ML101200091
| ML101200091 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/2010 |
| From: | Canton L US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Tailleart D Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response |
| Schrader, Eric, NSIR/DPR, 301-415-5627 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML101200091 (85) | |
Text
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Region II Jacob K. Javits Federal Office Building 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1311 New York, NY 10278-0002 o FEMA
?VD S" March 3, 2010 Mr. Don Tailleart U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Security and Incident Response 11555 Rockville Pike, Mail Stop T3B46M Rockville, MD 20852
SUBJECT:
Final Exercise Report for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Full Scale Exercise of September 22, 2009
Dear Mr. Tailleart:
Please find enclosed the Final Exercise Report for the federally evaluated, full-scale exercise held for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant on September 22, 2009.
The State of New York and local emergency response organizations successfully demonstrated the capabilities to implement their off-site radiological emergency response plans and procedures, based on the evaluation of this exercise by the Regional Assistance Committee and a team of Federal evaluators. There were no deficiencies; three Areas Requiring Corrective Action were identified.
Therefore we find that State and local preparedness is adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Nine Mile Point NPS and will provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency.
If there are any questions concerning this report, the FEMA Region II Technological Hazards Branch Chief and RAC Chair, Rebecca Thomson, can be reached at 212-680-8509.
Sincerely yours, ynn Canton Regional Administrator cc: Vanessa E. Quinn, REP Program Chief, FEMA HQ www.fema.gov
- PH: (212)680-3600
FINAL EXERCISE REPORT NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Licensee: Constellation Exercise Date: September 22, 2009 Report Date: February 25, 2010 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region II 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- 1.
EX ECU TIV E SU M M A R Y.................................................................................................
1 II.
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................
2 III.
EXERCISE OVERVIEW..............................................................................................
4 A.
Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description..............................................................
4 B.
Exercise Participants........................................................................................................
5 C.
Exercise Tim eline........................................................................................................
7 IV.
EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS................................................................
10 A.
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation......................................................................
10 B.
Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated...................................................................................
13
- 1.
STATE OF NEW YORK..........................................................................................
15 1.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/State Emergency C oordination C enter..........................................................................................
15 1.2 New York State Accident Assessment (AA)...................................................
15 1.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)...............................................................
15 1.4 Nile Mile Point Joint Information Center (JIC).................................................
16 1.5 EAS Radio Station (WSYR)............................................................................
17
- 2.
O SW EG O CO U N TY.................................................................................................
18 2.1 Oswego County Warning Point (WP)...............................................................
18 2.2 Oswego County Emergency Operation Center (EOC)......................................
18 2.3 Oswego County Accident Assessment (AA)...................................................
19 2.4 Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring Teams...................................
20 2.5 Oswego County - Traffic Control Point -Oswego County Sheriff................... 20 2.6 Oswego County - Traffic Control Point -Oswego City Police Department........... 21 2.7 Oswego County - Backup Route Alerting.......................................................
22 2.8 Oswego County - School Interview - Fredrick Leighton Elementary School....... 23 2.9 Oswego County - School Interview - Mexico High School..............................
23 2.9 Oswego County - School Bus Company - Oswego County BOCES................ 23 2.10 Oswego County - Special Population Bus Company - CNY Centro................ 24 ii
2.11 Oswego County - Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center - Highway G arage Parish, N Y............................................................................................
24 2.12 Oswego County - Medical Services Transport Oswego Fire Department........ 24 2.13 O sw ego County H ospital.................................................................................
25 2.14 Oswego County - General Population Reception Center - Onondaga County...... 25 APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................
26 APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS........................
28 APPENDIX 3 - EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT............................................................
30 APPENDIX 4 - SCENARIO SYNOPSIS..............
I........................ 65 List of Tables Table 1 - Exercise Tim eline............................................................................ 8 Table 2 - Summary results of Exercise Evaluation...................................................... 11 iii
I.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
On September 22, 2009, a full scale exercise was conducted in the 10-mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region II. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures.
The most recent previous exercise at this site was conducted on March 7, 2007. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on September 15, 1981.
FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in New York, Oswego and Onondaga Counties who participated in this exercise.
Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.
Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.
This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities: Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center (PMC) at the County Highway facility on September 22, 2009; Traffic Control Points -
Oswego County Sheriff and City of Oswego Police on September 22, 2009; Special Population Bus Company Interviews at Centro of Syracuse on September 23, 2009; School Bus Company Interview at BOCES on September 23, 2009; School Interviews at Leighton Elementary School in Oswego and Mexico High School in Mexico on September 23, 2009; Reception Center at New York State Fairgrounds on October 15, 2009; and a Medical Services MS-Drill (Transportation and Facility by Oswego Fire Department and Facility at Oswego Hospital on October 23, 2009.)
The State and local organizations except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Deficiencies and three Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified as a result of this exercise. In addition, corrective actions were demonstrated for two prior ARCAs, thus closing those issues. One ARCA from a previous exercise remains unresolved.
I
II.
INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.
FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local governments' participation in joint exercises with licensees.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments; Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments; Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and US Department of Defense.
2
Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region II Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Formal submission of the RERPs for the Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plants (JAFNPP) to FEMA Region II by the New York State and involved local jurisdictions occurred on July 15, 1981. Formal approval of the RERPs was granted by FEMA on February 1, 1985, under 44 CFR 350.
A REP exercise was conducted on September 22, 2009 by FEMA Region II to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.
The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region II RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Administrator.
The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;
'"Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," published in the Federal Register on September 12, 2001, and revised April 25, 2002, and contained in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15, 2002)
Section III of this report, "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
Section IV of this report, "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format.
This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.
3
III.
EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the September 22, 2009, exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
A.
Piume Emergency Planning Zone Description The area within the Nine Mile Point/James A. FitzPatrick site is located on Lake Ontario in Oswego County. Oswego County is predominantly rural in nature with approximately 75 percent of its total land acres consisting of woodland, wetlands, and inactive agricultural land. Although active agriculture land only accounts for 16 percent of the local land acres, agriculture is the major land use in the county. The major agriculture activity in Oswego County is dairy, accounting for approximately 63 percent of the value of all farm products produced in the county. The major harvested crops are hay, alfalfa, and corn. The major livestock animals are cattle and hogs.
The 10-mile EPZ contains a total population of 41,284 (2000 Census Population Estimates). The Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant site is located seven miles to the northeast of the city of Oswego and thirteen miles north of the city of Fulton. Aside from these two areas of population concentration, the region is sparsely populated.
The industrial activities within the 10-mile EPZ are confined principally to the metropolitan area within the city of Oswego, with little industry in the outlying communities of Scriba, Minetto, Volney and Mexico. Manufacturing firms directly account for 33 percent of the total employment of Oswego County.
The public institutions, aside from the schools and churches, within the EPZ are a hospital, a college, and a jail. There are also a number of special facilities located within the 10-mile EPZ.
Continuing urban and industrial expansion of the area will increase both the population and the amount of land used for residential and commercial purposes. It is anticipated that the population in the region will increase by about 30 percent in the next twenty years, with larger increases in the urban areas.
4
B.
Exercise Participants The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise on September 22, 2009.
