ML033010253
| ML033010253 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/2003 |
| From: | Short P Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML032890563 | List: |
| References | |
| 05-301-03-301, 50-266/03-301 | |
| Download: ML033010253 (57) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Point Beach Scenario No.: 1 OP-Test No.: 2003301 Examiners: ______________________ Operators: ______________________
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% Power, MOL, equilibrium xenon conditions. Unit 2 is at 100%
Power.
Turnover: G-02 EDG is out of service for annual maintenance. It was taken OOS 2 days ago, and is expected to be returned to service in 3 days. G-01 EDG is aligned to 4.16 kV buses 1A-05 and 2A-05 IAW OI-35A.
1P-2C Charging Pump is out of service due to a failed motor bearing. The failure occurred 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> ago and has been tagged out for repair.
1P-15A Safety Injection Pump has just been tagged out (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago) due to high vibration that was identified during In-service Testing. The pump is not available.
Today is Sunday, present clock time is real time. A normal shift complement is available with exception of the 3rd SRO. An RP Tech is on-site along with two mechanics who are working on the diesel. A maintenance crew has just been called in for 1P-15A.
The objective of the shift is to maintain stable plant conditions.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description C - BOP 1 Service Water Pump Trip.
SRO I - RO 2 Controlling Pressurizer Pressure channel PT-431 fails high.
SRO C - RO 3 1P-2A Charging Pump belt failure.
SRO 4 I - All Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-485 fails low.
5 M - All RCS Leak develops to SBLOCA, requiring reactor trip.
6 C - All Reactor trip breakers fail to open - (ATWS).
C - BOP 7 Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B fails to start.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT DYNAMIC EXAM SCENARIO ID#: SES-2003301: #1 SIMULATOR SHIFT TURNOVER:
Per Scenario Outline.
SIMULATOR SCENARIO SET UP STEP COUNTERS ON _________
INIT into IC _________
PBF-6802, Communicator Telephone Log, available _________
PBF-6801, Simulator Setup Checklist, completed _________
PBF-6806, Simulator Book Preparation Checklist, completed _________
PBF-6807, Simulator Scenario Briefing Sheet, completed _________
TI 9.0 Attachment 1 (Part 1), PBNP Simulator Security Checklist, completed _________
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT SCENARIO GUIDE:
- 2. Ensure SI Pump 1P-15A control switch is in pullout, suction valve 1SI-896A is shut , and 1SI-866A is shut. Place a danger tag on all components.
- 3. Ensure Charging Pump 1P-2C control switch is in pullout (1P-2A and 1P-2B should be running with 1P-2A in Automatic). Balance charging/letdown flows as necessary. Place a danger tag on control switch for 1P-2C.
- 4. Ensure G-01 EDG is aligned to 1A05 and 2A05.
- 5. Ensure G-02 Mode Selector switch is in Local. Place Danger Tags on the G-02 Mode Selector switch, breaker 1A52-66 control switch, and breaker 2A52-67 control switch. C02 alarms will have to be acknowledged after going to RUN.
- 6. Preload (or verify preloaded) the following simulator codes:
Initiation Action or Action Malf. Ramp Delay Time Trigger Verification Cue Component Tagname Value Time Performed Description Event Oper. Ready Inserted Criteria Init. #
PRELOAD 1-SI-896A, SI VLV1SIS046 1 - - - -
PUMP SUCTION ISOL (FAIL CONTRL FUSE)
PRELOAD 1-SI-866A, VLV1SIS035 1 - - - -
1P15A DISCH STOP CHECK (FAIL CNTRL FUSE)
PRELOAD 1B-5220A P- BKR1CVC007 6 - - - -
2C CHARGING PUMP CKTBKR (FAIL CNTRL FUSE)
PRELOAD 1-EP-1A5259R LOA1EPS102 RACKOUT - - - -
1-A05 BKR 59 RACKOUT, 1P15A (RACKOUT)
PRELOAD 0-P32B PMP1SWS002 90 - - - -
SERVICE C WATER PUMP B HEAD CAPACITY
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT Initiation Action or Action Tagname Malf. Ramp Delay Time Trigger Verification Cue Component Value Time Performed Description Event Oper. Ready Inserted Criteria Init. #
PRELOAD 1-A52-02 STA BKR1EPS002 5 - - - -
SERV TRANS NO 1-X11 NORMAL (FAIL AS IS)
PRELOAD 1-A5215 STA BKR1EPS003 5 - - - -
SERV TRANS NO 1-X12 SUPPLY (FAIL AS IS)
PRELOAD 1-B5204B BKR1EPS023 5 - - - -
480V BUS 1-B01 NORMAL FEED (FAIL AS IS)
PRELOAD 1-B5205B BKR1EPS024 5 - - - -
480V BUS 1-B02 NORMA FEED (FAIL AS IS)
PRELOAD REACTOR MAL1PPL001A 3 - - - -
TRIP BREAKER 52/RTA FAILURE (FAILS TO OPEN)
PRELOAD REACTOR MAL1PPL001B 3 - - - -
TRIP BREAKER 52/RTB FAILURE (FAILS TO OPEN)
PRELOAD 1-A5265 P- BKR1SIS002 4 - - - -
15B SAFETY INJ PUMP CKTBKR (FAIL AUTO CLOSE)
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT The following events will be entered when requested by the lead examiner.
Initiation Action or Action Tagname Malf. Ramp Delay Time Trigger Verification Cue Component Value Time Performed Description Event Oper. Ready Inserted Criteria Init. #
EVENT 1: SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP PLE 1-B5210C P- BKR1SWS001 1 - - 1 32A SERVICE WATER PUMP (TRIP)
EVENT 2: CONTROLLING PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CHANNEL PT-431 FAILS HIGH.
PLE 1-PT431 XMT1RCS019A 2500 00:00:30 0 0 2 PRZR PRESSURE 30 Sec.
FIXED OUTPUT (HIGH)
EVENT 3: CHARGING PUMP, 1P-2A BELT FAILURE.
PLE 1P-2A PMP1CVC004C 0 - - - 3 CHARGING PUMP NO 1-P2A FLOW CAPACITY EVENT 4: TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER, 1PT-485 FAILS LOW.
PLE 1-PT-485 XMT1MSS008A 0 00:00:30 0 0 4 FIRST STAGE 30 Sec.
PRESSURE XMTR FIXED OUTPUT (LOW)
EVENT 5: RCS LEAK DEVELOPS TO SBLOCA, REQUIRING REACTOR TRIP PLE RCS LEAK MAL1RCS002F 25 00:20:00 - - 5 LOOP B INT LEG 1200 Sec
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT Initiation Action or Action Tagname Malf. Ramp Delay Time Trigger Verification Cue Component Value Time Performed Description Event Oper. Ready Inserted Criteria Init. #
EVENT 6: REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS FAIL TO OPEN - ATWS WHEN REACTOR MAL1PPL001A DELETE - - - -
directed by TRIP Crew, BREAKER THEN 52/RTA FAILURE (FAILS TO OPEN)
WHEN REACTOR MAL1PPL001B DELETE - - - -
directed by TRIP Crew, BREAKER THEN 52/RTB FAILURE (FAILS TO OPEN)
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT ANTICIPATED BOOTH COMMUNICATION/GUIDANCE:
Event 1: This event is a failure of Service Water Pump P-32A. Following the SW Pump trip, the AO will be directed to check out P-32A in the Pump House. You will report, if asked, that the motor is very hot to the touch. There are no other signs of damage. If an AO is sent to the breaker, it has tripped on over-current. If asked to check out the Service Water Pump that was started, report back that it appears to be running fine. An AO will also be asked to check power to the Zurn strainers during AOP-9A implementation. Report back that power is available.
