ML063250313

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11-2006-Final-Outlines
ML063250313
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 10/23/2006
From:
Operations Branch IV
To:
Southern California Edison Co
References
50-361/06-301, 50-362/06-301, ES-401, ES-401-2, NUREG-1021 50-361/06-301, 50-362/06-301
Download: ML063250313 (28)


Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: SONGS 2 & 3 Date of Exam: 10/23/2006 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G Total A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 *

1. 1 3 1 3 4 4 3 18 3 3 6 Emergency

& 2 0 1 3 2 1 2 9 2 2 4 Abnormal Plant Tier 3 2 6 6 5 5 27 5 5 10 Evolutions Totals 1 3 4 1 4 1 1 6 2 1 2 3 28 3 2 5 2.

Plant 2 1 0 1 1 2 2 0 1 2 0 0 10 0 2 1 3 Systems Tier 4 4 2 5 3 3 6 3 3 2 3 38 5 3 8 Totals

3. Generic Knowledge and 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 10 7 Abilities Categories 2 4 2 2 2 1 2 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant specific priority, only those KAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10CFR55.43 NUREG-1021 1

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 E/APE # / Name Safety Function G K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 Number K/A Topic(s) Imp. Q#

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they 022 / Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X AA2.01 apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Makeup: 3.8 76 Whether charging line leak exists Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific 027 / Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction X 2.1.23 system and integrated plant procedures during all 4.0 77

/3 modes of plant operation.

Ability to determine or interpret the following as they 055 / Station Blackout / 6 X EA2.04 apply to a Station Blackout: Instruments and controls 4.1 78 operable with only dc battery power available Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: AC 057 / Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X AA2.06 3.7 79 instrument bus alarms for the inverter and alternate power source Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator E02 / Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 X 2.1.2 4.0 80 responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of E05 / Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 X 2.4.31 annunciators alarms and indications, and use of the 3.4 81 response instructions.

Ability to operate and monitor the following as they 007 / Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 X EA1.01 3.7 39 apply to a reactor trip: T/G controls Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and apply all 008 / Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X 2.1.32 3.4 40 system limits and precautions.

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses 009 / Small Break LOCA / 3 X EK3.22 as the apply to the small break LOCA: Maintenance of 4.4 41 heat sink Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Large Break 011 / Large Break LOCA / 3 X EK1.01 4.1 42 LOCA: Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling.

Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor 015 / 17 / RCP Malfunctions / 4 X AK2.08 Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the 2.6 43 following: CCWS Ability to determine and interpret the following as they 022 / Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X AA2.02 apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Makeup: 3.2 44 Charging pump problems NUREG-1021 2

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 E/APE # / Name Safety Function G K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 Number K/A Topic(s) Imp. Q#

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:

025 / Loss of RHR System / 4 X AA2.02 Leakage of reactor coolant from RHR into closed 3.4 45 cooling water system or into reactor building atmosphere Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: The 026 / Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X AA2.03 valve lineups necessary to restart the CCWS while 2.6 46 bypassing the portion of the system causing the abnormal condition Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the SGTR: Actions contained in EOP 038 / Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X EK3.06 4.2 47 for RCS Water Inventory Balance, SG Tube Rupture, and Plant Shutdown Procedures Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ATWS: definition 029 / ATWS / 1 X EK1.05 2.8 48 of negative temperature coefficient as applied to large PWR coolant systems.

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses 055 / Station Blackout / 6 X EK3.01 as the apply to the Station Blackout: Length of time for 2.7 49 which battery capacity is designed Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Offsite 056 / Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X AK1.04 3.1 50 Power: Definition of saturation conditions, implication for the systems Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they 057 / Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X AA1.06 apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Manual 3.5 51 control of components for which automatic control is lost Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they 058 / Loss of DC Power / 6 X AA1.03 apply to the Loss of DC Power: Vital and battery bus 3.1 52 components Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge symptom 062 / Loss of Nuclear Svc. Water / 4 X 2.4.6 3.1 53 based EOP mitigation strategies.

Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator 065 / Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X G2.1.2 3.0 54 responsibilities during all modes of plant operation Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand) Facility conditions E05 / Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 X EA2.1 2.7 55 and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

NUREG-1021 3

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 E/APE # / Name Safety Function G K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 Number K/A Topic(s) Imp. Q#

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they E06 / Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 X EA1.2 apply to the (Loss of Feedwater) Operating behavior 3.4 56 characteristics of the facility.

