ML072970045
| ML072970045 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/2007 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301 | |
| Download: ML072970045 (31) | |
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CP&L IOEOP-01-SEP-02 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT PLANT OPERATING MANUAL VOLUME VI EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE UNIT o
IIII~IIIIIII ~IIII 11I1 ~ ~II~ I1I1I ~II ~IIIIIIIIII ~1I11 ~ 1111111111111111111 OEOP-01-SEP-02 DRYWELLSPRAYPROCEDURE REVISION 13 CONTROllED Rev. 13 Page 1 of 121
A.
TITLE - Drywell Spray Procedure B.
ENTRY CONDITIONS 1.
As directed by the PCIP section of the "Primary Containment Control Procedure" (EOP-02-PCCP)
OR 2.
As directed by the DW/T section of the "Primary Containment Control Procedure" (EOP-02-PCCP)
C.
OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE Manpower required:
1 Control Operator 1 Auxiliary Operator Special equipment:
2 3095 Keys 1 Screwdriver 1 Locking Screwdriver Tape CO:
1.
ENSURE CLOSED WELL WATER TO VITAL HEADER VLV, SW-V141.
NOTE With a LOCA signal present, OUTBOARD INJECTION VLV, EI1-F017A{F017B) cannot be closed for five minutes.
CO:
2.
3.
CO:
CO:
4.
CO:
CO:
IF the INBOARD INJECTION VLV, EI1-F015A(F015B) is open, THEN CLOSE the OUTBOARD INJECTION VLV, E11-F017A(F017B).
ENSURE OPEN one of the following valves:
a.
CONV SW TO VITAL HEADER VLV, SW-V111.
b.
NUC SW TO VITAL HEADER VLV, SW-V1l7.
COMMENCE Drywell Spray by performing the following steps:
a.
ENSURE both reactor recirculation pumps are tripped.
b.
PLACE all drywell cooler control switches to "OFF (L/O)".
IOEOP-01-SEP-02 Rev. 13 Page 2 of 121
c.
UNIT 1 ONLY:
(1)
IF the drywell coolers continue to run, THEN PERFORM the following steps to energize the LOCA lockout relays for the drywell cooler fans:
co:
CO:
a.
b.
In Panel XU-27, West Side, PLACE D/W CLR A&D OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-CS-5993, keylock switch in the *STOP* position.
In Panel XU-28, West Side, PLACE D/W CLR B&C OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-CS-5994, keylock switch in the *STOp* position.
d.
UNIT 2 ONLY:
(1)
IF the drywell coolers continue to run, THEN PERFORM tEe following steps to energize the LOCA-rockout
~elays for the drywell cooler fans:
CO:
CO:
a.
b.
In Panel XU-27, West Side, PLACE D/W CLR A&D OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-CS-5993, keylock switch in the
- STOP* position.
In Panel XU-28, East Side, PLACE D/W CLR B&C OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-CS-5994, keylock switch in the
- STOP* position.
e.
IF the drywell coolers continue to run, THEN PERFORM on page 10 of this procedure AND RETURN to Step C.4.f on this page.
CO:
CO:
CO:
CO:
f.
g.
h.
i.
IF necessary, THEN PLACE Loop A(B) 2/3 CORE HEIGHT LPCI INITIATION OVERRIDE switch, E11-CS-S18A(S18B),
to the
- MANUAL OVERRD" position.
IF the CTMT SPR OVRD light for Loop A(B)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL switch, E11-CS-S17A(S17B), is NOT on, THEN momentarily PLACE Loop A(B)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL switch, E11-CS-S17A(S17B),
to the *MANUAL "
position.
VERIFY ON or START one RHR pump.
ENSURE CLOSED TORUS COOLING ISOL VLV, E11-F024A(F024B).
IOEOP-01-SEP-02 Rev. 13 Page 3 of 12/
FIGURE 1 Drywall Spray Initiation Limit 200 250 350 300 UNSAFE
,_**a.
