ML060830469
| ML060830469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/2005 |
| From: | Palagi B NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 50-305/05-301 50-305/05-301 | |
| Download: ML060830469 (82) | |
Text
Scenario1-1.doc 1
03/24/06 Rev. A Facility:
Kewaunee Scenario No.:
1 Op-Test No.:
1 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
IC-12, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC)
Motor Driven AFW A Pump is in PULLOUT.
SI Pump A is in PULLOUT.
Turnover:
The plant is at 100% power. AFW Pump A has been out of service for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> due to inboard bearing replacement. SI Pump A has been out of service for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after an inspection of the breaker cubicle indicated the lugs on one of the supply line connectors is loose.
At turnover, the Equipment Operator reported Steam Traps 23 and 24 on the lines from the individual steam header supplies to the TD AFW Pump, and Steam Trap 25 and 26 on the common steam line to the Turbine-Driven AFW Pump are cold. The Shift Manager has just declared the TD AFW Pump inoperable and directs the crew to remove it from service as soon as turnover is complete. (No action taken yet.)
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description Preload CC04B Failure to Auto Start CC Pump B 1
3/4 N
BOP SRO Power backdown to less than 1673 MWt (~94% power)
R RO Maintain DI and RCS Tave using rods and boron addition.
2
- RX211, 100 I
BOP SRO Controlling SG A level channel (LT461) fails high over 10 seconds.
3
- SW05C, 100 DI-46528-CLOSE ON C
BOP SRO Running Service Water Pump 1B1 trips on overcurrent. Standby Pump auto starts. SW-3A header isolation valve closes improperly.
4
- CC03B, 1.0 DI-46332-OPEN ON RC03B C
RO SRO RXCP B Thermal Barrier leak with failure of automatic isolation of CC cooling from thermal barrier. This will eventually lead to a manual reactor trip directed due to RXCP parameters exceeding limits or the RXCP will trip. (EOP entry) 5 AI-4301-02-R1, 0
C BOP SRO SG B PORV Controller fails giving PORV open signal. Manual control available.
6 SG01B, 7 10:00 M
BOP RO SRO SG B tube rupture of ~ 250 gpm ramped in over 10 minutes starting 2:00 minutes after the reactor trip.
7 CC05A CC04B C
RO SRO Component Cooling Water Pump trips on overcurrent. Component Cooling Pump B fails to auto start. Manual start available.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario1-1.doc 2
03/24/06 Rev. A
Scenario1-1.doc 3
03/24/06 Rev. A Event 1 - The plant is at 100% power. SI Pump A and AFW Pump A are inoperable. At turnover, the Turbine-Driven AFW Pump is determined to be inoperable due to the failure of steam traps on the steam lines to the TD AFW Pump. The CRS will direct removal from service (Placing TD AFW Pump in PULLOUT, and possible closing the Steam Supply valves fro the SGs MS-10A and MS-10B). Technical Specification 3.4.b will be addressed and LCO 3.4.b.3 requires reactor power be reduced to less than or equal to 1673 MWt within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Operations Management will inform the crew that power reduction needs to begin as soon as possible. 1673 MWt corresponds to 94.4% power. Crew will use N-O-03 and N-TB-54 to reduce load.
Event 2 - Following clearly observable plant response from the reactivity changes during the load reduction, the controlling level channel for SG A will fail high. The actual level will begin to lower due to FW-7A closing in response to the high level. The BOP will take FW-7A Controller to MANUAL and verify that SG level recovers toward program level. Procedure A-FW-5A and A-MI-87 will be used to address the failure. The failed instrument will be removed from service using A-MI-87. The SRO will address Technical Specification 3.5.b to ensure continued plant operation is allowed with the failed channel.
Event 3 - After the operator actions are completed for removal of the failed SG Level channel from service, the running Service Water Pump 1B1 will trip on overcurrent. This will result in automatic start of the standby SW Pump1B2 when SW header pressure drops below 72 psig. Train B Header Isolation valve SW-3A will inadvertently close. It normally closes on SI signal or on sensed low pressure in the associated header. Train A pressure will remain above the closure setpoint. The crew will respond by taking actions directed in A-SW-02, and re-open SW-3A when SW Header A Operating is checked. The SRO will address Technical Specification 3.3.e.2 for actions associated with the loss of the SW Pump. Also by direction of N-SW-02 Precaution and Limitation 2.2, the SRO will determine in accordance with this item that with SI Pump B also inoperable, Technical Specification 3.0.c is applicable requiring plant shutdown.
Event 4 - Once the requirement for plant shutdown is reviewed, a leak will develop in RXCP B Thermal Barrier.
This will result in leakage of RCS water into the Component Cooling System. CC radiation levels will rise and be detected on process monitor R17, Component Cooling Surge Tank level will rise and CC-610B, RXCP B Thermal Barr Comp Cooling Return, that normally closes on high flow, will fail to close. The crew will address the problem by entering A-RC-36C, A-RM-45, and/or A-CC-31. The actions are expected to identify RXCP B thermal barrier leakage and result in closing the isolation valve CC-610B. RXCP conditions deteriorate for bearing temperature and may require the RXCP be stopped. The CRS should then direct a manual reactor trip and stopping of RXCP B when the immediate operator actions of E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection, are complete. If the actions to close CC-610B are completed prior to the parameters reaching a required trip condition, then RXCP B will trip (breaker opens) two minutes after the valve is closed.
Event 5 - At the time of the reactor trip (based on NI power) SG B PORV Controller will fail so that SD-2B, SG B PORV fully opens. Manual control is available and when the open SG PORV is identified by the BOP, the Controller will be placed to MAN.
Event 6 & 7 - Associated with the transient placed on SG B, a SG tube rupture will occur in SG B. The rate will increase to a value of 250 gpm over a ten-minute period. The crew will recognize conditions requiring a Safety Injection and manually initiate SI (if required). Five minutes following SI actuation, Component Cooling Pump A trips. Component Cooling Pump B fails to automatically start and should be manually started after verification that SI sequencer completes its sequence. The scenario ends following cooldown and depressurization of the RCS, and if possible, termination of SI flow, OR at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.
Critical Tasks 1.
E-0 K - Manually start at least one CCW pump required to provide adequate component cooling for the operating safeguards trains before transition out of E-0. [Event 7]
Scenario1-1.doc 4
03/24/06 Rev. A 2.
E-3 A - Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs [Event 6]
3.
E-3 B - Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either of the following conditions: [Event 6]
Too high to maintain 50°F [85°F for adverse Containment] subcooling OR Below 270°F.
4.
E-3 C - Depressurize RCS until either 1) PRZR level is > 74%, 2) RCS subcooling based on CETs is < 30°F
[65°F for adverse containment], or 3) RCS pressure is < S/G pressure and PRZR level is > 5% [30% for adverse containment] before 96% level is exceeded in the ruptured S/G. [Event 6]
Scenario1-1.doc 5
03/24/06 Rev. A
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 6
03/24/06 Rev. A Op-Test No.:
1 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
1 Page of 43 Event
Description:
Power backdown to less than 1673 MWt.
Turnover indicates that Shift Manager has just declared TD AFW Pump inoperable due to failure of the steam line drains to operate properly. AFW Pump A is already OOS.
ACTION is based on LCO for AFW (TS 3.4.b. 3) with two of three AFW trains inoperable, within two hours, reduce reactor power to less than or equal to 1673 MWt.
Additionally, another LCO (TS 3.4.4.B) allows for two AFW trains to be inoperable for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when the RCS temperature is greater than 350ºF Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE:
Entry into LCO for two AFW Pumps inoperable.
(If necessary (once the LCO is discussed) a cue may be provided to the crew that Operations Management has directed an immediate downpower at normal rate (1/4%/min) to the lower thermal rating as result of the Operational Decision-Making process.)
CRS Implement actions of N-0-03 Plant Operation Greater Than 35% Power, step 4.2, Power Reduction:
CREW Review applicable Precautions, and Limitations and Actions.
CRS Determine that transition to A-O-03 is NOT required since power reduction rate is less than 1%/min.
CRS Direct that reactivity estimate be performed based on power reduction.
RO Perform reactivity estimate:
Current load: 100% (1772 MWt); Projected load: 94.4% (1673 MWt) [MINIMUM REQUIRED]
NOTE: Load may be reduced further but given values are based on reduction to 94%
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 7
03/24/06 Rev. A power.
Use the Reactivity Placard (or Reactor Data Manual) to perform reactivity balance:
Final Rod position: > 220 (226 is projected final position)
Given Borate: % pwr 7.5 gallons boron/%pwr Power decrease of 6% will require 45 gallons of boron with rods ending at 226 steps.
BOP Reduce load per N-TB-54, Turbine and Generator Operation, section 4.3, Shutdown:
Review applicable Precautions & Limitations Determine maximum load rate per Figures 2 & 3 and Attachment C Take Turbine off VPL (preferred method)
§ Press REFERENCE CONTROL DOWN pushbutton until SETTER value reads less than 103%.
§ Set Loading Rate to value less than or equal to 5%/min.
§ Press GO button.
§ When the VALVE POS LIMIT green light extinguishes, press HOLD button.
Press REFERENCE CONTROL DOWN pushbutton until SETTER value is at desired load.
Verify/set loading rate to 1/4%/min.
Inform (telephone) Energy Supply & Control of rate and amount of load reduction.
Depress GO Verify load increases Verify Reactive Load remains within Figure 5, Generator Capability Curve, limits
§ If required, adjust Generator #1 Voltage Adjuster switch to change VARs (REACT PWR meter 4460104)
When required load is reached, verify GO button not lit, or press HOLD pushbutton.
If desired set Valve Position Limit:
§ Adjust Valve Position Limit DOWN button in tiny increments until VALVE POS LIMIT light lit.
§ Press REFERENCE CONTROL UP pushbutton to increase SETTER value by 3%.
§ Press GO button.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 8
03/24/06 Rev. A RO Perform reactivity adjustments:
Rod Control (outward motion at 1.5°F difference Tref-Tave)
AND/OR Boron Concentration Control per N-CV-35A, Boron Concentration Control, section 4.5, Normal Boration During At Power Evolutions:
Review applicable Precautions & Limitations.
Determine rate and magnitude of boration (total amount from above reactivity calculations)
Adjust CVC-403/CV-31092, Blender Control BA Flow, to required flow rate.
Set Rx Make-up Totalizer to required quantity.
Position Reactor Makeup Mode Selector to BORATE.
Position Reactor Makeup Control switch to START Verify required change has been achieved by monitoring:
§ Rod Position
§ Boron Concentration
§ Tave When boration is complete:
At Boric Acid Totalizer:
§ Verify the correct quantity added.
§ Reset the BA Totalizer by pressing the black button.
§ Verify BA Totalizer indicating all ZEROs in window by black button.
Verify CVC-403/CV-31092 set to current RCS boron concentration using Oper Aid 96-3.
Place CVC-406/CV31094, BA Blender to VCT, to CLOSE position.
Perform a 20-gallon Alternate Dilute (section 4.4).
RO (cont.)
§ Set Rx Makeup Totalizer to 20.
§ Position Reactor Makeup Mode Selector to ALT DIL.
§ Position Reactor Makeup Control switch to START.
§ When dilution is complete:
o Verify MU-1022/CV-31095, Blender Control Rx Mu Flow, is set to 60 gpm.
o Verify correct quantity added at Rx Makeup Totalizer.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 9
03/24/06 Rev. A o
Reset Rx Makeup Totalizer by pressing the black button.
o Verify BA Totalizer indicating all ZEROs in window by black button.
Place CVC-406 to AUTO position.
Position Reactor Makeup Mode Selector to AUTO.
Position Reactor Makeup Control switch to START.
NOTE: Following the required reactivity change of ~ 5% power, Event 2 may be started.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 10 03/24/06 Rev. A Op-Test No.:
1 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
2 Page of 43 Event
Description:
Controlling SG A level channel (LT461) fails high over 10 seconds.
