and Equipment Sump Level Monitoring System_inoperable.
. Ensure Containment Floor and Equipment Sump pump-out duration is less than 30 minutes.
. Check CFAE Sump(s) to be pumped greater than 8 inches.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 1 Page 11 of 42 Event
Description:
Pump CF&E Sump Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP
- Record Containment Floor and Equipment_Sump_level(s) to be pumped.
. A CFAE Level 7 inches =
NOTE: The operator will inches to be pumped record 13 inches.
Estimate and record gallons to be NOTE: The operator will pumped (total inches to be pumped x 36 record 216 gallons.
gallons_per_inch): gallons Notify Radwaste Chemistry of estimated gallons of water to be pumped form Floor and Equipment_Sump(s).
- Ensure the following open:
. 1WL-64A (Unit 1 Rx Bldg Sump Pumps Disch Cont Inside Isol)
Start desired CFAE pump(s): NOTE: The operator will start both pumps.
. IAI CFAE Pump
. IA2CFAE Pump
- HOLD until desired to secure pumping CFAE, THEN perform the following:
- Ensure off:
. 1AI CFAE Pump
. IA2CFAEPump
- Perform one of the following:
Cont Outside Isol), close IWL 65B.
- Evaluate Containment Floor and Equipment Sump Level Monitoring System_operability.
- Record final Containment Floor and Equipment_Sump_level(s):
- A CFAE Level NOTE: The BOP will record 7 inches.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 1 Page 12 of 42 Event
Description:
Pump CF&E Sump Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments
. Multiply total level decrease (inches) by 36 (gallons per inch) and record gallons discharged in Autolog.
IF total gallons pumped is different from estimated gallons provided to Radwaste Chemistry in Step 3.3.6, notify Radwaste Chemistry of actual amount pumped.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 2 Page 13 of 42 Event
Description:
Raise power to 2-3%
Following this, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/IIA/61 00/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 0P111A161001003, CONTROLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE RO (Step 3.15) Perform the following to control NC System temperature until Turbine Generator is paralleled to the grid:
. Maintain the following by adjusting setpoint on STM PRESS CONTROLLER:
. Tcold 557-559°F
- Refer to Enclosure 4.14 (Reactor Power/Expected Tavg), Table 4.14-1 (Reactor Power/Expected Tavg) for expected Tavg for a given Reactor Power level.
CRS (Step 3.16) IF feedwater flow is aligned to NOTE: CF flow is NOT aligned CA nozzles, perform the following: to CA Nozzles.
- Ensure Reactor Power will remain less than 20% RTP.
BOP (Step 3.17) Ensure in service CF Pump NOTE: IA CF Pump is aligned Turbine LP GOV CNTRL and HP GOV as needed.
CNTRL in auto.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 2 Page 14 of 42 Event
Description:
Raise power to 2-3%
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO! (Step 3.18) IF AT ANY TIME SIG NIR Level NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP decreases to 28% OR exceeds 52%, perform Action. The CRS will make the following both board operators aware.
RD (Step 3.19) Increase Reactor Power to 2% NOTE: The RD will pull rods to RTP (2.0-2.5%). raise power.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 15 of 42 Event
Description:
Intermediate Range Channel failure After this, the Compensating Voltage for Intermediate Range Channel N35 will fail. The operator will enter AP111A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, and perform Case II, Intermediate Range Malfunction The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #1 (ENBOO7A(O))
Indications Available:
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, C-2, JR COMPENSATING VOLT FAILURE
. COMP VOLT status light on Nl-35 Drawer is LIT.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP111A15500116, MALFUNCTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CASE II, INTERMEDIATE RANGE MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) Check one lIR channel OPERABLE.
CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
BOP (Step 3) Place failed or channel LEVEL TRIP switch on hR Drawer to BYPASS.
BOP (Step 4) Check the following LIT:
. LEVEL TRIP BYPASS indicating light on failed hR drawer.
. SIR OR hR TRIP BYPASS alarm (lAD 2,_E-2).