- 1**
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10 20 30 40 50 60 70 DRYWELL PRESSURE (PSIG)
IOEOP-01-SEP-02 Rev. 13 Page 4 of 121
co:
j.
IF while executing the following steps drywell pressure drops below 2.5 psig, THEN TERMINATE Drywell Spray per Step 7 on page 6.
co:
co:
k.
VERIFY the following:
(1)
Drywell pressure and drywell temperature are in the
'SAFE" region of the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit graph (see Figure 1).
(2)
Suppression Pool water level is below +21 inches.
co:
co:
co:
1.
m.
n.
OPEN Loop A(B)
DRYWELL SPRAY INBD ISOL VLV, Ell-F021A(F021B).
Throttle OPEN Loop A(B)
DRYWELL SPRAY OTBD ISOL VLV, Ell-F016A(F016B) to obtain between 8,000 gpm and 10,000 gpm flow.
IF additional cooling is required, THEN START the second Loop A(B)
RHR pump AND limit flow to-Iess than or equal to 11,500 gpm.
5.
ENSURE RHRSW Loop A(B) is operating per the following steps:
NOTE The RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS A & C (B & D)
LOCA OVERRIDE switch, E1l-Sl9A(S19B),
is utilized to override the LOCA TRIP signal to RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS A & C (B
& D).
CO:
CO:
a.
b.
IF necessary, THEN PLACE RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS A & C (B & D)
LOCA OVERRIDE switch.
Ell-S19A(S19B),
in the
'MANUAL OVERRD' position.
ALIGN the RHR Service Water System to supply cooling water to RHR Heat Exchanger A(B)
(OP-43).
6.
ALIGN RHR flow through the heat exchanger as follows:
CO:
CO:
CO:
a.
b.
c.
ENSURE OPEN HX A(B)
INLET VLV, Ell-F047A(F047B).
ENSURE OPEN HX A(B)
OUTLET VLV.
Ell-F003A(F003B).
NOTE The HX A(B)
BYPASS VLV.
E11-F048A (F048B), is normally open. but with a LPCI initiation signal present cannot be closed or throttled for three minutes.
CLOSE HX A(B)
BYPASS VLV, Ell-F048A(F048B).
IOEOP-01-SEP-02 Rev. 13 Page 5 of 121
7.
WHEN Drywell pressure drops below 2.5 psig OR IF directed to terminate Drywell Spray, THEN PERFORM the following steps:
CO:
CO:
a.
b.
CLOSE Loop A(B)
DRYWELL SPRAY OTBD ISOL VLV, E11-F016A(F016B)
CLOSE Loop A(B)
DRYWELL SPRAY INBD ISOL VLV, E11-F021A(F021B).
co:
8.
IF reinitiation of Drywell Spray is required, THEN RETURN to Step 1 on page 2.
Initials 9.
WHEN Drywell Spray is no longer required, THEN PERFORM the following steps:
a.
IF LPCI injection is required, THEN OPEN OUTBOARD INJECTION VLV, E11-F017A(F017B).
b.
IF Suppression Pool Cooling is required, THEN PERFORM the following steps:
(1)
OPEN TORUS DISCHARGE ISOL VLV, E11-F028A(F028B).
(2)
THROTTLE OPEN TORUS COOLING ISOL VLV, E11-F024A(F024B) to obtain between 8,000 gpm and 10,000 gpm flow.
(3)
IF additional Suppression Pool Cooling IS required, THEN START the second Loop A(B)
RHR pump AND limit flow to less than or equal to 11,500 gpm.
c.
IF the RHR Loop is to be placed in standby, THEN PERFORM the following steps:
(1)
STOP the running RHR Loop A(B) pumps.
(2)
PLACE the RHR system in standby per OP-17.
d.
Prior to restoring power to the drywell
- coolers, VERIFY that the drywell cooler fans have been checked for electrical faults.
IOEOP-01-SEP-02 Rev. 13 Page 6 of 121
e.
