ML102920344

Email - from: Williams, Charles R. (Charles.Williams@Pgnmail.Com) to: Lake, Louis; Thomas, George; Nausdj@Ornl.Gov Dated Tuesday, November 24, 2009 7:17 Am Subject: Refute 8.1 for Review Attachments: Fm 8.1.ppt; Item 115-1992 Bs Event.Pdf;

ML102920344
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	11/24/2009
From:	Williams C Progress Energy Co
To:	Lake L, Naus D, George Thomas NRC/RGN-II, Oak Ridge
References
FOIA/PA-2010-0116
Download: ML102920344 (80)

Text

Franke, Mark From: Williams, Charles R. [CDýarles.Wlliams@pgnmail.com]

Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2009.7:17 AM To: Lake, Louis; Thomas, George; nausdj@ornl.gov 2.?

Subject:

Refute 8.1 for Review Attachments: FM 8.1 .ppt; Item 115 - 1992 BS event.pdf; Item 136 - 1992 BS event - strip chart annotated.pdf; 1992 BS Actuation.pdf Mr Lake, I am resending due to difficulty with opening/reading the previous attachments. Again, this is prelim. Call me with questions. It looks like I will need to send each one as separate emails to keep from mixing documents.

Thank you, Charles Williams ;J 919-516-7417 1

8.1 Prior spray event leading to low pressure inside containment May identify additional perspective on this DeiMina P issue as RCA related efforts proceeds

Description:

The containment spray event of October, 1992 resulted in an injection of about 9400 gallons of borated water into the reactor building (RB) atmosphere. The event resulted in a decrease in RB internal pressure.

Data to be Collected and Analyzed:

1. Review problem report of October 16, 1992 and associated containment atmosphere pressure graph.

(Exhibit 1)

2. Review Design bases for containment, FSAR Chapter 5. (Exhibit 2)

Verified Refuting Evidence: Verified Supporting Evidence:

The RB pressure excursion from the 1992 containment spray event did not result in the containment pressure exceeding the design criteria for the RB.

Reviewed by: Marci Cooper, 352-795-6486, ext 1030 - PII CR3 Team Office P11 ~

11/23/2009 11/23/2009 1 1

a-C .'

13 20 F E-

01) 5 , f Si40 0 L-15; 1az':JCt 6~C~ I ..

0.....

-. 11.1 -a-.

I -

Li

+50 -4 A 2 Cl 3 1)2 4 C

• I .59 1 Ci)

RL 0 B L E N R E P 0 RT NUMBER: PR 2-* 4

{irTitte /

Subject:

INTRODUCTION OF BORATED WATER TO THE REACTOR BUILDING ATMOSPHERE.

• )Description of the Condition/Event: DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF SP-340B,RECIRCULATION OF THE BWST WITH BSP-1A, THE CONTROL OARD OPERATOR OPENED BSV-3 TO INCREASE RECIRCULATION FLOW, THIS ALLOWED BORATED WATER FROM THE DISCHARGE OF BUILDING SPRAY PUMP 1A TO BE ADMITTED TO THE REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY HEADER. THE WATER THEN SPRAYED INTO THE REACTOR BUILDING ATMOSPHERE. RNG-18 WENT INTO HIGH ALARM AND THE PLANT EXPERIENCED SIGNS OF A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK. PLANT POWER WAS MANUALLY REDUCED BY ABOUT 8% IN RESPONSE TO THE SUSPECTED REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK. THE REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY PUMP WAS THEN SECURED. PLANT CONDITIONS STABILIZED WHEN THE BUILDING SPRAY PUMP WAS SECURED. INITIAL ESTIMATES OF WATER THAT ENTERED THE REACTOR BUILDING FROM THE BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK ARE APPROXIMATELY 9,400 GALLONS.

(3}lequirement(s) Violated: TO BE DETERMINED (4)wAsociated/ReLated Docuets: SP-340B (5) lmuedfate Actions Taken (if Eny): STOP BSP-1A, DECREASE PLANT POWER, ENSURE BSV-3. rA.-.O .

, )Nethod of Discovery: INCREASED REACTOR BUILDING SUMP LEVEL, DECREASE IN REACTOR BUILDING TEMPERATURE, DECREASING BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK LEVEL, RNG-18 IN HIGH ALARM.

(7)Suspected Causes (check all that q~ear to apply):

[ X] PersonneL Error C 3 Inadequate Procedure/Document C ] Equipment FaiLure/HaLfunction [ I Design Error I I Unknown I I Other (describe):

tejEqu~ld nt Tag Nmber(s):N/A e}Vendor Nam (if kImow): N/A (1o) Recomendations for Resolving the Probiem (if any):TO BE DETERMINED.

(1q)Orig~fltor (pdnt*am.): IVAN WILSOW .(7 , Date: 10-15-92 (12) SLWervisor1Nunager Revleu and Initial CLASSIFICATION:

PR is a SUSPECTED DESIGN BASIS ISSUE? CX3 NO I I YES QpYES,CjayPR-Smlgn,*Mc0Q PR is Classified as: I XI SIGNIFICANT CI NONSIGNIFICANT Comments:

(13) ResponsIble Dept: OPERATIONS Accepted By: ~

(14) Saq~fW/ (ssnt masgn): pPR Issue Date:

,O Pf*f

PROBLEM REPORT FORM AND ATTACHMENT A ENCLOSURE I (Page 1 of 4)

PROBLEM S REPORT Number: PR M.* . Is ITUIt, lme, Am IIm r IN IIm :W U M IM IfWZll ii i (1) letto / Jm vi (2) ki tilm 40 the ewitiowlvw (3) lmtd rN Viet i(sll C I ' I I I @rI~ 9r I 1 iell li opl i ol , I )owl" lprw (Ils k . -:Iu - filn Sm ' i i "- )f: IIi - --

(i ) Ur si ro._ i68T i '

(o s I. for Iosisu ( "! lll Pt I ui e o lIIa IN 1 io iuur Cteu~don rI p Sm amWIN PONT.at 9 CP-111 Rev. 47 Page 33

PPR OOBLEM REPORT Number: PR 92 - 0144_

{1) Plethol of PerfclinI Cause Analysis:

E X] Structured Analysis I Deductive Logic ]I Apparent/Suspected Cause (2) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN CCAP):

Primary Cause (describe and justify):

Personnel error, failure to apply proper self-checking measures to ensure adequate comprehension and correct implementation of required procedurul guidance. Refer to NPES report number 92-02 for details.

Associated Corrective Action:

Refer to attached Summary/Status Sheets for entire Corrective Action Plan.

Assigned Dept/Or: Refer to attached Sumnary Status Sheets. Completion Date: Refer to attached Summary Status sheets.

Sheets.

Secondary Cause (describe and justification):

Human Engineering deficiencies in the procedural guidance may have been a contributing factor. Insufficient training in operator self-checking/cross-checking methods and techniques may have been a contributing factor.

Refer to NPES Report ruwter 92-02 for details.

Associated Corrective Action:

Refer to attached Sunmary/Status Sheets for entire Corrective Action Plan.

Assigned Dept/Or:Refer to attached Summary Status Sheets. Completion Date: Refer to attached Summary Status sheets.

C I Additional Causes and Associated Corrective Actions are Continued on Page:

13) DIspositioning of Noncforftng Equipmemt/Iaterial:

C I N/A (no nonoonforrn-ng equipment or materiel Involved) 1 3 Accept-As-Is* E I Repair* C ] Rework EX I Other Cdescribe): Except for RM-G18 and AHF-51A. we are not aware of any other nonconforming eQuioment or material.

However. the results of the Short Lona Term AndAction plans may identify additional iteme.

• Engineering Justification and Approval Required for these Dispositions (document on form or attach)

(4) OwetaPed by lprint & slgn(: Tomi Metcaltf Date:i 3 9 (5) Aproved by (print &sgn) W.M. MarshaL t Date: "

~Comnt$: ~.rS~~~

(1) Technical lRevi ( nt&slignli: qSd.* Cq Date: /I.

(2) Ceap I ance Review By (print a sign) Date:

(3) PC: NTGNo. D - Date-

ý I Vts OF * * *C * *< -1* 17,l 3'*

(1) Technical Reviewer (print &sign): GH .

(21 Final, Pwaw Kwewer ( It& s 1:

0 Date:

Ii

PROB LEM REPORT Number: PR92 - 0144_

Corrective Action Plan (CAP) Continuation .POW:_

STATUS

SUMMARY

OF HPES ACTION PLAN PLANNED ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBILITY DUE DATE

1. Enhance administrative guidance to ensure appropriate surveillance Completed 11/4/92. Operations N/A activities include a pre-job briefing. Examples of enhanced pre-briefing checklist items:

a) Potential need for a additional implementing personnel/operators; i.e. independent procedure reader or verifier.

b) Potential need for direct supervision and observation during performance of critical steps or activities.

2. Affected operator to prepare a Lessons Learned paper/report on the Action assigned to Operations. 1/30/93 importance and methods of seLfchecking; (it may be necessary to consider operator.

other alternatives if industry information is unavailable).

3. Affected NCB Operator wilL be couwelled by appropriate tine Completed Operations. N/A management. 10/29/92.

4. Enhance applicable procedural guidance to address the following SP-340E changes ISI Group SP-340E aspects: are PRC approved revision to a) Additional barriers to preclude incorrect valve manipulation, and procedure is be issued by Examples: prior to starting pump, ensure RB spray valve is closed being typed and 12/30/92.

or placed in manual/closed position or ftag (tag) valve control expected to be devise. issued by 12/7/92. SP-3408 revision to b) Provide applicable CAUTION or NOTE statements immediately prior be issued by to adjusting flow or starting pump. 1/30/93.

c) Ensure guidance designates primary operator and locations of associated components.

d) Ensure individual guidance/sentence structure adequately emphasizes both the required action and the component acted upon.

5. Enhance scheduled operator training to include current industry Training Training Include in setfchecking and crosachecking methods and techniques; (it may be evaluating next re-quaL.

necessary to consider other alternatives if industry information is resources. training and unavailable), have alt crews trained by June 30, 1993.

Accepted by J. Smith 12/1/92.

PROBLEM REPORT Number: PR92-0144 Corrective Action PLan (CAP) Continuation P11e:_.

STATUS SUMMIARY OF REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN PLANED ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBILITY DUE DATE 1 Walkdown MCI thoroughly and Short Term instruction 92-019; Short Term action Item for Reported as complete; refer frequently to monitor for performed SP-300 twice per SNES fottowup item to evaluate to Short Term action item failed instruments and shift for one week. Evaluate continued need for Short Term #5.

components. need to extend Short Term instruction.

instruction.

2. Determine areas and Completed. Engineering N/A N/A components which need to be identified appropriate checked for indication of areas/components and water damage. participated in initiaL RB watkdown, 10/15/92.

3. Drain BS header. Completed. N/A N/A

4. Drain LOT-4A and LOT-41. Completed. Approximately 65 N/A N/A gal. of water and 2.5 gat of L/water emulsion.

5. Evaluate CRDNs and service Engineering participated in NPSE92-0483; Long term action Refer to Long Term action structure for adverse initial RB walkdown, no to inspect and clean sll CROM item #4.

effects. problems were noted, stators, PI Tube connections &

Thermal Couple connections.

SNES to ensure action is completed.

6. Coordinate pumping RB sump CompLeted 10/15/92. N/A N/A to MWST. Approximately 5400 gal.

7. AccLaumLate a list of known CompLeted, refer to N/A N/A damage and effects. Engineering Assessment,

_PSE92-0472.

8. Generate RB entry permits Completed, refer to N/A N/A and perform initial RB Engineering Assessment, watkdown. NPSE92-0472.

9. verify BSV-3 is closed. Completed; BSV-3 verified N/A N/A closed.

10. Report that LOT-4A and CompLeted, event number 24431 N/A N/A LOT-48 exceeded design basis Limits.

11. Verify reportability of Completed. Event itself is N/A M/A the event, not reportable; but exceeding LOT level limits is

. __reportable.