. The failed channels status light on 1 SI-19:
. 1IN-35A hR CHANNEL I TRIP BYPASS OR
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 16 of 42 Event
Description:
Intermediate Range Channel failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1/N-36A hR CHANNEL II TRIP BYPASS.
RO (Step 5) Place operable hR channel to record on NIS Recorder.
CR5! (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME hR fuses are ROI pulled above P-1O, THEN they should be inserted prior to lowering power below P-iD BOP (to prevent a reactor trip).
RO (Step 7) Check hR channel FAILED LOW.
RO (Step 7 RNO) WHEN reactor less than P-6 NOTE: The RO will need to during any subsequent shutdown (with failed take this action later in the hR channel), THEN place SOURCE RANGE scenario.
SELECT switches to RESET to energize S/R detectors.
CRS (Step 8) WHEN malfunctioning hR channel NOTE: The channel will repaired, THEN.... remain OOS.
NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the malfunction.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
Booth Operator Instructions: WHEN the CRS checks the Technical Specifications, Operate Trigger #3 (KCOO5A (4))
(NOTE: This action is needed to set up for Event 4, and the Malfunction will require 5 minutes before observable effects are seen)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event# 3 Page 17 of 42 Event
Description:
Intermediate Range Channel failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1 CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.l Enter the IMMEDIATELY Functions Condition with one or referenced in more Table 3.3.1-1 required for the channels channel(s).
F. THERMAL F.1 Reduce 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will POWER THERMAL determine that power must be
>P-6 and POWER to
<P-1O, one <P-6. raised or lowered within 24 Intermediat hours.
e Range OR Neutron F.2 Increase NOTE: This Action is Flux 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> THERMAL associated with Function 4 (IR channel POWER to Neutron Flux).
inoperable >P-1 0.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 18 of 42 Event
Description:
KC System leak Subsequently, a leak will develop in the KC System. The operator will enter AP/11A15500121, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water System.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (KCOO5A (4))
(NOTE: Operated as part of Event 3)
Indications Available: (NOTE: This Malfunction will require 5 minutes before observable effects are seen)
. MCB Annunciator IADI3, C-I, ND & NS ROOM SUMP HI-HI LEVEL, alarms.
. OAC Alarm Ui KC Surge Tank Compartment A Level.
. KC Surge Tank Level 1A is lowering.
Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check any KC pump ON.
ROI (Step 2) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP BOP (Step 3) Secure any dilution in progress.
CRS (Step 4) Check ND IN RHR MODE.
CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 7.
CRS (Step 7) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
BOP (Step 8) Check both trains KC Surge Tank level STABLE OR GOING UP.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 19 of 42 Event
Description:
KC System leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments (Step 8 RNO) IF Surge Tank level trend NOTE: 1A KC Surge Tank indicates a KC System leak, THEN GO TO level is lowering.
Step 11.
CRSI (Step 11) Initiate YM makeup to KC Surge BOP Tank as follows:
Immediately dispatch operator to open NOTE: The CRSIBOP will the following valves as required to dispatch an NEC.
maintain KC Surge Tank level: Booth Instructor:
Operate Trigger #5 (LOA KCOIIII2 (Open).
Within 2 minutes, as NEO report that YM is being added to the KC Surge Tank.
(NOTE: This may need to be closed later)
. To makeup to IA KC Surge Tank, unlock and open 1KC-107(1A KC Surge Tank Compartment YM Supply Isol) (aux bldg, 767+2, JJ-57, under grating, between KC surge tanks)
. To makeup to 1 B KC Surge tank, NOTE: The 1 B KC Surge unlock and open 1 KC-l 1 1 (1 B KC Tank level may be lowering by Surge Tank Compartment YM this time.
Supply Isol) (aux bldg, 767+2, JJ-58, under grating, between KC surge tanks).
Adjust makeup rate as required to prevent overflow of KC Surge Tank (approximately 8.5 ft.).