NEW YORK STATE New York State Emergency Management Office New York State Department of Health New York State Police New York State Department of Environmental Conservation New York State Department of Transportation New York State Department of Labor New York State Office of Aging New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets New York State Thruway Authority New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation New York State Department of Correctional Services New York State Office of Mental Health New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control New York State Education Department New York State Energy Research and Development Authority New York State Public Service Commission New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs New York State Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Organization RISK JURISDICTIONS OSWEGO COUNTY Oswego County Sheriff's Department Oswego County Department of Public Works Oswego County Emergency Management Office Oswego County Chairman of the Legislature Oswego County Information Technology Oswego County Personnel Department Oswego County Administrator Oswego County Administrative Services Oswego County Department of Social Services Oswego County Highway Department Oswego County Superintendent of Schools Oswego County Department of Health Oswego County Fire Coordinator Oswego City School District 5
Mexico Central School District Oswego County Attorney Oswego County Promotion and Tourism Oswego County Probation Department Oswego County Planning Department Oswego County Emergency Medical Services Oswego County Communication Center - 911 Cooperative Extension New York State Assembly BOCES of Oswego County SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS Town of Palermo Fire Department City of Oswego City of Fulton Fulton Police Department Onondaga City Emergency Management Office Cooperative Extension PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS American Red Cross RACES Entergy - James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Constellation Energy Corporation - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station WSYR Radio Station, Syracuse Oswego County Opportunities Transportation 6
C.
Exercise Timeline..,
Table 1, on the following pages, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise on September 22, 2009.
Also included are times that notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.
7
Table 1. Exercise Timeline U D"'*I.TT AJITT"CT Dn*Ylx7u DI A NMIT Oswego Co.
Warning Point NY State EOC EOF JIC Oswego Co.
EOC EAS Radio Station WSYR 0817 0829 0828 Unusual Event Alert 0858 0906 0906 0905 Site Area Emergency 1121 1129 1123 1128 1129 General Emergency 1226 1240 1226 1240 1240 Simulated Rad. Release 1128 1228 1228 1228 1228 Started Simulated Rad. Release Terminated Facility Declared Operational 1017 1003 1010 County Declared State of Emergency 1015 1015 Exercise Terminated 1501 1453 1452 1501 Early Precautionary Actions:
Close Parks and Beaches 1046 1045 1015 1015 Schools 1045 1024 1024 "Heads Up" Siren Activation 1046 1046 "Heads Up" EAS Message 1050 1053 1050 1050 Ist Protective Action Decision 14--1246 1245 Evacuate 1, 2,3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 26, 27 Siren Activation 1256 1256 1256 EAS Message 1300 1300 1300 2 d Protective Action Decision Evacuate 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 1355 1357 1355 24, 25, 28 Siren Activation 1406 1406 1402
EAS Radio Station WSYR I AIA 1 AI*,
l Jl/*
ILAi iviessage IVIu 1,l 1't u
KI Administration Decisions:
All EWs and Evacuation Zones 1, 2, 3,5, 6,10,11,26, 27 1245 1246 1245 Remaining EPZ Population 1355 1355 1310
IV.
EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the September 22, 2009 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the EPZ surrounding the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant.
Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria contained in the September 12, 2001 Federal Register Notice (revised April 25, 2002) and in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15, 2002).
Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise is found in Appendix 3 of this report.
A.
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those objectives is indicated by the use of the following letters:
M Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) assessed and no unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercises)
D Deficiency assessed A
ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)
N Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B) 10
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M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) Assessed and no Unresolved ARCA(s) from Prior Exercises A - ARCA(s) Assessed or Unresolved ARCA(s) from Prior N - Not Demonstrated as Scheduled (Reason Explained in Section IV.B)
Exercises Blank - Not Scheduled for Demonstration or Not Assigned to Facility/Function Al-ARCA Corrected D - Deficiency I1
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12 EMERGENCY OPNS PROTECTIVE ACTION PROTECTIVE ACTION MEASUREMENT & EMERG NOTIF &I SUPPORT MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING IMPLEMENTATION 3
ANALYSIS PUBLIC INFO OPN/FACILITIES ialllb[illldll[ei 2alI2bl12b2l2c1l2dI12e1 3al.l3b I4cc 3 e1d3d2 1
3e 3f1 4all4a2i4a314blI4cl 5al15a2J5a315bl6a16b1606 A
A Oswego County Field Monitoring Team 1 M
M M
M M
M M
Field Monitoring Team 2 M
M M
M M
M M
Traffic Control Point - Sheriff M
M A
Traffic Control Point - Police Department M
M A
Backup Route Alerting M
School Interview - FLES M
School Interview - MHS M
School Bus Company - BOCES M
M M
Special Population Bus Company - CNY Centro M M M Emergency Worker PMC HGPNY M
M MM Medical Services Transport - DMAC M
M M
M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) Assessed and no Unresolved ARCA(s) from Prior Exercises N - Not Demonstrated as Scheduled (Reason Explained in Section IV.B)
Blank - Not Scheduled for Demonstration or Not Assigned to Facility/Function A - ARCA(s) Assessed or Unresolved ARCA(s) from Prior Exercises Al-ARCA Corrected 12
B.
Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdiction-based, issues only format. Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to evaluation criteria demonstration status.
Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation criteria under which one or more Deficiencies were assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.
Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise evaluation criteria which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.
Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.
Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
13
The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that are discussed in this report.
A Deficiency is defined in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15, 2002) as
"...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."
An ARCA is defined in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15, 2002) as
"...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."
FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.
The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).
Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.
Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.
Objective Number - A two-digit number corresponding to the objective numbers in FEMA-REP-14.
Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.
Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.
14
STATE OF NEW YORK 1.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) State Emergency Coordination Center
- a. MET: 1.al; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 2.b.2; 3.b.1; 5.a.1; 5.b.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- a. MET: 1.e. 1; 2.a.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
- a. MET: 1.a.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE 15
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.4 Nile Mile Point Joint Information Center (JIC)
- a. MET: 1.a.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 5.b.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: ONE ISSUE: 40-07-5.a.1-A-01 CONDITION: The first EAS message, issued at 1131, did not contain the four required elements as prescribed. The message did not contain information referencing public information materials or to stay tuned to the radio station for further information.
REASON UNRESOLVED: The initial EAS Message that went out at 1050 contained 3 out of the 4 required elements.
EAS Message #1 stated that the EAS was activated by "Oswego County officials". FEMA Guidance requires "Identification of the State or local government organization and the official [emphasis added] with the authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message."
("Guidance for Providing Emergency Information and Instructions to the Public for Radiological Emergencies using the Emergency Alert System", FEMA Memorandum, Feb. 2, 1999.)
SCHEDULE OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The corrective action for this issue will be demonstrated at the next federally evaluated, biennial exercise.
16
1.5 EAS Radio Station (WSYR)
- a. MET: 1.d.1; 5.a.1; 5.b.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 17
- 2.
