Text

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) Revision 35 for EPIP-1 and Revision 4 for EPIP-12
	ML040420372
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	01/27/2004
From:	Salas P; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
	EPIP-1, Rev 35, EPIP-12, Rev 4
	Download: ML040420372 (78)
	v • d • e

Tennessee Valley Authorty, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000 January 27, 2004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority

)

Docket Nos.50-327 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT -

UNITS 1 AND 2 -

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISIONS In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the.following EPIPs:

EPIP EPIP-1 EPIP-12 Revision Title 35 4

Emergency Plan Classification Matrix Emergency Equipment and Supplies If you have any questions concerning this matter, please telephone me at (423) 843-7170 or J. D. Smith at (423) 843-6672.

is and Industry Affairs Manager Enclosure oL4!!5 Printed on McaW pap

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 January 27, 2004 JDS:JWP:KTS cc:

M. J.

J. R.

D. L.

D. A.

B. K.

D. C.

EDMS, Burzynski, BR 4X-C Ford, OPS 4I-SQN Koehl, OPS 4A-SQN Kulisek, POB 2B-SQN Marks, LP 6B-C Olcsvary, LP 6A-C WTC A-K I\\license\\EPIP\\2004\\EPIP revs 01 2004

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Revision 35 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: J. Randy Ford RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: Emergency Preparedness APPROVED BY: David Kulisek EFFECTIVE DATE: 1/22/2004 Level of Use: Reference

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Revision History Rev Date Revised Pages Reason for Revision 34 11/01/2002 47,48 Intent Revision: Update of Gaseous and Liquid EALs In Table 7-1.

35 0112212004 All Intent Revision: Changed Section 4, Records Section to current standard way that all of the EPIPs have the records sections, reformatted many sections to adhere to current word processing programs, added definitions for Confinement Boundary and ISFSI, added 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage to each section TOC, reformatted EAL 2.2 NOUE to be consistent with other EALs, moved tables and figures to end of sections 4, 5, & 7. Merged Table 4-3 directly Into EAL 4.6 Security. Specifically added ISFSI to EAL 4.6 NOUE, Changed process' to

'progress' In EAL 4.7. Added EAL 7.5, Spent Fuel Storage, NOUE to Sect. 7.

This EPIP-1 revision is to Implement basis changes in REP Revision 70.

Page 2 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Purpose........................................

4 2.0 References.......................................

4 2.1 Developmental References........................................

4 3.0 Instructions.......................................

4 3.1 REP Activation........................................

4 3.2 EAL Interpretation........................................

5 3.3 Validation of Information........................................

5 3.4 Classification Determination........................................

5 4.0 Records Retention........................................

6 4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies.......................................6 4.2 Drill and Exercise Records........................................

6 EAL Section 1 - FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX

.7 EAL Section 2 - SYSTEM DEGRADATION

.11 EAL Section 3 - LOSS OF POWER.19 EAL Section 4 - HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT.23 EAL Section 5 - DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON.31 EAL Section 6 - SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION.37 EAL Section 7 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS.41 Page 3 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides criteria to the Shift Manager (SM) or Site Emergency Director (SED) to be used in classifying and declaring an emergency based on plant conditions. The responsibility for declaring an emergency, based on the criteria in this procedure, belongs to the SM or SED, the designated Unit Supervisor when acting as the SM, or the TSC SED. This responsibility cannot be delegated.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Developmental Documents A.

10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.

B.

Reg Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NEI 99-01 Methodology For Development Of Emergency Action Levels - Revision 4, January 2003.

C.

Sequoyah Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Functional Restoration Guidelines (FRGs), Technical Instructions (TI), Surveillance Instructions (SI), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are also referenced in Appendix B of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

D.

Letter to Bruce A. Boger, Director of Inspection Program Management, USNRC, December 8, 2001 from Lynnette Hendricks, NEI, Recommended Actions in Response to a Site Specific Credible Threat at a Nuclear Power Plant (1A-01-1).

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 REP Activation The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this matrix is detected and declared. The REP is not activated based on a reporting of past conditions. This procedure will be used in conjunction with the REP Appendix B.

If the event is determined to be one of the four emergency classifications then implement EPIP-2, -3, -4, or -5 as applicable.

Page 4 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 3.2 EAL Interpretation The criteria in SQN EPIP-1 are given for reference: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken.

In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM or SED to arrive at an appropriate classification for a particular set of circumstances. These criteria apply to both Unit I and Unit 2. The SED must be aware of the affects of simultaneous events on both units.

3.3 Validation of Information If there is a reason to doubt if a given initiating condition has actually occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications provided. Unless a suspected spurious or otherwise false alarm can be substantiated within an acceptable timeframe (based on potential severity of the event), the SM or SED is to proceed with actions as required by this procedure until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.4 Classification Determination 3.4.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the respective status tree criteria that will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.3 Declare the highest emergency class based on events that are in progress at the time that the classification is made.

3.4.4 If, during an ongoing event, investigation shows that a higher classification was previously met, then report that, as information only, to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist unless it is a noted exception (i.e., EAL 2.3).

3.4.5 If, followina termination of an emergency declaration, investigation shows that a higher classification was met, then report that, as information only, to the ODS and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist.

3.4.6 If conditions have returned to a non-emergency state before any emergency can be classified, then the highest emergency class that was appropriate shall be reported, as information only, to the ODS and NRC and shall not be declared unless it is a noted exception (i.e., EAL 2.3).

Page 5 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 3.4.7 The NRC shall be notified within one hour of all classifications. Once made and reported, a declaration cannot be canceled or rescinded even if it is later determined to be invalid. If there is reason to doubt that a given condition has occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications and proceed with classification, as required by this procedure, until otherwise proven false.

3.4.8 The State shall be notified by the ODS within 15 minutes of any declaration and notified, for information only, within one hour of any classification that was met but not declared as allowed above. If the State is notified of a declaration that is invalidated before the NRC is notified, terminate the classification, if not already done, and report the declaration to the NRC.

3.4.9 The ACCEPTABLE timeframe for initiating notification to the ODS of an emergency declaration is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and contacting the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS RETENTION 4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies The materials generated in support of key actions during an actual emergency classified as NOUE or higher are considered Lifetime retention Non-QA records.

Materials shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall submit any records deemed necessary to demonstrate performance to the Corporate EP Manager for storage.

4.2 Drill and Exercise Records The materials deemed necessary to demonstrate performance of key actions during drills are considered Non-QA records. These records shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall retain records deemed necessary to demonstrate six-year plan performance for six years. The EP Manager shall retain other records in this category for three years.

Page 6 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier l 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation

/

2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 RCS Unidentified Leakage RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)

MIF 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Ad-'~

6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems X1-6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7

7.2 Liquid Effluent 1

7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A Page 7 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX IEPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:

BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CML DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, and associated welds.

CRmCAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink Pressurized Thermal Shock Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition Is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor. In which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities Including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that Imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

steam or feed line break) that results In an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke andlor heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE UMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result In a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INMTIANG CONDmONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION)INTRUDER: Suspected hostile Individual present In the protected area without authorization.

ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarmftrip setpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) Is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access Is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and is connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which Indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primaryto secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event ivolving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; () Thermal Power Oscillations 210%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to Interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g. chlorine, CO2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in correctve or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity Is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g. alarm setpoints. minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when It is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check or (2) Indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit In this definition Is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage Is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage Includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g. paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be Included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 8 of 47 Revision 35

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1

1. Critical Safety Function Status

1. Critical Safety Function Status I

Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1)

Potential LOSS.::: :.

Core Cooling Orange (FR-C.2)

OR Heat Sink RED (FR-H.1) and RHR Shutdown Cooling not in service

-OR-

2. Primary Coolant Activity Level

3

... - Potential LOSS....

7 RCS sample activity is Not Applicable greate an 300 uCi/gm dseqialent 11 31

- OR-

5. CnorThermocouple Hi Quad Average Greater than 1200 F on Greater than or equal to Xl-9E01 R or 102 700 F on X-94-101 or (EOEso R

102 (EXOSENSOR)

OR -

4.9RE+01or Vessel Water Level NtApiable VALID RVLIS level

<40% on LR-68-368 or Ll-68-371 with no RCP running

- OR -

1. CoDntument Radiation Monitor VLDrading of Not Applicable getrtan:

2.8E+01 Rem/hr on RM-90-271 or -272 OR 2.9E+01 Rem/hr on RM-90-273 or -274

- OR -

6. SED Judgmentl

_Potential LOSS:

Not Applicable Pressurized Thermal Shock Red (FR-P.1)

OR Heat Sink RED (FR-H.1) and RHR Shutdown Cooling not in service

-OR-

2. RCSLeakage / LOCA

_:n:..:

Po't'ential LOSS:

RCS leak results in Non Isolatable RCS leak subcooling <40 F as exceeding the capacity indicated on XI-94-101 of one charging pump in or 102 (EXOSENSOR) the normal charging alignment OR RCS leakage results in entry into E-1

-OR-

3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture STtht results in a Not Applicable actuatio OR Entry into E-3 4.

-;a-Potential LOSS:.-::.

VALID RVLIS level Not Applicable

<40% on LI-68-368 or LI-68-371 with no RCP running

- OR-

[5. SED Judgment Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss of potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.

Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss of potential loss of the RCS Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.