UNIT 1 ONLY:
(1)
IF the LOCA Lockout relays for the drywell cooler fans were energized, THEN PERFORM the following steps:
Initials a.
b.
In Panel XU-27, West Side, PLACE D/W CLR A&D OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-CS-5993, keylock switch in the "NORMAL" position.
In Panel XU-28, West Side, PLACE D/W CLR B&C OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-CS-5994, keylock switch in the "NORMAL" position.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
(2)
IF the drywell cooler start logic was
- defeated, THEN PERFORM the following steps:
IOEOP-01-SEP-02 a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board A, Terminal 40, TERMINATE black wire l-EVO-3.
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board A, Terminal 42, TERMINATE black wire l-EVl-3.
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board B, Terminal 56, TERMINATE black wire l-EPl-3.
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board B, Terminal 58, TERMINATE black wire l-EP2-3.
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board A, Terminal 40, TERMINATE black wire 3-87A-5.
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board A, Terminal 42, TERMINATE black wire 3-87B-5.
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board B, Terminal 56, TERMINATE black wire l-ER6-3.
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board B, Terminal 58, TERMINATE black wire l-ER7-3.
Rev. 13
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
Page 7 of 121
f.
UNIT 2 ONLY:
(1)
IF the LOCA Lockout relays for the drywell cooler fans were energized, THEN PERFORM the following steps:
Initials a.
b.
In Panel XU-27, West Side, PLACE D/W CLR A&D OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-CS-5993, keylock switch in the "NORMAL" position.
In Panel XU-28, East Side, PLACE D/W CLR B&C OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-CS-5994, keylock switch in the "NORMAL" position.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
(2)
IF the drywell cooler start logic was
- defeated, THEN PERFORM the following steps:
IOEOP-01-SEP-02 a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board A, Terminal 40, TERMINATE black wire 2-EVO-3.
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board A, Terminal 42, TERMINATE black wire 2-EVl-3.
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board B, Terminal 56, TERMINATE black wire 3-83A-5.
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board B, Terminal 58, TERMINATE black wire 3-83B-5.
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board A, Terminal 40, TERMINATE black wire 2-EY6-3.
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board A, Terminal 42, TERMINATE black wire 2-EY7-3.
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board B, Terminal 56, TERMINATE black wire 3-91A-5.
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board B, Terminal 58, TERMINATE black wire 3-91B-5.
Rev. 13
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
/
Ind.Ver.
Page 8 of 121
Initials Initials 10.
EXIT this procedure and CONTINUE in the procedure(s) in effect.
Date/Time Completed Performed By (Print)
Reviewed By:-----------:-;--r-:---:==-------------------------
Unit SCQ IOEOP-01-SEP-02 Rev. 13 Page 9 of 121 Additional Methods for Securing Drywell Coolers 1.
Perform the following steps to secure the drywe1l coolers.
a.
IF the Reactor Building is accessible, THEN DISPATCH an AO to place the following breakers in the "OFF" position:
AO:
(1)
OW Cooling Unit A Supply Fan A1-SF-DW, MCC XL, Compt.
EVO.
AO:
(2)
DW Cooling Unit A Supply Fan A2-SF-DW, MCC XL, Compt.
EVl.
AO:
(3 )
OW Cooling Unit B Supply Fan B1-SF-DW, MCC XM, Compt.
EY6.
AO:
(4)
OW Cooling Unit B Supply Fan B2-SF-OW, MCC XM, Compt.
EY7.
AO:
(5 )
OW Cooling Unit C Supply Fan C1-SF-OW, MCC XK, Compt.
ER6.
AO:
(6)
OW Cooling Unit C Supply Fan C2-SF-OW, MCC XK, Compt.
ER7.
AO:
(7)
OW Cooling Unit D Supply Fan D1-SF-OW, MCC XJ, Compt. EPl.
AO:
(8)
DW Cooling Unit D Supply Fan D2-SF-DW, MCC XJ, Compt.