OSWEGO COUNTY 2.1 Oswego County Warning Point (WP)
- a. MET: 1.a.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2 Oswego County Emergency Operation Center (EOC)
- a. MET: 1.a.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 2.a.1; 2.b.2; 2.c.1 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.1; 3.c.2; 3.d.1; 3.d.2; 5.a.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: ONE ISSUE: 40-09-5.b.1-A-01 CONDITION: There was an instance where an EAS message and a News Release were inconsistent, which could have led to confusion on the part of the public. In News Release number 6, it stated that the County Department of Health recommended that everyone in the entire 10-mile EPZ take KI. Subsequently, EAS #3 indicated that a General Emergency had been declared and the population in Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPA's): 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22 (per the previous Protective Action Decision) along with and additional ERPA's 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11 were to evacuate and ingest KI. The follow-on News Release to this EAS message was consistent with the EAS message, but neither EAS #3 or New Release
- 7 indicated that everyone in the EPZ was being encouraged to take KI by the County Department of Health.
POSSIBLE CAUSE: Inconsistent messages on ingestion of KI probably caused by PIOs not remembering that KI had been recommended for everyone, not just those evacuating.
REFERENCE:
NUREG-0654, E,5 7: G.3a, G.4.c 18
EFFECT: Potentially the public could have been confused as to whether or not to take KI.
RECOMMENDATION: When EAS messages and follow-on News Releases are being drafted, the previous messages should be reviewed to ensure that the new messages are consistent with those that have already been released.
SCHEDULE OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The corrective action for this issue will be demonstrated at the next federally evaluated, biennial exercise.
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: 5.a.1 ISSUE: 40-07-5.a.1-A-04 CONDITION: In the transmission of the first EAS message to the JIC, the EAS writer inadvertently listed the number of pages as 2, including the cover page, instead of 3. Consequently, when the document was received at the JIC, only the first page of the EAS message was forwarded to the EAS station.
CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The person faxing the EAS messages made sure to include proper numbers on each page and the total number was noted on the cover sheet.
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3 Oswego County Accident Assessment (AA)
- a. MET: 1.e.l; 2.a.l; 2.b.1; 4.a.2
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 19
2.4 Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring Team A
- a. MET: 1.a.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 4.a.1; 4.a.3
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.5 Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring Team B
- a. MET: 1.a.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 4.a.1; 4.a.3
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.6 Oswego County - Traffic Control Point - Oswego County Sheriff
- a. MET: 3.b.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: ONE ISSUE: 40-09-3.d.l-A-02 CONDITION: Detailed instructions and maps are provided in each dosimetry kit for route alerting, but there were no instructions, maps, or diagrams to provide Emergency Workers information concerning access control or evacuation route control.
POSSIBLE CAUSE: Unfamiliar with NUREG requirements.
20
REFERENCE:
NUREG-0654, J.1O.g,j EFFECT: Without providing detail mission preplans issuing verbal instructions to Emergency Workers during an incident, either in person or by radio without reference material could lead to confusion and cause a delayed response.
RECOMMENDATION: There should be written instructions to establish ACP & TCP's; written instructions should be brief and location-specific, contain maps to each point, a diagram of the setup showing traffic flow control, and an inventory of required traffic visuals (cones, barriers, signage).
SCHEDULE OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The corrective action for this issue will be demonstrated at the next federally evaluated, biennial exercise.
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.6 Oswego County - Traffic Control Point - Oswego City Police Department
- a. MET: 3.b.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: ONE ISSUE: 40-09-3.d.1-A-03 CONDITION: Detailed instructions and maps are provided in each dosimetry kit for route alerting, but there were no instructions, maps, or diagrams to provide Emergency Workers information concerning access control or evacuation route control.
POSSIBLE CAUSE: Unfamiliar with NUREG Requirements.
REFERENCE:
NUREG - J 10 g.j 21
EFFECT: Issuing instructions to Emergency Workers during an incident, either in person or by radio without reference material could lead to confusion and cause a delayed response.
RECOMMENDATION: There should be details to establish ACP &
TCP's; written instructions (brief), maps to each point, a diagram of the setup showing traffic flow control, and an inventory of required traffic visuals (cones, barriers, signage).
SCHEDULE OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The corrective action for this issue will be demonstrated at the next federally evaluated, biennial exercise.
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.7 Oswego County - Backup Route Alerting
- a. MET: 5.a.3
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: ONE ISSUE: 40-07-5.a.3-A-09 CONDITION: Backup route alerting for siren fourteen was not completed within the required 45 minutes. Additionally, one road with several residences within the siren coverage area has not been included in the route instructions.
CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Oswego County successfully demonstrated the use of their automated callout system "Hyper-Reach," to alert residents in an area which was affected by a siren failure during this exercise.
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 22
2.8 Oswego County - School Interview - Fredrick Leighton Elementary School
- a. MET: 3.c.2
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.9 Oswego County - School Interview - Mexico High School
- a. MET: 3.c.2
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.10 Oswego County - School Bus Company - Oswego County BOCES
- a. MET: 3.a. 1; 3.b. 1; 3.c.2
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 23
2.11 Oswego County - Special Population Bus Company - CNY Centro
- a. MET: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.12 Oswego County - Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center -
Highway Garage Parish, NY
- a. MET: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 6.a.1; 6.b.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.13 Oswego County - Medical Services Transport - Oswego Fire Department Ambulance
- a. MET: 3.a. 1; 3.b. 1; 6.d. 1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 24
2.14 Oswego County - Oswego County Hospital
- a. MET: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 6.d.1
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.15 Oswego County - General Population Reception Center - Onondaga County (Oct. 15, 2009)
- a. MET: 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 6.a. 1, 6.b. 1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- c. DEFICIENCY: NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE 25
APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations used in this report.
AA Accident Assessment ACP Access Control Point ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action CCC Congregate Care Center CFR Code of Federal Regulations cpm Counts Per Minute DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOI U.S. Department of the Interior DOT U.S. Department of Transportation DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification Level EEM Exercise Evaluation Methodology EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERPA Emergency Response Planning Area FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FR Federal Register GE General Emergency GM Guidance Memorandum HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services HQ Headquarters JIC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide KLT K.L. Travis and Associates NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 26
NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 NYS New York State OCEOC Oswego County Emergency Operations Center OCFA Oswego County Field Activity OEM Office of Emergency Management OnFA Onondaga County Field Activity ORO Offsite Response Organization PAD Protective Action Decision PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information Officer PMC Personnel Monitoring Center R
Roentgen RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RC Reception Center REM Roentgen Equivalent Man REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan R/h Roentgen(s) per hour SAE Site Area Emergency SECC State Emergency Coordination Center SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SOP Standard Operating Procedure TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TCP Traffic Control Point TL Team Leader TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter USCG U.S. Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture WP Warning Point 27
APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise on September 22, 2009. Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by the letters "(TL)" after their names. The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency NRC - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission USDA-U.S. Department of Agriculture USCG - U.S. Coast Guard ICF - Consulting Firm Performing Evaluation EVALUATION SITE Exercise Oversight STATE OF NEW YORK State EOC EOF Joint Information Center EAS Radio Station WSYR EVALUATOR Rebecca Thomson ORGANIZATION FEMA Brian Hasemann (TL)
Todd Sniffin Deborah Bell Marcy Campbell (AA)
Michael Leal Michael DeBonis Chris Cammarata (TL)
Michele Sturman Miriam Weston FEMA ICF ICF ICF FDA EPA FEMA FEMA FEMA 28
OSWEGO COUNTY Oswego County EOC Warning Point Field Monitoring Team A Field Monitoring Team B Traffic Control Points Back-up Route Alerting Bill Cullen (TL)
Joseph Keller (TL/AA)
Jon Christiansen Mabel Santiago Laura Forrest Terry Sheehan Johanna Berkey Sara Gelves Korky Dulgerian Ron Biernacki Kevin Reed Patricia Mason FEMA ICF ICF FEMA FEMA DOT FEMA FEMA FEMA FEMA FEMA FEMA OUT-OF SEQUENCE EVALUATIONS Emergency Worker PMC Highway Garage Parish, NY School Bus Company Interview BOCES School Interviews Mexico HS and Fredrick Leighton Elementary School Oswego Medical Services Transport - City of Oswego Fire Department Ambulance Sam Nelson Louis Sosler Sam Nelson Sam Nelson Patrick Taylor Patricia Mason ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF FEMA 29
APPENDIX 3 EXTENT-OF-PLAY GROUND RULES REAL LIFE EMERGENCIES TAKE PRIORITY OVER EXERCISE PLAY.