K/A Category Point Totals: 3/3 3 1 3 4 4/3 Group Point Total: 18/6 NUREG-1021 4

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 E/APE # / Name Safety Function G K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 Number K/A Topic(s) Imp. Q#

Conduct of Operations: Ability to apply Technical 005 / Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 X 2.1.12 3.8 82 Specifications for a system.

Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator A11 / RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 X 2.1.2 4.0 83 responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations) Adherence A13 / Natural Circ. / 4 X AA2.2 3.8 84 to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Functional Recovery) Adherence to E09 / Functional Recovery X EA2.2 4.0 85 appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific and 005 / Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 X 2.1.23 integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant 3.9 57 operation Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 024 / Emergency Boration / 1 X AK3.02 they apply to the Emergency Boration: Actions contained 4.2 58 in EOP for emergency boration Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system purpose 028 / Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 X 2.1.27 2.8 59 and or function.

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 032 / Loss of Source Range NI / 7 X AK3.01 they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear 3.2 60 Instrumentation: Startup termination on source-range loss Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 037 / Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 X AK3.07 they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: Actions 4.2 61 contained in EOP for S/G tube leak Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they 051 / Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X AA1.04 2.5 62 apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: Rod position Knowledge of the interrelations between the Accidental 059 / Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 X AK2.02 Liquid Radwaste Release and the following: Radioactive- 2.7 63 gas monitors Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they 067 / Plant Fire On-site / 8 X AA1.03 apply to the Plant Fire on Site: Bypass of a fire zone 2.5 64 detector Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Functional Recovery) Facility conditions and E09 / Functional Recovery X EA2.1 3.2 65 selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

NUREG-1021 5

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 E/APE # / Name Safety Function G K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 Number K/A Topic(s) Imp. Q#

K/A Category Point Total: 2/2 0 1 3 2 1/2 Group Point Total: 9/4 NUREG-1021 6

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 System #/Name G K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number K/A Topics Imp. Q#

Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X 2.1.23 system and integrated plant procedures during all 4.0 86 modes of plant operation.

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) 013 Engineered Safety Features X A2.02 based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to 4.5 87 Actuation correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; Excess steam demand Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based 026 Containment Spray X A2.03 on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, 4.1 88 or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of ESF Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use 062 AC Electrical Distribution X A2.05 3.3 89 procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Methods for re-energizing a dead bus Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge symptom 063 DC Electrical Distribution X 2.4.6 4.0 90 based EOP mitigation strategies.

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X A1.05 (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with 3.4 1 operating the RCPS controls including: RCS flow Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X A1.07 3.4 2 operating the RCPS controls including: RCS temperature and pressure Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-004 Chemical and Volume X K1.10 effect relationships between the CVCS and the 2.7 3 Control following systems: Pneumatic valves and RHRS Knowledge of RHRS design feature(s) and/or 005 Residual Heat Removal X K4.03 interlock(s) which provide or the following: RHR heat 2.9 4 exchanger bypass flow control Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or 006 Emergency Core Cooling X K4.06 interlock(s) which provide for the following: 2.7 5 Recirculation of minimum flow through pumps 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of purpose and X 2.1.28 function of major system components and controls 3.2 6 Tank Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system purpose 008 Component Cooling Water X 2.1.27 2.8 7 and or function.

NUREG-1021 7

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 System #/Name G K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number K/A Topics Imp. Q#

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X K1.01 effect relationships between the PZR PCS and the 3.9 8 following systems: RPS Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-012 Reactor Protection X K1.06 effect relationships between the RPS and the following 3.1 9 systems: T/G Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: RPS 012 Reactor Protection X K2.01 3.3 10 channels, components, and interconnections Knowledge of the operational implications of the 013 Engineered Safety Features X K5.02 following concepts as they apply to the ESFAS: Safety 2.9 11 Actuation system logic and reliability Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) 022 Containment Cooling X K4.02 which provide for the following: Correlation of fan sped 3.1 12 and flow path changes with containment pressure Containment equipment subject to damage by high or 022 Containment Cooling X K3.02 low temperature, humidity, and pressure Containment 3.0 13 instrumentation readings Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or 026 Containment Spray X A2.07 3.6 14 operations: Loss of Containment Spray Pump suction when in recirculation mode, possibly caused by clogged sump screen, pump inlet high temperature exceeded, cavitation, voiding, or sump below cutoff (interlock) limit Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

026 Containment Spray X K2.01 3.4 15 Containment spray pumps Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with 039 Main and Reheat Steam X A1.09 2.5 16 operating the MRSS controls including: Main steam line radiation monitors Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control 059 Main Feedwater X A4.08 3.0 17 room: Feedwater Regulating Valve Controller Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters 061 Auxillary/Emergency X A1.01 (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with 3.9 18 Feedwater operating the AFW controls including: S/G level Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