EP2.
b.
IF the drywell coolers continue to run, AND the Reactor Building is NOT accessible, THEN PERFORM-uie following steps:
(1 )
UNIT 1 ONLY:
CO:
(a)
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board A, Terminal 40, LIFT and TAPE black wire 1-EVO-3.
CO: --
(b)
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board A, Terminal 42, LIFT and TAPE black wire 1-EVl-3.
CO: -- (c)
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board B, Terminal 56, LIFT and TAPE black wire l-EPl-3.
CO: -- (d)
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board B, Terminal 58, LIFT and TAPE black wire 1-EP2-3.
IOEOP-01-SEP-02 Rev. 13 Page 10 of 121
Attacrunent 1 Additional Methods for Securing Drywell Coolers co: -- (e)
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board A, Terminal 40, LIFT and TAPE black wire 3-87A-5.
co: -- (f)
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board A, Terminal 42, LIFT and Tape black wire 3-87B-5.
co:
(g)
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board B, Terminal 56, LIFT and TAPE black wire l-ER6-3.
co: -- (h)
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board B, Terminal 58, LIFT and TAPE black wire l-ER7-3.
(2 )
UNIT 2 ONLY:
co:
(a)
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board A, Terminal 40, LIFT and TAPE black wire 2-EVO-3.
co: -- (b)
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board A, Terminal 42, LIFT and TAPE black wire 2-EVl-3.
co: -- (c)
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board B, Terminal 56, LIFT and TAPE black wire 3-83A-5.
co: -- (d)
In Panel XU-27, Terminal Board B, Terminal 58, LIFT and TAPE black wire 3-83B-5.
co: -- (e)
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board A, Terminal 40, LIFT and TAPE black wire 2-EY6-3 co: -- (f)
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board A, Terminal 42, LIFT and TAPE black wire 2-EY7-3.
co: -- (g)
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board B, Terminal 56, LIFT and TAPE black wire 3-91A-5.
co: -- (h)
In Panel XU-28, Terminal Board B, Terminal 58, LIFT and TAPE black wire 3-918-5.
CO:
2.
WHEN drywell coolers are no longer running, THEN RETURN to step C.4.f on page 3 of this procedure.
IOEOP-01-SEP-02 Rev. 13 Page 11 of 121
REVISION
SUMMARY
Revision 13 - This rev~s~on moves the steps for securing the DW cooling unit fans using breakers on MCC or wire lifts in the back panels to Attachment 1.
Revision 12 - Entry conditions from EOP-02-PCCP Hydrogen has been deleted.
IOEOP-01-SEP-02 Rev. 13 Page 12 of 121
CP&L CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT PLANT OPERATING MANUAL VOLUME VI
.J(/oi,j~XJI~
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"hI EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE\\';
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UNIT o
RECEIVED BY BNP DEC 0 7 1998 1I11III111111 "IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~IIIIIIIIIIIIIII "1111111111111111111 NUCLEAR DOCUMENT CONTROL OEOP-01-SEP-03 SUPPRESSION POOL SPRA Y PROCEDURE REVISION 6
EFFECTIVE DATE
\\2 -\\S-~~
Sponsor Approval fS\\""Wlw~
~1irg~
Date IOEOP-01-SEP-03 Rev. 6 Page 1 of 31
REVISION
SUMMARY
Removed entry condition from hydrogen leg of PCCP.
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES OEOP-01-SEP-03 IOEOP-01-SEP-03 Page(s) 1-3 Rev. 6 Revision 6
Page 2 of 31
A.
TITLE - Suppression Pool Spray Procedure B.
ENTRY CONDITIONS 1.
As directed by the PCIP section of the "Primary Containment Control Procedure" (EOP-02-PCCP).
C.
OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE Manpower required:
Special Equipment:
2 Control Operators None CO:
1.