The controlling SG A level channel, LI-461, normally reading 44% will fail up to 100% over a 10-second ramp. The BOP will recognize the failure by comparing SG A level on the other channels LI-462 and LI463, which will show a lowering level. The actual level will be lowering due to the response of FW-7A, Main FW Flow Control Valve, closing due to the controlling channel high level. The BOP will take manual control of FW-7A and adjust as necessary to maintain SG A level within normal operating band (39%-49%).
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUES:
Annunciator Alarms:
47062-A, S/G A PROGRAM LEVEL DEVIATION 47062-B, S/G A BYPASS CV LEVEL DEVIATION 47064-B, S/G A LEVEL HIGH, (at > 67%)
L0461A S/G A Chan 1 Level (H-4)
L0403D S/G A Lo Lo Level Chan 1 Trip [When bistable is tripped]
LI-461 S/G A level rising or at top of scale (100%) with LI-462 and LI-463 lowering.
FW-7A Valve Position Demand and Actual (Position) Indication lowering.
FI-466 and FI-467, S/G A Feed Flow indications lowering.
BOP Identify and report LI-461 failed high.
Take FW-7A controller to MANUAL.
CREW Address Annunciator Response for 47062-A and/or 47062-B.
Report that if the alarm is due to a failed instrument:
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 11 03/24/06 Rev. A Verify the alarm was caused by failure of S/G A Level LI-461 AND position FW-7A to MANUAL.
Go To A-MI-87 Go to A-FW-5A (NOTE: Addressing the Annunciator Response is normally done by the off operator, but may be performed by the involved operator if conditions dictate.)
CRS Direct the BOP to control SG A level with FW-7A in MANUAL.
NOTE: Although AFW-05A is identified in the Alarm Response, the procedure only provides direction for restoring the FW-7A/B, FW Control Valves, to automatic operation. No actions would be directed from this procedure in response to this event.
CRS Direct actions of A-MI-87, Bistable Tripping for Failed Reactor Protection or Safeguards Inst.
CRS Check Technical Specifications for instruments with bistable tripping requirements [TS 3.5.b]:
TS Table 3.5-2, item No. 12 (Lo-lo SG water level reactor trip) - 3/loop with 2/loop required.
TS Table 3.5-3, item No. 4.a (MD AFW Pumps, Either SG lo-lo level) - 3/loop with 2/loop required.
TS Table 3.5-3, item No. 5.a (TD AFW Pump, Both SG lo-lo level) - 3/loop with 2/loop required.
TS Table 3.5-4, No. 4.a (Main FW Isol, Hi-hi SG level) - 3/loop with 2/loop required.
CRS Ensure I&C (Work Control/Work Week Coordinator) is notified of status of LT461.
CRS Declare LT461 channel out-of-service (OOS).
CRS Ensure bistables for LT461 are to be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of declaring OOS.
CRS Direct I&C to check for redundant channel bistable status by performing SP 47-316E, Channel
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 12 03/24/06 Rev. A 1 (Red) Reactor Protection Logic Test.
NOTE: Time Warp may be used at this point to have the check of redundant bistables complete.
CUE: SP 47-316E is complete and no bistables were detected that would cause a reactor trip.
CRS Direct the crew to perform/verify Prerequisite Alignment of Attachment I for LT461.
BOP Ensure FW-7A, S/G A Main FW Flow Control Auto/Manual switch in MAN.
Ensure FW-10A, S/G A Bypass FW Flow Control Auto/Manual switch in MAN.
RO Act as SECOND OPER for verification of position for FW-7A and FW-10A in MAN.
CRS Direct I&C to trip bistables per Attachment I section 2.0 and 3.0 (NOTE: The COMMUNICATOR is set report & to receive direction from CRS, and will perform actions for tripping bistables from the Simulator Booth.)
CRS Direct crew to verify control room indications per Attachment I.
BOP Verify following lit:
§ Annunciator 47064-A, S/G A LEVEL LOW LOW
§ Annunciator 47064-B, S/G A LEVEL HIGH
§ Status Light 44907-1101, S/G A Low-Low Level
§ Status Light 44908-0801, S/G A Hi-Hi Level CREW Complete PERFORMED BY and VERIFCATION BY sections of Attachment I.
CRS Direct status control for LI-461 indication (OOS sticker).
AT THIS TIME the crew will be informed that the Turbine Drive AFW Pump steamline traps have been warmed, and the T/D AFW Pump may be returned to service. As Shift Manager, a cue is provided to the crew to remove any Status Control and restore the T/D AFW Pump to service.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 13 03/24/06 Rev. A NOTE: At Chief Examiner direction, Event 3 may be initiated.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 14 03/24/06 Rev. A Op-Test No.:
1 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
3 Page of 43 Event
Description:
Service Water Pump 1B1 trips on overcurrent. SW-3A, SW header A Isolation inadvertently closes.
Running SW Pump 1B1 trips, reducing the overall SW header pressure. When pressure drops to 78 psig, SW Pump 1B2 automatically starts. SW-3A and SW-3B, the SW Header Isolation valves are designed to close on a lowering header pressure at 72 psig on their associated header.
Pressure does no drop this low; however, SW-3A will go closed.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUES:
Annunciator Alarms:
47093-L, BUS 6 FEEDER BKR OVERLOAD 47092-L, BUS 6 FEEDER BKR TRIP 47051-P, SW HEADER PRESSURE LOW 47052-Q, TURBINE BLDG SW ISOLATION ALERT The WHITE light for SW Pump 1B1 will be lit.
SWW Pump 1B2 auto starts (red light).
FW-3A green light lit and SW -3B red light lit.
BOP Identify and report trip of SW Pump 1B1.
Report SW Pump 1B2 start.
CREW Address Annunciator Response.
47092-L and 47093-L:
If alarm is activated by SW Pump B1 Breaker 1-608 Overcurrent trip:
Start additional SW Pumps as required.
Refer to Technical Specification 3.3
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 15 03/24/06 Rev. A Dispatch NAO to investigate Timed Overcurrent relays on Bus 6.
Notify Plant Electricians.
47051-P and 47051-Q:
Go to A-SW-02 CREW (cont.)
When IPEOPs are NOT in effect:
If Turbine Bldg SW header is isolated [SW-4A and SW-4B closed], restore SW headers to normal per A-SW-02.
If Turbine Building SW header is not isolated AND SW ESF Isolation signal is present, SER 839(840), THEN depress SW ESF Isol Reset pushbutton.
(NOTE: Addressing the Annunciator Response is normally done by the off operator, but may be performed by the involved operator if conditions dictate.)
(47051-P AND 47052-Q should reset after the standby SW Pump starts.)
CRS Direct actions of A-SW-02, Abnormal Service Water System Operation.
BOP Check Forebay Level LI-41551 > 42%.
CREW Dispatch Operator to monitor SW Loads (Check SW Pumps and breakers).
BOP Check both SW header pressures > 72 psig on PI-41503 and PI-41506.
Check SW Header Isolation Valves SW-3A and SW-3b open.
Report SW-3A closed.
Verify all available SW Pumps running.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 16 03/24/06 Rev. A BOP (cont.)
Check if SW to Turbine Bldg should be isolated.
Annunciator 47051-N CW PUMPS FLOOD LEVEL TRIP not lit.
CREW Determine IPEOPS are not in affect.
BOP Check SW header pressure supplying Turbine Building > 60 psig on PI-41503 for header A.
Check SW-4A OPEN.
Check PI-41503 SW Header A pressure > 60 psig on PI-41503.
Check SW-10A, Aux Bldg SW Header A Isol, open.
Check PI-41506 SW Header B pressure > 60 psig on PI-41506.
Check SW-10B, Aux Bldg SW Header B Isol, open.
NOTE: The following indications are associated with the RO portion of then boards and may be addressed by either operator, although most likely by the RO.
CREW Check SW Header in Containment intact:
Normal Containment sump levels
§ Annunciators for sumps OFF: 47031-P, 47031-Q and 47031-R
§ Containment Level Wide Range Channel A, 4131703 AND Containment Level Wide Range Channel B, 4131704 NORMAL at ZERO.
BOP Check Containment FCU outlet temperatures approximately equal on Omniguard 41507, points 15127 through 15130.
Check both SW header pressures > 86 psig on PI-41503 and PI-41506.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 17 03/24/06 Rev. A Check annunciator 47052-P off, and SER points 240 and 241 on Alarm Screen or Alarm Printer are off.
Check PI-41503 SW Header A pressure > 60 psig.
Check SW-10A, Aux Bldg SW Header A Isol, open Check SW-3A, SW Header A Isolation open Report SW-3A closed.
Crew Verify SI is reset (not active) [Annunciators 47021-A and 47021B off].
BOP Open SW-3A.
BOP (cont.)
Check PI-41506 SW Header B pressure > 60 psig.
Check SW-10B, Aux Bldg SW Header B Isol, open.
Check SW-3B, SW Header B Isolation open Verify Turbine Bldg Header operating:
Turbine Bldg Header intact.
SW-4A open.
[END OF PROCEURE STEPS]
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 18 03/24/06 Rev. A CRS Check Technical Specifications for SW, TS 3.3.e.2 72-hour LCO with ONE SW Train inoperable.
Determine plant shutdown is required due to inoperability of SI Pump B based on inoperable SW Train B. Entry into TS 3.0.c Standard Shutdown Sequence. (Reference TS 3.7.c for electrical equipment operability)
NOTE: The affect on SI Pump B and other equipment dependent on SW is addressed in N-SW-02, Service Water System, Precautions and Limitations:
2.2 WHEN one train of Service Water is inoperable, components supported by that train are inoperable. Apply T.S. LCO for Service Water System.
- 1. Test other Diesel Generator daily to ENSURE OPERABILITY.
- 2. VERIFY engineered safety features associated with other Diesel Generator OPERABLE.
CRS Inform Operations Management of plant conditions and Technical Specification requirement to shutdown.
If not contacted earlier, ensure Electrical Maintenance (Work Control/Work Week Coordinator) contacted to address overcurrent for beaker for SW Pump 1B1.
NOTE: At Chief Examiner direction, Event 4 may be initiated.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 19 03/24/06 Rev. A Op-Test No.:
1 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
4 Page of 43 Event
Description:
RXCP B Thermal Barrier leak reactor coolant into Component Cooling (CC) System.
CC Isolation valve, CC-610B, fails to close. RXCP B trip (if required).
Leak of ~ 65 gpm from the RCS into the CC System initially. CC610B, RXCP B Thermal Barr Rtn, fails to close. Normally when the sensed CC return flow on FI609 exceeds 260 gpm, CC-610B will close isolating the cooling flow to the thermal barrier. RXCPB parameters degrade as the RCS coolant flows up the labyrinth seals feeding the thermal barrier leak. Component Cooling system shows indications of RCS leak with CC Surge Tank level rising and R-17, CC Radiation Monitor upward trend. Eventually worsening conditions for the RXCP should require a reactor trip so the RXCP can be stopped. If not stopped at the time the thermal barrier leak has been addressed, then RXCP B will trip.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUES:
Annunciator Alarms:
47014-L, RXCP B LABRYNTH SEAL DP LOW 47014-I, RXCP B LABRYNTH SEAL DP LOW 47024-H, CC SURGE TANK LEVEL HIGH/LOW 47012/11-B, RADIATION INDICATION ALERT; RADIATION INDICATION HIGH TLA-15 RMS ABOVE NORMAL PPCS Alarms:
P0129 RCP B Labyrinth Seal Water DP L-1 P0429A Przr pressure Channel 1 low L-1 P0430A Przr pressure Channel 2 low L-1 P0431A Przr pressure Channel 3 low L-1 P0449A Przr pressure Channel 4 low L-1 G00017A Radiation Monitor R-17 H-1 RXCP B PI-131B Labyrinth seal delta-P drops to ZERO in.
RXCP B FI-116 #1 Seal Injection Flow rises to top of scale.
