ML030860355

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision

ML030860355
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	03/24/2003
From:	Pace P Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
Download: ML030860355 (52)

Text

Tennessee Valley Authonty, Post Office Box 2000, Spnng City, Tennessee 37381-2000 MAR 2 4 2003 10 CFR 50, App E.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of

)

Docket No.

50-390 Tennessee Valley Authority WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN)

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the following EPIP.

EPIP Rev Title Effective Date EPIP-1 21 Emergency Plan Classification 3-3-2003 Flowchart There are no regulatory commitments in this letter.

If you should have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.

Sicrely Manager, Site Licensing and Industry Affairs Enclosure cc:

See Page 2 Pnnted on rcycled paper

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 MAR 2 4 2003 PLP:JES Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure)

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2 copies)

Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St.,

SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING PROCEDURES EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART Revision 21 Unit 0 NON-QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:

James F. Hawv (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

Em APPROVED BY:

Frank L. Pavlechko eraencv Planninq EFFECTIVE DATE:03/03/2003 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 21 FLOWCHART Page 2 of 49 K>

REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Description of Revision Number Date I

0 04/13/90 New WBN-EPIP. Supersedes IP-1.

1 02/04/91 Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS telephone numbers.

2 11/28/91 Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment 1 Definitions. Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for Uncontrolled Shutdown.

3 03/04/92 Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new "Merit" Tech Specs and ODCM references.

4 02/10/93 Procedure revised to reflect the new methodology for development of Emergency Action Levels per: NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 3, 1/92, endorsed by REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92.

5 09/15/93 Editorial (non-intent) and formal changes. Text changes made to EALs to meet review comments identified by the NRC.

6 01/01/94 Procedure revised to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes.

7 05/27/94 Procedure revised to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring) and establish site perimeter monitoring points.

8 01/10/95 FPBM, EAL 1.3.4, CNTMT, Bypass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate potential for misclassification. Maps revised to reference north and wind direction. Table 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to provide Operators additional information.

9 4/28/98 Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document (WBN-OS64-188). Reference to AOI-27 revised to AOI-30.2. Phone numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their reorganization. Annunciator window references for the earthquake corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following:

System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release time durations, and annual meteorological data enhancements.

Revision Implementation Date Pages Description of Revision Number Affected CN-1 09/28/95 10,14,26 The following non-intent enhancements were made:

(CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA),

to enhance description. New SI reference number for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tomado) revised to new number.

CN-2 11/10/95 3,6,34 The following n6n-intent enhancements were made:

Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1; Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability; an enhanced description for RE-404 was provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS Operators Manual was added to the Reference section.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 21 FLOWCHART Page 3 of 49 REVISION LOG(Continued)

Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected CN-3 05/24/96 8, 11, 16, The following non-intent enhancements were made: Due 19, 23, 24, to revisions made to AOI-27, it was added back to the 26, 29, 32, EALs in event 4.5 "Control Room Evacuation"; The 34 Assessment Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to correspond with the note at the top of the table. In addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements being made to EPIP-16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3 "Aircraft/Projectile Crash", to make it consistent with the EALs within it's classification.

10 3/15/99 All The following non-intent enhancement were made:

Software revised to Microsoft Word which re-formatted pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical errors corrected; two references revised - one added; SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500 to ICS.

11 4/15/99 2,34 Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to >0.1.

11A 7/1/99 3,26 Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of this procedure are Rev 11 only page 3, and the fold out page for 26 have been changed.

12 9/30/99 All Non intent change. Minor editorial\\format changes made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695.

(LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the resolution to PER 99-009326-000.

13 12/08/99 All Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1 step 1 of the Alert classification.

14 04/10/00 All Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN 50484, (Pg.4 & 45) stage 1 which moved 0-RE-90-101B, & -132B from ICS Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1 -RE-90-421 B thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120 & -121 from ICS Screen 4RM1 to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate ICS screen.

15 08/17100 All Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (Pg. 4, 11A & (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to correspond B) with the new TI-RPS-1 62, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 11 b. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000.

This revision was also determined not to reduce the level

.of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 21 FLOWCHART Page 4 of 49 REVISION LOG (Continued)

Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 16 3/30/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the (Pg. 11 &14) following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors readings in the Barrier Matrix (1.3) to support new dose assessment methodology.

Non intent change. Revised reference from annunciator alarm printer to annunciator monitor per DCN D-50301.

