Text

Technical Specifications Bases Revision 23 Update
	ML032180729
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	07/25/2003
From:	Bauer S; Arizona Public Service Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	102-04975-SAB/TNW/RKR
	Download: ML032180729 (23)
	v • d • e

1JUS Scott A. Bauer Department Leader Regulatory Affairs Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification 5.5.14 Tel: 6231393-5978 Fax: 6231393-5442 e-mail: sbauer@apsc.com Mail Station 7636 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034 102-04975-SAB/TNW/RKR July 25, 2003 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. STN 50-5281529/530 Technical Specifications Bases Revision 23 Update Pursuant to PVNGS Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.14, 'Technical Specifications Bases Control Program," Arizona Public Service Company (APS) is submitting changes to the TS Bases incorporated into Revision 23, implemented on July 25, 2003. The Revision 23 insertion instructions and replacement pages are provided in the Enclosure.

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter.

Should you have any questions, please contact Thomas N. Weber at (623) 393-5764.

Sincerely, SAB/TNW/RKR/kg

Enclosure:

PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 23 Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages cc:

Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV J. N. Donohew N. L. Salgado A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource sharing) Alliance Callaway

Comanche Peak

Diablo Canyon

Palo Verde

South Texas Project

wolf Creek

-AtoD

V.

ENCLOSURE PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 23 Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages

Remove Page:

Insert New Paaet Cover page Cover page List of Effective Pages,.

Pages 1/2 through List of Effective Pages, Page 7/blank B 2.1.1-5/blank B 2.1.2-3/B 2.1.2-4 B 3.4.14-1/B 3.4.14-2 B 3.4.14-3/B 3.4.14-4 B 3.7.17-1/B 3.7.17-2 B 3.8.1-37/B 3.8.1-38 List of Effective Pages, Pages 1/2 through List of Effective Pages, Page 7/blank B 2.1.1-5/blank B 2.1.2-3/B 2.1.2-4 B 3.4.14-1/B 3.4.14-2 B 3.4.14-3/B 3.4.14-4 B 3.7.17-1/B 3.7.17-2 B 3.8.1-37/B 3.8.1-38

P VNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specification Bases Revision 23 July 25, 2003 I

TECENICAL SPECIFICATION EASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.

Page No.

B B

B

-B B

B B

B 2.1.1-1 2.1.1-2 2.1.1-3 2.1.1-4 2.1.1-5 2.1.2-1 2.1.2-2 2.1.2-3 2.1.2-4.

2.1.2-5 3.0-1 3.0-2 3.0-3 3.0-4 3.0-5 3.0-6 3.0-7 3.0-8 3.0-9 3.0-10 3.0-11 3.0-12 3.0-13 3.0-14 3.0-15 3.0-16 3.0-17 3.0-18 3;0-19 3.1.1-1 3.1.1-2 3.1.1-3 3.1.1-4 3.1.1-5 3.1.1-6 3.1.2-1 3.1.2-2 3.1.2-3 3.1.2-4 3.1.2-5 3.1.2-6 3.1.Z-7 3.1.

3.1.2-9 3.1.3-1 3.1.3-2 3.1.3-3 3.1.3-4 3.1.3-5 3.1.3-6 3.1.4-1 3.1.4-2 3.1.4-3 3.1.4-4 Rev.

No.

0 0

21 21 23 0

0 0

23 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 14 14 14 0

0 0

17 17 17 17 0

0 12 12 12 0

O.-

0 5

12

.0 12 0

0 0

0 B 3.1.4-5 B 3.1.5-1 B 3.1.5-2 B 3.1.5-3 B 3.1.5-4 B 3.1.5-5 B 3.1.5-6 B 3.1.5-7 B 3.1.5-8 B 3.1.5-9 B 3.1.5-10 B 3.1.5-11 B 3.1.6-1 B 3.1.6-2 B 3.1.6-3 B 3.1.6-4 B 3.1.7-1 B 3.1.7-2 B 3.1.7-3 B 3.1.7-4 B 3.1.7-5 B 3.1.7-6 B 3.1.7-7 B 3.1.7-8 B 3.1.7-9 B 3.1.8-1 B 3.1.8-2 B 3.1.8-3 B 3.1.8-4 B 3.1.8-5 B 3.1.9-1 B 3.1.9-2 B 3.1.9-3 B 3.1.9-4 B 3.1.9-5 B 3.1.9-6 B 3.1.10-1 B 3.1.10-2 B 3.1.10-3 B 3.1.10-4 B.3.1.10-5 B 3.1.10-6 B 3.1.11-1 B 3.1.11-2 B 3.1.11-3 B 3.1.11-4 B 3.1.11-5 B 3.2.1-1 B 3.2.1-2 B 3.2.1-3 B.3.2.1-4 B -3.2.1-5 B 3.2.1-6 B 3.2.1-7 0

0 12 0

0 7

0 1

1 0

5 12 0

0 0

0 7

1 0

0 a

0 0

0-0 0

0 0

10 0

0 0

Rev No.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 1

Revision 23 July 25, 2003

TEC=CKCAL SPECIYICATION BASES LIST OF ECTIVE PAGES' Page Rev.

