ML050470044
| ML050470044 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/01/2005 |
| From: | Desilets M Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| Download: ML050470044 (32) | |
Text
1 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-I Op-Test Facility:
Vermont Yankee Scenario No.:
1 No.:
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
100% power, ORAM Sentinel is GREEN, Rapid Shutdown Sequence is latched Turnover:
A APRM is bypassed due to inability to adjust gain - I&C troubleshooting is in progress The plant is at 100% power. The HPCl quarterly surveillance was performed last shift. HPCl has been restored and is available, but has not been declared operable. Engineering is evaluating vibration data, and will notify the control room in the next few hours. The Speed Load Changer Bypass Test OP 4160 is schedule to be completed this shift.
Scenario Summary:
Following turnover, the crew will commence the performance of the Speed Load Changer Bypass Test OP 4160. Following the surveillance, the A SRV will fail open. The crew will implement OT 3121. After cycling A SRV shut, control power will be lost. As a result, the CRS will evaluate Tech Specs for SRVs (3.6.D.1) and ADS (3.5.F.3). With HPCl inoperable in combination with ADS a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> depressurization less than 150 psig is required. When Engineering subsequently notifies the control room that the vibration data is satisfactory, the CRS will exit the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> action and enter a 7 day LCO for the one inoperable ADS valve.
Subsequently, a loss of DC-1 will occur, requiring a Technical Specification plant shutdown and implementation of ON 3159 to mitigate the event. After control power is transferred for Bus 1, the A recirculation pump will trip resulting in entry into the exclusion region. OT 31 17 and OT 31 18 will be implemented to address the recirc pump trip and operation within the exclusion region. Control rods will be inserted to exit the exclusion region.
While still operating in the exclusion region, thermal hydraulic instabilities will be experienced requiring a manual reactor scram. Control rods will insert partially requiring actions from EOP-2, ATWS Control, to be implemented. Following rod insertion, a HPCl steam line break with a failure of Group VI isolation will occur. The crew will implement EOP-4, Secondary Containment Control to mitigate the event. Secondary containment temperatures will exceed their maximum safe limits in two different areas and an EOP-5, RPV-ED will be performed.
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks:
With the reactor at power and a scram signal required manually scram the reactor Actuate the manual scram pushbuttons within 1 minute of reaching an LPRM High Alarm With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by inserting control rods to prevent exceeding a primary containment design limit Actions taken within 10 minutes of the scram failure to implement appropriate appendices.
Only one method needs to be used. The method must result in successful control rod insertion.
With a primary system discharging into Secondary Containment and area temperature exceeds maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, initiate an RPV-ED.
Initiate RPV-ED within 5 minutes of area temperature exceeding maximum safe operating levels in more than one area.
Note: Actions to anticipate RPV-ED and prevent two area temperatures from exceeding maximum safe operating levels will be evaluated as a substitute Critical Task.
Malf. No.
Event 1
1 Type*
1 I
I N
2 AD08A C
SRV Event Trigger 3
I EDOGA 1
C 4
I 5
I
I R
6 Instability M
Event Trigger 7
RD 12NB C
8 HP09 M
PClHPI5 Event Description Scenario # I Speed Load Changer Bypass Test OP 4160 A
SRV Failure - OT 3121 Technical Specification Loss of DC-1 ON 3159 Technical Specification Recirc Pump Trip on Control Power Restoration - OT 31 18 Power Reduction - Control Rod insertion - OT 31 17 Instabilities - Man Scram ATWS - Partial ATWS EOP-2 HPCl Line Break with PClS Failure RPV-ED on Secondary Containment Temperatures (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Aooendix D Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test Event No.:
Scenario No.:
1 No.:
I Page 1 of Event
Description:
Speed Load Changer Bypass Test OP 41 60 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
0 Speed Load Changer Meter 0
- 1TBV Meter begins to open Slowly operate the Speed-Load Changer switch by going to RAISE until no further load increase is noted (bypass valves closed)
The pressure regulator now has control of load and the Speed-Load Changer switch may be set per OP 0105 Record required data (Use VYOPF 4160.09)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 0 p -Tes t Event No.:
Scenario No.: I No.:
2 Page 1 of Event
Description:
A SRV failure Indications and Alarms Monitored:
0 RX RELIEF/SAFETY VLV TEMP HI (3-B-4) 0 RX RELIEF VLV OPEN (3-A-1)
RX RELIEF VLVBELLOWS LEAKAGE (3-B-8) 0 SRV indicator lights CRP 9-3.