12. Return auxiltiory steam Completed. N/A N/A from Units 1/2.

13. Determine what actions Ongoing Nuclear Safety Supervisor. Prior to 9M outage.

were taken at other plants having similar events.

PROBLEM REPORT Number: PR92 - 0144 Corrective Action PLan (CAP) Continuation Pag.;.+/-

STATUS

SUMMARY

OF SHORT TERN AND FOLLOWUP ACTION PLAN PLANNED ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBILITY DUE DATE 1 Perform SP-150; Operability Reported as complete Operations, Since all items are reported and Functional Check of Loose as complete; per agreement Parts Monitoring Subsystem. with J. Terry, issue a Compare pre & post incident single NOTES item to Jim data. Terry for all 5 Short Term items; due 12/30/92.

2. Perform confidence checks Reported as complete I&C Shop See above.

of NI-1 cables from control room.

3. Place AC and DC RCP Lift Reported as complete Operations. See above.

oft Pumps is service. ........ .......

4. Trend RB Service Structure Reported as ecmpLete CODN System Engineer. See above.

Temperatures to monitor RB Shroud Fan health.

5. Evaluate need to extend Reported as complete NPSE I&C Section. See above.

Short Term Operating Instruction for increased frequency of SP-300 data collection based on instrument trends.

PROBLEM REPORT Number: PR92 - 0144 Corrective Action Plan (CAP) Continuation Ps;.g.:

STATUS SUMARY OF LONG TERM ACTION PLAN PLANNED ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBILITY DUE DATE

1. RB Instrumentation general waLkdown. Work request 302825 Nuclear Integrated Prior to 9N outage re-written. Scheduling; accepted by start.

H. Koon, 12/2/92. N.

Koon requests a sintl NOTES item for all the Long Term actions.

2. RCP motors with specific inspection NOTES item 20340A & SNES See #1 above.

criteria. including: 203405 assigned to SNES.

oil sample analysis AC & OC Lift oil purp motors motor instrumentation conduit inspection for boron.

3. NOV inspections for stem corrosion and Work request 302861 See #1 above. See #1 above.

other degraded conditions, written.

4. Inspect & clean all CRDN stators, Pi Work request 300074 See #1 above. See #1 above.

Tube connections and Thermal Couple written.

connections.

S. Inspection and maintenance requirements Work requests written: See #1 above. See #1 above.

for allo Re cranes. 302757, 302576, 302759, 302761.

6. AHF-¶A/1B/1C for boron in cooling coils Work requests written: See #1 above. See #1 above.

and other inspections points. 302820, 102521, 302822.

7. AHF-2A/2B filter rack replacement. Work request written: See #1 above. See #1 above.

278371, 290257 A

8. AHF-51A motor replacement. Work request 32B See #1 above. See #1 above.

written. 122"11 "W

9. ALL ANF-51 handLing fan motor Work request written: See #1 above. See #1 above.

Inspections.30760cu QR&A t

10. Snubber inspections. Work request 302838 See #1 above. See #1 above.

written.

11. Conduit/cable inspections, including: Work request 302674 See #1 above. See #1 above.

cable in cable tray written.

cable in conduit EQ circuitry weep hole inspections

12. Containment Spray System Nozzle check SP-183 activity. See #1 above. See #1 above.

(SP-183).

Information on Inadvertent Reactor Building Spraydown of 10/15/92 Time of event:

Commenced 1205, terminated 1218 (based on REDAS indication of BWST level)

Amount sprayed:

Approximately 8500 gallons (based on level change in the BWST as displayed by REDAS)

Approximate flowrate:

Approximately 650 gallons per minute (based on above data)

Apparent cause:

Operator error. The control board operator, while performing step 4.7.1 of SP-340, attempted to increase BS flow to the required specification. Instead of using BSV-28 (manual recirc throttle valve located in the field) as noted in the procedure, he used BSV-3 (automatic flow control valve located on the main control board). This diverted flow from the recirc line to the RE spray header.

Present intentions:

Hold power at present level of approximately 91% until PRC and DNPO have reviewed the event and cleared the plant for return to full power operation.

Action Plan:

1. Walk down main control board thoroughly and frequently to look for indication of failed instruments or components.

Status: Ongoing per Short Term Instruction 92-019, which requires performance of SP-300 Control Room Log twice per shift until the results of an engineering analysis are complete. In addition, shift supervision will respond conservatively to all failed or degraded equipment, up to and including prompt plant~shutdown.

2. Determine areas and components which need to be checked for indication of water damage.

Status: Engineering participated in the initial RB walkdown on 10/15/92. Specific recommendations are due by 1030 10/16/92.

3. Drain the BS header.

Status: Complete.

4. Drain LOT-4A/B.

Status: Complete. Approximately 65 gallons of water and 2.5 gallons of an oil/water emulsion were drained.

Analysis of the water showed 2262 ppm boron (BWST.

boron analysis is 2385 ppm boron).

5. Evaluate CRDMs and service structure for adverse effects.

Status: Engineering participated in the initial RB walkdown on 10/15/92, including a quick scan of the service structure area. No obvious problems were observed.

Specific recommendations are due by 1030 10/16/92.

6. Coordinate pumping RB sump to the MWST.

Status: Complete. Approximately 5400 gallons were pumped to the MWST on 10/15/92.

7. Accumulate a list of known damage and effects.

Status: Ongoing. Problems noted to date include:

RM-G18 failed high at the onset of the event.

Instrument went straight to a failed high condition without going into warning first, indicating probable electronics failure.

AHF-51A failed following the event. Initially the breaker for AHF-51A/E/I tripped (the three fans are supplied from one breaker). Investigation revealed that the A fan was failed. This fan was determed and the AHF-51E/I fans were repowered;

8. Perform initial RB walkdown.

Status: Complete. The following comments were compiled from input of the operations, engineering, health physics, and management personnel present:

Generally all areas inside the reactor building are dry. Floor areas on all levels showed some standing water, and some gang boxes on the 160' elevation had standing water on top (only those gang boxes with dished tops). No other components were observed to be wet, including junction boxes, transmitters, electrical panels, motors, fans, etc.

It appeared that some floor drains on the 95'.

elevation overflowed during the event. This was evidenced by a visible "bathtub ring' effect surrounding these drains. A significant amount of a black substance appears to have been flushed from these drains to the surrounding floor areas.

The incore pit area, shallow end of the fuel transfer canal, service structure, and catwalks around the fuel transfer canal were dry. In

addition the pressurizer heater power panels were dry.

The RB humidity did not appear to be abnormal or excessive.

When the BS header drain valve (BSV-50) was opened, significant flow was observed. The header was obviously full, and took approximately an hour to drain.

The following problems apparently unrelated to the event were noted:

MUV-22 is leaking at a rate of approximately 10 drops per minute. There is a large buildup of boron crystals, including severalstalactites, on the valve, and large amounts of boron crystals under the valve and on the surrounding floor area.

NGV-66 (nitrogen regulator to the A OTSG) is leaking at a rate of approximately 200 drops per minute. This water is OTSG secondary side fluid. Photographs of the area show crystal buildup on a pipe below the valve; however, this does NOT appear to be boron but rather crystal buildup from a substance leached out of the pipe insulation.

Oil was observed on the floor beneath AHF-IA.

The condensate drains on AHF-IA and 1B are not being collected by the funnels. Local air flow is blowing the water away from the funnels.

AHF-2A appears to have a cooler leak.

9. Verify BSV-3 is closed.

Status: Complete. BSV-3 has been confirmed shut.

10. Report LOT-4A/B exceeding design basis limits (>14%).

Status: Complete (Event number 24431).

11. Generate RB entry permits.

Status: Complete.

12. Verify reportability of the event.

Status: Complete. RB spraydown event is NOT reportable in and of itself but WAS reported as noted in 10.

above. There appeared to be more NRC interest in the RB spraydown event than in the LOT-4A/B aspects.

SSOD, SOTA, and Shift Manager all concur with the determination that the RB spraydown event is not reportable.

13. Return auxiliary steam from Units 1/2.

Status: Complete.

14. Determine what actions were taken at other plants having similar events.

Status: Ongoing. No results available yet.

ENCLOSR 19 (Page 1 of 2)

PRE-JOB BRIEFING CHECKLIST JOB DESCRIPTION PERSON-IN CHARGE EXPECTED START TIME/DATE I PERSONS IN ATTENDANCE CHECK (/)

PROCEDURES:

LIST ANY TO BE USED DISCUSS FLOW PATH(S)

DISCUSS PREVIOUS PROBLEM AREA(S)

WALK THROUGH NEEDED (V/N)  ; COMPLETED (Y/N)

This activity warrants additional personnel, i.e. A procedure reader, operator, or other personnel (V/N) ..  ; completed (Y/N)

This activity warrants direct or continuous supervision (Y/N); _ completed (Y/N) -

. PARTS:

FILTERS --- GASKETS --- O-RINGS --- TOOLS --- HOSES --- SLEEVING ---

EQUIPMENT FROM CAL LAB DISPOSITION OF OLD PARTS SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS:

SCAFFOLDING/LADDERS/WORK PLATFORMS SCAFFOLDING IN THE WAY? (WILL "IT" FIT?)

CONFINED SPACE (AI-1805)?

MEANS OF EGRESS/ESCAPE RESPIRATORY PROTECTION REQUIRED?

HEAT STRESS (AI-1801)?

TOXIC WASTE?

REVIEW MSDS IF APPLICABLE SAFETY BELTS BACK SPRAINS REVIEW APPROPRIATE CLEARANCE(S)

AI-500 Rev. 74 Page 94

4.8 PRE-JOB BRIEFINGS 4.8.1 5500 Briefing Occasionally, certain tasks will arise which will be beyond the' scope of day-to-day routines.

- Such tasks could include:

o Infrequently performed evolutions.

o Unusual evolutions.

o Multi-departmental evolutions.

- As an aid to forestall the unexpected, the Pre-Job Briefing Checklist (Enclosure 19) should be utilized.

o This checklist provides for a review of conditions that are encountered in everyday practices but could be overlooked from time-to-time due to varying circumstances.

o The Nuclear Shift Supervisor will determine when this checklist should be completed and whom is responsible for having it completed.

4.8.2 Briefing by DNPO Director, Nuclear Plant Operations Briefing For every infrequently performed test or evolution involving the core, reactivity control, or reactor protection, or potentially leading to a reactivity transient, a briefing shall be given by the Director, Nuclear Plant Operations (ONPO) or his designee.

For tests or evolutions that last longer than one shift, the briefing shall be repeated for each new oncoming crew at the start of the shift.

- The briefing outline is given in Enclosure 25.

The current FPC procedures defined as "Infrequently performed tests or evolutions" are listed below:

o Evolutions not specifically covered by an existing OP, EP, or AP:

Performance Tests (PT's) and Work Request Instructions which place the plant in an unusual configuration related to the core, reactivity control, or reactor protection.

AI-500 Rev. 74 Page 47

NOV 2 5 1992 Rev. 6 11/06/92

• NUCLEAR COMPLIANCE

• Nuclear Operations Tracking a Expediting System (NOTES) *

• Transmittal Shoot 0 NOTES No.: 3QN21 Due Date:

To: D. CZUFIN/S. ROE NA1E (Name) (MAC)

The attached document ( IOC NPSE92 0489 requires action as specified below. Please attach documented evidence of action completion to NOTES Transmittal Sheet and return to Nuclear Compliance NA2D.

Nuclear Compliance

Contact:

J. A. FRIJOUF Extension:( 3354 )

Manager, Nuclear Compliance: E. S. Froats Required action:

• CONTAINMENT SPRAY INCIDENT WORK (NPSE92-0489). 9M START-UP RESTRAINT PER D. CZUFIN. RCS MOTORS WITH SPECIFIC INSPECTION CRITERIA INCLUDING: INSPECT ALL FOUR RCP'S FOR: AC & DC LIFT OIL PUMP MOTORS; MOTOR INSTRUMENTATION; AND CONDUIT INSPECTION FOR BORON. *

..T-i1P6CT10.4 AfieFOCEnZ 34 1/ct3. S ed A"U"CabA RE csu)m JA)

A7TZtrf V-0 R G.c H."lo Note: This document is a transmittal sheet.

normally considered a quality record. Provide requested information by attachment 2alY.