17 09/25//01 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of Page 6, 11B effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2.

The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.

Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Barrier Matrix.

18 02/15/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the 2, 11B, 44 following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-Intent change. Changes to the EALs in this revision consist of changing 03-y to gamma in Section 7.0 to ensure consistency with NUMARC/NESP-007, Reg Guide 1.101, and NEI 99-01 rev 4. Clarification to EAL 1.3.3 (containment isolation status also made per this reference.) This standardizes these issues with the other TVAN sites. These changes were approved by the State of Tennessee.

19 06/05102 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of 4, 7 &30 effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Intent change(s): A revision to the Security Event (4.6) was made to incorporate change(s) resulting from the NEI to NRC (Mr. Bruce Boger) letter dated 12/18/01 requesting conformation for an EAL basis change to include response to a Credible Site Specific Threat.

Table 4-3 was revised to incorporate this additional EAL.

This meets the compliance of the NRC's 10/6/01 Safeguards Advisory on this matter. This represents an additional EAL and does not change existing criteria in the Security Event Basis.

Revised 5.1 Interfacing documents by noting the termination of EPIP 9 with reference to EPIP 16.

20 07/09/02

ALL, Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) pg. 2, 10, indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of 13,15, 20, effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

24, 30, 32, Intent change(s): Reference to T/S 3.4.16 in Event 2.4 EAL 39, 43 1(a) revised to correspond to levels in AOI-28. Credible Site-Specific was added to the definition pages. Removed reference to the definition in Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS to standardize with other TVAN sites.

21 03/03/2003 2, 15 Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

SNon-intent change: Deleted reference to table which was deleted from AOI-28, Ref. WBPER 03-004004-000.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 21 FLOWCHART Page 5 of 49 1.0 PURPOSE 4

This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY2'4 The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties CAN NOT be delegated.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4

3.1 The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY:

knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances.

3.2 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.

3.3 Classification Determination 3.3.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions referenced.

3.3.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.

3.3.3 The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 21 FLOWCHART Page 6 of 49 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.3.4 After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.

3.3.5 IF an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared.

3.3.6 IF the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition CAN NOT be reasonably discounted (i.e.,

spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered MET and the SM/SED SHALL follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.3.7 IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate shall not be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at the same clock time.

3.3.8 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS 4.1 Non-QA Records None

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 21 FLOWCHART Page 7 of 49

5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 Interfacing References BP-236, Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis SPP 3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements WBN-EPIP-2, Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3, Alert WBN-EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5, General Emergency WBN-EPIP-9, Loss of Meteorological Data (Canceled see EPIP-16)

WBN-EPIP-13, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPIP-14, Radiological Control Response WBN-EPIP-16, Initial Dose Assessment For Radiological Emergencies CECC-EPIP-9, Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures SI-4.04, Measurement of Identified and Unidentified Leakage of the Reactor Coolant System 5.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection From Radiation REG GUIDE-1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness ForNuclearPower Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.

Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs),

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

ICS Operator's Manual EPPOS #2, "NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 8 of 49

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 9 of 49 FISSION PRODUCUBARRIER...-MATRIX des. 4!.4)

.-A.

RCS

ý3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Technical Specification Safety Limit 2

3 LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 10 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS K>

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in uhich postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force K >

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSIONAINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual K >

ORANGE PATIh: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or rmtigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit inthis definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g, alarm setponits, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e, within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or mdirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

EPIPW Revision 21 Page IlAof49

1. Fue CldBare Function Status Potential LOSS Core Cooling Orange OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service)

-OR"

2. P'rimary Coolant Acti*v"ity Level Potential LOSS RCS sample activity is Greater Than 300 pCiagm Not appThcable dose equivalent iodine-131

-OR' 3! Inc0reT.Cs: Hi ad iA eragei!ii*i~i~~i!i iii !.i I I[*.%.*Potential LOSS Greater Than 1200OF Greater Than 7270F 4, Reactor Vessel Water Level I

IPotential LOSS Not Applicable VALID RVLIS level <33%

(No RCP running)

• 
  
  .-OR-5, -Containment Radiationfi Monitors, Potential LOSS 1...i Ci;ritical iSafety ;Fun~ction Status:*i

.gl:; i e t icwsn

• Pa`

! rllAof49 16 Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

Core Cooling Red I

Not Applicable VALID reading increase of Greater Than:

74 RJhr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 OR 59 RPhr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274

-OR 6, Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

7 1.2 RCS Barrier B!