The Scenario Development Team will develop the free play messages. The State Controller will inject the message to the County Emergency Management Director or designee for action.
Free play messages for Public Inquiry at the JIC will be developed by the Scenario Development Team. Public Inquiry messages will be injected at the JIC by a control cell to enable the public inquiry function to identify trends and false rumors.
The State Controller will inject radiological data for any radiological field activities.
According to REP Program Strategic Review Initiative 1.5, "During tabletop exercises, drills and other demonstrations conducted out-of-sequence from an integrated exercise, if FEMA and the offsite response organizations (ORO) agree, the FEMA Evaluator may have the participants re-demonstrate an activity that is determined to be not satisfactorily demonstrated. Immediate correction of issues in an integrated exercise is authorized only if it would not be disruptive and interrupt the flow of the exercise and affect other Evaluation Areas." This initiative is not applicable to EOC/JIC/EOF demonstrations during the September 22, 2009 exercise.
30
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element L.a - Mobilization Criterion I.a. 1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)
WARNING POINTS (NYS and Oswego County)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The latest revised call lists will be provided at the Federal/State evaluators briefing session the day before the exercise, if requested by FEMA. The lists will contain home and business telephone numbers and it is requested that these lists remain confidential.
There will be no free play messages introduced at the Warning Points.
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The State Liaison will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at the County EOC no sooner than 30 minutes after the notification is received by the State to mobilize. The Utility Technical Liaison assigned to the State EOC will be pre-positioned and arrive at the State EOC no sooner than 30 minutes after the notification to mobilize.
EOF Extent-of-Play Agreement:
State liaisons will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at the EOF no sooner than 30 minutes after the notification is received by the State to mobilize.
JIC Extent-of-Play Agreement:
State JIC Staff will be pre-positioned and arrive at the JIC no sooner than 30 minutes after the notification is received by the State to mobilize.
31
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element 1.b - Facilities Criterion I.b. 1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H.3)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
0 NOT SELECTED FOR EVALUATION 32
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control Criterion I.c. 1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A..d; A.2.a., b.)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
- The State Controller will inject free play messages to the County Emergency Management Director or designee for action.
33
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element 1.d - Communications Equipment Criterion I.d.l: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.
Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F. I, 2).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
A State Controller will inject a free play message to the County Emergency Management Director to initiate the demonstration of backup systems at/or to communicate from Oswego County EOC to the EOF, JIC, and Field Monitoring Teams.
Backup communications:
800 MHz Radio EOC to Field Monitoring Teams o
UHF Frequency Radios EOC to Field Monitoring Teams 34
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element I.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion I.e. 1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.1O.a, b, e, J. 11; K.3.a)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
No equipment such as barriers, traffic cones, signs, etc. will be deployed to the field.
35
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2.a. 1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e, f; K.4)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
A State Controller will inject a free play message to the County Radiological Officer to discuss what actions would be taken should a Field Monitoring Team's dose rate exceed the turn-back value.
This will be a discussion only activity.
A State Controller will inject a free play message to the Field Monitoring Teams to drive demonstration of activities associated with reaching an exposure that would require call back to the EOC.
36
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Criterion 2.b. 1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, 1.8, 10 and Supplement 3).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
37
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
38
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.
(NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT FOR THE FOLLOWING:
- TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS SCHOOLS SPECIAL FACILITIES AGREEMENT:
All above activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
39
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.d. -Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Criterion 2.d. 1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J. 11).
NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING TrilS EXERCISE.
40
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.e. - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Criterion 2.e.l:
Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654, 1.10; J.9; M.1)
NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING TIllS EXERCISE.
41
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a. 1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
42
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision Criterion 3.b. 1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made.
Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10. e)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
43
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations Criterion 3.c. 1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J. 1O.c, d, g).
EVACUATION OF TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION Extent-of-Play Agreement:
Bus companies will be interviewed in accordance with the offsite extent of play activities schedule.
Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 10% of that company's drivers needed to implement the Plan for interview.
During the September 22, 2009 exercise, there will be initial contact with the transportation providers (telephone call) by the Transportation Coordinator. Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up calls may be simulated. All calls to the transportation provider will be logged at the County EOC.
There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles during the exercise.
NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The hearing impaired list will be available for inspection at the County EOC. The list will be reviewed but not retained by the Federal evaluator. The procedures for notification will also be discussed at the County EOC.
There will be no actual notification of hearing impaired individuals during the exercise.
A State Controller will inject a free play message to the 911 (1) Center to initiate a test of the TDD system which will cause a test message to be sent to the 911 (2) Center (OCEOC).
EVACUATION OF NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The list of non-institutionalized mobility impaired individuals will be available for inspection at the County EOC. The lists will be reviewed but not retained by the Federal evaluator.
44
- There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles for transport of non-institutionalized mobility impaired individuals.
- During the exercise, there will be no actual contact of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals identified on the list.
45
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J. 10.c, d, g).
EVACUATION OF SCHOOL POPULATIONS Extent-of-Play Agreement:
Bus companies will be interviewed in accordance with the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule.
Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 10% of that company's drivers needed to implement the Plan for interview.
During the September 22, 2009 exercise, there will be initial contact with the schools (telephone call) by the School Coordinator. Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up calls may be simulated. All calls to the Schools will be logged at the County EOC.
SCHOOL INTERVIEWS Extent-of-Play Agreement:
One school from each (Oswego City and Mexico School Districts and BOCES) will be interviewed as per the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule.
SPECIAL FACILITIES Extent-of-Play Agreement:
During the exercise, there will be initial contact with the special facilities (telephone call). Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up calls may be simulated. All calls to special facilities will be logged at the County EOC.
There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles to the special facilities.
46
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Criterion 3.d. 1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J. I 0.g, j)
TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL POINTS (TCPs and ACPs)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
During the September 22, 2009 exercise, law enforcement officials will discuss how to activate TCPs/ACPs at mutually agreed upon locations. (Oswego City, Oswego County EOC)
The TCPs/ACPs will be identified by a free play message provided by the State Controller to the County Emergency Management Director or designee. Actual travel to the TCP/ACP will not be demonstrated Each designated law enforcement agency will provide one officer for interview.
There will be interviews of two (2) different law enforcement agencies responsible for staffing the designated TCPs/ACPs.