Event 2: This event is a failure of the controlling Pressurizer Pressure channel, PT-431. Following the failure of PT-431, the Instructor SM will field crew requests for I&C, STA, and DCS support. There are no anticipated booth communications.
Event 3: This event is a failure (belt shredding) of Charging Pump 1P-2A. If an AO is sent to inspect the pump, inform the crew that the belt is completely destroyed and is lying in pieces on the floor (motor running, pump is not).
Event 4: This event is a failure of Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, 1PT-485. There are no anticipated communications. This event will immediately transition to the next event (RCS leak) after control rods are placed in Manual.
Event 5: This event is an RCS leak inside Containment, eventually reaching the point where a Reactor Trip is required due to lowering Pressurizer level. There are no anticipated communications.
Event 6, 7: When a Reactor Trip is directed (Event 5), all attempts to trip the reactor will fail. This results in transition to CSP-S.1. The Instructor SM will act as the STA to monitor Status Trees. The crew will request an AO to locally open the Reactor Trip Breakers. After sufficient time has elapsed (2-3minutes), then delete the two malfunctions referenced for Event 6 and report back that the breakers are open. Requests will also be made for the status of valves SW-LW-61&62. It should be reported that both valves are shut. Requests for any maintenance support, review of the E-plan, etc.
will be fielded by the Instructor SM.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 1 Page 8 of 56 Event
Description:
P-32A Service Water Pump Trips on overload Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At discretion of Lead Examiner, activate Trigger 1.
BOP Acknowledges/responds to receipt of annunciators C01 A 3-5 and B 3-4.
(Additional low EDG cooling flow alarms will be received on C02)
- Identify P-32A has tripped (white light lit above control switch)
- Recognize SW header pressure has dropped.
- Reference Alarm Response Book
- Notify DOS
- Carry out actions of AOP-9A as directed by the DOS.
Note: The BOP Operator may start an additional service water pump immediately upon recognizing that P-32A has tripped and Service Water Header pressure is low. Referencing of the ARB and AOP entry are expected for verification of these actions.
DOS Entry into AOP-9A, Service Water System Malfunction based on ARB C01 A 3-5.
DOS/BOP Check Forebay Level > -11 feet on PPCS (points 1/2LT-3586B) or recorder YR-5832.
DOS/BOP Check Pumpbay Level > -11 feet on PPCS (points 1/2LT-3586A) or recorder YR-5832.
DOS/BOP Check Traveling Screen Differential Level High Alarm clear (C01 A 4-5)
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 1 Page 9 of 56 Event
Description:
P-32A Service Water Pump Trips on overload Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS/BOP Check Service Water header Pressure Alarm clear (C01A 3-5) - DOS should answer this question as NO even if alarm is now clear (additional pump may have been already started) in order to verify proper operator response actions.
- Start a non-running SW pump to restore SW header pressure between 50 -90 psig (if a service water pump has already been started, then this step is merely verification of the action).
- DOS proceeds to step 9 of AOP-9A DOS Requests SM make notification to DCS, implement the Emergency Plan, and enter applicable TS Action Conditions.(Note: the Instructor SM will ask the DOS to assess TS when time permits).
- Properly assesses LCO 3.7.8 LCO is not met.
- Condition A and Required Action A.1 of LCO 3.7.8 are applicable (with one SW pump inoperable, there is a completion time of 7 days AND 14 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO). Applies to both units.
DOS/BOP Check supply header integrity
- North and south header pressures approximately equal
- C01 A 3-5 Alarm clear
- Area sump alarms clear DOS/BOP Check Zurn Strainer
- Power available
- Strainer High DP alarms clear
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 1 Page 10 of 56 Event
Description:
P-32A Service Water Pump Trips on overload Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS/BOP Verify Service Water Header Valves Open
- SW-2890, 2891, 2869, 2870 DOS/BOP Check Component Alarms Clear - high temperature, low flow.
DOS Returns to step 1 of AOP-9A Loops through the same procedure steps as above, except this time around, service water header pressure is OK and eventually exits AOP-9A at step 8.
DOS/BOP At DOS discretion, the control switch for P-32A may be placed in pullout to clear the Motor Breaker Trip annunciator.
At the discretion of the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 2 Page 11 of 56 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-431) fails high which causes Pressurizer Spray valves to open and RCS pressure to lower.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Acknowledge and respond to receipt of annunciator ARB 1C04 1C 1-2, Pressurizer PRESSURE HIGH or LOW and ARB 1C04 1C 3-2, Pressurizer High Pressure Channel Alert Operator Actions:
- Check for associated alarms.
- Check whether pressure is high or low (Identify Failed Instrument).
- Take manual control of pressurizer control system and close the Pressurizer Spray valves. (Manual control of the Pressurizer Spray valves is established by placing the Master Pressurizer Pressure Controller in Manual; or placing the individual Pressurizer Spray Valve controllers in Manual; or placing the override switches for each spray valve to Closed.)
DOS Direct entry into AOP-24, Response to Instrument Malfunctions.
RO Identify Failed Instrument - PT-431 (PZR Pressure Blue Channel)
RO Check if failed instrument is a controlling channel - PT-431 is a controlling channel for Pressurizer Pressure Control.
RO Establish Manual Control - If not previously performed, manual control of the Pressurizer Spray valves is established via the individual controllers OR the Master Pressurizer Pressure Controller OR the Override switches - the spray valves are shut manually.
RO/DOS Return Affected Parameter(s) to desired value(s).
- Energize back-up heaters to restore plant pressure to 2235 psig.
- Manual control of pressurizer spray is required if needed.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 2 Page 12 of 56 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-431) fails high which causes Pressurizer Spray valves to open and RCS pressure to lower.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct entry into 0-SOP-IC-001, Routine Maintenance Procedure DOS Removal of Safeguards or Protection Sensor from Service.
- Obtain and implement 0-SOP-IC-001
- Review precautions and limitations
- Identify applicable Technical Specifications (reference 0-SOP-IC-002):
- Table 3.3.1-1 Items 5, 7a & 7b
- Table 3.3.2-1 Items 1d, 3c, 4d-2, 4e-2, 5c, 6c & 8
- Table 3.3.5-1 Item 2
- Channel required to be placed in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
- Table 3.3.3-1 Item 5c
- LCO met due to only 2 channels required
- Conduct pre-job brief for removing PT-431 from service
- Note: PT-429 will be the controlling channel after removal of PT-431 from service.
- Obtain DSS permission to remove channel from service
- Direct 0-SOP-IC-001Attachment A for PT-431 removal from service
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 2 Page 13 of 56 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-431) fails high which causes Pressurizer Spray valves to open and RCS pressure to lower.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP/DOS Perform actions as directed by DOS from Attachment A for PT-431 removal.
- Place RC-430 and 431C (PZR PORVs) in the close position (RO)
- Place HC-431K (pressurizer pressure controller) in MANUAL (RO)
- Place pressurizer pressure defeat switch in DEFEAT BLUE inside C-110 (BOP)
- Place HC-431K in AUTO, unless directed otherwise by DSS (RO)
- Place RC-430 and 431C in AUTO, unless directed otherwise by DSS (RO)
- Place the following bistables to TRIP inside C-116: (BOP)
- Verify alarms and trip status lights are proper (RO)
- 1. High Pressure Trip
- 2. Low Pressure Trip
- 3. Safety Injection
- 4. Unblock Safety Injection
- 5. Over-temperature Trip
- 6. Over-temperature Rod Stop
- Remove PT-431 from scan (BOP)
DOS Inform DSS PT-431 removed from service and that DCS and STA notifications need to be made.
