ML070400264

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Response by San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Sierra Club, and Peg Pinard to PG&E Motion for Prompt Commission Action
ML070400264
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 02/05/2007
From: Curran D
Harmon, Curran, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, LLP, Peg Pinard, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Sierra Club, Santa Lucia Chapter
To:
NRC/OCM
SECY RAS
References
72-26-ISFSI, RAS 13024
Download: ML070400264 (35)
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Text

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February 5, 2007 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the matter of Docket # 72-26-ISFSI DOCKETED Pacific Gas and Electric Company USNRC Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant February 5, 2007 (2:42pm)

Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF RESPONSE BY SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE, SIERRA CLUB, AND PEG PINARD TO PG&E MOTION FOR PROMPT COMMISSION ACTION Introduction Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.323, the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Santa Lucia Chapter of the Sierra Club, and Peg Pinard (collectively "SLOMFP") hereby respond to Pacific Gas & Electric Company Motion for Prompt Commission Action (January 24, 2007) ("PG&E Motion"). PG&E's motion essentially makes two requests:

first, that the Commission complete, by the summer of 2008, the proceeding remanded by the U.S. Court of Appeals in San Luis Obispo Mothersfor Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016

( 9 "hCir. 2006), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ (January 16, 2007); and second, that the Commission "issue an order to delineate the issues, the procedures to be followed, and the schedule for completion" of the remanded proceeding.

SLOMFP believes that those two requests generally are reasonable, but disagrees with PG&E regarding some of its suggestions regarding issues that should be addressed and procedures that should be followed in the remanded proceeding. In addition, SLOMFP requests the Commission to confirm the premise underlying PG&E's request TllcV

  • 2 for prompt action, i.e., that PG&E's license for the Diablo Canyon Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ("ISFSI") is invalid as a result of the Ninth Circuit's decision, and that PG&E may not load fuel into the ISFSI unless and until the Commission completes the remanded National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") review of PG&E's permit application and re-issues the permit.

!. COMMENTS ON PG&E MOTION A. Issues As PG&E observes, the central holding of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v.

NRC was that the NRC acted unreasonably in determining that intentional attacks on nuclear facilities are not reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law, and thus the "threshold" determination the Commission must make on remand is the likelihood of an intentional attack on the Diablo Canyon ISFSI. PG&E Motion at 4. PG&E suggests that the Commission could fulfill its obligation by preparing an environmental assessment

("EA") concluding that the possibility of an attack on the Diablo Canyon ISFSI is too

"~remote and highly speculative" to warrant NEPA consideration. PG&E Motion at 5 and

n. 10, citing Private Fuel Storage, L.L. C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation),

CLI-06-25, 56 NRC 340 (2002) ("PrivateFuel Storage").

SLOMFP urges the Commission not to follow the example of PrivateFuel Storage, which made a cursory and utterly inadequate "guess" regarding the probability of a site-specific intentional attack on the proposed Private Fuel Storage ISFSI after concluding that no such analysis was required under any circumstances. 56 NRC at 351.

The Commission made no attempt to evaluate the range of potential attacks on the facility

3 or the particular vulnerabilities of the facility to an attack. In any event, the physical characteristics of the Skull Valley site are very different from the Diablo Canyon site, which is located in a much more populated area and on an exposed hillside overlooking the Pacific Ocean.

SLOMFP recommends that the Commission should begin its analysis by consulting the reasoning of the Vehicle Bomb Rule (Final Rule, Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,889 (August 1, 1994)), which used a number of qualitative factors to evaluate the potential for a vehicle bomb attack on a nuclear power plant. But consideration of the reasoning underlying the Vehicle Bomb Rule should be supplemented by consideration of other analyses that provide more updated reasoning in light of the events of September 11, 2001. SLOMFP recommends, for example, that the Commission consider the recommendations made by Dr. Gordon Thompson in a 2005 workshop held by the California Energy Commission, which are summarized in his paper, Issues Regarding the Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.

A copy is attached as Exhibit 1. The Commission should also consider interim guidance recently issued by the U.S. Department of Energy for consideration of environmental impacts of intentional attacks in NEPA reviews. Memorandum from Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance to DOE NEPA Community re: Need to Consider Intentional Destructive Acts in NEPA Documents (December 1, 2006). A copy is attached as Exhibit 2.

The NRC's NEPA analysis for the Diablo Canyon ISFSI should cover a range of credible attacks, not limited to airborne attacks. It should take into consideration the

4 reasonably foreseeable capabilities of attackers, the particular vulnerabilities of the Diablo Canyon ISFSI, and the degree of damage that could be achieved by an intentional attack. The analysis should cover the entire time-frame of operation of the ISFSI, not just current conditions. The analysis should not be limited by the hypothetical design basis threat ("DBT") against which the NRC protects nuclear facilities under the Atomic Energy Act, but must take into account the broader category of threats that might be low in probability and yet reasonably foreseeable. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(1).

B. Procedures An adequate set of procedures for public comment and participation in the NRC's decision-making process constitutes the best tool for achieving PG&E's goal of expediting the NEPA review process. Had the NRC conducted a thorough and rigorous NEPA review of the environmental impacts of an intentional attack on the Diablo Canyon ISFSI when PG&E submitted its application in 2001, or granted a hearing when SLOMFP requested it in 2002, PG&E's Motion would not be necessary now. By the same token, a hastily prepared EA in response to the Ninth Circuit's remand, summarily or secretly concluding that an intentional attack on the Diablo Canyon ISFSI is not reasonably foreseeable, would merely invite more litigation. SLOMFP recommends that any procedures instituted by the Commission for the remanded proceeding should include the following measures:

1. The Commission should request public comment on the scope of its analysis of the environmental impacts of an attack on the Diablo Canyon ISFSI. If the Commission decides to prepare an EIS, such a scoping process is required by NRC

5 regulations. 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.26-51.29. Even if the Commission decides to prepare an EA on the topic rather than a full-scale EIS, it should seek public comment on the scope of its inquiry into the issue of probability. Such a commenting opportunity is necessary and important, given that the Commission has not requested public comment on appropriate methods for evaluating the environmental impacts of intentional attacks on nuclear facilities following the events of September 11, 2001, and a great deal has been learned by the Commission and the public at large since then.

2. The Commission should minimize the degree of secrecy of the NEPA process. An ISFSI is not a military facility, and therefore Weinberger v. CatholicAction of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 129 (1981) does not provide a useful precedent. Instead, the Commission should apply the principle articulated in the proposed DBT rule, 70 Fed.

Reg. 67,380 (November 7, 2005), of balancing public disclosure against the protection of sensitive information.' By providing the public with enough information to demonstrate 1 As stated in the proposed rule:

The approach proposed in this rulemaking maintains a level of detail in the § 73.1 (a) rule language that is generally comparable to the current regulation, while updating the general DBT attributes in a manner consistent with the insights gained from the application of supplemental security requirements imposed by the April 29, 2003, DBT orders. The result is a proposed rule with a level of detail that reflects all major features of the DBTs, yet avoids compromising licensee security by not publishing the specific tactical and operational capabilities of the DBT adversaries. The goal of this approach is to provide sufficient public notice of the upgrades to the DBTs, including the new modes of attack that facilities must be prepared to defend against, so that meaningful public input is possible regarding the proposed rule's scope and content.

The NRC recognizes that some stakeholders may expect more detail than is set forth in the current or proposed DBT regulations. However, the more detail that is

6 the information considered and the methods used to conduct a thorough and rigorous analysis, the Commission will achieve four important purposes: (a) allowing the public to play a meaningful role in evaluating and critiquing the NRC's analysis, (b) minimizing the chances that a party will challenge the adequacy of the NRC's environmental review in a time-consuming hearing, (c) dissuading would-be attackers and thereby reduce the chances of an attack on the facility, and (d) avoiding the corrosive societal effect of government secrecy regarding important public policy decisions that affect public health and safety.

3. The Commission should not commence an adjudicatory proceeding. See PG&E's Motion at 6-7. The Ninth Circuit clearly held that the EA for the Diablo Canyon ISFSI is deficient with respect to its discussion of the environmental impacts of an intentional attack on the Diablo Canyon ISFSI. The NRC must now take the next step of revising the EA. As discussed above, in Section 1, SLOMFP urges the Commission to made publicly available about the specific capabilities of the DBT adversaries, the greater the chance that potential adversaries could exploit that information. The disclosure of such details as the specific weapons, force size, ammunition, vehicles, and bomb sizes that licensees must be prepared to defend against could substantially assist an adversary in planning an attack.

On the other hand, it is important for the public to be informed of the types of attacks against which nuclear power plants and Category I fuel cycle facilities are required to defend. The public has a vital stake in the security of these facilities, as well as the right to meaningful comment when NRC proposes to amend its regulations. Understanding the general scope of the proposed DBG rule is necessary if the public is to exercise its right to meaningful comment and oversight of NRC regulations.

70 Fed. Reg. at 67,382.

7 seek public comment on the scope of the analysis that it conducts in the remanded proceeding. The burden of conducting that analysis, however, is on the NRC, not SLOMFP.

4. SLOMFP agrees with PG&E that, to the limited extent that issues related to the environmental impacts of intentional attacks on nuclear facilities are generic, they may be resolved in a rulemaking. See PG&E Motion at 8. In order to ensure that the licensing decision for the Diablo Canyon ISFSI complies with NEPA, the Commission should clearly provide, however, that PG&E's license for the Diablo Canyon ISFSI remains invalid until the rulemaking is completed and its results are applied to the re-opened licensing proceeding for the Diablo Canyon ISFSI.

Nevertheless, SLOMFP does not believe that a generic proceeding would be appropriate for all issues related to the environmental impacts of an intentional attack on the Diablo Canyon ISFSI. The licensing of the Diablo Canyon ISFSI poses significant site-specific environmental issues that cannot be resolved generically, such as the particular vulnerabilities to attack of the ISFSI and the site where it is located. If the Commission considers conducting a portion of the remanded proceeding generically, it should request public comment on the scope of issues that may be addressed generically and the scope of issues that must be addressed on a site-specific basis.

5. SLOMFP believes that if the NRC conducts a thorough and rigorous analysis as required by NEPA (42 U.S.C. § 4332), maximizing public disclosure of information to the degree possible, there is a reasonable chance of completing the remanded proceeding by the summer of 2008. In no event, however, should the

8 Commission sacrifice the thoroughness of its environmental analysis to PG&E's schedule.

II. REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION THAT ISFSI PERMIT IS INVALID.

In two recent decisions, the Commission refused SLOMFP's requests that it declare PG&E's permit to be invalid as a result of the Ninth Circuit's decision in SLOMFP v. NRC, stating only that PG&E must give SLOMFP 60 days' notice of any actual loading of fuel into the ISFSI. CLI-06-27, slip op. at 5 (November 9, 2006). See also CLI-06-23 (September 6, 2006). In opposing SLOMFP's requests, PG&E also refused to concede that its license for the ISFSI is invalid. Answer of Pacific Gas and Electric Company to Motion for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (July 17, 2006),

Answer of Pacific Gas and Electric Company to Motion for Partial Reconsideration of CLI-06-23 (September 28, 2006). Now, by urging the Commission to complete the remanded proceeding in a time-frame that "will allow the Diablo Canyon [ISFSI] to open on a schedule to support operation of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant," PG&E implicitly concedes that it has no legal authority to load spent fuel into the Diablo Canyon ISFSI until the NRC has completed the remanded proceeding. PG&E Motion at 1.

SLOMFP hereby renews its request that the Commission declare that PG&E lacks a valid permit for the Diablo Canyon ISFSI, and that PG&E may not use the ISFSI to store spent reactor fuel unless and until the NRC completes the environmental analysis remanded by the U.S. Court of Appeals and re-issues a permit to PG&E for the ISFSI.

Now that the Supreme Court has denied PG&E's request for a writ of certiorari, there is no longer any room for doubt or delay regarding the enforceability of the Ninth Circuit's

9 responsible for enforcing NEPA in this proceeding. The Commission should clarify that the NRC will prohibit PG&E from loading fuel into the Diablo Canyon ISFSI before the remanded NEPA proceeding is complete, rather than continuing to place an inappropriate burden of enforcing NEPA on SLOMFP.

(submtted,.

sbitd Z spectfully lane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, LLP 1726 M Street N.W., Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 202/328-3500 FAX: 202/328-6918 e-mail: dcurraniV harmoncurran.com February 5, 2007

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on February 5, 2007, copies of the foregoing Response by San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Sierra Club, and Peg Pinard to PG&E Motion for Prompt Commission Action were served on the following by first-class mail and/or fax as indicated below:

Office of the Secretary (original and two William V. Manheim, Esq.

copies) Antonio Fernandez, Esq.

Rules and Adjudications Branch Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 77 Beale Street B30A 11555 Rockville Pike San Francisco, CA 94105 Rockville, MD 06825 Also by e-mail to: AxFn( pge.com Also by e-mail to: hearingdocket Qa nrc.gov David A. Repka, Esq. Margaret J. Bupp, Esq.

Martin J. O'Neill, Esq. Office of General Counsel Winston & Strawn, LLP Mail Stop o-15D21 1700 K Street N.W. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20006-3817 Washington, D.C. 20555 Also by e-mail to: drepka@winston.com, Also by e-mail to: MJb5 @dnrc.gov inoneill(@)winston.com Timothy McNulty, Esq. Kenneth Alex, Esq.

Office of County Counsel Claudia Polsky, Esq.

County Government Center Room 386 California Department of Justice San Luis Obispo, CA 93408 1515 Clay Street, 201h Floor Also by e-mail to: Also by e-mail to: Oakland, CA 94612-0550 trncnultygco.slo.ca.us Also by e-mail to:

Claudia.polsky@doi.ca.us Barbara Byron, Staff Counsel San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace California Energy Commission P.O. Box 164 Chief Counsel's Office Pismo Beach, CA 93448 1516 Ninth Street, MS 14 Sacramento, CA 95814 Also by e-mail to:

Bbyronaenergy.state.ca. us Diane Curran

Exhibit 1 INSTITUTE FOR RESOURCE AND SECURITY STUDIES 27 Ellsworth Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, USA Phone: 617-491-5177 Fax: 617-491-6904 Email: info@irss-usa.org ISSUES REGARDING THE STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL Supporting document for participation by Gordon R. Thompson as a panelist at a public workshop held by the California Energy Commission in Sacramento, California, 15-16 August 2005 Table of contents

1. Introduction
2. Thompson's qualifications and experience
3. Options for managing spent fuel
4. Factors relevant to the security of nuclear facilities
5. The scale of radiological hazard
6. Vulnerability of nuclear facilities to attack
7. Consequences of attack
8. The future threat environment
9. Present defense of nuclear facilities
10. Options for enhanced defense of nuclear facilities
11. Comparative merits of spent-fuel storage options
12. Improving knowledge about nuclear-facility security
13. Conclusions
14. References Tables 1-4 Figure 1

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel: Supportingdocumentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 2

1. Introduction This document provides information that supports the participation of Gordon R.

Thompson in a public workshop held by the California Energy Commission (CEC). The workshop will address issues related to nuclear power, and will inform the CEC's preparation of its 2005 IntegratedEnergy Policy Report. Background information about nuclear power in California has been compiled in a draft report by a consultant to the CEC. 1 That report is used here as a point of departure for the presentation of additional information and perspectives.

The workshop will involve four panels of discussants. Thompson has been asked by the CEC to participate in the second panel, and to address the following questions about spent nuclear fuel:

(i) What are the trade-offs between interim storage facilities located at either the individual reactor sites or a centralized location in the West?

(ii) What are the implications of maintaining on-site storage of spent fuel at the individual reactor sites for at least the operating period of the reactors?

(iii) What are the major security and safety issues associated with the storage of spent fuel?

Those questions are addressed here in reverse order. Much has been said about the merits of various options for storing spent nuclear fuel. That discussion is not always well-informed regarding security and safety issues. Accordingly, three foci of discussion are adopted here. First, security issues related to the storage and transport of spent fuel are outlined (Sections 4-10). Second, security and safety issues are factored into a discussion of the comparative merits of spent-fuel storage options (Section 11). Third, needs and opportunities for improving knowledge about nuclear-facility security are outlined (Section 12).

A discussion of security issues can involve information that is not appropriate for general dissemination. This document does not contain such information, and is appropriate for unrestricted distribution. Thompson would be willing to talk to California public officials, in a secure setting, about matters that are not appropriate for open discussion.

There is a large body of technical literature that is relevant to the storage of spent nuclear fuel. Only a portion of that literature is cited in this short document. Thompson would be willing to discuss technical issues in greater depth than is done here, and to identify the relevant literature.

IMRW, 2005.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel: Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson'sparticipationin CEC workshop, 15-16August 2005 Page 3

2. Thompson's qualifications and experience Gordon R. Thompson is the executive director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (Cambridge, Massachusetts) and a research professor at the George Perkins Marsh Institute, Clark University (Worcester, Massachusetts). He was educated in science and engineering, and received a D.Phil. from Oxford University in 1973 for mathematical analysis on the stability of plasma undergoing thermonuclear fusion. Since then, he has been a technical and policy analyst on issues of energy, environment, international security, and sustainability. A substantial portion of his work has related to the security, safety and economics of nuclear facilities, including reactors, reprocessing plants, and spent-fuel storage installations.

In addition to being familiar with security and safety issues affecting nuclear facilities in the USA generally, Thompson has worked on these issues in the specific context of California. For example, he has prepared and presented testimony to the California Public Utilities Commission on the nature and costs of potential measures for enhanced defense of the Diablo Canyon nuclear station and the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS). 2 The Diablo Canyon testimony was on behalf of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, and the SONGS testimony was on behalf of California Earth Corps.

During an investigation conducted for a German state government in 1978-1979, Thompson found that spent fuel stored at high density in a water-filled pool could ignite if water were lost from the pool. He identified acts of war as events that could cause water loss. This finding led to a German policy of using dry storage for away-from-reactor storage of spent fuel. Subsequent investigations by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) supported Thompson's findings about the hazards of high-density pool storage. Nevertheless, the NRC challenged related findings and recommendations by Thompson and co-authors that were published in 2003.3 At the request of the US Congress, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) conducted an independent investigation that vindicated the work of Thompson and co-authors.

3. Options for managing spent fuel The draft consultant's report for the CEC demonstrates that storage is the only near-term option for management of spent fuel from California's reactors. If the Yucca Mountain repository were to open in 2010 - which no-one expects - emplacement of spent fuel inside Yucca Mountain could continue until 2034 or 2060.s There is a substantial probability that the Yucca Mountain repository will never open. Thus, most or all of California's spent fuel will be stored for at least several decades, potentially for a century or longer. Storage could occur at reactor sites or elsewhere.

2 Thompson, 2004.

3 Alvarez et al, 2003; Thompson, 2003.

4 NAS, 2005.

5MRW, 2005, page 67.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel."Supportingdocument for Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 4

4. Factors relevant to the security of nuclear facilities No commercial nuclear facility in the USA was designed to resist attack. Facilities have some capability in this respect by virtue of design for other objectives (e.g., resisting tornado-driven missiles, containing the vapors and gases that would be released if a reactor core suffered accidental damage).

Beginning in 1994, with NRC's promulgation of a vehicle-bomb rule, each US nuclear power plant has implemented site-security measures (e.g., barriers, guards) that have some capability to prevent attackers from damaging vulnerable parts of the plant. The scope of this defense was increased in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001.

Nevertheless, it continues to reflect the NRC's judgment that a "light" defense, to use military terminology, is sufficient.6 This judgment is not supported by any strategic analysis, and contrasts with the National Strategyfor The PhysicalProtectionof Critical Infrastructuresand7 Key Assets, which identifies nuclear power plants as key assets, defined as follows:

"Key assets represent individual targets whose destruction could cause large-scale injury, death, or destruction of property, and/or profoundly damage our national prestige, and confidence."

A strategic analysis of needs and opportunities for security of an item of critical infrastructure or a key asset should have three parts. It should begin with an assessment of the scale of damage that could arise from an attack. For a nuclear facility, a major determinant of this scale is the amount of radioactive material that is available for release to the atmosphere or a water body; other determinants are the vulnerability of the facility to attack, and the consequences of attack. 8 (See Sections 5-7.) The second step in the strategic analysis should be to assess the future threat environment. (See Section 8.) The third step should be to assess the adequacy of present measures to defend the facility, and to identify options for providing an enhanced defense. (See Sections 9-10.)

The analyst should seek to understand the interests and perspectives of potential attackers. To illustrate, a sub-national group that is a committed enemy of the USA might perceive two major incentives for attacking a US commercial nuclear facility.

First, release of a large amount of radioactive material could cause major, lasting damage to the USA. Second, commercial nuclear technology could symbolize US military dominance through nuclear weapons and associated technologies such as guided missiles; 6

NRC, 2004.

7 White House, 2003.

8 Direct release of radioactive material is not the only potential consequence of an attack on a nuclear facility. There is also concern that radioactive or fissile material could be removed from the facility and incorporated into a radiological or nuclear weapon. In addressing security issues, this document focuses on the potential for a release of radioactive material, because the overall scale of security measures at a facility will be determined primarily by measures designed to prevent such a release.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel. Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 5 a successful attack on a commercial nuclear facility could challenge that symbolism.

Conversely, the group might perceive three major disincentives for attack. First, nuclear facilities could be less vulnerable than other potential targets. Second, radiological damage from the attack would be indiscriminate, and could occur hundreds of km downwind in non-enemy locations (e.g., Mexico). Third, the USA could react with extreme violence.

5. The scale of radiological hazard The radioactive isotope cesium-137 provides a useful indicator of the radiological hazard associated with a nuclear facility. This isotope has a half-life of 30 years. Being comparatively volatile, it is liberally released from damaged fuel. It accounts for most of the offsite radiological exposure from the Chernobyl reactor accident of 1986. That event released about 2.4 MCi (27 kg) of cesium-137 to the atmosphere. For comparison, fallout of cesium-137 from atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons was about 20 MCi (220 kg). 9 SONGS Units 2 and 3, as described in Table 1, illustrate the amount of cesium-137 in commercial nuclear facilities. Each of these pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) has an adjacent spent-fuel pool. The pools are expected to be filled by 2007-2008. Table 2 shows typical inventories of cesium-137 at SONGS Units 2 and 3.10 The core of each reactor, consisting of 217 fuel assemblies, contains about 7.7 MCi (85 kg) of cesium-137.

The spent-fuel pool at each unit will, when operating at its capacity of 1,325 fuel assemblies, contain about 68 MCi (750 kg) of cesium-137. An independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) has been established at the San Onofre site. A typical dry-storage module at this ISFSI, holding 24 fuel assemblies, will contain about 0.89 MCi (9.9 kg) of cesium-137.

According to the NRC, a typical spent fuel transportation cask holds up to 4 PWR fuel assemblies for a truck cask and up to 26 PWR fuel assemblies for a rail cask." The inventory of cesium-137 in shipments of spent fuel from SONGS Units 2 and 3 can be estimated as follows. Assuming that a storage canister of a dry-storage module at the ISFSI, holding 24 assemblies, would be inserted into a cask for rail shipment, and that fuel would be transported 30 years after discharge from a reactor, one finds that each truck cask (4 PWR fuel assemblies) would contain 0.14 MCi (1.6 kg) of cesium-137, while each rail cask (24 PWR fuel assemblies) would contain 0.85 MCi (9.5 kg) of cesium-137.12 9 Thompson, 2003.

10These inventories are calculated for the specific assumptions stated in Table 2.

" NRC, 2005.

12 Cask inventories are calculated using the assumptions in the first row of Table 2.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel." Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 6

6. Vulnerability of nuclear facilities to attack Nuclear power plants and ISFSIs have vulnerabilities that arise from intrinsic factors and from design choices. The intrinsic factors derive from the basic processes and structures needed to harness nuclear fission. Notably, spent fuel from a fission reactor necessarily contains biologically harmful and heat-producing radioactive material (e.g., cesium-137).

Also, reactor structures and nuclear fuel employ chemically-reactive materials. In US commercial reactors, the fuel cladding is made of zirconium alloy that can react exothermically with air or steam. The latter reaction yields hydrogen that can form an inflammable or explosive mixture.

The intrinsic vulnerabilities have been exacerbated by design choices. Two policy decisions have been especially important in this respect. First, resistance to attack has not been a design goal. Second, the NRC has allowed the nuclear industry to employ cost-saving measures that have created vulnerabilities.

Four examples illustrate the combined influence of these factors on the vulnerability of present US nuclear facilities, as follows:

- Example #1: Spent-Fuel Pool Fires Spent-fuel pools are now equipped with high-density racks so that they can hold a much larger inventory of spent fuel than was envisioned when the pools were designed. The high-density racks have a closed configuration that is necessary to suppress criticality. As a result, loss of water from a pool would cause the spent fuel to heat up and, across a wide range of scenarios, experience a runaway zirconium-air or zirconium-steam reaction (i.e., a fire). The resulting heat production and fuel degradation would release a large amount of radioactive material to the atmosphere.' 3

- Example #2: Cascading Failures Spent-fuel pools are immediately adjacent to reactors, and share their support systems. At many sites, including SONGS and Diablo Canyon, reactors are adjacent to each other and share support systems. The resulting interdependence means that fires, radiation fields and other effects of an attack could preclude operation of active safety systems or implementation of damage-control measures (e.g., provision of water makeup or spray to a drained spent-fuel pool), leading to cascading failures.14 13 Alvarez et al, 2003; NAS, 2005; Thompson, 2003.

14Thompson, 2003.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel.: Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson'sparticipationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 7 Example #3: Reliance on Active Safety Systems At nuclear power plants, safety systems are typically active rather than passive, and rely on AC or DC electric power. Achieving grid disconnect could be easy5 for attackers, forcing reliance on potentially vulnerable onsite power sources.'

- Example #4: Vulnerable ISFSI Modules The dry-storage modules used at ISFSIs are not designed to resist attack. At all recently-established ISFSIs in the USA, spent fuel is contained in metal canisters with a wall thickness of about 1.6 cm. Each canister is surrounded by a concrete overpack, but this overpack is penetrated by channels that allow cooling of the canister by convective flow of air. Attackers gaining access to an ISFSI could employ readily-available skills and explosives to penetrate a canister in a manner that allows free flow of air to spent fuel, and could use incendiary devices to initiate burning 6

of fuel cladding, leading to a release of radioactive material to the 1

atmosphere.

A determined, sophisticated group planning to attack a nuclear facility could employ a variety of modes and instruments of attack. To illustrate the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to available instruments, consider the potential for penetration of reinforced-concrete structures. Such penetration could be sought in some attack scenarios. Reactor containments and spent-fuel pools are relevant structures. At a typical PWR, the reactor vessel and associated components are inside a cylindrical, reinforced-concrete containment with a wall about 1 m thick. The adjacent spent-fuel pool has reinforced-concrete walls up to 2 m thick.

An informed attacker is likely to consider a shaped explosive charge as an instrument for penetrating a structure of this kind.' 7 It is, therefore, noteworthy that the US government has published design details for a shaped-charge, cruise-missile warhead intended to penetrate rock or concrete. The warhead's purpose is to open a pathway for entry of a second, tandem-mounted charge. This warhead has a diameter of 71 cm, a length of 72 cm, and a total mass of 410 kg. When tested in 2002, it created a hole of 25 cm diameter in tuff rock to a depth of 5.9 m.' 8 One means of carrying such a device would be a general-aviation aircraft operated remotely or by a suicidal pilot. There are many suitable aircraft. For example, a Beechcraft King Air 90 will carry a payload of up to 990 kg at a speed of up to 460 km/hr. A used King Air 90 can be purchased for US$0.4-1.0 million. Note that there are more than 19,000 airports in the USA. Also, during the period 1998-2003, about 70 aircraft were stolen from general-aviation airports in the USA.' 9 15NRC, 1990.

16 Thompson, 2003.

17 Walters, 2003.

18These data are from an unclassified report that is accessible on the Web. The citation is withheld here.

19Thompson, 2004.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel. Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 8

7. Consequences of attack A successful attack on a reactor or a spent-fuel pool could release radioactive material to the atmosphere by exploiting mechanisms that would be powered by energy sources within the facility -- stored heat, radioactive decay heat, and exothermic chemical reactions (e.g., zirconium-air or zirconium-steam). At a spent-fuel pool, the release could include 10-100 percent of the cesium-137 in the pool, together with other radioactive isotopes.20 Analyses of reactor accidents suggest that a successful attack on a reactor could also achieve a cesium-137 release fraction of 10-100 percent. 21 The reactor release would, in addition, include short-lived radioactive isotopes such as iodine-131.

An attack on a dry-storage module of an ISFSI could potentially achieve a cesium-137 atmospheric release fraction of 10-100 percent. However, achieving this outcome would require the use of an incendiary device to initiate a zirconium-air reaction, and the availability of air to feed that reaction. 22 The offsite impacts of an atmospheric release of radioactive material can be estimated, if a variety of assumptions are made. A group of analysts considered a hypothetical release of 35 MCi of cesium-137 at each of five nuclear-power-plant sites in the USA. The five-site average of offsite economic damage was $400 billion. 23 That estimate would rise substantially if reasonable, alternative assumptions were used in the analysis.

8. The future threat environment The threat environment must be assessed over the entire period during which a nuclear facility is expected to operate. For spent-fuel storage facilities in the USA, that period could exceed a century. It should be noted that the risk of attack will accumulate over the period of operation.

Forecasting international conditions over several decades is a notoriously difficult and uncertain enterprise. Nevertheless, an implicit or explicit forecast must underlie any decision about the level of security that is provided at a nuclear facility. Prudence dictates that a forecast in this context should err on the side of pessimism. Decision makers should, therefore, be aware of a literature indicating that the coming decades could be turbulent, with a potential for higher levels of violence.24 One factor that might promote violence is a perception of resource scarcity. It is noteworthy that many analysts are predicting a peak in world oil production within the next few decades.25 Also, a 20 Alvarez et al, 2003.

2! NRC, 1990.

22 The same principles would apply to an attack on a spent fuel transportation cask.

23 Beyea et al, 2004.

24 Kugler, 1995; Raskin et al, 2002.

25 Hirsch et al, 2005.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel."Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 9 recent international survey shows significant degradation in the Earth's ability to provide ecosystem services. 26 27 The potential for attacks on nuclear facilities has been studied for decades.

Nevertheless, the NRC remains convinced that these facilities require only a light defense. The NRC's position fails to account for the growing strategic significance of sub-national groups as potential enemies. Various groups of this kind could possess the motive and ability to mount an attack on a US nuclear facility with a substantial probability of success. The unparalleled military capability of the USA cannot deter such a threat if the attacking group has no territory that could be counter-attacked. Moreover, use of US military capability could be counter-productive, creating enemies faster than they are killed or captured. Many analysts believe that the invasion of Iraq has produced that outcome.

9. Present defense of nuclear facilities As stated above, the NRC requires only a light defense of US nuclear facilities. Table 3 outlines the defenses that are routinely provided at a nuclear power plant. It will be seen, for example, that there is no defense from air attack. With some limited exceptions, current ISFSIs were built at the sites of nuclear power plants, and benefit to some extent from the defenses provided for those plants. As reactors are decommissioned, and away-from-reactor ISFSIs are established (e.g., at Skull Valley), an increasing number of ISFSIs will be defended on a stand-alone basis, at a lower level of defense than is provided for an operational power plant.

A light defense is also provided during transport operations. NRC regulations require the defense of spent-fuel shipments by measures that include the presence of one or two armed escorts.2 8

10. Options for enhanced defense of nuclear facilities Various measures are available to provide enhanced defense of nuclear facilities. This defense could be provided remotely or locally. Measures implemented remotely will typically seek to defend many targets, not just nuclear facilities, and are of two types.

First, measures can be taken to intercept or deter attackers. Second, other measures can address underlying issues that promote attacks on the USA.

For an existing nuclear facility, an enhanced defense 29 could be provided by locally-implemented measures of the following types:

26 Stokstad, 2005.

27 Ramberg, 1984.

28 10 CFR 73.37, Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit, from the NRC website (www.nrc.gov), accessed 1IAugust 2005.

29 Thompson, 2004.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel: Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 10

  • Site-security measures The potential for attackers to reach a facility and implement destructive acts could be reduced by a variety of measures. These measures could include air defense by an active system (e.g., Phalanx) or a passive system (e.g., poles and nets).

- Facility-robustness measures Measures could be taken to improve the ability of a facility to experience destructive acts without releasing a large amount of radioactive material to the environment. A high-priority measure of this kind would be to equip spent-fuel pools across the USA with low-density racks, storing the remaining spent fuel in ISFSIs in which dry-storage modules are hardened and dispersed.

0 Onsite damage-control capability Damage-control measures could reduce the potential for a release of radioactive material following damage to a facility. For example, new systems could be installed that could provide emergency cooling water to reactors and spent-fuel pools for days or weeks in a high radiation field.

0 Offsite emergency-response capability Improved measures of offsite emergency response could reduce radiation exposure in the event of a radioactive release.

- Altered mode of operation Altering a facility's mode of operation could reduce the potential for an attack-induced release of radioactive material. For example, the power level of a reactor could be reduced at times of alert.

The equipment of spent-fuel pools with low-density racks, identified above as a high-priority measure, deserves some more discussion. This measure would yield a major reduction in risk, in two ways. First, the low-density racks would have an open configuration, thereby eliminating most scenarios in which a loss of water would cause spent fuel to heat up and ignite. Second, the inventory of spent fuel in each pool would be substantially reduced. The pools would revert to their original purpose of storing only recently-discharged fuel. Table 4 shows how this reversion could occur at SONGS Units 2 and 3. In this illustrative case, the pools would be converted to a low-density configuration over a period of 2 years.

For any new nuclear facility, there would be many opportunities to incorporate enhanced defense into the design of the facility. 31 Three complementary approaches would be available. One approach would be to design the facility for passive safety. For example, a reactor could be designed so that the fission rate naturally declines at high temperature 30 Alvarez et al, 2003; Thompson, 2003.

31Hannerz, 1983.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel."Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 11 and heat is dissipated by radiation, conduction and natural convection. A second approach would be to harden the facility by employing thick barriers made of concrete, steel, earth, gravel, etc. A third approach would be to limit the size of a given unit and disperse the units spatially.

11. Comparative merits of spent-fuel storage options Sections 4-10, above, outline security issues related to the storage and transport of spent fuel. The same discussion also addresses security issues related to reactors. That is necessary because reactors and spent-fuel pools are closely-coupled systems. For many purposes, a reactor and its pool can be regarded as a combined hazard.

The concept of safety has not been discussed to this point. That concept applies to failure conditions that are attributable to equipment malfunction, human error, or natural events.

Such failure conditions are commonly described as "accidents". These fall into two classes. Design-basis accidents are explicitly foreseen during a facility's design.

Accidents of greater severity are described as beyond-design-basis accidents.

Many of the enhanced-defense options that are categorized in Section 10 would yield substantial benefits in terms of safety. That is, they would reduce the probability and/or consequences of beyond-design-basis accidents. As a practical matter, therefore, a discussion of security issues subsumes most of what would be discussed in an assessment of the adequacy of present arrangements for safety.

The major security issue related to spent-fuel storage is the present risk arising from high-density pool storage. This risk could be substantially reduced by converting spent-fuel pools to a low-density configuration using open-frame racks. Additionally or alternatively, the risk arising from pool storage could be reduced, although to a much smaller degree, by other enhanced-defense measures (e.g., installing a system to spray water into a drained pool).

Fuel that is not stored in a pool could be stored in an ISFSI of the present design. The risk arising from that storage mode could be further reduced by adopting an ISFSI design in which the dry-storage modules would be hardened and dispersed. Figure 1 shows a schematic view of a potential design for hardened, dry storage of spent fuel.

An ISFSI could, in principle, be established in many possible locations. Some of the factors relevant to choosing locations and designs of ISFS~s would pertain to security, and some factors would not. There are well-established procedures for identifying, evaluating and deciding upon sites and designs for hazardous facilities. These procedures could be applied to the siting and design of new ISFSls for California's spent fuel, although it is clear that the process would be highly controversial. From a technical perspective, a current obstacle to the application of these procedures is a lack of knowledge about relevant security issues. That matter is discussed further in Section 12.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel. Supportingdocumentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 12 If decision makers had access to good information about relevant security issues, they could use this information to assess the comparative risks of alternative locations and designs for ISFSIs. To take a simple example, suppose that spent fuel is currently stored at Sites A and B. Further suppose that Site A allows a higher level of security than can be provided at Site B. Finally, suppose that transportation risk is low. In this hypothetical situation, a policy of risk minimization could indicate that the spent fuel from both sites should be consolidated at Site A.

From a security perspective, there are some clear differences between the SONGS and Diablo Canyon sites. The SONGS site is smaller and more difficult to defend. However, the SONGS site is adjacent to Camp Pendleton, which could provide a site for an ISFSI that would be at least as defensible as an ISFSI at Diablo Canyon. This example shows that an assessment of the comparative risks of ISFSI options must rest upon a thorough, practical investigation of available sites.

Consolidation of spent fuel storage at a centralized location (e.g., Skull Valley) can only be consistent with risk minimization if transportation risk is low. Gordon Thompson's current judgment is that the cumulative transportation risk may be comparable to the cumulative risk of storage at a typical, present ISFSI, for a given quantity of spent fuel.

If this judgment were confirmed by appropriate investigations, it would generally follow that transportation should be avoided where possible. That finding could be reinforced if enhanced-defense measures - such as the adoption of ISFSI designs employing hardened, dispersed storage - could substantially reduce the risk of storage.

If spent-fuel pools were converted to a low-density configuration, as discussed above, the spent-fuel storage risk at the site of an operating reactor would become largely decoupled from the reactor risk. Then, other factors being equal, there would be no risk benefit from transporting the spent fuel to an alternative site. Indeed, there could be a risk detriment if the alternative site lacked some of the site-security measures that are associated with an operational reactor.

12. Improving knowledge about nuclear-facility security At present, the NRC is the primary source of technical information about the security of US nuclear facilities. Unfortunately, the NRC is not fully credible as a source of information on these matters. This deficiency has been demonstrated by the NRC's attempt to suppress the findings of the NAS study on spent-fuel hazards, and by intemperate and technically questionable statements by NRC officials.

California would be well advised to conduct its own investigations, alone or by working with other states through partnerships such as the Western Governors' Association. Such investigations would address sensitive information, but much of this information would not be classified in a formal sense. For example, a large part of the knowledge needed to understand a facility's vulnerability can be developed by a technical investigation that

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel. Supportingdocument for Gordon R. Thompson'sparticipationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 13 relies on basic principles and open literature. Knowledge and perspectives on the future threat environment could be gained from citizens and the many relevant experts who reside in California, through channels including open hearings.

Investigations conducted by California could address:

- the vulnerability of reactors, spent-fuel pools, ISFSIs and spent-fuel transportation to attack by sub-national groups;

" potential consequences of attack;

" the future threat environment;

" options for enhanced defense of nuclear facilities;

" potential sites and design options for ISFSIs; and

" comparative risks of spent-fuel storage options.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel." Supportingdocumentfor Gordon R. Thompson'sparticipationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 14

13. Conclusions Major conclusions are as follows:

C 1. Storage is the only near-term option for management of spent fuel from California's reactors. Most or all of California's spent fuel will be stored for at least several decades, potentially for a century or longer.

C2. The NRC requires only a light defense of US nuclear facilities, but this policy is not supported by strategic analysis.

C3. US commercial nuclear facilities are not designed to resist attack, and have vulnerabilities that arise from intrinsic factors and design choices.

C4. Spent-fuel pools pose a special hazard, due to their high-density configuration and proximity to reactors. Loss of water from a pool could release tens of MCi of cesium-137 to the atmosphere, compared to 2.4 MCi for the Chernobyl accident.

C5. The future threat environment is uncertain, but a pessimistic view would be prudent in the context of nuclear-facility security. Sub-national groups are of growing strategic significance as potential enemies.

C6. Options are available for enhanced defense of nuclear facilities. A high-priority option would be to convert spent-fuel pools to a low-density configuration, storing the remaining spent fuel in ISFSIs in which dry-storage modules are hardened and dispersed. This option would largely decouple the spent-fuel storage risk from the reactor risk.

C7. An assessment of the comparative risks of options for storing California's spent fuel in JSFS~s would require the development of additional knowledge.

California could develop this knowledge through investigations conducted alone or with other states.

C8. Consolidation of spent fuel storage at a centralized location (e.g., Skull Valley) can only be consistent with risk minimization if the risk of transporting spent fuel is low. Gordon Thompson's present judgment is that transportation risk is not low.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel: Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 15

14. References (Alvarez et al, 2003)

Alvarez, Robert, Jan Beyea, Klaus Janberg, Jungmin Kang, Ed Lyman, Allison Macfarlane, Gordon Thompson, Frank N. von Hippel, "Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States", Science and Global Security, Volume 11, 2003, pp 1-51.

(Beyea et al, 2004)

Beyea, Jan, Ed Lyman and Frank von Hippel, "Damages from a Major Release of 137Cs into the Atmosphere of the United States", Science and Global Security, Volume 12, 2004, pp 125-136.

(Hannerz, 1983)

Hannerz, K., Towards IntrinsicallySafe Light Water Reactors (Oak Ridge, Tennessee:

Institute for Energy Analysis, February 1983).

(Hirsch et al, 2005)

Hirsch, Robert L., Roger H. Bezdek and Robert M. Wendling, "Peaking Oil Production:

Sooner Rather Than Later?" Issues in Science and Technology, Volume XXI, Number 3, Spring 2005, pp 25-30. (This paper was adapted from a report prepared for the US Department of Energy's National Energy Technology Laboratory.)

(Kugler, 1995)

Richard L. Kugler, Toward a Dangerous World: US National Security Strategy for the Coming Turbulence (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1995).

(MRW, 2005)

MRW & Associates, Inc., Nuclear Power in California:2005 Status Report (Oakland, California: MRW & Associates, August 2005). (This draft report was prepared for the California Energy Commission.)

(NAS, 2005)

Committee on the Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, Board on Radioactive Waste Management, National Research Council, Safety andSecurity of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage.-Public Report (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005).

(NRC, 2005.)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Typical Spent Fuel Transportation Casks", illustration accessed from NRC website (www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-transp.html) on 9 August 2005.

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel: Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson'sparticipationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 16 (NRC, 2004)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ProtectingOur Nation Since 9-11-01, NUREG/BR-0314 (Washington, DC: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 2004).

(NRC, 1990)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Severe Accident Risks.- An Assessment for Five US Nuclear Power Plants,NUREG-1150 (Washington, DC: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1990).

(Ramberg, 1984)

Ramberg, Bennett, Nuclear Power Plantsas Weaponsfor the Enemy. An Unrecognized Military Peril (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1984).

(Raskin et al, 2002)

Paul Raskin et al, Great Transition: The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead (Boston, Massachusetts: Stockholm Environment Institute, 2002).

(Stokstad, 2005)

Stokstad, Erik, "Taking the Pulse of Earth's Life-Support Systems", Science, Volume 308, 1 April 2005, pp 41-43. (News story about the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.)

(Thompson, 2004)

Thompson, Gordon, testimony before the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California regarding Application No. 04-02-026, 13 December 2004. (This testimony, prepared for California Earth Corps, addressed the provision of an enhanced defense of Units 2 and 3 of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.)

(Thompson, 2003)

Thompson, Gordon, Robust Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.-A Neglected Issue of Homeland Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Resource and Security Studies, January 2003).

(Waiters, 2003)

Walters, William, "An Overview of the Shaped Charge Concept", paper presented at the I 1th Annual ARL/USMA Technical Symposium, 5 and 7 November 2003. (This symposium was sponsored by the Mathematical Sciences Center of Excellence at the US Military Academy (USMA) and hosted by the US Army Research Laboratory (ARL) and USMA.)

(White house, 2003)

White House, The National Strategyfor the PhysicalProtection of Critical Infrastructuresand Key Assets (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2003).

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel. Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 17 Table 1 Selected Characteristics of SONGS Unit 2 and Unit 3 Characteristic San Onofre Unit 2 San Onofre Unit 3 Rated power 3,438 MWt; 1,070 MWe 3,438 MWt; 1,080 MWe Average capacity factor, 94 percent 90 percent 1998-2003 Reactor vendor Combustion Engineering Combustion Engineering Number of fuel assemblies 217 217 in reactor core Mass of uranium in a fresh 485 kg 485 kg fuel assembly Year of first commercial 1983 1984 operation Year when operating 2022 2022 license expires Capacity of spent-fuel pool 1,542 assemblies 1,542 assemblies Inventory of spent fuel in 870 assemblies 918 assemblies pool in November 1998 Date when SCE predicts July 2007 March 2008 pool will lose space needed to receive full core offload Source: Thompson, 2004

Issues regarding the storage of spent nuclearfuel."Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 18 Table 2 Amounts of Cesium-137 in Nuclear Fuel Associated With SONGS Unit 2 or Unit 3 Category of Nuclear Fuel Amount of Cs-137 (MCi)

One spent fuel assembly at discharge from reactor 0.071 (15.8 MWt per assembly, 90% capacity factor, discharge after 54 months, 485 kgU/assembly)

One reactor core at operating equilibrium 7.7 (217 assemblies, av. burnup = 50% of discharge burnup)

One spent-fuel pool at full loading 68 (1,325 assemblies, av. age after discharge = 14 yr)

One ISFSI module at full capacity 0.89 (24 assemblies, av. age after discharge = 28 yr)

Adapted from: Thompson, 2004

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel: Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 19 Table 3 Potential Modes and Instruments of Attack on a US Nuclear Power Plant Mode of Attack Characteristics Present Defense Commando-style attack

  • Could involve heavy Alarms, fences and lightly-weapons and sophisticated armed guards, with offsite tactics backup
  • Successful attack would require substantial planning and resources Land-vehicle bomb
  • Readily obtainable Vehicle barriers at entry

- Highly destructive if points to Protected Area detonated at target Anti-tank missile - Readily obtainable None if missile launched

- Highly destructive at point from offsite of impact Commercial aircraft - More difficult to obtain None than pre-9/11 I

  • Can destroy larger, softer targets Explosive-laden smaller
  • Readily obtainable None aircraft
  • Can destroy smaller, harder targets 10-kilotonne nuclear
  • Difficult to obtain None weapon - Assured destruction if detonated at target Source: Thompson, 2004

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel: Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 20 Table 4 Two Options for Management of Spent Fuel at SONGS Unit 2 or Unit 3, Commencing in Year X and Assuming Continued Operation of the Reactor Category of Number of Fuel Assemblies Spent Fuel Base-Case Option Option Involving Reduction in Capacity of the Spent-Fuel Pool Number of fuel assemblies 217 217 in reactor core Annual discharge of spent 48 (1/3 of core each 18 48 (1/3 of core each 18 fuel from reactor months) months)

Initial capacity of spent-fuel 1,542 1,542 pool (year X)

Reduced capacity of pool Not applicable (capacity 506 (4/3 core plus full (year X+2 and thereafter) remains at 1,542) offload of I core)

Initial inventory of spent 1,325 (1,542 minus full 1,325 (1,542 minus full fuel in pool (year X) offload of 1 core) offload of 1 core)

Inventory of spent fuel in 1,325 240 (5 years of reactor pool in year X+2 and discharge @ 48/year) thereafter Spent fuel transferred to 48x2 = 96 (48x2) + (1,325 - 240)

ISFSI between year X and= 1,181 year X+2 Annual transfer of spent 48 48 fuel to ISFSI after year X+2 Spent fuel transferred to 1,325 240 ISFSI after reactor is shut down Source: Thompson, 2004

Issues regardingthe storage of spent nuclearfuel." Supporting documentfor Gordon R. Thompson's participationin CEC workshop, 15-16 August 2005 Page 21 Figure 1 Schematic View of Potential Design for Hardened, Dry Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel

.:.........~i l~ . ..

.. . . . . . . . .=

. . . . i . . . .

t¸ Ground Notes (i) Cooling channels would be inclined, to prevent pooling of flammable liquid, and would be configured to preclude line-of-sight access to the dry-storage module.

(ii) The tube, cap and pad surrounding the dry-storage module would be tied together with steel rods, and spacer blocks would prevent the module from moving inside the tube.

(iii) The steel/concrete tube could be buttressed by several triangular panels connecting the tube and the base pad.

Exhibit 2 DOE F 1325.8 (8-89)

EFG (07-90)

United States Government Department of Energy memorandum DATE: December 1, 2006 REPLY TO A1TN OF: Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (ECohen: 202-586-7684)

SUBJECT:

Need to Consider Intentional Destructive Acts in NEPA Documents TO: DOE NEPA Community (list attached)

In light of two recent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents, including environmental impact statements (EISs) and environmental assessments (EAs), should explicitly address potential environmental consequences of intentional destructive acts (i.e., acts of sabotage or terrorism). This interim guidance has been developed by the Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance, in consultation with the Assistant General Counsel for Environment and the Deputy General Counsel of the National Nuclear Security Administration. More detailed guidance on this matter is in preparation.

The more recent of the court's two decisions involved DOE's EA for Constructionand Operation of a Biosafety Level-3 Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (DOE/EA-1442, 2002). In that October 16, 2006, decision, Tri-Valley CAREs v.

Departmentof Energy, the court wrote:

Concerning the DOE's conclusion that consideration of the effects of a terrorist attack is not required in its Environmental Assessment, we recently held to the contrary in San Luis Obispo Mothersfor Peace v.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 449 F.3d 1016 ( 9 th Cir. 2006).

In Mothersfor Peace, we held that an Environmental Assessment that does not consider the possibility of a terrorist attack is inadequate. Id. at 1035. Similarly here, we remand for the DOE to consider whether the threat of terrorist activity necessitates the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement. As in Mothersfor Peace, we caution that there "remain open to the agency a wide variety of actions it may take on remand

[and]. . . [w]e do not prejudge those alternatives." Id.

A summary of the court's decision in Mothersfor Peace is contained in DOE's NEPA Lessons Learned QuarterlyReport, September 2006, page 19 (available on the DOE NEPA website at www. eh.doe.gov/nepa under Lessons Learned Quarterly Reports).

Each DOE EIS and EA should explicitly consider intentional destructive acts. This applies to all DOE proposed actions, including both nuclear and non-nuclear proposals.

Partial guidance on analyzing intentional destructive acts in NEPA documents is contained in Recommendationsfor Analyzing Accidents under NEPA (July 2002;

available on the DOE NEPA website under Selected Guidance Tools). This guidance includes example language and a discussion of ways to apply an analysis of accidents to an analysis of the potential consequences of acts of sabotage or terrorism. This approach may be appropriate for many, if not most, situations where the potential sabotage or terrorist scenarios and the accident scenarios involve similar physical initiating events or forces (e.g., fires, explosions, drops, punctures, aircraft crashes). This approach may not be adequate for all situations, however, because accident scenarios may not fully encompass potential threats posed by intentional destructive acts. For example, this approach may not adequately reflect the threat assessments for facilities with inventories of special nuclear materials. Each EIS and EA should explicitly consider whether the accident scenarios are truly bounding of intentional destructive acts. Regardless of whether additional analysis is necessary, each EIS and EA should contain a section demonstrating explicit consideration of sabotage and terrorism.

The Department is developing new guidance on considering intentional destructive acts in NEPA documents, and expects that the guidance will address such topics as:

" Determining the appropriate level of detail for analysis, consistent with the "sliding-scale" principle (e.g., a more detailed threat analysis is appropriate for a special nuclear material management facility, or for a non-nuclear facility with a significant amount of material at risk; a less detailed analysis may be adequate for a proposed office complex).

  • Determining when a finding of no significant impact for an EA is appropriate in view of potential large impacts from terrorist acts.

" Determining what information regarding analyses of these threats can be released to the public.

" Considering intentional destructive acts even when some or all of the analyses may be classified; protecting classified security information through the use of classified appendices and unclassified summaries.

" Timing considerations for cases where threat analyses are needed.

While this further guidance is in preparation, DOE NEPA practitioners should immediately implement the guidance in this notice to explicitly consider the potential impacts of intentional destructive acts in NEPA documents, and should consult with the Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance and, depending on the organization that is preparing the NEPA document, either the DOE or NNSA Office of the General Counsel.

Carol M. Borgstrom Director Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance cc: Paul Detwiler, NA- I Bruce Diamond, GC-51

Distribution:

NEPA Compliance Officers Richard Thorpe, NA-113.1 Sharon Hejazi, NSO Othalene Lawrence, EE-3 Carl Sykes, NA-124 Acting Chief Counsel, OR Steven Frank, EM-24 David Crawford, NA-512.4 Scott Stubblebine, ORP Mark Matarrese, FE-7 Arnold Epstein, NA-54 Darrell Riekenberg, PXSO Michael Mazaleski, IN-1 Mary Martin, NA-56 Robert Carosino, RL Richard Bush, LM-50 Richard Fox, NR-1 Debra Wilcox, RL Alice Williams, NA-56 Gordon Jensen, NR-1 George Hellstrom, RW Hitesh Nigam, NA-26 Paul Bayer, SC-74 Brenda Hayes, SR

  • Rajendra Sharma, NE-70 Mike Lopez, BSO Michele Reynolds, SSO Tony Como, OE-20 Ed Skintik, EMCBC Claire Douthit, WAPA Narendra Mathur, RW-30E Sally Arnold, FSO Sat Goel (acting NCO), SC Jon Cooper, FSO Document Managers (in addition to
  • Donna Green, AR Denise Glore, ID those designated with
  • Caroline Polanish, BHSO David Caughey, KCSO Antonio Bouza, EE-2J Kathy Pierce, BPA/KEC-4 Eugene Colton, LASO Cyrus Nasseri, EE-2J
  • Harold Johnson, CBFO Carrie Carter, LSO James Raba, EE-2J
  • Peter Siebach, CH David Alleman, NETL-Tulsa Stephen Walder, EE-2J Steve Blazek, GO Dan Cicero, NETL-MGN Jamie Joyce, EM-13 Jack Depperschmidt, ID Elias George, NETL-PGH John Neave, EM-22 Curtis Roth, KCSO Karen Agogino, NSC Don Metzler, EM-3.4 Karin King, LSO David Allen, OR Don Silawsky, FE-47
  • John Ganz, NETL-MGN Mark Belvin, OR Ward Sigmond, NA-113 Jesse Garcia, NETL-Tulsa James Elmore, OR George Allen, NA-i118 Michael Taylor, NPOC Patricia Hart, OR Alice Caponiti, NE-50 Jeff Robbins, NSC Dale Jackson, OR Tim Frazier, NE-50
  • Elizabeth Withers, NSC David Page, OR Steven Mintz, OE-20 Linda Cohn, NSO David Tidwell, NS-52 Jerry Pell, OE-20 Michael Skougard, NSO Katatra Vasquez, OR Ellen Russell, OE-20 Lydia Boada-Clista, OH Lori Huffman, ORP Julia Souder, OE-20
  • Gary Hartman, OR Theresa Aldridge, PNSO Ned Larson, RW-32 Woody Russell, ORP James Barrows, PXSO Kenneth Chiu, AR Kristi Wiehle, PPPO Craig A. Snider, PXSO Sandra Ackley, BPNKEC-4 Allen Wrigley, PSO Tom Ferns, RL Dawn Boorse, BPA/KEC-4
  • Richard Schassburger, RF Shannon Ortiz, RL Mickey Carter, BPNKEC-4
  • Jane Summerson, RW David Hoel, SR Doug Corkran, BPNKEC-4 Herbert Nadler, SEPA John Bridges, WAPA Tish Eaton, BPA/KEC-4
  • Katherine Batiste, SPRO Gary Burton, WAPA Carl Keller, BPA/KEC-4
  • Drew Grainger, SR Gene Lynard, BPAIKEC-4
  • Susan Lacy, SSO General Counsel Stacy Mason, BPA/KEC-4
  • Darlene Low, SWPA Richard Ahern, GC-51 Kelly Mason, BPNKEC-4 Shane Collins, WAPA Felix Amerasinghe, GC-51 Michelle O'Malley, BPAIKEC-4
  • Clayton Palmer, WAPA/CRSP Angela Foster, GC-51 Donald Rose, BPAIKEC-4
  • John Holt, WAPANDSWR Tracy Getz, GC-51 Colleen Spiering, BPA/KEC-4
  • James Hartman, WAPNRMR Seema Kakade, GC-51 Kimberly St. Hilaire, BPA/KEC-4 Loreen McMahon, WAPNSNR Ed LeDuc, GC-51 Shannon Stewart, BPNKEC-4 Nicholas Stas, WAPNUGPR Steven Miller, GC-51 Nancy Weintraub, BPA/KEC-4 Cathy Bohan, WVDP Dean Monroe, GC-51 Nancy Wittpenn, BPA/KEC-4
  • Dan Sullivan, WVDP Daniel Ruge, GC-51 Richard Yarde, BPA/KEC-4
  • Robert Hamby, YSO Stephen Smith, GC-51 Phil Smith, BPA/KEP-4 Martha Crosland, GC-52 Hermant Patel, BSO NEPA Contacts Irene Atney, BHSO Carl Schwab, BSO David Boron, EE-20 Herbert Adams, BPA Joyce Beck, GO Linda Graves, EE-2J Vicki Prouty, CH Richard Kimmel, ID Kenneth Picha, EM-24 Mell Roy, EMCBC Don Michaelson, ID Joel Berwick, EM-3.4 Derek Passarelli, GO Jeff Perry, ID Lyle Harris, EM-32 Brett Bowhan, ID Jeffrey Shadley, ID Phoebe Hamill, FE-24 Stephanie Bogart, KCSO Lisa Cummings, LASO David Johnson, FE-42 Janis Parenti, LSO Claire Holtzapple, LSO Connie Lorenz, FE-7 Thomas Russial, NETL-PGH Heino Beckert, NETL-MGN
  • = NEPA Document Managers December 1, 2006

Wolfe Huber, NETL-MGN Mark McKoy, NETL-MGN Roy Spears, NETL-MGN Janice Bell, NETL-PGH Richard Hargis, NETL-PGH David Hyman, NETL-PGH Joseph Renk, NETL-PGH Mary Beth Burandt, ORP David Biancosino, PNSO Doug Chapin, RL Lee Bishop, RW-30E Steve Danker, SR Tricia Sumner, TJSO Cathy Cunningham, WAPA David Swanson, WAPA Nancy Werdel, WAPA Mark Wieringa, WAPA Alison Jarrett, WAPNDSWR Rodney Jones, WAPA/RMR John Stover, WAPA/RMR Steve Tuggle, WAPA/SNR Dirk Shulund, WAPA/UGPR Anna Beard, YSO Becky Eddy, YSO Pamela Gorman, YSO Others Betty Nolan, C1-10 Donald Garcia, NSC David Nienow, NSC JoAnne Sackett, NSC Roberta Wright, NSC Jeffrey Lawrence, AGEISS William E. Fallon, Battelle Lucinda Swartz, Battelle Joseph Rivers, Jason Associates Fred Carey, Potomac-Hudson Pat Wherley, SAIC Jay Rose, Tetra Tech

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