47
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k).
IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION Extent-of-Play Agreement:
" The County will demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with at least two (2) impediments to evacuation on the day of the exercise.
The State Controller in the County EOC will hand the free play messages to the County Emergency Management Director or designee for action to test the procedures for the removal of traffic impediments.
No equipment (Barriers, Traffic cones, Signs, etc.) will be deployed to the field.
This demonstration will not involve the dispatch of a police or other emergency vehicle to the scene of a simulated impediment on the day of the exercise. Initial contact of resource providers will actually occur. All calls concerning traffic impediments will be logged at the County EOC.
48
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Criterion 3.e.l: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).
NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING THIS EXERCISE.
49
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).
NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING TI-iS EXERCISE.
50
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.f. - Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions Criterion 3.f. 1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654, M. 1, 3).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING THIS EXERCISE.
51
EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Criterion 4.a. 1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H. 10; 1.7, 8, 9)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The monitoring teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, the clothing will be available for inspection.
52
EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; 1.8, 11; J.10.a)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
53
EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, 1.9).
FIELD MONITORING TEAMS Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The County will dispatch two (2) radiological monitoring teams. Each team will be provided with a State Controller and FEMA evaluator.
Each team will take at least six (6) ambient radiation measurements and at least two (2) air samples.
All teams must take the air samples as though they were in the presence of the plume (even teams that may not be impacted by the plume). (Contamination Control)
The use of silver zeolite cartridges will be simulated and charcoal cartridges will be used. However, the silver zeolite cartridges are available in the kit.
There will be no actual transport of samples to the laboratory. All arrangements up to transport will be demonstrated. EOC staff will be questioned only regarding means of transportation of air samples to a central point and the location of the laboratory. Field teams will demonstrate how to obtain air samples during the exercise and will be questioned only regarding the procedures for the pick-up point of air samples.
The RO2A and E140N do not have installed check sources. Button sources for the EI40N are available for inspection.
54
EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling Criterion 4.b. 1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654, 1.8; J.1 1)
NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED AT TIllS EXERCISE.
55
EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; J. 11)
NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING THIS EXERCISE.
56
EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a. 1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D
& NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
There will be no actual siren sounding, no actual tone alert radio activation, and no broadcasting of EAS messages.
Airing of at least one EAS message will be simulated with the radio station.
Contact with the radio station for subsequent EAS-messages may be simulated.
Regular programming responsibilities of the radio station may preclude participation at the time of the issuance of the simulated EAS message.
57
EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.2: RESERVED 58
EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
- There are no exception areas that require supplementary route alerting.
During the September 22, 2009 exercise, one (1) simulated siren failure will be discussed at the County EOC. The State Controller will inject a free play message regarding this siren failure to the County Emergency Management director or designee for action to test route-alerting procedures.
In accordance with the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule, An interview of one law enforcement representative will be conducted at the County EOC.
A vehicle capable of public notification will be available during the interview.
One law enforcement representative with a vehicle capable of public notification will actually drive the route as determined by the Federal Evaluator.
- The route alerting demonstrations will not include actual vehicle siren sounding or public address announcement of emergency instructions. However, the emergency instructions or message will be read aloud to the Federal evaluator.
The route will be timed from the start of the route. (Starting point location) 59
EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c).
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
EMERGENCY INFORMATION Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
PUBLIC INQUIRY Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The public inquiry function at the JIC will be staffed by at least four operators with one supervisor.
Inject messages will indicate false or misleading information to enable the public inquiry function to identify a minimum of 2 trends or false rumors.
Conduct at least 2 actual briefings as selected by the Federal Evaluators. All briefings will be prepared/developed up to the point of performance of the actual briefing.
60
EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-element 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees Criterion 6.a.l: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J. IO.h; J. 12; K.5.a)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING TI LIS EXERCISE.
61
EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment Criterion 6.b. 1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b).
Extent-of-Play Agreement NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING THIS EXERCISE BY OSWEGO COUNTY.
State PMC at Mapleview will be demonstrated.
62
0 EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees Criterion 6.c. 1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
\\OT TO BE DEMONSSTRATED DURRING THIS EXERCISE.
63
EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Criterion 6.d. 1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
- The transportation and facility component of this medical drill will be demonstrated in accordance with the offsite extent-of-play agreement schedule.
The facility component of this drill will involve the transport of a patient from the Nine Mile Point site to Oswego Hospital for treatment. This component was evaluated on October 7, 2005.
The use of flashing lights and sirens for exercise play is not required.
64
NINE MILE POINT REP EXERCISE September 22, 2009 SCENARIO SYNOPSIS 65
Wlnen directed Dy tne Leaa Controller, insert message:
Input Simulator Message SIM-1 SIM-1 All communication to the Unit 2 Shift Manager will go through extension 2078, simulator I
I_ operator.
0800 Control room briefing /
turnover D 100% power
[c Conduct shift turnover Time Indications P
/
Plant Response or Control Room Actions, 2 contro~l~lerInject~
Inject Messages, &
oC-1 Preset Malfunction/ Remote Function/Instructor Overrides to begin scenario with these initial conditions:
- 1. Core Life: Middle of life Rod Sequence: Al Plant Conditions: 100% Reactor Power for 164 days, >
100% rod line
- 2. Technical Specification LCOs in effect:
L 3.1.2.b Liquid Poison L 3.1.6.b Control Rod Drive
- 3. Significant problems /abnormalities:
[] #11 CRD marked up for seal repair/replacement, expected to be returned to service on 9/23/09 @ 1500.
r] #11 Liquid Poison Pump marked up for repair of leaking piston found during monthly testing, expected to be returned to service on 9/24/09 @ 1300.
- 4. Evolutions/maintenance for the upcoming shift:
11 Continue work on 11 CRD pump seal 0 Work 11 LP pump piston repair.
- 5. Meteorological Conditions:
U Light and variable wind from the northeast (from 45 deg) between 5 and 10 mph, U Air temperature 72oF, no precipitation expected for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Lake water temperature 68oF 65
0805 When directed by the Lead SEC-1 Controller, insert message:
"This is Security we received and Input Simulator Message validated a message from the SEC-1 NRC Operations officer issuing See Supplemental Scenario 1 an Informational Threat notification call of a large aircraft whose flight path is tracking towards Nine Mile Point and is greater than 50 minutes away."
Note if asked:
The aircraft is an Airbus A330-300, traveling at 500 mph, flying in an unauthorized air corridor and unauthorized elevation. We are unable to establish communication with the aircraft.
0805 Simulator Activity When directed by the Lead Controller, insert message:
Input Simulator Message SIM-2 SIM-2 Sim. Instructor will contact U1 SM:
"This is the Unit 2 SM verifying that you have received security message concerning the information threat, I am currently executing SOP-76 actions and evaluating my EALs, and UI will take the lead in this event."
Crew Implements N 1-SOP-27.1, section D D Secure RWCU system Li Start CREVS SM
[] Reviews EPIP-EPP-01
[I Classifies Unusual Event in accordance with EAL 8.1.3 0805 Expected Response:
Control Room Personnel
] Report message of information security threat to SM.