0 RPV level decrease 8
Steam Flow/Feed Flow mismatch 0
Generator load reduction ADS POWER FAILURE (3-A-4)
CRO CRS BOP Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report A SRV is open Report level and pressure transient Enter and direct actions in OT 3121 Direct BOP to cycle the control switch on CRP 9-3 from AUTO to OPEN to AUTO Cycles the control switch on CRP 9-3 from AUTO to OPEN to AUTO Reports SRV indicates shut by tailpipe indications and alarms Reports following, indications and alarms:
0 0
Control power lost for both red and green lights coincident with ADS Center amber light is lit and Rx RELIEF VLVBELLOWS LEAKAGE (3-B-POWER FAILURE (3-A-4)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CRS Review and evaluate the following Tech Specs:
3.6.D.1 During reactor power operating conditions and whenever ther reactor coolant pressure is greater than 150 psig and temperature greater than 350F, all safety valves and at least three of the four relief valves shall be operable.
3.5,F.Z From and after the date that one of the four relief valves of the ADS are made or found to be inoperable due to malfunction of the electrical portion of the valve when the reactor is pressurized above 150 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless such a valve is sooner made operable, provided that during such seven days both the remaining Automatic Relief System valves and the HPCl System are operable.
Determines 3.5.F.2 does not apply since HPCl is still inoperable Applicable LCO is:
e 3.5.F.3 If the requirements of 3.5.F cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to 4 5 0 psig within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> After being notified HPCl is operable, reevaluate Tech Specs and determine 3.5.F.3 no longer applies.
Applicable LCO is:
e Enter 7 day LCO 3.5.F.2 Engineering Report: Make report following 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> action determination. HPCl vibration has been evaluated satisfactorily.
Appendix D Required 0 pe rat or Act ions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
3 Page of Event
Description:
Loss of DC ON 3159, Technical Specifications Indications and Alarms Monitored:
0 DC-I/DC-2 BKR TRIP (8-N-1) 0 BATT VOLTAGE LO (8-P-1) 0 Loss of position indication for HPCl System valves and components.
0 Loss of position indication for inboard MSIV.
C RO/BO P 3=
CRO CRS Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report loss of DC-1 Enter and direct actions in ON-3159
~
inform CRO feedwater pump high level trips are inoperable Direct CRO to Monitor reactor vessel level closely and secure feed pumps as necessary.
Request Electrical Maintenance assistance in determining the cause of the loss of DC-1 Monitor reactor vessel level closely and secure feed pumps as necessary.
After obtaining concurrence from electrical maintenance, Direct BOP to coordinate with an A 0 to transfer 4KV Buses 1 and 3,480V Bus 8 and DG-1-1 B control power to DC-2 Review Tech Specs and determine the following:
0 4KV Bus 3 and 480V Bus 8 (and their associated equipment) are considered inoperable without DC control power when on their alternate supply. Inoperability of Bus 3 requires placing the plant in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. (Note in ON 3159 page 4) 0 With the loss of DC-I, both the qualified immediate and delayed access sources and the alternate immediate access source are inoperable per 3.10.B.3 requiring the reactor be in cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. (Note in ON 3159 page 6)
Coordinate with an A 0 to transfer control power for Bus 3 Coordinate with an A 0 to transfer control power for Bus 8 Coordinate with an A 0 to transfer control power for Bus B D/G
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:
4 Page of Event
Description:
A Recirculation Pump Trip - OT 31 18 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
MG SET A GEN LOCKOUT (4-A-I)
MG SET A GEN AUX LOCKOUT (4-A-2)
MG SET A DRIVE MOTOR TRIP (4-A-5) 0 Recirc flow reduction APRM power, reactor pressure, RPV water level CRO CRS Recognize and report the trip of A Recirculation pump Enter and direct actions in OT 31 18 Direct CRO to immediately, close PUMP DISCHARGE RV-53A of the tripped pump.