I Potential LOSS Not Applicable Pressurized Thermal Shock Red OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service) 2 RCS. Leakage/LOCA.

Potential LOSS RCS Leak results in Non Isolatable RCS Leak Loss of subcooling Exceeding The Capacity of

(<650F Indicated),

One Charging Pump (CCP)

[85°F ADV]

In the Normal Charging Alignment.

OR RCS Leakage Results In Entry Into E-1 OR 3S.' Steam Ge'nerator Tube Rupture'.`:,

S-Potential LOSS SGTR that results in a Not Applicable safety injection actuation OR Entry into E-3 4., Reactor -Vessel Water.Level Potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level Not Applicable

<33%

(No RCP Running)

-OR,

5. Site "Emeargency 'Directo*r,J'udgmeb'nt

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page l1B of 49 Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4

'*Trtitlca1 :S afetY FunctionStatus LOS Not Applicable Potential LOSS Containment (FR-Z.1) Red OR Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE 2.. Contai nment Pres....v...

Rapid unexplained decrease following initial increase OR Containment pressure or Sump level Not increasing (with LOCA in prowress)

Potential LOSS Containment Hydrogen Increases to >4% by volume OR Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) with < One full train of Containment spray

3. Containment Isolation Status."

Potential LOSS Containment Isolation is Not Applicable Incomplete (when required)

AND a Release Path to the Environment Exists

-OR-'

4. Containment By ass U.K; Potential LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also Unexplained VALID increase FAULTED outside CNTMT in area or ventilation RAD OR monitors in areas adjacent to Prolonged (>4 Hours)

CNTMT (with LOCA in Secondary Side release progress) outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits

5. S

ignificant Radioactivity::inC-."'..o.ntainment't-:: :""-i',i "Potential LOSS Not Applicable VALID Reading increase of Greater Than:

108 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and I-RE-90-272 OR 86 R/hr on 1-RE-90-273 and I-RE-90-274

-R

6...Site Emergency Director Judgmen:::

sondition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates k.ý or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above INSTRUCTIONS NOTE. A condibon is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the condtibon w7l/be METimminently (I.e, within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, in the absence of a viable success path)

The classificabon shall be made a soon as this determination is made

1. In the matrix to the left, review the INITIATING CONDITIONS in all columns and identify which, if any, INITIATING CONDITIONS are MET.

Circle these CONDITIONS.

2. For each of the three barriers, identify if any LOSS or Potential LOSS INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.

3. If a CSF is listed as an INITIATING CONDITION; the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the EVENT classification for the Modes listed on the classification flowchart.

4 Compare the barrier losses and potential losses to the EVENTS below and make the appropriate declaration.

EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT Loss or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers I

LS I

F I

S S

I 0

N P

R 0

D U

C T

B A

R R

I E

R M

A T

R I

X U

1 ALERT Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrer OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier GENERAL EMERGENCY LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier I

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 12 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRA ATIONi*O*-.....

.1.Loss of Ins rntatiou C dniidekg 2

L:oUs's of Trnction/Comm catioxi 27 Uncontroled Cool DCwn

"+2<3+

Failure of Reator+'sotectio 28 Turbjue Failur

+

42 Fuel Clad tDegr~adatk 2 -9

.e.ika Specificat.o 2.5 RCS Unietiid

0. Saey.i i LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 3

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

-J

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 13 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): Aplant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e.

within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of I0CFRPart 100 RefertoFigure7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of seventy of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction inthe level of seventy is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Oflsite Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATHI: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs bythe FR-O wbich indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following" (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or hmb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g, alarm setpomts, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, 1 e, within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes-deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" and "Radiological Effluents" (Secbon 7)

Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)

1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications

2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

3. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS

4. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:

Sub-criticality Core Cooling Heat Sink PTS Containment Inventory UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators land Annunciator Printer) or indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS computer and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes.