Page Rev No.

No.

No..

No.

B 3.2.1-8 0

B 3.3.1-21 21 B 3.2.2-1 0

B 3.3.1-22 21 B 3.2.2-2 10 B 3.3.1-23 21 B 3.2.2-3 0

B 3.3.1-24 21 B 3.2.2-4 0

B 3.3.1-25 21 B 3.2.2-5 1

B 3.3.1-26 21 B 3.2.2-6 0

3 3.3.1-27 21 B 3.2.2-7 0

B 3.3.1-28 21 B 3.2.3-1 0

B 3.3.1-29 21 B 3.2.3-2 10 B 3.3.1-30 21 B 3.2.3-3 0

B 3.3.1-31 21 B 3.2.3-4 0

B 3.3.1-32.

21 B 3.2.3-5 0

B 3.3.1-33 21 B 3.2.3-6 0

B 3.3.1-34 21 B 3.2.3-7 0

B 3.3.1-35 21 B 3.2.3-8 0

B 3.3.1-36 21 B 3.2.3-9 0

B 3.3.1-37 21 B 3.2.3-10 0

B 3.3.1-38 21 B 3.2.4-1 0

B 3.3.1-39 21 B 3.2.4-2 10 B 3.3.1-40 21 B 3.2.4-3 0

B 3.3.1-41 21 B 3.2.4-4 0

B 3.3.1-42 21 B 3.2.4-5 0

B 3.3.1-43 21 B 3.2.4-6 0

B.3.3.1-44 21 B 3.2.4-7 0

B 3.3.2-1 0

B 3.2.4-8 0

B 3.3.2-2 0

B 3.2.4-9 0

B 3.3.2-3 1

B 3.2.5-1 0

B 3.3.2-4 1

B 3.2.5-2 10 B 3.3.2-5 0

B 3.2.5-3 0

B 3.3.2-6 15 B 3.2.5-4 0

B 3.3.2-7 15 B 3.2.5-5 0

B 3.3.2-8 15 B 3.2.5-6 0.

B 3.3.2-9 15 B. 3.2.5-7 0

B 3.3.2-10 15 B 3.3.1-1 0

B 3.3.2-11 15 B 3.3.1-2 0

B 3.3.2-12 15 B 3.3.1-3 0

B 3.3.2-13 15 B 3.3.1-4 0

B 3.3.2-14 15 B 3.3.1-5 18 B 3.3.2-15 15 B 3.3.1-6 21 B 3.3.2-16 15 B 3.3.1-7 21 B 3.3.2-17 15 B 3.3.1-8 21 B 3.3.3-1 0

B 3.3.1-'4; -

15 B 3.3.3-2 18 B 3.3.1-10 0

B 3.3.3-3 0

B 3.3.1-11 21 B 3.3.3-4 0

B 3.3.1-12 21 B 3.3.3-5 7

B 3.3.1-13 1

B 3;.3.3-6 0

B 3.3.1-14 0

B 3.3.3-7 0

B 3.3.1-15 6

B 3.3.3-8 0

B 3.3.1-16 0

B 3.3.3-9 0

B 3.3.1-17 21 B 3.3.3-10 0

B 3.3.1-18 21 B 3.3-.3-11 0

B 3.3.1-19 21 B 3.3.4-1 0

B 3.3.1-20 21 B 3.3.4-2 0

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2,

AND 3 2

Revision 23 July 25, 2003

ij TECHNICAL SPECIFICkTION BASES LIST, OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.

Page No.

Rev.

No Rev No.

_~~~~~~~~~~~~

3.3..4-3 3.3.4-4 3.3.4-5 3.3.4-6 3.3.4-7 3.3.4-8 3.3.4-9 3.3.4-10 3.3.4-11 3.3.4-12 3.3.4-13 3.3.4-14 3.3.4-15 3.3.5-1 3.3.5-2 3.3.5-3 3.3.5-4 3.3.5-5 3.3.5-6 3.3.5-7 3.3.5-8 3.3.5-9 3.3.5-10 3.3.5-11 3.3.5-12 3.3.5-13 3.3.5-14 3.3.5-15 3;3.5-16 3.3.5-17 3.3.5-18 3.3.5-19 3.3.5-20 3.3.5-21 3.3.5-22 3.3.5-23 3.3.5-24 3.3.5-25 3.3.5-26 3.3.5-27 3.3.5-28

3. 3 3.3.6-1 3.3.6-2 3.3.6-3 3.3.6-4 3.3.6-5 3.3.6-6 3.3.6-7 3.3.6-8

-3.3.6-9 3.3.6-10 3.3.6-11 3.3.6-12 0

0 0

.0

.0 0

.0

0

.0 0

0 0

O.

0 0

00O 1

0 0

10 10 10 0

0 0

-0 0

0

.0 0

0 0

0 10 C.

?

t

..Ik F

I.

~.

(.

.i r.

3.3.6-13 3.3.6-14 3.3.6-15 3.3.6-16 3.3.6-17 3.3.6-18 3.3.6-19 3.3.6-20 3.3.6-21 3.3.6-22 3.3.7-1 3.3.7-2 3.3.7-3 3.3.7-4 3.3.7-5 3.3.7-6 3.3.7-7.