SM W Evaluates EPIP-EPP-10, directs CRS to implement Ni-SOP-27.1 0806 at the direction of the When called by Ul Shift SIM-3 (as U2 SM)
Lead Controller Simulator Manager I concur that we are in a Activity SIM-3 site event, lAW EAL 8.1.3; NMP Unit 1 has the lead.
66
TIA: At completion of message SEC-1.
TIA:
Declared:
Notification:
El Reviews EPIP-EPP-01 and declares an Unusual Event per EAL 8.1.3 0 Assumes Emergency Director (ED) duties &
implements EPIP-EPP-18 0 Directs Communications Aide implement EPIP-EPP-20 for notifications, after completing appropriate fact sheets
-0810 COM-1 COM-1 This is for all ERONs Comm Aide fax ERONs sheet to activations X4874, controller will initiate ERONs activation.
This is for all ERONs activations OC-2 OC-2 Provide message if SM directs precautionary If SM determines a need to perform a precautionary staffing of facilities staffing of the facilities, state you acknowledge this action, but for the purpose of this drill, do not perform a precautionar staffing.
-UNUSUAL EVENT erEAL#8.1.3
-0820 OC-3 OC-3 If the SM does not declare an UE Confer with facility lead controllers in Declare the Unusual Event per EAL the TSC and EOF and provide this 8.1.3 and implement necessary message to the SM/ED Emergency Plan Procedures.
-0825 SEC-2 SEC-2 At direction of EP lead "This is Security; the NRC and after notification is Operations officer has called complete via RECs line stating that the Informational Threat is no longer in effect. The large aircraft whose flight path is tracking towards Nine Mile Point has been intercepted and re-directed to Buffalo International Airport."
Note if asked:
Aircraft was flying out of its assigned flight path at too low of an altitude with associated communications problems.
67
At direction of EP lead Inject message "This is Security; the NRC Operations officer called with an update, stating that the large aircraft is currently on the ground at the Buffalo International Airport. The Aircraft was flying out of its assigned flight path at too low of an altitude with associated communications problems.
Following Threat Notice no longer in effect SM/ED evaluates termination of event rL Evaluate recovery of RWCU (if isolated) 0 Secure CREVS (if started)
SM 11 Reports that Informational Security Notification is no longer in effect Li Directs CRS to exit N1-SOP-27.1 U1 Evaluates EPIP-EPP-25 Termination and Recovery from Unusual Event.
[I Contacts Plant management Control Room Personnel L] Acknowledge the Termination of the security event
[- Exit N1-SOP-27.1
-0850 Simulator Activity When directed by Lead Controller, activate the following malfunction by depressing the key:
Trigger I o FP08C DIESEL DX-2141A, True El A4-4-5 DSL.GEN.102 STAND BY OFF NORMAL ON/OFF (cry wolf
.annunciator and provide inject SIM-4)
CRO Reports following:
- 1. Annunciator A4-4-5 in alarm (DSL GEN 102 Standby Off Normal)
- 2. Computer point F013 in alarm (provide inject SIM-4)
-0850 SIM-4 SIM-4 At direction of EP lead Provide computer point to control Message room operator responding to See Supplemental Scenario 2 Annunciator tile A4-4-5 and after the operator looks at computer of log typer.
"F013 DSL GEN 102 START AIR PR LOW" 68
Provide message 10 seconds after fire alarm
- *VI-o This is Security I was outside the EDG 102 roll door when I heard an air compressor start and then heard something explode; I can see smoke, dust, and debris, looking under roll door. I can also hear the sound of air rushing in EDG Room.
I
-0850 8.2.1
,,Confirmed fire in or contiguous to any plant area, or Table 5 or Table 6, not extinguished in <15 minutes of control room notification.'
Not expected to declare based upon fire.... as report will be received by control room of no fire, but damage to equipment in EDG 102 Room. Initial report was for explosion.
I CRS
-l Directs operators to dispatch operator to EDG Room SM El Acknowledge reports Li Directs operators respond to plant transient o] Reviews EPIP-EPP-01 and should evaluate UE per EAL 8.2.1 L1 Implements EPIP-EPP-18 Li Implements appropriate station procedures
-0855 SIM-6 SIM-6 Provide message 5 minutes This is the FBL, in the EDG 102 after fire alarm room, we have no fire; I repeat we have no fire.
-0856 SIM-7 SIM-7 Provide message 1 minute "This is the Fire Brigade Leader; it after message SIM-6 appears that air compressor 96-02 had one of the cylinder heads explode which also caused some damage to the 96-03 compressor and the common discharge piping.
The air tanks have discharged all their air. We do have some oil on the floor from the explosion and some mechanical debris spread around the room from the air compressor explosion. Both air compressors are out of service due to the damage."
69
-0856 TIA: At completion of message SIM-7.
8.2.2 "Fire or explosion in any plant area which results in damage to plant equipment or structures required to establish or maintain safe plant shutdown.'
TIA:
Declared:
Notification:
SM L1 Acknowledge reports L1 Directs operators respond to plant transient
[I Reviews EPIP-EPP-01 and declares an ALERT per EAL 8.2.2 L Implements EPIP-EPP-18 1E Directs activation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF)
L1 Directs notification/activation of the ERO 11 Implements appropriate station procedures 11 Directs Protected Area Evacuation in accordance with EPIP-EPP-05B (simulated) 11 Directs Simulated Accountability in accordance with EPIP-EPP-05D
__________ i.
.~
-0900 Simulator Activity If directed by control room to reset fire zone:
Wait 1 minute and delete malfunction:
[- FP08C DIESEL DX-2141A CRO Reports following:
- 1. Clearing of DX-2141A CRS Exits N1-SOP-21.1 for fire.
ALERT per EAL
- H
- -4 4 ::- - :........................
% :::2 :::¸
- - % :: b H 2 :*: * % 2 - w 4.............................
After plant Alert message OG-3a Inject Message for TSCIOSC only, after plant announcement for Alert OC-3a State that the Control Room has announced a Protected Area Evacuation.
TSCIOSC only
-0905 COM-1 COM-1 Inject Message Comm Aide fax to X4874, then controllers will initiate ERONs activation.
This is for all activations
-0910 OC-4 OC-4 If the SM does not declare an Alert Confer with facility lead controllers in Declare an Alert per EAL 8.2.2 and the TSC and EOF and provide this implement necessary Emergency message to the SM/ED Plan Procedures.
70
During activation of the TSC/OSC Li Recovery actions for loss of EDG102 Li Continues to monitor plant status 0i Provides plant status turnover to TSCM TSCM F1 Receives turnover from SM/ED Li Oversees staffing and activation of the TSC per EPIP-EPP 23 & 13 Li Briefs the TSC staff on plant status Li Determines needs of control room and provides assistance as needed Li Ensures activation of the OSC
-0935 CN-1 CN-1 Accountability Complete Provide message 30 minutes 30 minutes after Alert, Security after Alert Liaison reports accountability Inject Message for Security complete, all persons accounted for.
Liaison When DCT dispatched for 102 EDG OC-5 OC-5 For the purpose of this drill, NMP Unit 2 is not participating. NMP Unit 2 is operating at full power.
Direct any communications to Unit 2 through your facility controller.
U2 participation will be simulated.