Page 9 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1

__~~~~

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Critical Safety Function St Not Applicable atus Containment Red (FR-Z.1)

OR Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE (i.e.: core TCs trendina up)

Note:

A condition is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the SED, the condition will be MET IMMINENTLY (i.e.:

with two hours). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.

- OR-

2. Containment Pressure I H drogen

; :.'-PotentiaI LOSS Rapid unexplained pressure Containment Hydrogen decrease following initial increases to >4% by volume on increase on PDI-30-44 or 45 H21-43-200 or 210 OR OR Containment pressure or sump Pressure >2.81 PSID (Phase B) level not increasing on LI with no containment spray 178 or 179 with a LOCA in operating when required progress (FR-Z.1)

- OR -

3. Containment Isolation Status Potential LOSS...............:

Containment isolation, when Not Applicable required is incomplete and a release path exists to the environment exists

-OR-

4. Containment Bypass 1 Potential LOSS:'."....'...

Secondary side release outside Unexpected VALID increase in containment from a area or venilation RAD RUPTURED SIG that cannot be monitors adjacent to terminated in <15 min (E2 and containment (with LOCA in E3) progress).

OR

>4 hour secondary side release outside containment from a SIG with a SIG tube leak >TIS limits (AOP R.01 App A)

- OR -

5. Significant Radiation in Containment

~~~~~~:- :Potential LOSS*

Not Applicable VALID reading of greater than:

3.6E+02 Rem/hr on RM-90-271 and 272 OR 2.8E+02 Rem/hr on RM-90-273 and 274

- OR -

6. SED Judgment

1. In the matrix to the left, REVIEW the initiating conditions in all three barrier columns and circle the conditions that are MET.

2.

In each of the three barrier columns, IDENTIFY if any Loss or Potential Loss INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.

3.

COMPARE the number of barrier Losses and Potential losses to the criteria below and make the appropriate declaration.

Note:

MONITOR the respective status tree criteria if a CSF is listed as an INITIATING CONDITION.

[

Emergency Class Criteria General Emergency LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier Site Area Emergencv LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers Alert Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier Unusual Event Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss of potential loss of the Containment Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.

LOSS or Potential LOSS of Containment barrier Page 1 0 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH I

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2

2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)

W-61 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)

Q' 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion i

4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake go 5.2 Tomado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 911% 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability W

6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7

7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A Page 11 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:

BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CML DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, and associated welds.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are stx CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink Pressurized Thermal Shock Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition Is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit In this definition Is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, In which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities Including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g..

steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease In steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame Is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke andtor heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE UMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result In a reduction In the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from Identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that Identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSIONINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present In the protected area without authorization.

ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual isa supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting In damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access Is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and Including the primary and secondary Isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-C which Indicates that the CSF(s) Is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action Is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the Intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations Z10%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g. chlorine. CO 2. etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result In corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when It is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit In this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage Is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or Impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 12 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Initiating Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and

'Radiological Effluents (Section7) and Continue In This Column.

On either unit an Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4):

1. Loss of > 75% of MCR annunciators and the annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system Indications.

2

2. Loss of Plant Computer.

3

3. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:

Subcriticality PTS Core Cooling 4

Containment Heat Sink Inventory

4. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT In progress.

On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of >75% MCR annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system Indications for > 15 minutes with a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or plant computer unavailable. (1and 2 and 3):

1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% MCR annunciators and 2,

the annunciator printer for >15 minutes or> 75% of safety system indications for> 15 minutes.

2. SMSEDjudgmentthat ncreased surveillance is required (> shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

4

3. (a orb)

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.

OR

b. Loss of plant computer.

On either unit an UNPLANNED loss > 75% MCR annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system ndications for > 15 minutes and plant computer available. (1 and2and 3):

1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% of MCR annunciators 2,

and the annunciator printer for> 15 minutes or>

75% of safety system indicators for > 15 minutes.

3,

2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required (> shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

3. The plant computer is capable of displaying requested data.

M.& I l No t I

-4 NotApplicable.

Not Applicable.

Significant Loss of Communications (1 or 2)

1. UNPLANNED loss of all In-plant communication capabilities listed below (a and b and c):

a. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX phones.

b. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones.

c. UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant radio frequencies.

A L

L OR

2. UNPLANNED loss of all offsite communication capabilities listed below: (a and b and c and d and e and J

a. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX phones

b. UNPLANNED loss of all offsite radio frequencies

c. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system

d. UNPLANNED loss of all 1-FB-Bell lines

e. UNPLANNED loss of all NRC ENS and HPN lines

f. UNPLANNED loss of all satellite phones

-I Page 13 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Mod.

111lUll I --

IIUIUUI1I Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID trip signals and loss of core cooling capability.

(I and 2):

Initiating I Cc Refer to 'Fission Product Barriei Continue in This Column.

1) and

1. FR-S.1 entered and immediate operator actions did not resut in a reactor power of S 5% and decreasing.

I

2. (a orb)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1).

OR

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1)

Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto and manual trip signals.

I NOTE: Although a mode change may occur before classification this event will still be classified and declared as SAE.

Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALD auto trip signal but a manual trip from the Control Room Is successful. (1 or2)

1. Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing following auto trip signal.

2. Manual trip in the Main Control Room successfully reduces reactor power S 5%.

NOTE: Although a mode change will occur, this event will still be classified and declared as an ALERT.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1).

Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to SQN Tech. Spec. 3.4.8):

1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a or b):

1,

a. Dose equivalent iodine (1-131) >0.35 pCi/gm for

> 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or in excess of T/S Figure 3.4-1 with Tave 500 F.

2, OR 3

b. Specific activity> 100/9 pCVgm with Tave 2 500 F.

-I b

Page 14 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Initiating / Condition MO1 M.d&

Refer to 'Fission Product Continue in This Column.

1) and Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

-4

-4.

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage

> 10 GPM.

RCS Identified leakage > 25 GPM.

1,

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.) > 10 GPM as indicated by (a or b):

1,

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)

> 25 GPM as indicated by (a orb):

2,

a. S-OPS-068-137.0 results.

2,

a. Sl-OPS-068-137.0 results.

OR 3,

3, OR

b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM into PRT, RCDT or CVCS holdup tank (Refer to T-28).

4 4

b. Wth RCS temperature and PZR level stable, the VCT level on L-62-129 or L-62-130 Is dropping at a rate >10 GPM.

Refer to 'Shutdown Systems Degradation' (Section 6.3).

Page 15 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Initiating / Condition de Wn.

Refer to 'Fission Product I Continue in This Column.

1) and

-4.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue In This Column.

4.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Turbine failure has generated projectiles that cause visible damage to any area containing safety related equipment 1,

1. Turbine generated PROJECTILES have resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following areas:

2, 3

Control Building Auxiliary Building Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment ERCW Pumping Station Addl Equipment Bldgs.

Diesel Generator Bldg.

RWST Intake Pumping Station Common Sta. Serv. Xfmr's Condensate Storage Tanks UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the main steam system resulting In a rapid RCS cooldown and safety Injection initiation. (1 and 2):

Turbine failure results In casing penetration or main generator seal damage.

1,

1. Rapid depressurization of any or all steam generators or the main steam system to 600 psig on PI-1-2A, 2B or 9A,9B or 20A, 20B or 27A, 27B.

1,

1. Turbine failure which results in penetration of the turbine casing or damage to main generator seals.

2, 2,

3

2. Safety injection has initiated or is required.

3 Refer to Hazards and SED Judgmenr (Section 4.3)

-i i

Page 16 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

I-NotApplicable.

Not Applicable.

1, Safety Limits have been exceeded. (1 or 2):

1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature and RCS pressure > safety limit Indicated by SON Tech. Spec. Figure 2.1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limit.

OR 2,

3, 4

2. RCSlPressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit

(> 2735 psig).

-i Page 17 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

This Page Intentionally Blank I

Page 18 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH I

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability iv',)

6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7

7.2 Liquid Effluent 1

7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A Page 19 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:

BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CML DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or actMties at the site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, and associated welds.

CRmCAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriicality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink Pressurized Thermal Shock Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit In this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, In which the reactor licenses has the authority to detemine all activities Including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that Imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

steam or feed line break) that results In an uncontrolled decrease In steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE. Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame Is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke andtor heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE UMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result In a reduction In the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION1NTRUDER: Suspected hostile Individual present In the protected area without authorization.

ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitorng of one or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action Is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant stnucture resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the Integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access Is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and Rs connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and Including the primary and secondary Isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) Is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the Intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event nvolving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 210%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body ofworkersto enforce compliancewih demands made onTVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to Interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that Is dangerous to life or limb by reason of Inhalation or skin contact (e.g. chlorine, C0 2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result In corrective or mitgative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE. A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit In this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release imes, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VAUD: An indication, report or condition Is considered to be VALID when R is conclusively verified by (1) an Instrument charnel check or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit In this definition Is the need for tmely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that Is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or Impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be Included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 20 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

initiating I onuluon Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either unit (1 and 2):

1

1. Both unit related 6.9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.

2. (a or b) 3,

a. Core Cooling Status Tree Red or Orange Path.

4 OR

b. Restoration of either a 6.9 KV shutdown board or a 6.9 KV unit board is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of the loss.

Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either unit for> 15 Minutes.

1,

1. Both unit related 6.9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.

2, 3,

4 Loss of offsite power to either unit with degraded onsite AC power for > 15 minutes..([Ia and lb] or 2):

1 la.

All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for

> 15 minutes.

2, lb. One (1) unit related 6.9 KV shutdown board de-3, energized for> 15 minutes.

OR 4

2. Any AC power condition lasting > 15 minutes where a single additional failure will result in a unit blackout.

Loss of offsite power to either unit for> 15 minutes.

(1 and 2):

1. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for> 15 1,

minutes.

2. Both unit related 6.9KV shutdown boards are 2,

energized.

3, 4

MOd, Inltatilng I.orJ1L1UFn NotApplicable.

NotApplicable.

-I UNPLANNED loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either unit for > 15 minutes.

5, 6,

1. Both unit related 6.9KV shutdown boards de-energized for> 15 minutes.

D E

F U

E L

E D

Also Refer to 'Loss of Shutdown Systems' (6.1) and continue in this column

-I UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power to either unit for > 15 minutes. (1 and 2):

5, 6,

1. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for

> 15 minutes.

D E

F U

E L

E D

2. One (1) unit related 6.9KV shutdown board de-energized for > 15 minutes.

-m Page 21 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 MO.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and

'Loss of Communication' (2.2) and Continue In This Column.

Loss of all vital DC power for > 15 minutes.

1, 2,

3,

1. Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V DC vtal battery board buses I and 11 and III and IV for > 15 minutes.

Also Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1),

'Loss of Communication" (2.2) and, 'Loss of Instrumentation (Z 1) and Continue in This Column.

4

-i Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1)

'Loss of Communication- (2.2), and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2. 1).

UNPLANNED loss of a required train of DC power for

> 15 minutes: (1 or 2).

1. Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V dc vital battery board buses I and IlIl for > 15 minutes.

5, OR

2.

Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V dc vital battery board busses 11 and IV for > 15 minutes.

6 I

Page 22 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH I

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake

5.

5.2 Tomado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A Page 23 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:

BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CML DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, M PC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, and associated welds.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radoactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressuized Thermal Shock Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the Initiating conditions associated with the event exist Implicit In this definition Is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, In which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities Including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that Imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE. Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive beits or overheated electrical components do riot constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but Is NOT required If large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Wthin two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result In a reduction In the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from Identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that Identity an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile ndividual present in the protected area without authorization.

ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

ODCM: Offste Dose Calctation Manual isa supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent ofisite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which Indcates that the CSF(s) Is under severe challenge; prompt operator action Is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting In damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the Integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsie.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and Including the primary and secondary Isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monioring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action Is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or rrisoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment Inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 210%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance wth demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to Interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of Inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO 2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operabons, testing or mfaintenance. Events that result in correcbve or Ntgative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an Instrument channel check or (2) indication on related or redundant Indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that Is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be Included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or Indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 24 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Initiating I Condition Initiating / Condition Mo.

Mod.

-4 Refer to 'Fission Product Barier Matrix' {Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

-4

-4 Refer to 'Control Room Evacuaton.' (4.5) and Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

FIRE in any of the areas listed In Table 4-1 that Is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. ( and 2):

EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed In Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2):

1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1.

1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1.

A L

L

2.

(a orb)

a. VSIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or safety related equipment In the specified area is observed due to the FIRE.

A L

L

2. (a orb)

a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures or to safety related equipment In the specified area is due to the EXPLOSION.

OR OR

b. Control room ndication of degraded safety system or component response due to the FIRE.

b. Control room Indication of degraded safety system or component response due to the EXPLOSION.

Refer to 'Security' (Section 4.6).

FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) threatening any of the areas listed in Table 41 that Is not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notification or verification of control room alarm.

UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) resulting In VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure or equipment A

L L

A L

L Refer to 'Security (Section 4.6).

-I b

Page 25 of 47 Revision 35

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Mod.

II Mod.

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Continue In This Column.

rix (Section 1) and itilmujung I LounltiUlo Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue In This Column.

Refer to Fission Product Bamer Matrix- (Section 7) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue n This Column.

UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within a facility structure containing safety related equipment or associated with safe operation of the plant.

Release of TOXIC GAS or smoke within a facility structure which prohibits safe operation of systems required to establish or maintain Cold SID.

(l and 2 and 3):

1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS or smoke within any building listed in Table 4-2.

1. Plant personnel report the average of three (3) readings taken In an -10 ft. Triangular Area Is >

25% Lower Explosive Limit, as Indicated on the monitoring Instrument within any building listed In Table 4-2.

A L

L A

L L

2. (aorb)

a. Plant personnel report severe adverse health reactions due to TOXIC GAS or smoke (i.e.,

burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness).

OR

b. Sampling Indication > Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL).

Refer to the MSDS for the LEL

3. Plant personnel unable to perform actions to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment Refer to the MSDS for the PEL A. UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY that may affect normal operations.

A Safe operations Impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS or smoke concentrations within a facility structure listed in Table 4-2.

A L

L

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken In an -10 ft. Triangular Area Is >

25% of the Lower Explosive Limit, as Indicated on the monitoring Instrument within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B).

A L

L OR OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State officials that an offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4-B) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) In concentrations > the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) causing a site evacuation.

B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State officials that a large offsite FLAMMABLE GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4-B) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) in concentrations > 25% of Lower Explosive Limit.