Direct CRO to monitor APRM indications
~
Amendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: I Event No.: 5 Page Of Event
Description:
Power Reduction - Control Rod Insertion - OT 31 17 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Power-Flow Map - ERFIS Control Rod Displays 0
APRMs, reactor power, reactor water level I CRS 1 CRO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize entry into Exclusion Region of Core Operating Limits Report Figure Enter and direct actions in OT 31 17 Direct CRO to monitor LPRM readings by selecting the STBLY key on ERFIS Direct CRO to manually scram reactor if either core wide or regional instability is verified 2.4-1 Direct CRO to Insert control rods per the Rapid Shutdown sequence to exit the Buffer and Exclusion Reqions Monitor LPRM readings by selecting the STBLY key on ERFIS Monitor for either core wide or regional instabilities Insert control rods per the Rapid Shutdown sequence Monitor plant parameters (reactor power, reactor pressure, reactor level)
STA Surrogate:
Report entry into buffer and exclusion regions of power-to-flow map
Atmendix D Rewired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
6 Page of Event
Description:
Reactor Thermal Hydraulic Instabilities - Manual Reactor Scram Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Multiple, periodic (Typical <3 sec.) high or low LPRM alarms Multiple, periodic (Typical <3 sec.), LPRM oscillations >20% peak-to-peak Multiple, periodic (Typical <3 sec.), APRM oscillations >I 0% peak-to-peak Critical Task Standard:
With the reactor at power and a scram signal required manually scram the reactor Actuate the manual scram pushbuttons within 1 minute of reaching an LPRM High Alarm Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRO Recognize and report indications of thermal hydraulic instabilities Initiate a manual reactor scram (OT 3117 Immediate Action) CRITICAL TASK Acknowledge report for instabilities, direct a manual reactor scram if not already performed by CRO as an immediate operator action CRS
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
ATWS - Partial ATWS - EOP-2 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Control rod display 0
0 APRM Downscale indications 0
Post Scram Report Program (PSRP) ERFIS Reactor water level and pressure Critical Task Standard:
With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by inserting control rods to prevent exceeding a primary containment design limit Actions taken within 10 minutes of the scram failure to implement appropriate appendices. Only one method needs to be used. The method must result in successful control rod insertion.
I Report APRM downscale condition I Enter and direct actions in OT 3100, SCRAM n
I Enter and direct actions in EOP-1, RPV Control IT-I Direct verification of Table A, Initiations and Isolations I Exit EOP-1 and enter EOP-2, ATWS Control Direct ADS inhibited Direct Appendix P jumpers installed 1 BOP I Inhibit ADS I
1 Install Appendix P jumpers (See Attachment 1-2)
Direct CRO to place Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN when steam flow is Direct CRO to initiate ARI/RPT Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Initiate ARI/RPT and trip B recirc drive motor breaker Direct RPV Water Level -1 9-1 77 using feedwater Direct RPV Pressure Control 800-1 000 psig using MHC-TBVs CRS
<O.SMlbm/hr CRO CRS
Amendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I
I CRO I Control RPV Water Level -1 9-1 77 using feedwater Control RPV Pressure 800-1 000 psig using MHC-TBVs Insert SRM/IRM and monitor reactor power decrease Direct control rod insertion using Appendices F, G, or BB CRITICAL TASK Implement control rod insertion appendix as directed (See Attachments I-CRS CRO 3,-44) Critical Task Report when rod insertion has commenced and when are fully inserted with the exception of rods 10-19, 14-23, 10-27 1 CRS Direct additional appendices to insert the last three control rods. Appendices H 1 orF I CRO I Implement control rod insertion appendix as directed (See Attachment 1-6)
Report when rod insertion has commenced and the status of the three remaining control rods (10-19, 14-23, 10-27) as they are inserted.
CRS After verifying reactor shutdown criteria by Table B, Exit EOP-2 and enter EOP-I Direct RPV Water Level 127-1 77 using feedwater I Direct a reactor plant cooldown at <100F/hr psig using MHC-TBVs I CRO I Control RPV Water Level 127-1 77 using feedwater I BOP I Commence a reactor plant cooldown at < I OOF/hr using MHC-TBVs I
I CRO/BOP I Backup automatic actions PClS Groups 2, 3, 5 STA Surrogate Report:
Report reactor power <2% following initial scram BOP Surrogate Report:
TBV indication is not available due to the loss of DC-I; however, steam flow is being used as an alternative indication
I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
8 Page of -
Event
Description:
HPCl Line Break with PClS Failure - EOP-4 RPV-ED - Secondary Containment Temperatures - EOP-5 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
STEAM LEAK DET PANEL TEMP HI (4-H-1)
RX BLDG/REFUEL FLR CH A/B RAD HI (5-H-I) (5-J-I)
RPV pressure RPV water level Secondary Containment Temperatures EOP-4 Limits ERFIS Critical Task Standard:
With a primary system discharging into Secondary Containment and area temperature exceeds maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, initiate an RPV-ED.