When DCT dispatched for 102 EDG DC-1 DC-1 See Supplemental Scenario 2 EDG 102 air compressor exploded damaging both air compressors and common discharge piping. The diesel cannot start because of a loss of starting air (air start tanks have been bled off). If DCT is able to restore air - allow success.
71
Trigger 2 CRO Simulator 0 RP01B REACTOR 0 Acknowledges half Activity TRIP BUS MOTOR scram GENERATOR TRIPS 141 L] Acknowledges loss of RPS MG 141 L] Acknowledges loss of one string of Feed water heating CRS Ii Directs station announcement Li Directs power reduction lAW N1-SOP-1.1 Li Directs entry into N1-SOP-16.1 Li Evaluates Nl-OP-48 for reset of feed water heating.
SM L] Notifies TSC of need to form DCT to address performing a dead bus transfer of RPS MG to I&C 130 to reset half scram.
[I Notifies TSC of need to form DCT to reset feed water heating.
-0950 During activation of the EOF El Recovery actions for loss of EDG102 Ll Recovery of 1/2 scram due to loss of RPS MG 141 1] Loss of one string of Feed water heating due to loss of RPS MG 141 ED/RM D Receives plant status update from SM/ED, Oversees staffing and activation of EOF per EPIP-EPP 23
& 13 L1 Briefs EOF staff on plant status Li Ensures notifications are up to date, and ensures turnover of communication responsibilities are completed Li Reviews activities of emergency response to date When DCT dispatched for RPS MG DC-2 DC-2:
141 transfer to I&C Bus 130 See Supplemental Scenario 3 Spurious trip of RPS MG 141, results in half scram and loss of one string of FW heating. Cause of trip is MG141 Motor Thermal Overload Relay 49 opened. The DCT will need to investigate failure of RPS MG set 141 and support operations in placing on I&C Bus 130 to allow
- reset of half scram and reset of feed water heating. This action will be successful.
/2
When contacted by DCT that MG141 is on I&C CRO Simulator Bus 130.
[] Receive report that MG141 is on I&C Activity Trigger 3 (Remote)
Bus 130A L. RP02 RX TRIP BUS 141 POWER SOURCE, D1 Request permission to reset half scram MAINT CRS Li Directs half scram to be reset Time When DCT dispatched DC-3 to reset lost feed water See Supplemental Scenario heating string 3
nse or ConrolRoom Actions, Inject ject>
Messages, & Simnulator Activity Simulator Activity When contacted by DCT that MG141 is on /&C Bus 130.
Trigger 3 (Remote)
Lw RP02 RXTRIP BUS 141 POWER SO U.............
CRO 11 Receive report that feed water heating has been reset.
Simulator Activity When contacted by DCT that FW heaters have been reset
- 121, 122, 123, 124, 125 Trigger 4 (Remote)
Lw MS02 HP FW HTR 125 RESET Trigger 4 (Remote)
D1 MS05 FW HTR STRING12 RESET When DCT dispatched to reset lost HWC at Panel 500 DC-4 See Supplementa 3
DC-4 I Scenario Spurious trip. of RPS MG 141 results in half scram and FCV-51-59 & FCV-51-60 fail open resulting in loss of HWC. The DCT w/ operations support will reset lost hydrogen chemistry. This action will be successful.
When contacted by DCT that HWC Panel 500 reset.
Trigger 10 L: FW46A SW537 H2 ISOL TO FWBP 11, AUTO L1 FW45A HWC H2 Flow Setpoint, power L1 FW36B HWC Remote Reset, normal
[I FW36C HWC Annunciator Reset, normal Simulator Activity 73
enier malTunctions:
Simulator Trigger 5 Activity
[] RR29 @ 6%
11 Drywell pressure rise noted by operators L-When drywell pressure reaches alarm set point Control Room will insert a manual scram 0i The Main Generator will Trip LI Four banks of control rods fail to insert (ATWS) 11 Turbine bypass valves fail closed 11 Fuel damage begins Trigger 6 Li TC01 w/ Mode Switch going to SID Li TC12 Turbine Bypass Valves Fail Shut set @
100%
Li RX01 at 13% ramped over 30 minutes w/ Mode Switch going to SID See Supplemental Scenario # 4, 5, and 6 If directed to pull HPCI fuses FU8/9 Trigger 7 FW24 Removal of HPCI Fuses FU8/FU9, PULLED If directed to reset Acoustic Monitor Alarm Trigger 8 ADO7 Acoustic Monitor Alarm Reset uperators Li Drywell pressure rise noted by operators El Prior to drywell pressure reaching trip set point the CRO will insert a manual scram Li Four banks of control rods will fail to insert (ATWS) 1[ Recognize that the Turbine bypass valves have failed closed CRO El Identifies that not all rods have inserted LI Failure to scam has occurred, Rx Power is greater than 6%
SM LI Acknowledges CRO 11 Reports plant status to TSCM & ED/RM 11 Enters EOPs and directs actions to stabilize plant Li Refers to EPIP-EPP-01, recommends upgrade to a Site Area Emergency per EAL # 2.2.2 CRO Li Reports plant status to SM 11 Performs operations as directed 11 Will recognize increasing drywell Rad levels 11 Makes announcements as directed If DCT is sent to take chemistry sample DC-5 See Supplemental Scenario 6 74 DC-5 Chemistry data should be provided as follows:
- 1. Log time sample is requested.
- 2. Add one hour to time logged, and use the sample analysis for this time as the time sample was collected.
- 3. Provide TSC Staff with the analysis for sample collected in step 2, 30 minutes after the time it was collected.
TIA: When reported by Operator of failure to scram and power greater than 6%.
2.2.2 Any RPS scram set point has been exceeded AND Automatic and manual scram fail to result in a control rod pattern which assures reactor shutdown under all conditions without boron AND Either Power >6%
OR Torus Temperature >110 F El Acknowledge reports Li Reviews EPIP-EPP-01 and declares a Site Area Emergency per EAL 2.2.2
[I Implements EPIP-EPP-18 11 Directs activation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF)
Li Directs notification/activation of the ERO Li Implements appropriate station procedures 11 May Directs Exclusion Area Evacuation in accordance with EPIP-EPP-05C (Simulated).
TIA:
Declared:
Notification:
SIT~E AREA EMERGENCY per EAL 2.2.
-1122 OC-6 If the ED/RM does not declare an Confer with facility lead controllers in SAE the TSC and EOF and provide this message to the ED/RM When DCT dispatched to perform DC-6 inplant surveys See Supplemental Scenario 4 If DCT sent to evaluate loss of DC-7 Turbine Bypass Valves See Supplemental Scenario 5 OC-6 Declare Site Area Emergency per EAL 2.2.2 and implement necessary Emergency Plan Procedures.
DC-6 In plant survey team(s) sent out to perform radiological surveys.
DC-7 The failure of the bypass valve is postulated to be caused by a failure of the bypass valve positioning units.
A failure of a summer circuit will cause no demand signal to be provided to the valves thus ensuring the valves will not open. DCT members assigned to troubleshoot the failure should be provided with indications, by the controllers using their expertise, sufficient to indicate a failure as described above. The failure of these valves to open will not be resolved in the time frame of this exercise.
