ML040770381
| ML040770381 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/2004 |
| From: | Beeney B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| RG-1.200 | |
| Download: ML040770381 (14) | |
Text
ENERGY
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NORTHWEST People. Vision-Solutions Risk-Informed DG ACT Extension Overview
- Columbia's Onsite & Offsite Power
- Discussion of TS Changes
- PRA Results In ACT Extension Request
- Overall PRA results & methodology
- Discuss PRA technical adequacy documentation (submittal and archival) 2 iNoERTHWEST 1
Columbia's Onsite and Offsite Power 0 MA GENR R2303 TO ASSE SUBSTATION IR-NORXAL AUX POWER START UP POWER 6 KV 4-r e--
.1KVA 4.16KV f
1 MV`) Y X_(30 UVA)
-1 NII S
22 N1-2 SM3
-- X N-1-S NOR-SAFETYF RELATEO I
SOP LOADS SOP LOADS EOP LOADS (10 0YVA) 10 UVA) 4.0 VVA)
SOGI-7 E
0-3 D2-8 t
DG-I 3.58 IIV "I8f(gD-5..8 UVA O a,8, 4.6K 14UA
.8 UVA O.6IPI OACK-U PO.ER COLUMBIAGENERATING STAtION 11 TO GENTON SUOSTATION SNPtLIFIED ONE l.DNE 3
10NOERTGHWEST Agreements with BPA BPA to conduct transient stability, voltage, and short circuit studies of the Federal Columbia River Transmission System (FCRTS) biennially.
Will notify if study results adversely affect power deliveries to Columbia per agreed standards.
Established standards for delivery of power at minimum and maximum voltage schedules.
Maintain interconnection facilities of the FCRTS to supply power at sufficient MW and MVAR minimums and frequency limits.
Develop Dispatcher's Standing Orders necessary to meet the standards for Columbia.
Coordinate all outages of the FCRTS with Columbia.
Columbia not part of any automatic or manual load shedding schemes.
Will not indude Columbia in such schemes without 1 year advanced notification to fadlitate alternate emergency power supply options.
4 G~NORTHWEST Ppo.Visionolotin olacr 2
BPA Near Plant Grid Line depiction of offsite power delivery to Columbia from BPA grid. Unes shown in red are critical to operation of plant. Lines shown in blue & black add to level of reliability to critical circuits.
5OTTENERGY l, NOsRoToH~zWlEoSnT Grid Stability 1998 Summer/1999 Winter Transient Analysis included loss of the single largest power source feeding the transmission system (Loss of 2 of the 3 Palo Verde Units)
- Loss of Columbia Loss of the most critical single transmission line near Columbia (3 phase fault at 500 kV at Ashe + loss of Ashe-Marion &
Ashe-Slatt)
- All Swing Cases were stable and damped (See FSAR Section 8.2.2.1)
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F Grid Unavailability.
- Grid Unavailabilityabased on historical data 1985-1991 FSAR 8.2.2.2 (Pre-dereguiaton)
Unavailability for 230 kV -.048 /yr Unavailability for. 115 kV =.00123 /yr
, LOOP External - 5.9 E-5 /yr-
- LOOP& Grid Unavailability Assumed in PRA (Pre-deregulation)
(Based on NuReg 1032, INEEL/BEh-97-00887, EPRI TR2110398, NUREG/CR-5496)
Plant Centered 2.98 E-2 /yr 82.5 %
Weatlher Related 3.61 E-3 /yr 10.0 %
Grid Related 2.72 E-3 /yr 7.5 %
Total 3.61 E-2/yr 7
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Peonl e Solutions Discussion of-TS Changes 4..
Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 Action B.4 Changes It (Changes and additions are In boldand Italicizedprint)
Conditon I Required Action I Completion flme B. One required DG Inoperable.
A.4_1 Restore required DG to OPERABLE status.
PR 54.21 EstablishRequiredRisk ManageamntActfons AN2
.4Z22 Restore required DC to OPERAM5Estatusm 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 6 days from discovery of faiure to meet LCO 72hours 14 days AND 17 days from discovery of fallure to meet
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NORTHWEST LCO 3.8.1 Action B.4 Bases Add RMAs B.4.1 Retains existing Required Action and ACT of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
B.4.2.1 The following risk management actions (RMA) are required for the extended ACT:
A MG extended ACT will not be voluntarily entered for planned maintenance purposes If severe weather conditions are expected.
The condition of the offsit power supplies and transformer yard, Induding transmission lines will be evaluated.
Operating crews will be briefed on the DG work plan, with consideration given to key procedural actions required In the event of a LOOP or S30.
[rae:The uwnrflned are rMUTMt ennrWnefsa meA'? ctdl In tFe RC 1177 VttP TS ae,er c
No elective maintenance or testing will be scheduled within the transformer Yard or on plant equipment that would challenge offsite power availability.
No elective maintenance or testing on the cross train division's DGs and their assodated service water subsystems.