Initiate RPV-ED within 5 minutes of area temperature exceeding maximum safe operating levels in more than one area.
Note: Actions to anticipate RPV-ED and prevent two area temperatures from exceeding maximum safe operating levels will be evaluated as a substitute Critical Task.
Time I Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior I CRO/BOP I Recognize and report high temperature in secondary containment I BOP I On CRP 9-21, determine which detector is alarming I
I Monitor the area temperature and radiation levels I CRS I Enter and direct actions in EOP-4 I Operate all available RRUs as required I Isolate all systems discharging into the area - Direct BOP to shut HPCI-15 I Determine source of leakage is from a primary source I Monitor secondary containment temperatures I Enter and direct actions in ON 3158 I Determine the cause of the high temperature For high temperature, attempt to determine the source of the leak and if b
Amendix D Rewired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 P
Isolate the leaking system(s), except for those systems required to:
Shutdown the reactor, Ensure adequate core cooling, Suppress a fire, Maintain primary containment integrity Consider using the plant paging system to warn unnecessary personnel to stay away from the area Monitor and report secondary containment temperatures Attempt to shut HPCI-15, and report failure of valve to operate Announce reactor building evacuation due to high area temperatures Contact maintenance to investigate and attempt to shut HPCI-15 Monitor secondary containment temperatures Implement pressure leg override to anticipate RPV-ED exceeding cooldown rates using TBVs due to lowering torus water level.
Direct CRO to anticipate RPV-ED rapidly depressurizing using TBVs Initiate actions to anticipate RPV-ED using TBVs Limit TBV operation controlling MS flow less than Group 1 isolation and controlling RPV water level Determine two different area temperatures have exceeded Maximum Safe Operating Limit and an RPV-ED is required
~~~
Exit EOP-1 pressure control and enteddirect actions in EOP-5 Direct 4 SRVs opened - CRITICAL TASK Open 4 SRVs Report lowering pressure Classify Event (after scenario)
~~
ATW S : A-7-c Unisolable HPCl Leak: S-3-a P
STA Surrogate Report:
Report EOP-4 entry condition STA Surrogate Report:
Report Group'6 isolation signal on HPCl from ISOL screen STA Surrogate Report:
Report EOP-4 maximum safe operating temperatures have been exceeded in a given area.
Amendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Field Report:
Five minutes after steam leak alarm, report steam from HPCl room was observed
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachments 1
OP 4160 Turbine Generator Su we ill a n ce 2
OP 3107 Appendix P Bypassing the PClS Group I Low Low Reactor Water Level Isolation Signals 3
OE 3107 Appendix F Initiation of a Manual Scram and Individual Control Rod Scrams 4
OE 3107 Appendix G Manual Insertion of Individual Control Rods 5
OE 3107 Appendix BB Insertion of Control Rods Using Cooling Water Differential Pressure 6
OE 3107 Appendix H Vent the Control Rod Drive Over Piston Volume
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 S eve ri t y/
Ramp/Delay 7%
S i mu la tor Set u plM a If u n ct i o ns Key Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Malfunction Name ALTER EMERG Auto Scram Failure 3
4 Partial Scram HPCI-I 5 Closure 25%/300*
Failure 8
Stuck Control Rods I O -
19, 14-23, 10-27 A SRV Failure LOSS of DC-1 Bus 3 Control Power Bus 8 Control Power B D/G Control Power Bus 1 Control Power Instability Event Trigger HPCl Line Break Malfunction RPOIA RDI 2A/B PC1 HP15 RD02 101 9 RD02 1423 RD021027 AD08A SRV Event Trigger EDO6A EDR03 EDR43 EDR44 EDROI ET INSTABILITY HP09 Increase leak size as direc safe readings in two areas.
I
- d by lead examiner to act Simulator Setup:
Check speed load changer setting 0
Supply with OP 4160 paperwork 0
HPCl 3.5.E.2 14 day LCO 0
APRM Table 3.1.I yellow tag Note Delete stuck control rod after either the performance of Appendix H or after resetting scram during the Derformance of Amendix F Following the completion of the Speed Load Changer surveillance Enter after Tech Spec eva I u a t io n Enter as reauested Enter as requested Enter as requested Entry will result in A Recirc pump trip. Enter as requested Enter after 2 control rod is inserted Following insertion of all control rods 3ve two areas above max
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Op-Test Facility:
Vermont Yankee Scenario No.:
2 No.:
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
100% power, ORAM Sentinel is YELLOW, Rapid Shutdown Sequence is latched Turnover:
A APRM is bypassed due to inability to adjust gain - I&C troubleshooting is in progress C RHR pump is tagged out for motor replacement.