CRS! (Step 12) Dispatch operators to locate leak. NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP anNEO,orNEOs.
Booth Instructor:
Within 3 minutes, as NEO, report that piping downstream of 1A1 KC Pump has a leak.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 20 of 42 Event
Description:
KC System leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 13) Check KC drain tank pump OFF.
CRSI (Step 14) IF AT ANY TIME it is determined NOTE: The CRS will take this BOP that YM makeup is inadequate to restore or action later.
stabilize KC surge tank level, THEN When this is done:
immediately align RN Makeup to KC PER Enclosure 3 (Aligning RN Makeup to KC Booth Instructor:
Surge Tank) as required.
DO NOT INITIATE RN MAKEUP UNTIL IA KC SURGE TANK LEVEL IS LESS THAN 2 FEET.
Operate Trigger #7 (LOA KC023 (Open).
IF lB KC SURGE TANK LEVEL IS INCREASING DO NOT INITIATE RN MAKEUP TO lB KC SURGE TANK.
Operate Trigger #9 (LOA KC024 (Open).
Within 2 minutes, as NEO report that RN is being added to the KC Surge Tank.
(NOTE: This may need to be closed later)
BOP (Step 15) Check both trains KC surge tank Examiner NOTE: Level may level GREATER THAN 3 FT.
be greater or less than 3 feet.
Either way, the CRS will ultimately arrive at Step 20.
If needed. Move forward to Step 20 below.
BOP (Step 16) Check sum of both trains KC surge tank level drops LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 0.10 FT/MIN.
CRS (Step 16 RNO) IF level is dropping faster NOTE: The level is lowering than 0.10 ft/mm, THEN GO TO Step 20. at .3 ft/minute.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 21 of 42 Event
Description:
KC System leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 20) Isolate 1A KC Train from lB KC Examiner NOTE: The crew Train as follows: may implement Enclosure 2 at any time based on Foldout Page Criteria.
If so, move forward to actions on Page 21.
. Check any 1A KC Train pump RUNNING.
. Check the following valves OPEN:
. 1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol)
. 1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_lsol).
. Close the following valves:
. IKC-53B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup_lsol).
. IKC-2B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. I KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
. IKC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. WHEN valves in Step 20c are closed, THEN check IA KC Surge Tank level GOING DOWN.
- GOTOStep2l.
BOP (Step 21) Check Unit 2 KC Surge Tank level STABLE.
Examiner NOTE: it is assumed that the crew will have been directed to implement Enclosure 2 by this point.
If NOT, the crew will continue in AP21, and implement this Enclosure shortly.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 22 of 42 Event
Description:
KC System leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP!1/A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 2, ISOLATION OF NON-ESSENTIAL HEADERS BOP (Step 1) Ensure normal letdown is NOTE: The BOP will close isolated. I NV-35.
BOP (Step 2) Ensure INV-121 (ND Letdown Control) is closed.
BOP (Step 3) Ensure recirc valve(s) on operating KC pumps in AUTO.
. 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol)
. I KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol).
BOP (Step 4) Isolate Aux Bldg Non-essential header from affected train:
. IF IA KC Surge Tank is less than 2 if, OR IA KC pumps tripped due to low surge tank level, THEN close:
. I KC-50A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol)
. IKC-IA (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. IF lB KC Surge Tank is less than 2 ft NOTE: The lB Surge Tank OR 1A KC pumps tripped due to low level is 2.25 feet.
surge tank level BOP (Step 5) Ensure all NM valves located on IMC-8 (vertical board) CLOSED.
CRS (Step 6) Check ND letdown ISOLATED PRIOR TO EVENT.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 23 of 42 Event
Description:
KC System leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 7) Check both trains of KC surge tank NOTE: The level will be level: lowering in 1A Surge Tank, and rising in the lB Surge tank.
. Level STABLE OR GOING UP
. Level ON SCALE CRSI (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF surge tank level is less than 1 ft, OR NOTE: This condition will KC pumps were tripped due to low surge most likely be met.
tank level, THEN GO TO Step 9.