No elective or planned maintenance or testing on rHPCS. RCIC. the cross train low pressure ECS Injection and RHR suppression pool cooling mode subsvstemsl The alternate AC source to the Division 1 and 2 battery chargers (AACSBC) Is available. Availability of the AACSBC Is that it must be capable of supplyina the battery chamers within the SBO copina time (4-hr) 10 toENERGY Pp VNO THWEST PPp.'Vi.Gk-.ninn.
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Columbia's-PSA Level 1 & 2 ScpeHistory/Futiire
- DG ACT Extension Upgrade &resolution'of 1997 BWROG Peer Review issues'during 2002-2003 2nd Peer Review by Erin Eng. of Level 1 & 2 in Jan 2004 (R-S)
.* OGACT;E-ten.on request using R-5 + sensitivity.tudles
- R-6 mid 2004Incorporiathon of 21d Peer Review F& Os app'lcable to DGACT from insights gained tlmugh the sensitivity'panalyses
- Reviiint otherissues that are identified through RG 1.200 pilot plant program and other 2d Peer review F & Os
'1ENERGY:5
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- NOzRTHWEST Columbia's PSA External Events Scope/History/Future External Events IPEEE NRC Review & RAIs
- 1" Peer Review of Fire PRA Level 1-Jan 2004 by Erin Eng.
. Review resulted in 8-NB F & Os
- Model updated for 3 F & Os plus sensitivity analysis
- Incorporatbon/Resolution of, F & Os affecting DG ACT
- Seismic PRA Level 1 & 2 upgirade'ofIPEEE -Startied Mar-2004 Planned Rev :Fire PM resolution of remaning F& Os 16 oNORTHWEST
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Model Enhancements (Rev 5)
.Added the RPV rupture as an Initiating event Revised the LOOP event tree sequence (reduced DG-1, -2 mission time, separated HPCS FrS from FrR, applied average power recovery, revised offsite power recovery curves)
Revised the SBO event tree sequence: reduced HPCS-DG mission time, Revised battery calculations, performed MAAP4 for recovery timing Updated Transient & LOCA IE frequency based on NUREG 5750 Revised the AC fault tree to include a second battery charger Applied the ECCS pump room HVAC engineering calculations Added Rx Building HVAC fault tree Updated the failure data using 2003 M-Rule results Revised Level 2 analysis focusing on LERF Added success criteria to certain systems Updatedih majrity of PSA donimpntation 17 QNORTHWEST PRA Results' in ACT Extension Request Assess the risk impact of ACT extension against acceptance guidelines of:
- RG 1.174 Core Damage Frequency Base & ACDF Very small risk: ACDF <1E-6/yr if CDFb, <1E-4/yr RG 1.177 Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability
. ICCDP < 5 E-7
. RMAs (Configuration Compensatory Measures) other than normal TS configuration limits are used to meet guidelines
. Total Impact to meet %smallo guidelines (Prindple 4)
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-Analy Methodology (Delta CDF Calculation)
. B'seCase: Risk assessed with ali plant equipment at nominal m'aintenance (including DG)-
- Increased. Maintenance Case: Risk-assessed with all DGs set to higher' average maintenance una'vailahility to accountifor on-line'maintenance U ACDFAnnual =CDFaintenanc+- CDFBase (compare with RG 1.174)
- 19 ENERGY GNORTHWEST Analysis, Methodology (ICDDP Calculation)
Base Case:f-Risk assessed with all plant r
...... h....
0.-,-.....
equipment at nominal maintenance (including DG):.--
- Maintenance Case:.Risk assessed with a DG out-of service'(event set to'1.0) and other plant equipment with -nominal maintenance except for those'RMA:(zero-maintenance)
. A CDF =, CDFMalntenance - CDFBase
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RG 1.174 Acceptance Results:
(Results may change based on sensitivity analysis Insights and final RMAs) laCDFA.,,,, =CI)Fmjnt,..,.- CI)Few,s & ALERF^n,,,,,=LERFwbintn,,,,,.-LERF>e,,
Average Annual increase In unavailability per DG Ls 5.5 days Risk Metric Criteria /yr, Results*
Internal Events Base CDF
<1 E-4 7.3 E-6 Internal Events ACDF
<1 E-6
<6 E-7 Internal Events Base LERF
<1 E-5 6.9 E-7 Internal Events ALERF
<1 E-7
<1 E-8 Fire CDF
<1 E-4 1.4 E-5 Fire ACDF
<1 E-5
<5 E-6
- Must meet"small" risk & Principle 4 21 ENRG 21 eONORTHWEST
~P.V RG 1.177 Acceptance Results:
(Results may change based on sensitivity analysis Insights and final RMAs)
ICCDP = ACDF *14/365 Days, ICLERP = ALERF*14/365 Days Risk Metric Criteria Results*
Internal Events DG1 ICCDP
<5 E-7
<3 E-7 Internal Events DG 2 ICCDP
<5 E-7
<2.5 E-7 Internal Events DG1 ICLERP
<5 E-8
<2 E-9 Internal Events DG2 ICLERP
<5 E-8
<1 E-9 Fire DG1 ICCDP.