DOS/RO Return controls to automatic if desired.
- any Pressurizer Heaters turned on manually may be returned to Auto at this time unless needed.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 2 Page 14 of 56 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-431) fails high which causes Pressurizer Spray valves to open and RCS pressure to lower.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS Check failure for Technical Specification or TRM applicability.
(Tech Specs impacted by this failure are listed on previous page).
DOS Exit AOP-24 Proceed to next event at the Lead Examiners discretion.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 3 Page 15 of 56 Event
Description:
Charging Pump 1P-2A belt fails causing pump flow to decrease to zero.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Acknowledge and respond to receipt of annunciator ARB 1C04 1C 1-8, Charging Pump Speed Control Limit HIGH or LOW and ARB 1C03 1D 2-1, 1P-1A or B RCP Labyr Seal DP LOW Operator Actions:
- Check for associated alarms.
- Check charging pump/flow indications.
- Attempt manual control of charging pump speed to determine which pump is affected
- Adjust charging pump 1P-2B speed to restore parameters Direct entry into AOP-1D, Chemical and Volume Control System DOS Malfunction.
DOS/RO Review foldout page criteria DOS/RO Check for Charging Pump Malfunction - 1P-2A not operating properly.
- 1P-2A should be secured following local report of belt failure DOS/RO Check any Charging Pump Running - 1P-2B is running DOS/RO Check Charging Flow Stable DOS/RO Check Charging Pump Relief Not Lifted
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 3 Page 16 of 56 Event
Description:
Charging Pump 1P-2A belt fails causing pump flow to decrease to zero.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Charging Pump Suction Supply Adequate DOS/RO Note : this is a Continuous Action Step Check Charging System Response - Adjust charging flow as necessary to DOS/RO restore PZR level while maintaining labyrinth seal DP DOS Notify DCS and Return to Procedure and Step in Effect DOS Check TS applicability:
DOS should determine that TLCO 3.5.1 is not met.
- Action Condition B is entered. Required Action is to restore a Charging Pump to operable status in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Proceed to next Event at the Lead Examiners Discretion.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 4 Page 17 of 56 Event
Description:
First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure (PT-485) Fails Low causing inward rod motion.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Identify Failure of PT-485 (First Stage Turbine Pressure)
- Rods will automatically move in the inward direction (RO)
- PT-485 indication on 1C03 is pegged low (BOP)
- Actual turbine load is constant (BOP)
- Tavg/Tref indicator on 1C04 indicates RCS is above program (RO)
NOTE: DOS may choose to first enter AOP 24 Response To Instrument Malfunctions. In either case, both AOP-24 and AOP-6C would need to be utilized to ensure all procedural requirements are met. The following steps of AOP-6C & AOP-24 are included due to lead examiner discretion of when to initiate the next event. The intent is to initiate the next event prior to implementation of AOP-24 and removing the channel from service. AOP-24 & 0-SOP-IC-001 were previously exercised during the PT-431 failure.
DOS Direct entry into AOP-6C, Uncontrolled Motion of RCCA(s)
CREW Check rod motion required:
- Change in turbine load
- Change in steam demand
- Tavg/Tref mismatch > 1.5 degrees F. (Note: Tavg/Tref indicator on 1C04 will not indicate properly - other indications will have to be utilized).
RO/DOS Rod motion determined to NOT be required, rods are placed in Manual.
Note: Rods may have been placed in Manual upon initial identification of the instrument failure. In this case, rods should be verified to be in Manual at this step.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 4 Page 18 of 56 Event
Description:
First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure (PT-485) Fails Low causing inward rod motion.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS Maintain RCS Tavg:
- Greater than 540 degrees F
- Less than 574 degrees F
- Within 7 degrees F of program Tavg Note: this is a continuous action step. Additional actions are required per the RNO column should any of the above conditions not be met.
RO/DOS Check RCS Tavg at or trending to Tref.
- Tavg will be less than Tref due to the inward rod motion.
- Tavg may be restored either via rod motion in Manual or adjusting turbine load (fuel has been conditioned).
RO/DOS Check control rods above the minimum insertion limit.
Rods should be above the limit. If not, boration must be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to restore the rods above the insertion limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
RO/DOS Verify AFD within the limit:
- PPCS axial flux alarm clear (DFMOOB)
- At least 3 control board meters within the limit No axial flux problems should be present.
Note: this is a continuous action step. Additional actions are required per the RNO column should any of the above conditions not be met.
CREW Check rod motion due to instrument failure:
Rod motion determined to be due to failure of PT-485, DOS should leave AOP-6C and go to AOP-24 Response to Instrument Malfunctions.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 4 Page 19 of 56 Event
Description:
First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure (PT-485) Fails Low causing inward rod motion.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS Enter AOP-24, Response to Instrument Malfunctions RO/DOS Identify failed instrument as PT-485.
RO/DOS Identify PT-485 is a controlling channel.
- Control rods placed in Manual or verified in Manual.
RO/DOS Return affected parameter to desired value - Tavg should be matched to Tref either by manual rod withdrawal or lowering turbine load (see AOP-6C).
Remove failed instrument channel from service per 0-SOP-IC-001 DOS Routine Maintenance Procedure Removal of Safeguards or Protection Sensor from Service.
DOS Check Tech Specs and TRM for applicability:
- DOS should determine that LCO 3.3.1 is not met. Action Condition A is entered immediately - Required Action is to enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 for the channel.
- Condition S is referenced from Table 3.3.1-1, Function 17.b.2.
Required Action is to verify within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> that the interlock (P-7) is in its required state for existing unit conditions OR be in Mode 2 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
Following identification of the failed channel and placing Rod Control in Manual, proceed to the next event at the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 5 Page 21 of 56 Event
Description:
A small RCS leak develops in the B RCS Loop, degrading to a SBLOCA requiring a reactor trip.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW Identify RCS leak. The following are some indications available which will enable the crew to identify that an RCS leak exists inside containment.
- Containment Sump A level rising and associated alarm (BOP)
- Containment humidity and pressure rising (BOP)
- RMS alarms inside containment (RO/BOP)
- Auto Charging Pump speed rising (RO)
- Pressurizer level lowering (RO)
DOS AOP-1A Reactor Coolant Leak is entered based on the above indications.
RO/DOS Check Safety Injection Not Required.
- Pressurizer level within 10% of program level.
- RCS subcooling greater than 30 °F.
Note: this is a continuous action step. Additional actions are required per the RNO column should any of the above conditions not be met.
RO/DOS Check Reactor Trip Not Required
- Check reactor critical
- Check charging pump suction aligned to the VCT.
Note: this is a continuous action step. Additional actions are required per the RNO column should any of the above conditions not be met.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 5 Page 22 of 56 Event
Description:
A small RCS leak develops in the B RCS Loop, degrading to a SBLOCA requiring a reactor trip.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check PZR Level - Stable At Or Trending To Program Level.
RO/DOS
- Manual control of Charging Pump 1P-2B should be established and Charging flow increased.
- The crew should manually isolate letdown per this continuous action step if pressurizer level continues to lower.