BOP (Step 9) Isolate Reactor Bldg Non-essential header from affected train as follows:
. IF IA KC Surge Tank is less than I ft, OR IA KC pumps were tripped due to low surge tank level, THEN close:
. IKC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).
. IKC-3A (Tm A Rs Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. IF 1 B KC Surge Tank is less than 1 ft... NOTE: It is likely that the I B KC Surge Tank level is> 1 foot.
. Ensure NC pump trip criteria on Foldout page is monitored.
BOP (Step 10) Check either KC train surge tank NOTE: The crew may stop level GREATER THAN 2 FT.
makeup to the Surge Tank at this point.
CRS (Step 11) Swap KC to train with surge tank level greater than 2 ft as follows:
. To start 1A Train, GO TO Enclosure 4 (Startup of 1A KC Train)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 24 of 42 Event
Description:
KC System leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. To start 1 B Train, GO TO Enclosure 5 (Startup of lB KC Train).
NOTE: The CRS will go to Enclosure 5.
AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 5, STARTUP OF lB KC TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check 1KC-81B (KC to B ND HX) -
CLOSED.
BOP (Step 2) Check 1 KC-56A (KC To A ND HX)
CLOSED.
BOP (Step 3) Check 1A Train KC pumps OFF. NOTE: The A Train KC Pumps may be running.
BOP (Step 4) Select CLOSED on 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol).
BOP (Step 5) Check 1 B Train KC pumps OFF. NOTE: The B Train KC Pumps are expected to be OFF.
If NOT, Move forward to Step 17 on Page 24.
BOP (Step 6) IF voiding of 1 B train KC is NOTE: Voiding is NOT suspected, suspected.
BOP (Step 7) Close the following:
. 1 KC-53B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup IsoI).
. 1 KC-2B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. I KC-228B (Tm B Rs Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 25 of 42 Event
Description:
KC System leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
BOP (Step 8) Start lB RN pump.
BOP (Step 9) Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) opens.
BOP (Step 10) Place control switch for IKC 54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in the AUTO position.
BOP (Step 11) Ensure IKC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) opens.
BOP (Step 12) Start IBI KC pump.
BOP (Step 13) Check 1KC-12 (1B1 KC Pump NOTE: 1KC-12 was NOT Discharge) LOCALLY THROTTLED IN previously throttled.
STEP 6.
BOP (Step 13 RNO) Perform the following:
- Start 1B2 KC pump.
- GO TO Step 17.
CRS (Step 17) Check ND pumps ANY ON NOTE: No ND Pumps were PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE. on prior to entering this procedure.
CRS (Step 17 RNO) GO TO Step 20.
BOP (Step 20) Check KC leak HAS NOTE: A KC leak has OCCURRED. occurred.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 26 of 42 Event
Description:
KC System leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 21) Check KC header with leak HAS NOTE: A KC leak has been BEEN IDENTIFIED. identified downstream of KC Pump 1A1.
CRS (Step 22) GO TO Step 24.
BOP (Step 24) Align KC as follows:
. Monitor the following KC pump parameters while aligning KC in this step:
. Pump flow and amps
. KC surge tank level.
. Limit KC pump flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in next step.
. CheckLEAKIDENTIFIEDON 1AKC TRAIN ESSENTIAL HEADER.
. Close the following valves:
- IKC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
- IKC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
- Open the following valves:
- IKC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
- IKC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg non Ess Sup_Isol).
. Close the following valves:
- IKC-50A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup_lsol).
- IKC-IA (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
- Open the following valves:
- IKC-2B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
- IKC-53B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 27 of 42 Event Descnption: KC System leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 25) Check 1A ND pump OFF.
BOP (Step 26) Check 1 KC-56A (KC To A ND HX)
CLOSED.
BOP (Step 27) Place control switch for 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the CLOSE position.
BOP (Step 28) Ensure 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) closes.