3.3.7-8 3.3.7-9 3.3.8-1 3.3.8-2 3.3.8-3 3.3.8-4 3.3.8-5 3.3.8-6 3.3.8-7 3.3.8-8 3.3.9-1 3.3.9-2 3.3.9-3 3.3.9-4 3.3.9-5 3.3.9-6 3.3.9-7 3.3.10-1 3.3.10-2 3.3.10-3 3.3.10-4 3.3.10-5 3.3.10-6 3.3.10-7 3.3.10-8 3.3.10-9 3.3.10-10 3.3.10-11 3.3.10-12 3.3.10-13 3.3.10-14 3.3.10-15 3.3.10-16 3.3.10-17 3.3.10-18 3.3.10-19 3.3.10-20 0

0 0

0 2

2 0

0 0

.0 0

0 2

0 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 2

21 10 1

0 0

0

~0 18 0-0 14 14 14 14

14

.14 14 14 14 14 14 14

11 1.

I PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2,

AND 3 3 -

Reyis-on 2 323 July 25, 2003

TECEIICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.

Page No.

Rev.

No.

Rev No.

3.3.10-21 14 3.3.11-1 0

3.3.11-2 2

3.3.11-3 2

3.3.11-4 2

3.3.11-5 19 3.3.11-6 2

3.3.11-7 2

3.3.12-1 15 3.3.12-2 15 3.3.12-3 5

3.3.12-4 5

3.3.12-5 6

3.3.12-6 6

3.4.1-1 10 3.4.1-2 7

3.4.1-3 0

3.4.1-4 0

3.4.1-5 0

3.4.2-1 7

3.4.2-2 1

3.4.3-1 0

3.4.3-2 0

3.4.3-3 0

3.4.3-4 2

3.4.3-5 2

3.4.3-6 0

3.4.3-7 0

3;4.3-8 2

3.4.4-1 0

3.4.4-2 7.

3.4.4-3 7

3.4.4-4 0

3.4.5-1 0

3.4.5-2 6

3.4-.-5-3 6

3.4.5-4 0

3.4.5-5 6

3.4.6-1 0

3.4.6-2 6

3.4.6-3 6

3.4.6 6

3.4.7-1 0

3.4.7-2 6

3.4.7-3 6

3.4.7-4 2

3.4.7-5 0

3.4.7-6 0

3.4.7-7 6

3.4.8-1 0--

3.4.8-2 6

3.4.8-3 6

3.4.9-1 0

B B

B B

B B

B-B B

B B

BB B

B B

3.4.9-2 3.4.9-3 3.4.9-4 3.4.9-5 3.4.9-6 3.4. 10-1 3.4.10-2 3.4.10-3 3.4.10-4 3.4.11-1 3.4.11-2 3.4. 11-3 3.4.11-4 3.4.11-5 3.4.11-6 3.4.12-1 3.4.12-2 3.4.12-3 3.4.12-4 3.4. 12-5 3.4.13-1 3.4.13-2 3.4.13-3 3.4.13-4 3.4.13-5 3.4.13-6 3.4.13-7 3.4.13-8 3.4.13-9 3.4.13-10 3.4.14-1 3.4.14-2 3.4.14-3 3.4.14-4 3.4.14-5 3.4.14-6 3.4.14-7 3.4.15-1 3.4.15-2 3.4.15-3 3.4.15-4 3.4.15-5 3.4.15-6 3.4.15-7 3.4.16-1 3.4.16-2 3.4.16-3 3.4.16-4 3.4.16-5 3.4.16-6 3.4.17-1 3.4.17-2 3.4.17-3 3.4.17-4 0

1 0

0 0

0 7

0

1. 0 7

0 0

1

'1 0

0

-0

.. 0

, 0 0

0 0

2 2

0 2

0 23 23 7

2 2

2 0.0 0

0 0

2 10 0

0 0

0 PALO VERDE'UNITS 1, 2,

AND 3 4

Revision 23 July 25, 2003

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES page No.

Page W^-

Rev.

No._

Rev No.

B B

BB B

3.4.17-5 3.4.17-6 3.5.1-1 3.5.1-2 3.5.1-3 3.5.1-4 3.5.1-5 3.5.1-6 3.5.1-7 3.5.1-8 3.5.1-9 3.5.1-10 3.5.2-1 3.5.2-2 3.5.2-3 3.5.2-4 3.5.2-5 3.5.2-6 3.5.2-7 3.5.2-8 3.5.2-9 3.5.2-10 3.5.3-1 3.5.3-2 3.5.3-3 3.5.3-4 3.5.3-5 3.5.3-6 3;5.3-7 3.5.3-8 3.5.3-9 3.5.3-10 3.5.4-1 3.5.4-2 3.5.4-3 3.5.5-1 3.5.5-2 3.5.5-3

-3.5.5-4 3.5.5-5 3.5.5-6 3 5 5-7 3.5.6-2 3.5.6-3 3.5.6-4 3.5.6-5 3.6.1-1 3.6.1-2 3.6.1-3 3.6.1-4--