0ORev. 6 11/06/92

• NUCLIPR COYLIANCCZ

• Nuclear Operations Tracking & Expediting System (NOTES) *

• Transmittal Sheet NOTES No.: 20257DO Due Date: 03/15 /93 TO: W. A. STEPHENSON (Name) (MAC)

The attached document (PR 92-0144 )

requires action as specified below. Please attach djojjnkj4 evidence of action comoletion to NOTES Transmittal Sheet and return to Nuclear Compliance NA2D.

Nuclear Compliance

Contact:

J. L. BUCKNER 40 Extension:(3410 -/

Manager, Nuclear Compliance: E. R. Froatsoi Required action:

• PR 92-0144, INTRODUCTION OF BORATED WATER TO THE RB ATMOSPHERE. COMPLETE REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN ITEM 13 TO DETERMINE WHAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN AT OTHER PLANTS HAVING SIMILAR EVENTS*

Notes This document is a transmittal sheet. It is not normally considered a quality record. Provide requested information by attachment 2ly.

0ORev. 6 11/06/92

• *'NUCLAR* COXPLI'NC3

• Nuclear Operations Tracking a Expediting System (NOTES) 0

• Transmittal Sheet

• NOTES No.: 20257F Due Date: 04/23 /93 To: H. KOON (Name) (MAC)

The attached document (PR 92-0144 requires action as specified below. Please attach d evidence of action oamDlotion to NOTES Transmittal Sheet and return to Nuclear Compliance NA2D.

Nuclear Compliance

Contact:

J. L. BUCKNER a/[

Extension: (3410 /

Manager, Nuclear Compliance: E. 2. lroats 4 Required action:

• PR 92-0144, INTRODUCTION OF BORATED WATER TO THE RB ATMOSPHERE. COMPLETE THE LONG TERM ACTION PLAN CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION TO VERIY COMPLETION TO COMPLIANCE. CORRECTIVE ACTION ITEMS ARE 4S 2 F LOWS: 1. RP INSTRUMENTATION GENERAL WALKDOWN-WR #30 3. NOV INSPECTIONS FOR STEM CORROSION AND OTHER DEGRADED CONDITIONS-WR

1. 302861. 4. INSPECT & CLEAN ALL CRDM STATORS , PI TUBE CONNECTIONS AND THERMAL COUPLE CONNECTIONS-WR #300074. 5.

INSP. & MAINT. REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL RB CRANES-WRs #s 302757, 302578, 302759, 302761. 6. AHF-lA/lB/lC FOR BORON IN COOLING COILS AND OTHER INSP. POINTS-WR #a 302820, 102521, 302822. 7.

AHF-2A/2B FILTER RACK REPLAC -WR #s 278371, 290257. 8.

AHF-51A MOTORRE._LACEMENT- 024 9. ALL AHF-51 HANDLING

//, FAN R INSP.-WR fs:'= 716 TIDL!424072. 10. SNUBBER INSP.-WR

1. 302838. 11. CONDUIT/CABLE INSP.-WR #302674. 12.

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM NOZZLE CHECK-SP-183 ACTIVITY*

4,/ V

........ l-INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering NA19 2403413 Office MAC Telephone

SUBJECT:

Introduction of Borated Water Into RB Atmosphere TO: W. A. Stephenson DATE: October 20, 1992 NPSE92-0472 Nuclear Technical Support was charged with coordinating an engineering assessment of CR-3 following the inadvertent containment spray incident (ref. Problem Report 92-0144). Also Included are short and long term actions required to maintain integrity of the RB equipment.

A presentation was given to PRC on Friday, October 16, recommending returning the unit to full power operation based on results of the attached study. A final action plan for completing the long term requirements is forthcoming.

If additional information is required, please let me know.

Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering JHT/tsw Attachments xc G. H. Halnon M. J.Fitzgerald L L Thompson D. M. Czufin R. L Muzzi A. H. Gelston P. Holmes-Ray Records Management

NA INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE C 0 P 6AIS Nucea Pn&%stMs Enginen office MAC Telephone

SUBJECT:

Containment Spray Incident TO: S. K. Balliet DATE: October 27, 1992 D. M. Czufln NPSE92-0483 M. J. Fitzgerald A. H. Gelston R. L Muzzi A. Petrowsky Attached please find two lists resulting from the containment spray Incident of October 15, 1992. The first addresses follow-up activities to ensure completion of the Short term actions. The second addresses Long term actions to ensure equipment availability.

Both lists require feedback to ensure timely completion of the activities. Work Requests for long term actions must be Initiated to compile with the 9M milestone date for adding outage work activities. To meet this date, return the completed lists to me by October 29th.

Ifyou have any questions, please contact me.

3( . eryanager Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering JHT/krt Attachments xc: G. H. Halnon H. Koon W. A. Stephenson Records Management

(... (

Attachmet WETAUIT WRAY 111C3Ut FOLLW UP ATIVIThES DESCRIPTION RESPONSIBILITY W ETIol STAlUS Perform SP-150; Operabf I Ity and Functionul Check of Loose Parts Monltoring SUksystem. perations Cqiare pro and post Incident date Perform confidence checks of Ut-1 cebtes from control room I&C shop Place AC and DC NC !m Lift OIfl Is service aperations ,.

Trend t8 Service Structure Toeratures to monitor NS Shroud Fan health COX Syste Engineer EvaLuate need to extend Short Term Operating Instruction for Increased freoamay of WIME 18C Section SP-300 date corlection based on Instrumnt trends NOTE: Documentation of coWpLeted Item on this page should be forwarded to J. N. Terry. NAC:AIME.

______________ 1~

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Florida Power cb,,oa,,. Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering NAI E 2403§18 Office MAC Telephone

SUBJECT:

9M Work Resulting from Containment Spray Incident TO: H. Koon DATE: October 30, 1992 NPSE92-0489 In an effort to meet our November 1, 1992 deadline for 9M scope additions, Tech Support submits the attached list of outage activities. Each item is directly associated with long term follow up resulting from the Containment Spray Incident. Each is considered a requirement to ensure equipment operability and will be included in the Corrective Action Plan for PR92-0144.

Items Identified during inspections scheduled for 9M will be evaluated on their merits for 9M addition and if necessary will be added via the emergent work process.

Ifyou need any information, please let me know.

J. H. Terry, Manager Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering JHT/tsw attachment xc: G. H. Halnon R. L. Thompson D. M. Czufin A. H. Gelston R. L. Muzzi M. J. Fitzgerald P. Holmes-Ray Records Management

(. Attech t LNG TErn DCTEU to Inomareatfo ell k gwwmt IC System by.13 s8115 Re~'J I7i 7 PMImpetfons far *tow corroofn and other &mrd candition C*V tm bEnve.ring 0oL froot A Clem sit Can staters. P1 Ti*. cunet~ion & t/ comractta'm "a" sto D.

Iap ttfm aid mointemmnc. grquf omum far .11 a cowe Co~amet &Wignmerm__________

ARF-WIA/IC for Srwin in coating colts wd ~ther spectfan points AN System tninimer A14k4 I ANF-2A/ filter ecc inntcmw AN SWtm Engilneer A64____- ___L Air NoaIdin Fen Uetev (MW-St fons) imepictfon AN Wytow fiqiere Al, IC .3 3 4Lý

• SAbwtvmestiw 13 q5 AN S~ý E g n r 32.

in .cml.

cobte rep troy dn w

wcomein t 1 ,pn~

FMF-SU corwjIt E0 cirawltry 5hp 5 adgjj If' !M e _inspections______________________

Co~fm

• Sprioy Ssem Ernie Chock (SP-18) muV

't R CZ.t -L--L7, 7 &,7 2 09 d.1-C 7- 3L,.,t,., F,*Ik,- Aw-ck. w-0, -Z-76:3'71 J.--

A&4h1 AAF - 0 AuidF7 A6 02 FIlff,* ý" F1 14eý, kpý-Cemtnt 6, ý-ýR A t4F- 'c At-k 3 4 mi= - v 8 4L,-.,-jk Al 3 A~u-~ £3 L 4Lres5 1--714(. r54-A" 4 7 P

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Power COMPOMATIONi Nuclear Operations SupDort 3499 Office KAC Tetephone

SUBJECT:

Request For An Extension to PR 92-144, Introduction of Borated Water to the RB Atmosphere.

TO: Ed Froats DATE: 11/02/92 It is requested the due date be extended to 12/4/92 to allow additional time to complete Part 3 of the PR. Additional time is needed because 1) the PR was not received/assigned until 10/29/92;

2) personnel with whom investigation and CAP development is to be coordinated, are not available for the first week following receipt/

assignment.

W. M. Marshall

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

• PPower Nuclear Plant Technical Support NA1E 240-3618 Office MAC Telephone

SUBJECT:

NOTES Item 20257E TO: E. E. Froats V/ DATE: December 29, 1992 NPSE92-0588 The subject NOTES Item related to the Containment Spray incident of October 15, 1992, was assigned to me for documentation that the five short term follow up activities are complete.

As of this date all are completed with the exception of Item 2, perform a confidence check of NI-1 cable from control room. This item was further evaluated and determined not necessary, reference attached speed memos from F. K. Bockhorst dated December 4, 1992 and December 9, 1992.

This IOC should serve to close out NOTES Item 20257E.

Nuclerry antyger Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering JHT/tsw xc: G. H. Halnon R. L. Muzzi

-e.

1 Records Management

To: J.H. Terry Fr: F.K. Bockhorst Sub: Building Spray Event 15 Oct, 1992 / NI-i Cable Inspection 12-4-92 Problem Report PR92-0144 written subsequent to this event defined an action plan which included the performance of confidence checks of the NI-I cables from the control room. It was felt at the time that since the preamplifier for NI-i had been removed, the potential existed for the cable connectors to become contaminated with water or boron. At this time, these checks have not and are not expected to be done.

Discussions with the I&C technicians who were working NI-i during the Refuel VIII restart indicated that the cable connectors were left bagged and protected and should not have been affected by the building spray event. Present plans are to restore the NI-i channel at the earliest opportunity followig the next shutdown and to fully inspect the preamplifier cables at that time.

To: R.L. Muzzi Fr: F.K. Bockhorst 12-9-92 Sub: Field Report on Replacement of Flow Transmitter RC-148-dPT2 The subject transmitter replacement was completed at about 11:30 on 12-8-92. The changeout went reasonably smoothly, with the only difficulty being a lead with cut insulation which was cut back and relugged. When the transmitter was returned to service, no apparent perturbations occurred in the 'C" channel, as reported by control and documented on the attached graph.

While I was in the RB, I inspected NI-I preamp cables and pressurizer level transmitter RC-1-LTi. The preamp cables are properly bagged and do not appear to have been affected by the inadvertent building spray event in any way. The pressurizer level transmitter does not show any signs of leakage from the reference leg piping.

I will be in tomorrow at some reasonable time.

To: JBUCKNER From: HKOON

Subject:

NOTES 20257F Boron Incident Date: 12-30-92 Time: 10:31a Jerry, in looking at the subject assigned NOTES item, I find that on page 7 of the PR, item £9 states "302716 through 302726". In actually, only 302716 is the only one that was really evaluated to do all the work for all the fans. It is currently loaded in 9M. The rest of them will not be.

Hope you're enjoying the holidays while the rest of us are keeping your lights on!!!

Give me a call when you get back.

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE SUSmfiftS Nuclear Plant Ooerations Off lee Telq.m

SUBJECT:

Closure of HPES CAP Item #2, NOTES Item 20257A.

TO: E. Froats, NA2D DATE: January 25, 1993 0P93-0010 The purpose of this letter is to document closure of the subject corrective action item associated with lessons learned from the Reactor Building Spray event.