Refer to the MSDS for the PEL Refer to the MSDS for the LEL I

Page 26 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 MUd.

Refer to Fit Continue in Mod*

II

1) and I

.UkuIUI In loss of Security event plant.

01o A

L L

1. Hostile armed force has taken control of the plant or control room or remote shutdown capacity.

Evacuation of the control room has been Initiated and control of all necessary equipment has not been established within 15 minutes of staffing the auxiliary control room. (l and 2):

A

1. AOP-C.04 'Shutdown from Aux Control Room" L

entered.

L

2. Control has not been established within 15 minutes of staffing the auxiliary control room and completing transfer of switches on panels LI IA and LII B to the AUX position.

Evacuation of the Control Room is Required.

1. AOP-C.04 Shutdown from Aux Control Room" has been entered.

A L

L Security event has or Is occurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions needed to protect the public.

A L

L

1. VITAL AREA, otherthan the control room, has been penetrated by a hostile armed force.

Confirmed security event which Indicates an actual or potential substantial degradation In the level of safety of the plant. (I or 2 or 3):

1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA.

A L

2CIiDSRBCOR

2.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the L

PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A).

OR

3. PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) has been penetrated by a hostile armed force.

NotApplicable.

Confirmed security event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant or ISFSI. (lor2or3or4or5or6)

A L

L

1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA (Fig 4-A).

2. SABOTAGEINTRUSION has occurred or is occurring within the PROTECTED AREA (Fig 4-A).

3.

HOSTAGE/EXTORTION situation that threatens to Interrupt plant operations.

4. CML DISTURBANCE ongoing between the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Fig 4-B) and the PROTECTED AREA (Fig 4-A).

5. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA which threatens to interrupt normal plant operations judgment based on behavior of strikers and/or Intelligence received).

6. A credible site-specific security threat notification.

-I Page 27 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Mode A

L L

I '

Events are In progress or have occurred which Involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B)

Events are in progress or have occurred which Involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public.

Any releases are not expected to result In Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B)

A L

L Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guideline A

Exposure Levels.

L L

Events are In progress or have occurred which Indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety A

Systems occurs.

L L

Page 28 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment Auxiliary Building Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station ERCW Pumping Station Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings CSST's RWST Condensate Storage Tanks TABLE 4-2 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS OR SMOKE EALs Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station ERCW Pumping Station Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings CDWE Building Page 29 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Figure 4-A Protected Area

'S Figure 4-B Exclusion Area Boundary Page 30 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1

1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation Z,

2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation (Modes 1-4) 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 RCS Unidentified Leakage RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER P.1$

3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire

£40 1 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A Page 31 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:

BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CML DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or actMties at the site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, and associated welds.

CRmCAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcrfticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink Pressurized Thermal Shock Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition Is made that one or more of the Initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit In this definition Is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, In which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities Including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

steam or feed line break) that results In an uncontrolled decrease In steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive bells or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but Is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE UMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result In a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from Identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile Individual present In the protected area without authorization.

ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarmttrip setpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which Indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action Is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting In damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access Is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and ncluding the primary and secondary Isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which Indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action Is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment Inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event Involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 210%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g. chlorine, CO 2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result In corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit In this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when It is conclusively verified by (1) an Instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant Indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit In this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that Is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage Is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage Includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or Indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 32 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Mode Mod Refer to 'Fission Pri (Section 1) and Co, IflIIdUll I

onFUtIU1UU Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue In This Column ue in This Column Refer to 'Fission Product Barrer Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column

-4 A

L L

Earthquake detected by site seismic Instrumentation.

(1 and 2):

1. Panel XA-55-1 5B alarm window 30 (E-2) plus window 22 (D-1) activated.

2. (a orb)

a. Ground motion sensed by plant personnel.

A L

L Tornado or high winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE. (I and 2):

1. Tornado or high winds (sustained >80 m.p.h. > one minute on the plant computer) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1.

2. (a orb)

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE.

OR OR

b.

National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

b. Control room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to event.

Note: National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423)-586-8400, can provide additional info.

Eatqaedtce ysiesimcIsrmns Earthquake detected by site seismic nstruments.

(l and 2):

1. Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 22 (D-1) activated.

Tornado within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

1. Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A)

A L

L

2.

(a orb)

a. Ground motion sensed by plant personnel.

A L

L OR

b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

a

-I Page 33 of 47 Revision 35

,SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Initiatin I Condition Initiating I Condition M.I.

Mod.

Refer to the 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1).

-4 Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

-t Refer to tme 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix (Section 1).

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section ) and Continue in This Column.

Aircraft or PROJECTILE Impacts (strikes) any plant structure listed In Table 5-1 resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE. (and2):

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has A

Impacted any structure listed In Table 5-1.

L

2. (a orb)

a. Confirmed report of VISIBLE DAMAGE.

OR

b. Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to the event within any structure listed in Table 5-1.

Aircraft crash or projectile impact (strikes) within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

1. Plant personnel report aircraft crash or PROJECTILE Impact within the EXCLUSION AREA A

BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A).

L L

River reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning as reported by River Operations.

A L

L River reservoir level Is at Stage I Flood Warning as reported by River Operations.

A L

L Page 34 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Initiating I Condition Initiatin I Condition Mod.

Mo.&

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrx' (Section 1) and Continue In This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue In This Column.

-4

-t Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrx' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

River reservoir level Is < 670 Feet as reported by River Operations.

A L

L River reservoir level is < 673 Feet as reported by River Operations.

A L

L

-4.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Watercraft strikes the ERCW pumping station resulting In a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). (1 and 2):

A L

L

1. Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck the ERCW pumping station.

2. (a orb)

a.

ERCW supply header pressure Train A 1 (2)-PI-67-493A Is < 15 psig.

OR

b. ERCW supply header pressure Train B 1 (2)-PI-67-488A Is < 15 psig.

Page 35 of 47 Revision 35

ISEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX T EPIP-1 TABLE 5-1 Plant Structure Associated With TornadolHigh Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 Containment Auxiliary Building Turbine Building RWST Unit #2 Containment Diesel Generator Bldg.

CDWE Building Condensate Storage Tanks Control Building ERCW Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs Intake Pumping Station Common Station Service Transformer's Page 36 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2

2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation (Modes 1-4) 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 RCS Unidentified Leakage RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake ZA 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6i 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 1}

7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A Page 37 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:

BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CML DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, M PC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, and associated welds.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radoactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink Pressurized Thermal Shock Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition Is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition Is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surroundng the reactor, In which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities Including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease In steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction In the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from Identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSIONtINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present In the protected area without authorization.

ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ODCM: Offste Dose Calculation Manual isa supportng document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarmftrip setpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which Indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action Is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting In damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access Is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and Rs connections up to and ncluding the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and Including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that the CSF(s) Is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action Is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment Inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event Involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 210%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance wth demands made on TVA The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that Is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in correctve or mibgative actions being taken In accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of Incorrect tank).

VALID: An Indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition Is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that Is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage Is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage Includes deformation due to heat or Impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be Included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or Indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 38 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Mod.

In'

.17:

MOd.

II I c.one Refer to Gaseous in This Column.

ontinue Not Applicable.

Loss of water level In the reactor vessel that has or will uncover active fuel In the reactor vessel.

(1 and 2 and 3):

Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown. (1 and [2a or 2b] ):

1. Hot shutdown required.

1. Loss of RHR capability.

1, 5,

2. VALID indication that reactor vessel water level

< el. 695'.

2a. CSF status tree Indicated Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1).

2, 6

OR

3. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temperature

> 200 OF.

3, 2b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1)

(RHR shutdown cooling not in service).

Note: If containment Is open refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (Section 7.1) and continue In this column.

4 Note: Refer to 'ReactorProtection System Failure' (Secton 2.3) and Continue in This Column

-4.

Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown when required (1 and 2):

Complete loss of function needed to achieve cold shutdown when cold shutdown required by Tech.

Specs. (1 and 2 and 3):

1. Cold shutdown required by Technical Specs.

5,

2.

ncore TCs (if available) indicate core exit temperature

> 200 F.

1,

1. Cold shutdown required by Tech. Specs.

2. Loss of RHR shutdown cooling capability.

2,

3. Loss of secondary heat sink and main condenser 6

3, 4

Note: If containment is open refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (Section 7.1) and continue in this column.

Note: Also refer to 'Failure of Rx Protection' (Section

23) and Continue in This Column.

-1*

Not Applicable.

Inability to reach required shutdown within Tech.

Spec. limits.

1,

1. The unit has not been placed in the required mode within the time prescribed by the LCO action statement.

2, 3,

4

-I Page 39 of 47 Revision 35

,SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 ModO In (Section 7.1)

Refer to Gaseous in This Column.

Continue

-4 Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents- (Section 7.1) and Continue In This Column.

Refer to Gaseous Effluents (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.

_ Loss of REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Inventory with Inadequate makeup. (1 and 2 and 3):

1. Reactor coolant system is pressurized above atmospheric pressure.

5,

2. Unplanned decrease in RCS or pressurizer level requiring initiation of makeup to the RCS.

6

3. With reactor coolant system temperature stable, the pressurizer level continues to decrease following Initiation of RCS makeup.

Page 40 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1

1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2

2.2 Loss of Communication A6 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation (Modes 1-4) 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 RCS Unidentified Leakage RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6

6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability

%J 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7

7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 41 of 47 Revision 35

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:

BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CML DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, and associated welds.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink Pressurized Thermal Shock Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition Is made that one or more of the Initiating conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, In which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities Including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that Imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

steam or feed line break) that results In an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE. Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but Is NOT required If large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction In the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from Identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that Identity an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ODCM: Offsde Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip selpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which Indcates that the CSF(s) Is under severe challenge; prompt operator action Is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting In damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the Integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or of/site.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and s connections up to and ncluding the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary Isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which Indicates that the CSF(s) Is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action Is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the Intent to render the equipment Inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 210%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to Interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that Is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine, CO 2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity Is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP. (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow minimum release imes, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of Incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it Is conclusively verified by (1) an Instrument channel check or (2) indication on related or redundant Indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that Is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage Is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage Includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be Included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Ary area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could drectly or Indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Page 42 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 M.&

initiating Condition EAB dose, resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity > 1 Rem TEDE or

> 5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of release. (1 or 2 or 3):

A

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General Emergency In Table 7-1 for >15 min, unless L

assessment within that 15 min confirms that the criterion Is L

not exceeded OR

2. Field surveys Indicate >1Rem/hr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-06 pCVcm at the EAB (Fig. 7-A)

OR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAS dose >1 Rem TEDE or >5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).

EAB dose resulting from an actual or Imminent release of gaseous radioactivity >100 mrem TEDE or

>500 mrem thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of release. (1 or2 or3):

A

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Site Area for > 15 min, unless assessment within that 15 min L

confirms that the criterion Is not exceeded L Z Field surveys indicate >100 mremihr gamma or an 1-131 conc of 3.9E-07 ICicm at the EAS (Fig. 7-A).

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose 100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for>15 minutes. (1 or2 or3 or4)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 minutes, unless assessment within that 15 minutes A

confirms that the criterion is not exceeded L

OR L

2. Field surveys indicate >10 mrernli gamma at the EAB for

>15 minutes (Fig 7-A).

OR

3. Dose assessment results Indicate EAS dose >10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).

OR

4. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of gaseous radioactivity >15 minutes in duration.

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for >60 minutes. (1 or2 or3 or4)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under UE for >60 minutes, unless assessment within that 60 minutes A

confirms that the criterion is not exceeded L

M L

2. Field surveys indicate >0.1 mremfhr gamma at the EAB for

>60 minutes (Fig 7-A)

OR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).

OR

4. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of gaseous radioactivity >60 minutes in duration bod.

Initlating I Condition NotApplicable.

NotApplicable.

Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Section 12.1.1 Limit for >15 minutes. (1 or 2)

A L

L

1. A VAUD rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion Is not exceeded.

OR

2. Sample results indicate an ECL >200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Section 1.2.1.1 Limit for >60 minutes.

(1 or 2)

A L

L

1. A VAUD rad monitor reading >Table 7-1 values under UE for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion Is not exceeded.

OR

2. Sample results Indicate an ECL >2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity 60 minutes In duration.

Page 43 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 InillayInE mode Refer to 'Fission Product (Section 1) or 'Gaseous E Continue in This Section.

TierMatrix' rents' (Section 7.1) and Refer to 'Gaseous In This Section.

tents' on C

7. 1 and ContinueI Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' (Section 1) or 'Gaseous Effluents' (Section 7. 1) and Continue in This Section.

Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (Section 7. 1) and Continue in This Section.

-4 UNPLANNED Increases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes safe operations or establishment or maintenance of cold shutdown.

(I or 2):

Major damage to Irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel. ( and 2):

1. VALIDalarmon RM-90-101 or RM-90-102or RM-90-103 or RM-90-130131 or RM-90-112.

A L

L

1. VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mremlhr in the control room or SAS.

A L

L 2

(a orb):

OR

a. Plant personnel report damage to irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods.

2. (a and b):

a. VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2.

OR

b. Access restrictions Impede operation of systems necessary for safe operation or the ability to establish cold shutdown (See Note Below).

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated fuel will be uncovered in the spent fuel pool or transfer canal.

-I.-

UNPLANNED Increase in radiation levels within the facility.

UNPLANNED loss of water level In spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered. (land 2 and 3):

1. A VALID area radiation monitor reading Increases by 1000 mremihr over the highest reading In the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months excluding the current peak value.

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal.

A L

L A

L L

Note: In either the UE orALERTEAL. the SED must determine the cause of Increase in radiation levels and review otherinitiating conditions for applicability (eg., a dose rate of 15 mrremo/hr In the control room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).

2. VALID alarm on RM-90-101 or RM-90-102 or RM-90-103.

3. Fuel remains covered with water.

-U I

Page 44 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1l Mode IiiaLdLi[n I oUn NotApplicable.

NotApplicable.

-4 NotApplicable.

Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY from: (1 or 2 or 3)

1. Natural phenomena (e.g., seismic event, tomado, flood, lightning, snow/ice accumulation, etc.).

A L

L

2. Accident (e.g: dropped cask, tipped over cask, explosion, missile damage, fire damage, burial under debris, etc).

OR

3. Judgment of the Site Emergency Directorthatthe CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY damage Is a degradation in the level of safety of the ISFSI a