2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)

3. (a orb) a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress

b. Loss of ICS Comouter and SPDS UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System annunciators or Indications in the Control Room for >15 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes 2 SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment) 3 ICS Computeror SPDS is in service and capable of displaying data requested EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 14 of 49 Mode IInitiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnrx*

Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown (1 or2)

1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red 1,2 3,4 2 CSF status tree Indicates Heat Sink Red (RHR not in service)

Note, Also Refer to 'Failure of Rx Protection" (2.3) and "Fission Product Bamer Matnx' Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs (1 and 2 and 3) 4

1. Shutdown is required

2. Loss of RHR capability 3 Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser A Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3)

ALL 1 UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones 2 UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones 3 UNPLANNED loss of all radios or B UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)

1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies

3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system

4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines

5. UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system 1,2 3,4 1,2 3,4 1,2 3,4 1-i

EPIP-I Revision 21 Page 15 of 49 1-.,.

Mode I L.

.4

-

U

< 11111 W5U*1

a

1 del t1

i fal a Initiating/Condition Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals 1,2 did not result in a reduction of Rx power to <5% and decreasing (1 and 2)

1. (a orb) a CSF status tree Indicates Core Cooling Red

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red

2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions Did Not result in a Rx Power of <5% and decreasing 1,2 Rx power Not <5% and decreasing after VALID Auto and Manual trip signals (1 and 2 and 3)

1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was Not successful 3 FR-S 1 has been entered Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal and manual trip from MCR was successful (1 and 2)

1. VALID Rx Auto Tnp signal received or required 2 Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was successful and power is <5% and decreasing Not Applicable Mode Initiating/Condition 1,2, 3,4, 5

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matfix" Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matnx" Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matnx" Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16)

1. Radjochemistry analysis indicates (a orb) a Dose equivalent Iodine (1-131) >0 265 pCi/gm for >48 Hours or

>21 tCL/gm b

Specific activity >100/E pCi/gm r

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Reiin21 Pag e16of 49 2.5 RCS Undntfe Leakage

• 1

Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx" Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix*

Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage

>10 GPM

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.) >10 GPM as indicated below (a orb) a 1-SI-68-32 results b With RCS Temperature and PZR Level Stable, VCT Level Dropping at a Rate >10 GPM 126 RCS Idnife Leaag

_g Mode 1,2, 3,4,

• 5 InitiatinalCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matnx" Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix" 4

Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec)

>25 GPM (a orb)

a. I-SI-68-32 results b Level rise In excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT or CVCS Holdup Tank

• N'ote: A,Inh=es to Mode 5f f RCS Pressunzedot d

EPP-(

LLj

ý 1,2 3,4,

• 5 i

• Note ADDrJeS to Mode 5 if RCS Pressunzed

Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx" Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix' Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" S

I T

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U A

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v E

UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety Injection Initiation (1 and 2)

1.

Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System

(<675 psig) 2 Safety Injection has initiated or is required EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 17 of 49

2.

Tubn Falr Mode Initiating/Condition i

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx' Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing Safety Related equipment

1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in VISIBLE 1,2,3 DAMAGE in any of the following areas Control Building Diesel Generator Bldg Auxihary Building RWST Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station CST Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration 1,2,3

1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Turbine Casing gr Damage to Main Generator Seals

'I 1,2,3

+

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E M

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G R

A D

A T

0 N

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EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 18 of49 Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech.

Spec. limits (1 and 2) 1,2

1. Any Tech Spec. LCO Statement, requiring a Mode 3,4 reduction, has been entered

2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode within the time prescnbed by the LCO Action Statement 2.1 Saey iit Mode 4

.1.

1,2, 3,4, 5

Initiatinq/Condition Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or2)

1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech.

Spec Figure 2 1 1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limits" 2

RCS/Pressunzer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig)

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E PIP-1 Revision 21 Pa: 19 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 28 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit

,iJLOSSOF POWER`,ý

""oss of AC (P[.wer

.p

)........

.f.AC.(Sh.do..)............

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment4 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash5 Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdow.n.)

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-27 Figure 7-A

EPIP-l Revision 21 Page 20 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN semor plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force K~/

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed FLA1IMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result m a reduction in the level of severty of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of seventy is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

~

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsate Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofthe following- (I) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release ofradioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmomtored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e, within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes-deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release ofAhich could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

Initiating/Condition Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power (I and 2)

1. 1A and 1 B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes

2. (a orb) a Core Cooling Red or Orange b Restoration of Either 1A or 1 B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss.

