IR 05000338/2007008

Download: ML072880550

Text

October 12, 2007

Virginia Electric and Power CompanyATTN:Mr. David A. ChristianPresident and Chief Nuclear OfficerInnsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION ANDRESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2007008 AND 05000339/2007008

Dear Mr. Christian:

On August 31, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a teaminspection at your North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on August 31, 2007, and again on October 5, 2007, with Mr. Daniel Stoddard and other members of your staff during an exit meeting.This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your licenses as they relate tothe identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your operating licenses. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.On the basis of the samples selected for review, the team concluded that problems weregenerally being properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. There was one Green finding identified during this inspection associated with the storage of safety-related components and material in an uncontrolled, unlocked, unmonitored, and environmentally unregulated container.

This finding was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this non-cited violation, you should providea response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the North Anna Power Station. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of VEPCO2NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site athttp://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Eugene F. Guthrie, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos. 50-338, 50-339License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000338/2007008 and 05000339/2007008

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: (See page 3)

VEPCO2NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site athttp://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Eugene F. Guthrie, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos. 50-338, 50-339License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000338/2007008 and 05000339/2007008

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: (See page 3)X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLEG SENSITIVE X NON-SENSITIVEADAMS: X YesACCESSION NUMBER:_________________________OFFICERII:DRSRII:DRPRII:DRSRIII:DRSSIGNATURE/RA//RA By LGarner for/ /RA By LGarner for/ /RA By LGarner for/ NAMESSanchezJDodsonRFannerWLewisDATE10/12/0710/12/0710/12/0712/12/07E-MAIL COPY? YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\RPB5\North Anna\REPORTS\2007\NA 07-08\NA 2007008.wpd VEPCO3cc w/encl:Chris L. Funderburk, Director Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail DistributionD. G. Stoddard, Site Vice PresidentNorth Anna Power Station Electronic Mail DistributionExecutive Vice PresidentOld Dominion Electric Cooperative Electronic Mail DistributionCounty AdministratorLouisa County P. O. Box 160 Louisa, VA 23093Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.Senior Counsel Dominion Resources Services, Inc.

Electronic Mail DistributionAttorney GeneralSupreme Court Building 900 East Main Street Richmond, VA 23219 VEPCO4Report to David from Eugene Guthrie dated October XX, 2007.

SUBJECT: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION ANDRESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2007008 AND 05000339/2007008Distribution w/encl:S. P. Lingam, NRR Richard Jervey, NRR C. Evans (Part 72 Only)

L. Slack, RII EICS OE Mail (email address if applicable)

RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC EnclosureU. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IIDocket Nos.:05000338, 05000339 License Nos.:NPF-4 and NPF-7 Report Nos.:05000338/2007008 and 05000339/2007008 Licensee:Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility:North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Location:1022 Haley DriveMineral, Virginia 23117Dates:August 6 - 31, 2007 Inspectors:S. Sanchez, Resident Inspector, Lead InspectorJ. Dodson, Senior Project Engineer R. Fanner, Reactor Inspector W. Lewis, Reactor InspectorApproved by:Eugene Guthrie, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000338/2007-008 and 05000339/2007-008; on 8/6/2007 - 8/31/2007; North Anna PowerStation, Units 1 & 2; biennial baseline inspection of the identification and resolution of problems.The inspection was conducted by one Senior Project Engineer, one Resident Inspector, and twoReactor Inspectors. One finding was identified by the NRC, which was determined to be a

Non-Cited Violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,

White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.Identification and Resolution of ProblemsThe team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, andcorrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. Generally, issues were prioritized and evaluatedappropriately, and in a timely fashion. The evaluations of significant problems were in general of sufficient depth to determine the likely root or apparent causes, as well as, address the potential extent of the circumstances contributing to the problem and provide a clear basis to establish corrective actions. Corrective actions that addressed the causes of problems were generally identified and implemented. Reviews of operating experience information werecomprehensive. Licensee audits and assessments were found to be adequately broad based and an effective tool for identifying adverse trends. Previous noncompliance issues documented in inspection reports as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site were free to raise safety concerns to their management without fear of retaliation.A.NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII,Handling, Storage and Shipping, was identified by the NRC. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure adequate controls for the storage and preservation of safety-related material and equipment in accordance with plant instructions.

Emergency diesel generator (EDG) parts were stored in an uncontrolled, unmonitored, and environmentally unregulated storage container on an open pad outside the Protected Area, but within the Owner Controlled Area.The failure to ensure adequate controls were in place to store safety-related EDGparts was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was considered more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern because of the possible use of these parts in safety-related 3Enclosureequipment. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significancebecause it did not represent an actual malfunction or inoperability of an EDG system or component. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of safety or risk-significant decision making in the area of human performance because the organization knowledgeable of quality assurance storage requirements was not included in the decision for the relocation of the storage container.