Page 45 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS NOTE: The monitor values below, if met or exceeded, indicate the need to perform the required assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the appropriate emergency classification shall be made based on the VALID reading.

GASEOUS MONITORS Units(2)

UE Alert SAE General Site Total Release Limit pCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31 E+08 1.31 E+09 1-RI-90-400 (EFF LEVEL) - U-1 Shield Bldg pCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31 E+09 2-RI-90-400 (EFF LEVEL) - U-2 Shield Bldg pCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31 E+09 O-RM-90-101B - Auxiliary Bldg cpm 1.03E+05 Offscale"1)

Offscale(1 )

0-RM-90-132B - Service Bldg cpm 2.62E+06 Offscale(')

Offscale(')

Offscale(1 )

1-RI-90-421 thru 424-U-1 MSL Monltors2) pCi/cc 1.71 E-01 1.71E+01 4.58E+01 4.58E+02 2-RI-90-421 thru 424 - U-2 MSL Monltors(2) pCilcc 1.71 E-01 1.71E+01 4.58E+01 4.58E+02 1-RM-90-255 or 256 - U-1 CVE mR/h 4.10E+02 4.10E+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 2-RM-90-255 or 256 - U-2 CVE mR/h 4.10E+02 4.10E+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 RELEASE DURATION minutes

>60

>15

>15 LIQUID MONITORS Units UE Alert Site Area General Site Total Release Limit pCi/ml 6.50E-03 6.50E-01 N/A NA RM-90-122 - RadWaste cpm 1.45E+06 Offscale(1)

N/A N/A RM-90-120,121 - S/G Bldn cpm 1.07E+06 Offscale(1)

N/A N/A RM-90-225 - Cond Demin cpm 1.90E+06 Offscale(1)

N/A N/A RM-90-212 - TB Sump cpm 2.33E+04 2.33E+06 N/A N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes

>60

>15

>15 ASSESSMENT METHODS:

Ajrbome Dose Assessment per SON EPIP-13 'Dose Assessment

ODCM Liquid Release Rate assessment per SON 0-TI-CEM-030.030.0

Integrated Airbome Release Rate assessment per SON 0-TI-CEM-030.030.0 (1) The calculated value is outside of the upper range for this detector. The maximum monitor output which can be read is 1.OE+07 cpm. Releases in excess of monitor capacity should be evaluated for proper classificabon by use of Dose Assessment (2) These unit values are based on flow rates through one PORV of 890,000 lb/hr at 1078.7 psia with 0.25% carry over (0.9975 quality). Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing, (e.g., PORV).

NOTE 1:

These EALs are based on the assumption that an emergency release is restricted to one pathway from the plant In all cases, the total site EAL is the limiting value. Therefore, in the case where there are multiple release paths from the plant, it is the total release EAL (obtained from ICS and/or SQN 0-TI-CEM-030-030,

Manual Calculation of Plant Gas, Iodine, and Particulate Release Rates for Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Compliance') that will determine whether an emergency classification is warranted.

NOTE 2:

In the case when there is no CECC dose assessment available, the length and relative magnitude of the release is the key in determining the classification. For example, in the case of the NOUE EAL of 2 times the Tech Spec limit, the classification is based more on the fact that a release above the limit has continued unabated for more than 60 minutes, than on the projected offsite dose.

NOTE 3:

See REP Appendix B for basis information.

Page 46 of 47 Revision 35

lSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS For purposes of comparng the meterlmonitor reading values to this table, it can be assumed that mR is equivalent to mrem.

Monitor No.

Location - Area and Elevation Meter Reading 1,2-RM-90-1 Spent Fuel Pit ARM El. 734.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-3 Waste Packaging ARM El. 706.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-4 Decontamination Room ARM El. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-5 SFP Pumps ARM El. 714.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-6 CCS HXS ARM El. 714.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-7 Sample Rm ARM El. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-8 AFW Pumps ARM El. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-9 Waste Cnds Tks ARM El. 669.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-1 0 CVCS Bd ARM El. 669.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-11 CS and RHR Pumps Radmon El. 653.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-102 Spent Fuel Pit Radmon El. 734.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-103 Spent Fuel Pit Radmon El. 734.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-230 CNDS Demineralizer ARM El. 685.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-231 Cnds Demineralizer ARM El. 706.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr Note: All of the above monitors have a range of 0.1 to 1 E+4 mremlhr.

Figure 7-A

)N AREA BOI Page 47 of 47 Revision 35

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-1 2 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES REVISION 4 PREPARED BY:

RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:

APPROVED BY:

EFFECTIVE DATE:

LEVEL OF USE:

BILL PEGGRAM EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS J. RANDY FORD 01/02/2004 REFERENCE USE QUALITY-RELATED

j SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-121 Revision History REV DATE REVISED REASON FOR CURRENT REVSISION PAGES 0

08/3012002 Renumbered procedure which was EPIP-17 to EPIP-12, changed records section for standardization purposes. Moved the flashlight bulbs from App. D to App. I so spare flashlight bulbs and batteries would be on the same inventory. Removed FRED Manuals and CECC Information Systems Manuals and replaced SQN and TVA phone directories with TVA phone list for more current listings from the TSC & OSC Inventories, App. H &

I respectively. Changed NOMS to eSOMS and added WWM to MSS slot on OSC Inventory, App.. Changed the number of the Team Tracking Status Boards to from one to two to reflect physical layout. Added 2 flashlights to Appendix I. Changed the location of the 12 SCBAs and associated equipment from the Relay Room outside the TSC to the Main Control Room Area on App. K. Changed titles of appendices to match the Table of Contents. Other small format editorials were made.

1 03/03/2003 Standardized retention of records in Sect. 4.2 from two to three years. Added misc. supplies and expiration date for Zeolite Cartridges to App C.

Added portions of communications tests and inventories from 0-PI-REM-244-002.Q Quarterly Testing Of Emer. Response Facility Communications Equip. and all of 0-PI-REM-244-001.0 Monthly Testing Of Emergency Response Facility Communications Equipment to EPIP-12 for standardization forming Appendices L & M and removed of 0-PI-REM-244-001.0 from App. K. Moved portable Satellite phone from App. I to App. H. Added Sample Map in App. H. In App.

H&I changed to verify revisions with EPIL-1 instead of CECC EPIP-9. Added office supplies and procedures to App. H&l.

Added items to LRC App J. Added App. N for Quarterly Administrative Reviews.

2 10/01/2003 ALL Intent Change. General Revision for format and content standardization.

3 12/05/03 19, 20, 28 Intent change: Corrected elevations on App. G. Correction made on App. K concerning van inventory frequency.

4 01/02/2004 10,14 Intent change: corrected phone # for Chem Lab to 6348, removed ice vests section from App. B.

PAGE 2 of 29 REVISION 4

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES EPIP-12 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page Table of Contents............

3

1.0 INTRODUCTION

4

2.0 REFERENCES

4 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS............

4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Conduct of Inventories............................................

4 Completion of Appendices...........................................

5 Responsible Organizations............................................

6 Special Inventories............................................

6 4.0 DOCUMENTATION...........................................

7 4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies...........................................

7 4.2 Drill and Exercise Records............................................

7 5.0 APPENDICES A. Technical Support Center

.8 B. Operations Support Center.12 C. Main Control Room.15 D. Local Recovery Center.16 E. RADCON Equipment.17 F. Onsite Decontamination Supplies.18 G. Protective Clothing.19 H. Agreement Hospital Cabinet Inventory.23 I.

Monthly Testing Of Communications Equipment.25 J. Quarterly Administrative Checks and Reviews.27 K. Review of Inventories Performed by other Procedures.28 L. Emergency Dosimetry.29 PAGE 3 of 29 REVISION 4

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-121

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this instruction is to comply with the requirements of the Radiological Emergency Plan for periodic inspection and maintenance of equipment and supplies.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Industry Documents A.

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-11: NRC Emergency Telecommunications System B.

1 OCFR50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities Part IV.E.9.d C.

NUREG 0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants D.

NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities E.

TVA Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan F.

CECC EPIP-9, Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 Conduct of Inventories A.

The individuals performing the inventory shall complete the appendices as indicated and make arrangements to correct any items found unsatisfactory.

B.

Completed appendices will be forwarded prior by the end of the quarter in which they are due to the Emergency Preparedness Manager for review.

C.

The Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for ensuring the overall state of readiness of supplies and equipment identified in this procedure.

D.

List any deviations and the disposition on the appropriate Appendix Data Sheet.

Deficient outdated or missing items shall be replaced as soon as possible.

E.

Personnel conducting tasks will provide legible documentation of results.

F.

In addition to this frequency schedule, special inventories are indicated when items or equipment maintained by this procedure have been affected by a drill, exercise, or training. This special inventory will be performed at a reasonable time following the activity. This special inventory may also be used as the routine inventory.

G.

A copy of the most recent inventory of the equipment should be posted on the outside of the cabinet where a posting device has been provided.

PAGE 4 of 29 REVISION 4

l SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES EPIP-12 3.2 Completion of Appendices A.

A checkmark in the "SAT" column will represent that the item being inventoried meets the operable condition and/or minimum quantities were observed.

B.

If the "As Found" condition of items differ from the expected condition, comments in the "Remarks" column of the appendix should be recorded and in enough detail to leave no doubt as to the conditions found and actions taken. Comments such as the following - batteries missing" do not document the full action taken allow a person to determine what, if any, action has been taken. Comments should read for example: "Batteries missing, replaced on Feb 5, 04".

C.

All unexpected As Found" conditions shall be corrected as soon as possible. If circumstances do not allow prompt correction, the Emergency Preparedness Manager shall be notified. Once the condition(s) has been corrected, the applicable form will be signed.

D.

Special checks of certain material in the cabinets shall be performed. The following checks shall be made where applicable:

1. The protective clothing and heat/moisture sensitive materials shall be checked for deterioration.

2.

The smoke tubes and aspirator bulbs shall be checked for deterioration and that the tubes have not been broken or used.

3.

Replace all flashlight batteries at the end of shelf -life with fresh batteries.

(Do not discard batteries. Return them to the tool room.)

4.

Check to determine that flashlights are operable.

E.

The emergency equipment stored in cabinets may be provided with a lock or plastic seal as a means of controlling access or determining that the cabinet has not been opened.

F.

Equipment in certain cabinets is sepa rated into Table A and Table B. Table A is a list of all non-perishable items stored in a small metal box equipped with a security seal within the cabinet itself. These items will be inventoried annually (preferably in January) and whenever a security seal has been found to be violated. Those items listed in Table B of these attachments are inventoried on a quarterly basis.

G.

"As found" quantities at less than minimum specified generally do not rise to the levels described in SPP 3.1 if promptly corrected. However, any items deemed to meet the criteria of SPP 3.1 shall be documented under SPP 3.1.