1-Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power > 15 minutes

1. 1A and 1 B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2 1A or 1 B Diesel Generator not available Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes

2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board 1

3.

oso AC (Sudon Mode 5,6, or De fuel 5,6, or De fuel Initiating/Condition

-1 Not Applicable Not Appricable UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for >15 minutes

1. 1A and 1 B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems' (6.1)

UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (I and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2 Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board 1,2, 3,4 1,2, 3,4 1,2, 3,4 1,2 3,4

-1 1z

J~~gS 3.3Ls fD Poer Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" and "Loss of Funcbon" (2.2)

I I G

E N

E R

A L

S I

T E

Am Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes

1. Voltage <1 05V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-11 and 1-111 and 1-IV for >15 minutes Also Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx",

"Loss of Functon" (2.2),

and 'Loss of Instrumentation" (2 1)

Also Refer to 'Fission Product BamerMatnx",

"Loss of Function" (2 2),

and 'Loss of Instrumentabon" (2 1)

T UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for >15 minutes (1 or 2)

1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-111 for >15 minutes

2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-Il and 1-IV for >15 minutes EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 22 of 49 L

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Mode 4-1,2, 3,4 5,6, or De-fuel

,,.4-

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Pag e23of 49 K

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT.*-*.

4.1 Fire 43 lammffable Gas 45 Cot1 Room 'Evacuau

.24sion

,4..

xi as

4.

6 S....uri..

"Table 4 Table 4 -2 4 7-3".EDt 4

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 24 of 49 DEFJMTIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgnent 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences wen recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of seventy of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of seventy is an unprovement in the applicable parameters, e g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSIONFINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one ormore ofthe following (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED. (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g., alarm setpomts, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maxinmum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant midcators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e, within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g&, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 25 of 37 Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Refer to 'Control Room Evacuabon," (4.5) or Fission Product Bamer Matnx' FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2) 1 FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1

2. (a orb) a VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure gr Safety Related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE b Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the FIRE FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is Not extinguished within 15 minutes from the Time of Control Room notification or verification of Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A)

A nitiati3g/Condi Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamrer Matrix" All All 4 EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed In Table 4.1 that Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)

1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 2 (a or b) a An EXPLOSION has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to Safety Related equipment b Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the EXPLOSION Referto "Secunty" (4.6)

UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure or equipment (Figure 4-A)

Refer to "Secunty" (4 6)

I I Mode All All 4

1 4.1 FIRE

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 26 of 49 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building CST Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1&2)

RWST Figure 4-A PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER H

A z

A R

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S E

D J

U D

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EPIW Revision 21 Pag 27of 49

4.

Flm al Ga Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier MatOx" UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within a facility structure containing Safety Related equipment or associated with Power production

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -1 Oft triangular Area is

>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limi, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2 A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -1 Oft Tnangular Area is

>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 4-B)

OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials that a Large Offsite Flammable Gas release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >25% of LEL Lower Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B)

Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" All a

All Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matnx" Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to establish or maintain Cold SID (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building listed in Table 4-2

2. (a orb) a Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health Reactions due to TOXIC GAS (i.e, burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness)

b. Sampling indications > (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit 3 Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropnate personnel protection equipment A. Normal Operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations within a Facility Structure listed in Table 4-2 OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the Site Perimeter in concentrations >than the (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit thus causing an Evacuation (Figure 4-B)

I Mode 4-All All L

EPIP-I Revision 21 Page 28 of 49 TABLE 4-2 Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1&2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building Figure 4-B ONE MILE RADIUSISITE PERIMETER H

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U D

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T U

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Revision 21 Page 29 of 49 Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" Evacuation of the Control Room has been initiated and Control of all necessary equipment Has Not been established within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room (1 and 2 and 3)

All

1. (a or b) a AOI-30 2 "Fire Safety Shutdown" entered

b. AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered 2 SMISED Orders Control Room evacuation 3 Control has Not been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels L11A and LI 1 B Evacuation of the Control Room is Required (I and 2)

1. (a orb)

a. AOI-30 2 "Fire Safe Shutdown" entered E

All b AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered T

2. SM!SED Orders Control Room evacuation U

Not Applicable A

4.

Seuiy-Mode I Initiating/Condition Security Event resulting in loss of Control of the Plant

1. Hostile Armed Force has taken Control of the Plant, All Control Room, or Remote shutdown capability Security Event has or is occurring which results in Actual or Likely Failures of Plant Functions needed to Protect the Public All

1. VITAL AREA, other than the Control Room, has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force Confirmed Security Event which indicates an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2 or 3)

All

1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA

2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA 3 PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force Refer to Figure 4-A For a Drawng of Protected Area and Site Perimeter Confirmed Security Event which indicates a Potential Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2)

1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA All

2. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-3

EPIP-I Revision 21 Page 30 of 49 1

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irecto J m

J,Mode InitiatinqlCondition Events are in progress or have occurred All which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation orr Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonable expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.