IF necessary, THEN PLACE the Loop A(B) 2/3 CORE HEIGHT LPCI INITIATION OVERRIDE switch, E11-CS-S18A(S18B),
in the "MANUAL OVERRD" position.
CO:
2.
IF the CTMT SPR OVRD light for the Loop A(B)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL switch, E11-CS-S17A(S17B) is NOT on, THEN MOMENTARILY PLACE the Loop A(B)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL
- switch, E11-CS-S17A(S17B),
to the "MANUAL" position.
CO:
3.
IF INBOARD INJECTION VLV, E11-F015A(F015B) is open, AND injection to the reactor is NOT required, THEN CLOSE OUTBOARD INJECTION VLV, E11-F017A(F017B).
CO:
4.
ENSURE at least one RHR Loop A(B) pump is operating.
CO:
5.
ENSURE OPEN TORUS DISCHARGE ISOL VLV, E11-F028A(F028B).
CO:
6.
OPEN TORUS SPRAY ISOL VLV, E11-F027A(F027B).
CO:
7.
ENSURE RHR Loop A(B) is placed in either the LPCI, Suppression Pool Cooling, or DrYWell Spray mode.
CO:
8.
WHEN Suppression Chamber pressure is less than 2.5 psig OR Suppression Pool Spray is no longer required, THEN CLOSE'TORUS SPRAY ISOL VLV, E11-F027A(F027B).
CO:
9.
IF reinitiation of Suppression Pool Spray is required, THEN RETURN to Step C.1 of this procedure.
CO:
10.
WHEN Suppression Pool Spray is no longer required, THEN EXIT this procedure and CONTINUE in the procedure(s) in effect.
IOEOP-01-SEP-03 Rev. 6 Page 3of 31
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STEP 015 TERMINATE AND PREVENT INJECTION TO THE REACTOR FROM THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS UNLESS THE SYSTEM IS BEING USED TO INJECT BORON:
- CONDENSATEIFEEDWATER
- ALTERNATE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEMS 015 STEP BASES:
A list of systems to terminate and prevent is provided to aid the operator.
Injection into the reactor vessel is terminated and prevented while Emergency Depressurization proceeds in order to prevent the uncontrolled injection of a large amount of cold water as reactor pressure decreases below the shutoff head of operating system pumps. Injection from boron injection systems and CRD is not terminated because operation of these systems may be needed to establish and maintain the reactor shutdown. Further, the injection flow rates from these systems are small compared to those of the other systems used to control reactor water level.
Unlike the Level/Power Control (EOP-01-LPC) procedure where RCIC operation continues when reactor water level is deliberately lowered or emergency depressurization is required, RCIC injection is terminated and prevented here. Since the goal of the Reactor Flooding Procedure is to flood the reactor, if the main steam lines become submerged with RCIC in operation, equipment damage may result and its future availability as an injection source may be lost.
1001-37.6 Rev. 5 Page 11 of 361
17 18 STEPS 017 and 018 WHEN INJECTION HAS BEEN TERMINATED AND PREVENTED, OPEN SEVEN ADS VALVES.
PLACE TliE FOLLOWING SWITCHES TO OVERRIDE RESET IF NECESSARY TO RESTORE CONTINUOUS PNEUMATIC SUPPLY:
DIY, NON -INTRPT RNA-SV-5262 D1V II NON.INTRPT RNA-SV* 5261 I
0 IF SEVEN ADS VALVES ARE NOT OPEN THEN OPEN SRVs B,F,E OR G UNTIL SEVEN VALVES ARE OPEN I
0 STEP BASES:
When reactor flooding is required, the reactor must be depressurized:
a.
The open SRVs establish a path from the reactor capable of rejecting energy in excess of decay heat to ensure the reactor flooding actions are successful.
b.
Reduced reactor pressure results in increased injection f1owrates, reducing the total time required to flood the reactor.
c.
Reduced reactor pressure reduces the water inventory loss through non-isolable leaks and breaks.
d.