3.6.1-5 3.6.2-1 3.6.2-2 0

0 0

0 7

0 0

1 1

01 0

0

.0 0

022 O

2 1

1 00 0

0 2

2 1

0 1

0 0

0*

7 4

4 0

0 0

1 0

1 0

0 0

6 BB BB B

B B

B

B B

B B

B B

B B

B 3.6.2-3 3.6.2-4 3.6.2-5 3.6.2-6 3.6.2-7 3.6.2-8 3.6.3-1 3.6.3-2 3.6.3-3 3.6.3-4 3.6.3-5 3.6.3-6 3.6.3-7 3.6.3-8 3.6.3-9 3.6.3-10 3.6.3-11 3.6.3-12 3.6.3-13 3.6.3-14 3.6.3-15 3.6.3-16 3.6.3-17 3.6.4-1 3.6.4-2 3.6.4-3 3.6.5-1 3.6.5-2 3.6.5-3 3.6.5-4 3.6.6-1 3.6.6-2 3.6.6-3 3.6.6-4 3.6.6-5 3.6.6-6 3.6;6-7 3.6.6-8 3.6.6-9 3.6.7-1 3.6.7-2 3.6.7-3 3.6.7-4 3.6.7-5 3.7.1-1 3.7.1-2 3.7.1-3 3.7.1-4 3.7.1-5 3.7.1-6 3.7.2-1 3.7.2-2 3.7.2-3 3.7.2-4 0

0 0

0 1

1 1

1 11 1

11 11 11 1

1 1.

1*

1 0

1

.1 0

1 0

0 0

0 1

7 1

0 1

1 0

0 0

7 7

a 0

7 0

0

0 0

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 5

Revision.23 July 25, 2003

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.

Page No.

Rev.

No.

Rev No.

B 3.7.2-5 B 3.7.2-6 B 3.7.3-1 B 3.7.3-2 B 3.7.3-3 B 3.7.3-4 B 3.7.3-5 B 3.7.4-1 B 3.7.4-2 B 3.7.4-3 B 3.7.4-4 B 3.7.5-1 B 3.7.5-2 B 3.7.5-3 B 3.7.5-4 B 3.7.5-5 B 3.7.5-6 B 3.7.5-7 B 3.7.5-8 B 3.7.5-9 B 3.7.5-10 B.3.7.5-11 B 3.7.6-1 B 3.7.6-2 B 3.7.6-3 B 3.7.6-4 B 3.7.7-1 B 3.7.7-2 B 3;7.7-3 B 3.7.7-4 B 3.7.7-5 B 3.7.8-1 B 3.7.8-2 B 3.7.8-3 B 3.7.8-4 B 3.7.9-1 B 3.7.9-2 B 3.7.9-3 B 3.7.10-1 B 3.7.10-2 B 3.7.10-3 B 3.7.10-4 B 3.7.11RI B 3.7.11-2 B 3.7.11-3 B 3.7.11-4 B 3.7.11-5 B 3.7.11-6 B 3.7.12-1 B 3.7.12-2 B--3.7.12-3 B 3.7.12-4 B 3.7.13-1 B 3.7.13-2 0

0 1

1 1

0 0

9 9

9 0

0 5

0 0

1 1

I 1

0 1

0 10 1

1 1

0 0

21 10 10 10 1

21 21 10 0

0 B

B B

B B

B B

B

-B

B B

B B

BB B

B B

3.7.13-3 3.7.13-4 3.7.13-5 3.7.14-1 3.7.14-2 3.7.14-3 3.7.15-1 3.7.15-2 3.7.16-1 3.7.16-2 3.7.16-3 3.7.16-4 3.7.17-1 3.7.17-2 3.7.17-3 3.7.17-4 3.7.17-5 3.7.17-6 3.8.1-1 3.8.1-2 3.8.1-3 3.8.1-4 3.8.1-5 3.8.1-6 3.8.1-7 3.8.1-8 3.8.1-9 3.8.1-10 3.8.1-11 3.8.1-12 3.8.1-13 3.8.1-14 3.8.1-15 3.8.1-16 3.8.1-17 3.8.1-18 3.8.A-19 3.8.1-20 3.8.1-21 3.8.1-22 3.8.1-23 3.8.1-24 3.8.1-25 3.8.1-26 3.8.1-27 3.8.1-28 3.8.1-29 3.8.1-30 3.8.1-31 3.8.1-32 3.8.1-33 3.8.1-34 3.8.1-35 3.8.1-36 0

0 0

0 21 21 3

3 7

0 0

0 23 3

3 3

.3 3

22 2

20 20 20 20 2

2 2

20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

...I-PALO VERDE UNITS 1, I

2, AND 3 6

Revision 23 July 25, 2003

!ECM~tAL SPECICTION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.

Page No.

Rev.

No.

Rev No.