Charging Pump A speed increases (in AUTO).
Pressurizer pressure and level drop.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 20 03/24/06 Rev. A CC Surge Tank level LI-618 rises R-17, CC Radiation Monitor value rising.
RO Identify and report RXCP problem (RXCP Labyrinth seal DP low; seal injection flow higher; CC Surge Tank level rising).
CREW Address Annunciator Response.
For 47014-L and/or 47014-I:
Go to A-RC-36C For 47024-H:
If an increase in level is noted that is not attributable to system makeup or temperature increase, then go to A-CC-31.
For 47011-B or 47012-B:
If alarm is NOT due to planned evolution, then inform Radiation Protection and request assistance in identifying and isolating radiation source.
Go to A-RM-45 (NOTE: Addressing the Annunciator Response is normally done by the off operator, but may be performed by the involved operator if conditions dictate.)
NOTE: The crew may address one or more of the procedures in any order based on crew-determined priority.
Each of these procedures is addressed below.
CRS Direct the actions of A-RC-36C.
CREW If any RXCP monitored parameter exceeds the allowed maximum value, then trip the reactor and got to E-0.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 21 03/24/06 Rev. A RO Check if RXCP should remain operating:
- 1 seal leakoff flow < 8.0 gpm on recorder 42588.
- 1 seal outlet temperature < 125ºF on TI-181/TI-182.
Bearing Water temperature < 225ºF on T-132/T-125.
Motor vibration < 5 mils on RXCP Vibration monitors.
Pump vibrations < 20 mils RXCP Vibration monitors.
PPCS CC temperature T0621A < 120ºF.
PPCS motor Bearing temperatures T0413A-T0416A/T0433A-T0436A < 195ºF.
PPCS Motor stator temperature T0417A/T0437A < 155ºF (NOTE: Values may also be read from RXCP Graphic Display on PPCS. The above is a Continuous Action Step.)
RO Check CC flow to RXCPs Motor Bearing Oil Coolers; At least one CC pump running.
Valves CC-600, CC-601A/B and CC-612A/B open.
RXCP CC FLOW LOW annunciator 47021-I off.
Check #1 seal DP greater than 200 psid on PI-173/PI-174.
RO (cont.)
Check RXCP Pump vibration < 15 mil.
Check #1 Seal leakoff flow < 6.0 gpm.
Verify CC flow to RXCP Thermal Barriers intact:
CC-610A/B, RXCP Thermal Barrier CC Return open Component Cooling radiation levels R-17 normal.
CC Surge Tank level normal.
Report R-17 radiation levels elevated and/or CC Surge Tank level rising.
CREW Determine RXCP Thermal Barrier is leaking.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 22 03/24/06 Rev. A (NOTE: It is expected that the parameters will be sufficient to allow determination that RXCP B thermal barrier is leaking; however, the crew may elect to isolate both until an evaluation is performed.)
CRS Direct closing CC-610B and/or CC-610A.
RO Close CC-610B.
(NOTE: The closure of the valve will initiate 2-minute timer leading to trip of RXCP B.)
CREW Verify thermal barrier leak has been stopped:
1.
Monitor R-17 2.
Monitor CC Surge Tank level.
CREW Trend RXCP parameters on PPCS.
Do not open CC-610A/B on affected RXCPs during subsequent recovery steps.
If any thermal barrier is intact, reestablish CC flow to thermal barrier:
Place CC-610A/CV31127, RXCP A Thermal Barr CC Alternate Control in OPEN position.
Open CC-610A, if closed.
NOTE: It is expected that RXCP B conditions may require or may have required a reactor trip and RXCP B shutdown by this point. If not, RXCP B will trip at this point. A-CC-31 actions are covered below.
CRS Direct the actions of A-CC-31.
At least one CC Pump running.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 23 03/24/06 Rev. A BOP Verify Comp Cooling Heat Exchanger A/B outlet, CC-6A AND/OR CC-6B, at least one open.
RO Check CC Flow return normal (1000 - 1500 gpm) on FI-619.
Maintain CC System Inventory:
Surge Tank Level < 52% on LI-618 Report CC Surge Tank level rising.
Isolate Surge Tank makeup:
Verify SW-1400, Emergency Makeup to CC, closed CREW Direct NAO to locally verify DW-161, makeup Supply from Demin Water, closed.
RO Check CC Surge tank level > 45% on LI-618.
Check both CC Pumps running Report CC Pump A running.
1.
Check CC Pump A discharge pressure > 90 psig on PI-4130202.
2.
Monitor temperature and flow to components in operation.
RO Check if RXCP should remain operating:
Check RXCP operating Check RXCP parameters
- 1 seal outlet temperature < 125ºF on TI-181/TI-182.
Bearing Water temperature < 225ºF on T-132/T-125.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 24 03/24/06 Rev. A Motor vibration < 5 mils on RXCP Vibration monitors.
Pump vibrations < 20 mils RXCP Vibration monitors.
PPCS CC temperature T0621A < 120ºF.
PPCS motor Bearing temperatures T0413A-T0416A/T0433A-T0436A < 195ºF.
PPCS Motor stator temperature T0417A/T0437A < 155ºF (NOTE: Values may also be read from RXCP Graphic Display on PPCS. The above is a Continuous Action Step.)
CREW If any RXCP monitored parameter exceeds the allowed maximum value, then trip the reactor and got to E-0.
RO Stop the affected RXCPs and close its associated Spray valve.
RO (cont.)
Check CC flow to RXCPs Motor Bearing Oil Coolers; At least one CC pump running.
Valves CC-600, CC-601A/B and CC-612A/B open.
RXCP CC FLOW LOW annunciator 47021-I off.
Check CC Hx Outlet temperature on PPCT0621A < 120ºF and stable.
If temperature is high or rising:
Direct NAO to locally place SW-1306A/B controller in manual and operate to regain control of CC temperature.
Open SW-1300A/B CC Hx A/B Outlet as necessary to maintain CC temperature < 120ºF.
Cool down CC temperature:
§ Verify proper cooling established to CC heat exchanger.
§ Shut down unnecessary loads supplied by CC.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 25 03/24/06 Rev. A Verify CC flow to letdown HX At least one CC Pump running Letdown HX Outlet temperature stable or decreasing on TI-130.
Verify CC flow to letdown HX At least one CC Pump running VCT Outlet temperature stable or decreasing on TI-140.
RO (cont.)
Check if CC System is intact:
1.
CC radiation level R-17 normal Report R-17 radiation level elevated.
CREW Try to identify location of leak:
Abnormal CC flow through components Abnormal CC temperatures Abnormal temperatures on components Abnormal Sump level changes Local visual inspection Selective isolation of Heat Exchangers Check CC Hxs intact.
Check CC to RXCPs intact:
Containment sump alarms clear.
RXCP motor bearing oil coolers intact.
CC piping to/from RXCP inside containment intact.
RO Verify CC flow to RXCP Thermal Barriers:
RXCP A/B Therm Barr temperature between 105-120ºF CC-610A/B, RXCP Thermal Barrier CC Return open RXCP Thermal Barrier Return flow, FI-614/FI-610 normal
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 26 03/24/06 Rev. A RO (cont.)
Report thermal barrier temperature on TI-610 elevated.
CREW If Thermal Barrier return flow is checked, direct NAO to locally read FI-614/FI-610.
When NAO responds, report elevated flow on FI-610.
RO Isolate any leaking thermal barrier:
Close CC-610B.
(NOTE: The closure of the valve will initiate 2-minute timer leading to trip of RXCP B.)
CREW Place computer points for RXCP B on trend.
RO Maintain seal injection flow to RXCPs 6-13 gpm.
NOTE: It is expected that RXCP B conditions may require or may have required a reactor trip and RXCP B shutdown by this point. If not, RXCP B will trip at this point. A-RM-45 actions are covered below.
CRS Direct the actions or performance of A-RM-45.
CREW Check if personnel should be evacuated:
Determine monitor indications for R-2 through R-10 are normal.
Check for radiation monitors failed downscale.
Go to step 18 for R-17 response.
Check R-17 operating properly.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 27 03/24/06 Rev. A Check R-17 radiation levels elevated:
Direct contact/Contact Chemistry to determine sampling requirements.
With indications of leakage into CC System, Go to A-CC-31.
NOTE: Actions of A-CC-31 are listed above.
NOTE: When the reactor is tripped (manual or automatic due to RXCP trip), Events 5, 6 & 7 are initiated.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 28 03/24/06 Rev. A Op-Test No.:
1 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
5, 6 & 7 Page of 43 Event
Description:
Reactor trip actions with failed SG B PORV controller. Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Trip of running Component Cooling (CC) Water Pump (A) with failure of CC Pump B to auto start.
On the reactor trip, SG B PORV, SD-3B, setpoint input fails to ZERO resulting in SD-3A opening in AUTO. Manual control of the PORV is available. The reduction in SG B pressure due to the open PORV results in initiation of SGTR. The 250 gpm rupture results in SI actuation. During the actions of E-0, the running CC Pump trips, and the standby pump fails to auto start. The operator must manually start CC Pump B to ensure cooling to ECCS components.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUES:
Annunciator Alarms:
various SD-3B, SG B PORV, red light lit, green light out SG B pressure < 1000 psig and lowering.
Steam Flow indicated on FI474 & FI-475 for SG B, with steam dumps closed.
Przr pressure lowering.
Przr pressure and level dropping.
Charging flow increasing.
TLA-15 Alarm RMS ABOVE NORMAL Radiation trend rising for R-15, Air Ejector Exhaust, and R-19SG Blowdown Liquid.
Automatic SI actuation.
SG B level rising faster than SG A level / SG B level rising with feed isolated.
47103-F, BUS 51 FEEDER BKR TRIP (SER0746)
Various CC flow low annunciators CC Pump A green and white lights lit.
CC Header pressure falling below 35 psig on 4130202 without start of CC Pump B RO
[E-0, step 1]
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 29 03/24/06 Rev. A Verify reactor trip:
Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers OPEN [Green lights lit for RTBs A & B]
All Rod Position indicator £ 7.5 steps All Rod Bottom (red) lights lit Neutron flux decreasing [4122601-4122604 or Power Range NIS Panel A drawers]
[E-0 steps 2 & 3]
Verify turbine trip:
HP Impulse pressure trending to ZERO (PI-485 & PI-486).
Turbine Stop Valve green CLOSE indications lit.
Verify power to either Bus 5 or Bus 6 (White voltage lights lit).
CREW
[E-0 step 4]
Check if SI is actuated:
Annunciator 47021-A and 47021-B - SI Train A(B) ACTUATED - either lit.
If not, Check if SI is required:
Przr pressure < 1815 psig Przr level < 5%
RCS subcooling <30ºF SG pressure < 500 psig CNTMT pressure > 4 psig.
If SI is not required announce reactor trip.
RO Take Przr Spray Control LOOP B to MAN and verify closed.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 30 03/24/06 Rev. A CREW Identify steam release:
Przr pressure lowering Steam flow indicated from SGs with steam dumps closed RED light lit for SD-3B BOP Report SD-3B open (with SG B pressure less than setpoint).
Take SD-3B controller to manual and verify SD-3B closed.
CRS Direct actions of E-0 Verify immediate actions.
If SI has not occurred or is not required, inform crew of transition to ES-0.1 NOTE: it is expected that the SGTR malfunction will be active before the crew does transition to ES-0.1 or performs actions in ES-0.1. If the transition is made to ES-0.1, then upon actuation of SI, transition to E-0 step 1 will be made and the immediate operator actions reperformed.
RO Report indications of RCS leak:
Lowering RCS pressure Lowering Przr level Charging flow rising.
CREW Report secondary radiation indication.
CRS If SI has not occurred, direct SI actuation (E-0 QRF):
CRS (cont.)
Przr level cannot be maintained > 5%
Przr pressure is trending toward 1815 psig and actions have not stabilized pressure.