RO/DOS Check PZR Pressure - Stable At Or Trending To Desired Pressure Check Reactor Makeup Control at the proper concentration, armed, and in RO/DOS auto.
Notify DCS and implement Emergency Plan (this action will be requested DOS of the DSS)
The remainder of the steps in AOP-1A are diagnostic steps and can be performed in any order. Due to the availability of only one Charging Pump and the magnitude of the leak, it is doubtful that any further steps will be performed in AOP-1A. When PZR level cannot be maintained within 10% of program a manual reactor trip will need to be initiated per AOP-1A step 1 RNO. When the manual reactor trip is directed, proceed to the next event.
Note: A manual Reactor Trip, Safety Injection, and Containment Isolation should be directed by the DOS.
However, when the reactor does not trip, a manual Safety Injection should NOT be performed.
DOS/RO/BOP Carry out immediate actions of EOP-0
- Verify reactor trip (not tripped)
- Attempt manual reactor trip
- De-energize rod drive motor generators (breakers fail to open)
- Start monitoring Critical Safety Functions
- Go to CSP-S.1 Critical Task: Crew inserts negative reactivity into the core by continuous control rod insertion.
RO/BOP Carry out immediate actions of CSP-S.1
- Verify reactor trip (not tripped, ensures continuous rod insertion)
- Verify turbine tripped DOS Verify immediate actions have been performed and reviews foldout page criteria with crew ROBOP Verify AFW Actuation (Note: depending on crew timing, an Auto SI may or may not have occurred.)
- IF an Auto SI has occurred, then start verification of both Motor Driven Pumps and the Turbine Driven AFP should occur.
- IF an SI has NOT occurred, then the steam supply valves to the Turbine Driven AFP must be manually opened and both Motor Driven Pumps manually started.
RO/BOP Align Charging pump suction to RWST
- OPEN 1CV-112B
- SHUT 1CV-112C
RO/BOP Initiate emergency boration:
- Establish maximum charging by fully opening HC-142 - only 1 Charging Pump (1P-2B ) is available.
- Start a boric acid transfer pump
- Open 1CV-350 DOS/BOP Recognize SI Verification criteria applies and directs the BOP to perform Attachment A of CSP-S.1. Major steps of this attachment include:
- Verify Safeguards Buses energized
- Verify Feedwater Isolation
- Verify Containment Isolation NOTE: Manually starting SI Pump B is a critical task. This task may be performed in CSP-S.1, however, this is an EOP-0 critical task and must be performed prior to exiting EOP-0 at step16 (transition to EOP-1).
- Check SI Pumps running (SI Pump B should be manually started if not previously started)
- Check RHR pumps running
- Check CCW pumps-only one running
- Verify SW system alignment
- Verify Containment Accident Cooling Units running
- Check Control Room Fans armed
- Check Control Room Ventilation in accident mode
- Check if Main Steam Lines can remain open
- Verify Spray not required
- Check 4160 Vac Safeguards buses both powered by offsite power RO/BOP Check pressurizer pressure < 2335 psig RO/BOP/DOS Check if the reactor trip breakers have opened and if the turbine has tripped
- Dispatch an AO to locally open reactor trip breakers (if not already completed.)
RO/BOP Stabilize intact S/G level
- Control feed flow to maintain at least 400 GPM AFW until intact S/G level between [51%] 29 % to 65 %.
- If SG levels are within the required band, then AFW flows should be reduced to minimize the RCS cooldown. This may require securing one or more AFW pumps due to the minimum flow requirements.
RO/BOP Verify dilution paths-ALL ISOLATED
- Blender via 1CV-111
- Chemical addition pot
- VCT drain via P-33 or P-9
- Deboration
- Demineralizer resin change-out operations RO Check RCS cold leg temperature > 543 ºF
- If not, ensure atmospheric dumps and condenser steam dumps are shut, and minimize AFW flow RO Check if uncontrolled cooldown is in progress based on RCS temperature dropping in uncontrolled manner or S/G pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner
- If NO, Proceed to step 18
- If YES, isolate both main steam lines, identify that neither S/G faulted and proceed to step 18 RO Check Core exit thermocouples < 1200 ºF RO Verify reactor sub-critical
- Power range channels < 5%
- Intermediate range SUR zero or negative RO Check if boration can be stopped
- All rods fully inserted
- Stop boration
- Adjust charging flow as necessary to control PZR level
DOS Exits CSP-S.1 and directs entry into EOP-0 DOS/RO Enter at Verify Reactor Trip RNO (where exited from)
- Re-energize stripped MCCs as time permits (none should be de-energized)
- Dispatch operator to locally open reactor trip breakers (should have already been performed)
RO Verify Turbine Trip RO Verify Safeguard buses energized RO Check if SI is actuated:
- Recognize SI has actuated
- Check SI - BOTH SI & RHR pumps running Note: SI pump 1P-15B should have been manually started in CSP-S.1 DOS Review foldout page criteria with the crew.
DOS/RO Both RCPs must be manually tripped per foldout page criteria due to loss of subcooling.
DOS EOP-0 Attachment A Automatic Action Verification directed to be completed by the BOP operator while continuing on with EOP-0.
Note: Actions contained in this Attachment are essentially identical to the Attachment performed in CSP-S.1. Therefore, these steps are not included in this guide. This attachment would provide an additional opportunity to identify the failure to start of SI Pump B.
Manually starting SI Pump B prior to exiting EOP-0 is considered a critical task. SI Pump B may have been previously started in CSP-S.1.
RO/BOP Verify Secondary Heat Sink:
- Level in at least one S/G >[51%] 29%
- Control pumps and align valves as necessary to maintain S/G level
[51%] 29% to 65 %
- Labyrinth seal DP > 20 inches or
- Component cooling to RCP thermal barrier-NORMAL RO/BOP Verify RCS Temperature Control:
- RCS wide range cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 547 ºF AND STABLE
- If not stable and trending lower, stop dumping steam and control AFW flow to maintain greater than or equal to 200 gpm until at least one S/G level > [51%] 29%.
- If SG levels are within the required band, then AFW flows should be reduced to minimize the RCS cooldown.
RO Check PORVs BOTH SHUT RO Verify PZR spray valves- SHUT
- Normal spray valves BOTH SHUT
- Auxiliary spray valves SHUT RO Check if RCPs should remain running
- Check RCS subcooling > [60 ºF] 30 ºF.
Both RCPs must be tripped at this time if not previously tripped per the Foldout page criteria.
DOS Inform STA to commence monitoring critical safety functions per CSP-ST.0 (Monitoring already in progress after first transition out of EOP-0 due to ATWS)
RO/BOP Verify Containment sump recirculation not required:
- RWST level greater than or equal to 60 %
- RCS pressure > [425 psig] 200 psig CREW Check Secondary system Intact.
CREW Check if S/G tubes are Intact.
CREW Check if RCS is Intact Inside Containment
- Check containment radiation levels NORMAL - they are not.
- Check containment sump A level NORMAL - it is not.
- Check containment pressure NORMAL - it is not.
DOS Transition to EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Upon transition to EOP-1 or at discretion of Lead Examiner, terminate the scenario.
Inform the Examinees that they are to remain in the simulator until any evaluator follow-up questions are answered. Do not discuss any scenario related events.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Point Beach Scenario No.: 2 OP-Test No.: 2003301 Examiners: ______________________ Operators: ______________________
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 75% power. Power was reduced approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago at the request of the Power System Supervisor. Xenon is building in slightly. Unit 2 is at 100% Power.