062 AC Electrical Distribution X K2.01 3.3 19 Major system loads NUREG-1021 8

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 System #/Name G K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number K/A Topics Imp. Q#

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the dc electrical systems; 063 DC Electrical Distribution X A2.01 and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to 2.5 20 correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Grounds Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X A1.03 3.2 21 operating the ED/G system controls including:

Operating voltages, currents, and temperatures Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X K6.07 2.7 22 following will have on the ED/G system: Air receivers Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X A1.01 3.2 23 operating the PRM system controls including: Radiation levels Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system purpose 076 Service Water X 2.1.27 2.8 24 and or function.

Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) 076 Service Water X K4.02 which provide for the following: Automatic start features 2.9 25 associated with SWS pump controls Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control 078 Instrument Air X A4.01 3.1 26 room: Pressure gauges Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following 078 Instrument Air X K2.01 2.7 27 Instrument air compressor Ability to monitor automatic operation of the 103 Containment X A3.01 3.9 28 Containment system, including: Containment Isolation K/A Category Point Totals: 3/2 3 4 1 4 1 1 6 2/3 1 2 Group Point Total: 28/5 NUREG-1021 9

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 2 System #/Name G K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number K/A Topics Imp. Q#

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, 001 Control Rod Drive X A2.11 4.7 91 control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Situations requiring a reactor trip Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and apply all 014 Rod Position Indication X 2.1.32 3.8 92 system limits and precautions.

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Condensate System; and (b) based on those predictions, use Procedures to 056 Condensate System X A2.04 2.8 93 correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of Condensate Pumps Knowledge of the operational implications of the 014 Rod Position Indication X K5.02 following concepts as they apply to the RPIS: RPIS 2.8 29 independent of demand position Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X K4.10 provide for the following: Redundant sources of 3.2 30 information on power level Knowledge of the operational implication of the 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation X K5.01 following concepts as they apply to the NNIS: 2.7 31 Separation of control and protection circuits Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ITM 017 In-core Temperature Monitor X A3.01 system including: Indications of normal, natural, and 3.6 32 interrupted circulation of RCS Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of 029 Containment Purge X K3.02 the Containment Purge System will have on the 2.9 33 following: Containment entry Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System ; and (b) based those predictions, use 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X A2.02 2.7 34 procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Loss of SFPCS Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-034 Fuel Handling Equipment X K1.02 effect relationships between the Fuel Handling System 2.5 35 and the following systems: RHRS Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass X K6.03 following will have on the SDS: Controller and 2.7 36 Control positioners, including ICS, S/G, CRDS NUREG-1021 10

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 2 System #/Name G K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number K/A Topics Imp. Q#

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Liquid 068 Liquid Radwaste X A3.02 3.6 37 Radwaste System including: Automatic isolation Ability to monitor the automatic operation of the Waste 071 Waste Gas Disposal X A3.02 Gas Disposal System including: Pressure Regulating 2.8 38 System for Waste Gas Vent Header K/A Category Point Totals: 0/1 1 0 1 1 2 2 0 1/2 2 0 Group Point Total: 10/3 NUREG-1021 11

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: SONGS 2 & 3 Date of Exam: 10/23/2006 RO SRO-Only Category K/A # Topic IR Q# IR Q#

Ability to apply technical specifications for a 2.1.12 4.0 94 system.

Ability to locate and use procedures and

1. 2.1.5 directives related to shift staffing and 3.4 95 Conduct of activities.

Operations Knowledge of conduct of operations 2.1.1 3.7 66 requirements.

2.1.22 Ability to determine Mode of Operation. 2.8 67 Subtotal 2 2 Knowledge of the process for conducting 2.2.7 tests or experiments not described in the 3.2 96 safety analysis report.

Knowledge of the process for determining 2.2.34 the internal and external effects on core 2.8 68 reactivity.

2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. 3.0 69 2.

Equipment Control Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those 2.2.1 3.7 70 controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.

Ability to manipulate the console controls as 2.2.2 required to operate the facility between 4.0 71 shutdown and designated power levels.

Subtotal 4 1 Knowledge of the process for performing a 2.3.8 3.2 97 planned gaseous radioactive release.

Knowledge of SRO responsibilities for auxiliary systems that are outside the 2.3.3 2.9 98

3. control room (e.g., waste disposal and Radiation Control handling systems).

Knowledge of the process for performing a 2.3.9 2.5 72 containment purge.