BOP (Step 29) Stop IAI and 1A2 pumps. NOTE: It is likely that the A Train KC Pumps are OFF (Manually tripped earlier on Foldout Page criteria).
BOP (Step 30) Check KC flow LESS THAN 4000 GPM PER OPERATING KC PUMP.
BOP (Step 31) Check ND pumps ANY ON NOTE: No ND Pumps were PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE. on prior to entering this procedure.
CRS (Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 37.
BOP (Step 37) Check KC System leak HAS NOTE: A KC leak has OCCURRED. occurred.
CRS (Step 38) GO TO Step 39 in boy of this procedure.
AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 28 of 42 Event
Description:
KC System leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 39) Continue attempts to identify and Examiner NOTE: The CRS isolate leak. may address Technical Specifications at this time. If NOT, address this Technical Specification evaluation at the end of the scenario.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One CCW A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> train CCW train to inoperable OPERABLE status.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 29 of 42 Event
Description:
Sequentially Dropped Control Rods Next, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction. 30 seconds later a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor. The crew will enter EPI1IAI5000IE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #11 (IREOO6HB (1), IREOO6D4 (1), 30 seconds delayed)
Indications Available:
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, A-lU, ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE, alarms.
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-9, RPI AT BOTTOM ROD DROP, alarms.
. MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-10, RPI URGENT FAILURE, alarms.
. DRPI indication that Control Rod H8 is on the bottom.
30 seconds later:
- MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, E-9, RPI AT BOTTOM >1 ROD DROPPED, alarms.
. DRPI indication that Control Rod D4 is on the bottom.
Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments APIIIAI5500II 4, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, Immediate Action THEN perform the following:
. Trip Reactor. NOTE: The rods will drop sequentially so the action of tripping the reactor will be delayed, but Immediate upon observation.
. GO TO EPJ1/A15000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety_Injection).
RD (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action RO (Step 3) Check rod movement STOPPED. Immediate Action
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenario# 3 Event# 5 Page 30 of 42 Event
Description:
Sequentially Dropped Control Rods Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: Upon recognition of the dropped rod, the RO will perform Step 1 which now applies.
RO (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, Immediate Action THEN perform the following:
. Trip Reactor. NOTE: The rods will drop sequentially so the action of tripping the reactor will be delayed, but Immediate upon observation.
CRITICAL TASK:
(SS) Trip the reactor upon recognition of the second dropped rod (4600111 31E1 3.19)
Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant from challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PT/0/A14600/113, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod.
When the reactor is tripped move to Events #6-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni i-i Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 31 of 42 Event
Description:
Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Shortly after entry into EPIIIAI5000IES-O.1 the O.B.E. Exceeded annunciator will alarm, indicating that an earthquake has occurred. Within seconds a large Steam Rupture will occur outside Containment on the A Steam Generator. The operator will actuate Safety Injection, and return to EPI1IAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur. Both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and load onto the Emergency Busses, and all SI loads will sequence on as designed. Upon completion of E-O, the operator will transition to EPI1IA/50001E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition to either EPI1IAI5000IE-1, Response to Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant, or EPI1IA/5000IES-1.1, SI Termination. The scenario will terminate this transition is made.
Booth Operator Instructions: Ensure Trigger #13 has operated (ANN-ADI3-E7 (ON), SMOO8A(4.125 E+6) and EPOOI)
Indications Available:
. MCB Annunciator 1AD13 E-7, OBE EXCEEDED, alarms.
. Control Room lights dim.
. A EDG starts and loads onto Bus 1 ETA.
. B EDG starts and loads onto Bus IETB.
. DRPI Panels de-energize.
. Control Room lights return to normal after ESF Busses re-energize.
. IA SG pressure starts to lower.
. RCS pressure starts to lower.
. SI actuates.
Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The RO will need to manually re-energize the S/R Channels due to a previous malfunction.
EPIIIAI5000IE-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION SRO (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action
. All rod bottom lights LIT NOTE: DRPI indication is no longer available.