PAGE 5 of 29 REVISION 4

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-121 3.3 Responsible Organizations Responsible Organizations (as designated below) shall conduct inventories at the specified frequencies.

Apdx Frequency Description Responsible Org.

A Calendar Technical Support Center EP Quarter B

Calendar Operations Support Center EP Quarter C

Calendar Main Control Room EP Quarter D

Calendar Local Recovery Center EP Quarter E

Calendar Radiological Monitoring Equipment RadCon Quarter F

Calendar Onsite Decontamination RadCon Quarter G

Calendar Protective Clothing - MCR Corridor Cabinet RadCon Year G

Calendar Protective Clothing - Communications Room RadCon Year G

Calendar Protective Clothing - 6.9kV Shutdown Board RadCon Quarter Room G

Calendar Protective Clothing - OSC Response Team RadCon Quarter Equipment H

Calendar Agreement Hospital Cabinet Inventory Corp EP Quarter l

Monthly Monthly Testing Of Communications Equipment EP (per REP)

J Quarterly Quarterly Administrative Checks And Reviews EP (per REP)__

K Calendar Inventories Performed in other Procedures EP Quarter L

Calendar Emergency Dosimetry RadCon Quarter 3.4 Special Inventories In addition to the frequency schedule in Section 3.3, special inventories are indicated when items or equipment maintained by this procedure have been affected by a drill, exercise, or training. This special inventory will be performed at a reasonable time following the activity. This special inventory may also be used as the routine inventory.

PAGE 6 of 29 REVISION 4

I SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-12 1 4.0 RECORD RETENTION 4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies The materials generated in support of key actions during an actual emergency classified as an Alert or higher are considered Lifetime retention Non-QA records.

Materials shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall submit any records deemed necessary to demonstrate performance to the Corporate EP Manager for storage.

4.2 Drill and Exercise Records The materials deemed necessary to demonstrate perform ance of key actions during drills are considered Non-QA records. These records shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall retain records deemed necessary to demonstrate six-year plan performance for six years. The EP Manager shall retain other records in this category for three years. The Appendices/Checklists in this Instruction are NON -QA documents and will be retained by the SQN Emergency Planning (EP) Manager for at least three years.

5.0 ILLUSTRATIONS / APPENDICES Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G Appendix H Appendix I Appendix J Appendix K Appendix L Technical Support Center Operations Support Center Main Control Room Local Recovery Center RADCON Equipment Onsite Decontamination Supplies Protective Clothing Agreement Hospital Cabinet Inventory Monthly Testing Of Communications Equipment Quarterly Administrative Checks and Reviews Review of Inventories Performed by other Procedures Emergency Dosimetry PAGE 7 of 29 REVISION 4

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES EPIP-121 APPENDIX A Page 1 of 4 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)

SUPPLIES SAT Min Description Remarks Asrtd Office/Desktop Supplies Asrtd Dryboard Supplies 6

Calculators, (Scientific) 12 Flashlights 24 Batteries (D-Cells) Best used by Date:

/

24 Batteries (AA) Best used by Date:

/

4 Telephone Headsets (on desks) 3 Telephone Headsets (Spares) 12 Grease Pencils 4 pk Copier Paper 1 Roll Thermal Paper for Tracking Board 2

ASME Steam Tables

=____

1 Accountability Roster (Current Rev) 1 ea TSC Position Notebooks - Check for uncontrolled or out-Iof-date materials (in notebooks or TSC areas)

MAPS SAT Min Description Remarks 1

2 Mile Map Latest Rev.

Verify wall maps are the 1

10 Mile Evac Sect. Map Latest Rev.

latest revision (see EPIL-1) 1 10 Mile Sample Point Map Latest Rev.

1 50 Mile Sample Point Map Latest Rev.

COMMUNICATIONS BRIDGES SAT Description Remarks Verify bridges are functional by calling numbers listed on two pones and ensuring clear communications.

It

Bridge

/

Bridge 101 Ops Bridge - Talk 104 Maintenance 102 Ops Bridge - Listen 6406 OSC Teams 103 RadCon Bridge I

(Continued next page)

Completed By Date:

PAGE 8 of 29 REVISION 4

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES EPIP-12 APPENDIX A Page 2 of 4 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)

FUNCTIONAL CHECKS r SAT Description Remarks Verify Key Phones for TSC are functional by calling numbers listed in the REND (Forward corrections to Corporate EP as part of quarterly REND validation)

Verify CECC ring-down is functional by calling CECC Director Position Verify Fixed Satellite Phone is functional by calling known good phone Verify Portable Satellite Phone is functional by calling known good phone Verify CECC Terminal/Printer is functional by printing current Met Data

=____

Verify copier is functional by copying a page Verify Electronic Display Projectors functional Verify Zetron Radio is functional using handheld radio Verify Incoming Fax is functional by faxing to Outgoing Fax Verify Outgoing Fax is functional by faxing to Incoming Fax Verify clocks are functional by checking current time Verify signs are functional by changing to one or more classifications and observing Verify TSC Printer is functional by printing test page Verify all ICS/Wide Area Network Terminals are functional by checking ICS or EP Website as appropriate Position Position Position Operations Mgr.

Ops Comm. #1 TAT 1 ICS Chemistry Mgr Ops Comm. #2 TAT 2 ICS RadCon ICS Maintenance Mgr TAT 3 ICS RadCon WAN Site Vice Pres.

TAT 4 ICS NRC Room Logkeeper TATTEC ICS TAT DISPLAY (Continued next page)

Completed By Date:

PAGE 9 of 29 REVISION 4

SEQUOYAH l EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-12 1 APPENDIX A Page 3 of 4 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)

SITE WIDE PA SYSTEM SAT Description Remarks VERIFY operability ERF Public Address System by completing the following steps:

DIAL x4900 from TSC EP Manager's telephone.

BROADCAST the following message "This is a test of the REP PA system". Repeat message.

CONTACT plant personnel at a minimum of three of the specified locations below (each quarter) to confirm that the message was heard.

Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sep Oct-Dec O&PS 1st Solar Lunch STC 1st DSB East O&PS 2nd Solar 1st STC 2nd DSB West O&PS 3rd Solar 2nd MPB TEACP O&PS 4th EMERGENCY CENTER PA SYSTEM SAT Description Remarks VERIFY operability ERF Public Address System by:

ACTIVATE the system from the TSC by dialing x4825 (OSC) or x4826 (Labs) from the podium or other appropriate TSC phone BROADCAST This is a test of the REP PA system".

CALL each remote location at the phone numbers indicated to confirm that message was heard.

OSC (x6436)

RADCON Lab (x7865)

Chem Lab (x6348)

(Continued next page)

Completed By Date:

PAGE 10 of 29 REVISION 4

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-12 1 APPENDIX A Page 4 of 4 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)

PROCEDURES SAT Min Description Remarks 4

REP (Radiological Emergency Plan)

Verify presence only 2

REND (DCU controls contents) 2 CECC EPIPs 4

SQN EPIPs 4

Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMGs) 3 SAMG Lesson Plans 2

Functional Restoration Guidelines 2

Emergency Instructions 2

Emergency Abnormal Procedures (EAPs) 2 Emergency Contingency Actions (ECAs) 2 WOG, ERG Maint Direct Work Item DW-97-002 (Emergency Response Guidelines, Bkgd Info)

I Updated SQN FSAR 2

Unit 1 Technical Specifications 2

Unit 2 Technical Specifications 1

State of TN Multijurisdictional REP Response Plan 1

Sys Operating Manual/Sys Oper Instructions (SO/SOI) 1 Annunciator Response Manuals (AR) 1 Periodic Instructions (PI) 2 Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP) 1 Technical Instructions (TI) 1 General Operating Instructions (GO) 1 SQN Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) 1 SQN Process Control Program (PCP) 1 Radiological Control Instructions (RCI) 1 Fire Protection Report 1

Users Manual - Emergency Paging System 2

Users Manuals - Meteorological Data Print Program 1

Users Manual - Meteorological Data Display I

Users Manual - ICS 1

Zetron Radio Manual 1 set Drawings Completed By, Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 11 of 29 REVISION 4

l SEQUQYAHi l EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES l EPIP-12 APPENDIX B Page 1 of 3 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)

SUPPLES SAT Min Description Remarks Asrtd Office/Desktop Supplies Asrtd Dryboard Supplies 6

Calculators 12 Flashlights 24 Batteries (D-Cells) Expires I

24 Batteries (AA)

Expires I

4 Communication Headsets (on desks) 2 Communication Headsets (spares) 6 Batteries - Cordless Phone (Charged) 1 Digital Camera 4 Pk Copier Paper 1 Roll Thermal Paper for Tracking Board 2

Pagers 1

Accountability Roster (Current Rev)

I ea OSC Position Notebooks - Check for uncontrolled or out-of-date materials (in notebooks or OSC areas)

PROCEDURES SAT Min Description Remarks 1

SQN EPIPs

. REND I1 Emergency Instructions I

Emergency Abnormal Procedures (EAPs) 1 Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) 1 Emergency Contingency Actions (ECAs)

I AOP-P.01 Loss of Offsite Power 1

User Manual - ICS 1 set Drawings (Continued next page)

Completed By, Date:

PAGE 12 of 29 REVISION 4

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES EPIP-12 1 APPENDIX B Page 2of3 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)

FUNCTIONAL CHECKS SAT Description Remarks Verify Key Phones for OSC are functional by calling numbers listed in the REND (Forward corrections to Corporate EP as part of quarterly REND validation)

Verify copier is functional by copying a page Verify Zetron Radio is functional using handheld radio Verify Fax is functional by faxing to EP Office Verify clocks are functional by checking current time Verify signs are functional by changing to one or more classifications and observing Verify HIS-20 Terminal functional and HIS-20 loads Verify OSC printer is working by printing a page Verify Electronic Display Projectors functional by turning on and observing image Verify all ICS/Wide Area Network Terminals are functional by checking ICS or EP Website as appropriate X1 Position q

Position l

Position Ops Advisor #1 DCRM Fire Ops

_ Ops Advisor #2 Materials Coord Status BdWriter eSOMS RadCon MAPS SAT Min Description Remarks 1

2 Mile Map Latest Rev.

Verify wall maps are the 1

10 Mile Evac Sect. Map Latest Rev.

latest revision (see EPIL-1)

=___

1 10 Mile Sample Point Map Latest Rev._

OSC PA SYSTEM SAT Description Remarks VERIFY operability OSC Public Address System by completing the following steps:

VERIFY message understood from the Wired Microphone VERIFY message understood from the Wireless Microphone (Continued next page)

Completed By Date:

PAGE 13 of 29 REVISION 4

ISEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES EPIP-12 APPENDIX B Page 3 of 3 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)

RADIOS SAT Min Description Remarks 10 Hand held radios 10 Radio batteries I=

1 Radio battery charger II Completed By Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 14 of 29 REVISION 4

l SEQUOYAH l EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-12 1 APPENDIX C Page 1 of 1 MAIN CONTROL ROOM (MCR)

NOTE:

Obtain Shift Manager approval before conducting testing on Main Control Room telephones or equipment.

SAT Description Remarks Test the Control Room Communicator portable phone by dialing a known good number.

Operations Duty Specialist ODS) Ringdown Line: Pickup receiver to the SODS Ringdown' telephone. When the ODS answers, tell him that this is a test and confirm clarity.

Main Control Room/SM EP Satellite Phone Link: Verify operability by pressing the Satellite' programmed button on the Shift Manager's telephone. Once the dial tone is established, call Corporate EP Secretary @ 423-751-8580.

Completed By Review and Approval: EP Manager Date:

Date PAGE 15 of 29 REVISION 4

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-12 1 APPENDIX D Page 1 of 1 LOCAL RECOVERY CENTER (LRC)

SUPPLIES SAT Min Description Remarks Asrtd Office/Desktop Supplies Asrtd Dryboard Supplies 4

Calculators (Scientific) 12 Flashlights 2

Spare flashlight bulbs 24 Batteries (D-Cells) Expires

/

4 Pk Copier Paper (for Printer)

FUNCTIONAL CHECKS SAT Description Remarks Verify Key Phones for LRC are functional by calling numbers listed in the REND (Forward corrections to Corporate EP as part of quarterly REND validation)

Verify CECC Terminal/Printer is functional by printing current Met Data Verify ICS Terminal is function by printing copy of REP Overview ICS screen Completed By Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 16 of 29 REVISION 4