Events are in progress or have occurred All which involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.

Events are in progress or have occurred All which Involve Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels.

All Unusual Events are in Progress or have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.

Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS a SABOTAGEIINTRUSION has occurred or is occurring within the PROTECTED AREA b HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation that Threatens to interrupt Plant Operations c CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA d Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA which threatens to interrupt Normal Plant Operations (Judgment Based on behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence received)

e. A CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC security threat notification.

H A z A

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EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 31of49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Q,>

Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DIESTRUCTIVEJ. IPHENOMENON.:ýýi...

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SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 0

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 32 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found m the Safeguards Contingency Plan CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs" Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e.

within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressunzed.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of seventy of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of seventy is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or oflsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all ownier controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas inthe immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmomtored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, andlor discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e, within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes. deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g,, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

E PIP-1 I

Revision 21 Page 33 of 49 5.1 Earthquake IMode I nitiatinqlC ondition

+

Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx" Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. (a and b) a Ann 166 D indicates "OBE Spectra Exceeded" b Ann.1 66 E indicates "Seismic Recording Initiated" 2 (a orb) a Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel b National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. Ann 166 E indicator "Seismic Recording Initiated" 2 (a or b) a Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel b National Earthquake Information Center at 1 -(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event 0

5. Tornad Mode Initiating/Condition All All Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx" Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results In VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph > one minute) stnkes any structure listed in Table 5-1

2. (a orb) a Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE b Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to event Note: Site Met Data Instrumentabon fails to 0 at >100 mph Natonal Weather Serice Morrstown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide addibonal information if needed Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

All All

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 34 of 49 WI nwn v..

A

-p a InitiatinW/Condition Refer to 'Fisson Product Bamer Matnx"

III, G

E N

E R

A L

S I

T E

A L

E R

T U

N U

S U

A L

E 1AW Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any Plant structure listed in Table 6-1 resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1

2. (a orb) a Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE

b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to the event within the specified areas Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

Table 5-1 Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Units 1 & 2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building RWST CST Mode All All Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx" D

E S

T R

U C

T I

V E

P H

E N

0 M

E N

0 N

U 1

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matfix" River Reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning River Reservoir level is at Stage 11 Flood Warning (1 or 2)

1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft

2. Stage II Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning (1 or 2 or 3)

1. River Reservoir level >726 5 Ft from April 16 thru September 30 2 River Reservoir level >714 5 Ft from October 1 thru April 15 3 Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations Mode Initiating/Condition

+

All

.1.

All Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx" Refer to 'Fission Product Barfier Matrx" River Reservoir level is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations River Reservoir level is <673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations EPIP-I Revision 21 Page 35 of 49 All All

InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnix

• 2*

Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW)

(I and 2)

1. Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the Intake Pumping Station 2 (a or b or c) a ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train A O-PI-67-18A is <15 psig b ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train B O-PI-67-17A is <15 psig

c. RCW Supply Header Pressure O-PI-24-22 is

<15 psig EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 36 of 49 Mode All I

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E S

T R

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T I

V E

P H

E N

0 M

E N

0 N

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EPIP-I Revision 21 Page 37 of 49 Figure 5-A PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER

SEPIP-1I Revision 21 Pa e38of49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment 4

Figure 4-A Figure 4-B3 Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWNLSYSTEM.DEGRA.DATION 7.1 Gaeu140un aiainLvl 6 o Sl td w tS str :

L63 Lss fDC(Shutdown) 64---

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RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling 7

Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 39 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist-Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in Iiwich postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFRPart 100 Referto Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force

]

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWVER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the stationto ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 "hich indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure orthe operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 %hich indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mins-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15%thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection>

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: Awork stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e, within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAIIAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA "hich contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation 0

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 40 of 49 Mod e InitiatinglCondition 5,6 Note. Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs Refer to "Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel with CNTMT closure established (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5) 5,6

1. Loss of RHR capability 2 Rx vessel water level < el 718' 3 Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp >2000 F 4 RCS is vented/open to CNTMT 5 CNTMT closure is established Note* If CNTMT open, refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Inability to maintain Unit in Cold Shutdown (1 and 2 and 3) 5,6

