ML042730090

Technical Specification Pages for Amendment No. 177 Turbine Building Service Water Header Isolation (TS) S110810

ML042730090
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	09/24/2004
From:	NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD3
To:	Nuclear Management Co
Shared Package
ML041610101	List: ML042730090
References
TAC MB9944
Download: ML042730090 (3)

Text

e. Service Water System

1. The reactor shall not be made critical unless the following conditions are satisfied, except for LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTS and except as provided by TS 3.3.e.2.

A. TWO service water trains are OPERABLE with each train consisting of:

1. TWO service water pumps

2. An OPERABLE flow path consisting of all valves and piping associated with the above train of components and required to function during accident conditions. This flow path shall be capable of taking a suction from the forebay and supplying water to the redundant safeguards headers.

3. An OPERABLE turbine building service water header isolation valve and associated isolation logic capable of closing the header isolation valve, or a closed and deactivated turbine building service water header isolation valve.

B. The Forebay Water Level Trip System Is OPERABLE.

2. During power operation or recoveryfrom an Inadvertent trip, ONE service water train may be inoperable for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. If OPERABILITY is not restored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, then within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action shall be Initiated to:

- Achieve HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

- Achieve HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

- Achieve and maintain Reactor Coolant System Tag less than 3500 F by use of alternate heat removal methods within an additional 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

TS 3.3-7 T37imut lb. 177

TABLE TS 4.1-1 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHANNELS CHANNEL DESCRIPTION CHECK CALIBRATE TEST REMARKS

43. AFW Pump Low Not Applicable Each refueling cycle Each refueling Discharge Pressure Trip cycle

44. Axial Flux Difference Weekly Verify AFD within limits for each OPERABLE (AFD) excore channel

45. Service Water Turbine Not Applicable Each refueling cycle Each refueling Header Isolation Logic cycle Trip (SW 4 A/B)

Page 7 of 7 Pg77Ai t I1t. 177

The spray additive system may be inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The containment spray system would still be available and would remove some iodine from the containment atmosphere in the event of a Design Basis Accident. The 72-hour completion Ume takes into account the containment spray system capabilities and the low probability of the worst case Design Basis Accident occurring during this period.

One component cooling water pump together with one component cooling heat exchanger can accommodate the heat removal load either following a loss-of-coolant accident or during normal plant shutdown. If, during the post-accident phase, the component cooling water supply were lost, core and containment cooling could be maintained until repairs were effected.(8)

A total of four service water pumps are installed and a minimum of two are required to operate during the postulated loss-of-coolant accident. (9)The service water valves in the redundant safeguards headers have to be OPERABLE in order for the components that they supply to be considered OPERABLE.

The various trains of equipment referred to in the specifications are separated by their power supplies (i.e.: SI Pump 1A, RHR Pump 1A and Valve SM-4A, etc.). Shared piping and valves are considered to be common to both trains of the systems.

Service Water Header Isolation Logic (TS 3.3.e. A.Z3' The turbine building service water (SW') header isolation logic automaltically closes valves SWV-4A and SW-4B on a Safety Iniection (Sl) signal coincident with a servdicewater low-pressure signal.

Eailure to isolate the turbine building from the service water header durino a de-sin basis accident may result in Insufficient oressure In the containment fan coil 'units disharage Piping or decreased heat removal aoabilitv in other safety-related components. Tlhe isolation logic is only required to function for the SW train aligned to the turbine building header during a design basis accident.

The isolation logic is OPERABLE when turbine buildina service water header isolation valves (SWV-4A and SW-4B1) are capable of automatically closina from a safety iniection signal coincident with a low header pressure signal from the service water header Pressure stitch-es- If either inout into the Isolation logic is inoperable. the Isolation flunction can be returned to OPERABLE statusby tripnpin the affected circuit.

TD urement a chanae In the valve Position by a single active failure when the valve or isolation logic is inoperable, the turbine building service Water header isolation valve is deactivated. Removing or interrupting the valves motiye force deactiYates the isolation valve. De-activation may be accomplished by isolating air to the yalye, removing the supply fuse for the solenoid, or any other means for ensuring the valve cannot be affected by a single active failure.

° USAR Section 9.3 9)USAR Section 9.6 Awrret N. 177 TS B3.3-4 08/200712004a