<5 E-7 Negligible Fire DG2 ICCDP
<5 E-7
<1.7 E-7
- With compensatory measures credited must meat"Small" risk & Princple 4 I
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,,-Results,',-
- esults reflect-expectations of low risk impact due to:
highly reliable offsite'power
' Existing TS limits & RMA to avoid risk significant configurations arid conditions
. Alternate 480 V AC source Div 1/2 DC battery chargers (AACSBC) during SBO provides:
. Extended time for RCIC operations
.Extended SRV operations
. Exteided 'power supply breaker control for AC power restoration
- Extended Rx and Containment Parameter instrumentation availability
- Extended time for recovery of onsite or offsite sources 23 0 NOENERGY 23 ONORTHWEST
,ENER Y
NORTH EST People.Vision Solutions
.M PRA Technical Adequacy. of Risk-Informed DG ACT Extension 1 2.
Required Licensee Submittal PRA F^;
Documentation (RG 1.200)
- RG 1.200 provides submittal and archival documentation requirements
- Handout from NRC/Pilot Plant Meeting of January 22, 2004 lists submittal and archival expectations for pilots. Underlined bullets in following slides are from that handout.
- Initial Insights from Peer Review to RG 1.200 25 NORTHWEST Required Licensee Submittal PRA r Documentation (RG 1.200) - con't L..
- Characterization of the key assumptions and approximations relevant to the results used in the decision-making process and peer reviewers' assessment of those assumptions
- Given the focused scope of this application, we expect to report a small number of assumptions relevant to this
-application.
- This is primarily due to It being a delta calculation focused on the DG system. These will be addressed In the submittal 26 ORTHWST 13
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- Discussion of the resolution of the peer review comments that are applicable to the parts of the PRA required for the application.
t The peer review identified a small percentage of papplication related supporting requirements (SR) that are less than ASME capability category II (RG 1.200).
GeneraI discussion will includdeoverall impact of peer review facts and observatons (F 0's) anddiscdission 'of which F & O's warranted PRA'changes or sensitivity calculations..
The actual A/B F & O's with associated risk impact assessment on the application are included in the archival PRA calculation file A = Extremely Important and necessary to address to assure the technical adequacy of the PRA or the quality of the PSA or the quality of the PSA update process B = Important and necessary to address, but may be deferred with appropriate justifcation until the next PSA update. May also be necessary to meet Capability Catemory II
-27 ENERGY 27 NPORTHWE"ST RequiredLicensee Submittal PRA Documentation (RG 1.209) - con't
- Identify the use of the parts of the PRA that conform
- to the less detailed capability categories and the
--imitatins this' iio'ses.-
U Thejeer review identified approximately 20% of the overall level 1 & 2 supporting.requirements (SR)' that are less than
-ASME capability category II (RG 1.200).
Based on sensitivity evaluations performed (at 60% of total),
the SRs that are less than category II.,will not significantly affectthe 'application r'ults' The submittal will summarize these SRs and the associated F
& O's and discuss the sensitivity calculations and the impact on the application.
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2004. Peer Review PSA Summary
.Leve I and 2 N/A Not I --
DI Total F& Os-DG F & Os PSA Element Met A&B A&B
.itiiating Event (IE) 1 2
2 6
19 30 3
1 Accident Sequence (AS) 1 0
1 1
18.
21 10 3
Success Criteria (SC) 1 6
0 0
8 15 8
0 System Analysis (SY).
1 3
0 2
35 41 4
2 Hunan Reliability (HR) 0 9
4
-3 18 34 13 8
Data Analysis (DA) 1 4
3 6
15 29 2
2 Internal Flood (IF) 1 1
.0.
0 26 28 2
0 Quantification (QU) 1 4
0-1 25 31 2
1 LERFAnalyses (LE) 2 7
8 6
14 37 16 10 Total 36 18 25 178 266 60 27 29 eENERGY 29 (D
pIN.TH ES Archival (Non-docketed) Documentation
- Description of Process Used to Determine Adequacy of the PRA
- Bases Supporting Results Used in the Application
- Impact of the ApRlication'on Plant Design; Configuration, or Operational Practices
- Acceptance Guidelines and Method of Comparison Scope of the Risk Assessment in Terms of Initiating Events and Operating Modes Modeled Parts of the PRA Required to Provide the Results Needed to Support Comparison with Acceptance Guidelines Description'of the Process for Maintenance, Update, and Control of the PRA' -
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I Archival (Non-docketed) Documentation nI I
The list'of pilot expectations on the previous slide will be providediat NEI within the following archival documents:
- Colurnbia PRA Model and main supporting'documentation (available on CD-ROM)
. 2004 peer'review report and. irmpact assessments of the A/B F & Os related to the application
- PRA calculation report for the DG AC1 Extension (including required nmoaeling changes, calculation methodology, calculation assumption's, 'cutsets,: and results)
- PRA Maintenance'and Update Procedure 31 31 0 NORTH WEST p;- --
Further>Questions?
- -m b
GNORTHWEST PPoop. VU9on 6oNMdn
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