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

None Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

4OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)4OA2Problem Identification and ResolutionThe team based the following conclusions, in part, on issues that were identified in theassessment period, which ranged from February 1, 2005, (the last biennial problem identification and resolution inspection) to the end of the inspection on August 31, 2007.

In addition, the team reviewed problems for selected systems identified outside the planned assessment period whose significance might be age dependent. a.Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (1)Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed procedures associated with the corrective action program (CAP)which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems using plant issues (PIs) and/or condition reports (CRs). The team also reviewed NRC inspection reports that documented NRC reviews over the last two years. This review was performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Where possible, the team independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented as intended. The team also reviewed common causes and generic concerns to determine if they had been appropriately addressed.The team conducted a detailed review, primarily focused on selected issues associatedwith five risk significant systems: Service Water (SWS), Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), Reactor Protection (RPS), Safety Injection (SI), and Safety-Related Electrical Breakers, specifically 4160 and 480 Volt. For these systems and associated components, the team reviewed PIs/CRs, system health reports, maintenance history, and completed Work Orders (WOs). The team conducted plant walkdowns of these systems to assess the material condition and to identify any deficiencies that had not been entered into the CAP.The team reviewed selected industry operating experience items, including NRC genericcommunications, to verify that they were appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP.To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones, the team selected arepresentative number of PIs/CRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including operations, maintenance, engineering, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness, outage and planning, and security. These PIs/CRs were reviewed to assess each department's threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions.The team reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those which focusedon problem identification and resolution, to determine if these audits and assessments 5Enclosurewere effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement, and to determine ifappropriate corrective actions were developed and implemented. Action Category 1, 2, and 3, PIs/CRs were reviewed to assess the adequacy of the root/apparent cause evaluations of the selected problems. The team reviewed the root/apparent cause evaluations against the description of the problem in the PI/CR and the guidance in procedure PI-AA-300, Rev. 0, Cause Evaluation Program. The team attended various plant meetings to observe management oversight functions of the corrective action process. These included morning meetings, Corrective Action Review Board (CARB)meetings, Corrective Action Review Team (CART) meetings, and Condition ReportReview Team (CRT) meetings. The team also held discussions with various personnel to evaluate their threshold for identifying issues and entering them into the CAP.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. (2)AssessmentIdentification of Issues. The team determined that the licensee was generally effectiveat identifying problems and entering them into their CAP. PIs/CRs normally provided complete and accurate characterization of the subject issues. Where they did not, the team observed the CRT flag them for return to the initiator or make changes based upon clarifying discussion. In general, the threshold for initiating PIs/CRs was low as evidenced by the continued large number of CRs entered annually into the CAP.

Employees were encouraged by management to initiate PIs/CRs. Site managementwas actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. The team's independent review did not identify any significant adverse conditions which were not in the CAP for resolution. Futhermore, previous noncompliance issues documented in inspection reports as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program.During the system reviews and walkdowns, the team determined that systemdeficiencies were, generally, being identified and placed in the CAP and that the system engineers were appropriately tracking and trending these issues. The team identified the following minor deficiencies for which CRs had not previously been written:*A drawing update was not performed as required by procedure. The licenseedocumented this condition in CR018989 and indicated an extent of condition review would be performed to ensure compliance with procedures.*Corrective action CA004296 assigned to Maintenance was inappropriately closedout. The licensee documented this condition in CR017917 and reopened the corrective action.*Heat exchanger test procedures did not specify design basis acceptance criteria. The licensee documented this condition in CR018908 and determined this was a procedural deficiency. In addition, the licensee determined, and the team agreed, that the heat exchangers were fully capable of meeting their intended safety-related function based upon Engineering evaluations.

6Enclosure*Electrical breaker procedures may not contain the proper Quality Assurance holdpoints. The licensee documented this condition in CR018965.The team determined, during interviews, that the licensee had overlooked notificationand familiarization of plant personnel for a recently implemented corporate CAP procedure involving the anonymous CR submittal process. The licensee provided a site-wide communication during the inspection to address the lack of familiarization by site personnel and external contractors.Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues. The team determined that the licensee hadadequately prioritized issues entered into the CAP consistent with established procedures. This was confirmed through the review of audits conducted by the licensee and the assessment conducted by the inspection team during the inspection period.