RCS subcooling <30ºF RO If directed, actuate SI by pressing both SI Train A and Train B INITIATE pushbuttons.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 31 03/24/06 Rev. A CREW Check both trains of SI actuated:
Annunciator 47021-A and 47021-B - SI Train A(B) ACTUATED lit.
CRS Evaluate E-0 QRF, Ruptured SG Isolation Criteria.
CREW When determined that SG B is ruptured, then apply ruptured SG Isolation Criteria:
If any SG level rises in an uncontrolled manner OR any SG has abnormal radiation AND Narrow range level in the affected SG [B] is > 4%,
THEN feed flow may be isolated to SG B.
BOP When directed, isolate feed flow to SG B by closing AFW-2B and AFW-10B.
BOP Verify FW Isolation FW-7A/B, SG A & B Main Feed Control Valves, closed FW-10A/B, SG A & B Bypass Flow Control valves, closed.
FW 12 A/B, Feedwater to SG A & B Isolation, closed.
CREW Make plant announcement that Safety Injection has occurred.
CREW Dispatch EO/AO to Locally monitor AFW Pump operation:
AFW Pump B and TD AFW Pump running.
BOP Check if steamline isolation is required:
High steam flow (>0.75E6) and low RCS Tavg (<540ºF) for SG A.
Containment pressure > 17 psig.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 32 03/24/06 Rev. A CREW Verify Containment Spray not required:
Check containment pressure (Cntmt Wide Range Pressure recorders 42597 & 42598) have remained below 23 psig.
BOP Verify Containment Fan Coil Units running.
Verify SW-903 A, B, C & D CNTMT Fan Coil Unit SW Return valves open.
BOP Verify Aux Bldg Special Ventilation running:
Annunciator 47052-G NOT lit.
Zone SV Fans A and B running.
Verify Service Water alignment:
Verify all SW Pumps running Verify SW header selected on Turbine Bldg SW switch > 82.5 psig [Train A hdr-PI-41503]
Verify AFW Pumps running:
1.
Check AFW Pump A running Report AFW Pump A OOS Close AFW-2A, AFWP A Flow Control.
2.
Check AFW Pump B running 3.
Check TD AFW Pump running (red light lit for MS-102, T/D AFW Pump Main Steam Isol, and discharge pressure on 41040 Throttle AFW Pump Disch valves (AFW-2B):
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 33 03/24/06 Rev. A 1.
Maintain running AFW Pump Disch Pressure > 1000 psig 2.
Maintain either 1) Total AFW flow > 205 gpm OR 2) SG narrow range level in at least one SG > 4% [15% ADVERSE].
NOTE: If SG B feed flow has been isolated IAW E-0 QRF for ruptured SG actions, then the TD AFW pump will be aligned and operated as necessary to feed SG A only.
RO Verify CI Active Status Panel Lights lit.
Verify ESF Equipment running:
1.
SI Pumps Report SI Pump A not running - OOS 2.
RHR Pumps 3.
CC Pumps Check RO CRITICAL TASK When CC Pump A trips, report trip of CC Pump A.
Start CC Pump B.
4.
SI Active Panel lights lit [SI Pump A, AFW Pump A and SW Pump B1 not lit.]
RO (cont.)
Verify SI flow on F925.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 34 03/24/06 Rev. A Check RXCP cooling:
CC valves to RXCPs open - CC-600, CC-601A/B, CC610A/B & CC-612A/B.
RXCP Thermal Barrier temperatures normal, T614 & T610. [Normal is 60ºF to 95ºF.]
RXCP bearing temperatures normal, T132 & T125. [Normal is Ambient to 150ºF.]
Report CC-610B closed.
CRS Direct starting one Charging Pump.
RO Ensure Charging Pump to be started is in MAN.
Rotate Charging Pump pot fully counter-clockwise to minimum.
Start one Charging Pump.
CREW Check RCS average temperature stable at or trending to 547ºF:
NOTE: If feed to SG B was isolated due to the action of the E-0 QRF, then the crew may not stop the TD AFW Pump since it is the only source of feed to SG A.
BOP If Tave is not stable or trending to 547ºF:
Transfer Steam Dumps to Pressure Control Mode.
If at least one MD AFW Pump is running, place TD AFW Pump in PULLOUT Control feed flow. Maintain total feed > 205 gpm until narrow range in at least one SG >
4% [15% ADVERSE]
If cooldown continues, close MS-1A & B.
RO Check Przr PORVS closed.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 35 03/24/06 Rev. A Check Przr Spray Valves closed.
Check CV-15, Aux Spray Valve closed.
Check if RXCPs should be tripped:
RCS injection flow indicated on F925 AND RCS subcooling <15ºF [45ºF]
If both conditions exist, THEN stop both RXCPs and place the control switches in PULLOUT.
Any SG pressure decreasing in uncontrolled manner.
OR Any SG completely depressurized Report NO SGs depressurizing uncontrolled or depressurized.
CREW Check SG Tubes not ruptured:
R-15 Air Ejector Exhaust monitor panel & recorder 45716 normal R-19 SG Blowdown liquid monitor panel & recorder 45716 normal R-31& R-33, Steamline monitors, on SPDS normal Report indications for secondary radiation (R-19 reading elevated).
CRS Inform crew of transition to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 36 03/24/06 Rev. A Direct monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.
CRS Direct actions of E-3 Refer to E-3 QRF.
Inform Shift Manager to contact personnel for initiating of surveys and sampling and to review EPIPs.
RO Check if RXCPs should be tripped:
RCS injection flow indicated on F925 AND RCS subcooling <15ºF [45ºF]
If both conditions exist, THEN stop both RXCPs and place the control switches in PULLOUT.
CREW Dispatch an operator to locally monitor AFW Pump operation.
BOP Report SG B level rising faster than expected or rising with feed flow isolated.
Report secondary radiation indications that may identify the ruptured SG:
R-33 on SPDS R-43 on recorder 42562 CREW Direct Radiation Protection/Chemistry to check for indications of radiation or secondary conductivity to confirm ruptured SG.
Identify ruptured SG B.
NOTE: It is expected SG B will be identified with narrow range level rising and feed stopped to SG.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 37 03/24/06 Rev. A CRITICAL TASKs BT-2B and BT-3B closed SD-3B Controller set to 1050 psig Report SG B PORV controller in MANUAL and closed Close MS-100B, SG B Steam Supply to T/D AFW Pump.
CREW CRITICAL TASK Direct AO to locally close TD-1-9 & TD-3-9, Main Steam Header B, Trap 9 Inlet and Bypass valves.
BOP CRITICAL TASKs Close MS-1B, SG B MSIV, by pressing Main Steam Isolation Initiate Train B pushbutton.
Verify MS-2B, SG B MSIV Bypass, closed.
Check SG B level > 4% narrow range, and if so stop feed flow to SG B by closing AFW-2B and AFW-10B.
If < 4%, maintain feed flow to ruptured SG until narrow range level indicates > 4%, THEN stop feed flow to ruptured SG.
NOTE: The isolation of feed flow may have already occurred as directed by E-0 QRF.
Those actions also satisfy the Critical Task above for closing AFW-2B (or stopping AFW Pump B) and closing AFW-10B.
BOP Check SG B pressure > 550 psig.
RO Reset SI by pressing SI Train A and Train B RESET pushbuttons.
Verify annunciators 47021-A and 47021-B clear.
CREW Determine required CET temperature based on SG B pressure.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 38 03/24/06 Rev. A NOTE: Value will be based on SG B at the time this step is performed. SG B press ________
CET desired temp _________
BOP Maintain running AFW Pump Disch Pressure > 1000 psig Direct NAO to locally throttle AFW-2C, T/D AFW Pump Discharge as necessary to maintain > 1000 psig discharge pressure.
BOP Dump steam to condenser or atmosphere from SG A.
If dumping steam to condenser:
Set steam dump to STM PRESS mode Dump steam at maximum rate
§ Take Steam Dump Control to MAN and rotate pot clockwise to open dumps or
§ Rotate setpoint dial clockwise to lower setpoint until dumps fully open.
BOP (cont.)
When RCS falls below 540ºF, then take both Trains of Steam Dump Control to BYPASS INTLK.
If dumping steam using SG A PORV:
Take SD-3A controller to MAN and rotate pot clockwise to open valve.
or Rotate SD-3A setpoint dial clockwise to lower setpoint until SD-3A fully opens.
NOTE: While the cooldown is in progress, the procedure directs continuing the actions with step 11 until the required temperature is reached. These steps that may be performed during this time are noted below [STEP #].
CREW Cooldown RCS Core Exit Thermocouples read less than CET value determined above.
Close steam dumps or SG A PORV.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 39 03/24/06 Rev. A Operate steam dumps or SG A PORV to maintain RCS Tave less than CET value determined above.
[11]
Check SG A level: > 4% narrow range.
If not, maintain AFW feed > 205 gpm until narrow range level is > 4%, THEN control feed to maintain SG A level between 4% and 50%.
[12]
Check Przr PORVs and Block Valves:
Power available to Block Valves by indicating lights lit.
PORVs closed At least one PORV Block Valve open.
[13, 14, 15]
Place LD-4A to CLOSE.
If not performed earlier, reset SI.
Reset Containment Isolation by pressing CI Train A and Train B RESET pushbuttons.
Verify annunciators 47021-C and 47021-D clear.
[16]
Verify Instrument Air to Containment established:
IA-101, Instr Air to Containment Isol, open Containment Air Pressure header > 40 psig on 4150103.
[17]
Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:
RCS pressure > 150 psig
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 40 03/24/06 Rev. A Stop RHR Pumps and place in AUTO.
[18]
Establish Charging flow:
If Charging Pump is running then continue with action. If no charging pump is running, check CC flow to RXCP B thermal barrier is isolated (CC-610-B closed), and then proceed to next step Open CVC-301, RWST Supply to Charging Pumps Close CVC-1, VCT Supply to Charging Pumps Start a second charging pump and establish maximum charging flow. (CVC-7 open and Charging Pumps demand > 90%)
CREW
[19]
Check if cooldown should be stopped:
Cooldown RCS Core Exit Thermocouples read less than CET value determined above.
CET temperature __________
Close steam dumps or SG A PORV.
Operate steam dumps or SG A PORV to maintain RCS Tave less than CET value determined above.
BOP CRITICAL TASK Check SG B pressure stable or increasing.
If SG B pressure continues to decrease to less than 250 psi above SG A pressure, then transition to ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant Subcooled Recovery Desired.
(See NOTE below for possible conditions that may affect this Critical Task)
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 41 03/24/06 Rev. A CRS If conditions required, inform crew of transition to ECA-3.1.
NOTE: It is not expected that conditions for transition will occur here. However, with RXCP B stopped and cooler SI injection flow to loop B, the reduced loop flow may result in unanticipated reduction of SG B pressure.
If the conditions do warrant transfer, the Chief Examiner will terminate the scenario here. [Training has the shift.] This is done since ECA-3.1 provides no further additional actions for the crew to be evaluated on until step 14, which initiates the RCS cooldown (already performed to the initial plateau). The critical task is valid for evaluation if actions the operator took during the cooldown resulted in the plant conditions that require transition to ECA-3.1. Critical Task reads, Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature Post scenario review of this task would then be required.
CREW CRITICAL TASK Check RCS subcooling > 50ºF.
RO RO (cont.)
CRITICAL TASK Depressurize the RCS to minimize break flow and refill Przr:
Determine normal Przr spray is available using PS-1A.
Energize/deenergize Przr heaters as necessary to maintain saturated conditions in Przr.
Fully open PS-1A to depressurize RCS until a stopping condition is met:
1.
Przr level >74%
OR 2.
RCS pressure < SG B pressure AND Przr level > 5%
When one of the conditions above is met, close PS-1A.
NOTE: The Contingency Action of step 22.c allows for faster depressurization to prevent SG overfill. The crew may evaluate conditions and chose to use more rapid depressurization using a Przr PORV. If so the next section covers those actions.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 42 03/24/06 Rev. A RO CRITICAL TASK Determine one Przr PORV is available.