Control Rod Operability Check, OP 41 1 1 Section A, is schedule to be completed this shift. Steps 1-3 of OP 41 11 are complete.
Scenario Summary:
Following turnover, the crew will respond to a failure of a Group I I PClS valve. To address the containment Technical Specifications, the other in-line valves will be shut. As a result of the actions to address the containment valves, the CRS will enter a 7 day LCO for isolation of the DW floor and equipment sumps.
The crew will commence the performance of the Control Rod Operability surveillance. When the coupling check is performed on rod 26-43, the coupling check will fail requiring actions from ON 3144 to be implemented. Control rod 26-43 will be declared inoperable until the control rod is fully inserted and disarmed. During the power reduction with recirculation, the master recirc controller will fail to respond. Control will be transferred to the individual recirculation controllers for the power reduction.
Following the insertion of control rod 26-43, a leak on the A DIG air system will result in an inoperable DIG. The CRS will need to evaluate the inoperable D/G in combination with the C RHR pump and apply the inoperable definition with respect to power supplies.
After the crew enters a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> COLD SHUTDOWN Tech Spec action, a small recirc break will occur requiring actions in OT 31 1 1. When DW parameters have been stabilized with the start of additional RRUs, the C RFP trips without the auto start of B RFP. When the B RFP is started, a loss of bus 1 will occur causing a loss of all reactor feed pumps and require a manual reactor scram as directed in OT 31 13.
Following the scram, Bus 2 will fail to transfer and A DIG will fail to start. The loss of normal power will be implemented; however, bus 4 restoration from the Vernon tie will fail. HPCl will start but the HPCl inverter will fail preventing injection. RClC will fail to automatically start, but should be started manually to maintain RPV water level. With RClC maintaining RPV water level, containment Darameters will be addressed by spraying the torus and drywell.
Following drywell sprays, the recirc break will exceed the capacity of the RClC system causing RPV water level to lower. The CRS will address the competing priorities associated with the containment md the RPV. With only two injection systems (D RHR and 6 CS pumps) available, containment sprays will be lined up for injection prior to TAF when an EOP-5 RPV-ED will be required. RPV water eve1 will be recovered using low pressure pumps.
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks:
With the reactor shutdown and RPV level approaching +6 inches, restart available high pressure feed systems and maintain RPV level above +6 inches RPV level maintained above +6 inches; RPV-ED NOT required due to RPV low level Prior to RPV-ED, when torus pressure exceeds the suppression chamber spray initiation pressure, initiate drywell containment spray while in the safe region of the drywell spray initiation limit Spray the drywell within 10 minutes of exceeding 10 psig torus pressure AND RPV level not an overriding priority. Decreasing level below 82.5 inches is considered and overriding priority With the reactor shutdown and reactor pressure greater than the shutoff head of the low pressure systems, initiate RPV-ED BEFORE RPV level reaches -1 9 inches Initiate RPV-ED (begin opening valves) BEFORE RPV level reaches -48 inches Event No.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 Malf. No.
PC2 RD032643 RR10 AN8G7 AN8G7 RROlA FW08C Fw22B ED1 28 ED03A ED1 8C ED21 DGOSA HP10 RC02 RROlA Reduction with recirculation flow - ON 31 44 I
I Master Recirc Failure A D/G low starting air - Technical Specifications c
l C
1 Small Recirc break - OT 31 11 C RFP trip with failure of B RFP to auto start c
l M
Loss of Bus 1 Loss of Normal Power Loss of Bus 4 (A D/G, Vernon Tie)
C HPCl Inverter Trip M
Recirc Break RCIC failure to auto start RPV-ED RPV Low Level (M)ajor (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent,
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test Event No.:
Scenario No.: 2 No.:
1 Page 1 of Event
Description:
PClS Group II valve failure -Technical Specification
' Indications and Alarms Monitored:
0 Time P
LRW-82 and LRW-94 valve position indication on 9-4 Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRO CRS Check valve position indications; control switches in AUTO-OPEN Recognize and report loss of indication for LRW-82 and 94.