1. RHR capability is not available for RCS Cooling 2 Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp. >200* F 3 CNTMT closure is established 5,6 Note Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs 0

1 6.2 In Loss o gC d

(

itihdown)

Mode Initiating/Condition 5,6 or De Fuel 5,6 or De Fuel Not Applicable Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power for>15 minutes

1. 1 A and 1 B 6 9 KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes (I and 2)

1. C and D CSSTS not available For >15 minutes 2 Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 41 of 49 1

.3 30 Initiating/Condition Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of DC Power for >15 minutes (1 or2) 1 Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-111 for >15 minutes

2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-11 and l-IV for >15 minutes Mode InitiatinglCondition All All Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)

1. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-1 01 or O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-R E-90-1 30/131 or 1-R E-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400

2. (a orb) a Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods b Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capability such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal 2 VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60 3 Fuel remains covered with water t

I I ode b,6 or De fuel I~

6.

Fue Handling Mode r

Initiating/Condition I

4 S

H U

T D

0 W

N S

Y S

T E

M S

D E

G R

A D

A T

I 0

N U

1

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 3

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4 2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment 4

Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling

.RADIOLOGICAL 7-1.Gaseous Effluent

-2Liquid Eftluent Table 7.t

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ation 7 "' '

.Vik l Table.7,72 S EPIP-1 I

Revision 21 Page 42 of 49 "7...

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 43 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling. Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences %Nhen recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist Implicst in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force K >

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of seventy of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 xhich indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or rms-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release ofradioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in tlhs definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e., within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

EPIP-1 Revision 21 "ID--- AA~ ^VAn Initiating/Condition EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion Is Not exceeded.

2 Field survey results indicate >1000 mrem/hr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-6 ýt Ci/cc at SP 3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>1000 mrem TEDE or >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fiaure 7-A)

EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 600 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (I or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Site in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time penod confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded 2 Field survey results indicate >100 mremlhr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3 9E-7 I' Ci/cc at SP 3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>100 mreim TEDE or >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or2 or3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded 2 Field survey results indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma at SP >15 minutes 3 EP dose assessment results Indicate EAB dose

>10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >0 1 mrem/hr gamma at SP for >60 minutes 3 EP dose assessment results Indicate EAB dose

>0 1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

All All 4.

Not Applicable Not Applicable Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or 2)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for

>60 minutes (1 or2)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded 2 Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity

>60 minutes in duration All All All All

EPIP-1 Revision 21 Page 45 of 49 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS"'

NOTE:

The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading. As used here, the radiation monitor indications as displayed on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local indication as necessary.

Monitor ICS Screen Units UE Alert Site General Total Site EFFI

ýtCi/s (2) 1.5E+05 1.5E+07 2.5E+08 2.5E+09 U1 Shield Building 1-RE-90-400 EFFI itCi/s 6.7E+04 6.7E+06 1.0E+08 1.OE+09 U2 Shield Building 2-RE-90-400 EFFI

.tCi/s 1.5E+04 1.5E+06 2.5E+07 2.6E+08 Auxiliary Building O-RE-90-101B 4RM1 cpm 1.2E+04 1.2E+06 Service Building 0-RE-90-132B 4RM1 cpm 4.3E+03 4.3E+05 9.8E+06 Ut Condenser Vacuum Exhaust 1-RE-90-404A 3PAM i+/-Ci/cc(3) 5.5E-02 5.5E+00 8.83E+01 8.83E+02 I-RE-90-404B 3PAM p[tCi/cc 5.5E-02 5.5E+00 8.83E+01 8.83E+02

/G Discharge Monitors 1-RE-90-421 thru 4RM2 nR/hr(4)

NA 3.5E+02 3.5E+03 3.5E+04 424 (B)

Liquid Monitors n/a pýCi/ml(2) 1.8E-05 1.8E-03 N/A N/A O-RE-90-122 4RM2 cpm 1.1E+06 I N/A N/A 1-RE-90-120,121 4RM2 cpm 1.OE+06

• .*.li N/A N/A O-RE-90-225 4RM2 cpm 9.2E+05 N/A N/A O-RE-90-212 4RM2 clm 1.5E+04 1.5E+06 N/A N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes 60 15 15 15 ASSESSMENT METHOD: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as necessary Note:

(1) Table values are calculated values. The ***** indicates the monitor is off scale.

