ML111640684

Entergy Answer Opposing Commonwealth of Massachusetts Conditional Motion to Suspend License Renewal Proceeding

ML111640684
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	06/13/2011
From:	Gaukler P Entergy Nuclear Generation Co, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLP
To:	NRC/OCM
SECY RAS
References
RAS 20450, 50-293-LR, ASLBP 06-848-02-LR
Download: ML111640684 (15)

Text

June 13, 2011 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Commission In the Matter of )

)

Entergy Nuclear Generation Company and ) Docket No. 50-293-LR Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. ) ASLBP No. 06-848-02-LR

)

(Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) )

)

ENTERGY ANSWER OPPOSING COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS CONDITIONAL MOTION TO SUSPEND LICENSE RENWAL PROCEEDING Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(c), Entergy Nuclear Generation Company and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (collectively Entergy) hereby oppose the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Conditional Motion to Suspend Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Proceeding Pending Resolution of Petition for Rulemaking To Rescind Spent Fuel Pool Exclusion Regulations (June 2, 2011) (Conditional Motion).1 The Conditional Motion should be denied. In addition to failing to meet the standards for suspending an ongoing licensing proceeding, the Commonwealth improperly seeks to impose on the Commission a prescribed procedure by which to consider the Commonwealths claims of new and significant information.

1 In addition to the Conditional Motion, on June 2, 2011 the Commonwealth filed (1) Commonwealth of Massachusetts' Contention Regarding New and Significant Information Revealed by the Fukushima Radiological Accident (June 2, 2011) (Contention); (2) Commonwealth of Massachusetts' Motion to Admit Contention and, if Necessary, to Re-Open Record Regarding New and Significant Information Revealed by Fukushima Accident (June 2, 2011) (Contention Motion); (3) Commonwealth of Massachusetts' Petition for Waiver of 10 C.F.R. Part 51 Subpart A, Appendix B or in the Alternative, Petition for Rulemaking to Rescind Regulations Excluding Consideration of Spent Fuel Storage Impacts From License Renewal Environmental Review (June 2, 2011)

(Waiver Petition); (4) New and Significant Information From the Fukushima Daiichi Accident in the Context of Future Operation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant; a report for Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Gordon R. Thompson, Institute for Resource and Security Studies) (June 1, 2011) (Thompson Report); and (5) Declaration of Dr. Gordon R. Thompson in Support of Commonwealth of Massachusetts' Contention and Related Petitions and Motions (June 1, 2011) (Thompson Decl.). Entergy will respond to these other filings at the time called for by the Commissions regulations.

Specifically, the Commonwealth argues that, assuming the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Licensing Board or Board) denies its Waiver Petition, rescission of the regulation excluding litigation of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) spent fuel pool issues in individual license renewal proceedings (spent fuel exclusion regulations) followed by an adjudicatory hearing on its claims of new and significant information are necessary to comply with NEPA and the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). The Commonwealths attempt runs afoul of the Supreme Courts decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), and numerous other precedents. It is long settled that NEPA imposes no hearing requirement nor establishes any other procedural requirements that would proscribe application of the Commissions procedures for considering the Commonwealths allegedly new and significant information. Furthermore, the AEA does not entitle the Commonwealth to an adjudicatory hearing on its purported new and significant information where it fails to meet the Commissions procedural requirements for a hearing. For these reasons, as well as the other grounds set forth in this Answer,2 the Commission should deny the Commonwealths Conditional Motion.

I. THE CONDITIONAL MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED The Conditional Motion should be denied because it fails to meet the Commissions standards governing suspension of licensing proceedings and because it seeks to usurp the Commissions ample discretion in determining how to address purported new and significant environmental information.

2 As an initial consideration, the Conditional Motion should be denied because it is premature. The Licensing Board has yet to rule on the Commonwealths Waiver Petition. Because the Commonwealths rulemaking petition will not activate until (and if) the Licensing Board denies the Waiver Petition, there simply is no need for the Commission to consider the Conditional Motion. Should the Licensing Board deny the Commonwealths Waiver Petition, the Commonwealth may renew its petition to suspend the Pilgrim licensing proceeding. In short, there is no need for the Commission to rule on suspension at this time.