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-1 2 APPENDIX E Page 1 of 1 RADCON EQUIPMENT NOTE Survey instrumentation, counting equipment, air samplers, dosimeters and other radiological control equipment is maintained in calibration be the Western Area Labs. Conduct of this inventory does include verification that instruments are within calibration dates.

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL LABORATORY - SERVICE BUILDING SAT Min Description Remarks 1

Alpha Survey Meter (500,000 cpm) 1 Neutron dose rate survey meter (5,000 mR/hr) 2 High Range Survey Instrument (1,000 R/hr with extendible probe) 6 ION Chamber Survey Meters (50 R/h) 1 ION Chamber Survey Meter (20,000 R/h) 10 Frisker Type Survey Meters (50,000 cpm) 1 Portable Scaler 1

Shielded Detector 5

High volume Air Samplers (and support eqpt) 5 Low-volume Air samplers (and support eqpt) 5 Noble Gas Sampling Syringes 10 Silver Zeolite Cartridges NOTE: 10 year shelf life if packaging is unopened Date of Manufacture:

/

5 Marinelli Beakers I Bx Smears

=____

5 Calculators 8

Flashlights 16 Batteries (D-Cell)

Expires:

I 2 Bx Particulate Air Filters 12 Pens Completed By Review and Approval: EP Manager.

Date:

Date PAGE 17 of 29 REVISION 4

l SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-121 APPENDIX F Page 1 of 1 ONSITE DECONTAMINATION SUPPLIES DECONTAMINATION ROOM EL. 690' SAT Min Description Remarks 2 bx Disposable Gloves 2 bx Gauze Pads I 1 pkg Cotton Swabs 2 btl Saline Solution 12 Surgical Brushes 2 btl Shampoo 5 bar Soap 1 bx Laundry detergent 1 btl Soap (liquid abrasive) 2 can Mechanic's Hand Cleaner 1 can Shaving Cream 5

Razors 1 bx Paper Bath Towels 25 Towels 1 pr Scissors

__ 5 Petri Dishes 2 roll Duct Tape 10 pr Paper Coveralls 1 pair Shoes (Sizes 7-12) half sizes are OK each

____size I______________________________

Completed By Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 18 of 29 REVISION 4

ISEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES EPIP-1 2 l APPENDIX G Page 1 of 4 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING NOTE:

Table A will be inventoried annually (preferably in January) and whenever a security seal has been found to be violated.

TABLE A - MAIN CONTROL ROOM CORRIDOR - CONTROL BUILDING EL. 732 SAT Mm Description Remarks SAT Min Description Remarks 12 pr Rubber overshoes - Various sizes 12 pr Rubber gloves - Various sizes 12 pr Canvas gloves 12 Surgeon caps 12 Hoods 2

Boxes smoke tubes 2

Aspirator bulbs 4 roll Duct tape and/or masking tape Security seal replaced TABLE B - MAIN CONTROL ROOM CORRIDOR - CONTROL BUILDING EL. 732 SAT Min Description Remarks 12 pr Pairs of paper overalls - Various sizes

=

12

_Face Goggles 2

Flashlights 12 Flashlight batteries Best use by Date:

/

1 First-aid kit 1

ION Chamber Survey Meter (50 R/h)

Security seal replaced Completed By Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 19 of 29 REVISION 4

ISEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-12 1 APPENDIX G Page 2 of 4 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING NOTE:

Table A will be inventoried annually (preferably in January) and whenever a security seal has been found to be violated.

TABLE A - COMMUNICATIONS ROOM - CONTROL BUILDING EL. 662 SAT Min Description Remarks A

Remaeksaui 6 pr Rubber overshoes - Various sizes

___6 pr Rubber gloves-Various sizes 6 pr Canvas gloves 6

Surgeon caps 6

Hoods 2

Boxes smoke tubes 2

Aspirator bulbs 4 roll Duct tape andlor masking tape Security seal replaced TABLE B - COMMUNICATIONS ROOM - CONTROL BUILDING EL. 662 SAT Min Description Remarks

=

6 pr Pairs of paper overalls - Various sizes 12 Face Goggles 2

Flashlights 12 Flashlight batteries Best use by Date:

/

=____ 1 First-aid kit ISecurity seal replaced Completed By Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 20 of 29 REVISION 4

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-12 1 APPENDIX G Page 3 of 4 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING 6.9KV SHUTDOWN BOARD ROOM - AUXILIARY BUILDING UNIT 2 EL. 734 SAT Min Description Remarks 40 pr Coveralls - Various sizes 25 pr Cotton liners 25 pr Rubber gloves - Various sizes 25 pr Plastic booties*

25 pr Rubber overshoes - Various sizes 25 Surgeon caps 25 Hoods 8 rolls Duct Tape and/or Masking Tape 1

Box of vinyl gloves 6 pr Canvas gloves 2

Flashlights 12 Flashli ht batteries Best use b Date:

Security seal replaced Completed By Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 21 of 29 REVISION 4

ISEQUOYAH l EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-121 APPENDIX G Page 4 of 4 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING OSC STORAGE AREA - PLANT OFFICE BUILDING EL. 706 SAT Min Description Remarks 40 pr Coveralls - Various sizes

=____ 25 pr Cotton liners.

25 pr Rubber gloves - Various sizes 25 pr Plastic booties 25 pr Rubber overshoes - Various sizes 25 Surgeon caps 25 Hoods 8 rolls Duct Tape and/or Masking Tape 2000 Potassium Iodide Tablets (Expires:

/

)

doses

(#Pkgs * #Tablets/pkg = #doses)

Door Relocked Completed By Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 22 of 29 REVISION 4

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-1 2 APPENDIX H Page 1 of 2 AGREEMENT HOSPITAL CABINET INVENTORY JERLANGER ONORTH PARK M

SAT Min Description l

Remarks l

10 r Shoe covers 10 pk Dress out packages (coveralls, booties, gloves) 3 Surgical gowns 2 bx Surgical gloves 4 rolls Surgical tape for dressout - 2 inch 1 set Floor coverings (hospital specific)

I roll Heavy duty paper (3 foot wide) 2 rolls 2 inch duct tape I roll Radiation Warning symbol tape (2 inch) 2 Step off pads 8

Radiological barrier posting signs 1

Radiological barrier rope or ribbon (spool) 5 Traffic cones 10 Large rad waste plastic bags (trash can size) 10 Medium rad waste plastic bags (x-ray cassette size)

I Radioactive material label tape 1

Decontamination table, backboard and bottles (min. total capacity of 10 gallons) 1 Flexible funnel with drain hose - optional 1

Decontamination media /soap product 12 Cotton swabs 20 Zip lock bags for sample collection 10 Labels for sample bags 2

Scissors 1

Wall poster with decontamination steps (Continued next page)

Completed By Date:

PAGE 23 of 29 REVISION 4

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-12 1 APPENDIX H Page 2 of 2 AGREEMENT HOSPITAL CABINET INVENTORY VI ERLANGER l NORTH PARK NOTE Survey instrumentation, counting equipment, air samplers, dosimeters and other radiological control equipment is maintained in calibration be the Western Area Labs. Conduct of this inventory does include verification that instruments are within calibration dates.

SAT Min Description Remarks 2

Hospital specific booklet (1 at desk, 1 in cabinet)

Last Update:

/

1 NCRP # 65 Reference Handbook 10 TLDs 1

Wound probe with cable 10 Electronic dosimeters and tray 200 Smears 12 Radioactive Material tags 1

Masslin mop and 20 cloths SAT Min Description Serial Number Calibration Due

=.

1 Bicron Surveyor 50 1

Bicron Surveyor 50

= _

1 Bicron ISM (RSO-5 or 50) 1 1

1 Completed By, Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 24 of 29 REVISION 4

SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-121 APPENDIX I Page 1 of 2 MONTHLY TESTING OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT NOTE:

Obtain Shift Manager approval before conducting testing on Main Control Room telephones or equipment.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER SAT Description Remarks VERIFY operability NRC ENS System by calling NRC on the main Emergency Notification System (ENS) line (TSC Operations Manager Position) and confirming dial tone on others.

Dial the number on the sticker on the phone in the TSC. Tell NRC that 'this is a test of the TVA SQN ENS line". Ensure that communications are understandable Request that the NRC return your call and supply appropriate telephone number VERIFY return call received VERIFY dial tones at the following TSC locations TSC - Health Physics Network (HPN)

NRC - Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL)

NRC - Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL)

NRC - Management Counterpart Link (MCL)

NRC - Emergency Notification System (ENS)

NRC - Health Physics Network (HPN)

NRC - Local Area Network (LAN) dial-up line MAIN CONTROL ROOM SAT Description Remarks VERIFY conducting MCR test after actual call is made to NRC using one of the TSC NRC ENS telephones.

VERIFY operability by confirming dial tone on three NRC ENS phones in the MCR.

SM position U2 Completed By Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 25 of 29 REVISION 4

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES EPIP-12 1 APPENDIX I Page 2of2 MONTHLY TESTING OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WARNING: Special Handling required for Equipment Problems For any NRC telephone equipment or system determined inoperable, initiate a Work Request (WR) or Service Request (SR), as applicable, to ensure that it is repaired in a timely manner. Notify NRC at 9-1-301-951-0550 of equipment problems and ongoing repair efforts.

Maintenance and Service Requests Document trouble ticket, WR, or SR number in Remarks section.

Document the equipment's return to operable status in the Remarks section Post Repair Testing - After being notified that the trouble ticket, WR, or SR has been completed on inoperable equipment, test the equipment using the applicable step in this procedure to ensure its operability.

Notify the Shift Manager and NRC (at the above number) of the repairs.

Make a copy of the completed Appendix, attach any notes, and file in SQN EP files.

PAGE 26 of 29 REVISION 4

l SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES l EPIP-12 APPENDIX J Page 1 of 1 QUARTERLY ADMINISTRATIVE CHECKS AND REVIEWS EPIP TELEPHONE NUMBERS SAT Description Remarks REVIEW the phone numbers in the SQN EPIPs once per quarter for accuracy.

REVISE any procedures that have incorrect phone or pager numbers.

Completed By Date:

CALL LISTS SAT Description Remarks SEND the phone numbers in the SQN REP Call List out to representatives of organizations to review and correct phone numbers and pager numbers DISTRIBUTE corrected copies to Main Control Room, TSC, OSC, Simulator, and place one in the EP department files.

Completed By Date:

ACCESS LIST SAT Description Remarks PRINT and DISTRIBUTE new copies to SQN Access Portal, SQN site check point and place one in the EP department files.

Completed By Review and Approval: EP Manager Date:

Date PAGE 27 of 29 REVISION 4

SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES l EPIP-12 l APPENDIX K Page 1 of REVIEW OF INVENTORIES PERFORMED BY OTHER PROCEDURES AMBULANCE MEDICAL SUPPLIES: (FIRE OPERATIONS) l 0-PI-FPU-317-301.M performed Date:

SCBA INVENTORIES: (FIRE OPERATIONS) 0-PI-FPU-049-401.M performed Date:

Review to ensure the following equipment is available:

Main Control Room Area (EL 732):

12 Self-contained breathing apparatus 12 Additional air cylinders 2 Small MSA face pieces 2 Large MSA face pieces SERVICE BUILDING EL 690 (PASF Units):

8 Dual Purpose self-contained breathing apparatus 4 Dual Purpose Airline Hoses 3 Small MSA face pieces 3 Large MSA face pieces SERVICE BUILDING EL 690 (RADCON AND RADCHEM LABS):

16 Self-contained breathing apparatus SERVICE BUILDING (EL. 706) FIRE EQUIPMENT CAGE 6 Self-contained breathing apparatus 12 Additional cylinders EMERGENCY VAN SUPPLIES: (RADCON)

CECC-EPIP 9 Appendix J. performed at least one per van per quarter Truck 2 Date:

i Truck 3 Date:

QUARTERLY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (EP MANAGER) 0-PI-REM-244-002.Q performed Date:

QUARTERLY TOOL ROOM TOOL KITS: (TOOL ROOM)

I0-PI-REM-000.001.Q performed Date:

I TELECOM EQUIPMENT: (TELECOM)

Quarterly Testing of Diesel Generator/Battery Power Supply for the Date:

I Node Building Completed By Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date 4.

PAGE 28 of 29 REVISION 4

SEQUOYAH l EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I EPIP-12 1 APPENDIX L Page 1 of I EMERGENCY DOSIMETRY PACKAGES FOR ACCESS CONTROL POINT SAT Min Description Remarks 25 Packets each containing the following:

Protected Area Access Badge TLDs (Verify Current Quarter)

Self-Reading Dosimeter (Rezero)

Potassium Iodide Tablet (in Foil packet)

Emergency Worker Information Card PACKAGES FOR PERIMETER SECURITY CHECKPOINT SAT Min Description Remarks 50 Packets each containing the following:

Owner Controlled Area Access Badge TLDs (Verify Current Quarter)

Self-Reading Dosimeter (Rezero)

Potassium Iodide Tablet (in Foil packet)

Emergency Worker Information Card._

__I Completed By Date:

Review and Approval: EP Manager Date PAGE 29 of 29 REVISION 4

ML040420372

Text

2.0 REFERENCES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 REFERENCES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 REFERENCES

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