The affected operator has completed summary presentation of the Lessons Learned; presentation was given to approximately 60 Operations personnel. Documentation of attending personnel has been reviewed and appropriately filed; please let me know if you require additional documentation.

W. M. Marshall Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations cc: J. Buckner NA20 File

• p1 im DESCI P N OF CN pa Ta T o 2)

N. TITLE DHP-1A, BSP-1A AND VALVE PRt.n.POEUEN.....IO 0"ION OEDR N-I EISD43 U SURVEILLANCE 3R,51'3 SP-34B23119;11 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Page i -Table of Conet;Pgii Tbef oens Page 1 Step 2.1.5; Page 6 Step 3.5.7; Page 74.1.8.8 Step 3.7.3; Page 13 Steps 4.1.8.3 4.1.8.4, 4.1.8.6 and 4.1.8.7; Page 14 Steps through 4.2.1; Page 15 Steps 4.2.2 through 4.2.5; Page 16- Steps 4.2.6 through 4.3.1; Page 17- Steps 4.4 through 4.4.5; Page 18 - steps 4.4.6 through 4.5.6; Page 19 Steps 4.5.7 through 4.7.1; Page 20 Steps 4.7.2 through 4.8.2; Page 21 - Steps 4.8.3 through 4.8.5; Page 23 -

Step 5.2.3; Page 24; Page 28,; Fi 11 , s

. w,4.i.1,3 Paf ). c,, 4.1.7.5 .hvw 4.1.7.4 REASON AND REFERENCES FOR PROCEDURE CHANSE Page 13,Page 14, 4.1.8.3, 4.1.8.4, and Steps 4.1.8.6 through 4.1.8.10 - Provided Caution and clarified Steps for verification of DHV-42 opening; Page 14 Steps 4.2 through 4.2.1, Page 16,Page 17, Page 18, Page 19, Page 20, Page 21 Steps 4.8.3 through 4.8.5 - Revised Sections on DHP-1A, BSP-1A and Valve testing to clarify requirements and enhance performance.

Also added Cautions and Steps to help preclude opening of BSV-3 while performing BSP-1A testing. ; Page 23 - Step 5.2.3 corrected referenced Step; Page 29 -

Corrected Table; Page i and ii - Corrected Table of Contents; Page I Step 2.1.5 and Page 6 Step 3.5.7 added reference; Page 7 Step 3.7.3 corrected step number; Page 24 - Corrected Valve restoration position. PfonottZ ,

Biennial Review: 0 Result of scheduled procedure review notification from Document Control

- PRNR-A previously submitted to Document Control

- Enclosure 23 of AI-402B attached 0 Review conducted prior to normal review frequency

- PRNR-B attached

- Enclosure 23 of AI-402B attached o Plant Modification: MAR Number NA o Non-Conformance: Finding number and date PR92-0144 / 10/15/92 O Technical Specifi atio end nt- Specification Number NA Originated By __/A___I__________- __ Sen. Nuc. Results Eng.

• 9Z.

Si-gatu -r Title Date PART 7WO Interpretation Contact _ __ __Date PRC Meeting No. g3 01 Plant Review Chairman _,, __ _ _ Date .

I- -..

Dir. Nuc. Plant Oper. Date PNot Required Al-400C Rev. 9 Page 13

PROCEDURE TRAINING

SUMMARY

4~

r- '.~ -93 PROCEDURE NO. SP-3400 REVISION NO. 23 DESCRIPTION: (Provide a brief summary, describing the major changes made to the procedure.

If a new procedure, briefly describe the procedure.)

Changes were made to enhance the performance of testing for BSP-IA , DHP-1A and associated valves. Steps were added to preclude opening of BSV-3 while BSP-]A Factors changes were made in responsonse to the HPES resulting from is being tested. Human the Building Spray Event.

Other changes are editorial in nature.

Procedure Revised By:

Date: /-97_-

ENCLOSURE 3 AI-400C pot, 0 n- -- I r

'1 ENCLOSURE 1 (Pape 1 of 2)

PART ONE PROCEDURE REVIEW RECORD PRR. NO. PROCEDURE NO. LREVISION NO. ITITLE DHP-1B, BSP-1B AND VALVE 7 SP-340E 5 SURVEILLANCE DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Page i - Table of Contents; Page ii - Table of Contents; Page 12 - Caution Statement; Page 13 Steps 4.1.8.2 through 4.1.8.6; Page 14 Steps 4.1.8.7 through 4.1.8.10; Page 15 Steps 4.1.8.11 through 4.2.2; Page 16- Steps 4.2.3 through 4.2.7; Page 17- Steps 4.3 through 4.4.2; Page 18 - Steps 4.4.3 through 4.4.6; Page 19 Steps 4.5 through 4.5.7; Page 20 Steps 4.6 through 4.7.2; Page 21 - Steps 4.7.3 through 4.8.3; Page 22 Steps 4.8.4, 4.8.5; Page 24 - Step 5.2.3; Page 25; Page 29 REASON AND REFERENCES FOR PROCEDURE CHANGE Page 12-Caution Statement, Page 13,Page 14, Page 15 -Steps 4.1.8.2 through 4.1.8.12 - Provided alternate method for verification of DHV-43 opening; Page 15 Steps 4.2 through 4.2.2, Page 16,Page 17, Page 18, Page 19, Page 20, Page 21, Page 22 Steps 4.8.4 and 4.8.5 - Revised Sections on DHP-IB, BSP-IB and Valve testing to clarify requirements and enhance performance. Also added Cautions and Steps to help preclude opening of BSV-4 while performing BSP-1B testing. ; Page 24 - Step 5.2.3 corrected referenced Step; Page 25 - Changed valve used to throttle flow for BSP-1B per request from Nuclear Operations; Page 29 - Corrected Table; Page i and ii - Corrected Table of Contents.

Biennial Review: 0 Result of scheduled procedure review notification from Document Control

- PRNR-A previously submitted to Document Control

- Enclosure 23 of AI-402B attached 0 Review conducted prior to normal review frequency

- PRNR-B attached

- Enclosure 23 of AI-402B attached O Plant Modification: MAR Number NA O Non-Conformance: Finding number and date NA 0 Technical SpecificaloAmendment: Specification Number NA Originated By _ __ _Sen. Nuc. Results Eng. 11/23/92 Signattre Title Date PART TWO Interpretation Contact Date PRC Meeting No.

Plant Review Chairman Date Dir. Nuc. Plant Oper. Date O Not Required AkI-400C Rev. 9 Page 13

PROCEDURE TRAINING

SUMMARY

PROCEDURE NO. SP-340E REVISION NO. 5 DESCRIPTION: (Provide a brief summary, describing the major changes made to the procedure.

If a new procedure, briefly describe the procedure.)

This change provided an improved method for remote position verification of DHV-43. The new method provides a more positive indication of DHV-43 disc position and has been validated to provide acceptable results.

Changes were also made enhance the performance of testing for BSP-1B , DHP-1B and associated valves. Steps were added to preclude opening of BSV-4 while BSP-1B is being tested. Throttle Valve used for regulating flow for BSP-1B was changed per a request from Operations.

Other changes are editorial in nature.

Procedure Revised By: Date: 11/23/92 AI-400C Rev. 9 Page 15

INTER.OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE CORPORATIOWr Nuclear Integrated Scheduling NHAZD 240-3219 Office Tewepwn

SUBJECT:

NOTES 20257F (PROBLEM REPORT 92-0144)

TO: Quality Assessments DATE: April 20, 1993 NIP93-124 Please close the above-mentioned NOTES Item. As stated in the Long Term Action Plan, activities I and 3 through 12 have been performed.

Hoyt Koon lam

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Nuclear Operations Training NU-47 795-0504 COOPODA T I fit Office MAC Tel ephone

SUBJECT:

NOTES ITEMS 20257C AND 20574 TO: DATE: April 28, 1993 TRS93 0015 Training on Self-Checking for operators has been completed using lesson plan ROT 6-5, Self-Checking. This training was completed as part of the first requal cycle for 1993. Attached for your review are copies of attendance sheets for this class.

/ G. Smith JGS/If Attachments

ja~s 0ORev. 6 11/06/92

• *NUCLEA COMPLIANCE

• Nu*lear Operations .Tracking & Zzpediting System (NOTES) *

, Transmittal Sheet

• NOTES No.:: Due Date: 06/30 /93 To: L. C. KELLEY/SMITH NU47 (Name) (MAC)

The attached document ( -0144 requires action as specified below. Please attach 4oaute evidence of aotion completion to NOTES Transmittal Sheet and return to Nuclear Compliance NA2D.

Nuclear Compliance

Contact:

J. L. BUCKNER/?

Extension:(3410 Manager, Nuclear Compliance: Z. E. Froats "'

Required action:

• PR 92-0144, INTRODUCTION OF BORATED WATER TO THE RB ATMOSPHERE. COMPLETE HPES ACTION PLAN ITEM 5 TO ENHANCE SCHEDULED OPERATOR TRAINING TO INCLUDE CURRENT INDUSTRY SELFCHECKING AND CROSSCHECKING METHODS AND TECHNIQUES; (IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER OTHER ALTERNATIVES IF INDUSTRY INFORMATION IS UNAVAILABLE*

11-:

EG 21 199Z Note: This document is a transmittal sheet. It is not normally considered a quality record. Provide requested information by attachment 2 = .

Florida INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Power Nuclear ScheduiHn* Department NA2l 24-30 CORPORATION OFFICE NAC TELEPNOW

SUBJECT:

NOTES 20257F (PROBLEM REPORT 92-0144)

TO: Quality Assessment NT"3 DATE: May 6, 1993 NIP93-132 The above-mentioned NOTES Item referring to Problem Report 92-0144 regarding borated water to the Reactor Building Atmosphere has been completed. This work was performed during the 9M Outage. Please close this action item.

B. C. Moore lam

POST CONTAINMENT SPRAY INCIDENT INSPECTION OF RCPS

REFERENCE:

Notes Item 20340B An inspection of each Reactor Coolant Pump motor for signs of boron damage as a result of the Building Spray Incident was performed 3/31/93 by the System Engineer. Particular attention was given to both the AC and DC high pressure lube oil lift pumps.

On each Reactor Coolant Pump Motor, the lube oil 11ft pumps are located in a anon enclosed' part of the lube oil collection system. This provided direct access for not only the containment spray but for a good visual examination. There was no sign of boron spray reaching any of the lift pumps or any of the other equipment associated with the Reactor Coolant Pump Motors. Only a slight trace of a boron puddle was noted on the oil collection system for RCP-IB. This puddle and its residual boron are of no consequence to the operation of the motor and its associated equipment.

Operation of each of the lube oil lift pumps was checked just after the event by starting each one of the lift pumps and verifying that the permissive light for each lift pump (located on the RCP main start switch) was lit. The lift pumps were again checked in this manner during the shutdown for the 9M outage were both AC and DC lift pumps are run for main coolant pump shutdown.

This completes the required actions for NOTES Item 20340B.

Ste oe, Senior Nuclear Mechanical Engineer Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering

I,

('a

'.._i,,J"l

• V 44 QL))

[ V V 0C ,a. /5s Lie-Nn-r5-: /70ePA S

-ho D.r7,*,*l .m ;a r -t-vý e, v

o1ToAe L 0~ GIPA v

7~N ~ ,q KA. JUt ..

TI>T7--1ý F pq - -

(~~2k)

-J Ifi Z . .

aI .NTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Nuclear Technical Support NAI E 240-3730 Office NAC Tetehomne

SUBJECT:

Problem Report (PR-92-0144-0)

TO: L. W. Moffat DATE: June 8, 1993 NPTS93-0307 The purpose of this correspondence is to respond to the above referenced Problem Report Corrective Action Plan Item which relates to oil sample analysis of the RCP motors. This action was requested as a result of the Building Spray incident of October 1992. Oil samples have been collected for both reservoirs on all four motors. While both reservoirs are enclosed, only the upper has any potential for contamination. Unfortunately, the oil samples are contaminated and can not be released from site. While we do have a means of sampling contaminated oil, it is extremely costly.