Energize/deenergize Przr heaters as necessary to maintain saturated conditions in Przr.
Open either PR-2A OR PR-2B to depressurize RCS until a stopping condition is met:
1.
Przr level >74%
OR 2.
RCS pressure < SG B pressure AND Przr level > 5%
When one of the conditions above is met, close the open Przr PORV.
RO If PORV was opened to reduce RCS pressure, check RCS pressure increasing.
RO Check if SI flow should be terminated:
1.
RCS subcooling greater than 30ºF.
2.
RCS pressure stable or increasing.
3.
Przr level greater than 5%.
BOP Check if SI flow should be terminated:
4.
Secondary heat sink:
Total feed flow greater than 205 gpm available. [TD AFW Pump available]
OR Narrow range level in SG A greater than 4%.
RO If the above conditions are met, stop SI Pump B and place in AUTO.
Comments:
Scenario1-1.doc 43 03/24/06 Rev. A Following actions to terminate SI flow, the Chief Examiner will terminate the scenario. [Training has the shift.]
Facility:
Kewaunee Scenario No.:
2 Op-Test No.:
1 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
IC-10; 49% power, Beginning of cycle (BOC)
Ready to start Feedwater Pump B and continue power increase.
Motor Driven AFW A Pump is in PULLOUT.
SI Pump A is in PULLOUT.
Turnover:
The plant is at 49% power. Currently at step 4.1.9.d of N-O-03, Plant Operation Greater Than 35%
Power and step 4.1.8.b (4.1.4.i) of N-FW-05A, Feedwater System Normal Operation. The EO is standing by at Feedwater Pump B, ready for pump starting. Once FW Pump B is started, the crew is directed to continue power increase to 100% power. All fuel pre-conditioning requirements for normal power increase have been met. AFW Pump A has been out of service for 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> due to inboard bearing vibration. SI Pump A has been out of service for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> due to failing to develop the minimum dP during IST surveillance.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description Preload RD11 RP03 Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open on TRIP Signal AMSAC Actuation Override Preload DI-46624-CLOSE ON DI-46624-TRIP &
PTL OFF Bkr 13301 Bus 33 Supply fails to trip. (CRD MG Set A power source)
Preload DI-46621-CLOSE ON DI-46621-TRIP &
PTL OFF Bkr 1-308 Bus 33 Supply fails to trip. (CRD MG Set A power source)
Preload SI05B SI Pump B fails to automatically start. Manual start is available.
Preload D I-40 0 15 -C LO S E ON D I-40 0 16 -C LO S E ON RBV-150C and RBV-150D fail to open on high containment pressure.
1 3/4 N
BOP SRO Start FW Pump B and resume power increase.
R RO Follow turbine load increase using rods and/or dilution.
2 RX217 100 I
BOP SRO SG B controlling steam flow channel fails high.
3 NI05D 100 I
RO SRO Power Range Nuclear Instrument channel fails high.
4 D I-46 1 55 -T R IP O N M
BOP RO SRO Turbine trips without reactor trip. Operation of (Rod Drive MG Set) supply breakers to Bus 33 fails.
5 MS02A 75 M
RO BOP SRO SG A steam line rupture inside containment. Delayed for 3 minutes following opening of the reactor trip breakers, and ramped over 5 minutes.
6 D I -4 0 01 5 -C L O SE O N D I -4 0 01 6 -C L O SE O N C
BOP SRO Train B Containment Fan Coil Units Emergency Dampers fail to auto open. Manual control is available.
7 SI05B C
RO SRO SI Pump B fails to auto start. Manual start available. (Only SI Pump)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient
SCENARIO 1-2 OVERVIEW Event 1 - The plant is at 49% power during a startup. Feedwater Pump B is to be started using N-FW-05A, Feedwater System Normal Operation. The Equipment Operator (EO) is standing by following turnover and has completed local checks of the pump. Once the FW Pump is started the crew should resume the normal power increase to 100% at the rate of 1/4 %/minute, as allowed by fuel pre-conditioning.
Event 2 - Following clearly observable plant response from the reactivity changes, the controlling channel for SG B steam flow will fail high. The BOP will take manual control of FW-7B, Main Feed Control Valve, and restore SG level to normal. The channel will be removed from service using A-MI-87. The CRS will address Technical Specification requirements for steam flow channels (TS 3.5.b) in Table TS 3.5-2 and Table TS 3.5-4 Event 3 - Following completion of the removal of service and Technical Specification review for the failed steam flow channel, Power Range NI channel N-44 will fail high. This will cause control rods to insert in AUTO, and will generate a rod withdrawal rod stop. The RO will respond, after identifying the failed channel, by taking rod control to MANUAL. A-NI-48 will be used to identify and respond to the failure, and A-MI-87 will be entered to remove the failed NI channel from service. The CRS will address Technical Specification requirement for the failed channel (TS 3.5.b) in Table TS 3.5-2.
Event 4 - Following completion of the removal of service and Technical Specification review for the failed NI channel, an inadvertent turbine trip signal will be generated. The turbine will trip; however, the reactor will not trip. The crew will enter E-0 and during the immediate operator actions take actions to manually trip the reactor and deenergize the buses supply the rod drive MG sets. Neither action will be successful, and the CRS will direct transition to FR-S.1. The immediate actions will be performed including dispatching the Auxiliary Operator (AO to locally trip the reactor trip breakers. Following the completion of step 2 (Verify Turbine Trip) and no sooner than 2 minutes after being notified, the AO will locally trip the reactor trip breakers and stop both MG sets. The AO will then inform the Control Room of actions completed. The crew will continue with actions of FR-S.1, including establishing charging flow and boration flow path.
The crew should transition to E-0 at step 19 of FR-S.1.
Event 5, 6 & 7 - Four minutes following the opening of the reactor trip breakers, a steam line break on SG A will initiate and worsen over the next 5 minutes. The crew should recognize the conditions for Safety Injection and manually actuate SI, if it has not automatically occurred. The BOP will report that RBV-150C and RBV-150D, Containment Fan Coil Unit Emergency Dampers (Train B), have not opened when Containment pressure has risen above 4 psig. The SRO will direct the dampers be opened manually (Control Room switch). The RO will recognize that no SI Pumps are running, and after SI sequencing is complete, start SI Pump B. The crew will recognize the conditions indicating SG A is faulted inside containment. (NOTE: Depending on the maximum value for containment pressure and transition time from E-0, entry may be made into FR-Z.1 Response to Containment High Pressure, on an ORANGE path for Containment CSF.)
Transition will be made to E-2 to isolate the faulted SG. Following isolation and check of secondary radiation indication, transition will be made to E-1. The scenario terminates following transition to E-1 if SG A has completed blowdown, or after evaluation of SI termination criteria in step 12 of E-1, OR at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.
Critical Tasks 1.
FR-S.1 C - Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before completing the immediate-action steps of FR-S.1: [Event 4]
- Open the Bus 33 and Bus 43 supply breakers to de-energize the Rod Drive MG sets
- Manually insert Control Rods 2.
E-0 I - Establish flow from at least one SI pump before transition out of E-0. [Event 7]
3.
E-2 A - Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2. [Event 5]
SCENARIO 1-2 OVERVIEW
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 5
03/24/06 Rev. A Op-Test No.:
1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
1 Page of 39 Event
Description:
Start Feedwater Pump B and initiate load increase to 100%.
Start FW Pump B using N-FW-05, Feedwater System Normal Operation. Crew directs EO to complete checks for pump when running. The crew will initiate a load increase to 100% power using N-O-03, Plant Operation Greater Than 35% Power, N-TB-54, Turbine and Generator Operation, and N-CVC-35A, Boron concentration Control.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE:
Provided in Turnover.
CRS Direct actions of N-0-03 Plant Operation Greater Than 35% Power, step 4.1.9.d.
BOP (Step 4.1.4.i of N-FW-05) Start of FW Pump B Direct EO to verify C-17B, Feedwater Pump B Suction, open.
Take FW-2B, Feedwater Pump B and Discharge Valve, to START.
Check PPCS FW Pump Group Output parameters (Group 26 - Feedwater Pump B Temperatures or Graphic Display - Feedwater Pumps) stabilize.
Check SG levels stable.
Direct EO to locally verify proper FW conditions (step 4.1.4.k), and perform actions to ensure proper FW operation (step 4.1.4.l).
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 6
03/24/06 Rev. A CRS Direct (Continuous Action Step) SG Blowdown be shifted to Mode II with condensate to Heater Drain Tank (HDT) per N-BT-07A.
CREW Direct EO to align SG blowdown with Condensate to HDT per N-BT-07A. (step 4.1.2.q)
CREW Contact Chemistry for instructions regarding chemical injection per N-CI-28, Chemical Injection System.
CRS Direct that reactivity estimate be performed based on power loading RO Perform reactivity estimate for power increase:
Use the Reactivity Plan to plan dilutions and rod movement for power increase from 50% to 100% power.
Final Rod position: 226 BOP Raise load per N-TB-54, Turbine and Generator Operation, section 4.1.19:
Review applicable Precautions & Limitations Determine maximum load rate % per minute based on fuel performance limit: 40 Mw/hr Determine maximum load rate % per minute based on Turbine Operating Limits using figure 1 and Attachment A steps A.7 through A.10 Take turbine off Valve Position Limiter:
§ Lower the SETTER to less than or equal to the value on the EH Panel Plaque [43.6]
using REFERENCE CONTROL DOWN pushbutton.
§ Set Loading Rate to a rate less than or equal to 5% /min
§ Press GO pushbutton
§ When the VALVE POS LIMIT green light goes out, press the HOLD pushbutton Set valve Position Limit to 100%.
Press REFERENCE CONTROL UP pushbutton until SETTER value is at desired load
(~ 100%)
Verify/set loading rate to 1/4%/min.
Inform (telephone) ATC of rate and amount of load pickup.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 7
03/24/06 Rev. A Depress GO Verify load increases BOP (cont)
(N-TB-54 cont.)
Verify Reactive Load remains within Figure 5, Generator Capability Curve, limits
§ If required, adjust Generator #1 Voltage Adjuster switch to change VARs (REACT PWR meter 4460104)
Verify and maintain turbine and auxiliaries operating conditions:
§ Turbine Lube Oil Cooler outlet temperature 106-110ºF. (PPCS T2165A, Group 28 Turbine Bearings/Oil Temperatures)
§ Exciter air temperature 108-112ºF. (PPCS T2121A, T2122A, T2123A)
§ EH oil temperature 110-120ºF. (Local)
§ Hydrogen seal oil temperature 112-120ºF (Local)
§ Generator Hydrogen temperatures 30-35ºC; 86-95ºF on Gen Stator Temp recorder.
(PPCS T0397, Group 34 Generator Slot Temperatures 2; Recorder 42525)
RO Perform reactivity adjustments:
Rod Control (outward motion at - 1.5°F difference Tref-Tave)
AND/OR Boron Concentration Control per N-CV-35A, Boron Concentration Control, section 4.4, Dilute or Alternate Dilute:
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 8
03/24/06 Rev. A RO (cont.)
Review applicable Precautions & Limitations.
Determine rate and magnitude of dilution(s) (total amount from above reactivity calculations)
Adjust MU-1022/CV-31095, Blender Control Rx Mu Flow, to required flow rate.
Set Rx Makeup Totalizer to required quantity.
Position Reactor Makeup Mode Selector to DILUTE or ALT DIL.
If ALT DIL is selected, place CVC-406/CV31094, BA Blender to VCT, to CLOSE position.
Position Reactor Makeup Control switch to START Verify required change has been achieved by monitoring:
§ Rod Position
§ Boron Concentration
§ Tave When dilution is complete:
Use Oper Aid 96-3 to verify CVC-403/CV-31092, Blender Control BA Flow, set at current RCS boron concentration.
Verify MU-1022/CV-31095, Blender Control Rx Mu Flow, is set to 60 gpm.