2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. 2.7 73 Subtotal 2 2 Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of 2.4.30 which events related to system operations/status 3.6 99 should be reported to outside agencies.

Knowledge of operator response to loss of

4. 2.4.32 3.5 100 all annunciators.

Emergency Procedures / Plan 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. 2.7 74 Knowledge of abnormal condition 2.4.11 3.4 75 procedures.

Subtotal 2 2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 7 NUREG-1021 12

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 2/1 062 A2.02 #89 - Excessive overlap to topic for #20. Randomly selected 062 A2.05 2/1 022 K4.05 #12 - Not plausible at SONGS / Ventilation ducts are encased in concrete.

Randomly selected 022 K4.03 2/1 059 A4.10 #17 - Topic is specific to B&W plant design. Randomly selected 059 A4.08 2/2 028 A2.01 #93 - System abandoned in place. No procedural guidance applies.

Randomly selected 056 A2.04

  1. 45 - Not performed at facility. Interlocks removed. Randomly selected 025 1/1 025 AK3.02 AK3.01 1/1 038 EK3.04 #47 - No automatic actions associated with PRMs related to event
  1. 51 - Valves are not powered from Vital Instrument AC. Randomly selected 1/1 057 AA1.04 057 AA1.06 1/2 005 G2.2.25 #57 - Removed TS Basis item for RO. Randomly selected 005 G2.1.23
  1. 88 - Phenomena is expected to occur for Westinghouse Plant designs.

2/1 026 A2.01 Recirc not same on CE designs. Randomly selected 026 A2.023 2/1 007 G2.2.25 #6 - No TS associated with Quench Tank. Randomly selected 007 G2.1.28 2/1 022 K4.03 #12 - No CIA on CCS at facility. Randomly selected 022 K4.02

  1. 34 - No relation between SFPCS and inadequate SDM. There would be no 2/2 033 A2.01 system actions to take based on loss of SDM. Randomly selected 033 A2.02 2/2 071 K3.04 #38 - Direct overlap with Simulator JPM S2. Randomly reselected 071 A3.02 1/1 027 G2.1.30 #77 - Direct Overlap with scenario event. Randomly reselected G2.1.23 2/1 026 A2.08 #14 - Direct Overlap with Simulator JPM S7. Randomly reselected 026 A2.07
  1. 82 - Impossible to develop a psychometrically sound SRO test item for the 1/2 005 G2.1.28 topic. Randomly reselected G2.1.12.

Oversample topic G 2.1.28. Randomly reselected 012 topic from all available 2/1 012 G2.1.28 012 KAs. 012 K1.06 selected Excessive overlap for G2.1 and 012 topic. Randomly reselected 012 topic 2/1 012 G2.1.2 from all available 012 KAs. 012 K2.01 selected.

Impossible to develop a psychometrically sound item that matches the KA because topic requires operation of components that are automatically 2/1 103 A4.01 operated at the system level. Randomly reselected from 103 topic area.

Chose 103 A3.01 Excessive overlap with 007 topic. Randomly reselected KA 078 G2.1.2 from 1/1 E02 EK1.3 unselected EPE/APEs 1/1 054 AA1.02 Excessive overlap with E06 topic. Randomly reselected 029 EK1.05 Plant design and procedures do not support question for topic. Randomly 1/1 025 AK3.01 reselected 025 AA2.02 from the 025 APE Topic selected was at RO level. Randomly reselected from among 2.4 topics 3/4 G2.4.49 and chose 2.4.30 NUREG-1021 13

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: SONGS Date of Examination: 10/23/2006 Examination Level RO Operating Test Number: NRC Administrative Topic Type Code* Describe activity to be performed (see Note) 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant Conduct of Operations M, R operation (3.9).

JPM: Determine Shutdown Margin (J078A).

2.1.12 Ability to apply technical specifications for a system (2.9).

Conduct of Operations N, R JPM: Verify required flowpath(s) OPERABLE per Technical Specifications (New).

2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures (3.6).

Equipment Control D, R JPM: Prepare a tagging clearance (J234A).

2.3.10 Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel N, R exposure (2.9).

Radiation Control JPM: Calculate stay time (New).

Emergency Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; for 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

(S)imulator Class(R)oom NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary A.1.a The candidate will determine Shutdown Margin by manually performing a calculation given the available conditions. The set of plant conditions will include a CEA anomaly as well as a Xenon transient. The critical task will be to identify the correct Shutdown Margin. This is a modified bank JPM.

A.1.b The candidate will be required to determine the Technical Specification required Boric Acid flowpaths while in Mode 4. The critical task will be to determine the available flowpaths given current plant alignment and OPERABLE equipment. This is a new JPM.