Therefore, some qualitative checks have been made of the upper reservoir samples. The results of these checks dearly indicate there are no significant contaminates present. The samples were also reviewed for the presence of any water, with none observed. Based on these qualitative results, combined with the other tests/inspections performed on the RCP motors during midcycle 9, we can conclude the motors did not suffer any adverse damage as the result of the Building Spray incident. Thus, the action item to sample the oil should be closed. The oil samples will be maintained until the radioactivity decays sufficiently to allow their release. They will then be sampled as part of the ongoing Condition Monitoring Program for overall lubricant condition and wear particle analysis. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at ext. 3730 W. J. Brewer, Supervisor Nuclear Plant Technical Support WJB/wjb xc: P. Gerardin K.Tyler Records Management

H 1 5c(21Y

• /

EF EEýT cO  ?% 40 1121. 1~.

1. i.. 1' I

J*

4p S I'c JA77.5 4

~ ~ *"70 0

/ 1 4' 04(4 n

W-ý-5.0 A

• ..~

j 1 ~ ...........

rJ, 7- II) :E

,R-O*BhLrEIN R E P 0 R T /P06 &2 NUMBER: PR_? - o-lLj 1.2 -93 012G4 P

~~~~~~~~~~~~...

Zfl ~ MEMT 1

........ ~ S ~ . . . . . . . . . . . ~0 .. . . . . . . . . . .

i1)Titte I

Subject:

INTRODUCTION OF BORATED WATER TO THE REACTOR BUILDING ATMOSPHERE.

.}Description of the ConditiorVEvent: DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF SP-340B,RECIRCULATION OF THE BWST WITH BSP-lA, THE CONTROL OARD OPERATOR OPENED BSV-3 TO INCREASE RECIRCULATION FLOW, THIS ALLOWED BORATED WATER FROM THE DISCHARGE OF BUILDING SPRAY PUMP IA TO BE ADMITTED TO THE REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY HEADER. THE WATER THEM SPRAYED INTO THE REACTOR BUILDING ATMOSPHERE. RMG-18 WENT INTO HIGH ALARM AND THE PLANT EXPERIENCED SIGNS OF A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK. PLANT POWER WAS MANUALLY REDUCED BY ABOUT 8% IN RESPONSE TO THE SUSPECTED REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK. THE REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY PUMP WAS THEN SECURED. PLANT CONDITIONS STABILIZED WHEN THE BUILDING SPRAY PUMP WAS SECURED. INITIAL ESTIMATES OF WATER THAT ENTERED THE REACTOR BUILDING FROM THE BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK ARE APPROXIMATELY 9,400 GALLONS.

(3)ReqlUrement(s) Violated: TO BE DETERMINED 4)Associatedl/ReLted Doccments: SP-340B f5) Iumdeldate Actions Taken (if any): STOP BSP-1A, DECREASE PLANT POWER, ENSURE BSV-3. C.LO3c,-b

.)Nethod of Discovery: INCREASED REACTOR BUILDING SUMP LEVEL, DECREASE IN REACTOR BUILDING TEMPERATURE, DECREASING BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK LEVEL, RMG-18 IN HIGH ALARM.

(7)Suspected Causes (check alt that appear to appty):

I X1 Personnel Error I Inadequate Procedure/Document E I Equipment Failure/Matfunctlon I I Design Error I I Unknown E I Other (describe):

(a) Equi9pmnt Tag NIwber(s):N/A I {Vendor Mane (if k~osm): N/A (io) Recomendations for Resotving the Probte= (if any):TO BE DETERMINED.

{iii Originaltor (pnt uw*: IVAN WI LSOV-) Date- 10-15-92 (12) Supervisor/Ma er Revie and Inital n lCASSIFICATION:

- PR is a SUSPECT1ED DESII BASIS ISSUE? E X3 NO I I YES QlYES,assfsFPR.-Ignwc"n

• PR is Classified as: I X) SIU8IFICANT E I NUNSINIFICANT Comments:

(13)-Responsb.e Dept: OPERATIONS Accepted By: ., A4 -

T14) SupvflNr Wrfit & sign): pPR IssueDate:

II~ýw

. UIWu I; _- fW ~ ~ i.:U~~I 1 TT IK13.W3fT~)I ý I.

I

PROBLEM REPORT FORM AND ATTACHMENT A ENCLOSURE I (Page 1 of 4)

P . REP EM RTNumber: PIR go in~

Itk

)Rý SI FP Ti

(, sw POT- s SINUUITsIMihi =I M " OF oM NMS1;T 0e10TN414IA1m (IS)Titl / @) WVIS PS)An Ist . e NBIeUseS N l~v~ m,~im le PStm of sissfovewCIU fl Im mii CP-111 Rev. 47 Page 33

.PROBLEM REPORT Number: PR 92 - 0144_

(1) Method of Performing Cause Anlstyis:

I X] Structured Analysis I I Deductive Logic C I Apparent/Suspected Cause (2) WRRECTIVE ACTION PLAN CCAP):

Primary Cause (describe and justify):

Personnet error, failture to appty proper serf-checking measures to ensure adequate comprehension and correct imptementation of required procedural guidance. Refer to WPES report number 92-02 for details.

Associated Corrective Action:

Refer to attached Summary/Status Sheets for entire Corrective Action Plan.

Assigned Dept/Or: Refer to attached Summary Status Sheets. Comptetion Date: Refer to attached Summary Status sheets.

Sheets.

Secondary Cause (describe and justification):

Human Engineering deficiencies In the procedural guidance may have been a contributing factor. Insufficient training in operator setf-checking/cross-checking methods and techniques may have been a contributing factor.

Refer to HPES Report numter 92-02 for details.

Associated Corrective Action:

Refer to attached Summary/Status Sheets for entire Corrective Action Plan.

Assigned Dept/Or:Refer to attached Summary Status Sheets. CoplLetion Date: Refer to attached Sumnary Status sheets.

E I Additional Causes and Associated Corrective Actions are Continued on Page:

(3) Dispasitioning of Nonconforming Equipment/Material:

I I N/A (no nonconformilng equipment or materiel Involved) I I Accept-As-Is* C 3 Repair* C I Rework EX I Other (describe): Except for RN-GIB and AHF-51A. we are not aware of any other nonconforming eculoment or material.

However, the results of the Short and Lanm Term Action oLans may Identify additional item,

• Engineering Justification and Approval Required for these Dispositions (document on form or attach)

(4) Developed by,print & sign): Tom MetcalfL1 Date: 22 j (6) Approved by (print &sgnp W.NM. Marsha Llk Date:, 7 Comments: t r~ P~ ~

(1) Technicat leviro rI & sign): $9 q -0 Date:

(2) Casptlance By hpdnti & sign):

pevre ..... Date:

(3) PMC; ,r Y9 lat G"No.Da -a.& 7 4

,t t e,

Comments: tj CtL '7 e-k4 Cc. Clow O C 1-3C/

Zt~gzZý &C- C- A-'-;L4 3 ct4 .

i/Date: ...

F (i) Tediicat Reviewer (prim ansign):

(2, (2) I/inAt e &.. /ackw-n

/L)

,,~v A

4.1 Dat.te. ..

PROBLEM REPORT Number: PR92 - 0144 Corrective Action Plan (CAP) Continuation POg:_g STATUS

SUMMARY

OF HPES ACTION PLAN PLANNED ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBILITY DUE DATE

1. Enhance administrative guidance to ensure appropriate surveiLlance Completed 11/4/92. operations N/A activities include a pre-job briefing. Examples of enhanced pre-briefing checklist items:

a) Potential need for a additional impLementing personnel/operators; i.e. independent procedure reader or verifier.

b) Potential need for direct supervision and observation during performance of critical steps or activities.

2. Affected operator to prepare a Lessons Learned paper/report on the Action assigned to Operations. 1/30/93 Importance and methods of setfchecking; (it my be necessary to consider operator.

other alternatives if industry information is unavailable). .......

3. Affected MNCOperator will be eoumelLed by appropriate line Completed Operations. N/A management. 10/29/92.

4. Enhance applicable procedural guidance to address the following SP-340E changes ISI Group SP-340E aspects: are PRC approved revision to a) Additional barriers to preclude incorrect valve manipulation, and procedure Is be issued by Examples: prior to starting pump, ensure RB spray valve is closed being typed and 12/30/92.

or placed in manual/closed position or flag (tag) valve control expected to be devise. issued by 12/7/9Z. SP-3406 revision to b) Provide applicable CAUTION or NOTE statements immediately prior be issued by to adjusting flow or starting pump. 1/30/93.

c) Ensure guidance designates primary operator and Locations of associated components.

d) Ensure individual guidance/sentence structure adequately emphasizes both the required action and the component acted upon.

5. Enhance scheduled operator training to include current industry Training Training Include in setfchecking and crosschecking methods and techniques; (it may be evaluating next re-quaL.

necessary to consider other alternatives if industry information is resources. training and unaval Lable). have alt crews trained by June 30, 1993.

Accepted by J. Smith 12/1/92.

I I I

PROBLEM REPORT Number: PR92-0144 Corrective Action Plan (CAP) Continuation Pag.:_.

STATUS

SUMMARY

OF REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN PLANED ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBILITY DUE DATE I Watkdown M4CB thoroughly and Short Term instruction 92-019; Short Term action item for Reported as complete; refer frequently to monitor for performed SP-300 twice per SNES foltowup item to evaluate to Short Term action item failed instruments and shift for one week. Evaluate continued need for Short Term #5.

components. need to extend Short Term instruction.

instruction.

2. Determine areas and Completed. Engineering N/A N/A components which need to be identified appropriate checked for indication of areas/components and water damage, participated in initial RB

_walkdown, 10/15/92.

3. Drain BS header. completed. N/A N/A

4. Drain LOT-4A and LOT-48. Completed. Approximately 65 N/A N/A gat. of water and 2.5 gat o_ L/water emulsion.

5. Evaluate CRDF)s and service Engineering participated in NPSE92-0483; Long term action Refer to Long Term action structure for adverse initial RB walkdown, no to inspect and clean all CRDN item #4.

effects. problems were noted, stators, PI Tube connections &

Thermal Couple connections.

SNES to ensure action is completed.

6. Coordinate pumping RB sump Completed 10/15/92. N/A N/A to NWST. Approximately 5400 gat.

7. Accumulate a list of known Completed, refer to N/A N/A damage and effects. Engineering Assessment, NPSE92-0472.

8. Generate RB entry permits Completed, refer to N/A N/A and perform initial RB Engineering Assessment, watLkdown. NPSE92-0472.

9. Verify BSV-3 is closed. Completed; BSV-3 verified N/A N/A 9.____V ___y _________ closed.

10. Report that LOT-4A and Completed, event number 24431 N/A N/A LOT-4B exceeded design basis Limits.

11. Verify reportabiLity of Completed. Event itself is N/A M/A the event, not reportable; but exceeding LOT level limits is reportable. ._....

12. Return auxiliary steam Completed. N/A N/A from Units 1/2.

13. Determine what actions Ongoing Nuclear Safety Supervisor. Prior to 9M outage.

were taken at other plants having similar events.

PROBLEM REPORT Number: PR92 - 0144_

Corrective Action PLan (CAP) Continuation Pago:_.

STATUS SUIM4ARY OF SHORT TERM AND FOLLOWUP ACTION PLAN PLANNED ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBILITY DUE DATE 1 Perform SP-150; OperabiLity Reported as complete Operations. Since alL items are reported and Functional Check of Loose as complete; per agreement Parts Monitoring Subsystem. with J. Terry, Issue a Compare pre & post incident singt NOTES item to Jim date. Terry for alt 5 Short Term items; due 12/30/92.

2. Perform confidence checks Reported as complete I&C Shop See above.

of NI-i cables from control room.

3. Piece AC and DC RCP Lift Reported as comptete Operations. See above.

ott Pumps is service.

4. Trend RB Service Structure Reported as ecaplete CRDM System Engineer. See above.

Temperatures to monitor RD Shroud Fan hearth.

5. Evatuate need to extend Reported as complete NPSE I&C Section. See above.

Short Term Operating Instruction for increased frequency of SP-300 data collection based on instrument trends.