The licensee performed timely evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth to determine the likely root or apparent causes, as well as, address the potential extent of the circumstances contributing to the problem and provide a clear basis to establish corrective actions. The team determined that site trend reports were thorough and that a low threshold was established for evaluation of potential trends.

Use of trending at the site was comprehensive and effective.The team determined that the station conducted appropriate type of root causeevaluations as specified by established procedures. A variety of causal analysistechniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue. For root causes that were selected for review, the licensee appropriately developed corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPR). The team further determined that operability, reportability, and degraded or non-conforming condition determinations were consistent with the guidance contained in PI-AA-200, Rev. 0, Corrective Action.The team concluded that CAP-related meetings were attended by the appropriatepersonnel who were prepared for the meetings. Assignment of significance level and investigation types to PIs/CRs were in accordance with CAP procedures and guidance.

In general, there was good discussion and interaction among the meeting members that the team observed with the proper focus on reactor safety.Effectiveness of Corrective Action. Based on a review of numerous PI/CR correctiveactions and their implementation, the team found, in general, that the licensee's corrective actions were timely, effective, and commensurate with the safety significance of the issues. Effectiveness reviews for CAPRs and audits were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective.The team identified an example where corrective actions lacked justification for on-goingdegraded conditions of the service water (SW) system. Piping deterioration, corrosion, defects, and de-lamination of internal coatings had been a long-standing problem which had not been fully resolved. There were numerous condition reports from 1999 to the present where problems were identified with service water system piping deterioration and the resulting heat exchanger fouling. Although corrective actions taken were sufficient to maintain or return the SW system and heat exchangers to an operable 7Enclosurecondition, some of the developed corrective actions appeared to be untimely and inothers the corrective actions were postponed and not implemented. Although the licensee had taken some action on each individual PI/CRs, only recently had the licensee issued a CR which identified the need to address the overall on-going degrading conditions. Furthermore, the team identified that a justification for acceptability of operating with the on-going degradation had not been developed. The licensee responded to the team's concern by providing preliminary justifications and by establishing a plan and schedule to develop and document a more thorough justification.

For the SW issues, the team concluded that CAP actions lacked rigor and were not well documented. (3)FindingsIntroduction. A Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, CriterionXIII, Handling, Storage and Shipping, was identified by the NRC. Specifically, the team determined that the licensee failed to ensure adequate controls for the storage and preservation of safety-related material and equipment in accordance with plant instructions by maintaining emergency diesel generator (EDG) parts in an uncontrolled, unmonitored, and environmentally unregulated storage container on an open pad in the Owner Controlled Area (OCA). The NCV was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone.Description. The licensee implemented a work process change involving the utilizationof large storage containers for staging essential parts and tools to support EDG overhaul and maintenance. Previously, personnel had to be dispatched for parts and tools, introducing delays and increased opportunity for human error deficiencies. During the actual maintenance, the containers were stored within the protected area (PA) in the alleyway immediately outside of the EDG spaces. Following the maintenance, the containers were relocated to a remote pad outside the PA but within the OCA.During this inspection, the team found the containers to be wholly exposed to theelements, with locks other than those provided when the containers had been inside the protected area. Closer inspection revealed that the lock placed on the parts container, while found loosely wrapped in duct tape, was actually unsecured and thus compromised traceability of the parts. The parts container was found to contain numerous Level B and C controlled components from the licensee's stock inventory. The team determined that there was no process or procedure that would have prevented the future use of the parts or material.Licensee procedure VPAP-0703, Revision 15, Storage, Handling and ShippingRequirements for Plant Materials, classified these containers as satellite storage, a designation for which none of the procedural requirements were in place to support the plant's quality assurance requirements (i.e., the containers be controlled, monitored, and environmentally regulated to support the material stored inside). In accordance with the licensee's Quality Assurance requirements, Level B components are not to be subjected to temperatures in excess of 140 degrees Fahrenheit (F) or less than 40 F. Thecontainers were found exposed to the Virginia climate where both extremes might be 8Enclosureexpected over the interval between container utilization. Level C components wererequired to be stored in a well ventilated storage space. The containers were found to have no ventilation. Given the recent nature of this work process change, none of the parts in question had been utilized in the performance of safety-related maintenance on the plant's EDGs.Analysis. The team determined that the licensee failed to ensure adequate controls forthe storage and preservation of safety-related material and equipment in accordance with plant instructions. The finding was in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The finding was considered more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern because of the possible use of these parts in safety-related equipment. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, 1, SDP Phase 1 screening worksheet because it did not represent an actual malfunction or inoperability of an EDG system or component, in that, the parts had not actually been utilized in the performance of safety-related maintenance of the plant's EDGs. The team determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect of safety or risk-significant decision making in the area of human performance (H.1(a)). The licensee failed to obtain adequate "interdisciplinary input and reviews on safety-significant or risk-significant decisions" prior to the container's long-term relocation, in that, personnel familiar with quality assurance storage requirements for safety-related equipment were not involved in the relocation decision.Enforcement. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage andShipping, states, in part, that measures shall be established to control the handling, storage, shipping, cleaning and preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work and inspection instructions to prevent damage or deterioration. Contrary to the above, on August 30, 2007, the NRC identified that the licensee had maintained safety-related components in an uncontrolled, unlocked, unmonitored, and environmentally unregulated storage container, exposed to the elements which coulddamage or deteriorate the material. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR018990, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item will be tracked as NCV 05000338, 339/2007008-01, Failure to Ensure Adequate Control and Storage of Safety-Related EDG Parts. b.Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (1)Inspection ScopeThe team conducted a review of the licensee's Operating Experience (OE) program toverify actions were completed in accordance with licensee procedures DNAP-3002, Dominion Nuclear Operating Experience Program, and PI-AA-100-1007, Operating Experience Program. The team reviewed a sampling of the items the licensee had submitted for OE to verify the information accurately reflected the events, were appropriately evaluated, and documented in their CAP. The team also focused on NRC generic communications and OE items associated with the five systems selected for a 9Enclosuredetailed review to verify issues were appropriately evaluated for applicability andwhether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP.