A.2 The candidate will be required to prepare a tagging clearance for the Boric Acid Makeup Pump (2MP174). The critical tasks include identifying the necessary boundaries for the repair. This is a bank JPM.

A.3 The candidate will be required calculate stay time based on a maintenance activity. The critical task requires calculation of total dose with and without shielding for one or two operators performing the task. This is a new JPM.

A.4 N/A NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: SONGS Date of Examination: 10/23/2006 Examination Level SRO(I) & (U) Operating Test Number: NRC Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant Conduct of Operations M, R operation (4.0).

JPM: Determine Shutdown Margin (J078A).

2.1.12 Ability to apply technical specifications for a system (4.0).

Conduct of Operations N, R JPM: Verify required flowpath(s) OPERABLE per Technical Specifications (New).

2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits (4.1).

Equipment Control D, R JPM: Perform a Safety Function Determination (J233A).

2.3.10 Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel N, R exposure (3.3).

Radiation Control JPM: Calculate stay time (New).

2.4.41 Knowledge of emergency action level thresholds and classifications (4.1).

Emergency Plan N, R JPM: Classify an emergency event (New).

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; for 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

(S)imulator Class(R)oom NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary A.1.a The candidate will determine Shutdown Margin by manually performing a calculation given the available conditions. The set of plant conditions will include a CEA anomaly as well as a Xenon transient. The critical task will be to identify the correct Shutdown Margin. This is a modified bank JPM.

A.1.b The candidate will be required to determine the Technical Specification required Boric Acid flowpaths while in Mode 4. The critical task will be to determine the available flowpaths given current plant alignment and OPERABLE equipment. This is a new JPM.

A.2 The candidate will perform a Safety Function Determination per SO123-0-A5, Technical Specification LCOARs / EDMRs. The critical tasks include determining the systems and Safety functions affected. This is a bank JPM.

A.3 The candidate will be required calculate stay time based on a maintenance activity. The critical task requires calculation of total dose with and without shielding for one or two operators performing the task. This is a new JPM.

A.4 Loss of Coolant Accident and Loss of Feedwater events are in progress. The candidate will perform an EPIP classification. The critical task is to properly classify the event. This is a new JPM.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: SONGS Date of Examination: 10/23/2006 Exam Level (circle one): RO / SRO(I) / SRO (U) Operating Test No.: NRC Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Type Code* Safety Function System / JPM Title S-1 061 - Auxiliary Feedwater System (J206FS) A, D, S 4-S Verify proper EFAS Actuation S-2 071 - Waste Gas Disposal System (J231S) A, M, S 9 Prepare and release a Waste Gas Decay Tank S-3 006 - ECCS (J050FS) A, D, S 2 Perform HPSI Throttle/Stop S-4 062 - AC Electrical Distribution (J054S) D, S 6 Restore Bus 2A06 from cross-tie operations S-5 004 - Chemical and Volume Control System (New) A, N, S 1 Respond to a dilution accident S-6 003 - Reactor Coolant Pump (J027FS) A, D, L, M, S 4-P Start a Reactor Coolant Pump S-7 026 - Containment Spray System (J049S) D, S 5 Terminate Containment Spray S-8 012 - Reactor Protection System (RO only) (J035S) D, S 7 Set CEAC Inoperable Flag on the Core Protection Calculator In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P-1 062 - AC Electrical Distribution (J018) D, E 6 Restore Offsite Power and transfer EDG control P-2 001 - Control Rod Drive System (J020) M, R 1 Perform actions for a CEDMCS Timer failure P-3 039 - Main and Reheat Steam System (J022) D 4-S Restore the Atmospheric Dump Valve to remote operation NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (L)ow-Power 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator 1/1/1 NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 NRC JPM Examination Summary Description S-1 The candidate will verify EFAS-1 & 2 actuation following a Reactor trip. The alternate path requires that the candidate recognize that the AFW valve alignment is incorrect and re-aligns per SO23 2.22, ESFAS System Operation. This is a bank JPM under the Auxiliary Feedwater System -

Secondary System Heat Removal from Reactor Core safety function. This is a PRA significant action. This meets the ESF function for the SRO upgrade.

S-2 The candidate will align and commence a Waste Gas Release. The alternate path will require closing of the flow control valve when the radiation monitor goes into alarm. This is a modified JPM under the Waste Gas Disposal System - Radioactive Release safety function.