Turnover: G-02 EDG is out of service for annual maintenance. It was taken OOS 2 days ago, and is expected to be returned to service in 3 days. G-01 EDG is aligned to 4.16 kV buses 1A-05 and 2A-05 IAW OI-35A.
1P-2C Charging Pump is out of service due to a failed motor bearing. The failure occurred 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> ago and has been tagged out for repair.
1P-15A Safety Injection Pump has just been tagged out (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago) due to high vibration that was identified during scheduled In-service Testing. The pump is not available.
Today is Sunday, present clock time is real time. A normal shift complement is available with exception of the 3rd SRO. An RP Tech is on-site along with two mechanics who are working on the diesel. A maintenance crew has just been called in for 1P-15A.
The objective of the shift is to maintain stable plant conditions until the Power System Supervisor requests power be returned to 100%.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description I - BOP 1 Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter 1PT-478 fails high.
SRO C - BOP 2 Running CCW pump trips, with failure of standby to start.
SRO I - RO Letdown line pressure controller 1HC-135 fails (oscillating in 3
SRO Auto/Man).
C - RO 4 Steam Generator B Tube Leak develops.
SRO R - RO 5 N - BOP Power reduction initiated due to tube leak.
N - SRO 6 M- ALL Tube leak increases to rupture requiring reactor trip.
C - RO 7 Main turbine fails to auto-trip.
SRO 8 M- ALL Steam Leak develops on Steam Generator B.
C - BOP 9 Steam Generator B Blowdown Valve fails to isolate.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT DYNAMIC EXAM SCENARIO ID#: SES-2003301: #2 SIMULATOR SHIFT TURNOVER:
Per Scenario Outline.
SIMULATOR SCENARIO SET UP STEP COUNTERS ON _________
INIT into IC _________
PBF-6802, Communicator Telephone Log, available _________
PBF-6801, Simulator Setup Checklist, completed _________
PBF-6806, Simulator Book Preparation Checklist, completed _________
PBF-6807, Simulator Scenario Briefing Sheet, completed _________
TI 9.0 Attachment 1 (Part 1), PBNP Simulator Security Checklist, completed _________
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT SCENARIO GUIDE:
- 8. Ensure SI Pump 1P-15A control switch is in pullout, suction valve 1SI-896A is shut , and 1SI-866A is shut. Place a danger tag on all components.
- 9. Ensure Charging Pump 1P-2C control switch is in pullout (1P-2A and 1P-2B should be running with 1P-2A in Automatic). Balance charging/letdown flows as necessary. Place a danger tag on control switch for 1P-2C.
- 10. Ensure G-01 EDG is aligned to 1A05 and 2A05.
- 11. Ensure G-02 Mode Selector switch is in Local. Place Danger Tags on the G-02 Mode Selector switch, breaker 1A52-66 control switch, and breaker 2A52-67 control switch. C02 alarms will have to be acknowledged after going to RUN.
- 12. Ensure Rod Control is in Automatic.
- 13. Preload (or verify preloaded) the following simulator codes:
Initiation Action or Action Malf. Ramp Delay Time Trigger Verification Cue Component Tagname Value Time Performed Description Event Oper. Ready Inserted Criteria Init. #
PRELOAD 1-SI-896A, SI VLV1SIS046 1 - - - -
PUMP SUCTION ISOL (FAIL CONTRL FUSE)
PRELOAD 1-SI-866A, VLV1SIS035 1 - - - -
1P15A DISCH STOP CHECK (FAIL CNTRL FUSE)
PRELOAD 1B-5220A P-2C BKR1CVC007 6 - - - -
CHARGING PUMP CKTBKR (FAIL CNTRL FUSE)
PRELOAD 1-EP-1A5259R LOA1EPS102 RACKOUT - - - -
1-A05 BKR 59 RACKOUT, 1P15A (RACKOUT)
PRELOAD 1-MS-5959 VLV1SGB006 1 - - - -
SGB BD ISOL (FAIL OPEN)
PRELOAD 1-B5223B P- BKR1CCW002 4 - - - -
11B CC WATER PUMP CKTBKR (FAIL AUTO CLOSE)
PRELOAD SG B MAIN MAL1SGN003 0.5E6 00:01:00 - JCRFTR -
STEAMLINE B BREAK INSIDE 60 Sec. (7)
CONTAINMEN T
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT The following events will be entered when requested by the lead examiner.
Initiation Action or Action Malf. Ramp Delay Time Trigger Verification Cue Component Tagname Value Time Performed Description EVENT 1: STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER, 1PT-478 FAILS HIGH PLE 1-PT478 XMT1SGN017A 1400 00:00:00 - - 1 LOOP B STEAM PESS 30 Sec.
FIXED OUTPUT (HIGH)
EVENT 2: RUNNING CCW PUMP TRIPS, WITH FAILURE OF STANDBY TO START.
PLE 1-B5210A P- BKR1CCW001 1 - - - 2 11A CC WATER PUMP CKTBKR (TRIP)
EVENT 3: LOW PRESSURE LETDOWN INE, 1HC-135 OSCILLATIONS IN AUTO AND MANUAL PLE 1-HC135 CNH1CVC014C 50 - - - 3 LOW PRESS LETDOWN LINE OSC AUTO/MAN EVENT 4: STEAM GENERATOR B TUBE LEAK DEVELOPS PLE STEAM MAL1RCS008B 1.25 00:10:00 - - 4 GNERATOR B TUBE 600 Sec.
RUPTURE (50 GPM)
EVENT 6: TUBE LEAK INCREASES TO RUPTURE REQUIRING REACTOR TRIP.
PLE STEAM MAL1RCS008B INCREASE 00:01:00 - - -
TO 10 GNERATOR B TUBE 60 Sec.
RUPTURE (400 GPM)
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT ANTICIPATED BOOTH COMMUNICATION/GUIDANCE:
Event 1: This event is a failure (high) of SG B controlling pressure transmitter 1PT-478. This will require the crew to manually close SG B Atmospheric Dump valve and take manual control of SG B Main Feed Regulating Valve. Following the failure of 1PT-478, the Instructor SM will field crew requests for I&C, STA, and DCS support. There are no anticipated booth communications.
Event 2: This event is a failure of the running CC pump with a failure to auto-start of the standby pump. Ensure the pre-load for the auto start failure is active, and insert the failure of 1P-11A at the request of the lead examiner. It is important that the insertion of this failure be coordinated such that the BOP is most likely to respond to the failure and not the Unit 1 CO (for position specific malfunction response counting numbers only). The crew should contact the PAB AO to investigate the tripped CC pump (1P-11A) as well as the status of 1P-11B once running. The AO should report back to the crew that the CC pump motor is very hot. If the breaker is checked, it has tripped on over-current. The running CC pump (1P-11B) is running normally if asked. A request to Chemistry for CCW sampling and DCS notification will be fielded by the Instructor SM. No specific response is necessary. The Instructor SM will also be informed to implement the E-plan. This can be acknowledged, and later reported back (if desired) that no E-plan applicability was discovered for this event. Preparation of a tag series for 1P-11A may also be requested, and should be acknowledged.
Event 3: This event is a failure of Letdown Pressure Control Valve 1HC-135. This is an oscillating type failure of the controller affecting both auto and manual control. Letdown must be isolated to mitigate this event. If an AO is sent to investigate the valve, it should be reported that the valve is cycling. The PAB AO may also be contacted due to the Waste Disposal System alarm that occurs when Letdown is isolated. This communication should be acknowledged. Notifications to the DCS and I&C will be fielded by the Instructor SM. No additional booth communications are anticipated.