B B

BB B

B B

. B B

B

. B B

B B

- B B

B B

3.8.1-37 3.8.1-38 3.8.1-39 3.8.1-40 3.8.2-1 3.8.2-2 3.8.2-3 3.8.2-4 3.8.2-5 3.8.2-6 3.8.3-1 3.8.3-2 3.8.3-3 3.8.3-4 3.8.3-5 3.8.3-6 3.8.3-7 3.8.3-8 3.8.3-9 3.8.4-1 3.8.4-2 3.8.4-3 3.8.4-4 3.8.4-5 3.8.4-6 3.8.4-7 3.8.4-8 3.8.4-9 3.8.4-10 3.8.4-11 3.8.5-1 3.8.5-2 3.8.5-3 3.8.5-4 3.8.5-5 3.8.5-6 3.8.6-1 3.8.6-2 3.8.6-3 3.8.6-4 3.8.6-5 3.8.6-6 3.8

'F 3.8.7-1 3.8.7-2 3.8.7-3 3.8.7-4 3.8.8-1 3.8.8-2 3.8.8-3 3.8.8-4 3.8.8-5 3.8.9-1 3.8.9-2 23 23 20 20 0

0 0

21 21 0

0 0

0.

-0o 1

0 0

2 2

21 1

21 21 21

.2 0

0 O'

6 6

6 0

0 0

0 1

.1 21 21 1

0 0

B 3.8.9-3 B 3.8.9-4 B 3.8.9-5 B 3.8.9-6 B 3.8.9-7 B 3.8.9-8 B 3.8.9-9 B 3.8.9-10 B 3.8.9-11 B 3.8.10-1 B 3.8.10-2 B 3.8.10-3 B 3.8.10-4 B 3.9.1-1 B 3.9.1-2 B 3.9.1-3 B 3.9.1-4 B 3.9.2-1 B 3.9.2-2 B 3.9.2-3 B 3.9.2-4 B 3.9.3-1 B 3.9.3-2 B 3.9.3-3 B 3.9.3-4 B 3.9.3-5 B.3.9.3-6 B 3.9.4-1 B 3.9.4-2 B 3.9.4-3 B 3.9.4-4 B 3.9.5-1 B 3.9.5-2 B 3.9.5-3 B 3.9.5-4 B.3.9.5-5 B 3.9.6-1 B 3.9.6-2 B 3.9.6-3 B 3.9.7-1 B 3.9.7-2 B 3.9.7-3 0

0 0

0 21 0

0 0

0 i5 15 15 15 18 19 19 19 19 19 0

1 0

0 0

16 16 16 16 0- -

0 0

0 3

s PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2,

AND 3 7

Revision-.,23 July 25, 2003

Reactor Core SLs B 2.1.1 BASES SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATIONS (continued) 2.2.3 If SL 2.1.1.1 or SL 2.1.1.2 is violated, the NRC Operations Center must be notified within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (Ref. 3).

2.2.4 If SL-'2.1.1.1 or SL 2.1.1.2 is violated. the appropriate senior management of the nuclear plant and the utility shall be notified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . This 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period provides time for the plant operators and staff to take the appropriate immediate action and assess the condition of the unit before reporting to the senior management.

2.2.5 If SL 2.1.1.1 or SL 2.1.1.2 is violated, a Licensee Event Report shall be prepared and submitted within 30 days to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (Ref. 4). A copy of the report shall also be provided to the senior management of the nuclear plant.-and the utility Senior Vice President, Nuclear.

2.2.6 If SL 2.1.1.1 or SL 2.1.1.2 is violated. restart of the-unit shall not commence until authorized by the NRC. This requirement-ensures the NRC that all necessary reviews.

analyses. and actions are completed before the unit begins its restart to normal operation.

I REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50. Appendix A. GDC 10, 1988.

_ 2. UFSAR, Sections 6 and 15.

-3. 10 CFR 50.72.

4. 10 CFR 50.73.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 8 2.1.1-5 REVISION 23

2 I

Ii L

iii I

I,

-! 1. I.

i I I

'i,.

I

'.

I -

.I This page intentina1Jy blank

.1J'*

. 4

RCS Pressure SL B 2.1.2 -

BASES APPLICABILITY SL 2.1.2 applies in MODES 1. 2.. 3.'4. and 5 because this SL could be approached or exceeded in these MODES due to overpressurization events. The SL is not applicable in MODE 6 because the reactor vessel head closure bolts are not fully tightened. making it unlikely that the RCS can be pressurized.

SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATIONS The following SL violation responses are applicable to the RCS pressure SLs.

2.2.2.1 If the-RCS pressure SL is violated when the reactor is in MODE.1 or 2. the requirement is to'restore compliance and be in MODE 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

With RCS pressure greater than the value specified in SL 2.1.2 in MODE 1 or 2. the pressure must be 4educed to below this value. A pressure greater that the value specified in SL 2.1.2 exceeds 110 of the RCS design pressure and may challenge system'integrity.

The'allowed Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months provides the operatQr time to complete the necessary actions to reduce RCS pressure by terminating the cause of the pressure increase, removing mass or energy from the RCS. or a combination of these actions, and to establish MODE 3 conditions.

2.2.2.2 If the RCS pressure SL is exceeded in MODE 3. 4. or 5. RCS pressure must be restored to within the SL value within 5 minutes.