Verify CVC-406 to AUTO position.
Position Reactor Makeup Mode Selector to AUTO.
Position Reactor Makeup Control switch to START.
At Rx Makeup Totalizer:
§ Verify correct quantity added.
§ Reset Rx Makeup Totalizer by pressing the black button.
§ Verify BA Totalizer indicating all ZEROs in window by black button.
If RCS boron has been changed by > 50 ppm, the operate Przr heaters as necessary to equalize RCS and Przr boron.
NOTE: Following the required reactivity change of ~ 5% power, Event 2 may be started.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 9
03/24/06 Rev. A Op-Test No.:
1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
2 Page of 39 Event
Description:
SG B controlling steam flow channel (FT-474) fails high.
The controlling Steam Flow channel for SG B fails high indicating 4.5E6 PPH/HR flow. Input to the control circuit demands additional feedwater flow, so FW-7B, Main Feed Control Valve, will open. SG B inventory will rise until the operator takes manual control of FW-7B. The other Steam Flow channel will indicate normal flow (~ 2.0E6 PPH/HR).The operator will adjust FW-7B as necessary to maintain SG B level within normal operating band (39%-49%).
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUES:
Annunciator Alarms:
47061-E, S/G B SF>FF 47061-F, S/G B FEEDFLOW EXCESSIVE 47062-D, S/G B PROGRAM LEVEL DEVIATION 47062-E, S/G B BYPASS CV LEVEL DEVIATION 47062-J, STEAM HEADER B ISOLATION ALERT 47063-J, MAIN STEAM HEADER B FLOW HI-HI TLA-10 SG TILTS PPCS Alarms:
L0461A S/G A Chan 1 Level FI-474, S/G B Steam Flow at top of scale; FI-475, S/G B Steam Flow stable at ~2E6 PPB/HR LI-471, LI-472 and LI-473 S/G B level rising.
FW-7B Valve Position Demand and Actual (Position) Indication rising.
FI-476 and FI-477, S/G B Feed Flow indications rising.
BOP Identify and report FI-474 failed high.
Take FW-7B controller to MANUAL.
CREW Address Annunciator Response for 47061-E, 47061-F, 47062-E and/or 47062-F.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 10 03/24/06 Rev. A Report that if the alarm is due to a failed instrument:
Verify the alarm was caused by failure of S/G B Steam Flow FT-474 AND position FW-7B to MANUAL.
Go To A-MI-87.
Refer to A-FW-05, Abnormal Feedwater System Operation, when returning FW-7B to AUTO.
(NOTE: Addressing the Annunciator Response is normally done by the off operator, but may be performed by the involved operator if conditions dictate.)
CRS Direct the BOP to control SG B level with FW-7B in MANUAL.
CRS Direct actions of A-MI-87, Bistable Tripping for Failed Reactor Protection or Safeguards Inst.
CRS Check Technical Specifications for instruments with bistable tripping requirements [TS 3.5.b]:
TS Table 3.5-2, item No. 16 (Steam Flow/Feedwater Flow Mismatch) - 2 with 1 required.
TS Table 3.5-4, No. 2.a (Hi-Hi Steam Flow with SI) - 2/loop with 1 required.
TS Table 3.5-4, No. 2.b (Hi Steam Flow and 2 of 4 Lo-Lo Tavg with SI) - 2/loop with 1 required.
CRS Ensure I&C (Work Control/Work Week Coordinator) is notified of status of FT474.
CRS Declare FT474 channel out-of-service (OOS).
CRS Ensure bistables for FT474 are to be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of declaring OOS.
CRS If desired, direct I&C to check for redundant channel bistable status by performing SP 47-316G, Channel 3 (Blue) Reactor Protection Logic Test.
NOTE: Time Warp may be used at this point to have the check of redundant bistables complete.
CUE: SP 47-316G is complete and no bistables were detected that would cause a reactor trip.
CRS Direct the crew to perform/verify Prerequisite Alignment of Attachment I for FT474.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 11 03/24/06 Rev. A BOP Position Steam Flow Channel Selector switch for S/G B 46549/HFC-475 to 475/YELLOW (Channel IV).
NOTE: The FW Flow Channel Selector switch for S/G B 46550/HFC-476 may also be placed to the 477/YELLOW (Channel IV) position, as it is standard practice that the corresponding control channels be powered from the same Instrument Bus in the event of a bus failure.
RO Act as SECOND OPER for verification of position 46549/HFC-476 in 475/YELLOW.
CRS Direct I&C to trip bistables per Attachment I section 2.0 and 3.0 (NOTE: The COMMUNICATOR is set report & to receive direction from CRS, and will perform actions for tripping bistables from the Simulator Booth.)
CRS Direct crew to verify control room indications per Attachment I.
BOP Verify following lit:
§ Annunciator 47063-J, MAIN STEAM HEADER B FLOW HI-HI
§ Annunciator 47062-J, STEAM HEADER B ISOLATION ALERT
§ Annunciator 47061-F, S/G B FEED FLOW EXCESSIVE
§ Annunciator 47061-E, S/G B SF>FF
§ Status Light 44908-0507, MS Hdr B Hi Flow
§ Status Light 44908-0607, MS Hdr B Hi-Hi Flow
§ Status Light 44907-1003, S/G B SF> FF CREW Complete PERFORMED BY and VERIFCATION BY sections of Attachment I.
CRS If desired, direct status control for FI-474 indication (OOS sticker) and switch 46549/HFC in 475/YELLOW (CAUTION tag).
NOTE: At Chief Examiner direction, Event 3 may be initiated.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 12 03/24/06 Rev. A Op-Test No.:
1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
3 Page of 39 Event
Description:
Power Range Nuclear Instrument channel N44 fails high.
Power range NIS output fails to 100% of scale or 120% indicated power for this channel.
Control Rods in AUTO will begin to step IN due to turbine power - auctioneered high nuclear power mismatch. The RO will be required to take manual control of rods.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUES:
Annunciator Alarms:
47031-L, POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD STOP 47031-M, POWER RANGE HIGH FLUX 47032-K, POWER RANGE POSITIVE RATE CHANNEL ALERT 47033-K, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION TLA-6, POWER RANGE RADIAL FLUX TILT Various PPCS Alarms associated with N44 channel Control Rods stepping IN in AUTO.
RO Identify and report trip failure of Power Range NI channel N44 high.
CREW Determine no valid signal for rods stepping (Tave-Tref within 1.5ºF initially and NO turbine runback in progress, load stable and RUNBACK VPL and RUNBACK REF lights not lit on Turbine Control Panel Limits section.)
RO Place Control Rod Bank Selector in MAN.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 13 03/24/06 Rev. A CREW Address Annunciator Response.
47031-L and 47031-M: (The other AR Sheets also address the actions below)
Stop any positive reactivity additions Reduce load until alarm clears CREW (cont.)
If alarm is caused by instrument failure:
§ Position Control Rod Bank Selector switch to MAN.
§ Go to A-NI-48 If alarm is caused by boron dilution, Go To A-RC-36F.
(NOTE: Addressing the Annunciator Response is normally done by the off operator, but may be performed by the involved operator if conditions dictate.)
RO If Dilution is in progress, stop dilution by placing Reactor Makeup Control Switch to STOP.
CRS Direct actions of A-NI-48, Abnormal Nuclear Instrumentation.
RO Check Control rod motion stopped.
If NOT stopped and moving due to Power Range channel failure, position Control Rod Bank Selector in MAN.
RO Check 4 Power Range channels operable.
Report N44 NOT operable.
CREW Determine with a single Power Range channel inoperable, remove the channel from service
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 14 03/24/06 Rev. A per A-MI-87.
CRS Direct actions of A-MI-87, Bistable Tripping for Failed Reactor Protection or Safeguards Inst.
CRS Check Technical Specifications for instruments with bistable tripping requirements [TS 3.5.b]:
TS Table 3.5-2, item No. 2 (Nuclear Flux Power Range)
(Low Setting) - 4 with 3 required. Permissible Bypass - P-10 [Currently BYPASSED].
(High Setting) - 4 with 3 required.
(Positive Rate) - 4 with 3 required.
(Negative Rate) - 4 with 3 required.
TS Table 3.5-2, item No. 5 (Overtemperature DT) - 4 with 3 required.
CRS Ensure I&C (Work Control/Work Week Coordinator) is notified of status of N44.
CRS Declare N44 channel out-of-service (OOS).
CRS Ensure bistables for N44 are to be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of declaring OOS.
CRS Direct I&C to check for redundant channel bistable status by performing SP 47-316H, Channel 4 (YELLOW) Reactor Protection Logic Test.
NOTE: Time Warp may be used at this point to have the check of redundant bistables complete.
CUE: SP 47-316G is complete and no bistables were detected that would cause a reactor trip.
CRS Direct the crew to perform/verify Prerequisite Alignment of Attachment I for Power Range N44.
RO Position UPPER SECTION switch on Detector Current Comparator to PR N44.
Position UPPER SECTION switch on Detector Current Comparator to PR N44.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 15 03/24/06 Rev. A RO (cont)
Position ROD STOP BYPASS switch on Miscellaneous Control and Indication Panel to BYPASS PR N44.
Position POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch on Miscellaneous Control and Indication Panel to BYPASS PR N44.
Position COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch on Comparator and Rate drawer to BYPASS N44.
Position N44A drawer CONTROL POWER breaker to OFF.
BOP Act as SECOND OPER for verification of actions performed above.
CRS Direct I&C to trip bistables per Attachment I section 3.0 and 4.0 (NOTE: The COMMUNICATOR is set report & to receive direction from CRS, and will perform actions for tripping bistables from the Simulator Booth.)
CRS Direct recover of rod control operation.
RO As directed by CRS, withdraw Control Bank D in 5 step increments to order to match Tave-Tref.
NOTE: The limit on 5-step withdrawals in MAN is specified in GNP-03.17.10, Reactivity Management.
CRS When conditions permit, direct positioning Control Rod Bank Selector to AUTO.
RO When directed and conditions permit (Tave-Tref within 1ºF and no rod control step demand),
place Control Rod Bank Selector in AUTO.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 16 03/24/06 Rev. A CRS Direct crew to verify control room indications per Attachment I.
BOP Verify following lit:
§ Annunciator 47033-C, OTDT HIGH
§ Annunciator 47041-R, OTDT CHANNEL RNBACK/RDSTP ALERT
§ Annunciator 47032-K, POWER RANGE POSITIVE RATE CHANNEL ALERT
§ Annunciator 47032-J, POWER RANGE NEGATIVE RATE CHANNEL ALERT
§ Annunciator 47031-M, POWER RANGE HIGH FLUX
§ Annunciator 47033-J, POWER RANGE DETECTOR VOLTAGE LOW
§ Status Light 44907-0404, PR N44 P8
§ Status Light 44907-0504, PR N44 P10
§ Status Light 44907-0604, PR N44 LOW RANGE HI FLUX
§ Status Light 44907-0704, PR N44 HI RANGE HI FLUX
§ Status Light 44907-0508, LOOP A OTDT
§ Status Light 44907-0804, PR N44 HI FLUX RATE
§ Status Light 44906-0602, N44 ROD STOP BYPASSED
§ Status Light 44904-0201, LOOP A CHAN 4 OTDT CREW Complete PERFORMED BY and VERIFCATION BY sections of Attachment I.
CRS If desired, direct status control for N-44 indications (OOS stickers) and N44 drawer (power switch) (CAUTION tag).
CRS Direct remaining actions of A-NI-48.
RO Verify annunciator 47032-L clear OR on Detector Current Comparator drawer, check under Upper Section ALL CHANNELS BELOW 50% F.P. light lit.
Verify annunciator 47032-M clear OR on Detector Current Comparator drawer, check under Lower Section ALL CHANNELS BELOW 50% F.P. light lit.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 17 03/24/06 Rev. A Check both Intermediate Range channels operable.
Check both Source Range channels operable.