Dynamic loading on the SRVs and downstream piping is minimized as reactor water level reaches and is discharged through these valves. The depressurization is performed using SRVs. Of the SRVs, those dedicated to the ADS function are generally the most reliable because of their qualifications, pneumatic supply systems, the design and operation of initiation circuitry, or the availability of control power. Additionally, the relative location of their discharge devices uniformly distributes the heat load around the suppression pool.
Concurrent opening of all ADS valves is within analyzed plant design limits.
Other steps in the guidelines provide instructions for maintaining sufficient suppression pool heat capacity to accommodate simultaneous opening of all ADS valves at any reactor pressure.
1001-37.6 Rev. 5 Page 13 of 361
STEPS 017 and 018 (continued)
If one or more ADS valves cannot be opened, other SRVs are opened to effect the desired reactor depressurization so that the total number of open SRVs equals the number of SRVs dedicated to ADS function. Use of alternate depressurization paths is not addressed here since, if no SRVs can be opened, primary containment flooding is required and the SAMGs are entered.
An SRV opening sequence is not specified in this step because of the desire to reduce reactor pressure as rapidly as possible.
If suppression pool water level drops below the elevation of the top of the SRV discharge devices after the reactor is depressurized, however, the SRVs need not be reclosed. Once reactor depressurization has been completed, the energy addition to the primary containment through the SRVs will be within the capacity of the containment vent, even if the SRV discharges are uncovered. Maintaining the reactor depressurized then takes priority and primary containment pressure may be controlled by venting.
Defeating all isolation interlocks for the SRV pneumatic supply and restoring pneumatics is appropriate if the SRVs are unavailable due to the loss of the pneumatic supply. These actions may be performed prior to or after the system isolation dependent upon time, manpower, and the need or anticipated need for SRV use.
The depressurization is performed "irrespective of the resulting coo/down rate," since the need for rapid depressurization and reactor flooding takes precedence over normal cooldown rate limits. If the rapid depressurization were not performed, the objective of this contingency would be unnecessarily delayed.
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STEPS 019 and 020 NO 019 CLOSE THE FOLLOWING:
- MSlVs
- 821*F016
- 821* F019
- E51*F008 020 STEP BASES:
Steam lines connected to the reactor vessel are isolated prior to initiating action to flood the reactor vessel to preclude damage which may occur from cold water coming in contact with the hot metal, excessive loading of pipes or hangers not designed to accommodate the weight of water and flooding of steam driven equipment (RCIC turbine, main turbine, etc.). Isolation is performed, however, only if the status of SRVs assures that the reactor vessel will remain depressurized during the flooding evolution.
If less than the minimum Number of SRVs Required for Emergency Depressurization (5) can be opened, steam line isolation is not appropriate because the open steam lines provide the necessary means of venting the reactor vessel as the floodup progresses.
Direction to isolate the HPCI steam line is purposely omitted from this step. The emergency depressurization will cause HPCI to automatically isolate on low reactor pressure if HPCI is in operation when the Reactor Flooding Procedure is entered. Even if the automatic HPCI isolation fails to function, the HPCI System steam demand reduces reactor pressure to the turbine stall speed for reactor power levels at or below the decay heat range. Until this occurs, HPCI injection flow to the reactor vessel is maintained for as long as possible thus assisting in floodup of the reactor vessel.
On the other hand, RCIC is isolated in order to preserve its ability to provide reactor vessel injection should it later be needed under conditions when all motor-driven pumps are incapable of adequately flooding the reactor vessel.
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STEPS 021 through 023 TABLE 1 MINIMUM ALTERNATE FLOODING PRESSURE NUMBER OF PRESSURE OPENSRVs (PSlG) 7 OR MORE 120 6
140 5
175 4
220 3
295 2
450 1
915 STEP BASES:
When the reactor is depressurized to below the Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure, or when no SRVs are open, then injection to the reactor vessel is initiated.