Exceeding the RCS pressure SL in MODE 3. 4. or 5 is potentially more severe than'exceeding this SL in MODE 1 or 2. since the reactor vessel temperature may be lower and the vessel material. consequently. less ductile.

As such, ressure must be reduced to less than the SL within minutes.

This action does not require reducing MODES.

since this would require reducing temperature. which would (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 2.1.2-3 REVISION 0

RCS Pressure SL B 2.1.2 BASES SAFETY LIMIT 2.2.2.2 (continued)

VIOLATIONS compound the problem by adding thermal gradient stresses to the existing pressure stress.

2.2.2.3 If the' RCS pressure SL is violated, the NRC Operations Center must be notified within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . in accordance with 10'CFR 50.72 (Ref. 6).

2.2.2.4

,If ;

the RCS pressure SL is violated. thefappropriate senior X -

managenent.,ofthe nuc ar plant"and the utity shall be notified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . -This.24-hour period provides time for the plant operators and staff to take"the appropriate immediate act4ln and to.,assess the condition of the unit before reporting to the senior mahagement.

2.2.2.5 If the RCS pressure SL is violated. a Licensee Event Report shall be prepared and submitted within 30,days to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (Ref. 7). A copy of the report shall also be provided to the senior management of the nuclear plant. and the utility Senior Vice President.

Nuclear.

2.2.2.6 If the RCS pressure SL is violated, restart of the unit shall not commence until authorized by the NRC. This requirement ensures the NRC that al.l necessary reviews.

a,;---analyses, and actions are completed before the unit begins its restart to normal operation.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 2.1.2-4 REVISION 23

RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.14 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.14 RCS Operational LEAKAGE BASES BACKGROUND Components that contain or transport the coolant to or from the reactor core make up the RCS.

Component joints are made by welding, bolting, rolling, or pressure loading, and valves isolate connecting systems from the RCS.

During-plant life,-the joint and valve interfaces can produce varying amounts of. reactor coolant LEAKAGE. through either normal operational wear or-,mechanical deterioration.

The purpose of the RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO is to limit system operation.in the presence of LEAKAGE from these sources to amounts that do not compromise safety. This LCO specifies the types and amounts of LEAKAGE.

10 CFR 50. Appendix A. GDC 30ftRef. 1).-requires means for detecting and. to the extent practical., identifying the source of reactor coolant LEAKAGE. Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Ref. 2) describes acceptable methods for selecting leakage detection systems.

The safety significance of RCS LEAKAGE varies widely depending on its source, rate. and duration. Therefore.

detecting and monitoring reactor coolant LEAKAGE into the containment area is necessary. Quickly separating the identified LEAKAGE from the unidentified LEAKAGE is necessary to provide quantitative information to the operators; allowing them to take corrective action should a leak occur detrimental to the safety of the facility and the public.

A limited amount of leakage inside containment is expected from auxiliary systems that cannot be made 100X leaktight.

Leakage from these systems should be detected, located, and

isolated from the containment atmosphere. if possible. to not interfere with RCS LEAKAGE detection.

This LCO deals with protection of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) from degradation and the core from inadequate cooling-. in addition to preventing the accident

-analysis radiation release assumptions from being exceeded.

The consequences of violating this LCO include the possibility of a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.14-1 REVISION 0

RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.14 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE Except for primary to secondary LEAKAGE. the safety analyses SAFETY ANALYSES do not address operational LEAKAGE.

However, other operational LEAKAGE is related to the safety analyses for.

LOCA: the amount of leakage can affect the probability of such an event.

The safety analysis for an event resulting in steam discharge to the atmosphere assumes a 1 gpm total, primary to secondary LEAKAGE as the-initial condition.

While some events assume the 1 gpn leakage is in one steam generator, others assume-0.5 gpm per steam generator (1 gpm total).as an initial condition. Therefore. the individua UFSAR accident analysisvsection'musttbe reviewed to

deternine the assumed i1ma y to -secondary LEAKAGE for a specifit accident:.,,'

e ;

j C

I-,.

, ( I Primary'-lto secondary'LEAKAGE is a factor in-the.dose releases oUts1dde contallriientresulting from a Steam Line Break. (SLB)'accidenht lbo a leSserlextent. 'other accidents or transients involve secondary steam release to the atmoisphere.: sich -as-a'-Steam'Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR).

- Ths eakage tontaiitts!the.secondary fluid.

The Technical1 Specification lihit of 150 gallons per day.

(gpd) primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator is significantly less than the initial conditions assumed in the safety analyses.

The 150 gpd limit is based on-operating experience as an indication of one or more propagating tube leak-mechanisms.

This leakage rate limit

.provides additional:assurance against tube rupture at normal and faulted conditions and provides additional assurance that cracks.wil not propagate to burst prior to detection by leakage monitoring methods and commencement of plant shutdown.

The UFSAR (Ref. 3) analysis for SGTR assumes the

-contaminated secondary fluid is only briefly released via safety valves and the majority is steamed to the condenser.