(2)AssessmentThe licensee was generally effective in evaluating internal and external industry OEitems as well as NRC generic communications for applicability and entering issues into the CAP. Industry OE was evaluated at either the corporate or plant level depending on the source and type of the document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. Any documents requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. Additionally, OE was regularly included in System Health Reports and CRs associated with station eventsas part of the causal investigations and corrective action development process.

(3)FindingsNo findings of significance were identified. c.Assessment of the Self-Assessment and Audits (1)Inspection ScopeThe team conducted a review of the licensee's self-assessment and audit program toverify actions were completed in accordance with licensee procedures PI-AA-100-1004, Formal Self Assessments, PI-AA-100-1005, Informal Self Assessments, and PI-AA-100-1006, Benchmarking. The team reviewed samples of self-assessments and audits to verify that identified deficiencies and areas needing improvement were entered into the CAP tracking system. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. (2)AssessmentThe team determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. Department self-assessments were generally detailed and critical. Corrective actionsdeveloped as a result of these assessments were incorporated into the CAP and tracked to completion. The team also determined that the licensee had adequately prioritized issues entered in to the CAP. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate. Site trend reports were thorough and a low threshold was established for evaluation of potential trends. The team concluded that the self-assessments and audit were an effective tool to identify adverse trend. (3) FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

d.Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (1)Inspection ScopeThe team conducted interviews with the plant staff to determine if any conditions existed that would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns and to develop a general sense of the safety conscious work environment at the site. Interviewees were questioned on their understanding and their willingness to initiate CRs or raise safety concerns. The team reviewed the licensee's Employee Concerns Program (ECP) whichprovides an alternate method to the CAP for employees to raise concerns. The program is defined by licensee procedure ECP-GL-1, Nuclear Employee Concerns Program. Theteam interviewed the ECP Coordinator and reviewed ECP reports and associated corrective actions to verify that concerns were being properly reviewed and that identified deficiencies were being resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.

(2)AssessmentThe team determined that a safety conscious work environment existed where peoplefelt free to raise issues without fear of retaliation. The team concluded that licensee management fostered a safety conscious work environment by emphasizing safeoperations and encouraging problem reporting through multifaceted communications and training programs. The investigations conducted by the ECP were thorough, complete and the recommended corrective actions were appropriately focused to address the actions needed to resolve the individual concerns.

(3)FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA6Management MeetingsOn August 31, 2007, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Daniel Stoddardand other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. On October 5, 2007, the team re-exited on the inspection results with Mr. Daniel Stoddard and other members of his staff. The team confirmed that proprietary information was returned following the inspection.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

T. Huber, Director, Nuclear Engineering

S. Hughes, Manager, Nuclear Operations

P. Kemp, Supervisor, Licensing

M. King, Employee Concern Program Coordinator

J. Kirkpatrick, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance

R. Klearman, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Safety

G. Lear, Manager, Organizational Effectiveness

G. Marshall, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning

C. McClain, Manager, Nuclear Training

F. Mladen, Manager, Nuclear Site Services

G. Salomone, Licensing Technician

M. Sartain, Director, Nuclear Safety and Licensing

B. Scanlon, Manager, Nuclear Oversight

D. Stoddard, Site Vice President

NRC personnel

J. Reece, Senior Resident Inspector, North Anna

R. Clagg, Resident Inspector, North Anna

E. Guthrie, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and

Closed

05000338, 339/2007008-01NCVFailure to Ensure Adequate Control andStorage of Safety-Related EDG PartsClosedNone