PROBLEM REPORT Number: PR92 - 0144 Corrective Action Plan (CAP) Continuation Page: 1A STATUS SUMNARY OF LONG TERM ACTION PLAN PLANNED ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBILITY DUE DATE

1. RB Instrumentation general walkdown. Work request 302825 Nuclear Integrated Prior to 9H outage re-written. Scheduling; accepted by start.

H. Koon, 12/2/92. H.

Koon requests a s!agte NOTES item for alt the Long Term actions.

2. RCP motors with specific inspection NOTES items 20340A & SNES See #1 above.

criteria. including: 2034OB assigned to SNES.

oft sample analysis AC & DC Lift oil pump motors motor instrumentation conduit inspection for boron.

3. NOV inspections for stem corrosion and Work request 302861 See #1 above. See #1 above.

other degraded conditions, written.

4. Inspect & clean alt CRON stators, PI Work request 300074 See #1 above. See #1 above.

Tube conrections and Thermal Couple written.

connections.

5. Inspection and maintenance requirements Work requests written: See #1 above. See #1 above.

for all RB cranes. 302757, 302578, 302759, 302761.

6. ANF-1A/18/¶C for boron in cooling coils Work requests written: See #1 above. See #1 above.

end other inspections points. 302820, 102521, 302 822.

7. ARF-ZAI26 filter rack replacement. Work request written: See #1 above. See #1 above.

278371, 290257 .A 51A motor replacement. Work request 3024E61 See #1 above. See #1 above.

written. 53116

9. All AHF-51 handling fan motor Work request written: See #1 above.

S7 See #1 above.

Inspections. 302716 cog!_________V _ _

10. Snulbber inspections. Work request 302838 See #1 above. See #1 above.

written.

11. Conduit/cabte inspections, including: Work request 302674 See #1 above. See #1 above.

cable in cable tray written.

cable in conduit EQ circuitry weep hole inspection*s

12. Containment Spray System Nozzle check SP-183 activity. See #1 above. See #1 above.

(SP-183). _ _ _ __ I I _________________________

Information on Inadvertent Reactor Building Spraydown of 10/15/92 Time of event:

Commenced 1205, terminated 1218 (based on REDAS indication of BWST level)

Amount sprayed:

Approximately 8500 gallons (based on level change in the BWST as displayed by REDAS)

Approximate flowrate:

Approximately 650 gallons per minute (based on above data)

Apparent cause:

Operator error. The control board operator, while performing step 4.7.1 of SP-340, attempted to increase BS flow to the required specification. Instead of using BSV-28 (manual recirc throttle valve located in the field) as noted in the procedure, he used BSV-3 (automatic flow control valve located on the main control board). This diverted flow from the recirc line to the RB spray header.

Present intentions:

Hold power at present level of approximately 91V until PRC and DNPO have reviewed the event and cleared the plant for return to full power operation.

Action Plan:

1. Walk down main control board thoroughly and frequently to look for indication of failed instruments or components.

Status: Ongoing per Short Term Instruction 92-019, which requires performance of SP-300 Control Room Log twice per shift until the results of an engineering analysis are complete. In addition, shift supervision will respond conservatively to all failed or degraded equipment, up to and including prompt plant shutdown.

2. Determine areas and components which need to be checked for indication of water damage.

Status: Engineering participated in the initial RB walkdown on 10/15/92. Specific recommendations are due by 1030 10/16/92.

3. Drain the BS header.

Status: Complete.

4. Drain LOT-4A/B.

Status: Complete. Approximately 65 gallons of water and 2.5 gallons of an oil/water emulsion were drained.

Analysis of the water showed 2262 ppm boron (BWST.

boron analysis is 2385 ppm boron).

5. Evaluate CRDMs and service structure for adverse effects.

Status: Engineering participated in the initial RB walkdown on 10/15/92, including a quick scan of the service structure area. No obvious problems were observed.

Specific recommendations are due by 1030 10/16/92.

6. Coordinate pumping RB sump to the MWST.

Status: Complete. Approximately 5400 gallons were pumped to the MWST on 10/15/92.

7. Accumulate a list of known damage and effects.

Status: Ongoing. Problems noted to date include:

RM-GIS failed high at the onset of the event.

Instrument went straight to a failed high condition without going into warning first, indicating probable electronics failure.

AHF-51A failed following the event. Initially the breaker for AHF-51A/E/I tripped (the three fans are supplied from one breaker). Investigation revealed that the A fan was failed. This fan was determed and the AHF-51E/I fans were repowered.'

8. Perform initial RB walkdown.

Status: Complete. The following comments were compiled from input of the operations, engineering, health physics, and management personnel present:

- Generally all areas inside the reactor building are dry. Floor areas on all levels showed some standing water, and some gang boxes on the 160' elevation had standing water on top (only those gang boxes with dished tops). No other components were observed to be wet, including junction boxes, transmitters, electrical panels, motors, fans, etc.

It appeared that some floor drains on the 95'.

elevation overflowed during the event. This was evidenced by a visible "bathtub ring" effect surrounding these drains. A significant amount of a black substance appears to have been flushed from these drains to the surrounding floor areas.

The incore pit area, shallow end of the fuel transfer canal, service structure, and catwalks around the fuel transfer canal were dry. In

addition the pressurizer heater power panels were dry.

The RB humidity did not appear to be abnormal or excessive.

When the BS header drain valve (BSV-50) was opened, significant flow was observed. The header was obviously full, and took approximately an hour to drain.

The following problems apparently unrelated to the event were noted:

MUV-22 is leaking at a rate of approximately 10 drops per minute, There is a large buildup of boron crystals, including several.stalactites, on the valve, and large amounts of boron crystals under the valve and on the surrounding floor area.

NGV-66 (nitrogen regulator to the A OTSG) is leaking at a rate of approximately 200 drops per minute. This water is OTSG secondary side fluid. Photographs of the area show crystal buildup on a pipe below the valve; however, this does NOT appear to be boron but rather crystal buildup from a substance leached out of the pipe insulation.

Oil was observed on the floor beneath AHF-IA.

The condensate drains on AHF-1A and IB are not being collected by the funnels. Local air flow is blowing the water away from the funnels.

AHF-2A appears to have a cooler leak.

9. Verify BSV-3 is closed.

Status: Complete. BSV-3 has been confirmed shut.

10. Report LOT-4A/B exceeding design basis limits (>141).

Status: Complete (Event number 24431).

11. Generate RB entry permits.

Status: Complete.

12. Verify reportability of the event.

Status: Complete. RB spraydown event is NOT reportable in and of itself but WAS reported as noted in 10.

above. There appeared to be more NRC interest in the RB spraydown event than in the LOT-4A/B aspects.

SSOD, SOTA, and Shift Manager all concur with the determination that the RB spraydown event is not reportable.

13. Return auxiliary steam from Units 1/2.

Status: Complete.

14. Determine what actions were taken at other plants having similar events.

Status: Ongoing. No results available yet.

aLg 1SUoE2)

(Page I of 2)

PRE-JOB BRIEFING CHECKLIST JOB DESCRIPTION PERSON-IN CHARGE EXPECTED START TIME/DATE I PERSONS IN ATTENDANCE CHECK (j)

PROCEDURES:

LIST ANY TO BE USED DISCUSS FLOW PATH(S)

DISCUSS PREVIOUS PROBLEM AREA(S)

WALK THROUGH NEEDED (Y/N) COMPLETED (Y/N)

This activity warrants additional personnel, i.e. A procedure reader, operator, or other personnel (Y/N) _; completed (Y/N)

-This activity warrants direct or continuous supervision (Y/N); _ completed (Y/N) -

• .' PARTS:

FILTERS --- GASKETS --- O-RINGS --- TOOLS --- HOSES --- SLEEVING ---

EQUIPMENT FROM CAL LAB DISPOSITION OF OLD PARTS SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS:

SCAFFOLDING/LADDERS/WORK PLATFORMS SCAFFOLDING IN THE WAY? (WILL "IT' FIT?)

CONFINED SPACE (AI-1805)?

MEANS OF EGRESS/ESCAPE RESPIRATORY PROTECTION REQUIRED?

HEAT STRESS (AI-I80I)?

TOXIC WASTE?

REVIEW MSDS IF APPLICABLE SAFETY BELTS BACK SPRAINS REVIEW APPROPRIATE CLEARANCE(S)

AI-5O00 Rev. 74 Page 94

4.8 PRE-JOB BRIEFINGS 4.8.1 SSOD Briefing Occasionally, certain tasks will arise which will be beyond the scope of day-to-day routines.

- Such tasks could include:

o Infrequently performed evolutions.

o Unusual evolutions.

o Multi-departmental evolutions.

- As an aid to forestall the unexpected, the Pre-Job Briefing Checklist (Enclosure 19) should be utilized.

o This checklist provides for a review of conditions that are encountered In everyday practices but could be overlooked from time-to-time due to varying circumstances.

o The Nuclear Shift Supervisor will determine when this checklist should be completed and whom is responsible for having it completed.

4.8.2 Briefing bY DNPO Director, Nuclear Plant Operations Briefing For every infrequently performed test or evolution involving the core, reactivity control, or reactor protection, or potentially leading to a reactivity transient, a briefing shall be given by the Director, Nuclear Plant Operations (ONPO) or his designee.

- For tests or evolutions that last longer than one shift, the briefing shall be repeated for each new oncoming crew at the start of the shift.

- The briefing outline is given in Enclosure 25.

- The current FPC procedures defined as "Infrequently performed tests or evolutions" are listed below:

o Evolutions not specifically covered by an existing OP, EP, or AP:

Performance Tests (PT's) and Work Request Instructions which place the plant in an unusual configuration related to the core, reactivity control, or reactor protection.

Al-500 Rev. 74 Page 47

NOV 25 1992 Rev. 6 11/06/92

• NUCLEAR COMPLIANCE

• Nuclear Operations Tracking & Expediting System (NOTES) *

• Transmittal Sheet *

,+/Z!Sft3 NOTES No.: Due Date: (i I To: D. CZUFIN/S. ROE (Name) (MAC)

The attached document ( IOC NPSE92 0489 )

requires action as specified below. Please attach documentkd evidence of action comDletion to NOTES Transmittal Sheet and return to Nuclear Compliance NA2D.

Nuclear Compliance

Contact:

J. A. FRIJOUF Extension:( 3354 Manager, Nuclear Compliance: E. Z. Froats Required action:

• CONTAINMENT SPRAY INCIDENT WORK (NPSE92-0489). 9M START-UP RESTRAINT PER D. CZUFIN. RCS MOTORS WITH SPECIFIC INSPECTION CRITERIA INCLUDING: INSPECT ALL FOUR RCP'S FOR: AC & DC LIFT OIL PUMP MOTORS; MOTOR INSTRUMENTATION; AND CONDUIT INSPECTION FOR BORON. *

..TmiPeC 7iO4 pee~on~ I 3/311-0. $e~i AVMWC'4b Nt&Aerf a Thi o net or. MUT Note: This document is a transmittal sheet.

normally considered a quality record.

requested information by attachment onl.

0ORev. 6 11/06/92

• NUCLBPJ COOPLLNCE *

• Nuclear Operations Tracking A Expediting System (NOTES) *

• Transmittal Sheet

• NOTES No.: Q20257N Due Date: 03/15 /93 To: W. &. STEPHENSON (Name) (MAC)

The attached document (PR 92-0144 )

requires action as specified below. Please attach d evidence of action oombletion to NOTES Transmittal Sheet and return to Nuclear Compliance NA2D.