Tube leakage of 1 gpm in the-unaffected steam generator is assumed for the durationiof the transient.

~~~~~~~~~~~

.I The SLB is more limiting for site radiation releases. The safety analysis for the SLB accident assumes 1 gpm primary to secondary LEAKAGE ih'the faulted-steam generator as an initial condition. -The dose consequences resulting from the SLB accident are -ell-iwithin the limits defined in 10 CFR 50 or the staffiapprovbd licensing basis (i.e.. a small fraction of these limits,)-.

I I

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 B 3.4.14-2 REVISIO.N 23

RCS Operational LEAKAGE~~

RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.14 BASES APPLICABLE RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR SAFETY ANALYSES 50.36'(C)(2)(ii).-

(continued)

LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

a.

Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material deterioration. 'LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration. resulting in higher LEAKAGE.

Violation of this:LCO couldnresult in continued degradation of the RCPB.>'.LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not-pressure boundary LEAKAGE.

b.

Unidentified LEAKAGE

'One gallon per-Minute (gpm) of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowedvas a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment sump level monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. if the LEAKAGE is from the pressure boundary.

c.

Identified LEAKAGE Up to 10 gpm of identified LEAKAGE is considered allowable because LEAKAGE is from known sources that do not interfere with detection of unidentified LEAKAGE and is well within the capability of the RCS makeup system.' Identified LEAKAGE includes LEAKAGE to the containment from specifically knownand located sources. but does not include pressure boundary LEAKAGE or controlled Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal leakoff (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE). Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of a component or system.

(continued)

PALO VERDE,-UNITS 1.2.3

B' 3.4.14-3 I REVISION 23

RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.14 BASES

-l LCO. -

(continued)

LCO 3.4.15, -RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV)

Leakage., measures leakage through each individual PIV and can impact this LCO. Of the two PIVs in series in each-isolated line, leakage measured through one PIV does not result in'RCS LEAKAGE when the other is leaktight. 'If both valves leak and result in a loss of mass.from theRCS. the loss must be included in the allowable identified LEAKAGE..

d.

Primary to'Seconda'~YLEAKAGE through Any One SG The maximum allowable operational primary to

- secondary LEAKGE-.through any-one SG of 150 gpd is.

,based on operating experienpceas an indication of one or more propagating-tube leak mechanisms. This operational.,-limit Is signi.firantly less'than the initial conditions assumedin'.the safety analyses.

'The Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program.

described in:TS,ectjon15;;5.9 ensures that the structural infegrFtyof the-SG tubes is'maintained.

The 150 gpd leakage-4rate-limit provides additional assurance against:,tube-rupture at normal and faulted conditions and.provides.additional assurance that cracks: willnpt propagate to burst prior to detection by leakage.monitoring methods and.commencement of plant shutdown,-, Primary to secondary LEAKAGE must be-included in the total allowable limit-for identified LEAKAGE.

APPLICABILITY In MODES L1 2. 3. and 4, the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the RCS-is pressurized.

In MODES 5 and 6. LEAKAGE limits are not required because the reactor coolant pressure is far lower, resulting in lower stresses.and reduced potentials for LEAKAGE.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.14,4

. 14EV SiON r7! . -

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage B 3.7.17 B 3-7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage BASES I

BACKGROUND The spent fuel storage is designed to store either new (nonirradiated) nuclear fuel assemblies, or burned (irradiated) fuel assemblies in a vertical configuration underwater.

The storage pool was originally designed to store up to 1329 fuel assemblies in a borated fuel storage mode: The currentstorage configuration. which allows credit to be taken frboron concentration. burnup, and decay time. -and dop4_.!ot,rtgquIre neutron absorbing (boraflex),storage. cans., provides for a maximum storage of 1209 fuel 1assembliesin a four-regio'n.'configuration.

The design basis. of the spent fuei'.co6l-ing system. however, is to provide adequate~.cooling t9.the spent fuel during all operating conditions.-(i'ncqudine'fudll core offload) for only 1205 fuel assemblies (UFSAR section 9k133). :Therefore, an additional. four' spaces.are,mechanically ocked to limit the maximum number,'f

-fuel 4ssembljies that may be stored in the spent fuel storage pool to 1205.

Region 1 is comprised of two 9x8 storage racks and one 12x8 storage rack.

Cell, blocking devices are placed in every other storage cell location in Region 1 to maintain a two-out-of-four checkerboard configuration. These cell blocking devices prevent inadvertent insertion of.a'fuel assembly into a cell that is not allowed to contain a fuel assembly.

Region 3 is comprised of three 9x8 storage racks and one 9x9

.storage rack.

Since fuel. assemblies may be stored in every Region 3-cell location. no cell blocking-devices are installed in Region 3.

Regions 2 and 4 are mixed and are comprised of seven 9x8 storage racks and three 12x8 storage racks.. Regions 2 and 4 are mixed in a repeating 3x4 storage pattern in which two-out-of-twelve cql.l locations are designated Region 2 and ten-out-of-twelve cell locations are designated Region 4 (see UFSAR Figure 9,.-1-9).

Since fuel assemblies may be stored in every Region 2 and Region 4 cell location, no cell blocking devices are installed in Region 2 and Region 4.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 BP 3.7.17-1 REVISION 23

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage B 3.7.17 BASES BACKGROUND The spent fuel storage cells are instaiied in parallel rows (continued) with a nominal center-to-center spacing of 9.5 inches. This spacing, a minimum soluble boron concentration of 900 ppm.

and the storage of fuel in the appropriate region based on assembly burnup in accordance with TS Figures 3.7.17-1.

3.7.17-2. and 3.7.17-3 is sufficient to maintain a keff of

'0.95 for fuel of original maximum radially averaged enrichment of up to 4.80X.'

APPLICABL SAFETY AN

.E-The spent fuel storage pool 4s designed for-non-ALYSES criticality by use of adequate spacing. credit for boron concentration.

arnd the-!storage of fuel in the appropriate region based on assembly burnup in accordance with

-M'Figures 13.7-.17-1. 3.7.17-2. and 3.7.17-3.

The design Fecjuirements'related to criticality (TS 4.3.1.1) are

' kif'< '1.O'assuming 'no credit for boron and kef < 0.95 taking credit for soluble boron.' The burnup versus enrichment requirements (TS Figures 3.7.17-1. 3.7.17-2. and 3.7.17-3) are developed assuming keff < 1.0 with no credit taken for 'soluble boron.>arid that keff < 0.95 assuming a soluble boron concentration of 900 ppm and the most limiting single fuel mishandling accident.

The analysis of the reactivity'effects of fuel storage in the spent fuel storage racks was performed by ABB-Combustion Engineering (CE) using'the three-dimensional Monte Carlo code KENO-VA with the updated 44 group ENDF/B-5 neutron cross section library. The KENO code has been previously used by CE for the analysis of fuel rack reactivity and have been benchmarked against results from numerous critical experiments. These experiments simulate the PVNGS fuel storage racks as realistically as possible with respect to parameters important to reactivity such as enrichment and assembly spacing.

The modeling of Regions 2. 3."and 4 included several conservative assumptions. These assumptions neglected the reactivity effects of poison shims in the assemblies and structural grids. *These assumptions tend to increase the calculated effective multiplication,'factor (keff) of the racks.

The stored fuel assemblies were modeled as CE 16x16 assemblies with a nominal-pitch of 0.5065 inches between fuel rods, a fuel.pellet diameter of 0.3255 inches, and a UO(2) density of 10.31 g/cc.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 B 3.7.17-2 REVISION.3

AC Sources -

Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.18 Under accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequencer.

The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the IGs due to high motor starting currents.

The 1 second load sequence',time tolerance ensures that sufficient. time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are

.not'violated.:- FSAR. Chapter 8.(Ref. 2) provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF-buses, The Frequency of 18 months is-consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref;.-3).

'paragraph 2.2.4. takes Into considerationiunit conditions required to perform the'Surveillance. and i.s intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle:lengths-.-;

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance Would remove a required offsite circuit froi servPie., 'perturb~ the. electrical distribution system. and challenge safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.19 In the event of a OBA coincident with a loss.of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so.that'the.fuel. RCS. and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates the 0G operation. as

-discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11. during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF actuation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable.

This testing may include any series of sequential. overlapping. or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

-The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is Intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 18 months.

(continued)

I PALO-VERDE ! UNITS 12, 2R3 B 3.8.1-37 REVISION 23

z

i.

AC Sources-Operating

- /