Event 4, 5: This event involves a tube leak on SG B. Leak size is approximately 50 gpm. The leak size will require a unit shutdown. Chemistry and RP may be contacted to confirm the tube leak. It may be reported back to the crew that there are increased radiation levels near SG B steam line.
The crew should choose AOP-17A to perform the downpower. If the crew should decide to use OP-3A, the Instructor SM will inform the SRO that AOP-17A is preferred as it will ensure a timely downpower. Notification of plant conditions should be made to the field operators, and these communications should be acknowledged. All notifications to the STA, DCS, and SM will be fielded by the Instructor SM. The Lead Examiner will determine when the downpower is sufficient which will be the trigger for the next event.
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT TRAINING SIMULATOR EXAM SCENARIO Revision 0 DRAFT Event 6,7,8,9: After reducing power a sufficient amount, the tube leak will be increased to a full tube rupture that will require a Reactor Trip on lowering Pressurizer level. Upon initiating the trip, a fault will occur inside Containment on SG B, making SG B both ruptured and faulted. Also, the Main Turbine will fail to trip requiring the RO to manually trip the turbine. Steam Generator Blowdown Valve 1MS-5959 will fail to isolate and the in-series valve 1MS-2045 must be manually closed. A request will be made for the status of valves SW-LW-61&62, and it should be reported that both valves are shut. A request will also be made for the closing of local valves for SG isolation in EOP-2.
After approximately 5 minutes, it can be reported that the valves are closed. No other booth communications are anticipated. All other requests for support (E-plan, RP, Chemistry, STA, etc.) will be fielded by the Instructor SM.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 1 Page 8 of 56 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Pressure Channel (PT-478) Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Identify failure of PT-478 (B S/G Pressure BLUE Channel).
RO/BOP Acknowledge and respond to receipt of annunciator ARB 1C03 1E2 1-5, Steam Generator B Level Setpoint Deviation Operator Actions:
- HC-478 B S/G Atmospheric Dump Valve controller taken to manual and shut.
- HC-476 B Main Feed Regulating Valve controller taken to manual.
DOS Direct entry into AOP-24, Response to Instrument Malfunctions.
BOP Identify Failed Instrument - PT-478 (B S/G Pressure BLUE Channel).
BOP Check if failed instrument is a controlling channel - PT-478 is a controlling channel for Steam Generator Pressure Control and Steam Generator Level Control.
BOP Establish Manual Control - If not previously performed, Manual control of the B S/G Atmospheric Dump valve is established to shut the valve. Also, manual control of the B Main Feed Regulating Valve is required to manually control level.
RO/DOS Return Affected Parameter(s) to desired value(s).
- Manual control of the B Main Feed Regulating Valve is used to re-establish level at 64%.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 1 Page 9 of 56 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Pressure Channel (PT-478) Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct entry into 0-SOP-IC-001, Routine Maintenance Procedure DOS Removal of Safeguards or Protection Sensor from Service.
- Obtain and implement 0-SOP-IC-001
- Review precautions and limitations
- Identify applicable Technical Specifications (reference 0-SOP-IC-002):
- LCO 3.3.1 is not met:
- Action Condition A is entered immediately - Required Action is to enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 for the channel.
- Condition D is referenced from Table 3.3.1-1 Functions 14-2.
Required Action is to place the channel in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
- LCO 3.3.2 is not met:
- Action Condition A is entered immediately - Required Action is to enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.2-1 for the channel.
- Condition D is referenced from Table 3.3.2-1 Functions 1.e. Required Action is to place the channel in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> AND Mode 4 in 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.
- Note: All other affected Functions in Table 3.3.2-1 reference Function 1.e for required action. A list of these functions may be found in 0-SOP-IC-002. Therefore, these are all the TS actions that are required.
LCO 3.3.3 is still met since only two channels are required operable.
LCO 3.3.5 references LCO 3.3.2 Function 3, which once again references Function 1.e for required actions. The actions required due to removing FT-474 from service are the same as Condition D above.
- Conduct pre-job brief for removing PT-478/FT-474 from service
- Obtain DSS permission to remove channel from service
- Direct 0-SOP-IC-001Attachment A for PT-478 removal from service
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 1 Page 10 of 56 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Pressure Channel (PT-478) Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP/DOS Perform actions as directed by DOS from Attachment A for PT-478 removal.
- Place HC-476 in MANUAL (BOP)
- Place the loop B steam flow and feedwater flow selector switches in YELLOW (BOP)
- Place HC-476 in AUTO, unless directed otherwise by DSS (BOP)
(Note: SG B Atmospheric must remain in manual.)
- Place HC-478 in MANUAL (BOP)
- Place the following bistables to TRIP inside C-115: (BOP)
- Verify alarms and trip status lights are proper (RO)
- 7. Safeguard Actuation
- 8. Low Pressure (Alarm)
- 9. SF<FF (F-476)
- 10. SF>FF (F-476)
- Remove P-478 from scan (BOP)
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 1 Page 11 of 56 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Pressure Channel (PT-478) Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS Direct 0-SOP-IC-001Attachment A for FT-474 removal from service (Note: FT-474 Steam Flow channel must also be removed from service due to the pressure input for density compensation from PT-478)
Perform actions as directed by DOS from Attachment A for FT-474 RO/BOP/DOS removal.
Note: First 3 steps are deleted due to switches already in YELLOW
- Place the following bistables to TRIP inside C-115: (BOP)
- Verify alarms and trip status lights are proper (RO)
- 1. High Trip
- 2. High-high Trip
- 3. SF<FF (F-476); previously performed
- 4. SF>FF (F-476); previously performed
- Remove F-474V from scan (BOP)
DOS Inform DSS PT-478 & FT-474 removed from service and that DCS and STA notifications need to be made Note: SG B Atmospheric must remain in manual.
DOS Exits AOP-24 Proceed to next Event at the Lead Examiners Discretion.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 2 Page 12 of 56 Event
Description:
Running CCW Pump Trips with a Failure of the Standby Pump to AUTO Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Respond to numerous Annunciator alarms on 1C03.
RO/DOS Recognize Motor Breaker Trip of 1P-11A (running CCW Pump) occurred and the Auto Pump (1P-11B) did not AUTO start.
RO/DOS Start 1P-11B (standby CCW Pump) - this pump should have started on low pressure but did not, it is expected that the pump be manually started to back up the auto start that failed (also required to be started per ARB).
DOS Directs entry into AOP-9B, Component Cooling System Malfunction DOS/BOP Check Component Cooling Pumps at least one running (1P-11B manually started)
DOS/BOP Check Surge Tank Level lowering (recognizes level is stable and proceeds to next step)
DOS/BOP Check Surge Tank Level greater than 10%
DOS/BOP Check Component Cooling System for In-leakage (recognizes surge tank level is not rising and proceeds to next step)
DOS/RO Check Reactor Trip - NOT REQUIRED
- Check reactor critical
- Check VCT high temperature alarm-CLEAR DOS/BOP Check RHR Status-RHR not in service and proceeds to next step
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 2 Page 13 of 56 Event
Description:
Running CCW Pump Trips with a Failure of the Standby Pump to AUTO Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS Request Chemistry analyze CCW (may request DSS to perform this step).