Determine LRW-83 and 95 should be shut as second in-line PClS valve to comply with Tech Spec 3.7.D.2 Direct CRO to shut LRW-83 and LRW-95 CRO Place control switches for LRW-82/83 and LRW-94/95 to CLOSE Verify and report LRW-83 and 95 are shut CRS After isolating DW Floor and Equipment Sumps by completing the required PCIS Tech Spec action, recognize sumps are inoperable. Determine Tech Spec 3.6.C.2 requires a 7 day LCO for the resulting condition
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test Event No.:
Scenario No.:
2 No.:
2 Page 1 of Event
Description:
Control Rod Operability - OP 41 11 Provide CRO with a copy of Control Rod Position Display. Steps 1-3 have been completed, this is NOT the first time this surveillance is being performed this month.
and Alarms Monitored:
Control rod displays APRM recorders Alarm tvoer for rod position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRO I Review precautions and prerequisites for OP 41 11, Section A Select the first control rod shown on VYOPF 41 11.02 without an asterisk and drive it in one notch.
Verify rod position indication decreases to the next even notch.
Return the control rod to its original position, if the original rod position is 48, perform a coupling check at position 48 Repeat the above steps for all operable control rods shown on VYOPF 41 11.02 without an asterisk that are not fully inserted
Amendix D Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 of Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
3 Page Event
Description:
Uncoupled Control Rod - ON 31 44 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
ROD OVER TRAVEL (5-D-4)
ROD DRIFT (5-D-5)
CI Rod drift red light on rod 26-43 Ti me
_pp
]fro1 rod disp!
Position CRO CRS CRO CRS I for rod 26-43 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Perform coupling check on rod 26-43 Provide continuous withdraw signal for 3 to 5 seconds by simultaneously going to NOTCH OVERRIDE and ROD OUT. Verify the following:
0 The display window continues to show 48 0
The computer printout indicates coupling check SAT 0
The ROD OVER TRAVEL (5-D-4) annunciator does not alarm 0
If during the coupling check, the 48 disappears, the rod display window goes dark, and the ROD DRIFT (5-D-5) and ROD OVER TRAVEL (5-D-4) alarms are received, the control rod is uncoupled If a rod is uncoupled, refer to ON 3144 Report rod 26-43 is uncoupled Enter and direct actions in ON 3144 Direct CRO to immediately reduce reactor power by reducing recirc flow to 27.5-29 Mlbrdhr at a rate not to exceed 10% RTP/min Direct CRO to Fully insert rod 26-43 using the CONTINUOUS-IN mode Immediately reduce reactor power by reducing recirc flow to 27.5-29 Mlbm/hr at a rate not to exceed 10% RTP/min Contact Rx Bldg A 0 to monitor recirc lube oil temperatures Monitor plant parameters (reactor power, reactor pressure, reactor level) and recirculation parameters (recirc MG speeds, recirc flow)
Fully insert rod 26-43 using the CONTINUOUS-IN mode Reset the ROD DRIFT alarm Review Technical Specifications and determine rod 26-43 is inoperable 3.3.F 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> COLD SHUTDOWN until control rod is fully inserted and electrically disarmed Contact tagging desk for a tagout to electrically disarm rod 26-43
Amendix D Reauired ODerator Actions Form ES-DQ Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 4 Page of Event
Description:
Master Recirculation Controller Failure Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Master Recirc signal - no change Individual Recirc Controller speedkignal - no change Recirc flow - no change I
I CRO 1 Recognize and report failure of the master recirculation controller I Place recirculation controller to individual manual control for both controllers I
I Continue reducing power using individual manual control I
I Report actions to the CRS Direct recirculation controllers be placed in individual manual control for both controllers and continuing with the power reduction. (If not already completed)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Event
Description:
A D/G low starting air pressure Indications and Alarms Monitored:
DG A TROUBLE (8-G-8)
DG A START AIR PRESS LO AIR (8-G-7)
Position BOP CRS Applicants Actions or Behavior Report A DG low starting air pressure Declare A D/G inoperable as a result of low air pressure Review Technical Specifications 3.1 O.B.l and determine all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices supported by the operable diesel generator are NOT operable 0
C RHR pump powered from Bus 3PB D/G - operable D/G Since required features supported by the operable D/G are inoperable, the redundant required features supported by the inoperable D/G are immediately declared inoperable and the applicable Tech Spec actions taken 0
A and B RHR pumps are declared inoperable (bus 4) 3.5.A.6 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> COLD SHUTDOWN LCO entered Surrogate Report:
Report a leaking hand hole on D/G air receiver with pressure 100 psig and lowering. The air compressor is running
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
6 Page -
Event
Description:
Small Recirc Break - OT 31 11 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Drywell Temperature and Pressure - ERFIS RWCTMT BLDG RAD MONITOR TROUBLE (3-F-9)
Of -
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Report rising DW pressurehemperature Enter and direct actions in OT 31 11 Direct closure of AC-20 Direct verification of the torus vent path Direct the start of all available RRUs Close N2 MAKE-UP AC-20.