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A. The Conditional Motion Fails to Meet the Commissions Standards for Suspension of Proceedings Before the Licensing Board The Commonwealths Conditional Motion seeks to suspend the Licensing Boards consideration and resolution of multiple filings pending before the Board that are unrelated to the Commonwealths (conditional) rulemaking petition. The Conditional Motion must be denied because it fails to meet the Commissions standards for such suspension.

The Commonwealth petitions the Commission under 10 C.F.R. § 2.802(d) to suspend the Pilgrim license renewal proceeding pending resolution of its (now dormant) rulemaking petition.

The Commission reviews such petitions to suspend under the following standard:

[W]e consider whether moving forward with the adjudication will jeopardize the public health and safety, prove an obstacle to fair and efficient decisionmaking, or prevent appropriate implementation of any pertinent rule or policy changes . . . .

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-4, 57 N.R.C. 273, 277 (2003) (denying Section 2.802(d) petition to suspend licensing proceeding pending resolution of rulemaking petition).

The Conditional Motion fails to meet these standards. First, the Commonwealth asserts no reason, and none exists, why mere continuation of this adjudicatory proceeding would result in any danger to public health and safety. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

Given the current posture of this proceeding, it is in fact suspension of this proceeding that would undermine fair and efficient decisionmaking. This proceeding is in its sixth year, notwithstanding the Commissions goal to complete license renewal proceedings in two and one half years.3 Similar to the circumstances in Diablo Canyon, CLI-03-4, 57 N.R.C. at 277, 3

In contested license renewal proceedings, the Commissions long-standing goal has been the issuance of a Commission decision in about two and one half years from the date that the application was received. Baltimore 3

resolution of the sole remaining admitted contention (as remanded by the Commission) - which represents the culmination of months of discovery, preparation, and written presentations to the Licensing Board - is imminent.4 Also pending before the Licensing Board are requests for hearing on late-filed contentions from another party that are unrelated to the Commonwealths Fukushima Daiichi concerns.5 As in Diablo Canyon, CLI-03-4, 57 N.R.C. at 277, [i]t is not sensible to postpone resolution of these unrelated issues pending consideration of the Commonwealths rulemaking petition. Moreover, portions of the Commonwealths own contention are not subject to its Waiver Petition. The Commonwealth asserts no reason, and there is none, why moving forward with adjudication on these unrelated matters pending before the Licensing Board would prevent appropriate implementation of any pertinent rule or policy change that might result from the Commissions consideration of the Commonwealths rulemaking petition.

In short, the Commonwealth offers no basis whatsoever for the Commission to order suspension of the Licensing Boards consideration of matters unrelated to its petition for rulemaking. As such, the Conditional Motion should be denied.

Gas & Electric Co. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-98-14, 48 N.R.C. 39, 42 (1998);

Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-98-17, 48 N.R.C. 123, 126 (1998). In this proceeding, Entergys application to renew the Pilgrim operating license was filed in January 2006.

4 Licensing Board Notice (June 2, 2011) (indicating that the Board anticipates ruling on remanded Pilgrim Watch Contention 3 and other filings pending before the Board in June and/or July 2011).

5 Pilgrim Watch Request for a Hearing on a New Contention (Nov. 29, 2010); Pilgrim Watch Request for a Hearing on a New Contention: Inadequacy of Entergys Aging Management of Non-Environmentally Qualified (EQ) Inaccessible Cables at Pilgrim Station (Dec. 13, 2010); Pilgrim Watch Request for Hearing on a New Contention: Inadequacy of Entergys Aging Management Program of Non-Environmentally Qualified (Non-EQ)

Inaccessible Cables (Splices) at Pilgrim Station (Jan. 20, 2011); Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing on Post Fukushima SAMA Contention (May 12, 2011); Pilgrim Watch Request for Hearing on a New Contention Regarding Inadequacy of Environmental Report Post Fukushima (June 1, 2011).