DOS Notify DCS and implement E-plan (may request DSS to perform these actions)
DOS/BOP May place 1P-11A in Pull-Out which clears Motor Breaker Trip annunciator.
DOS Check TS applicability:
DOS should determine that LCO 3.7.7 is not met.
- Action Condition A is entered. Required Action is to restore the CC pump to operable status in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND 144 hours0.00167 days <br />0.04 hours <br />2.380952e-4 weeks <br />5.4792e-5 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet the LCO.
Proceed to next Event at the Lead Examiners Discretion.
hp-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 3 Page 14 of 56 Event
Description:
Letdown Line Pressure Controller (HC-135) oscillates in auto and manual, requiring isolation of Letdown.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Acknowledge and respond to receipt of annunciator 1C04 1C 1-6, 2-6 and 4-6.
Operator Actions:
- Check for associated alarms
- Check operation of CV-135
- Take manual control of letdown pressure controller (HC-135) -
CV-135 oscillation continues in manual
- Recommend isolating letdown.
DOS Direct manual isolation of Letdown.
Direct entry into AOP-1D, Chemical and Volume Control System DOS Malfunction.
Note: AOP-24, Response to Instrument Malfunctions, may initially be entered to stabilize charging and letdown.
DOS/RO Review foldout page criteria.
Check for Charging Pump Malfunction - there is no charging pump DOS/RO malfunction, pumps are operating properly DOS If LP Letdown Line pressure Control Valve failed, go to step addressing 1CV-135 DOS/RO Check LP Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve failed RO Establish Manual Control - CV-135 oscillation continues in manual
hp-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 3 Page 15 of 56 Event
Description:
Letdown Line Pressure Controller (HC-135) oscillates in auto and manual, requiring isolation of Letdown.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Shut Letdown Orifice Outlet valves RO Reduce charging flow to minimum Establish excess letdown per OP-5E, Establishing and Securing Excess DOS/RO Letdown DOS Notify DCS and I&C Duty and Call, Return to Procedure and Step in Effect DOS Check TS applicability:
If PZR level > 48% (parametric value), DOS should determine that LCO 3.4.9 is not met.
- Action Condition A is entered. Required Action is to restore PZR level to within limit in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Excess Letdown will not be established, proceed to next event at the Lead Examiners discretion.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 4,5 Page 16 of 56 Event
Description:
Steam Generator B tube leak requiring a Power Reduction.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW B S/G Tube leak identified. Indications are:
- Lowering pressurizer level
- Auto Charging pump speed rising
- Lowering VCT level
- Main Steam Line Radiation rising (RE-232)
- Air Ejector Radiation rising (RE-215)
- B S/G level deviations DOS Enters AOP-3 Steam Generator Tube Leak based on available indications.
DOS Reviews foldout page criteria with crew.
DOS/RO Check Safety Injection Not Required (continuous action step)
- Check pressurizer level within 10% of program
- Check RCS subcooling > 30o F Reactor trip is not required due to this criteria at this time.
NOTE: The initial tube leak rate is approximately 50 gpm.
DOS/RO Check Reactor Trip Not Required (continuous action step)
- Check reactor critical
- Check charging pump suction aligned to the VCT Reactor trip is not required due to this criteria.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 4,5 Page 17 of 56 Event
Description:
Steam Generator B tube leak requiring a Power Reduction.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS/RO Check Pressurizer level stable at or trending to program level. (continuous action step)
- If level is trending lower, charging pump speed/flow is raised.
- If level continues to lower, letdown is isolated. (Letdown should already be isolated)
DOS/RO Check Pressurizer pressure stable at or trending desired pressure.
- RCS pressure should be controlling near program in Automatic DOS/RO Check Reactor Makeup control
- Makeup set at proper boric acid concentration
- Makeup armed and in auto DOS Notify the DCS, Chemistry, and implement the E-plan.
CREW Identify the leaking S/G (continuous action step).
From available indications, the B S/G is determined to be leaking.
CREW Determine Leak Rate (using either or all of the following)
- Direct Chemistry to perform CAMP 014
- PBF-2034, Control Room Shift Log Unit 1
- OI-55, Primary Leak Rate Calculation CREW Check Reactor Shutdown Required
- Reactor shutdown determined to be required due to primary to secondary leakage exceeding 75 gpd.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 4,5 Page 18 of 56 Event
Description:
Steam Generator B tube leak requiring a Power Reduction.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW Determine action response based on S/G Leakage.
- First item in Table determined to be applicable - action response is to reduce power to less than or equal to 50% in one hour AND be in Mode 3 in the next two hours.
CREW Place the Unit in Mode 3
- AOP-17A determined to be applicable due to required time frame to be in Mode 3.
DOS Enters AOP-17A, Rapid Power Reduction CREW Determine Desired Power Level - initially less than or equal to 50% in one hour Note: Next four steps may be performed in any order DOS Notify PSS of Load Reduction DOS/RO Check Rod Control System in Auto DOS/BOP Select Rate Reduction Method and Reduce Load - Operator Auto -
Impulse In is the recommended mode of operation.
DOS/RO Borate as Necessary to Maintain Rods Above the Low-Low Insertion Limit Alarm (continuous action step).
- Reference Reactivity Operating Data Book ROD 1.3 for amount of boration required DOS/RO Check PZR pressure stable at or trending to 2235 psig (continuous action step)
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 4,5 Page 19 of 56 Event
Description:
Steam Generator B tube leak requiring a Power Reduction.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS/RO Check Pressurizer level stable at or trending to program level. (continuous action step)
DOS/BOP Check Steam Generator level controlling in Auto (continuous action step)
DOS/RO Maintain RCS Tavg (continuous action step)
- Greater than 540°F
- Less than 574°F
- Within 7°F of program Tavg DOS Check TS applicability:
- DOS should determine that LCO 3.4.13 is not met.
- Action Condition A is entered. Required Action is to reduce leakage to within limits in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Following >>5% power reduction or at the Lead Examiners discretion, proceed to the next event.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 6, 7 Page 23 of 56 Event
Description:
ATWS Event and Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B auto start failure with previous SBLOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Due to a lowering pressurizer level trend, a reactor trip will be required during AOP-3 based on the inability to maintain pressurizer level within 10% of program level.
Critical Task: Crew manually trips the reactor prior to pressurizer level going off scale low DOS Direct a Manual Reactor Trip, Safety Injection, Containment Isolation, and entry into EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection due to lowering pressurizer level.
RO Manual Reactor Trip, SI, and CI performed. Immediate Actions of EOP-0 (Steps 1-4) performed and informs DOS they are ready for verification.
- Verify reactor trip
- Verify turbine trip - the turbine will not automatically trip however, the turbine will trip from the manual pushbutton.
- Verify safeguard buses energized
- Check if SI is actuated DOS/RO Verify Reactor Trip
- Check reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN
- Check all rod bottom lights LIT
- Check all rod position indicators ON BOTTOM
- Check neutron flux LOWERING DOS/RO Verify Turbine Trip - contingency action for manually tripping the turbine is verified.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 6, 7 Page 24 of 56 Event
Description:
ATWS Event and Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B auto start failure with previous SBLOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS/RO Verify Safeguard buses energized
- Check at least one 4160 Vac safeguards bus energized (1A05 or 1A06)
- Check at least one 480 Vac safeguards bus energized (1B03 or 1B04)
DOS/RO Check if SI is actuated:
- 1C04-1B 4-2, Manual Safety Injection
- 1C04 1B 4-3, Containment Pressure High
- 1C04-1B 4-4, Pressurizer Low Pressure SI
- 1C04-1B 4-5, Steam Line Loop A Lo-Lo Pressure
- 1C04-1B 4-6, Steam Line Loop B Lo-Lo PressureB Pressure Low-Low Manual SI actuation was procedurally required.