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 32 of 42 Event
Description:
Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. hR amps GOING DOWN.
(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action
. Trip reactor.
. IF reactor will not trip...
BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action
. All throttle valves CLOSED.
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB Immediate Action ENERGIZED.
NOTE: An LOP has occurred and the Diesels will start re energizing these busses.
RO / (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP
. SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1 SI-i 8) LIT.
. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights_(1SI-14) LIT.
SRO (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
(Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (ISI-4) LIT BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK.
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):
. Groupsl,2,5DARK.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Nil-i Scenano# 3 Event# 6&7 Page 33 of 42 Event
Description:
Seismic EventiSteam Line Break/Loss of Offsite Power Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Group 3 LIT.
. OACINSERVICE.
. Group 4, Rows A through F LIT AS REQUIRED.
CRS GO TO Step 10.
ROI (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:
. MDCApumpsON.
. NIR level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.
BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps ON. NOTE: The Train A KC Pumps will re-start upon actuation of SI.
BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.
CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running.
. Start 2A RN pump.
. THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.
RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures NOTE: The 1A SG is GREATER THAN 775 psig. depressurizing.
RO (Step 14 RNO) Perform the following:
. Check the following valves closed:
. All MSIVs
. All MSIV bypass valves
. IFanyvalveopen....
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 34 of 42 Event
Description:
Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is 0 psig.
BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:
. Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG NOTE: NV Flow is 320 gpm.
FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.
. Check NC pressures LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.
. Check NI pumps INDICATING FLOW.
. Check NC pressure LESS THAN 275 PSIG.
BOP (Step 16d RNO) Perform the following:
. Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:
. 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol)
. 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).
CRS . IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.
CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRD to NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic address.
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.
RD / (Step 18) Check CA flow:
. Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
. Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 P51G.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 35 of 42 Event
Description:
Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments WHEN each SIG N!R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that SIG NIR level between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.
RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:
. IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC NOTE: All NC Pumps will be T-Avg STABLE OR TRENDING TO ON.
557°F OR
. IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T Colds STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.
(Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based on plant conditions:
IF temperature less than 557°F AND NOTE: The CRS may assign going down, THEN attempt to stop the RO to perform this action.
cooldown PER Enclosure 3 If so, RO Examiner follow (Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown).
actions of Enclosure 3.
Other Examiners follow E-0 Actions, Step 20, on Page 36.
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO (Step 1) Check steam dump valves Examiner NOTE: Follow the CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.
RO (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs CLOSED.
RO (Step 3) Check MSR RESET light LIT.
RO (Step 4) Check any NC pump ON.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni 1-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 36 of 42 Event
Description:
Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO Step 6.
RO (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:
. IF S/G NIR level is less than 11% (32%
ACC) in all S/Gs...
. WHEN NIR level is greater than 11%
(32% ACC) in at least one SIG, THEN throttle feed flow further to:
. Minimize cooldown
. Maintain at least one S/G NIR level greater than 11% (32% ACC).
RO (Step 7) Check MSIVs ANY OPEN. NOTE: All MSIVs are Closed.
(Step 7RNO) Perform the following:
. Close MSIV bypass valves.
. Exit this enclosure.
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIBOP continue HERE.
BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:
. All PzrPORVsCLOSED.
. Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.
. At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN.
BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 3 of 42 Event
Description:
Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:
. All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING NOTE: The 1A SG is UP. depressurizing.
. All SIGs PRESSURIZED.
CRS (Step 22 RNO) IF any SIG is faulted, THEN perform the following:
. IFATANYTIME both of the following conditions exist, THEN start one train of VX PER Enclosure 4 (VX Manual Start):
- Containment pressure has remained less than 3 PSIG.
- Implement EPI1IAI5000IF-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).
- GO TO EPI1IAI5000IE-2 (Faulted Steam NOTE: The CRS will transition Generator Isolation), to E-2.
EPII IAI5000IE-2, FAU LTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION RO! (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP CRS (Step 2) Maintain any faulted S/G or secondary break isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for NC System cooldown.