S-3 The candidate will initiate HPSI throttle / stop per SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments. The alternate path requires manual actions to restore HPSI flow once throttling is complete because the throttle / stop criteria are no longer met. This is a bank JPM under the Emergency Core Cooling System - Reactor Coolant System Inventory Control safety function.

S-4 The candidate must restore Bus 2A06 from cross-tie operations to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 2XR2. This is a bank JPM under the AC Electrical Distribution - Electrical Systems safety function.

S-5 The candidate will respond to an inadvertent dilution per SO23-13-11, Inadvertent Dilution or Boration. The alternate path is performed when it is determined that the Letdown Heat Exchanger outlet temperature is not being maintained at 120ºF. This is a new JPM under the Chemical and Volume Control System - Reactivity Control safety function. This is a PRA significant action.

S-6 The candidate will start a Reactor Coolant Pump. The alternate path requires an RCP trip upon receipt of abnormal RCP conditions. This is a modified JPM under the Reactor Coolant Pump -

Primary System Heat Removal from the Reactor Core safety function.

S-7 The candidate will perform actions to terminate Containment Spray per SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments. This is a bank JPM under the Containment Cooling System -

Containment Integrity safety function.

S-8 The candidate must set the CEAC Inoperable Flag on the Core Protection Calculator. This is a bank JPM under the Reactor Protection System - Instrumentation safety function.

P-1 The candidate will shutdown the Emergency Diesel Generator and transfer EDG control following a Control Room evacuation. This is a bank JPM under the AC Electrical Distribution - Electrical Systems safety function.

P-2 The candidate will perform actions for a CEDMCS Timer failure alarm SO23-15-50.A2. This is a modified JPM under the Control Rod Drive System - Reactivity Control safety function.

P-3 The candidate will restore the Atmospheric Dump Valve to remote operation per SO23-3-2.18.1, Local Manual Operation of the Atmospheric Dump Valves. This is a bank JPM under the Main and Reheat Steam System - Secondary System Heat Removal from Reactor Core safety function.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: San Onofre Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: * ~98.7% power - RCS Boron is 1542 ppm by Chemistry Sample

  • Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service
  • Train A Charging Pump (P-190) OOS
  • Train A Saltwater Cooling Pump (P-307) OOS
  • Train A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (P-015) OOS
  • Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) OOS Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions..

Critical Tasks:

  • Restore power to 4 kV Bus A03 and/or A07.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 Security Warning from the Security Shift Commander.

+ 5 min 2 CV22B C (CO, CRS) Charging Pump P-191 trip.

+15 min TS (CRS) 3 RC16B I (CO, CRS) Pressurizer Level Control Channel fails high (LT-0110-2).

+25 min TS (CRS) 4 CV16B I (CO, CRS) Volume Control Tank Level Instrument fails low (LT-0227).

+35 min 5 FW11 C (ACO, CRS) Condensate Pump P-050 overcurrent trip.

+40 min 6 ED04A M (ALL) Bus 2A03 overcurrent trip.

+45 min FW23 Loss of Condenser vacuum (+2 min post-trip).

Loss of Main Feedwater.

7 Bus 2A07 C (ACO) Bus 2A07 fails to transfer upon Unit trip.

+45 min XFR LP 8 FW02A C (ACO) Aux. Feedwater Pump P-141 shaft seizure (+2 min post-trip).

+45 min FW02B Aux. Feedwater Pump P-504 shaft seizure (+2 min post-trip).

FW25 Aux. Feedwater Pump P-140 overspeed trip (+1 min post-trip).

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specifications Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #1 The crew will assume the shift and maintain steady-state conditions per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations.

This section redacted per SUNSI requirements When the security event actions are complete, Charging Pump P-191 will trip and be addressed per the Annunciator Response Procedures (ARPs) and SO23-3-2.1, Chemical and Volume Control System Operations. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

After the crew has stabilized the plant, a Pressurizer Level instrument fails high and will require crew actions per the ARPs and AOI SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Malfunction.

The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

When the plant is stable, the VCT Level Transmitter (LT-227) will fail low. The crew will secure Charging and Letdown per the ARPs and SO23-3-2.1, CVCS Charging and Letdown Operations and/or SO23-3-2.2, Makeup Operations. The Control Operator will manually operate the Charging Pumps to control Pressurizer level.

When plant conditions are stable, a Condensate Pump will trip and the standby pump will fail to auto start. The crew will respond per the Annunciator Response Procedures.