Nuclear Compliance

Contact:

J. L. BUCKNER 120 Extension:(3410

(-'/

Manager, Nuclear Compliance: R. a. Froats fi Required action:

• PR 92-0144, INTRODUCTION OF BORATED WATER TO THE RB ATMOSPHERE. COMPLETE REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN ITEM 13 TO DETERMINE WHAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN AT OTHER PLANTS HAVING SIMILAR EVENTS*

Note: This document is a transmittal sheet. It is not normally considered a quality record. Provide requested information by attachment 9_l.

00Rev. 6 11/06/92

\ NUCLEAR COMPLIANCE

• Nuclear Operations Tracking & Expediting System (NOTES) *

• Transmittal Shoot NOTES No.: 20257L Due Date: 04/23 /93 To: H. KOON (Name) (MAC)

The attached document (PR 92-0144 requires action as specified below. Please attach g2flt4 evidence of aotion completion to NOTES Transmittal Sheet and return to Nuclear Compliance NA2D.

Nuclear Compliance

Contact:

J. L. BU KNER I71/

Extension: (3410 Manager, Nuclear Compliance: R. 1. Froats a Required action:

• PR 92-0144, INTRODUCTION OF BORATED WATER TO THE RB ATMOSPHERE. COMPLETE THE LONG TERM ACTION PLAN CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION TO VERIF COMPLETION TO COMPLIANCE. CORRECTIVE ACTION ITEMS ARE F LOWS: 1. RP INSTRUMENTATION GENERAL WALKDOWN-WR #30 W 3. MOV INSPECTIONS FOR STEM CORROSION AND OTHER DEGRADED CONDITIONS-WR

1. 302861. 4. INSPECT & CLEAN ALL CRDM STATORS , PI TUBE CONNECTIONS AND THERMAL COUPLE CONNECTIONS-WR #300074. 5.

INSP. & MAINT. REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL RB CRANES-WRs #s 302757, 302578, 302759, 302761. 6. AHF-IA/lB/lC FOR BORON IN COOLING COILS AND OTHER INSP. POINTS-WR #s 302820, 102521, 302822. 7.

AHF-2A/2B FILTER RACK REPLAC -WR #s 278371, 290257. 8.

AHF-51A MOTOR REPLACEMENT- 024 9. ALL AHF-51 HANDLING AN R INSP.-WR a 16 THRV-flUQ4Q-6. 10. SNUBBER INSP.-WR

1. 302838. 11. CONDUIT/CABLE INSP.-WR #302674. 12.

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM NOZZLE CHECK-SP-183 ACTIVITY*

,,. ?e

....... 1-INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Nuclear Plant Systems EngineerInS NAI[ 240-3423 Office MAC Telephone

SUBJECT:

Introduction of Borated Water Into RB Atmosphere TO: W. A. Stephenson DATE: October 20, 1992 NPSE92-0472 Nuclear Technical Support was charged with coordinating an engineering assessment of CR-3 following the inadvertent containment spray incident (ref. Problem Report 92-0144). Also included are short and long term actions required to maintain integrity of the RB equipment.

A presentation was given to PRC on Friday, October 16, recommending returning the unit to full power operation based on results of the attached study. A final action plan for completing the long term requirements is forthcoming.

If additional information is required, please let me know.

J. rry Manaer Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering JHT/tsw Attachments xc: G. H. Halnon M.J. Fitzgerald R. L Thompson D. M. Czufin R. L Muzzi A. H. Gelston P. Holmes-Ray Records Management

N INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE cou Pmalu Nuclear Plant &9Mtems Enaireeeina Oflice MAC Telephone

SUBJECT:

Containment Spray Incident TO: S.K Balliet DATE: October 27, 1992 D. M. Czufin NPSE92-0483 M.J. Fitzgerald A. H. Gelston R. L Muzzi A. Petrowsky Attached please find two lists resulting from the containment spray Incident of October 15, 1992. The first addresses follow-up activities to ensure completion of the Short term actions. The second addresses Long term actions to ensure equipment availability.

Both lists require feedback to ensure timely completion of the activities. Work Requests for long term actions must be Initiated to compile with the 9M milestone date for adding outage work activities. To meet this date, return the completed lists to me by October 29th.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

YH.Teryanager Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering JHT/krt Attachments xc: G. H. Halnon H. Koon W. A. Stephenson Records Management

'J

(

Attachment IWTAEIMIT SIMY IUCIDUT FOLLOW UP ACTIVITIES DES*UIPTIO ,ESPONU.IUILIITY .M ETIO STARAS Perform SP-ISO; Operability awd Functional Check of Loose Parts Monitoring Sukaystem. Operations Caegere pro mnd post Incident date .... _-

Perform coflIdence checks of Ut-I cables from control roam IC shop Plice AC and DC IC PuM Lift Oil u io service Operations Trend as Service Structure Te=ersturs, to monitor MSShroud Fen health CNN System ELlineer Evaiumte need to extend Short Tem Operatini Imntruction for increased froqmcy of iUM IC Section SP-300 date cotlection based on Instrumnt tres I , ,

NOTE: Oocmenttion of coapLeted Items an this paep shoutd be forwarded to J. N. Terry. NAC:AIAE.

FINTEROFFICE Florida CORRESPONDENCE 7IPower Powe r [Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering NAIE 240-361 Office MAC Telephone

SUBJECT:

9M Work Resulting from Containment Spray Incident TO: H. Koon DATE: October 30, 1992 NPSE92-0489 In an effort to meet our November 1, 1992 deadline for 9M scope additions, Tech Support submits the attached list of outage activities. Each item is directly associated with long term follow up resulting from the Containment Spray Incident. Each is considered a requirement to ensure equipment operability and will be included in the Corrective Action Plan for PR92-01144.

Items identified during inspections scheduled for 9M will be evaluated on their merits for 9M addition and if necessary will be added via the emergent work process.

If you need any information, please let me know.

J.H. Terry, Manager Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering JHT/tsw attachment xc: G. H. Halnon R. L. Thompson D. M. Czufin A. H. Gelston R. L. Muzzi M. J. Fitzgerald P. Holmes-Ray Records Management

( ( (

Atta~ t a CVAIT WEI IUCISM L" 13M DCTIOM KtIPTI OII I = hE* 3I TI

- t einutuienl ulr e mI *I8 Ir I 6rT __ _ _ __ _ _

S orWm wit ,cudi fc irspection eri* irsi iC stm Eiiwe ir sKlitmte omvis AC A OC tlIft oft pum muter.

,itb

.uma itimpactio for Do a_____________1_ 4,.,k,,

. ,- i---

_M plIwectiam for aste cern m, ai*d other.e"e cei dti- Cowt .,-wweri.,q.,

lmpact 4£le sit OWl sUtators, PI To~smanet low & tc ca.=c tam CF "I-tm Do. O1 Inewstfan aid minterinmm reqtreminte for Ott a crunms compent Irsere.____________

AIF-IU/*IC far loom In colis milts and ether impwctim points AN Sy*tn iiimer AIn/e_ I APF-?A/a filter rec repl.wi A Svmlti Erum fro A14k ".

Aff-SA saw rept t , ,tI ,t Ersnieo 30- SL. 3 Air, Normli, Fen ftotr (AMF-Si form) Impectltfu PM Wytom Erqinsr Al- e .3 SUdh lmnpectirns Iii wayp 3,0-z- t --

cbe in coIle tray 1ar-

. tob e in ca~eunuta

• a spry Ste m0=10 Check (W-t0) _____________

'FIA C(&AOS -4s-L-7 ; 7 ,5011S Alk 1. 404F- ,A we4-76I 7 ý-

A#.F- i¢ 3 A,4F- Si t AK j' C z C? 'l rC~mf 7

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE CORPORATIONi Nuclear Operations Support 349 Office KAC Teteptane

SUBJECT:

Request For An Extension to PR 92-144, Introduction of Borated Water to the RB Atmosphere.

TO: Ed Froats DATE: 11/02/92 It is requested the due date be extended to 12/4/92 to allow additional time to complete Part 3 of the PR. Additional time is needed because 1) the PR was not received/assigned until 10/29/92;

2) personnel with whom investigation and CAP development is to be coordinated, are not available for the first week following receipt/

assignment.

W. M. Marshall

SINTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE COMP POP T '0 Nuclear Plant Technical Support NIA! 240-3618 Office MAC Telephone

SUBJECT:

NOTES Item 20257E TO: E. E. Froats V DATE: December 29, 1992 NPSE92-0588 The subject NOTES Item related to the Containment Spray incident of October 15, 1992, was assigned to me for documentation that the five short term follow up activities are complete.

As of this date all are completed with the exception of Item 2, perform a confidence check of NI-1 cable from control room, This item was further evaluated and determined not necessary, reference attached speed memos from F. K. Bockhorst dated December 4, 1992 and December 9, 1992.

This IOC should serve to close out NOTES Item 20257E.

P an er nuclerr Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering JHT/tsw xc: G. H. Halnon R. L. Muzzi Records Management

To: J.H. Terry Fr: F.K. Bockhorst Sub: Building Spray Event 15 Oct, 1992 / NI-I Cable Inspection 12-4-92 Problem Report PR92-0144 written subsequent to this event defined an action plan which included the performance of confidence checks of the NI-i cables from the control room. It was felt at the time that since the preamplifier for NI-i had been removed, the potential existed for the cable connectors to become contaminated with water or boron. At this time, these checks have not and are not expected to be done.

Discussions with the I&C technicians who were working NI-i during the Refuel VIII restart indicated that the cable connectors were left bagged and protected and should not have been affected by the building spray event. Present plans are to restore the NI-i channel at the earliest opportunity followig the next shutdown and to fully inspect the preamplifier cables at that time.

To: R.L. Muzzi Fr: F.K. Bockhorst 12-9-92 Sub: Field Report on Replacement of Flow Transmitter RC-14B-dPT2 The subject transmitter replacement was completed at about 11:30 on 12-8-92. The changeout went reasonably smoothly, with the only difficulty being a lead with cut insulation which was cut back and relugged. When the transmitter was returned to service, no apparent perturbations occurred in the 'C" channel, as reported by control and documented on the attached graph.

While I was in the RB, I inspected NI-i preamp cables and pressurizer level transmitter RC-1-LTI. The preamp cables are properly bagged and do not appear to have been affected by the inadvertent building spray event in any way. The pressurizer level transmitter does not show any signs of leakage from the reference leg piping.

I will be in tomorrow at some reasonable time.

To: JBUCKNER From: HKOON

Subject:

NOTES 20257F Boron Incident Date: 12-30-92 Time: 10:31a Jerry, in looking at the subject assigned NOTES item, I find that on page 7 of the PR, item £9 states "302716 through 302726". In actually, only 302716 is the only one that was really evaluated to do all the work for all the fans. It is currently loaded in 9M. The rest of them will not be.

Hope you're enjoying the holidays while the rest of us are keeping your lights on!!!

Give me a call when you get back.

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE S COR PORATIONm Nuclear Plant Onerations Off ice MR38 Tek~mw

SUBJECT:

Closure of HPES CAP Item #2, NOTES Item 20257A.

TO: E. Froats, NA2D DATE: January 25, 1993 0P93-0010 The purpose of this letter is to document closure of the subject corrective action item associated with lessons learned from the Reactor Building Spray event.

The affected operator has completed summary presentation of the Lessons Learned; presentation was given to approximately 60 Operations personnel. Documentation of attending personnel has been reviewed and appropriately filed; please let me know if you require additional documentation.

W. N. Marshall Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations cc: J. Buckner NA2D File