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B. Suspension of the Pilgrim Licensing Proceeding is Not Required to Ensure that the Commission Complies with NEPA and the AEA The primary focus of the Conditional Motion is the Commonwealths assertion that, in order for the Commission to meet the requirements of NEPA and the AEA, the Commission must suspend the Pilgrim licensing renewal proceeding, rescind the spent fuel exclusion regulation, and provide the Commonwealth with an adjudicatory hearing on its purportedly new and significant information. The Commonwealths position puts the cart before the horse, to say the least. Neither NEPA nor the AEA support the Commonwealths radical attempt to usurp the Commissions discretion and to dictate to the Commission how it must consider the Commonwealths purportedly new and significant environmental information.

1. NEPA requires no hearing and does not revoke application of the Commissions procedural requirements The Conditional Motion greatly overstates what the Commission is procedurally required to do under NEPA with respect to the Commonwealths alleged new and significant information.

The Commonwealth contends that the Pilgrim license renewal proceeding must be suspended to allow sufficient time for the Commission to consider the Commonwealths alternative petition for rulemaking and to rescind the spent fuel exclusion regulations, and further argues that rescission of the regulations is necessary to ensure that the Commonwealth receives a hearing on its NEPA claim regarding new and significant information, which is allegedly material to the Pilgrim NPP license renewal decision. Conditional Motion at 2, 4 (emphasis added).

However, NEPA requires nothing of the sort. The Commonwealths mere allegation of new and significant information does not straightjacket the Commission as the Commonwealth would 5

contend into holding a hearing on the Commonwealths contention,6 or taking any other procedural steps that the Commonwealth may claim are necessary to implement NEPA.

[T]he only procedural requirements imposed by NEPA are those stated in the plain language of the Act. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548 (citation omitted). Although NEPA requires that an agency fully consider environmental issues, NEPA does not itself provide for a hearing on those issues. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 F.2d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir.

1990) (UCS II). See also San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 635 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2011). Nor does NEPA alter the procedures employed (or not employed) by an agency for considering environmental issues. See UCS II 920 F.2d at 56 (citing Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548). Indeed, the First Circuit has already rejected a similar Commonwealth claim in this proceeding that sought to usurp the Commissions discretion. In response to the Commonwealths concern that the NRCs proposed procedure would subject the Commonwealths NEPA claim to the NRCs unfettered discretion to grant or withhold a stay of the licensing proceedings, the First Circuit responded:

Again, although NEPA does impose an obligation on the NRC to consider environmental impacts of the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee license renewal before issuing a final decision, the statute does not mandate how the agency must fulfill that obligation. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332; Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 100-01, 103; Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548. Beyond "the statutory minima" imposed by NEPA, Vt.

Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548, 98 S. Ct. 1197the implementing procedures are committed to the agency's judgment. In theory, what fetters the agency's decision-making process and ensures ultimate compliance with NEPA is judicial review.

Massachusetts, 522 F.3d at 130 (emphasis in original).

6 As the Commission has previously held in this proceeding, and as affirmed by the First Circuit, adjudicating Category 1 environmental issues site by site based merely on a claim of new and significant information would defeat the purpose of resolving generic issues by a rule. Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-14, 71 N.R.C. __ slip op. at 36 (June 17, 2010), citing Massachusetts v. NRC, 522 F.3d 115, 120-21 & 125-27 (2008) (CLI-10-14) 6

Thus, it is clear that NEPA does not prescribe how the Commission must consider proffered evidence of new and significant information. Accordingly, NEPA does not require that the NRC abandon its procedures every time someone alleges new and significant information.

UCS II, 920 F.2d at 55 (it [is] unreasonable to suggest that the NRC must disregard its procedural timetable every time a party realizes based on NRC environmental studies that maybe there was something after all to challenge it either originally opted not to make or which simply did not occur to it at the outset) (footnote omitted). Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287, 292 (1st Cir. 1973), relied upon by the Commonwealth (Conditional Motion at 5), is not to the contrary.

In the very same sentence expressing the proposition cited by the Commonwealth that an agencys NEPA duties are non-discretionary, the First Circuit goes on to state that an agencys non-discretionary NEPA duties are to be reflected in the procedural process by which agencies render decisions. Silva, 473 F.2d at 292 (emphasis added).