The major event begins with a loss of Bus 2A03 and total loss of vacuum. This will require a plant trip due to a loss of Main Feedwater flow. The crew will enter SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions. This is followed by a total loss of feedwater that will necessitate entry into SO23 6, Loss of Feedwater. The ACO will be required to manually transfer Bus 2A07 during post-trip SPTAs.

Event termination will occur when Bus 2A07 power is restored and the Steam Generators are depressurized sufficiently to allow the remaining Condensate Pumps to supply feedwater flow.

Risk Significance:

  • Risk important components out of service: Charging P-190, LPSI P-015, SWC P-307
  • Risk significant core damage sequence: Loss of all feedwater
  • Risk significant operator actions: Depressurize and restore feedwater flow to at least one SG Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: San Onofre Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

  • 70% power - RCS Boron is 1619 ppm by Chemistry sample
  • Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service
  • Train A Charging Pump (P-190) OOS
  • Train A Saltwater Cooling Pump (P-307) OOS
  • Train A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (P-015) OOS
  • Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) OOS Turnover: Holding at 70% power.

Critical Tasks:

  • Restore flow to the CCW Non-Critical Loop (RCPs operating).
  • Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.
  • Stabilize RCS temperature/pressure following loss of heat removal from the faulted SG.
  • Manually Trip the Reactor (RPS Failure).

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 CC03A C (ACO, CRS) Component Cooling Water Train A header ruptures at the SDC

+10 min TS (CRS) Heat Exchanger.

2 RC11A I (CO, ACO Reactor Coolant System Loop 1 Thot fails high (TT-0111X1).

+20 min CRS) 3 SG06A C (CO, CRS) Steam Generator tube leak on E-088 requiring plant shutdown.

+30 min TS (CRS) 4 R (CO) Rapid Power Reduction.

+45 min N (ACO, CRS) 5 SG06A M (ALL) Steam Generator Tube Rupture on E-088.

+50 min 6 RP03 C (ACO) Auto and manual Reactor trip failure (ATWS).

+50 min 7 MS03B M (ALL) Excess Steam Demand Event on E-089 inside Containment

+50 min (5 minutes post-trip).

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specifications Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #2 The crew will assume the watch maintaining steady state power per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations.

When turnover is complete a Train A Component Cooling Water header rupture is initiated. The crew will respond per SO23-2-17, Component Cooling System Operation and/or Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-7, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) / Saltwater Cooling (SWC). The crew will align SWC & CCW Train B per pump configuration requirements.

The ruptured header will be removed from service. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

When the CCW and SWC systems are properly aligned, a Thot instrument fails high and will require crew actions per the ARPs, Operating Instruction SO23-3-1.10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control and Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Malfunction.

With the plant in a stable condition, a Steam Generator tube leak will commence on E088. The crew will enter AOI SO23-13-14, Reactor Coolant System Leak and the CRS will be required to evaluate Technical Specifications. The CRS will determine that a rapid plant shutdown per the AOI is required.

When the crew has demonstrated adequate control of the downpower, the leak size will increase to that of a SGTR and be accompanied by an ATWS. The crew will respond to the ATWS by opening breakers to Buses B15 and B16. Five minutes later, an ESDE inside Containment will occur. The crew performs SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnoses an ESDE and a SGTR and transitions to SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery.

The scenario is terminated when RCS temperature and pressure are stabilized while in the Functional Recovery procedure and associated Floating Steps.

Risk Significance:

  • Risk important components out of service: Charging P-190, LPSI P-015, SWC P-307
  • Failure of risk important system prior to trip: CCW Header Rupture
  • Risk significant core damage sequence: SGTR and ESDE
  • Risk significant operator actions: Manually trip Reactor on ATWS Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: San Onofre Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: * ~98.7% power - RCS Boron is 1542 ppm by Chemistry Sample

  • Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service
  • Train A Charging Pump (P-190) OOS
  • Train A Saltwater Cooling Pump (P-307) OOS
  • Train A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (P-015) OOS
  • Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) OOS Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions.

Critical Tasks:

  • Restore flow to the CCW Non-Critical Loop (RCPs operating).
  • Establish minimum design SI flow rate.
  • Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 CC06B C (ACO, CRS) CCW Pump P-025 trip.

+5 min TS (CRS) 2 CV16A I (CO, CRS) VCT Level Instrument fails low (LT-0226).

+15 min 3 RD0403 C (CO, CRS) Dropped CEA #4.

+35 min TS (CRS) 4 R (CO) Downpower due to dropped CEA.

+45 min N (ACO, CRS) 5 FC05B I (ACO, CRS) Steam Generator E-088 Master Controller Setpoint failure.

+50 min 6 RC01C M (ALL) Large break LOCA.