DiscussedNone

A-2Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures:DNAP-0110, Identifying and Addressing Nuclear Safety and Quality Concerns, Rev.1DNAP-3002, Dominion Nuclear Operating Experience Program, Rev. 1

DNAP-1604, Cause Evaluation Program, Rev. 6

ECP-GL-1, Nuclear Employee Concerns Program, Rev. 3

PI-AA-100, Performance Monitoring, Rev. 0

PI-AA-100-1001, Nuclear Business Plan Performance Indicators, Rev. 0

PI-AA-100-1002, Focus on Four, Rev. 3

PI-AA-100-1004, Formal Self Assessments, Rev. 0

PI-AA-100-1005, Informal Self Assessments, Rev. 0

PI-AA-100-1006, Benchmarking, Rev. 0

PI-AA-100-1007, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 0

PI-AA-200-2002, Effectiveness Reviews, Rev. 0

PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 0

PI-AA-300, Cause Evaluation, Rev. 0

VPAP-0102, Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee, Rev. 11

VPAP-1501, Deviations, Rev. 18

VPAP-1601, Corrective Action, Rev. 23

VPAP-0213, Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Action Verbs, Rev. 4

2-PT-66.3, Containment Depressurization Test, Rev. 35-OTO2

1-PT-77.13A, Control Room Chiller Equipment Performance Test (1-HV-E-4A), Rev. 12

2-PT-74A, Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 2-CC-E-1A Performance Test, Rev. 4-P1

2-PT-74A, Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 2-CC-E-1A Performance Test, Rev. 07

2-PT-74B, Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 2-CC-E-1B Performance Test, Rev. 08

2-PT-75.6, Service Water System Flow Balance, Rev. 16

NASES-3.20, Generic Letter (GL) 89-13 Programs, Rev. 2

0-PT-75.15,

GL 89-13 Service Water System Testing Requirements Coordination, Rev. 5

1-PT-14.1, Operations Periodic Test, Charging Pump 1-CH-P-1A, Rev. 45

1-PT-14.5, Venting ECCS Lines, Rev. 009

2-PT-14.5, Venting ECCS Lines, Rev. 010

1-ES-0.2A, Rev. 21, Natural Circulation Cooldown With CRDM Fans

2-ICP-MS-F-2474, Rev. 21, Steam Generator A Steam Flow and Feed Flow Protection Channel

III (2-MS-F-2474 & 2-FW-F-2477) Calibration

1-ICP-MS-P-1485, Rev. 5, Steamline B Steam Pressure Protection Channel III (1-MS-P-1485)

Calibration

0-FCA-0, Rev. 10, Fire Protection Response

0-FCA-1, Rev. 31, Control Room Fire

1-AP-20, Rev. 21, Operation from the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel

0-AP-10, Rev. 55, Loss of Electrical Power

ENAP-0025, Rev. 1, Post-Modification Testing

1-PT-36.1A, Rev. 56, Train A Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Actuation Test

2-PT-36.4.2, Rev. 17, Reactor Protection and ESF Circuitry Response-Time Testing For Cycles

14B, 17A, 20B, 23A

2-PT-36.4.3, Rev. 15, Reactor Protection and ESF Circuitry Response-Time Testing For Cycles

15A, 18B, 21A, 24B

A-3Attachment1-OP-26.1, Rev. 24, Transferring 4160-Volt Busses0-PT-80, Rev. 11, AC Sources Operability Verification

1-MOP-55.74, Rev. 9, Delta T/T AVE Protection Instrumentation

VPAP-0710, Rev. 2, Uniquely Tracked Commodities (UTC)

VPAP-0703, Rev. 15, Storage, Handling, and Shipping Requirements for Plant Materials

VPAP-0602, Rev. 6, Vendor Technical Manual Control

0-ECM-0301-01, Rev. 10, Troubleshooting and Repair of 480-Volt Motor Control Center Breaker Assemblies and 480-Volt Air Circuit Breakers

0-ECM-0302-01, Rev. 7, Troubleshooting and Repair of 4160-Volt Air Circuit Breakers

0-ECM-0308-01, Rev. 11, Troubleshooting and Repair of Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers

0-ECM-2005-01, Rev. 1, Replacement / Testing of Cell Switch Assemblies on Reactor Trip Breakers

0-ECM-2005-02, Rev. 3, Replacement / Testing of Cell Switch Assemblies on Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers

0-EPM-0302-01, Rev. 35, BBC/ITE 4160-Volt Type 5HK Breaker and Associated Switchgear Cubicle Maintenance

0-EPM-0302-02, Rev. 35, 480-Volt K-Line Breaker and Associated Switchgear Cubicle Maintenance

0-EPM-0302-03, Rev. 27, BBC/ITE 4160-Volt Type 5HK Breaker 9-Year Inspection

0-EPM-0302-04, Rev. 23, BBC/ITE 480-Volt K-Line Breaker 9-Year Inspection

0-EPM-0303-01, Rev. 29, Reactor Trip and Bypass Breaker Refueling Maintenance

1/2-EPM-0311-01, Rev. 4/6, Testing of Cell Switch on Reactor Trip and Bypass BreakersPlant Issues (PIs):N-2006-0139-R4N-2006-2400-R2N-2005-0605-R3N-20050504N-2006-0504N-2005-2636N-2005-2565N-2002-1850

N-2002-3216N-2003-1060N-2003-4337N-2004-0219

N-2004-1030N-2004-1248N-2004-3989N-2005-0036

N-2005-0988N-2005-2533N-2005-4009N-2005-5197

N-2005-5310N-2005-5333N-2006-0508N-2006-0820

N-2006-1663N-2006-2892N-2006-2968N-2006-3217

N-2006-3218N-2005-3936-R1N-2005-3936-R6N-2005-3283

N-2005-2813-E1N-2005-0412N-2005-2193N-2006-1018

N-2005-5258-R23N-2005-1615-R14N-2006-1990N-2006-2845

N-2005-5560N-2005-4947N-2005-0697N-2005-2141

N-2005-2092N-2005-2636N-2005-2636-E1N-2005-2636-R2

N-2005-2636-R3N-2005-2636-R4N-2005-2636-R5N-2005-2636-R6

N-2005-2636-R7N-2005-2636-R8N-2005-2636-R9N-2006-3253

N-2006-3253-R1N-2005-3283N-2005-3016-RCEN-2006-1232

N-2005-3016N-2004-2410-E1N-2006-1112N-2006-1682

N-2006-1729N-2006-2436N-2006-2840N-2006-3267

N-2005-1615N-2005-3274N-2006-1297N-2006-2115

N-2005-0845N-2005-1462N-2005-3401N-2005-3462

N-2005-3633N-2005-4516N-2005-4836N-2005-5211

N-2005-5416N-2006-1056

A-4AttachmentCondition Reports (CRs):CR016112CR008068CR000263CR000445CR000570CR000590CR000716CR000764CR000784CR001170CR001766CR002002

CR002028CR003269CR003474CR004701CR005076CR005207

CR005561CR005814CR005938CR006418CR006802CR007129

CR007540CR007569CR007723CR008917CR009532CR009718

CR009779CR010246CR010584CR010622CR011420CR011918

CR011987CR013761CR014987CR015207CR015658CR017687

CR015722CR015846CR016796CR016867CR017024CR019385

CR003018CR018661CR018679CR015926CR013591CR010084

CR018686CR018738CR009972CR17857CR003580CR008853

CR007078CR004458CR010083CR008734CR015375CR004545

CA005161CR003203CR017036CR017656CR016320CR017297

CR001943CR001357CR008355CR011859CR004961CR004966

CR004971CR011706CR001098CR001100CR001125CR001851

CR002130CR002164CR003126CR003560CR003676CR003695

CR003935CR004018CR004484CR005777CR006804CR008829

CR009485CR009565CR009567CR009602CR009792CR009798

CR009803CR009835CR009920CR009967CR010097CR010221

CR010226CR010227CR010321CR010363CR010374CR010422

CR010616CR010643CR010723CR012127CR012138CR012498

CR014464CR000282CR001319CR001969CR003076CR003081

CR003488CR003632CR003982CR003986CR005412CR005935

CR007667CR007692CR010418CR011452CR012189CR012282Condition Reports Initiated for NRC Identified Issues:CR018990, Improper Storage of Safety-Related Parts in Sealand ContainerCR018965, Breaker Procedures May Not Contain Proper QA Hold Points

CR018989, Drawing Update Was Not Performed as Required by Procedure

CR018908, Heat Exchanger Performance Test Procedures Lack Acceptance Criteria

CR017917, CA004296 Was Inappropriately Closed OutWork Orders:WO 00131733WO 00117414WO 00132315WO 00117127WO 00117106WO 00117085WR00133269LERs:50-338/2005-001-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification - LTOP50-339/2005-001-00, Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Lightning Strike