For the NRCs consideration of purportedly new and significant information, these procedural processes include those governing late-filed contentions. UCS II, 920 F.2d at 55 (approving of NRCs application of the late-filing requirements); Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311, 334 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991). They also include application of the requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 2.326 for reopening a closed record. New Jersey Envtl. Fedn v. NRC, No. 09-2567, 2011 WL 1878642 at *10-11 (3d Cir. May 18, 2011)

(approving of application of reopening standards to alleged new information); Ohio v. NRC, 814 F.2d 258, 262 (6th Cir. 1987) (same). They also include the requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b) for the waiver of a Commission regulation. Massachusetts, 522 F.3d at 127 (approving of the NRCs rule waiver requirements). In short, numerous courts have approved the NRCs 7

procedural requirements, and nothing in NEPA proscribes application of those procedures or requires an adjudicatory hearing.

The Commonwealths claim that its purportedly new and significant information [m]ust be [c]onsidered in a [s]upplemental [environmental impact statement (EIS)] (Conditional Motion at 5 (emphasis added)) is likewise erroneous. As with the Commonwealths attempt to rope the Commission into an adjudicatory hearing, the Commonwealths mere claim of purportedly new and significant information does not require supplementation of the EIS.7 Supreme Court precedent makes clear that NEPA does not require that an agency supplement an EIS every time new information comes to light after the EIS is finalized because to require otherwise would render agency decisionmaking intractable. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res.

Council, 490 U.S. 360, 373 (1989) (footnote omitted). Rather, supplementation of an EIS on the basis of new information is required only where the new information paint[s] a seriously different picture of the environmental landscape. Private Fuel Storage, LLC (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-06-3, 63 N.R.C. 19, 28 (2006) (quoting National Comm.

for the New River v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1323, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2004), quoting City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 274 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)).8 Furthermore, following the Supreme Courts mandate in Vermont Yankee, the courts have allowed agencies to employ many different approaches for determining whether allegedly new and significant impacts are sufficiently significant to warrant supplemental analysis and 7

CLI-10-14 at 36. See supra note 6.

8 As articulated by the Commission in its denial of the Commonwealths previous rulemaking petition, for new information to be significant for an issue addressed in the GEIS, the new information must be [i]nformation that was not considered in the analyses summarized in NUREG-1437 and that leads to an impact finding different from that codified in 10 CFR Part 51. The Attorney General of Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the Attorney General of California; Denial of Petitions for Rulemaking, 73 Fed. Reg. 46,204, 46,208 (Aug. 8, 2008)

(Rulemaking Denial) (emphasis added).

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formal supplementation of existing NEPA documents. Among other examples, Federal Courts have approved (1) an agencys internal reevaluation of projected impacts from new information, North Idaho Community Action Network, 545 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2008); (2) use of an agency-requested expert analysis, Highway J Citizens Group v. Mineta, 349 F.3d 938, 959-60 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004); (3) an agency record of decision based on review of previous NEPA documents, Hodges v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 446, 448 (4th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003); and (4) an agency supplemental information report based on agency-requested expert analysis, Marsh, 490 U.S. at 383-85. In short, neither a supplemental EIS nor an environmental assessment is required to document an agencys determination that new information does not have a significant environmental impact.

Thus, there are many different avenues by which an agency can document its conclusion that alleged new and significant information is neither. In this case, because of the procedures the Commonwealth has followed, both the Licensing Board and the NRC Staff will have occasion to consider the Commonwealths alleged new and significant information. Under the Commissions applicable procedural regulations, the Licensing Board will evaluate the Commonwealths claims of new and significant information under the Commissions record reopening standards (10 C.F.R. § 2.306) and its rule waiver standards (10 C.F.R. 2.335(b)). The Commonwealths assertion that [i]t is not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove, in its contention or waiver petition, that the new and significant information would, as a matter of certainty, change the outcome of the environmental analysis (Conditional Motion at 5), is a strawman. Neither the reopening standards nor the rule waiver standards require such proof, but they do require a substantive, substantial showing by the Commonwealth of the presumptive validity of its claims of new and significant information. Among other criteria, a request to 9