75
If DCT is sent to investigate trip of DC-8 the 12 Liquid Poison See Supplemental Scenario 10 If DCT sent to insert 5 stuck control rods (when identified by CR staff)
If DCT sent to implement EOP-3.2, alternate boron injection DC-9 See Supplemental Scenario 4 DC-10 See Supplemental Scenario 4 DC-8 DCT actions to investigate failure of 12 liquid poison pump. DCT members assigned to troubleshoot the failure should be provided with indications, by the controller. The failure of this pump to operate will not be resolved in the time frame of this exercise.
DC-9 DCT actions taken to insert the control rods that were identified by control room as being unable to be driven in via RMCS. DCT is expected to vent over piston area of associated control rods. The DCT sent into the reactor building will be eventually forced to evacuate the area due to rising area radiation levels and airborne concentrations following the EC Steam Line break outside the Primary Containment.
DC-10 Due to failure of Liquid Poison pumps the DCT will take actions lAW N1-EOP-3.2 alternate boron
-1147 injection.
Another EAL entry 1.3.2, station is already in SAE.
Li Drywell Radiation reaches -3000 R/hr EDIRM Li Receives plant status change and briefs TSCM 0 Ensures offsite agencies are notified on plant status change, and all notifications are completed
[I Reviews and approves media news releases as appropriate 76
Simulator Activity Li EC steam line break in EC IV room.
[] Release of into Rx Building begins
[i RB Area radiation monitors respond appropriately EI RB Area temperatures increase Message #~
When Drywell radiation reaches -20,000 R/hr and when EC is initiated insert Trigger 6, at direction of EP Lead in simulator.
Trigger 9 E] EC08A EC LOOP 11 STEAM IV'S FAIL TO CLOSE (EC steam IV fails open) set @ 100%
Li EC08B EC LOOP 11 STEAM IV'S FAIL TO CLOSE (EC steam IV fails open) set @ 100%
ii EC02 STEAM LEAKAGE OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT, set
@13%
[I EC02 (remote) IV 39-06 valve Position Limit 0/100%, 0%
TIA: When EC loop 11 isolation failure is reported.
3.4.2 Main Steam line, EC steam line or RWCU isolation failure AND A release pathway, outside normal process system flow paths from the unisolable system, exists outside primary containment AND any:
1I Coolant activity >300 pCi/gm Li RPV level cannot be restored and maintained
>-84" Li RPV Flooding required
[I DWArea Radiation
>3000 R/hr Inject Messages, &
Simulator Activity Operators Li Acknowledge ARM"s /
PING alarms in Reactor building 1] Report Emergency Ventilation Activation Li EC area high temperatures CRO
] Reports plant status to SM, determine based on Rx Building conditions that a leak exists in the Rx Building.
Operators Li Attempt to isolate EC Loop 11, recognize EC Loop 11 Fails to isolate (TIA)
SM Li Acknowledges CRO Li Directs actions lAW EOPs Li Reports plant status change to TSC/EOF Li Refers to EPIP-EPP-01 and recommends upgrade to a GENERAL EMERGENCY per EAL #
3.4.2 11 Identifies release pathway EDIRM Li Receives plant status change and briefs TSCM 11 Ensures offsite agencies are notified on plant status change, and all notifications are completed Li Reviews and approves media news releases as appropriate
-1210 Li EC are unable to be isolated.
77
Time
-1212 ED/RM L Receives update from SM L1 Declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY per EAL #
3.4.2 L: Determines / provides PARs to NYS and OCEMO via Part 1 Notifications Fact Sheet
[I Completes appropriate notifications
-1225 If the ED/RM does not declare a General Emergency If a exclusion area evacuation is discussed OC-7 Confer with facility lead controllers in the TSC and EOF and provide this message to the ED/RM OC-8 Input Message OC-8a Input Message OC-9 Input Message If a Reactor Building evacuation is conducted If KI is planned to be administered to ERO OC-7 Declare a General Emergency per EAL 3.4.2, implement necessary Emergency Plan Procedures.
OC-8 Do not announce an Exclusion Area Evacuation to the Station.
This will be simulated.
OC-8a Announcement of a Reactor Building Evacuation.
This will be simulated.
OC-9 No one is allergic or refusing to take KI.
KI use will be simulated.
If DCT sent to investigate EC system DC-11 DC-1I break See Supplemental Scenario 7 The purpose of this malfunction is to provide a release pathway outside the secondary containment and into the environment. The coolant leak is located inside the EC Steam IV room, reactor building elev. 298".
Radiation levels and airborne concentration levels will prevent any DCTs from entering the area.
SIMULATOR OPERATOR NOTE: Actions taken by the operators to emergency depressurize should occur when the following conditions exist per the EOPs: More than one reactor building radiation level exceeds 8 R/hr or 135oF (N 1-EOP-5) or information is provided based upon Dose projections or field surveys lAW N 1-EOP-6.
78
SIMULATOR OPERATOR NOTE: DCT"s sent to isolate the leak will be turnei temperature in the vicinity of the line break, which is located within the reactor isolation attempts from the control room of the EC"s will also fail.
If DCT sent to investigate EC DC-12 system break See Supplemental Scenario 8 & 9 z*i*,muiaxor CIVl d back due to radiation levels and building elevation 298". Manual DC-12 The purpose of this malfunction is to prevent the isolation of the steam leak to allow offsite doses requiring implementation of protective actions to be reached to ensure offsite objectives are accomplished. The failure to close the EC Steam IV 39-09R will permit an unisolable flow path to the reactor building atmosphere and out through the breach in secondary containment. The controller should provide sufficient indications and information to any DCT members assigned to repair/close this valve to make the DCT aware that dose levels and temperatures in the building will result in them being turned back.
DC-13:
Based upon N1-EOP-5, a steam leak into the Reactor Building on elevation 298" with rad release, a DCT will need to be sent out to provide area temperatures and radiation levels for determination of an Emergency Depressurization.
If DCT sent to evaluate MAX Safe Temps per N1-EOP-5 DC-13 See Supplemental Scenario 7 OC-10 OC-10:
Inject Message If Dose Assessment projects greater than PAGs beyond 10 miles. Controller will inject values greater than PAGs beyond 5 miles but not beyond 10 miles.
The Exercise will be terminated when the following conditions have been met:
[I FEMA, NRC, Oswego County and NY State have been contacted and have had sufficient time to observe all needed aspects of the exercise.
1400 at the direction of the Lead SIM-8 SIM-8 Controller I have the shift.
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When exercise is terminated CN-2 CN-2 Termination of the Exercise Place GAltronics in Merge, message sound the station alarm, and announce:
Attention, Attention all personnel, the Exercise is terminated.
Repeat alarm and announcement The Exercise will be terminated when the following conditions have been met:
1] FEMA, NRC, Oswego County and NY State have been contacted and have had sufficient time to observe all needed aspects of the exercise.
1400 at the direction of the Lead Controller When exercise is terminated SIM-8 CN-2 Termination of the Exercise message SIM-8 I have the shift.
CN-2 Place GAltronics in Merge, sound the station alarm, and announce:
Attention, Attention all personnel, the Exercise is terminated.
OC-11 The Exercise critique will commence following exercise termination in the respective facilities.
Please bring all logs/records with you to the critique. We will collect them at that time.
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