DOS Review foldout page criteria with the crew
- Determines that the Ruptured S/G Isolation Criteria and Faulted S/G Isolation Criteria are applicable.
- Auxiliary Feedwater flow should be isolated to the B S/G by closing 1AF-4000 and AF-4021.
- P-38B Motor Driven AFP is required to be secured when feed is reduced less than 50 gpm.
DOS EOP-0 Attachment A Automatic Action Verification directed to be completed by the BOP operator while continuing on with EOP-0. The steps for Attachment A are included near the end of this event section.
- All items of Attachment A should indicate normal with the exception of the B Steam Generator Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve, 1MS-5959 which fails to close.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 6, 7 Page 25 of 56 Event
Description:
ATWS Event and Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B auto start failure with previous SBLOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task: Crew manually closes 1MS-2045 (in series with 1MS-5959) prior to exiting EOP-2.
RO/DOS Verify Secondary Heat Sink:
- Level in at least one S/G > [51%] 29%.
- Control pumps and align valves as necessary to maintain S/G level between [51%] 29% and 65%.
Adequate Aux Feedwater will be available, > 200 gpm should be maintained until level is within the band on the A S/G.
DOS/RO Verify RCP Seal Cooling
- Check labyrinth seal delta-P > 20 inches OR
- Check component cooling to RCP thermal barrier normal DOS/RO Verify RCS temperature control (continuous action step).
- This procedure step provides actions to stop dumping steam and reducing total feed flow (if S/G levels are in the required band) with RCS temperature trending lower.
DOS/RO Check pressurizer PORVs both shut.
DOS/RO Verify pressurizer spray valves shut
- Both normal loop spray valves shut.
- Auxiliary spray valve shut.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 6, 7 Page 26 of 56 Event
Description:
ATWS Event and Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B auto start failure with previous SBLOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS/RO Check if RCPs should remain running - RCPs are running and subcooling is > [60 ºF] 30 ºF DOS Start Monitoring Critical Safety Function Status trees.
The instructor DSS/STA will acknowledge this report and begin monitoring.
CREW Verify Containment Sump Recirculation Not Required - sump recirc is not required.
CREW Check if secondary system is intact:
- No S/G completely depressurized AND
- No S/G pressure trending lower in an uncontrolled manner DOS transitions to EOP-2 based on B S/G being faulted DOS Reads cautions and reviews foldout page criteria of EOP-2 DOS/RO Check RCS wide range Hot Leg Temperatures STABLE:
- Control feed and dump steam as necessary using A S/G to stabilize RCS hot leg temperatures DOS/BOP Isolate both Main Steam Lines - MSIVs will already be shut.
DOS/BOP Check if any S/G in NOT faulted (determines A S/G is not faulted)
DOS/BOP Identify faulted S/G (determines B S/G is faulted)
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 6, 7 Page 27 of 56 Event
Description:
ATWS Event and Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B auto start failure with previous SBLOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DOS/BOP Reset Loss of Feedwater Turbine Trip DOS/BOP Isolate Feed to faulted S/G
- Ensure Main Feed Regulating Valve SHUT
- Ensure Main Feed Regulating Bypass Valve SHUT
- Ensure Motor Driven AFW pump P-38B is stopped.
- Ensure AF-4021 AND 1AF-4000 in manual and SHUT DOS/BOP Isolate flow from faulted S/G
- Ensure 1MS-2015 SHUT (atmospheric dump)
- SHUT 1MS-2019 (turbine driven AFW steam supply)
- Ensure 1MS-5959/2045 SHUT (S/G Blowdown) - Note: 1MS-2045 should have previously been closed in EOP-0 Attachment A.
Closure of 1MS-2045 prior to exiting EOP-2 is a critical task.
- Locally shut 1MS-237 (1P-29 AFP/Radwaste steam isolation)
- Locally shut 1MS-238 (main steam trap isolation)
DOS/BOP Check CST Level > 8 Ft CREW Check secondary system radiation normal DOS transitions to EOP-3 based on B S/G being ruptured Upon transition to EOP-3, the scenario may be terminated at discretion of Lead Examiner.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 6, 7 Page 28 of 56 Event
Description:
ATWS Event and Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B auto start failure with previous SBLOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Inform the Examinees that they are to remain in the simulator until any evaluator follow-up questions are answered. Do not discuss any scenario related events.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 6, 7 Page 29 of 56 Event
Description:
ATWS Event and Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B auto start failure with previous SBLOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The remainder of steps listed in this event section are those found in EOP-0 Attachment A, Automatic Action Verification. The DOS should ensure that performance of this Attachment is continued by the BOP operator, and performed in parallel with EOP-0.
BOP Verify feedwater isolation:
- Feedwater Regulating and Bypass Valves SHUT.
- Both main feed pumps tripped.
- MFP discharge MOVs - BOTH SHUT.
BOP Verify containment isolation:
- CI Panels A and B ALL LIGHTS LIT - B Steam Generator Blowdown CI valve determined not to be shut (1MS-5959). 1MS-5959 will NOT shut. However, 1MS-2045, which is in series with 1MS-5959 can be shut using its control switch.
- RS-SA-9 SHUT.
- No other valves open under administrative control (DSS may be asked to verify this).
- Checks both motor driven AFW pumps running. (P-38B has been previously secured).
BOP Check both SI pumps running.
BOP Check both RHR pumps running.
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 6, 7 Page 30 of 56 Event
Description:
ATWS Event and Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B auto start failure with previous SBLOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Check only one CCW pump running.
BOP Verify Service Water Alignment:
- 6 service water pumps running.
- Service water isolation valves shut.
- Direct AO to locally check SW-LW-61 or SW-LW-62 shut.
BOP Verify Containment Accident Cooling Units Running
- All accident fans running.
- 1SW-2907 & 2908 OPEN.
- Unit 1 Containment Recirc Coolers Water Flow Low Alarm CLEAR.
BOP Check Control Room Fans Armed:
- W-14A & W-13B2 WHITE LIGHT OFF (white light is off).
BOP Check Control Room Ventilation IN ACCIDENT MODE:
- At least one control room recirc fan RUNNING
- Control room damper solenoid valve PURPLE LIGHT LIT BOP Check if Main Steam Lines Can Remain Open, checks both MSIVs SHUT.
BOP Verify proper SI valve alignment:
- Unit 1 SI active status panel ALL LIGHTS LIT
- Unit 1 SI-Spray Ready status panel NO LIGHTS LIT
Op-Test No: 2003301 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 6, 7 Page 31 of 56 Event
Description:
ATWS Event and Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B auto start failure with previous SBLOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Verify containment spray not required:
- Recognize containment pressure is rising and if > 25 psig perform continuous actions of RNO
- Containment Spray actuated, C01 B 2-6 LIT
- All containment spray discharge valves OPEN
- At least one spray pump running
- Shutdown one train of spray by placing spray pump in PULL-OUT and shutting its associated suction valve.
- One spray additive valve verified OPEN BOP Verify SI Flow:
- RCS pressure <1400 psig
- Check SI pumps flow indicated
- RCS pressure < [425] 200 psig This ends the steps of EOP-0 Attachment A.