reopen the hearing record will not be granted unless the request demonstrate[s] that a materially different result would be or would have been likely had the newly proffered evidence been considered initially. 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(a)(3) (emphasis added). Likewise with respect to a waiver petition, among other things, the petitioner must make a prima facie showing (i.e.,

legally sufficient to establish a fact or case unless disproved9) that special circumstances were not considered, either explicitly or by necessary implication, in the rulemaking proceeding leading to the rule which show that the application of the regulation would not serve the purpose for which it was adopted. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-05-24, 62 N.R.C. 551, 559-60 (2005).10 These standards are similar to those required for supplementation of an EIS, i.e., new and significant information that paints a seriously different picture of the environmental landscape.

Accordingly, the application of these standards to the Commonwealths purportedly new and significant information would constitute the required hard look under NEPA often referred to by the Commonwealth under the case law discussed above. In other words, before the Commonwealths (now conditional) petition for rulemaking reaches the Commission, the Commonwealths claims of new and significant information will presumably have been fully considered by the Licensing Board. Thus, should the Licensing Board deny the Waiver Petition, 9

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-653, 16 N.R.C. 55, 72 (1981) (emphasis added).

10 The NRCs record reopening standards and rule waiver requirements ensure that, for examples relevant here, a long-closed hearing record is not reopened and a longstanding rule is not challenged in an individual licensing proceeding, based on mere allegation that new and significant information exists. Otherwise, a hearing record would never remain closed, and there would be no point in promulgating rules of generic applicability.

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the Commission need not suspend the Pilgrim license renewal proceeding pending its consideration of the Commonwealths rulemaking petition.11 C. The AEA does not guarantee the Commonwealth a right to an adjudicatory hearing on its alleged new information The Commonwealth again overstates the Commissions statutory obligations in asserting that it is entitled to an adjudicatory hearing merely because it asserts new information related to an issue material to whether the NRC should relicense Pilgrim, namely concerning severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs). Conditional Motion at 7-8. This is not the case.

The Commonwealth is not guaranteed an adjudicatory hearing by merely raising such allegedly new information as it seems to claim. Rather, the Commonwealth must satisfy the applicable Commission procedural requirements for raising new information in an ongoing licensing proceeding. UCS II, 920 F.2d at 55.

In UCS II, the D.C. Circuit further explained its holding in Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985)

(UCS I) (relied on by the Commonwealth, Conditional Motion at 7). The D.C. Circuit distinguished between the NRCs foreclosing of any opportunity to raise a material issue (the subject of USC I) and the NRCs application of its procedural requirements to new information 11 In addition, the Commission, in its discretion, could make an interim finding on the sufficiency of the alleged new and significant information based, in part, on the responsive filings submitted by Entergy and the NRC Staff and decline to suspend the licensing proceeding pending completion of its consideration of the rulemaking petition.

See Diablo Canyon, CLI-03-4, 57 N.R.C. at 277. Should the Licensing Boards denial of the Waiver Petition be based solely on narrow grounds (e.g., that the special circumstances are not unique to the facility rather than common to a large class of facilities, Millstone, CLI-05-24, 64 N.R.C. at 560), the Commission should require the same prima facie showing by the Commonwealth to suspend the Pilgrim licensing proceeding pending disposition of the Commonwealths alternative rulemaking petition. As the Commission has recognized, mere assertion of new and significant information is not sufficient to negate the effect of a generic rule because it would defeat the purpose of resolving generic issues in a GEIS. See note 6, supra. Likewise, if the mere filing of a rulemaking petition asserting new and significant information were sufficient to delay the issuance of the renewed license, as claimed by the Commonwealth here, a party could repeatedly file such petitions to stop the relicensing. Such a result would also defeat the purpose of resolving generic issues in a GEIS.

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or evidence concerning material issues that were apparent at the outset of the proceeding. UCS II, 920 F.2d at 55. In upholding the NRCs authority to apply its balancing test for late-filed contentions to such new information, the D.C. Circuit explicitly held that it would be unreasonable to suggest that the NRC must disregard its procedural timetable every time a party realizes based on NRC environmental studies that maybe there was something after all to a challenge it either originally opted not to make or which simply did not occur to it at the outset.