50-338/2006-001-00, Manual Reactor Trip Due to Shutdown Bank "A" Group 2 Step Counter Inoperable

50-339/2006-001-00, Reactor Trip Due to Steam Generator Low Level Coincident With a Steam Flow Feed Flow Mismatch

50-338/2007-001-00, Reactor Trip Due to Steam Generator Low Level Coincident With a Steam Flow Feed Flow Mismatch

50-339/2007-001-00, Damper Leakby During PREACS Testing Results in Unanticipated Power Reduction

A-5Attachment50-339/2007-002-00, Automatic Start of 2H EDG on Loss of "B" Reserve Station Service

Transformer Due to Cable FaultSelf Assessments:SA-04-01, Problem Identification and ResolutionFocused Self-Assessment of the Corrective Action Program, February 2005

QSL-CA-04-04, Corrective Action Functional Area Audit, August 2004

QAS-CA-05-1, Corrective Action Program, November 2005System Health Reports:02 Chemical and Volume Control System, 2006-2, Unit 1

Chemical and Volume Control System, 2006-2, Unit 2

4.16 KV Switchgear Breakers, 2006-2, Unit 1

Reactor Protection System, 2006-2, Unit 1

Reactor Protection System, 2006-2, Unit 2

Service Water System Safety Injection System

RPS Health Report 2007

SBO Health Report 2007

EDG Health Report 2006

EDG Health Report 2007

Fire Protection Health Report 2006

Fire Protection Health Report 2007

North Anna Power Station 06Q4 Program Executive Summary North Anna Power Station 07Q1 Program Executive Summary North Anna Power Station 07Q2 Program Executive Summary North Anna Power Station 06Q4 System Executive Summary North Anna Power Station 07Q1 System Executive Summary North Anna Power Station 07Q2 System Executive Summary North Anna Power Station 06Q4 Component Executive Summary North Anna Power Station 07Q1 Component Executive Summary North Anna Power Station 07Q2 Component Executive Summary North Anna Power Station 07Q2 AAC Overall Assessment North Anna Power Station 07Q2 AAC Detail North Anna Power Station 07Q2 EE Overall Assessment North Anna Power Station 07Q2 EE Detail North Anna Power Station 07Q2 EG Overall Assessment North Anna Power Station 07Q2 EG Detail North Anna Power Station 07Q2 EP Overall Assessment North Anna Power Station 07Q2 EP Detail North Anna Power Station 07Q2 Breakers Overall Assessment North Anna Power Station 07Q2 Breakers DetailApparent and Root Cause Analyses:ACE

000222, Increased seal leakage on 2-CH-P-1AACE

000248, 1-CH-P-1C secured due to lube oil leak

ACE 000454, Oil leaking from sight glass 2-SI-P-1A

A-6AttachmentACE

000498, 1-CH-P-1B1 High VibesN-2002-3216-E1, The interior coating of SW supply/return lines to the RSHXs for both units

N-2003-4337, Improper Assembly of 1-CH-P-1B1 Gear Box Heat Exchanger

N-2005-2533-E1, 2-CH-P-1C after disassembly of the outboard seal

N-2005-3213-E1, Data taken during 2-PT-77.13A on 8/17/2005 was insufficient to demonstrate the ability of 2-HV-E-4A to achieve its designed cooling capacity

N-2006-1663-E1, 1-SI-MOV-1867C did not go open when pushbutton was depressed from control room

RCE000033, SW flow restricted through RSHX during CDA functional testing

RCE000042,Reactor Trip/Safety Injection NAPS/ Unit 2 7300 Card Failures

RCE000031, North Anna "B" RSST Trip and Lockout

N-2005-1615, 1-EE-MCC-1J1-2N Failure

N-2005-2636, 1-EE-BKR-14J5 Fault

N-2005-3225, 2-EE-BKR-24J1-4 (2-QS-P-1B) Breaker Failure

RCE000004, Failure of Breaker 2-EE-BKR-24H1-4 During Performance of 2-PT-63.1A

N-2005-3401, Diesel Fuel Oil Particulates

N-2005-4516, Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (2-EE-EG-2J) 24-Hour Performance Test FailureOther Documents:SAR

000117, Corrective Action and Root Cause/Pre-PI&R AssessmentCorrective Action Trend Report 1st Quarter 2007Corrective Action Trend Report 2nd Quarter 2007

TE 000936, Trend for possible rework on 1-CH-P-1C compression fitting North Anna UFSAR Chapter 9, Rev. 42