_V ENCLOS 1(a e f2)

PATi* AP DnE RECORD .L ;2 Pa~n.'O. PROCEDURE No. REVISION No. TITLE DHP-IA, BSP-IA AND VALVE P"IR I-35 SP-3400 == 23 SURVEILLANCE DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Page i - Table of Contents; Page ii - Table of Contents; Page I Step 2.1.5; Page 6 Step 3.5.7; Page 7 Step 3.7.3; Page 13 Steps 4.1.8.3 14 Steps 4.1.8.8 through 4.2.1; Page 15 Steps 4.1.8.4, 4.2.2 4.1.8.6 through 4.2.5; Page 16- Page and 4.1.8.7; Steps 4.2.6 through 4.3.1; Page 17- Steps 4.4 through 4.4.5; Page 18 - Steps 4.4.6 through 4.5.6; Page 19 Steps 4.5.7 through 4.7.1; Page 20 Steps 4.7.2 through 4.8.2; Page 21 - Steps 4.8.3 through 4.8.5; Page 23 -

Step 5.2.3; Page 24; Page 28; F .ddA,*l..,

A 4,s.1,3 ý P01f It SMf'S 4.I.7.5hrv .7.G REASON AND REFERENCES FOR PROCEDURE CHANGE Page 13,Page 14, 4.1.8.3, 4.1.8.4, and Steps 4.1.8.6 through 4.1.8.10 - Provided Caution and clarified Steps for verification of DHV-42 opening; Page 14 Steps 4.2 through 4.2.1, Page 16,Page 17, Page 18, Page 19, Page 20, Page 21 Steps 4.8.3 through 4.8.5 - Revised Sections on DHP-1A, BSP-1A and Valve testing to clarify requirements and enhance performance.

Also added Cautions and Steps to help preclude opening of BSV-3 while performing BSP-lA testing. ; Page 23 - Step 5.2.3 corrected referenced Step; Page 29 -

Corrected Table; Page i and ii - Corrected Table of Contents; Page I Step 2.1.5 and Page 6 Step 3.5.7 added reference; Page 7 Step 3.7.3 corrected step number; Page 24 - Corrected Valve restoration position. Pf. 1iZ jAJ r~cS-, ol7r\braf riFm Biennial Review: 0 Result of scheduled procedure review notification from Document Control

- PRNR-A previously submitted to Document Control

- Enclosure 23 of AI-402B attached 0 Review conducted prior to normal review frequency PRNR-B attached Enclosure 23 of AI-402B attached 0 Plant Modification: MAR Number NA O Non-Conformance: Finding number and date PR92-0144 / 10/15/92 0 Technical Specif atoAAmend nt- Specification Number NA Originated By ____________________-__ Sen. Nuc. Results Enq I /2.9 /9 .

Sig atureV Title Date PART IWO Interpretation Contact ___Date S1//31f PRC Meeting No. Q -0j Plant Review Chairman , Date I- -qa Dir. Nuc. Plant Oper. Date

• Not Required I I-400C Rev. 9 Paqe 13

PROCEDURE TRAINING

SUMMARY

'*) -. 93 PROCEDURE NO. SP-340B REVISION NO. 23 DESCRIPTION: (Provide a brief summary, describing the major changes made to the procedure.

If a new procedure, briefly describe the procedure.)

Changes were made to enhance the performance of testing for BSP-IA , DHP-1A and associated valves. Steps were added to preclude opening of BSV-3 while BSP-IA is being tested. Human Factors changes were made in responsonse to the HPES resulting from the Building Spray Event.

Other changes are editorial in nature.

Procedure Revised By: Date: / I-19 9_z I I ENCLOSURE 3 AI-400C pal Cl M---

• _ rP

.1 ENCLOSURE 1 (PaRe 1 of 2)

PART ONE PROCEDURE REVIEW RECORD PRR. NO. PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. TITLE DHP-1B, BSP-1B AND VALVE 7 SP-340E 5 SURVEILLANCE DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Page i - Table of Contents; Page ii - Table of Contents; Page 12 - Caution Statement; Page 13 Steps 4.1.8.2 through 4.1.8.6; Page 14 Steps 4.1.8.7 through 4.1.8.10; Page 15 Steps 4.1.8.11 through 4.2.2; Page 16- Steps 4.2.3 through 4.2.7; Page 17- Steps 4.3 through 4.4.2; Page 18 - Steps 4.4.3 through 4.4.6; Page 19 Steps 4.5 through 4.5.7; Page 20 Steps 4.6 through 4.7.2; Page 21 - Steps 4.7.3 through 4.8.3; Page 22 Steps 4.8.4, 4.8.5; Page 24 - Step 5.2.3; Page 25; Page 29 REASON AND REFERENCES FOR PROCEDURE CHANGE Page 12-Caution Statement, Page 13,Page 14, Page 15 -Steps 4.1.8.2 through 4.1.8.12 - Provided alternate method for verification of DHV-43 opening; Page 15 Steps 4.2 through 4.2.2, Page 16,Page 17, Page 18, Page 19, Page 20, Page 21, Page 22 Steps 4.8.4 and 4.8.5 - Revised Sections on DHP-1B, BSP-IB and Valve testing to clarify requirements and enhance performance. Also added Cautions and Steps to help preclude opening of BSV-4 while performing BSP-1B testing. ; Page 24 - Step 5.2.3 corrected referenced Step; Page 25 - Changed valve used to throttle flow for BSP-1B per request from Nuclear Operations; Page 29 - Corrected Table; Page i and ii - Corrected Table of Contents.

Biennial Review: 0 Result of scheduled procedure review notification from Document Control

- PRNR-A previously submitted to Document Control

- Enclosure 23 of AI-402B attached 0 Review conducted prior to normal review frequency

- PRNR-B attached

- Enclosure 23 of AI-402B attached O Plant Modification: MAR Number NA O Non-Conformance: Finding number and date NA /

O Technical SpecificalioAmendment: Specification Number NA Originated By ___Sen. Nuc. Results Eng. 11/23/92 Signatre Title Date PART TWO Interpretation Contact Date PRC Meeting No.

Plant Review Chairman Date Dir. Nuc. Plant Oper. Date O Not Required AI-400C Rev. 9 Paue 13

PROCEDURE TRAINING

SUMMARY

PROCEDURE NO. SP-340E REVISION NO. 5 DESCRIPTION: (Provide a brief summary, describing the major changes made to the procedure.

If a new procedure, briefly describe the procedure.)

This change provided an improved method for remote position verification of DHV-43. The new method provides a more positive indication of DHV-43 disc position and has been validated to provide acceptable results.

Changes were also made enhance the performance of testing for BSP-IB , DHP-1B and associated valves. Steps were added to preclude opening of BSV-4 while BSP-1B is being tested. Throttle Valve used for regulating flow for BSP-1B was changed per a request from Operations.

Other changes are editorial in nature.

Procedure Revised By: Date: . 11/23/92 AI-400C Rev. 9 Page 15

INTEI .OFFICECORRESPONDENCE CORPORNATI ON Nuclear Intearated Scheduling Office MAC Telphome

SUBJECT:

NOTES 20257F (PROBLEM REPORT 92-0144)

TO: Quality Assessments DATE: April 20, 1993 NIP93-124 Please close the above-mentioned NOTES Item. As stated in the Long Term Action Plan, activities I and 3 through 12 have been performed.

Hoyt Koon 1am LX'

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Nuclear Operations Training .U-47 795-0504 Or 00O0AT '(1g Office MAC Telephone

SUBJECT:

NOTES ITEMS 20257C AND 20574 TO: E. t. -RuzLs DATE: April 28, 1993 TRS93 0015 Training on Self-Checking for operators has been completed using lesson plan ROT 6-5, Self-Checking. This training was completed as part of the first requal cycle for 1993. Attached for your review are copies of attendance sheets for this class.

( G. Smith JGS/If Attachments

OORev. 6 11/06/92

• NUCLEAR COMPLIANCE

• Nuclear Operations Tracking & Expediting system (NOTES) 0

• Transmittal Sheet NOTES No.: 025.K 7S.IT Due Date: 06/30 /93 To: L. C. KELLEY/SMITH NU47 (Name) (MAC)

The attached document (PR 92-0144 requires action as specified below. Please attach l evidence of action copletion to NOTES Transmittal Sheet and return to Nuclear Compliance NA2D.

Nuclear Compliance

Contact:

J. L. BUCKNER Extension: (3410 Manager, Nuclear Compliance: E. E. Froats Required action:

• PR 92-0144, INTRODUCTION OF BORATED WATER TO THE RB ATMOSPHERE. COMPLETE HPES ACTION PLAN ITEM 5 TO ENHANCE SCHEDULED OPERATOR TRAINING TO INCLUDE CURRENT INDUSTRY SELFCHECKING AND CROSSCHECKING METHODS AND TECHNIQUES; (IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER OTHER ALTERNATIVES IF INDUSTRY INFORMATION IS UNAVAILABLE*

D~C21 199Z

÷,

Note: This document is a transaittal sheet. It isnot norally considered a quality record. Provide requested information by attachment g .

Florida INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Power Nuclear Sclieduling Deggrtment NAB 240-80 CORPORATION OFFICE MC TEUEPIIONE

SUBJECT:

NOTES 20257F (PROBLEM REPORT 92-0144)

TO: Quality Assessment NT03 DATE: May 6, 1993 NIP93-132 The above-mentioned NOTES Item referring to Problem Report 92-0144 regarding borated water to the Reactor Building Atmosphere has been completed. This work was performed during the 9M Outage. Please close this action item.

B. C. Moore lam

POST CONTAINNENT SPRAY INCIDENT INSPECTION OF RCPS

REFERENCE:

Notes Item 203405 An inspection of each Reactor Coolant Pump motor for signs of boron damage as a result of the Building Spray Incident was performed 3/31/93 by the System Engineer. Particular attention was given to both the AC and DC high pressure lube oil lift pumps.

On each Reactor Coolant Pump Motor, the lube oil lift pumps are located in a "non enclosed" part of the lube oil collection system. This provided direct access for not only the containment spray but for a good visual examination. There was no sign of boron spray reaching any of the lift pumps or any of the other equipment associated with the Reactor Coolant Pump Motors. Only a slight trace of a boron puddle was noted on the oil collection system for RCP-IB. This puddle and its residual boron are of no consequence to the operation of the motor and its associated equipment.

Operation of each of the lube oil lift pumps was checked just after the event by starting each one of the lift pumps and verifying that the permissive light for each lift pump (located on the RCP main start switch) was lit. The lift pumps were again checked in this manner during the shutdown for the 9M outage were both AC and DC lift pumps are run for main coolant pump shutdown.

This completes the required actions for NOTES Item 20340B.

Stephen Roe, Senior Nuclear Mechanical Engineer Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering

V 0

- 4~O _

/7n V% ¢4t)tJ

/*~C 0 c

n ase No-reF-s / TýL-,A I

_u I %_! RO e I ýeem is --zL,7 M.. xot

.. .. . . _s 1; k~

~~1

-J

S =INTEROFFICE 0 s glb@I  ?

Toh Nuclear Technical Support Office CORRESPONDENCE NAI E MAC 240-3730 Telqehone SUBýJECT: Problem Report (PR-92-0144-0)

TO: L. W. Moffat DATE: June 8, 1993 NPTS93-0307 The purpose of this correspondence is to respond to the above referenced Problem Report Corrective Action Plan Item which relates to oil sample analysis of the RCP motors. This action was requested as a result of the Building Spray incident of October 1992. Oil samples have been collected for both reservoirs on all four motors. While both reservoirs are enclosed, only the upper has any potential for contamination. Unfortunately, the oil samples are contaminated and can not be released from site. While we do have a means of sampling contaminated oil, it is extremely costly.

Therefore, some qualitative checks have been made of the upper reservoir samples. The results of these checks dearly indicate there are no significant contaminates present. The samples were also reviewed for the presence of any water, with none observed. Based on these qualitative results, combined with the other tests/inspections performed on the RCP motors during midcycle 9, we can conclude the motors did not suffer any adverse damage as the result of the Building Spray incident. Thus, the action item to sample the oil should be closed. The oil samples will be maintained until the radioactivity decays sufficiently to allow their release. They will then be sampled as part of the ongoing Condition Monitoring Program for overall lubricant condition and wear particle analysis. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at ext. 3730 W. J. Brewer, Supervisor Nuclear Plant Technical Support WJB/wjb xc: P. Gerardin K. Tyler Records Management