Check open the following normal Torus vent path isolation valves:
0 TORUS 3" VENT AC-6B 0
VENT TO SBGT SGT-6 0
INLET ISOLATION SGT-2A(B) 0 DISCH ISOLATION SGTSA(B)
Start all available Drywell RRUs Determine additional DW RRUs have stabilized containment parameters Direct the transfer of house loads to startup transformers (if time allows)
Transfer house loads to the startup transformers Report failure of Breaker 23 to close and failure of Bus 2 to transfer to the startup transformers Enter and direct actions in ON 31 53 based on (3-F-9) alarm Determine which process system or station area indicates abnormally high radiation levels and verify the alarm STA Surrogate Report:
Report rising DW pressure based on ERFIS trend
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
C RFP Trip with failure of B RFP to auto start Indications and Alarms Monitored:
FW PUMP C TRIP LVL HI/ELEC (6-E-7) 8 RFP ammeter and indication lights Time 1
Position I
Applicants Actions or Behavior CRO Report trip of C RFP and failure of B to auto start IF the standby pump did not auto start THEN:
Amendix D Reauired ODerator Actions Form ES-D-2 of Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
8 Page Event
Description:
Loss of Bus 1 Loss of Normal Power Loss of Bus 4 (A D/G, Vernon Tie)
Indications and Alarms Monitored:
RFP breaker indications Bus Voltage meters and breakers RPV Water Level, RPV LEVEL HVLO (5-E-1)
. P Time Flow indicatil Position P
CRO CRS BOP CRS Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report loss of both operating feedwater pumps and lowering reactor water level.
Initiate a manual reactor scram (OT 31 13 immediate Action)
Acknowledge report for loss of all feedwater pumps, direct a manual reactor scram if not already performed by CRO as an immediate operator action Recognize and report loss of bus 1 Following the scram and turbine trip, report:
0 The failure of Breaker 23 to close and failure of Bus 2 to transfer to the startup transformers The loss of normal power The loss of Bus 4 and the failure of A D/G Only Bus 3/8 have power Complete LNP Immediate Actions Verify both diesels start and supply power to Buses 3 and 4 at normal voltage and frequency 0
Start or verify operation of a minimum of 2 SW pumps and start others as required Restart station air compressors A & B Enter and direct actions in OT 3100, SCRAM Enter and direct actions in OT 3122, Loss of Normal Power Enter and direct actions in EOP-1, RPV Control
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Direct verification of Table A, Initiations and Isolations
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Direct RPV Water Level 127-1 77 using HPCVRCIC Direct RPV Pressure Control 800-1 000 psig using SRVs, HPCl
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ CRO Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Control RPV Water Level 127-177 using HPCVRCIC Control RPV Pressure 800-1000 psig using SRVs, HPCl Report critical parameter status Backup automatic actions PClS Groups 1,2,3,5 Complete LNP Followup Actions 0
If only one DG started, close or verify closed SW-19A -1 9B 0
Check open the normal bus supply breaker 4T2 0
If the diesel restart fails and the Vernon tie is available energize the dead bus as follows: Close the 3V4 breaker.