North Anna UFSAR Table 5.2-22, Rev. 42; Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Materials Engineering Transmittal,

ET-N-06-0069, Revision 0; Evaluation and Report of Reconciliation for Pressurizer Manway Cover Closure Configuration Engineering Transmittal,

ET-CME-98-0006, Rev. 0; Component Cooling Heat Exchanger,

2-CC-E-1A Post Installation Performance Test, North Anna Power Station, Unit 2

Engineering Transmittal,

ET-CME-99-0039, Rev. 0; Component Cooling Heat Exchanger, Periodic Test 2-PT-74A, Rev. 5, 6/14/99, Engineering Evaluation, North Anna Power Station

SM-1542, Revision 0; GOTHIC Containment Analysis to Support Evaluation of As-Found Condition of North Anna Unit 2 Service Water Side Debris in Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers Configuration Management Trend Reports 2nd Quarter 2006, 3rd Quarter 2006, 4th Quarter 2006,

1st Quarter 2007Virginia Electric and Power Company Response to Generic Letter 89-13, January 29, 1990

Virginia Electric and Power Company Generic Letter 89-13 Activities, April 30, 1991

Virginia Electric and Power Company Generic Letter 89-13 Activities Revision, October 18,

1991

Technical Report No.

ME-0025, Rev. 2, 11/30/1994, NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Activities Technical Report No.

ME-0062, Rev. 0, 07/14/1992, Periodic Test 1-PT-74B of CCHX 1-CC-E-

1B

Technical Report No.

ME-0093, Rev. 0, Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Performance

Test Periodic Test 1-PT-74ASDBD-NAPS-EG, Rev. 11, System Design Basis Document for EDG System

A-7AttachmentSDBD-NAPS-EG, Rev. 8, System Design Basis Document for Reactor Protection SystemDCP 07-112, Replace Group 2 and 3

NLP 7300 Cards with Group 5 (U-2)

DCP 07-136, 7300 Process Rack NLP and NCB Card Modification/NAPS/Unit 1

Technical Report NO.

EE-0079, Rev. 0

NITDP-13-AG/APE-10.1, Rev. 0, NLP Card Front Edge Alignment

NITDP-13-LP-10, Rev. 1, NLP Loop Power Supply Card

NAPS UFSAR, Rev. 42

Information Notice No. 91-52: Nonconservative Errors in Overtemperature Delta-Temperature

(OtdT) Setpoint Caused By Improper Gain Settings Dominion Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description,

DOM-QA-1, Rev. 2

VPAP-0602, Rev. 6, Vendor Technical Manual Control

NA-VTM-00-59-W893-00085, Rev. 11, Solid State Protection System

NA-DW-6007D01, Rev. 3, Sh.1, Master Reference Drawing Units 1 & 2

NA-DW-6008D12, Rev. 0, Sh.1, Feedwater System First Stage Loop # 1 Feedwater Control System Control II

NA-DW-6008D48, Rev. 1, Sh.1, Feedwater System Turbine First Stage Pressure Loop #2

Feedwater Control System Control III Units 1&2

North Anna Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 42, dtd 8/15/07

Dominion Cause Evaluation Handbook, Rev. 7, dtd 3/22/07

Dominion Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description,

DOM-QA-1, Rev. 2

NEETRAC ltr to Dominion Virginia Power Re: Kerite Cable Failure, NEETRAC Project No. 07-

2, dtd 8/2/2007

NA-VTM-000-59-I145-00001, Rev. 4, Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers Type K-225 Thru

2000 and K-600S Thru 2000S Stationary Mounted and Drawout Mounted

NA-VTM-000-59-I145-00002, Rev. 5, Medium-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers Installation/Maintenance Instructions

NA-VTM-000-59-I145-00003, Rev. 1, Instructions Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear

NA-VTM-000-59-I145-00004, Rev. 2, Type 5HK, 7.5HK, and 15HK Metal-Clad Switchgear

5000, 7000 and 15000 Volt North Anna Power Station Corrective Action Program Station Due Date Policy North Anna Power Station Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACEs) Station Expectations North Anna Power Station Corrective Action Program Station Expectations for Department Manager's Role in the Corrective Action Process North Anna Power Station Nuclear Safety (SNS) Common Cause Analysis Guideline North Anna Power Station Corrective Action Program Effectiveness Review Guideline Dominion Trend Analysis Manual, Rev. 0

North Anna Power Station Outage and Planning Department Self Assessments Standard North Anna Power Station Maintenance Information Bulletin 06-09,

NDAP-2000 Minor Work