~~~~~~~~~~AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.19 (continued).

REQUIREMENTS.

This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on-the DGs during testing.

For the purpose of this testing. the OGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil-continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer reconmendations for DGs. -The reason for Note 2 is that performing the.Surveillance would remove a required offsitecircuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution-system..arnd challenge safety

'systems..Note 3 states.that-the steady' state voltage and frequency -limits are analyzed values~ and have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy.

The analyze values for

-the.steady-state dies~li.generator vol-tage' limits are 2 4000 and

, 4377.2:volts,and :th analyzed valiues for the steady-state'diesel generator fiequency limits are

59.7 and s 60.7 hertz.

The, indicated steady state6diesel generator voltage and frequency. l-imits."-using the: panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation and adjusted for instrument error, are x:4080 and s 4300 volts l(Ref.12). and 2 69.9 and 5 60.5 hertz -(Ref i13);, respectively., -If digital Maintenance and Testing'Equipment (M&TE-) is used-instead of the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentatior,-.the instrument error may be reduced. increasing the range for the indicated steady state voltage and frequency limits.

SR 3.8.1.20 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence'has not been compromised.

Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can proper speed within the.specified time when the OGs are started simultaneously.

The'10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9.(Ref. -3),iparagraph 2.3.2.4 and Regulatory. Guide 1.137

.(Re;f. 9).

This SR. is modified by three Notes.

The reason for Note 1 is to minimize-wear, orthe0DGtduring testing.

The reason for N6te 2 is that durtng!'operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the EDS that could'cthj1lenge continued-steady state operation and. as a result.-unit safety systems.

Note 3 states that the steady'state'voltage. and frequency limits are analyzed values and have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy.

The analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator voltage limits are 2 4000 and (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.8.1-381- _-,

ML032180729

Contents

Text

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Enclosure:

Navigation menu

ML032180729

Text

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Enclosure:

Navigation menu

Search