(2) These releases rate values in ptCi/s and ýtCi/ml are provided on the gaseous and liquid release points for Information Only. Actual monitor readings are given in the table corresponding to the monitor for the four emergency classifications (3) This eberline channel reads out in cpm in the MCR. Indications of a radioactivity release via this pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondary leakage such as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates p.Ci/cc and has a visual indication of an alarm condition when the indications exceeds 5.5E-021tCi/cc. This channel wvas included in the table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path for possible escalation.

(4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [ 1] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig, 6001F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g. PORV).

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S EPIP-1i Revision 21 Page 46 of 49 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER NOTE: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do Not confuse this boundary w~ith the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or w~ith other definitions of "Site Boundary."

Note-Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.

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RaitonLvl Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx" or "Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" or "Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within the Facility that impedes Safe Operations or establishment or maintenance of Cold Shutdown (1 or 2) 1 VALID area Radiation Monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mrermlhr in the Control Room or CAS 2 (a and b) a VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2

b. Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for Safe Operation gr the ability to establish Cold Shutdown See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels within the Facility 1 VALID area Radiation Monitor readings increase by a factor 1000 over normal levels Note: In Either the UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must determine the cause of Increase in Radiaton Levels and Review Other INITIA TING/CONDITIONS for Applicability (e g, a dose rate of 15 mrernvhrin the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).

74 Fue Handlin Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

All All Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (7. 1)

Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)

1. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-101 or 0-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or 1 -RE-90-130/131 or 1 -RE-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400

2. (a orb) a Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods b Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool, or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal 2 VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or l-RE-90-60 3 Fuel remains covered with water.

EPIP-I Revision 21 Paee 47 of 49 I

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Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS Location Monitor Monitor No.

Building and Elevation Reading

• 1&2 RE-90-1 1-RE-90-2 O-RE-90-3 O-RE-90-4 O-RE-90-5 1&2-RE-90-6 1&2-RE-90-7 1&2-RE-90-8 O-RE-90-9 1&2-RE-90-10 O-RE-90-11 1-RE-90-61 O-RE-90-230 O-RE-90-231 Auxiliary El. 757.0 (spent fuel pool)

Auxiliary El. 757.0 (personnel air lock)

Auxiliary El. 729.0 (waste pac. area)

Auxiliary El. 713.0 (decon room)

Auxiliary El. 737.0 (spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.)

Auxiliary El. 737.0 (comp. cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.)

Auxiliary El. 713.0 (sample room)

Auxiliary El. 713.0 (aux feed pump area)

Auxiliary El. 692.0 (wst. cond. evap tk. ar.)

Auxiliary El. 692.0 (cvcs area)

Auxiliary El. 676.0 (ctmt. spry. & rhr pmp ar.)

Auxiliary El. 736.0 (RB low. cmpt. inst. rm.)

Turbine El. 685.0 (conden. demin.)

Turbine El. 685.0 (conden demin.)

2.5 x 103 mRjhr 2.5 x 100 R/hr 2.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x I mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 2x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 2.5 x 103 mRhr 1.5 x 10' rnR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr Note: *These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mremnhr.

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WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 21 FLOWCHART Page 49 of 49 SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of I

1. NIR-0551, DV-847100 F00012, and MC 850321 809004, MSC-00956, NCO 920030366.

2. MC-84 0827 005 035A, MCS-2400

3. MC-8407 1900 3003, MSC-00701, NCO 920030222 CNTMT

4. ANSI Standard N. 18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01 POI

5.

6.

MSC-02401, NCO-920030998 EPPOS #2 Monitor readings and challenges to barriers are provided in EPIP-1, Section 1 in (1.1 Fuel Clad 1.1.5 and 1.3 CNTMT Barrier 1.3.5), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluents, 7.2 Liquid Effluents, Table 7-1, 7.3 Radiation Levels, 7.4 Fuel Handling and Table 7-2). Barriers are covered in Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix. Monitor readings are also provided in EPIP-5, App. B, Note 3.

SED duties that can not be delegated. Section 2.0 Responsibility.

Rad Monitors used in conjunction with a plant parameter to determine emergency classifications.

Monitor readings are included with plant parameters for the purposes of emergency classifications. Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix (1.1 Fuel Clad, 1.2 RCS, 1.3 Containment),

Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluent, 7.2 Liquid Effluent and 7.3 Radiation Levels and 7.4 Fuel Handling).

EPIPs will contain the following elements.

Chemistry detection of failed fuel.

Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on timeliness of classification of emergency conditions.