RO (Step 3) Check the following valves CLOSED:
- AIIMSIVs
- All MSIV bypass valves.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event# 6&7 Page 38 of 42 Event
Description:
Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 4) Check at least one SIG pressure NOTE: Although all SG STABLE OR GOING UP. pressures may be decreasing slowly, the operator will report stable based on plant conditions (i.e. faulted SG).
Otherwise a transition to ECA 2.1 will be made.
RO/ (Step 5) Identify faulted SIG(s): NOTE: The 1A SG is Faulted.
. Any S/G pressure GOING DOWN IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.
. Any S/G DEPRESSURIZED.
(Step 6) Maintain at least one S/G available for NC System cooldown in subsequent steps.
RO (Step 7) Check faulted S/G(s) SM PORV CLOSED.
BOP (Step 8) Reset CA modulating valves.
RO/ (Step 9) Isolate faulted S/G(s) as follows:
BOP RO/
- For IAS/G:
- Check S/G A FDW ISOLATED status light (1SI-4) LIT.
- Close ICA-66A (UI TD CA Pump Disch To IA SIG Isol).
- Check BB valves CLOSED:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 39 of 42 Event
Description:
Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1BB-1B (1A S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control)
. 1 BB-5A (A S/G BB Cont Inside Isol).
. Close ISM-83 (A SM Line Drain lsol).
E-2A Isolate the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that would not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).
RO (Step 10) Close IAS-12 (UI SM To AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol).
(Step 10 RNO) IF 1AS-12 will not close, THEN perform the following:
. IF controller for lAS-i 1 (Unit 1 Main Steam TO Aux Steam Hdr Control)
(Unit 1 turbine bldg, 739, on column 1F-34) is accessible, THEN dispatch operator to CLOSE lAS-il PER EP/1/A15000/G-1 (Generic Enclosure). Enclosure 4 (Closing lAS-il Using Local Controller), Step 2.
. IF controller for lAS-i 1 is not NOTE: The controller for lAS-accessible.... 11 is accessible.
BOP (Step 11) Check if S/G tubes intact as follows:
. Check the following EM Fs NORMAL:
. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust)
. 1EMF-24(S/GA)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nil-i Scenario # 3 Event# 6&7 Page 40 of 42 Event
Description:
Seismic EventlSteam Line Break/Loss of Offsite Power Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1 EMF-25 (SIG B)
. 1EMF-26(S/GC)
. 1EMF-27(S/GD).
. IF any SIG has previously been identified NOTE: There is no previously as ruptured... known SGTL.
. Notify RP to perform the following: NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
. If SIG(s) fault known to be outside containment, THEN monitor area of steam fault for radiation.
. Frisk all Unit 1 SIG cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly higher for any SIG.
. Notify Control Room of any abnormal radiation conditions.
. WHEN activity results reported, THEN notify station management to evaluate SIG activity.
ROI (Step 12) Check S/I termination criteria:
. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
. Secondary heat sink:
. N/R level in at least on intact SIG GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC)
. Total feed flow to intact S/Gs GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
. NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29%
ACC).
. GO TO EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection_Termination).
UNIT I STATUS:
Power Level: lxi 08 NCS [B] 1847 ppm Pzr [B]: 1856 ppm Xe: Per OAC amps Power History: The reactor has just been started up Core Burnup: 12 EFPDs three days after a trip from 100%
power.
CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/11A16100103 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:
- Unit 1 is at 1x10 8 amps in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase.
- It is intended to raise power on this shift.
- The CF&E Sump level is high, and the crew will need to pump the contents of the sump to the Floor Drains Tank.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:
- MCB Annunciator IAD-4, A-5, BB BLOWOFF TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).
Crew Directions:
- Pump the CF&E Sump using 0P111A165001001, Liquid Waste System.
- Raise reactor power to 2-3% and Hold in accordance with Enclosure 4.1 of OP/l/N6100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5
t h Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya