ML070190181
| ML070190181 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/2006 |
| From: | Kafantaris M Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | D'Antonio J Operations Branch I |
| Sykes, Marvin D. | |
| References | |
| 50-272/06-301, 50-311/06-301 50-272/06-301, 50-311/06-301 | |
| Download: ML070190181 (67) | |
Text
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE:
SGTR SCENARIO NUMBER:
I ILT NRC ESG-001 EFFECTIVE DATE:
12/4/6 EXPECTED DURATION:
1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> REVISION NUMBER:
00 PROGRAM:
L.O. REQUAL X
INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary:
Rev 0: New Issue for I ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY:
Paul Williams 10/9/06 (INSTRUCTOR)
(DATE)
APPROVED BY:
(OPERATIONS TRAINNG MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)
(DATE)
APPROVED BY:
2 OF 10 (OPERATIONS MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)
(DATE)
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 2 of 75 I.
OBJECTIVES Enabling Objectives A.
Given the unit at power the crew will reduce power to remove a Heater Drain Pump from service, IAW approved station procedures.
B.
Given the unit at power with a failure of a Pressurizer Pressure control channel, the crew will take action to stabilize RCS pressure and swap to a non-failed channel, IAW approved station procedures.
C.
Given the unit with a leak in a SW bay, the crew will take action to isolate the leak, IAW approved station procedures.
D.
Given a SGTL, the crew will identify and isolate the leaking SG, IAW approved station procedures.
E.
Given the unit with a SGTR and loss of off-site power, take actions to minimize off site dose and RCS leakage, IAW approved station procedures.
II.
MAJOR EVENTS A.
Power Reduction to 90%
B.
Pressurizer Pressure Channel 1 Fails High C.
- 2 SW Bay Leak D.
SGTL E.
SGTR on 21 SG with Loss of Off-Site Power and B Vital Bus
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 3 of 75 III.
SCENARIO
SUMMARY
A.
The crew will receive the unit at 100% power with all system in automatic. One major piece of equipment will be C/Ted, 2B D/G.
B.
Once the crew takes the watch they will reduce reactor power to 90% at 30% per hour to remove 22 Heater Drain pump from service due to an emergent mechanical seal leak.
C.
Once the power reduction to 90% is underway Channel 1 Pressurizer Pressure will fail high.
The RO will take manual control of the Master Pressure Controller and adjust demand to stabilize RCS pressure. The CRS will enter AB.PZR-0001 and direct crew actions to remove the channel from service.
D.
After AB.PZR-0001 has been completed to the point of determining channel operability a leak will begin in #2 SW Bay. The CRS will enter AB.SW-0003 and direct crew actions to isolate and remove #2 bay from service.
E.
When the bay isolated a SGTL will occur on 21 SG. The CRS will enter AB.SG-0001 and direct the crew to perform actions to address the SGTL. During the SGTL, the SG tube will rupture. The CRS will direct a manual SI initiation.
F.
The RO will manually initiate SI and commence the Immediate Actions of EOP-TRIP-1. The CRS will enter EOP-TRIP-1. During the performance of EOP-TRIP-1 a loss of off-site power will occur coincident with the loss of B Vital Bus. This will necessitate the crew manually isolating service water to the turbine building.
G.
The crew will perform actions of EOP-TRIP-1 and then transition to EOP-SGTR-1
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 4 of 75 IV.
INITIAL CONDITIONS
____ Presnapped IC-191 from portable exam drive MALFUNCTIONS:
SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Severity
____ 1.
VL0055 23SW20 Fails to Position NA NA NA 100
____ 2.
VL0053 2SW26 Fails to Position NA NA NA 100
____ 3.
PR0016A Ch 1 Prz Press Fails High NA NA ET-1 2500
____ 4.
SW0216A 2 SW Bay Leaks NA 1 min ET-2 10000
____ 5.
SG0078A SG Rupture NA 3:00 ET-3 25
____ 6.
EL0134 Loss of Off-Site Power
- 30 NA ET-4 NA REMOTES:
SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Condition
____ 1.
DG19D 2B D/G Locked Out NA NA NA Yes
____ 2.
DG21D 2B DG BKR Rack Out NA NA NA Tagged
____ 3.
DG20D 2B DG BKR Control Power NA NA NA Off
____ 4.
PR34D PORV Stop Valve 2PR6 Tagged NA NA RT-10 Tagged
____ 5.
SW23D - 21 SW Pump Control Power NA NA RT-11 Off
____ 6.
SW27D - 22 SW Pump Control Power
- 30 NA RT-11 Off
____ 7.
SW32D - 23 SW Pump Control Power
- 60 NA RT-11 Off OVERRIDES:
SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Action
____ 1.
AI06 OVAO BIT Flow meter failed NA NA NA 0
EVENT TRIGGERS:
SELF-CHECK ET#n Discription Command
____ 1.
ET-4 MONP 254<10
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 5 of 75
____ 2.
ET-5 KA915TC4 DMF VL0055 TAGGED EQUIPMENT:
Description
____ 1. RH1 and RH2
____ 2. VC 1-4
____ 3. RH 18s
____ 4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)
____ 5. RT (SELF CHECK)
____ 6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)
____ 7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).
____ 8. 22 ABV Supply Fan
____ 9. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)
____ 10. 2B D/G (C/T)
OTHER CONDITIONS:
Description
____ 1. Ensure Channel 1 Pressurizer Pressure selected for control
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 6 of 75 V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS A.
State shift job assignments:
B.
Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide CREW members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
C.
Inform the crew The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift.
D.
Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.
E.
Do not review objectives with crew
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 7 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- 1. Power Reduction to 90%
CREW will be provided with a OP-AP-300-1004 filled out with correct information for power reduction boration
- CRS implements S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004
- CRS directs RO/PO to commence a power reduction to 90% at 30% per hour
- CRS directs RO to commence a boration at rate and gallon amount as determined during brief IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006
- RO monitors reactor parameters to maintain Tavg within programmed value
- PO monitors main turbine response
- PO monitors SGFP suction pressure to ensure it remains greater than 320 psig
- PO monitors condenser Delta Ts
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 8 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments Proceed to next event when the power reduction has proceeded to the satisfaction of the lead evaluator
- CREW reviews S2.OP-SO.TD-0001 to remove 22 Heater Drain Pump from service
- 2. Pressurizer Pressure Channel 1 Fails High Enter ET-1, PZR PR Channel 1 fails to 2500 Crew may decide to suspend load reduction if not completed until PZR pressure is stabilized
- RO reports that Pressurizer Pressure Channel 1 has failed high and requests permission to take master pressure controller to manual SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0102 rules of usage
- CRS enters S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001
- RO reports POPS is not in service
- RO reports that controlling pressurizer pressure channel is failed
- RO adjust master pressure controller to be consistent with attachment 2
- RO selects channel 3 for controlling channel RO may request permission to wait until pressure has returned to normal operating control band. This is an acceptable alternative.
- RO returns master pressure controller to Auto Brief may occur after PR6 has been closed and S2.OP-SO.RPS-0003 has been implemented. Either time is acceptable
- CRS conducts brief and discusses contingent actions. Also during brief informs crew that TSAS 3.3.2.1 b 19, 3.3.1.1. act 6 and 3.4.5b are applicable.
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 9 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- CRS directs PO to implement S2.OP-SO.RPS-0003
- PO initiates S2.OP-SO.RPS-0003 Proceed to next event when PO has initiated Continue to next page
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 10 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- CREW responds to OHA alarms o B-13 and 14: 21 and 22 SW HDR Press LO o B-29: 21-23 SW Pmp Sump Area Lvl HI.
ROLE PLAY: After ~ 3 minutes report water level in #2 SW Bay is about 2 and rising.
- CREW dispatches operator to investigate.
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 11 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments Simulator Operator: When requested turn 125 VDC control power off to #2 SW Bay Pumps using the following remotes: Perform 1st check RT-11, SW23D, 21 SW Pump Final Value = Off RT-11, SW27D, 22 SW Pump Final Value = Off, 30 sec TD RT-11, SW32D, 23 SW Pump Final Value = Off, 60 sec TD
- Crew isolates 2 SW Bay:
o CRS directs NEO to open 125 VDC Control Power to 2 Bay SW Pumps.
o RO closes 21SW22, NucHdr Inlet.
o RO closes 21SW20, TurbHdr Supply.
ROLE PLAY: If requested, NEO reports #2 SW Bay level has stopped rising
- SM contacts maintenance services to assist with dewatering
- CRS enters AB-ZZ-0002 for flooding With 2 Bay inoperable, 24 SW pump does not have diesel back-up, so only C bus pumps are operable
- CRS refers to Tech Specs and determines that TS 3.8.1.1.b, action b.2 and 3.7.4 for 1 SW header inoperable
- 4. Tube Leak on 21 SG ENTER RT-3 21 SGTL, 25 GPM after TSAS determination as directed by Lead evaluator
- CRS directs monitoring of 2R19A to confirm status of SGTL
- PO informs CRS that 2R19A is rising as expected for tube leak
- CRS enters S2.OP-AB.SG-0001
- CRS directs NEO to de-energize
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 12 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments turbine and polisher area sumps RO may initially report PZR level as stable due to slow ramp of SGTL
- RO reports PZR level lowering slowly
- CRS directs a swap to centrifugal charging pump
- RO places a centrifugal charging pump in service by performing the following:
o Closing CV55 o Starts 21 or 22 CV Pump o Places 23 CV pump in manual and lowers speed o Adjust CV55 to maintain stable charging flow and seal injection flow o Stops 23 CV Pump o Places CV55 in automatic Due to small size of leak, PZR level can be stabilized and CRS may decide to not reduce letdown
- CRS directs letdown flow to minimum
- RO reduces letdown to minimum At some point during performance of AB.SG-0001 the CRS may stop to have a brief and discuss actions and contingencies
- RO adjusts charging to stabilize Pressurizer level and estimate leak rate Leak rate is >140 gpd Once shut down determination is made, when directed by the lead examiner, Modify SG0078B to 900 gpm no ramp Record Time: ____:____:____
- SM/CRS/STA determine that Action level 3 is met and Unit must be in Mode 3 in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 13 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- 5. SGTR Note: Loss of Off-Site power Malf:
EL0134 will auto enter 30 sec after Rx Trip as will loss of B vital bus
- RO performs I/As of EOP-TRIP-1
- CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1
- CRS confirms immediate actions
- RO announces reactor trip and request SM and STA report to control room CAS item to isolate 21 SG SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0102 rules of usage for AFW CT#1 (E-3 -A) Close 21AF11 and 21 within 10 min on identification of fault and complete isolation of Ruptured Steam Generator Time of Isolation: ____:____:____
SAT ______ UNSAT______
- When Immediate Actions are complete PO requests permission to throttle AFW and isolate 21 SG by closing 21AF11 and 21
- CRS directs action as requested
- CREW continues with EOP-TRIP-1
- PO evaluates AFW status and SEC Loading and reports that 22 AFW Pump is unavailable and that all equipment is loaded as expected except that 2B Vital Bus de-energized due to 2B EDG tag-out 2SW26 on B bus, thus no power Crew may decide to start 26 SW pump due to low pressure. This pump should not be started due to concern for overloading EDG. 1 pump is sufficient if the turbine
- PO determines that valves 2SW26 and 23SW20 have not closed as required and SW header pressure is <30psig
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 14 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments header is isolated.
CT#2 (E-0 -L): Manually start and align the minimum ESW pumps in an operating safeguard train prior to transition from EOP-TRIP-1 SAT _____ UNSAT_____
- CRS directs 23SW20 closed since 2SW26 has no power
- RO determines containment pressure has remained less than 15 psig
- CRS conducts brief to discuss plant status and minimizes length due to time critical nature of SGTR Should be 23 CC Pump since 22 is unavailable Remote SW01D to reset, this can not be reset until SEC for A bus is reset
- CRS directs RO/PO to start one CCW pump IAW EOP-APPX-1 o RO starts 23 CCW Pump by blocking 2C SEC o Verifying 22CS Pump is stopped and 22CS2 is closed o Sends and operator to place 21 CCHX in service o Closes 22CC3
- CREW validates that charging pumps have correct amps and valve lineup is correct
- PO maintains AFW flow >22E4 lbm/hr until 1 SG is greater than 9% and then throttles to maintain 9-33%
- RO reports Reactor Trip Breakers are open
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 15 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments closed, however, only 2PR7 is open
- PO evaluates all steam generator pressure are stable or rising and no faulted steam generator exist
- CREW transitions to SGTR-1 based on 21 SG Level rising in an uncontrolled manner
- PO adjusts 21MS10 setpoint to 1045 psig
- PO closes 21MS7, 18, 167 and GB4
- PO determines 23 AFW pump is not required to maintain feed flow since 21 AFW pump feeds 23/24 SGs and can provide sufficient AFW flow for cooldown
- PO trips and stops 23 AFW pump
- CRS dispatches and NEO to close 21MS45
- CRS dispatches an operator to close 2SS321
- RO determines 2PR6 is closed with power removed REMOTES - PR34D to UNTAGGED, 3 mins after requested
- CRS directs power restored to 2PR6
- PO determines no SG is faulted
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 16 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- CREW resets safeguards
- PO evaluates 21 SG as greater than 375 and not faulted
- CRS dispatches operator to shift Gland seal supply to U1
- CREW determines target temperature is 503°F
- CREW commences rapid cooldown to target temperature CT# 3 (E-3 -B): Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that a transition from SGTR-1 does not occur SAT _____ UNSAT_____
- PO cools down at max rate using available MS10s PO must set MS10s to insure RCS temperature is maintained below target to insure Subcooling during coming depressurization
- PO stops cooldown when target temperature is reached and dumps steam to stabilize temp CT# 4 (E-3 --C): Depressurize RCS until Ruptured SG and RCS pressure are equal and PZR level is > 11%
with Subcooling >0, before water release from ruptured SGPORV or Safety valve SAT _____ UNSAT_____
- Crew determines normal spray is not available and depressurizes using 2PR2
- RO terminates depressurization when criteria of table F is met
- CREW terminates SI Evaluator Note: ECG Classification is ALERT IAW EAL 3.2.3.a. SW bay leak is a UE EAL 9.7.1. This should NOT be upgraded to 9.7.2 with 2B EDG tagged, as 2nd train of
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 17 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments SW is not affected by the flood.
Terminate scenario when Depressurization is complete or at discretion of lead evaluator
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 18 of 75 VI.
SCENARIO REFERENCES A.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
B.
Technical Specifications C.
Emergency Plan (ECG)
D.
SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102(Q), Use of Procedures E.
S2.OP-SO.TD-0001 - Bleed Steam Coil Drain Tank And Heater Drain Pump Operation F.
S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 - Boron Concentration Control G.
S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 - Power Operation H.
S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 - Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction I.
S2.OP-SO.RPS-0003 - Removing a Pressurizer Channel from Service J.
S2.OP-AB.SW-0001 - Loss of Service Water Header Pressure K.
S2.OP-AB.SW-0003 - Service Water Bay Leak L.
S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 - Steam Generator Tube Leak M.
2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety Injection N.
2-EOP-SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 19 of 75 VII.
ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL CT#1 (E-3 --A): Close 21AF11 and 21 within 10 min on identification of fault and complete isolation of Ruptured Steam Generator Basis Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and intact SGs. Upon loss of differential pressure the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that necessitates the crew taking compensating action that complicates the event mitigation strategy For feedwater, isolation must occur after ruptured SG level exceeds minimum indication (9%)Any delay in the AFW isolation allows the ruptured SG level to increase as the AFW adds additional inventory along with the primary to secondary leakage. Too long a delay (>10 min) prevents the crew from depressurizing and terminating SI before excessive inventory seriously damages the SG as a fission product barrier.
CT#2 (E-0 --L): Manually start and align the minimum ESW pumps in an operating safeguard train Basis Failure to manually start and align the minimum required number of ESW pumps in an operating safeguards train represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to:
- Recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of and ESF system or component
- Effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls.
CT#3 (E-3 --B) Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that a transition from SGTR-1 does not occur Basis Failure to establish and maintain correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from SGTR-1 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action that complicates the event mitigation strategy CT# 4 (E-3 --C) Depressurize RCS until Ruptured SG and RCS pressure are equal and PZR level is > 11% with Subcooling >0, before water release from ruptured SG PORV or Safety valve Basis Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 20 of 75 VIII. ESG - PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION S-ILT-2006 NRC ESG-1 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT N
TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N
Loss of Service Water Y
Steam Generator Tube Rupture N
Loss of CCW Y
Loss of Control Air N
Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N
Station Black Out N
LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
Gas Turbine Y
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area Y
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N
Auxiliary Feed Pump N
CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N
SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N
Connect to gas turbine N
Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N
Re-align RHR system for re-circulation Y
Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N
Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Y
Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Y
Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures Y
Early depressurize RCS N
Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 21 of 75 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS TODAY MODE:
1 POWER:
100 RCS BORON:
731 MWe:1200 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):
N/A REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 10,500 MWD/MTU, reactivity plan provided MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:
3.8.1.1.b action b. 2B diesel C/T EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:
Shutdown to 90% at 30% per hour to support removal of 22 heater drain pump from service, due to degrading mechanical seal leak ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.
No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.
PRIMARY:
NONE SECONDARY:
Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.
RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 22 of 75 X.
SIMULATOR ESG REVIEW/VALIDATION CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.
EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note:
This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.
SELF-CHECK ESG-_I ILT NRC-ESG-001 _
REVIEWER: Ed Gallagher
____ 1.
THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.
____ 2.
The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.
____ 3.
Each event description consists of:
- The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated,
- The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event,
- The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew,
- The expected operator actions (by shift position), and
- The event termination point.
____ 4.
The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.
____ 5.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
____ 6.
Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).
____ 7.
Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
____ 8.
If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.
____ 9.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
____ 10. All crew competencies can be evaluated.
____ 11. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).
____ 12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.
____ 13. Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures.
____ 14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 23 of 75
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 24 of 75
- 1.
Verify simulator is in correct load for training
- 2.
All required computer terminals in operation
- 3.
Simulator clocks synchronized
- 4.
Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 5.
Rod step counters correct (channel check)
- 6.
All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)
- 7.
DL-10 log up-to-date
- 8.
Required procedures clean
- 9.
All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)
- 10.
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 11.
Procedure pens available
- 12.
Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 13.
Shift manning sheet available
- 14.
SPDS reset
- 15.
Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 16.
Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
- 17.
Required keys available
- 18.
Video Tape (if applicable)
- 19.
Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03
- 20.
Reset P-250 Rod Counters
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 25 OF 10 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.
The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
degradation of any barrier to fission product release degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity a violation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 26 OF 10 ATTACHMENT 3 ESG PRE-JOB BRIEF CHECKLIST EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:
Lead ESG:
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 Examiner:
____ 1.ESG overview and sequence of major events.
____ 2.Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.
____ 3.ESG summary of Critical Tasks.
____ 4.Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.
____ 5.Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.
____ 6.Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.
____ 7.Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.
____ 8.Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.
Ensure SOE recorder is recording.
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE:
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 27 OF 10 SCENARIO NUMBER:
I ILT NRC ESG-002 EFFECTIVE DATE:
12/4/6 EXPECTED DURATION:
1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> REVISION NUMBER:
00 PROGRAM:
L.O. REQUAL X
INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary:
Rev 0: New Issue for I ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY:
Paul Williams 10/9/06 (INSTRUCTOR)
(DATE)
APPROVED BY:
(OPERATIONS TRAINNG MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)
(DATE)
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 28 OF 10 APPROVED BY:
(OPERATIONS MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)
(DATE)
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 2 of 75 XI.
OBJECTIVES Enabling Objectives A.
Given the unit in a start-up condition and the need to raise power, raise power to 18-20%,
IAW approved station procedures.
B.
Given the unit at power with a loss of tripping capability on a reactor trip breaker, the crew will validate the alarm, IAW approved station procedures.
C.
Given the unit with a trip of the running charging pump, the crew will place another pump in service, IAW approved station procedures.
D.
Given the unit at power with a partial loss of off-site power, the crew will take actions to stabilize the unit, IAW approved station procedures.
E.
Given the unit with a LOCA in progress, the crew will take corrective actions to mitigate the accident, IAW approved station procedures.
F.
Given the unit with a total loss of off-site power and a LOCA in progress, the crew will take actions to restore safeguards equipment, IAW approved station procedures.
XII.
MAJOR EVENTS A.
Raise power to place Turbine on Line B.
Loss of Tripping Capability on RTB B C.
23 CV Pump Trip D.
Loss of 3 SPT E.
Small Break LOCA F.
Loss of Off-Site Power
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 3 of 75 XIII. SCENARIO
SUMMARY
A.
The crew will receive the unit at 4.5% power returning from a forced outage to repair Digital EHC problems. All approvals and surveillances are complete and approval to proceed to mode 1 has been given. Order to the shift is to raise power to 18% in preparation for placing turbine on line.
B.
After the power ascension is in progress an electrical malfunction will cause the A Reactor Trip breaker to lose 125V DC causing the loss of Shunt trip capability. The CRS will evaluate the operability of the trip breaker and enter the tech spec action statement.
C.
After the tech spec is entered the in service charging pump will trip additionally the letdown orifice isolation valve will fail partially open. The crew will isolate letdown and place a standby charging pump in service IAW AB.CV-0001. Once charging is restored excess letdown will be placed in service.
D.
After excess letdown is in service 3 station power transformer will trip. This will cause a loss of 2 group busses and RCPs. No auto trip signal will occur at <P-10. The crew will enter AB.LOOP-0003, which will direct a Reactor Trip.
E.
After the crew has transitioned to EOP-TRIP-2, a LOCA will occur and Auto SI initiation will fail. The crew will manually initiate SI and re-enter the EOP network.
F.
After the crew has progressed to EOP-LOCA-1 and reset safeguards a loss of Off-site power will occur. The crew will reset the SECs and load the ECCS equipment required for the LOCA conditions. The scenario will end after safeguard loads are started.
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 4 of 75 XIV. INITIAL CONDITIONS
____ Presnapped IC-192 from Exam Drive MALFUNCTIONS:
SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Severity
____ 7.
CV0034 23 Charging Pump Trip NA NA ET-2
____ 8.
VL0245 2CV4 Fails to Position NA NA ET-2 50
____ 9.
EL0102 Loss of 3 SPT-Diff NA NA ET-3
____ 10.
RC0002 RCS Leak into Containment NA NA ET-4 10000
____ 11.
EL0134 Loss of Off-Site Power NA NA ET-5
____ 12.
RP0108 Failure of Automatic SI NA NA NA NA
____ 13.
RP0342 2SJ12 Fails to Open on SEC act NA NA NA NA
____ 14.
RP0343 2SJ13 Fails to Open on SEC act NA NA NA NA
____ 15.
AN0183 E37 Ch C Shutdown Margin NA NA NA 1
____ 16.
AN0191 E45 Ch D Shutdown Margin NA NA NA 1
REMOTES:
SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Condition
____ 8.
MC12D Loss of Tripping Capability RTB A
NA NA ET-1 Alarm
____ 9.
CV42A Minimum Flow Stop for 2CV55 NA NA ET-10 0
____ 10.
MT03D Main Turb Turning Gear PB NA NA NA Dep PB
____ 11.
DA033D DC breaker #14 A RX Trip Brkr NA NA ET-1 Off OVERRIDES:
SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Action
____ 2.
None
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 5 of 75 EVENT TRIGGERS:
SELF-CHECK ET#n Discription Command
____ 3.
None TAGGED EQUIPMENT:
Description
____ 11. RH1 and RH2
____ 12. VC 1-4
____ 13. RH 18s
____ 14. RCPs (SELF CHECK)
____ 15. RT (SELF CHECK)
____ 16. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)
____ 17. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).
____ 18. 22 ABV Supply Fan
____ 19. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)
OTHER CONDITIONS Description
____ 2. IOP-3 signed off thru step 5.4.14
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 6 of 75 XV.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS A.
State shift job assignments:
B.
Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide CREW members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
C.
Inform the crew The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift.
D.
Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.
E.
Do not review objectives with crew
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 7 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- 1. Power Increase Crew will receive the watch at 4.5%
power with direction to raise power in preparation to place the main turbine on line. IOP-3 is signed off thru step 5.4.14
- CRS briefs crew on power increase
- RO withdraws rods to raise reactor power
- PO adjusts steam dumps to increase steam load and maintain Tavg on program Proceed to next event when power reduction has progressed to the satisfaction of the Lead examiner but before 10% power
- 1. Loss of Tripping Capability on A RTB Insert ET-1 at the direction of the Lead evaluator
- CRS directs NEO to check 125VDC breaker 3 mins after request to check breaker inform CRS breaker is closed
- CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 act 14 Proceed to next event after TSAS
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 8 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments determination or when directed by Lead Evaluator
- 2. 23 CV Pump Trip Enter ET-2 when directed by lead evaluator
- RO responds to loss of seal injection flow console alarms, identifies 23 Charging Pump trip
- CRS enters AB-CVC-1
- Crew determines pump did not trip due to cavitation
- RO closes 2CV2 and 2CV277
- CRS directs letdown isolated using the 2CV2 and 2CV277 to prevent flashing the Letdown Line
- Crew determines 23 CV pump not available
- CRS directs NEO to investigate cause of 23 Charging pump trip
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 9 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments To place CV55 in Bypass REMOTES CV47A to 0.0
- RO establishes excess letdown
- CRS directs CV7 to be closed to isolate penetration Proceed to next event when TSAS is determined
Crew acknowledges multiple OH and console alarms PO informs CRS that 21 CN pump and 21 SGFP have tripped and AFW has started and is feeding the SGs CRS must prioritize multiple problems including loss of main feed, steam dumps and 2 group busses and their respective RCPs.
The CRS may order a Reactor trip at this time due to loss of 2 RCPs or cycling of MS dumps. CRS may also enter AB.CN or AB.CW neither will direct a Reactor Trip at <P10
- PO informs CRS that all vital buses are energized by off-site power
- CRS directs WCC to coordinate opening 500KV disconnects CAS of LOOP-3 directs implementing Attachment 2, Part A.
This attachment directs opening of the Reactor Trip breakers
- Crew initiates Attach 2, Part A of LOOP-3 for loss of 2E and 2H group busses
- CRS directs a Reactor trip, enters Trip-1 requests assistance form WCC to continue with AB-LOOP-3
- RO initiates a MANUAL Rx trip INSTRUCTOR NOTE:
Insert ET-4 after Crew transitions to TRIP-2, at RCS Temp Control
- RO performs TRIP-1 Immediate Actions, from memory:
- 1. Trip reactor,
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 10 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments Step (Step-5)
- 2. Confirm reactor trip,
- 3. Trip turbine,
- 4. All 4 KV Vital Bus energized
- 5. SI Actuation not required
- CRS enters TRIP-1 and reads Immed Actions
- PO throttles AFW at completion of Immed actions
- CRS transitions to TRIP-2
- RO announces Reactor Trip
- PO throttles AFW
- RO reports rapidly lowering PZR pressure and level CT-1 (E-0 --D) Manually actuate at least 1 train of Safety Injection before transition to LOCA-1, any FR procedure or completion of step 9 of Trip-2 SAT_____ UNSAT_____
- RO initiates Safety Injection due to lowering Pressurizer Pressure
- CRS returns to Trip-1
- RO announces Rx Trip and Safety Injection and informs CRS that Auto SI failed to actuate Depending on timing of manual SI crew may not identify failure of Auto SI if manual is initiated prior to auto setpoint. SI setpoint occurs in approx 14 sec
- RO/PO performs SEC loading verification
- PO ensures 21 and 22 AFW pumps are running and throttles AFW flow to maintain Steam Generator level >9% or
>22E4 lbm/hr feed flow.
- PO checks Safeguards Valve Alignment and identifies 2SJ12 and 2SJ13 not open
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 11 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- RO closes 21/22CA330.
- RO reports Containment Spray not required
- RO determines MSLI isolation is not required
- CREW closes CV139 and CV140 when RCS pressure is below 1500 psig with BIT Flow established CT #2 (E-1-C) Trip all RCPs prior to RCS inventory becoming depleted to critical inventory. (Within 5 mins of RCS pressure < 1350 with ECCS flow)
SAT_____ UNSAT_____
- CREW secures remaining RCPs when RCS pressure is < 1350 with ECCS flow established Instructor note: RCPs must be stopped regardless of BIT flow, ECCS flow is established via the SI pumps
- PO verifies all 4KV vital busses energized
- RO reports Control Room Ventilation in Pressurized Mode
- RO reports proper Switchgear Room Ventilation lineup.
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 12 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- Crew verifies RCS temperature control.
- RO/PO verifies reactor trip breakers open.
- CREW identifies PZR Sprays not available and RCPs secured.
- PO verifies no faulted SGs.
- PO verifies no SGTRs exist.
- RO/PO perform LOCA evaluation
- CREW transitions to LOCA-1.
Depending on timing of scenario Containment spray may occur while the crew is in TRIP-1 or LOCA-1 and a purple path transition to FRCE may occur
- Crew performs verifications of FRCE-1 and return to LOCA-1 (Only of Purple path is met)
- PO verifies no faulted SGs.
- PO maintains SG levels
- PO verifies no ruptured SGs.
- RO/PO resets Safeguards:
- Resets SI;
- Resets Phase A;
- Resets Phase B;
- Opens 21 & 22CA330;
- Resets each SEC; and
- Resets 230V Control Centers.
- Crew evaluates SI flow reduction
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 13 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments criteria Depending on timing of scenario RHR pumps may be stopped if RCS pressure has stabilized.
- PO stops unloaded diesels
- 5. Loss of Off-Site Power Insert ET-5 after 230V Control Centers are reset, or at Lead Evaluators discretion.
- CRS refers to Step 5 Continuous Action IF Blackout occurs
- Crew performs actions of Table B of LOCA-1
- RO/PO verifies SEC loading complete
- PO resets all SECs.
Crew may decide not to start RHR pumps if they were previously stopped, RHR pumps are not required at this pressure
- CRS directs restart of available Safeguards loads:
o 21 and 22 Charging Pump o 21/22 SI Pump; o 21-25 CFCU in slow speed; o Switchgear Room Exhaust Fans o Containment Spray pumps (If required)
CT #3 (E-0-J) Start at least one Safety Injection Pump (Intermediate Head) prior to step 14 of LOCA-1 or prior to step 6 of FRCC-2.
SAT UNSAT Evaluator Note: ECG classification is Alert EAL 3.2.2.b Terminate scenario at the completion of the equipment restart or lead evaluators discretion
`
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 14 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 15 of 75 XVI. SCENARIO REFERENCES A.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
B.
Technical Specifications C.
SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102(Q), Use of Procedures D.
S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 - Charging System Malfunction E.
S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0003 - Partial Loss of Off-Site Power F.
EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety Injection G.
EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip Response H.
EOP-LOCA Loss of Coolant I.
EOP-FRCE-1 -Response to Excessive Containment Pressure
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 16 of 75 XVII. ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL CT-1 (E-0 -D): Manually actuate at least 1 train of Safety Injection before transition to any LOCA, or FR procedure or completion of step 9 of Trip-2.
BASIS: Failure to manually actuate SI under postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity Additionally, failure to manually actuate SI (when it is possible to do so) results in a significant reduction in safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Finally, failure to manually actuate SI is a violation of the facility license condition CT #2 (E-1-C): Trip all RCPs prior to RCS inventory becoming depleted to critical inventory. (within 5 mins of RCS pressure < 1350 with ECCS flow)
BASIS:
Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to the degradation of a barrier to fission product release.
WOG sponsored analysis to demonstrate that the operating crew would have sufficient time (from the point at which the criteria was met) to recognize the indications that the criteria are met and trip RCPs before the window for adverse consequence beginsThe minimum response time for the operating crew is 5 minutes if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT remains below 2200 CT#3: Re-establish plant design basis conditions by starting at least one train of ECCS equipment after a loss of off-site power occurs with SI Reset.
BASIS: FSAR assumption of minimum ECCS flow per section 15.3.1.2.
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 17 of 75 XVIII. ESG - PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION I ILT NRC #2 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT N
TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N
Loss of Service Water N
Steam Generator Tube Rupture N
Loss of CCW Y
Loss of Control Air N
Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N
Station Black Out Y
LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
Gas Turbine N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N
Auxiliary Feed Pump Y
CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N
SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N
Connect to gas turbine N
Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N
Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N
Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N
Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N
Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N
Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N
Early depressurize RCS N
Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 18 of 75 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS TODAY MODE:
1 POWER:
4.2 RCS BORON:
607 MWe: 0 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):
N/A REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 17,500 MWD/MTU, reactivity plan provided by reactor engineering is for initial power increase to 20% to be performed with control rods. Detailed plan for continued power ascension will be provide after Turbine is on line.
MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:
EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:
Increase power to 18% in preparation for placing the main turbine on line. IOP-3 is complete thru step 5.4.14 and all approvals and surveillances for transition to Mode 1 are complete.
ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.
No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.
PRIMARY:
NONE SECONDARY:
Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.
RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 19 of 75 XIX. SIMULATOR ESG REVIEW/VALIDATION CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.
EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note:
This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.
SELF-CHECK ESG-_I ILT NRC-ESG-002 _
REVIEWER: Ed Gallagher
____ 15. THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.
____ 16. The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.
____ 17. Each event description consists of:
- The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated,
- The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event,
- The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew,
- The expected operator actions (by shift position), and
- The event termination point.
____ 18. The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.
____ 19. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
____ 20. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).
____ 21. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
____ 22. If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.
____ 23. The simulator modeling is not altered.
____ 24. All crew competencies can be evaluated.
____ 25. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).
____ 26. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.
____ 27. Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures.
____ 28. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 20 of 75
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 21 of 75
- 1.
Verify simulator is in correct load for training
- 2.
All required computer terminals in operation
- 3.
Simulator clocks synchronized
- 4.
Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 5.
Rod step counters correct (channel check)
- 6.
All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)
- 7.
DL-10 log up-to-date
- 8.
Required procedures clean
- 9.
All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)
- 10.
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 11.
Procedure pens available
- 12.
Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 13.
Shift manning sheet available
- 14.
SPDS reset
- 15.
Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 16.
Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
- 17.
Required keys available
- 18.
Video Tape (if applicable)
- 19.
Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03
- 20.
Reset P-250 Rod Counters
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 22 OF 10 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.
The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
degradation of any barrier to fission product release degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity a violation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario B. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 23 OF 10 ATTACHMENT 3 ESG PRE-JOB BRIEF CHECKLIST EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:
Lead ESG:
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 Examiner:
____ 9.ESG overview and sequence of major events.
____ 10. Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.
____ 11. ESG summary of Critical Tasks.
____ 12. Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.
____ 13. Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.
____ 14. Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.
____ 15. Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.
____ 16. Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.
Ensure SOE recorder is recording.
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 24 OF 10 SCENARIO TITLE:
Loss of Heat Sink SCENARIO NUMBER:
I ILT NRC ESG-003 EFFECTIVE DATE:
12/4/6 EXPECTED DURATION:
1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> REVISION NUMBER:
00 PROGRAM:
L.O. REQUAL X
INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary:
Rev 0: New Issue for I ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY:
Paul Williams 10/9/06 (INSTRUCTOR)
(DATE)
APPROVED BY:
(OPERATIONS TRAINNG MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)
(DATE)
I ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 25 OF 10 APPROVED BY:
(OPERATIONS MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)
(DATE)
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 2 of 75 XX.
OBJECTIVES Enabling Objectives A.
Given the unit at power, with a sustained excessive U2 Main Power Transformer DC Ground Current, the crew will reduce power as required, IAW approved station procedures.
B.
Given the unit at power with a Thot Failure, the crew will place rods in manual and stabilize the plant, IAW approved station procedures.
C.
Given the unit at power with a leak in the CCW system, the crew will identify and isolate the leak, IAW approved station procedures.
D.
Given a situation with an OHA alarm, perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, IAW approved station procedures.
E.
Given the unit with a loss of heat sink condition, the crew will restore feedwater, IAW approved station procedures.
XXI. MAJOR EVENTS A.
Abnormal Grid B.
22 Loop Tavg fails as is C.
CCW Leak D.
Main Power Transformer Failure E.
Loss of Heat Sink
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 3 of 75 XXII. SCENARIO
SUMMARY
A. The crew takes the watch at 100% power. 21 AFW Pump is tagged for bearing replacement.
B. Once the crew assumes the watch the DC neutral ground current will rise to 25 amps. The crew will enter AB.GRID-0001 and reduce power to 942 MWe. During the power reduction 22 Loop Tavg will fail as is resulting in excessive rod motion. The crew will enter AB.ROD-0003 and remove the channel from service.
C. After the channel is removed from service, a leak develops in the CCW system. The crew should implement AB.CC-0001 to establish makeup flow and isolate the leak.
D. Following isolation of the CCW leak, an OHA alarm comes in on MPT Phase 1. The NEO will report a major oil leak on the MPT and a desire to leave the area because of electrical arcing noises.
The CRS should order a manual reactor trip.
E. The Turbine fails to trip on the reactor trip and MSLI fails to auto initiate. The crew should initiate a MSLI as part of immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1. Safety Injection will occur based on the high steam flow.
F. 23 AFWP trips when it auto starts and is not able to be reset. After AFW flow is throttled to 22e4, 22 AFWP breaker trips open. The crew should transition to FRHS-1 when the RED PATH conditions are met. In FRHS-1, the crew should stop the RCPs; select 1 SG for depressurization to allow feed using a Condensate pump.
G. The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario any time after S/G WR level is observed rising.
H. NOTE: Depending on timing of the MSLI and progress through the procedures, RCS Bleed and Feed criteria may be met before the Condensate pump is feeding the S/G. In that case, the crew will initiate RCS Bleed and Feed then feed the S/Gs via a Condensate Pump.
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 4 of 75 XXIII. INITIAL CONDITIONS
____ Pre-snapped IC-193 from portable exam drive MALFUNCTIONS:
SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Severity
____ 1.
RP0069 MN Turb Trip Internal Vlv Fail N/A N/A N/A N/A
____ 2.
RP0073 MN Turb Trip Failures Various N/A N/A N/A 4
____ 3.
RP0279A Auto MSLI Fails to ACT Trn A N/A N/A N/A N/A
____ 4.
RP0279B Auto MSLI Fails to ACT Trn B N/A N/A N/A N/A
____ 5.
AF0183, 23 Aux FW Pmp Overspeed Trip N/A N/A NA NA
____ 6.
RC0014B 22 Loop Tavg 2:00 NA ET-1 As-Is
____ 7.
CC0329 CC Leak at 21 Safety Rel Header N/A 1:00 ET-2 30
____ 8.
AN0529, SER 529:H15 MPT Sud Press N/A N/A ET-3 On
____ 9.
AF0181B, 22 Aux Feedwater Pump Trip N/A N/A ET-4 True
____ 10.
VL0464-467 21-24BF40 Fails (as directed)
NA NA NA 100 REMOTES:
SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Condition
____ 1.
AF20D, 21 AFW Pump Bkr Control Power N/A N/A N/A Off
____ 2.
AF21D, 21 AF Pump Rack Out N/A N/A N/A Tagged
____ 3.
EL12A DC Neutral Ground Current NA 2:00 ET-1 25 OVERRIDES:
SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Action
____ 3.
OVDI MSLI CH A Loop 1 NA NA NA Off
____ 4.
OVDI MSLI CH A Loop 2 NA NA NA Off
____ 5.
OVDI MSLI CH A Loop 3 NA NA NA Off
____ 6.
OVDI MSLI CH A Loop 4 NA NA NA Off
____ 7.
OVDI MSLI CH B Loop 1 NA NA NA Off
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 5 of 75
____ 8.
OVDI MSLI CH B Loop 2 NA NA NA Off
____ 9.
OVDI MSLI CH B Loop 3 NA NA NA Off
____ 10.
OVDI MSLI CH B Loop 4 NA NA NA Off EVENT TRIGGERS:
SELF-CHECK ET#n Description Command
____ 4.
None TAGGED EQUIPMENT:
Description
____ 20. RH1 and RH2
____ 21. VC 1-4
____ 22. RH 18s
____ 23. RCPs (SELF CHECK)
____ 24. RT (SELF CHECK)
____ 25. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)
____ 26. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).
____ 27. 22 ABV Supply Fan
____ 28. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)
____ 29. 21 AFW Pump (C/T)
OTHER CONDITIONS:
Description
____ 3. None
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 6 of 75 XXIV. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS A.
State shift job assignments:
B.
Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide CREW members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
C.
Inform the crew The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift.
D.
Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.
E.
Do not review objectives with crew
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 7 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- 1. Abnormal Grid Enter ET-1 EL12A to 25
- PO acknowledges OHA H-23, MPT 2 TRBL
- PO determines CRT point 545 is in alarm and refers to alarm response INSTRUCTOR NOTE: 2 minutes after modifying the remote, call as the Electric Systems Operator (ESO) and inform the Crew that the SMD has been upgraded to K-8 for the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- CREW dispatches NEO to MPT Phase 2 to investigate and correct alarm
- CREW monitors Computer point Y2107A and determines that MPT DC Ground Current is 15 amps
- CREW determines that MPT DC Ground Current has been 17 amps for
> 5 minutes.
CREW initiates Attachment 2, Solar Magnetic Disturbance.
CREW holds brief discussing actions of AB.GRID-1 including reactivity and contingency actions
- CREW initiates a Generator Load reduction to <942 MW by:
o PO selecting SMD #1 Runback of DEHC panel o PO selecting GO on DEHC panel
- CREW initiates S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 8 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments CREW performs Continuous Actions Summary (Attachment 1) of S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001.
- RO/PO maintain TAVG on program with rods, boration, or turbine load
- RO energizes Pressurizer heaters
- RO/PO initiates boration or Rapid Boration to maintain rods above RIL
- CREW determines AFD is outside the target band and begins accumulation of penalty minutes.
- 2. 21 loop Tavg fails As Is Failure of 21 loop Thot will become evident during down power
- RO informs CRS that rods are inserting in Auto, with Tave lowering further than expected also 21 Tavg channel is higher than the others Crew should determine that the Rod insertion limits are not valid alarms due to the failed Thot channel.
Depending on timing of 22 Loop Thot failure, crew may not enter AB-ROD-3 but may defeat the channel using console ARP. This will cause rods to withdraw rapidly when failed channel is removed from circuit
- CRS directs RO to place rods in manual RO may request permission to place rods in manual prior to direction
- CRS enters S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 Proceed to next event when load is stable and level control has been returned to auto or at discretion of lead evaluator
- Crew identifies 21 loop Thot as failed
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 9 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- RO adjusts charging flow as required to restore PZR level to program
- RO returns PZR level and Rod control to Automatic
- CRS enters TSAS for 21 Loop Thot and requests assistance from I&C to remove channel from service TSAS 3.3.1.1 act 6, 3.3.2.1.b act 19
- RO/PO report lowering level in CCW surge tank
- CREW enters AB.CC-001.
- PO opens 2DR107 to makeup to the system and determines level can be maintained Role Play: ~2 minutes later, NEO reports CC145 is open, CC146 is closed.
- RO directs NEO to verity CC145 or CC146 open.
- CRS directs NEOs to walkdown the system.
- Crew monitors sumps and WHUTs
- CRS initiates attachment 4 for locating leak.
- RO informs CRS 22CV pump not in service Role Play when 21 CC pump is stopped call as NEO and report:
Large leak on 21 CC pump mechanical seal appears to have
- CRS returns to step 3.28 and refers to
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 10 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments lessened when the pump was stopped.
Modify MALF: CC0339A from 30 to 5
If asked: NEO states he can safely close pump isolation valves with reduced leak rate for isolation of leak
- CRS directs NEO to isolate pump by closing 21CC2 and 21CC19
- CRS directs the WCC to have NEO de-energize control power for 21 CC pump to prevent auto start of isolated pump and requests tagging request for 21 CC pump.
Remote CC21D to off then report as NEO: 125V DC control power for 21 CC pump is off Delete MALF CC 0339A and report as NEO: 21CC2 and 21CC19 closed
- CRS refers to Tech Specs and enter TSAS 3.7.3
- 3. MPT PHASE I Failure Insert ET-3 when directed by Lead Evaluator
- CREW responds to OHA H-15 Role Play: ~ 3 minutes after contacted, the NEO reports a major oil leak on the Main Power Transformer and the constant sound of electrical arcing.
- CREW implements OHA ARP and sends an NEO to investigate.
- 4. Reactor Trip, Failure of Auto Turbine Trip, MSLI and Subsequent Loss of all Feedwater
- CRS orders a MANUAL Reactor trip based on MPT problem.
Note: Trip of 23 AFW pump is pre-inserted. The pump will trip on overspeed when it starts.
- 1) Trip Reactor.
- 2) Confirm Reactor trip.
- 3) Reports Turbine NOT Tripped.
- 4) Attempts Manual Turbine Trip
- 5) Attempts MSLI from safeguards bezel
- 6) Fast closes MS167s from CC3
- 7) Verifies 4kV Vital Bus energized.
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 11 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- 8) Reports SI actuated.
CT#1(E-0 -P): Manually accomplish MSLI before a severe challenge develops to either subcriticality or integrity CSF or transition to LOSC SAT_____ UNSAT____
- PO reports 23 AFW pump tripped PO report generator breakers did not open with turbine failing to trip CRS directs generator breakers open Insert RT-4 on que from lead evaluator to trip 22 AFW pump PO throttles 21/22AF21 to 22e4 to minimize cooldown.
- PO reports trip of 22 AFW Pump and loss of all AFW capability Role Play: ~ 2 minutes after contacted, NEO reports the trip linkage is bent and the 23 pump cannot be reset request maintenance assistance
- CREW dispatches NEO to investigate loss of 22 and 23 AFW pumps Crew brief in TRIP-1 should be expedited due to degrading Heat Sink conditions
- CRS briefs crew on status and plan
- CREW transitions to FRHS-1 at step 20.1 of TRIP-1 Evaluators: If RCS Bleed and Feed criteria are met before feed is initiated from the CN system, Crew should IMMEDIATLY go to Bleed and Feed at step 23 See Page 13 of this guide.
- CRS reviews Bleed and Feed criteria
- Crew determines Aux Feed Pumps are
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 12 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments not available
- PO reports Condensate system is in operation
This was previously performed in EOP-TRIP-1
- Crew verifies SI valve alignment.
RO resets safeguards 24 SG should be selected for depressurization as its level will be less than 22 SG due to the delayed trip of 22 AFW pump Crew selects SG for depressurization CRS reviews depressurization termination criteria Enter Vl-464-467 to 100% as directed to open BF40 PO reports Steam Dumps are NOT available (MSLI)
CT#2A (FR-H.1-E): Establish minimum required feedwater flow rate to the S/Gs before S/G dryout.
SAT_____ UNSAT_____
- PO fully opens selected MS10 CRS dispatches an NEO to fully open selected BF40 PO opens selected BF13 PO releases selected BF22 Depressurization of selected SG should not be stopped until WR level is rising in that SG (FF>SF)
PO opens 21 and 22 CN48s and closes 21 and 22 CN32s The Scenario can be terminated at the Lead Evaluators discretion, after S/G WR level is observed to be raising.
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 13 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments USE this Section if RCS Bleed and Feed Initiation Criteria are met.
- CREW goes to Step 23 of FRHS-1.
Crew may validate that SI is in service without re-initiating
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 14 of 75 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RO verifies Charging pumps running and BIT flow established CT#2B (FR-H.1 --B): Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before PZR PORVs open due to loss of heat sink.
SAT_____ UNSAT_____
If not previously completed
- CREW performs EOP-APPX-3.
- RO/PO resets SI, Phase A, Phase B, opens 21 & 22CA330, resets each SEC and 230V Control Center.
At Step 35, CRS returns to Step 20 to align a Condensate Pump to feed at least one S/G.
- CRS selects a S/G to be steamed.
- RO depressurizes and maintains selected S/G < 575 psig using steam dumps or MS10.
- PO positions selected S/G valves:
- BF13 open,
- BF19 or BF40 (local by NEO) open,
- BF22 open,
- 21 & 22 CN48 open, and
- closes 21 & 22 CN32.
The Scenario can be terminated at the Lead Evaluators discretion, after S/G WR level is observed to be raising.
- CREW establishes condensate flow to the selected S/G as evidenced by rising S/G WR level indication or lowering CETs.
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 15 of 75 XXV. SCENARIO REFERENCES A.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
B.
Technical Specifications C.
SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102(Q), Use of Procedures D.
S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 - Abnormal Grid E.
S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 - Continuous Rod Motion A.
S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 - Component Cooling Abnormality B.
2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection C.
2-EOP-FRHS Loss of Heat Sink D.
2-EOP-APPX SI Verification
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 16 of 75 XXVI. ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL CT#1(E-0 -P) Manually initiate MSLI before a severe challenge develops to either subcriticality or Integrity CSF or transition to LOSC BASIS: Failure to close the MSIVs under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the auto actuation of an ESF system or component and to take action that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
CT#2A (FR-H.1-A)Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before RCS Bleed and Feed is required.
BASIS: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the crews having to rely upon the lower priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release.
NOTE: This Critical Task will be considered NOT satisfied if in the opinion of the Evaluators the bleed and feed criteria is reached due to mis-operation, inaction or delay by the crew. If the bleed and feed criteria is reached as a direct result of the failure of the automatic MSLI then the action of the crew will be based on CT-2B. Thus, when the crew fails to simply establish available feedwater flow (as it could, given postulated conditions) before SG dryout occurs, it necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy.
CT#2B (FR-H.1 --B) Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before PZR PORVs open due to loss of heat sink.
BASIS:
Failure to establish RCS bleed and feed before automatic opening of the PORVs reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a significant reduction of the safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario NOTE:
The PORV opening as stated in the critical task means opening caused by the RCS heatup from loss of heat sink. If the PORV opens for any other cause, it does not constitute a misoperation of the critical task.
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 17 of 75 XXVII.
ESG - PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION I ILT NRC-ESG-003 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT N
TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N
Loss of Service Water N
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Y
Loss of CCW N
Loss of Control Air N
Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N
Station Black Out N
LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
Gas Turbine N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N
Auxiliary Feed Pump N
CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N
SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N
Connect to gas turbine N
Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N
Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N
Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N
Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N
Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N
Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N
Early depressurize RCS Y
Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 18 of 75 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS TODAY MODE:
1 POWER:
100 RCS BORON:
1192 MWe:1200 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):
N/A REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 4000 MWD/MTU MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:
3.7.1.2a. (21 AFW Pump) entered last shift, 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> remaining EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:
21 AFW Pump C/Ted for Pump Inboard bearing Repair ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
Currently K-3 in effect CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.
No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.
PRIMARY:
NONE SECONDARY:
Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.
RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:
River grass loading very high, high tide in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 19 of 75 XXVIII.
SIMULATOR ESG REVIEW/VALIDATION CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.
EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note:
This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.
SELF-CHECK ESG-_I ILT NRC-ESG-003 _
REVIEWER: Ed Gallagher
____ 29. THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.
____ 30. The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.
____ 31. Each event description consists of:
- The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated,
- The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event,
- The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew,
- The expected operator actions (by shift position), and
- The event termination point.
____ 32. The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.
____ 33. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
____ 34. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).
____ 35. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
____ 36. If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.
____ 37. The simulator modeling is not altered.
____ 38. All crew competencies can be evaluated.
____ 39. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).
____ 40. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.
____ 41. Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures.
____ 42. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 20 of 75
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST 21 of 75
- 1.
Verify simulator is in correct load for training
- 2.
All required computer terminals in operation
- 3.
Simulator clocks synchronized
- 4.
Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 5.
Rod step counters correct (channel check)
- 6.
All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)
- 7.
DL-10 log up-to-date
- 8.
Required procedures clean
- 9.
All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)
- 10.
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 11.
Procedure pens available
- 12.
Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 13.
Shift manning sheet available
- 14.
SPDS reset
- 15.
Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 16.
Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
- 17.
Required keys available
- 18.
Video Tape (if applicable)
- 19.
Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03
- 20.
Reset P-250 Rod Counters
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 22 of 75 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.
The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
III. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
degradation of any barrier to fission product release degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity a violation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario C. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
I ILT NRC-ESG-001 23 of 75 ATTACHMENT 3 ESG PRE-JOB BRIEF CHECKLIST EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:
Lead ESG:
I ILT NRC-ESG-003 Examiner:
____ 17. ESG overview and sequence of major events.
____ 18. Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.
____ 19. ESG summary of Critical Tasks.
____ 20. Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.
____ 21. Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.
____ 22. Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.
____ 23. Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.
____ 24. Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.
Ensure SOE recorder is recording.