+60 min 7 RP01E C (CO) LPSI Pump P-016 fails to start.

+60 min

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specifications Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #3 The crew will assume the shift and maintain steady-state conditions per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations.

When turnover is complete a CCW Pump will trip. The crew will respond per AOI SO23-13-7, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) / Saltwater Cooling (SWC). The crew will align SWC &

CCW Trains per pump configuration requirements. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

When the plant is stable, the VCT Level Transmitter (LT-226) will fail low. The crew will secure VCT makeup per the Annunciator Response Procedures and SO23-3-2.1, CVCS Charging and Letdown Operations. The RCS Makeup Control System will then be aligned for manual blended makeup mode.

A dropped control rod follows the transmitter failure. The crew will respond and stabilize the primary plant using Annunciator Response Procedures (ARP) and Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-13, Dropped or Misaligned CEA. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications. The CEA is not recoverable and a down power will be conducted per the AOI.

When the plant is stable, a Master Controller Setpoint will fail to 58% level. The crew will regain control of feedwater per Annunciator Response Procedures and/or AOI SO23-13-24, Feedwater Malfunctions.

The next event is a large break LOCA. The crew will determine that a plant trip is required and enters SO23-12-1, SPTAs, then SO23-12.3, Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). A LPSI Pump failure will require the operator to manually start the LPSI Pump.

Scenario is terminated when plant conditions are stable.

Risk Significance:

  • Risk important components out of service: Charging P-190, LPSI P-015, SWC P-307
  • Failure of risk important system prior to trip: CCW Pump trip
  • Risk significant core damage sequence: Large break LOCA with loss of LPSI
  • Risk significant operator actions: Restore the Non-Critical Loop Start a LPSI Pump Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: San Onofre Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: NRC spare Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

  • Reactor Critical at ~3x10-4% power - RCS Boron is 1342 ppm by Chemistry Sample
  • Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service
  • Train A Saltwater Cooling Pump (P-307) OOS
  • Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) OOS Turnover: Power increase in progress to ~2% power.

Critical Tasks:

  • Restore flow to the CCW Non-Critical Loop (RCPs operating).
  • Restore power to at least one 1E 4kV Bus.
  • Establish Reactivity Control (> 2 FLCEAs Not Fully Inserted & No SIAS).

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 R (CO) Rod withdrawal and power increase in progress to ~2% power.

+15 min N (ACO, CRS) 2 RC15B I (CO, CRS) Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel fails high (PT-0100Y).

+25 min TS (CRS) 3 ED08B C (CO, ACO, Loss of Non-1E Instrument Bus Q0612.

+35 min CRS) 4 ED03A C (ACO, CRS) Bus 2A04 Overcurrent lockout.

+45 min TS (CRS) 5 PG24 M (ALL) Loss of Offsite Power.

+50 min 6 EG08B C (ACO) Emergency Diesel Generator 2G003 mechanical failure.

+50 min Station Blackout 7 RD8802 C (CO) Four fully stuck CEAs; Loss of Reactivity Control.

+50 min RD8902 RD9002 RD9102

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #4 The crew will assume the watch with the Reactor critical at ~3x10-4% power. The crew will raise power using rod withdrawal per SO23-5-1.3.1, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load.

After the crew has demonstrated control of the power change, a Pressurizer Pressure instrument fails high and will require crew actions per the Annunciator Response Procedures (ARPs) and Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Malfunction. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

After the crew has restored the Pressurizer Pressure instrument, a loss of Non-1E Instrument Bus Q0612 will occur and require crew actions per the ARPs and AOI SO23-13-19, Loss of Non-1E Instrument Buses.

With Letdown restoration in progress, a bus fault and lockout will occur on Bus 2A04. The crew will refer to SO23-13-26, Loss of Power to an AC Bus. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

Once the decision to shutdown is made, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur. The Reactor will trip and the crew will perform SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions. EDG 2G003 will trip. Four rods remain stuck out of the core requiring manual boration alignment on the part of the CO in preparation for Bus 2A06 power restoration.

The crew diagnoses a Loss of Reactivity Control due to a Station Blackout and enters SO23 9, Functional Recovery. The success path will require cross-tying power with Unit 3 and establishing a boration flowpath.

The scenario is terminated when Bus 2A06 is energized and boration at greater than 40 gpm is established.

Risk Significance:

  • Risk important components out of service: SWC P-307
  • Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Loss of Vital Inverter
  • Risk significant core damage sequence: SBO with Loss of Reactivity Control
  • Risk significant operator actions: Vital AC power restoration Establish boration flowpath Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9