[END OF A-NI-48 PROCEURE STEPS]
RO If dilution was secured due to N44 failure, restore Reactor makeup to AUTO per N-CVC-35A:
Obtain current RCS boron concentration.
If required use Oper Aid 96-3 and adjust CVC-403/CV31092, Blender Control BA Flow, to provide makeup at current RCS boron concentration.
Position Reactor Makeup Mode Selector to AUTO.
Position Reactor makeup Control Switch to START.
Observe VCT level to verify proper automatic control operation.
NOTE: At Chief Examiner direction, Event 4 may be initiated.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 18 03/24/06 Rev. A Op-Test No.:
1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
4 Page of 39 Event
Description:
Turbine Trip with ATWS.
A turbine trip signal is generated and the turbine trips. The reactor trip does not occur and the manual actuation of a reactor trip from the control room will also fail. The crew will attempt to remove power to the Rod Drive MG set buses, allowing the rods to drop; however, the breakers to Rod Drive MG Set A will not open (Bkr 13301 Bus 33 Supply Breaker and Bkr1-308 Bus 33 Supply fail to trip.). When an operator is dispatched to open the Reactor Trip Breakers locally, the reactor trip breakers will open.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUES:
Annunciator Alarms:
47051-S, TURBINE TRIP 47032-A, TURBINE TRIP REACTOR TRIP [First Out Annunciator]
Turbine trip indications:
HP Impulse pressure trending to ZERO (PI-485 & PI-486).
Turbine Stop Valve green CLOSE indications lit.
Reactor Trip Breaker A and B red lights lit.
Power Range Instruments indicating above 5% power Control Rod Position indications at 226 for Shutdown Banks And Control Banks A & B and above ZERO for Control Banks C & D.
CREW Identify turbine trip.
Report failure of reactor to trip.
CRS Direct manual reactor trip.
CREW Perform Immediate Actions of E-0 (first 4 steps are so designated):
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 19 03/24/06 Rev. A RO Verify reactor trip.
Report failure of reactor to trip.
Reactor trip breakers NOT open Rod Positions indications greater than 7.5 steps Rod Bottom lights NOT lit Neutron flux not less than 5%.
RO (cont.)
Manually trip the reactor (press the Reactor Trip button on panel with Rod Controls)
BOP Manually trip the reactor (press the Reactor Trip button on panel with Turbine Controls)
RO Report failure of reactor trip.
Drive rods IN.
NOTE: Rods may be left in AUTO to drive in as long as inward rod motion is apparent. If rod motion stops rods are to be taken to MAN and inserted.
BOP Take the following breakers to TRIP position:
BKR 13301, Bus 33 SUPPLY (Red label)
BKR 14301, Bus 43 SUPPLY (red label)
Report failure of breakers to open and deenergize Bus 33.
Verify turbine trip:
HP Impulse pressure trending to ZERO (PI-485 & PI-486).
Turbine Stop Valve green CLOSE indications lit.
Verify power to either Bus 5 or Bus 6 (White voltage lights lit)
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 20 03/24/06 Rev. A NOTE:
The above actions may be taken by the BOP as part of his immediate actions of E-0, prior to the determination of the need to go to FR-S.1.
NOTE: Depending on timing for performing the Immediate Actions, reactor power may be below 5% due to the operator driving in rods, if so transition to FR-S.1 is NOT required.
RO Report reactor power is GREATER THAN 5%.
CRS Verify actions of E-0.
Read step 1 and check actions taken.
If reactor power is greater than 5%, announce transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. (Sep 1.c CA)
CREW PERFORM Immediate Actions of FR-S.1 RO Verify reactor trip.
Report failure of reactor to trip.
Reactor trip breakers NOT open Rod Positions indications greater than 7.5 steps Rod Bottom lights NOT lit Neutron flux not less than 5%.
Manually trip the reactor (press the Reactor Trip button on panel with Rod Controls)
CRITICAL TASK (if in FR-S.1)
Manually insert Control Rods (NOTE: The insertion performed as directed in E-0, CA step 1.b.1) also counts for this Critical Task.)
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 21 03/24/06 Rev. A NOTE: The steps for deenergizing Bus 33 and Bus 43 need not be performed again since the Breaker controls are in the TRIP position.
CREW Dispatch AO to locally open the Reactor Trip breakers and to Position the Rod Drive MG Set Motor and Generator Circuit Breaker Control Switches to TRIP.
(NOTE: The COMMUNICATOR is set receive direction from crew, and will perform actions above from the Simulator Booth 2 minutes after receiving direction AND FR-S.1.
step 3 is initiated.)
BOP Verify turbine trip:
HP Impulse pressure trending to ZERO (PI-485 & PI-486).
Turbine Stop Valve green CLOSE indications lit.
[This completes the Immediate Actions of FR-S.1]
BOP Check both MD AFW Pumps running; if NOT, manually start pumps. [NOTE: AFW Pump A is OOS]
Check TD AFW Pump running OR start TD AFW Pump.
NOTE: The next malfunction (Steam line break in Containment) is set to occur 3 minutes following the opening of the reactor trip breakers. This may occur while still performing actions of FR-S.1. The actions here will also include those actions for the condition if SI is actuated.
RO (cont.)
Starting the SI Pump here, if conditions
- warrant, will satisfy Check SI Pumps stopped.
If any SI Pump is running, open Przr PORVs to obtain SI flow greater than 100 gpm.
If SI flow is greater than 100 gpm AND additional charging flow is NOT desired then do NOT establish charging flow & boration path, otherwise establish charging flow.
NOTE: The Charging Pumps are load shed when SI actuates.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 22 03/24/06 Rev. A the Critical Task identified in E-0 below.
Establish Charging flow:
Start charging pumps as necessary to establish 2 running.
Verify CVC-11/CV31229, Charging Line Isolation open.
Fully open CVC-7/CV-31103, Charging Control Chg Line.
Increase charging pump speed as necessary to establish maximum available charging flow
(~ 75 gpm indicated FI-128)
RO (cont.)
Align boration path:
Start both Boric Acid Transfer Pumps in FAST speed Open CVC-440, Emergency Boration valve.
Check Przr pressure less than 2335 psig Verify charging flow greater then 40 gpm.
Continue boration until Cold Shutdown Boron Concentration is achieved (RD-6.7) [~1795 ppm @ 2000 MWD/MTU burnup)
BOP Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
Cnmt Purge/Vent Supply & Exhaust closed - RBV-1, RBV-2, RBV-3, RBV-4, RBV-5 TAV-12.
Post LOCA H2 valves closed - LOCA-2B, LOCA-100B, LOCA-201B, SA-7003B
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 23 03/24/06 Rev. A NOTE: If SI has actuated at this point, steps 3 through 16 of E-0 should be performed as time permits. The CRS will usually direct the BOP to perform these actions while continuing in FR-S.1 with the RO.
The actions for the operator performing the steps of E-0 are located under the next event.
RO Check that reactor is tripped.
Check that turbine is tripped.
BOP Check SG narrow range level in at least one SG greater than 4% [15% for ADVERSE Containment].
If NOT, verify total feed flow greater than 410 gpm (sum of indicated flow 414107 AFW Hdr A Flow and 4104202 AFW Hdr B Flow).
Control feed flow to maintain SG narrow range level between 4% [15%] and 50%.
NOTE: Adverse Containment occurs when containment pressure is above 4 psig or containment radiation is above 1E5 R/hr.
RO Verify all dilution paths isolated:
MU-1022, Reactor makeup Water to Blender Direct the AO to locally verify the following are closed: MU-1025, MU-1024, CVC-423, MU-1031A and MU-1031B CREW Check for reactivity insertion from uncontrolled cooldown:
RCS temperature decreasing in uncontrolled manner Any SG pressure decreasing in uncontrolled manner If no uncontrolled cooldown, then stop any uncontrolled cooldown and continue actions for checking Core Exit TCs; otherwise continue with attempts to isolate cooldown source.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 24 03/24/06 Rev. A NOTE: These actions will be performed if the next event is active.
Check Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass valves closed [MS-1A/B and MS-2A/B; MS-2A/B are normally closed at power].
If required, Actuate Main Steam Line Isolation train A and Train B to close MS-1A and MS-1B respectively.
Check if TD AFW should be stopped.
Check both MD AFW Pumps running Report AFW Pump A not running or available.
Performing the actions here satisfy the Critical Tasks identified in E-2 Check if SGs are faulted:
Any SG pressure decreasing in uncontrolled manner Any SG completely depressurized Isolate faulted SG [which will be SG A, if event 5 active]
Verify BT-2A and BT-3A closed Verify SG PORVs closed (SD-3A)
Close AFW-2A, AFW Pump A Flow Control Valve Close MS-100A, SG A Steam Supply to T/D AFW Pump Verify BT-31A and BT-32A, SG Sample Isol, closed [dual lights]
Close FW-12A, SG A FW isol valve Close AFW-10A, AFW Train A Crossover valve RO Check Core Exit TCs less than 1200ºF.
Verify Reactor subcritical:
1.
Power Range channels (N41-N43) less than 5%.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 25 03/24/06 Rev. A 2.
Intermediate Range channels negative SUR.
CRS Ensure CAUTION is read and understood by crew to continue boration to obtain Cold Shutdown Boron Concentration.
Transition to E-0 step 1.
CREW Monitor Critical Safety Function Status Trees.
NOTE: Continued under Event 5, 6 & 7.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 26 03/24/06 Rev. A Op-Test No.:
1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
5, 6 & 7 Page of 39 Event
Description:
SG A steam line ruptures inside containment.
Train B Containment Fan Coil Unit dampers fail to shift to accident mode.
SI Pump B fails to auto start on SI sequencer.
Three minutes following the opening of the reactor trip breakers, SG A steamline will rupture in containment result in full shear over a 5-minute ramp. Containment pressure will rise and Przr pressure, Przr pressure and RCS temperature will lower resulting in SI actuation, M ain Steamline Isolation and Containment Spray actuation. During the event the Train B CFCU dampers which open on 4 psig pressure in Containment will fail to open, requiring the operator to manually open them. SI Pump B will fail to auto start and must be manually started.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUES:
Annunciator Alarms:
47021-A, SI TRAIN A ACTUATED 47021-B, SI TRAIN B ACTUATED 47021-C, CI TRAIN A ACTUATED 47021-D, CI TRAIN B ACTUATED 47022-D, CONTAINM ENT HIGH PRESSURE SI 47022-B, MAIN STEAM HEADER A LOW PRESSURE SI S/G A pressure lowering.
Containment humidity and pressure rising.
RCS pressure, temperature and Przr level lowering.
ECCS/ESF equipment started.
Containment Fan Coil Unit (CFCU) Emergency Damper position indication green light lit when Containment pressure is greater than 4 psig. (RBV150C & RBV-150D). RBV-10A/B red lights lit.
SI Pump B NOT running (green light lit / no SI flow indicated) following sequencing of ECCS
/ESFAS equipment. (Step 1 of SI sequence)
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 27 03/24/06 Rev. A Note: If one of the operators was assigned to perform E-0 steps 3-16 while performing FR-S.1, the CRS may choose to review the actions taken and conditions noted and begin actions where the operator stopped.
RO Verify reactor trip.
BOP Verify turbine trip:
HP Impulse pressure trending to ZERO (PI-485 & PI-486).
Turbine Stop Valve green CLOSE indications lit.
Verify power to either Bus 5 or Bus 6 (White voltage lights lit)
CREW Check both trains of SI actuated:
Annunciator 47021-A and 47021-B - SI Train A(B) ACTUATED lit.
CREW NOTE: This action may be performed at any time based on judgment of CRS and CREW. (and earlier actions taken)
Implement E-0 QRF Item 3 FAULTED SG ISOLATION CRITERIA:
If any SG pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner OR any SG completely depressurized, AND remaining SG is intact, THEN the following may be performed:
Isolate feed flow to faulted SG. [Close AFW-10A, AFW Train A Crossover.]