CRO/BOP BOP 0
Cross tie buses 8 and 9 Recognize and report the failure of the 3V4 breaker to close
Amendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
9 Page Of Event
Description:
HPCl Inverter Failure and Failure of RClC to auto start Indications and Alarms Monitored:
HPCl INVERT CIRCUIT FAILURE (3-U-5) 0 HPCl Inverter Light 9-3 lower panel 0
RClC system valves and indications RPV Water Level RX WATER LEVEL LO-LO (5-E-3)
Critical Task Standard:
With the reactor shutdown and RPV level approaching +6 inches, restart available high pressure feed systems and maintain RPV level above +6 inches RPV level maintained above +6 inches; RPV-ED NOT required due to RPV low level I
I Time I Position 1
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize and report HPCl inverter failure Recognize and report failure of RClC to automatically start on low low water level
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Direct RPV Water Level 127-177 by manually starting RCIC
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Direct RPV Pressure Control 800-1 000 psig using SRVs/RCIC Control RPV Water Level 127-1 77 manually starting RCIC using OP 21 21 Appendix C, MANUAL RClC INJECTION (See Attachment 2-1) CRITICAL TASK
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Control RPV Pressure 800-1 000 psig using SRVs/RCIC
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
10 Page of Event
Description:
Recirc Break - EOP-3 RPV-ED - Low RPV Water Level - EOP-5 indications and Alarms Monitored:
HI DW Pressure alarms (5-L-3)
DW Pressure RPV Water Level RHR DRYWELL PRESS HI (3-L-1)
RX WATER LEVEL LO (5-K-2)
RX WATER LVL CH N B LO-LO (5-H-2)/(5-J-2)
RX WATER LEVEL LO-LO (5-E-3)
ADS BLOWDOWN TIMER START (3-A-2)
Critical Task Standard:
Drywell Sprays Prior to RPV-ED, when torus pressure exceeds the suppression chamber spray initiation pressure, initiate drywell containment spray while in the safe region of the drywell spray initiation limit Spray the drywell within 10 minutes of exceeding 10 psig torus pressure AND RPV level not an overriding priority. Decreasing level below 82.5 inches is considered and overriding priority RPV-ED With the reactor shutdown and reactor pressure greater than the shutoff head of the low pressure systems, initiate RPV-ED BEFORE RPV level reaches -1 9 inches Initiate RPV-ED (begin opening valves) BEFORE RPV level reaches -48 inches Enter and direct actions in EOP-3 I
I I Restart all available DW RRUs I
Spray the torus using B RHR I
I Spray the DW using B RHR not required for adequate core cooling CRITICAL 1 TASK
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DP Direct verification of Table A, Initiations and Isolations for high DW pressure Backup automatic actions for high DW pressure (RHR, CS pump starts)
Report lowering RPV water level and status of injection systems CRO/BOP CRS Direct CRD injection maximized 1 Direct SLC injection CRO/BOP I Maximize CRD injection OP 21 11 Section Q (See Attachment 2-3)
Inject SLC Report ADS Timer Initiated CRS Direct ADS inhibited CRO/BOP Inhibit ADS CRS I Determine at least two systems are available for injection (B CS, B RHR)
Direct B RHR lined up for injection Lineup B RHR for injection Open RHR-65B BOP Close DW/lorus spray and cooling CRS Report RPV water level at +6 inches (TAF)
Exit EOP-1 pressure control and enteddirect actions in EOP-5 Direct 4 SRVs opened CRITICAL TASK Direct level recovery using RHWCS to 127-1 77 Open 4 SRVs and report lowering pressure CRO/BOP I Report ECCS injection valves opening on low pressure and injection I Report RPV water level status for rising water level, -48, +6 When RPV water level is >+6 remove/throttle injection systems as necessary to control RPV water level 127-177
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachments 1
OP 2121 Appendix C Manual RClC Injection 2
OP 2124 Appendix C Containment Sprays (torus, drywell) 3 OP 21 11 Section Q Maximizing CRD flow
Appendix D Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-DP Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Malfunction Name Check to ensure individual controllers remain in automatic I Uncoupled Control Rod 1
2 3
4 3
2 5
7 26-43 Master Recirculation Enter when directed by lead examiner Following insertion of uncoupled control rod Following tech spec de t e r m i n at io n for D/G Enter after DW pressure has been stabilized following RRU starts Immediately after B RFP start Enter after RPV water level recovers to >130 Enter following DW sprays are initiated 1 Controller Failure 1 Bus 2 Fail to Transfer Breaker 23 failure 3V4 Breaker failure A D/G failure to start RClC failure to start RHR pump C LRW 82/94 Valve failure A D/G low starting air Recirc Leak C RFP Trip Loss of Bus 1 HPCl inverter Recirc Break Malfunctions Malfunction Fw22 RD032643 RR10 ED12B ED2 1 ED18A DG05A RC02 RH13 PC2LR8294 AN8G7 AN8G8 RROlA FW08C ED03A HP10 RROlA RROlA Severity/
Ram p/Dela y 71.54 OPEN Spurious 0.01 0.1 0.5/600 4
Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert Preinsert I