If the Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure cannot be maintained, adequate core cooling is not assured and fuel clad temperature may exceed 1500°F. At least one SRV must be open to maintain adequate core cooling and to ultimately flood the reactor.
1001-37.6 Rev. 5 Page 16 of 361
STEPS 024 through 027 IRRESPECTIVE OF NPSH AND VORTEX LIMITS. SLOWLY INCREASE INJECTION TO THE REACTOR WITH THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS:
TABLE 1 MINIMUM ALTERNATE FLOODING PRESSURE NO
- LPCl
- ESTABLISH RHR SERVICE WATER FLOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
- CONDENSATE AND CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMPS
- CRD* MAXIMIZE FLOW PER EOP* 01* SEP* 09 NUMBER OF PRESSURE OPENSRVs (PSIG) 1ORMORE 120 6
140 5
115 4
220 3
295 2
450 1
915 STEP BASES:
The caution concerning rapid flow increases is applicable to EOP steps governing control of reactor water level under failure-to-scram conditions, when the shutdown margin may be small or nonexistent. In these steps, rapidly increasing injection may cause a large net increase in positive reactivity due to increased subcooling at the core inlet, reduction of the core void fraction, and, if boron has been injected, the removal of boron from the core region. The subsequent power excursion may be large enough to cause substantial damage to the core and the reactor. Under failure-to-scram conditions, reactor injection must therefore be increased slowly.
1001-37.6 Rev. 5 Page 17 of 361
STEPS 024 through 027 (continued)
As long as reactor pressure remains above the Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure, the core is adequately cooled by a combination of submergence and steam cooling irrespective of whether any water is being injected into the reactor or the reactor is at power. The Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure is the lowest reactor pressure at which steam flow through open SRVs is sufficient to preclude any clad temperature from exceeding 1500°F even if the reactor core is not completely covered. When reactor pressure decreases to the Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure, injection into the reactor must be re-established to maintain adequate core cooling and to ultimately flood the reactor. Since the reactor may become critical during this evolution, injection into the reactor is increased slowly to preclude the possibility of large power excursions caused by rapid injection of relatively cold, unborated water.
Injection at a rate sufficient to maintain reactor pressure above the Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure ensures that either the reactor will flood to the main steam lines, or, if the reactor returns to criticality, the core will be adequately cooled by a combination of submergence and steam cooling.
The systems identified for use here are those utilizing motor driven pumps and injecting outside the shroud. These systems are used preferentially in order to mix cold, unborated water injected into the reactor with warm, borated water prior to it reaching the core. The need to establish reactor injection and maintain the specified reactor pressure to assure adequate core cooling takes precedence over adherence to precautionary NPSH and Vortex limits on equipment operation.
1001-37.6 Rev. 5 Page 18 of 361
STEPS 028 through 030 CONTROL INJECTION FLOW TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST 1 SRV OPEN AND REACTOR PRESS ABOVE mE _UN ALTERNATl! FLOOOING PRESS BUT AS LOW AS POSSIBlE STEP BASES:
TABLE 1 MINIMUM ALTERNATl! FLOODING PRESSURE IlUMBEROF PRESSURE OPENSRVI 1PSM>1 70RMPRE 120 8
140 8
175 4
220 3
m 2
4SO 1
tl5 Once the conditions for reactor flooding have been established, throttling injection to maintain reactor pressure above the Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure assures that either the reactor vessel will ultimately flood to the main steam lines or the core will be adequately cooled by a combination of submergence and steam cooling.
Reactor pressure should be maintained above the Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure but as low as practicable to minimize injection flow requirements, SRV tail pipe loads, containment heatup, and boron dilution.
Should the reactor be shut down with soluble boron but reactor water level raised to the main steam lines, boron dilution will follow and the reactor may return to criticality. The subsequent increase in reactor power will require a reduction in injection to maintain reactor pressure near the Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure which in turn will result in a reduction of reactor water level to below the main steam lines, thus limiting the boron dilution.
1001-37.6 Rev. 5 Page 19 of 361