ML051310353
| ML051310353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 05/10/2005 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC MC6916 | |
| Download: ML051310353 (30) | |
Text
Committed to Nuclear Excellence I
May 10, 2005 I; Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Protection License Amendment Request b-'-
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- Agenda nda Modification (Design/Analysis)
Modification (Operations) ise Amendment Request
%fusion Leslie Hartz Lori Armstrong Jeff Stafford Brian Koehler Jeff Stafford Morris Branch Leslie Hartz II II III N
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Background===
Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump protection for:
- Loss of normal water supply Loss of Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) at
- runout License Amendment Request Suction Pressure Trip
- Discharge Pressure Trip Operator Actions
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Stem Pre-Modification Normal/Standby Steam SW601A AFW2A AFW3A
Steam Pre-Modification Operations Steam SW60IA AFV3A
Post Modification - Design Features Low Suction Pressure AFW Pump Protection
- Rerouted & Resized suction piping to provide a Protective Volume
- Suction Pressure Trip function Low Discharge Pressure AFW Pump Trip Setpoint I
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Steam Post-Modification Design Features Steam SW60IA AFMA2 AFV3A
' Post Modification - Safety Analysis
.USAR Accident and Transient Analysis reviewed
- No impact to safety analysis of record
- Westinghouse review Steam generator pressures > 750 psig
- Except for Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)
- SGTR event during RCS cooldown described)
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Post Modification - Operations Operational Strategy
- Integrated Plant Emergency Operating Procedures wSteam generator tube rupture wMain steam line break
- Event identification (system symptoms)
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Steam Post-Modification Design Features Steam SW601A AFW2A ArNV3A
- Post Modification - Operations Potential Local Operator Actions
- Manual valve throttling
- Diverse access routes
- Operator time validation I
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I" License Amendment Request Request for an Expeditious Review
-Commitment to time validate Operator Actions I TS Changes
- TS 3.4.b.1-AFW Pump Suction Pressure.Trip Channels added
- TS 3.4.b.5-Required actions and completion times for inoperable AFW pump trip channels added
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License Amendment Request
,,:,.:,Surveillance Changes to TS Table 4.1.1
- Item 43 - AFW pump discharge pressure trip channels
- Item 46 - AFW pump low suction pressure trip channels
- "TS Bases Changes
- Revise discharge pressure switches functionality
- Implement Control Room Operator Actions--...,
- Implement Local Operator Actions 13
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Conclusions ummary
- Modifications provide pump protection from loss of suction or pump runout.
4 'Accident analyses timelines are unaffected and current accident analyses are valid.
'*Current radiological dose assessment of SGTR is valid
'Local manual operator action may be necessary for post-accident RCS cooldown in some scenarios
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'Operator actions will be time validated prior to.
start-up.
'-AFW system will be reviewed for elimr(nath.g N local operator action 14
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Committed to Nuclear Excellence p...
May 10, 2005
- -Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant NRC Meeting on Internal Flooding
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Agenda W Purpose g USAR Background
% Internal Flooding Basis g Closing Comments I'
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Lori Armstrong Tom Breene Tom Breene Lori Armstrong Canmtedo MadeE 2
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Meeting Purpose Communicate Kewaunee design basis for internal flooding.
Communicate status on resolution of flooding issues.
USAR Background KNPP was designed and constructed to comply with the intent of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) General Design Criteria (GDC) as proposed on July 10, 1967 Construction 50% complete when Appendix A GDCs published, February 20,1971 AEC did not require KNPP to reanalyze
- AEC was "satisfied that the plant desj.gn-generally conforms to the intent of these criteriaa" (SERtofg July 24, 1 972)
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USAR Background Appendix B.5 - Protection of Class I Items "Class I items are protected against damage from: a) Rupture of a pipe or tank resulting in serious flooding or excessive steam release to the extent that the Class I function is impaireFl" > /^
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V3. e ternal Flooding Basis Overview Class I SSCs Designed Not to Fail.
Non-Class I Pipe and Tank Failure:
a) Assume the single most limiting failure in an area b) Single most limiting case determined by maximum level calculated in an area c) Mitigating actions and design features are considered A Single Active Failure is Applied for-Chapt 14 Events and High Energy Line Bteak (HIE Post-Flood Equipment is Sufficient to.-Maint Safe Shutdown Requirements.
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Internal Flooding Basis
- 1. Class I SSCs Designed Not to Fail.
- Systems, structures, and components designated Class I are so designed that there is no loss of function in the event of a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) and all environmental factors (Ref.: USAR 1.3.1)
- Non-Class I SSCs may be excluded by evaluation to Class I criteria.
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Internal Flooding Basis S on-Class I Pipe and Tank Failure:
-.a) Assume single most limiting break in an area
- Precedent evaluations of similar vintage plants.
Assume single, worst case non-Class I piping or tank failure 1:.
consistent with:
v NRC guidance from Multi-plant Generic Issue B-1 1.
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Similar vintage plant TIA 2001-02.
v IN 87-49, Deficiencies in outside containment flooding protection.
4;:.. Assume only one CW expansion joint failure consistent with:
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/Similar vintage plant flooding analyses.
V NUREG 0800 section 10.4.5 "Circulating Water System"- _
At @Pipe breaks of 1" or less not considered, consistentwith BT3\\
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I.* 4 Internal Flooding Basis Non-Class I Pipe and Tank Failure:
b) Single most limiting case. determined by maximum level calculated in an area
- Flood levels determined based on water sources from either inside or outside a potential flood area.
- Single complete break vs crack of non-Class!lpiping is evaluated.
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Internal Flooding Basis
- 2. Non-Class I Pipe and Tank Failure:
c) Mitigating actions and design features are considered, similar to other plants.
- These Include:
V CW pump trip V
Barriers Vt Validated operator actions
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Internal Flooding Basis A Single Active Failure is Applied for Chapter 14 Events and HELB.
Available guidance (Multi-plant Generic Issue B-1 1) does not require consideration of additional single active failure.
A review of the USAR and the Safety Evaluation Report for Kewaunee indicate that the single active failure criteria is treated separately from criteria related to protection from external events.
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Internal Flooding Basis Post-Flood Equipment Sufficient to Maintain Safe Shutdown Requirements.
Safe shutdown requirements based on achieving and maintaining hot shutdown from at-power conditions.
Loss of offsite power assumed when it increases the consequences of the event. (Ref.: Multi-Plant Generic Issue B-11)
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Design Basis Application Areas defined based on physical configuration of plant Preliminarily, the worst case Turbine Building flood is the Feed Water HELB accompanied by Fire Protection actuation The basis is being applied to otheFlalnt<
areas
VIa temnal Flooding Modifications A.
Issue Turbine building internal flooding.
Corrective Actions tn Modify doors and barriers to be leak tight Add circulating water pump trip Reroute AFW cooling water to the turbine building Add check valves to interconnecting drain lines Remaining Actions Complete modification calculations and design Complete installation and testing II I
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I' Closing Comments