Maintain total feed flow greater than 205 gpm until narrow range level in at least one SG is greater than 4% [15% ADVERSE] [4104202 AFW HDR B FLOW]
BOP Verify FW Isolation FW-7A/B, SG A & B Main Feed Control Valves, closed FW-10A/B, SG A & B Bypass Flow Control valves, closed.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 28 03/24/06 Rev. A FW 12 A/B, Feedwater to SG A & B Isolation, closed.
CREW Make plant announcement that Safety Injection has occurred.
Dispatch EO/AO to Locally monitor AFW Pump operation:
AFW Pump B and TD AFW Pump, if running.
BOP Check if steamline isolation is required:
High steam flow (>0.75E6) and low RCS Tavg (<540ºF) for SG A.
Containment pressure > 17 psig.
Verify MS-1A, SG A Main Steam Isolation, closed.
If NOT and conditions required it closed, press Main Steam Line Isol Train A pushbutton.
Verify MS-2A, SG A MSIV Bypass, closed.
NOTE: If Containment pressure is > 17 psig, both steamlines should be isolated, so MS-1B and MS-2B will be verified closed.
CREW Verify Containment Spray not required:
Check containment pressure (Cntmt Wide Range Pressure recorders 42597 & 42598) have remained below 23 psig.
If NOT, verify containment spray initiated. [Annunciator 47021-F CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATED lit and Panel 44910, SI ACTIVE, Row 10 Status Lights lit)
BOP Verify Containment fan Coil Units running Verify SW-903 A, B, C & D CNTMT Fan Coil Unit SW Return valves open.
When containment pressure exceeds 4 psig, verify RBV-150A, B, C & D, CNTMT Fan Coil Unit Emergency Dampers open
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 29 03/24/06 Rev. A Report RBV-150C & D NOT open.
Manually open RBV-150C & D.
Verify Aux Bldg Special Ventilation running:
Annunciator 47052-G NOT lit.
Zone SV Fans A and B running.
BOP (cont.)
Verify Service Water alignment:
Verify all SW Pumps running Verify SW header selected on Turbine Bldg SW switch > 82.5 psig [Train A hdr-PI-41503]
Verify AFW Pumps running:
1.
Check AFW Pump A running Report AFW Pump A OOS Close AFW-2A, AFWP A Flow Control.
2.
Check AFW Pump B running 3.
Check TD AFW Pump running (red light lit for MS-102, T/D AFW Pump Main Steam Isol, and discharge pressure on 41040.
Throttle AFW Pump Disch valves:
1.
Maintain running AFW Pump Disch Pressure > 1000 psig 2.
Maintain either 1) Total AFW flow > 205 gpm OR 2) SG narrow range level in at least one SG > 4% [15% ADVERSE].
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 30 03/24/06 Rev. A RO Verify CI Active Status Panel Lights lit.
RO (cont.)
CRITICAL TASK Verify ESF Equipment running:
1.
SI Pumps Report SI Pump B NOT started. [SI Pump A not running - OOS]
Manually start SI Pump B.
2.
RHR Pumps 3.
CC Pumps 4.
Check SI Active Panel lights lit [SI Pump A not lit.]
Verify SI flow on F925 if RCS pressure is < 2200 psig [2000 psig ADVERSE].
Check RXCP cooling:
CC valves to RXCPs open - CC-600, CC-601A/B, CC610A/B & CC-612A/B.
RXCP Thermal Barrier temperatures normal, T614 & T610. [Normal is 60ºF to 95ºF.]
RXCP bearing temperatures normal, T132 & T125. [Normal is Ambient to 150ºF.]
CREW Check RCS average temperature stable at or trending to 547ºF:
NOTE: If blowdown of SG A is complete at this time, the RCS temperature may be trending up and the following action step would not be performed. Also for the following step, the PORVs may be cycling and passing water due to heatup and injection refill of Przr.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 31 03/24/06 Rev. A BOP Transfer Steam Dumps to Pressure Control Mode.
If at last one MD AFW Pump is running, place TD AFW Pump in PULLOUT Control feed flow. Maintain total feed > 205 gpm until narrow range in at least one SG >
4% [15% ADVERSE]
If cooldown continues, close MS-1A & B.
RO Check Przr PORVS closed Check Przr Spray Valves closed.
Check CV-15, Aux Spray Valve, closed.
Check if RXCPs should be tripped:
RCS injection flow indicated on F925 AND RCS subcooling <15ºF [45ºF]
RO (cont.)
If both conditions exist, THEN stop both RXCPs and place the control switches in PULLOUT.
Any SG pressure decreasing in uncontrolled manner.
OR Any SG completely depressurized Report SG A depressurizing uncontrolled or depressurized.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 32 03/24/06 Rev. A NOTE: Transition may be made to FR-P.1 if the cooldown is such that the INTEGRITY status tree indicates a RED or ORANGE Path. The steps to be performed are covered further down after the E-2 & E-1 actions.
CRS Inform crew of transition to E-2, Faulted SG Isolation.
Direct actions of E-2.
Inform Shift Manager to review EPIPs.
Read CAUTIONS to crew:
At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
Any faulted SG or secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown BOP CRITCAL TASK Verify Steamline Isolation For SG A - MS-1A and MS-2 A Closed.
CREW Dispatch Operator For AFW Operation.
BOP Check if any SG NOT faulted: Check pressure in SG any stable or increasing.
Report SG B pressure stable (or increasing).
[NOTE: Pressure in SG B may be decreasing, but is considered stable if the pressure is approximately the saturation pressure for the RCS Loop B cold leg temperature. Cold leg temperature may be depressed due to the SI injection water.]
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 33 03/24/06 Rev. A BOP (cont.)
CRITCAL TASK Isolate SG A:
BT-2A & BT-3A, SG A Blowdown Isol, closed.
AFW-2A, AFWP A Flow Control Valve closed. [This is not critical as the Pump is not running.]
MS-100A, SG A Steam Supply to T/D AFW Pump, closed.
BT-31A & BT-31B, SG Sample Isol, closed.
FW-12A, Feedwater Isol, closed AFW-10A, AFW Train A Crossover Valve, closed.
Check CST level > 20% on 4102901 & 4102902.
CREW Check secondary radiation normal:
Request Chemistry provide periodic activity samples and Radiation Protection conduct radiation surveys of both SGs Check unisolated secondary rad monitors - normal
§ R-31& R-33, Steamline monitors, on SPDS.
§ SG A & SG B N-16 monitors, recorders 42506 and 42562.
§ R-15, Condenser Air Ejector monitor, panel & recorder 45716.
§ R-19, SG Blowdown monitor, panel & recorder 45716.
BOP Set steam dump to minimize heatup:
If condenser steam dumps available, SG B MSIV (MS-1A) open and CDSR AVAIL DUPM PERM status light (44905-0301) lit, Then:
Set Steam Dump Control Mode to STM PRESS.
Verify Steam Dump Pressure Setpoint controller in AUTO.
Set Steam Release Control Steam Dump Pressure to saturation pressure for RCS Loop B
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 34 03/24/06 Rev. A Cold Leg temperature.
When RCS temperature is less than 540ºF, set Main Steam Dump Train A and B Interlock Selector to BYPASS INTLK.
If MS-1A and MS-1B closed OR steam dumps not available (as indicated above):
Verify SG B PORV controller in AUTO. (SD-3B)
Set SG B PORV controller to saturation pressure for RCS Cold leg temperature.
CRS Inform crew of transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant.
Direct actions of E-1.
Refer to E-1 QRF.
RO Check if RXCPs should be tripped:
RCS injection flow indicated on F925 AND RCS subcooling <15ºF [45ºF]
If both conditions exist, THEN stop both RXCPs and place the control switches in PULLOUT.
Check RWST level > 37% on LI-920 & LI-921.
Any SG pressure decreasing in uncontrolled manner.
OR Any SG completely depressurized If so, verify steamlines and feedlines isolated.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 35 03/24/06 Rev. A Check level in at least one SG > 4% [15% ADVERSE].
If so, control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 4% [15% ADVERSE] and 50%.
If NOT, maintain total feed > 205 gpm until narrow range in at least one SG > 4% [15%
ADVERSE].
CREW Check Main Steamline rad monitors - normal R-31& R-33, Steamline monitors, on SPDS.
SG A & SG B N-16 monitors, recorders 42506 and 42562.
RO Check Przr PORVs and Block valves:
PR-1A and PR-1B, Przr PORV Block Valves have power available.
PORVS closed.
At least one Block Valve open.
Isolate letdown:
Place LD-4A, Letdown Orifice Valve, switch in CLOSE; verify LD-4B & LD-4C switches in CLOSE position.
RO Reset SI by pressing SI Train A and Train B RESET pushbuttons.
Verify annunciators 47021-A and 47021-B clear.
Reset Containment Isolation by pressing CI Train A and Train B RESET pushbuttons.
Verify annunciators 47021-C and 47021-D clear.
BOP Verify Instrument Air to Containment established:
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 36 03/24/06 Rev. A IA-101, Instr Air to Containment Isol, open Containment Air Pressure header > 40 psig on 4150103.
RO Establish Charging flow:
Report no charging pump running.
Check that CC flow has not been lost the RXCP Thermal Barriers (CC-610A 7 B open)
Reduce demand on charging pump to be started to ZERO Start the selected Charging Pump.
Raise charging pump speed to establish charging flow.
Monitor Przr level for > 5% [30% ADVERSE]
CREW Check if SI should be terminated 1.
RCS subcooling > 30ºF [65ºF ADVERSE].
2.
RCS pressure > 2200 psig [2000 psig ADVERSE] and stable or increasing.
3.
Przr level > 5% [30% ADVERSE]
4.
Secondary heat sink:
- Total flow to SG B > 205 gpm
- Narrow range level in at least one SG >4% [15% ADVERSE].
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 37 03/24/06 Rev. A CRS If all conditions for SI termination are met, inform crew of transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.
If conditions not met then continue.
The Chief Examiner will terminate the scenario at this point. [Training has the shift.]
NOTE: The steps of FR-P.1 are included below, if CSFTs dictate transition for INTEGRITY path.
CRS Inform crew of transition of FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.
Direct actions of FR-P.1.
CRS (cont.)
Check if FR-P.1 implementation required.
RO Check RCS pressure > 150 psig on PI419 or PI420, or recorder 42556.
CREW Check Cold Leg temperatures stable or increasing on recorder 42555.
BOP If NOT, stop RCS cooldown:
Verify MS-1A closed on faulted SG Close MS-100A from faulted SG Isolate feedwater to SG A, unless needed for RCS cooldown.
RO Check Przr PORVs and Block valves:
PR-1A and PR-1B, Przr PORV Block Valves have power available.
PORVS closed.
At least one Block Valve open.
Check if any SI Pump running.
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 38 03/24/06 Rev. A Identify SI Pump B running.
CREW Check if SI should be terminated 1.
RCS subcooling > 80ºF [115ºF ADVERSE].
If so, Reset SI by pressing SI Train A and Train B RESET pushbuttons.
Verify annunciators 47021-A and 47021-B clear.
Reset Containment Isolation by pressing CI Train A and Train B RESET pushbuttons.
Verify annunciators 47021-C and 47021-D clear.
BOP Verify Instrument Air to Containment established:
IA-101, Instr Air to Containment Isol, open Containment Air Pressure header > 40 psig on 4150103.
RO Stop SI Pump A and place in AUTO Stop RHR Pump A and B and place in AUTO.
RO Establish Charging flow:
Report no charging pump running.
Check that CC flow has not been lost the RXCP Thermal Barriers (CC-610A 7 B open)
Comments:
Scenario1-2.doc 39 03/24/06 Rev. A Reduce demand on charging pump to be started to ZERO Start the selected Charging Pump.
Establish 20 gpm charging flow (FI-128).
If transition was made to FR-P.1, The Chief Examiner will terminate the scenario at this point. [Training has the shift.]
S