UCS II, 920 F.2d at 55 (footnote omitted).

The same rationale applies here. The Commonwealth is not entitled to an adjudicatory hearing on its contention unless it satisfies the Commissions procedural requirements. The Commonwealth has it backwards in asserting that the Commission should rescind the spent fuel pool exclusion regulations in order to provide the Commonwealth the hearing to which it is entitled. Conditional Motion at 7. Rather, under UCS II, the Commission fulfills its statutory obligations by applying, inter alia, its procedural requirements for reopening a record, waiver of a rule (for those aspects of its contention requiring such a waiver), and late-filed contentions to the purportedly new and significant information that the Commonwealth claims the Commission must consider. Were this not the case, NRC proceedings could come to a halt each and every time someone made a mere allegation of new information.

Because no adjudicatory hearing is required unless the Commissions procedural requirements for considering new information are met, the Commission is not required to suspend the Pilgrim license renewal proceeding pending consideration of the Commonwealths claims.

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II. CONCLUSION For the above stated reasons, the Commission should deny the Conditional Motion and not suspend the Pilgrim license renewal proceeding should the Licensing Board deny the Commonwealths Waiver Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

/Signed electronically by Paul A. Gaukler/

______________________________

David R. Lewis Paul A. Gaukler Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-1128 Phone: (202) 663-8000 E-mail: paul.gaukler@pillsburylaw.com Counsel for Entergy Dated: June 13, 2011 13

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Commission In the Matter of )

)

Entergy Nuclear Generation Company and ) Docket No. 50-293-LR Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. )

) ASLBP No. 06-848-02-LR (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of Entergy Answer Opposing Commonwealth of Massachusetts Conditional Motion to Suspend License Renewal Proceeding, dated June 13, 2011, was provided to the Electronic Information Exchange for service on the individuals below, this 13th day of June, 2011.

Secretary Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-16 C1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-mail: OCAAMAIL@nrc.gov Washington, DC 20555-0001 hearingdocket@nrc.gov Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Ann Marshall Young, Esq., Chair Dr. Paul B. Abramson Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop T-3 F23 Mail Stop T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Ann.Young@nrc.gov Paul.Abramson@nrc.gov Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Dr. Richard F. Cole Mail Stop T-3 F23 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop T-3 F23 Washington, DC 20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Richard.Cole@nrc.gov

Susan L. Uttal, Esq. Matthew Brock, Assistant Attorney General Andrea Z. Jones, Esq. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Brian Harris, Esq. Office of the Attorney General Beth Mizuno, Esq. One Ashburton Place Office of the General Counsel Boston, MA 02108 Mail Stop O-15 D21 Martha.Coakley@state.ma.us U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Matthew.Brock@state.ma.us Washington, DC 20555-0001 Susan.Uttal@nrc.gov ;

andrea.jones@nrc.gov ;

brian.harris@nrc.gov ;

beth.mizuno@nrc.gov Ms. Mary Lampert Sheila Slocum Hollis, Esq.

148 Washington Street Duane Morris LLP Duxbury, MA 02332 505 9th Street, NW mary.lampert@comcast.net Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20006 sshollis@duanemorris.com Mr. Mark D. Sylvia Richard R. MacDonald Town Manager Town Manager Town of Plymouth 878 Tremont Street 11 Lincoln St. Duxbury, MA 02332 Plymouth, MA 02360 macdonald@town.duxbury.ma.us msylvia@townhall.plymouth.ma.us Chief Kevin M. Nord Katherine Tucker, Esq.

Fire Chief and Director, Duxbury Emergency Law Clerk, Management Agency Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 688 Tremont Street Mail Stop T3-E2a P.O. Box 2824 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Duxbury, MA 02331 Washington, DC 20555-0001 nord@town.duxbury.ma.us Katie.Tucker@nrc.gov

/Signed electronically by Paul A. Gaukler/

_______________________________

Paul A. Gaukler 402952588 2